Instead of reposting all of the quotes between me and Bilge's discussion
concerning the possibility of observational contradictions of Bohm's
ontology, I will merely let the archives speak for themselves. Instead, I
will give a brief summary of the cogent points I think have been made and
post this follow up reply. The last reply by Bilge has snipped many of the
contradictions I have been pointing out in the discussion, so a review of
the archives would be necessary anyways. This is a part of the thread
"Unobserved Nature is Probabilistic ?", for those with Google Groups or
other newsreaders that don't maintain thread integrity when the subject line
changes.
Bilge maintains:
-- a black box can distinguish between a probabilistic ontology of Nature
and a deterministic ontology of Nature through outcome dependence
** despite my point that such a box must be able to set _all_ initial
conditions or it cannot distinguish chaotic determinism and probability, and
if it is so able (which for Bohm's ontology would imply the machine is able
to violate Heisenberg's theorem) that the machine would indeed show Bohm's
ontology to be deterministic
-- non-relativistic ontologies are a "defect"
** despite my point that this is assuming what is desired to be proved
-- it is legitimate to reference the 2002 paper by Suarez, et al. as
empirical support against Bohm's ontology
** despite my pointing out that the paper is concerned with an ontological
extension of Bohm's theory known as Multisimultaneity which has different
predictions that Bohm's ontological basis
** and despite the fact that in both that paper and earlier papers by
Suarez, the author(s) state quite clearly that Bohm's ontology by itself
gives no different predictions than standard QM
-- and, above all, that I have given no reason why Bilge must believe they
even need to study the theory being debated
** despite the fact that they are tossing out references that presuppose
such a knowledge to interpret correctly
The most unusual thing is that I am being asked to recapitulate arguments
found in the literature as part of a debate, instead of as part of serious
inquiry into knowledge about the ontology. As can be seen by my response in
the "ha ... ha ... ha !" thread on sci.physics, et al., I am willing to show
the basics of the calculations when approached from a serious intellectual
request.
So, for now I will merely give a good list of referrences that detail some
of what I have been maintaining. I hope that future debates point to what
is already developed and actually cast doubt on the claims in that context,
instead of a priori belief in a position.
All of these papers will be from http://www.arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/
The most lucid response to Ghose's claims are found in the paper by Struyve
and de Baere at (0108038).
The entire discussion revolves around the papers by Ghose (0001024, 0103126)
and Golshani and Akhaven (0009040, 0103100, 0103101). However one should
also see the discussions between Marchildon (0007068, 0101132) and Ghose
(0008007, 0102131). Additionally, to see how not understanding the
fundamental nature of the ontologies being tested can lead experimenters
astray, see the Brida, et al. (0206196). That's important, because money
and time were wasted on an experiment that had the improper interpretation
pointed out by Struyve and de Baere, and is one of the reasons why I think
it is essential in science to at least attempt to understand the topic one
is debating by being willing to ask for assistance and persue referrences.
Mistakes can be made, as always. But claims that one doesn't even need to
study something to make accusations, where in the course of events it is
revealed that one hasn't even studied the basics of what one is trying to
disprove, is utterly unscientific.
I am sorry if I am being harsh. It is just when I noticed that some of the
central contradictions I was pointing out were snipped (and not
acknowledged) and a statement about not needing to research anything to make
claims about a theory one was demonstrating a lack of knowledge in, I gave
up the will to continue anymore beyond a recapitulation and some sources.
Also, I must again emphasize the need to look through the Bohm and Hiley
book. Its fairly good at pointing out many of the things discussed and even
shows some of thinking leading to extension of the theory into observable
consequences beyond QM, like Suarez's experiment (which I don't see as a
waste of money like Brida, et al. as it understood its position in the
research programme). Sorry if this does not clarify things without going to
sources, but I don't like the idea of wasting my time without serious
intellectual curiosity.