How can an electron be dimensionless?
Charles Cagle
<Uncl...@hate.spam.net> wrote:
> Chuck Fuller wrote:
> >
> > Let me first of all state that I am not heavily endowed with a
> > propensity for physics. This being said, I would like to ask if
> > anyone can help me understand how an electron can be dimensionless?
>
> All leptons are point particles. High energy scattering experiments
> show no structure at at any accessible scale.
Mr. Fuller,
Uncle Al is a regurgitator. He has read that leptons are point
particles and as self appointed guard to the hallways of consensus he's
sworn to knee-jerk respond if given the proper stimulus. You can count
on him.
The first thing wrong with ordinary conceptions of quantum particles is
that people like Uncle Al still think of them as having the
characteristics of macro objects like baseballs which have discrete
visual trajectories. The first rule (or axiom) of quantum particles is
that:
1) Quantum particles can have motion only with respect to other quantum
particles and not with respect to any arbitrarily contrived coordinate
system.
This single axiom has more meat on its bone that all of modern particle
physics theories put together.
First, it essentially tells you that a single particle in a universe of
n particles can potentially have motion with respect to n-1 other
quantum particles. It can simultaneously prosecute n-1 trajectories.
But a single dynamic relationship between two quanta is not like
ordinary motion in coordinate space but really is much more primitive.
It consists of a time rate of change of a one dimensional relationship
and one can give it the following notation (as an example) <15 m/s> or
>15 m/s<. The outer brackets <> indicate recession, which means the
particles one dimensional relationship is increasing or in the case of
>< it means that the one dimensional relationship is decreasing.
The arrows endow the rate of change with a primitive noncoordinate
system type of vector-ness which is that the particles are either
headed right toward one another or are going in opposite directions
(except without a coordinate system you don't really have a direction).
So, they are either approaching or receding. In either case the arrows
indicate they are going in opposite directions.
At this point I need to introduce the idea of a 'whole particle'.
But let me recap first.
Recall that in a universe with a finite number, n, of particles that
any one particle would have possible relationships between n-1 other
particles.
Using combinatorics we can see that any one particle is connected in
this relationship fashion to n-1 other particles so we can multiply
n*(n-1) and see that there are (n^2)-n relationships. There are
((n^2)-n)/2 pairwise combinations of particles. Every relationship set
consists of two relationships which is composed of a set of two arrows
pointing in opposite directions. So, now, at this point I can
introduce the idea of a 'whole' particle which consists of the n-1
inward pointers (primitive velocity vectors) and n-1 outward pointers.
I call them 'primitive' because they are not related to a coordinate
system but only to a particle. We can call these primitive velocity
relationships 'velocity potentials'. We can see that velocity
potentials come in sets and we can refer to them as a velocity
potential and its conjugate. Now to complete the idea of a whole
particle we also have a quantum scale loop which consists of a velocity
potential and its conjugate so that the whole particle really consists
of n velocity potentials and their conjugates. (See below for why it
became necessary to develop this idea).
Now, if I could split a 'whole particle' into two 'half particles', one
all inward pointing velocity potentials and one all outward pointing
velocity potentials and the two loop components which are conjugates
one of the other then I would have two 'bundles' of velocity
potentials. Such a 'bundle' would constitute the unit charge and the
'field' of a charged particle, by this model of the unit charge would
consist of n-1 velocity potentials.
Geometrically, a charged particle is a loop with n-1 velocity
potentials pointing outward (for a source) or inward (for a sink).
This 'Whole Particle' is an Archetype and one worth paying attention to.
With this model, now you have a means of visualizing the nature of the
unit charge and you can see that the 'field' of a charged particle is
not a continuous structure at all but really consists of a large but
finite number of velocity potentials. A velocity potential which
begins on a source terminates on a sink so that every source is linked
to every sink and vice versa
As I see it there is a continuous symmetry because each velocity
potential has its necessary conjugate. Each half particle is a set of
velocity potentials and there is a one-to-one mapping between sets such
that both the function or relationship between the velocity potential
and its inverse are continuous because they emerge from the continuous
center of momentum frame relationship so the half particles, because
they are continuously related to one another, are a kind of
homeomorphism as I see it. Thus, it doesn't matter if the 'whole'
particle exists at one place or if it split up half existing one place
and half at another place, the point is that each velocity potential
pair remains a correlated pair so that even if a whole particle is
split into a sink and a source they remain completely and continuously
correlated with every other particle in the universe. The idea of a
particle being at a place can be 'replaced' by the correct notion that
it is at all places or at least it is connected to all places.
So, by using this sort of construction, it appears to me that the
esthetic requirement of symmetry is maintained because it is a
continuous function (center of momentum frame, that is). This makes
this model consistent with Emmy Noether's theorem:
"For every continuous symmetry of the laws of physics, there must exist
a conservation law. For every conservation law, there must exist a
continuous symmetry."
But the really nice part about this model is that it tells us that the
continuous symmetry emerges out of motion and that a proper grasp of it
tells us that the origin of charge is motion and hence that the primary
symmetry we should look for in the origin of matter is not matter vs.
antimatter but rather we should recognize that matter comes into
existence as charge conjugate pairs.
So what I have emerging here is a model for a charged particle but it
turns out that there is nothing else to the particle. In other words
the particle is a bundle of these velocity potentials each of which is
really just a pointer to some one other bundle of such velocity
potentials in the universe.
Now, a long time ago, it occurred to me that if this model had anything
at all to do with a reasonable model of charge then it couldn't end
here with the velocity potentials pointing inward and outward from a
point and so I wondered what might be the next minimal structure which
would accommodate other aspects of particles. All that occurred to me
is that the next step would be a line, but not any line, but rather a
closed line. So, if the velocity potentials terminated and originated
at closed lines then we could conceive of equipotential surfaces in
onion layer skins around a closed line and such equipoential surfaces
give us at least the conception of a torus. The torus is composed of
two orthogonal curves. E could lie along the toroidal axis and H could
lie orthogonal to the toroidal axis. Now one has E X H = P and we have
the Poynting vector as a normal to the surface and in fact P then
becomes or already is the normal to the closed line at every point. So
there appears to be a relationship between P and the velocity
potentials at any point. Both of them represent movement which is
normal to the closed line. Integrating the Poynting vector over the
closed surface yields the total power crossing the surface in an
outward sense. This is for a half particle. For a 'whole particle'
if the Poynting vector is the same as the primitive velocity potential
then we have the Poynting vector 'pointing' both inward and outward at
each point. If the Poynting vector represents motion the velocity
potential and its conjugate represent null motion. Now take one more
tiny little step with me and I'll show you how this model also permits
us to unify electromagnetism and gravity. Recall the model of a
'Whole' particle? A quantum loop - a velocity potential and its
conjugate in a small closed loop and with n-1 normals to the loop each
of which is a velocity potential and its conjugate? What we have,
then, is a 'particle' which has a null motion gradient. And that, my
friends, is the unit gravitational charge.
Now it you want lesson number two, let me know.
(Not you Uncle Al, - Your brightness built your ego and your ego makes
you blind) Objectivity = 1/ego
Think more, talk less, Uncle Al.
Charles Cagle
Frodo Morris
> In article <3EDF6D59...@hate.spam.net>, Uncle Al
> <Uncl...@hate.spam.net> wrote:
>
>
>>Chuck Fuller wrote:
>>
>>>Let me first of all state that I am not heavily endowed with a
>>>propensity for physics. This being said, I would like to ask if
>>>anyone can help me understand how an electron can be dimensionless?
>>
>>All leptons are point particles. High energy scattering experiments
>>show no structure at at any accessible scale.
>
>
> Mr. Fuller,
>
> Uncle Al is a regurgitator. He has read that leptons are point
> particles and as self appointed guard to the hallways of consensus he's
> sworn to knee-jerk respond if given the proper stimulus. You can count
> on him.
>
of measurements on electron "size" before you claimed superior knowledge?
The electron does not display any extension at any scale so far probed.
One clue to its having a 'parton' structure would be a non-zero
electric dipole moment. As a quick flick through the PDG review will
tell you, the experimentally determined dipole moment is consistent with
zero to within one sigma.
Some theories guess that the electron may have a finite extension, but
this is on the scale of <<10^-30m, at least fifteen orders of magnitude
smaller than scales current accelerators can probe. The energies
required to examine these scales are orders of magnitude larger than the
GZK cutoff, meaning that even ultra high energy cosmic rays will not
help us explore this regime.
So, a recap: the electron appears to be a point particle. It will
continue to appear to be a point particle until - and if - evidence is
reviewed and published and confirmed showing otherwise.
--
Frodo Morris http://users.ox.ac.uk/~wadh1342
All your bast are belong to us AKA Graham Lee, Wadham College
SpectrumSofts currently on show at URL/speccy/: Speccy@Home SETI Client
Also the home of iloveyou.bas, the first PC virus ported to the ZX82!!!
Y.Porat
> Charles Cagle wrote:
> > In article <3EDF6D59...@hate.spam.net>, Uncle Al
> > <Uncl...@hate.spam.net> wrote:
> >
> >
> >>Chuck Fuller wrote:
> >>
> >>>Let me first of all state that I am not heavily endowed with a
> >>>propensity for physics. This being said, I would like to ask if
> >>>anyone can help me understand how an electron can be dimensionless?
> >>
> >>All leptons are point particles. High energy scattering experiments
> >>show no structure at at any accessible scale.
> >
> >
> > Mr. Fuller,
> >
> > Uncle Al is a regurgitator. He has read that leptons are point
> > particles and as self appointed guard to the hallways of consensus he's
> > sworn to knee-jerk respond if given the proper stimulus. You can count
> > on him.
> >
> Did you ever consider the possibility of looking at experimental results
> of measurements on electron "size" before you claimed superior knowledge?
>
> The electron does not display any extension at any scale so far probed.
> One clue to its having a 'parton' structure would be a non-zero
> electric dipole moment. As a quick flick through the PDG review will
> tell you, the experimentally determined dipole moment is consistent with
> zero to within one sigma.
you dont have to wait for experimental proves to understand
that the electron *is not a point particle*!
just make some use of your brain.
for instance:
a point 'final' particle, cannot emmit something from itself
2 may be you still dont know:
all crystals and metal latice are built of ....
something tyhat has a constant unit length wich is much more than
that 10 exp ...... so small as is 'quated'
it is about 2 angstrom and always with that *exact unchanged length*
it is 'the expansion of Avogadros law from the Gas state
to the solid state'
such and exact and *constant orbital length* which is narow
and longish
cannot ! be done unless it is composed of a conglomeration
of subparticles connected linearily!!
no other easonable explanation for a very constant length
you dont have to accept it
just keep it in memory that Y.Porat told you something like that.
(and dont forget from whom you first heared it (:-))
i suppose thre are too many indications for the electron
not to be a point particle, we have just to pick them up
and collect one to the other to get at least
what is called in the legal world as *at least*
'circumstantial evidemce'
but not for parrots.
all the best
Y.porat
--------------------
Jeff Relf
" ... the electron appears to be a point particle . "
You're such a snob Frodo ! Do you shit marble ?
You take incomplete information
and then you parade it like it was God's own truth .
nightbat
"Y.Porat" wrote:
>
> Frodo Morris <graha...@wadham.ox.invalid.ac.uk> wrote in message news:<bbq2dg$gqa$1...@news.ox.ac.uk>...
> > Charles Cagle wrote:
> > > In article <3EDF6D59...@hate.spam.net>, Uncle Al
> > > <Uncl...@hate.spam.net> wrote:
snip
Porat
nightbat
Hello and sure Porat, very interesting, if the space geometric
background is looked at from a base dominant volume dimension, with c as
the photon wave limit length and all other energy and mass from a
relative or constricted and conserved moving length, that might work.
Because then all mass is conserved length with releasable c squared
compressed pressure counter free length energy contained potential.
It makes perfectly sense that mass constant electron orbital moving
length is free energy under length contraction effect of mass nucleus
composition (strong force). Only when free wave or contracted length
moving particle comes in contact with contracted mass is more outer
shell energy released or captured to position (weak force). The further
length of the mass atom is contracted versus impacting free energy (EM)
or high contracted mass under higher uniform momentum or dominant
directional velocity, then further contraction or length released as sub
mass and free length c energy occurs. Sure, it's all about base volume
dimensional reality and mental understood fixed length understanding and
moving length motion to relative time contraction return to center of
position curved orbits effect (gravity). There is also a point position
fixed upper limit for mass length contracted counter pressure gradient.
Per stellar dynamics of solar masses in normal gravity field uniform
gravitational free fall. (Chandra)
The term length was used 13 times in this reply post to Porat. What does
that infer about the physics term length, oops, 14 times? That it's all
about fixed moving length and counter contracted moving length? That's
it, that's 16 times, enough.
regards,
the nightbat
Gregory L. Hansen
It is God's own truth, the electron does appear to be a point particle!
And we do have complete information on how the electron has appeared so
far in experiment.
Whether the electron really is a point particle is another matter, and
Frodo did mention that.
--
"Is that plutonium on your gums?"
"Shut up and kiss me!"
-- Marge and Homer Simpson
Robert J. Kolker
Jeff Relf wrote:
> You're such a snob Frodo ! Do you shit marble ?
>
> You take incomplete information
>
> and then you parade it like it was God's own truth .
All of our information is incomplete. We have neither the wits nor the
senses to see into the heart of reality. We perceive what we perceive
and we construct interpretations of what we perceive. Some of these
constructions constitute physics.
Bob Kolker
John Anderson
Jeff Relf wrote:
Please cite an experiment that shows that an electron has a
measurablesize.
I'll give you a hint in advance. There isn't one!
John Anderson
Frodo Morris
BTW I parade *nothing* like it's "God's own truth", because 'God' and
'truth' have no place together in the same sentence.
Jeff Relf
" Whether the electron really is a point particle
is another matter , and Frodo did mention that .
You're right ! He covered this quite well in fact .
Maybe I was trying to shake Frodo's tree ... Who knows ?
Jeff Relf
" Care to demonstrate that I'm incorrect ? "
No . I was out of line . Sorry .
Frodo Morris :
" BTW I parade * nothing * like it's ' God's own truth ' ,
because ' God ' and ' truth ' have no place together
in the same sentence . "
That's just an expression ... don't take it so literally .
My only point was that , hopefully ,
we're still learning new things about the electron .
And a thousand years from now , hopefully ,
we'll still be learning new things about the electron .
So let's acknowledge our current ignorance .
Jeff Relf
" All of our information is incomplete .
We have neither the wits nor the senses
to see into the heart of reality .
We perceive what we perceive
and we construct interpretations of what we perceive .
Some of these constructions constitute physics . "
Very well put ... Thanks .
Only I'd add that
We hypothesize in order to fill in the blanks ,
where we lack sufficient perception ,
based on what we believe to be most likely .
Ahmed Ouahi, Architect
........... ...One of the problems facing physicists who sought to apply
general relativity to these newly discovered or hypothetical objects was to
make it compatible with Quantum Mechanics!!!!!!!!!!......... ...
--Stephen Hawking
--
Ahmed Ouahi, Architect
Best Regards!
"Jeff Relf" <____Je...@NCPlus.NET> kirjoitti
viestissä:Xns9394290...@130.133.1.4...
Mark Martin
> So let's acknowledge our current ignorance .
Hey, dude, that's exactly what evreyone's been fruitlessly trying
to help you understand. You haven't spilled the beans on some dirty
little secret. That's at the very core of science, that we're
basically ignorant. It goes for you too. You have no basis upon which
to assert... that incomplete knowledge means that we go with your
emotional problems. Fact is that nature as probablistic arose because
of our increasing database of empirical knowledge. That's what we have
to work with. Your line of reasoning is one of the most arbitrarily
authoritarian I've seen in a while. You've no concept of science. I
think you're the antithesis of a scientist. You're a control freak.
-Mark Martin
Jim
Mark Martin
> Jeff has problems.
>
> Jim
I just now clicked on Relf's name, and it returned 65 pages, with
648 of his posts, from several different groups. What's so telling is
that- this is just since May 15. /:|
-Mark Martin
Jim
Jeff has problems, but boy can he type! :)
Looks like he types all the content he quotes.
Not to mention hitting the space-bar twice every time.
Must have blisters on his thumbs.
Jim
Jeff Relf
" Jeff has problems , but boy can he type ! :) "
If I have all the problems then
why do you have all the complaints ?
Tell me is any of this helps :
I can control who I want to see ...
While You apparently can not !
I can relax and enjoy myself with light conversation ...
While you can not .
I can rank people from -1 to 9 ,
zero is the default score .
Replies get an extra 10 . My posts always get a 100 .
My XNews comes up sorting on this scoring , showing me
only the unread posts with a score of one or better .
Also :
To control Agent's threading preferences , go to :
options > general preferences > message list
At http://tinyurl.com/cnm5 , Don Kirkman writes :
" Agent ( not Free Agent ) also has sorting capability ,
which can override the threading preferences .
Clicking on the column titles in the header pane sorts
headers by the title criterion .
( also available on the Group menu . )
Subject , Author , and Date are toggles ,
and Thread / Size rotate through the choices .
The sort criterion in use is underlined .
If a newsgroup is not threading when you expect it to ,
in Agent first check which column is controlling sorting ,
changing as necessary , and in both programs
double-check your threading preferences . "
Jeff Relf
" I believe Jeff has noticed that he gets spanked
when trying to stay on-topic in s.p ,
and has chosen to do otherwise . "
I don't remember ever being " Spanked " for being
what you'd call " On-Topic " .
Determinism is a valid hypothesis ...
Total proof is not required .
It just says that the observed probabilistic nature of
wave-particles is just that ... observed ... not real .
Do you have a problem with that ?
Paul B. Andersen
"Jeff Relf" <____Je...@NCPlus.NET> skrev i melding
news:Xns9395E6...@130.133.1.4...
> It just says that the observed probabilistic nature of
>
> wave-particles is just that ... observed ... not real .
>
>
> Do you have a problem with that ?
If what is observed is not real, what is then real?
Paul
Jeff Relf
" If what is observed is not real , what is then real ? "
Why can't you distinguish between :
*_1 What is " Observed " Vs. *_2 What is " Real " ?
Are you arguing that our current " Observations "
of wave-particles are the " Real " story ?
As if we'll never discover any new truths about them !?
Mark Martin
> Determinism is a valid hypothesis ...
>
> Total proof is not required .
>
>
> It just says that the observed probabilistic nature of
>
> wave-particles is just that ... observed ... not real .
It's already thoroughly understood that nature is, indeed,
deterministic. If it wasn't then we couldn't speak meaningfully of
nature in the first place. So the question to you is, exactly what do
you mean when you assert that nature is deterministic? Quantum
mechanics itself is determinstic. It makes forecasts of the outcomes
of experiments. It makes claims about what will be observed in the
world. But what's determined in QM isn't the trajectories of billiard
balls. In QM it's not the billiard balls which are the essential
elements of the world.
So the question again is, what PRECISELY do *you* mean by nature
being deterministic? To be meaningful, your concept must be stated
such that it makes a difference as to what will be really found in the
world. Simply asserting that, "Determinsim is a valid hypothesis...
Total proof is not required", means nothing. What do you mean by
determinism, as opposed to the known deterministic character of
nature, and what can you do to demonstrate it? In what way can we
discriminate between yours and another productive hypothesis?
-Mark Martin
Gordon D. Pusch
[...Bunch of blank-verse nonsense sent to /dev/null ...]
I indeed acknowledge that you are suffering from profound ignorance.
(gnus-kill "From" "Jeff Relf")
<*!PLONK!*>
Jeff Relf
[ the idea of ] nature as probabilistic arose because
of our increasing database of empirical knowledge . "
Really ? Unobserved nature is probabilistic ?
Why do you assume that our observations of probabilistic
behaviors of wave-particles describe " Reality " ?
A coin toss seems probabilistic ... that is ...
to the man who doesn't know all of the forces involved .
Does this ignorant man's observations of probabilistic
behaviors describe " Reality " too then ?
Jeff Relf
Jim only manages to type two words : " Priorities noted . "
Good boy Jim ! Tomorrow we'll shoot for three words !
Dare to dream ! ( Jim is a bot ? ... or a small child ? )
Jeff Relf
" What do you mean by determinism ,
as opposed to the known deterministic character
of nature , and what can you do to demonstrate it ? "
I'm talking about total determinism ...
where nature is devoid of intrinsic randomness ...
where nature is immutable ... static ... time is spatial .
While everything suggests that unobserved nature is not random ,
nothing contradicts it !
If you were ignorant of the various forces ,
you'd " Observe " that a coin toss was " Probabilistic " ...
And if you were like the typical scientist today ...
you'd call that this probabilistic behavior " Reality " .
What you would _ Not _ be like is :
Newton , Maxwell, Darwin , Freud , Einstein , Bell etc. ...
all famous determinists .
Mark Martin
> Mark Martin :
>
> " What do you mean by determinism ,
> as opposed to the known deterministic character
> of nature , and what can you do to demonstrate it ? "
>
>
>
> I'm talking about total determinism ...
>
> where nature is devoid of intrinsic randomness ...
>
> where nature is immutable ... static ... time is spatial .
That's not what I asked. Please, go back and read it again.
> While everything suggests that unobserved nature is not random ,
>
> nothing contradicts it !
This is really a foolish statement on your part. The normal
distribution of quantal events is perfectly consistent with a
probablistic mechanics, regardless if it's ultimately found to be
otherwise. That's not what I'd call "everything/nothing".
> If you were ignorant of the various forces ,
>
> you'd " Observe " that a coin toss was " Probabilistic " ...
>
>
> And if you were like the typical scientist today ...
>
> you'd call that this probabilistic behavior " Reality " .
I'd like for you to tell me, exactly what you think the argument is
that QM is indeterministic? I can tell you right off, that it doesn't
amount to "I've never seen such & such, therefore it definitely
doesn't exist." That's a monkey see, monkey do view of how scientists
think, but it's not accurate at all. It's similar to how a lot of
people think they can debunk special realtivity. They say "Scientists
think that nothing travels faster than light, because they've never
seen anything go that fast. How do they know that they won't ever see
something go that fast?" They don't understand the reasoning. Of
course, for all anyone knows, in the future translight phenomena may
be observed. Special relativity is based upon a system of reasons that
lead to c as a limit naturally.
And so it's the same with QM. Physicists don't just say "Well,
I've never seen it happen, so I conclude it never happens." They ask
what the orderliness is in what is seen, and construct a theory that
reproduces the data, and then predicts more than the original data
itself. That's why QM is a good theory, because you can ask it
questions about nature open endedly, and it keeps giving you the right
answers within its domain. There's a system of reasons whereby QM is
said to be probablistic, and it's not what you keep saying it is.
Schrodinger originally constructed his QM wave equation to do exactly
as you describe; to predict the probability of QM events, but not to
portray nature itself as probablistic. But analysis of the whole of
quantum theory produced probability a unexpected result, a result
which Schrodinger himself came to regret. But it doesn't matter that
he regretted it. It's in there just the same.
You also seem to insist that whatever is not known is the
reserved territory of Jeff Relf. Well let's ask if this is legitimate.
Take the case of Area 51. What goes on in there? Most people don't
know what goes on inside, but a number of them know what they *want*
to be going on. They want the government to be hiding UFOs and alien
bodies. Since they have no way of being disproven, they conclude that
it's safe to "know" that, indeed, there are UFOs and aliens in there.
But the objective fact is that they have no knowledge of what's
inside, and they have no justification to insist upon their UFO
supposition any more than they could justify insisting that Snow White
is in there with the seven dwarves. Of course there is something being
done inside, but what's the most reasonable expectation? The only
thing that's justifiable is that there's secret defense research being
done, because we know that this is what can be done, and it's what the
gov' needs such a place for that purpose.
So then, when you say that you can justify micro-determinism only
because observations are discontiuous, it's just Area 51 all over
again. You claim to categorically know what's in between the
observations. The objective fact is that you don't know any better
than anyone else what's in those unmeasured regions of processes. It
could easily be nothing like what you wish it to be. And you have
admitted it yourself, that you adopt micro-determinism as a matter of
faith, rather than any reasoning supported by actual data. That you
have "faith" rather than reasons tells me that you aren't interested
in truth. You have an agenda, an agenda having more to do with how you
fit into society than with being curious about nature. Does it occur
to you that the kind of determinsim you want is already true in QM as
it stands? Of course the orbital path of a planet is deterministic. Of
course humans are psychological machines. Of course, of course, of
course.
> What you would _ Not _ be like is :
>
> Newton , Maxwell, Darwin , Freud , Einstein , Bell etc. ...
>
> all famous determinists .
You're name dropping again. This is pointless. It's utterly
irrelevant. An equally long list of similarly creditable
indeterminists can be provided. You actually defame these peoples'
legacies as scientists by merely speaking their names as some sort of
argument in your favor. And really- Newton, Maxwell and Darwin had no
choice but to be micro-determinists. They were dead before QM was ever
discovered. I doubt that Freud knew anough about QM to even care what
he thought of it. As for Einstein & Bell, well they did a lot more
than you do to support their concepts of nature. They actually knew
enough about QM to meaningfully address both its strengths and its
weaknesses.
-Mark Martin
Gordon D. Pusch
<*!PLONK!*>
Bilge
>Really ? Unobserved nature is probabilistic ?
In all likelyhood, nature at the fundamental level is probabilistic.
>Why do you assume that our observations of probabilistic
>behaviors of wave-particles describe " Reality " ?
>A coin toss seems probabilistic ... that is ...
>to the man who doesn't know all of the forces involved .
You are attempting to address a rather deep question with a superficial
example that presupposes anyone with some intelligence could be confused
by mere appearance.
>Does this ignorant man's observations of probabilistic
>behaviors describe " Reality " too then ?
No, it describes his ignorance. One can perform objective tests to
determine that something is _not_ random. Here is a simple method.
Consider your "experiment" to be a black box which accepts some input and
produces some output. In the case of a coin toss, the input would be all
of the information related to the initial conditions of the toss, like the
mass of the coin, the momentum with which the coin is tossed, the forces
involved, etc. All of the input parameters may be chosen arbitrarily and
varied at will. The output would be either heads or tails. A random
process is then one in which the output is independent of the input.
If it is impossible to know from the input, what the output will be with
better precision than just guessing (i.e., a 50-50 chance in this case),
then the process is random. There is no restriction on what one specifies
for the input, so one is free to specify _anything_ than might influence
the output.
You also cannot assume that there is some aspect which only makes the
output appear random, becaause it isn't necessary to know anything about
how the black box uses the input to produce the output. All that is
necessary is to change the input (like the forces involved), such that
it alters the probability of of getting heads or tails. If it does,
the coin toss isn't random. Obviously, it's possible to specify forces
which _do_ alter the probability of getting heads or tails, so a coin
toss _cannot_ be a true random process. Coin tosses are are only used
as examples of random processes because it's a picturesque way of getting
the point across and most examples qualify that by saying "fair coin
toss". No one believes any real coin toss is actually random.
Jeff Relf
" As for Einstein & Bell , well they did a lot more
than you do to support their concepts of nature .
They actually knew enough about QM to meaningfully address
both its strengths and its weaknesses . "
They did the EPR experiment ...
And they are the hardest of the hard determinists .
( This means they Always believed in the theory that
nature has no _ Intrinsic _ randomness . )
You show a Vulgar Arrogance when you claim to know
something these two guys somehow missed .
Mark Martin
On the contrary, I never claimed to KNOW anything they missed. I
said they did one hell of a lot more than you do, which is to say that
you do nothing but assert, rather than produce an actual, testable
argument. Do you get it yet? You do NOTHING. You really are one
arrogant control freak.
-Mark Martin
Jeff Relf
Which is a _ Lot _ more than what you do .
Hayek
Bilge wrote:
> Jeff Relf:
>
>> Really ? Unobserved nature is probabilistic ?
>
> In all likelyhood, nature at the fundamental level
> is probabilistic.
Good, one, "in all likelyhood" :-).
But I am in a rut here.
Suppose the Quantum world really is without inertia.
That means also : no c speed limit.
Now take an example of a goalkeeper in soccer.
The ball with inertia, he can see it coming, quickly
predict its trajectory and catch it.
It already gets problematic if the ball comes at him at
higher speeds.
But now the ball comes at infinite speeds and any
molecule of air can deflect its trajectory, it has no
inertia. (this is an analogy, so do not go nitpicking)
After so many tries the goalkeeper says "I do not see a
ball, but I know that the chance of it hitting my body
versus the chance it hitting the net is exactly
proportional to the surfaces of my body versus the
surface of the goal.
So, the probability nicely follows from the 'speed
difference' between inertial an non inertial (or less
inertial) sytems. But, having established this, can we
call it deterministic, or not ?
Hayek.
--
The small particles wave at
the big stars and get noticed.
:-)
Gordon D. Pusch
<*!PLONK!*>
Gordon D. Pusch
<*!PLONK!*>
Edward Green
> (gnus-kill "Subject" "A Vulgar Arrogance")
>
> <*!PLONK!*>
This subject was a creation of Relf the Subject Hydra. Other means
must be found to deal with him -- cut off one subject, he spawns five
more.
Paul B. Andersen
"Jeff Relf" <____Je...@NCPlus.NET> skrev i melding news:Xns9396107...@130.133.1.4...
> Confused over terms , Paul B. Andersen asks :
>
> " If what is observed is not real , what is then real ? "
As a response to Jeff Relf's statement:
| It just says that the observed probabilistic nature of
| wave-particles is just that ... observed ... not real .
"observed ... not real"
> Why can't you distinguish between :
>
> *_1 What is " Observed " Vs. *_2 What is " Real " ?
Because my only connection to "reality" is through observation.
> Are you arguing that our current " Observations "
>
> of wave-particles are the " Real " story ?
>
>
> As if we'll never discover any new truths about them !?
No. I am asking a question.
It was:
If what is observed is not real , what is then real ?
Or in other words:
Do you know of any other way to find out about "reality"
than through observations?
Can you name something which is "real .. not observed"?
Paul
Mark Martin
>
> <*!PLONK!*>
An example of the use of Plonk's constant. :)
-Mark Martin
dolores
"Paul B. Andersen" <paul.b....@hia.no> wrote in message
news:bcaqvb$50h$1...@dolly.uninett.no...
>
> "Jeff Relf" <____Je...@NCPlus.NET> skrev i melding
news:Xns9396107...@130.133.1.4...
> Can you name something which is "real .. not observed"?
>
> Paul
1. Dustbin men.
2. Buses.
3. Socks thief.
4. Burglars.
Dolores
>
>
John Anderson
Mark Martin wrote:
> Jeff Relf <____Je...@NCPlus.NET> wrote in message news:<Xns9395E6...@130.133.1.4>...
>
> > Determinism is a valid hypothesis ...
> >
> > Total proof is not required .
> >
> >
> > It just says that the observed probabilistic nature of
> >
> > wave-particles is just that ... observed ... not real .
>
> It's already thoroughly understood that nature is, indeed,
> deterministic. If it wasn't then we couldn't speak meaningfully of
> nature in the first place. So the question to you is, exactly what do
> you mean when you assert that nature is deterministic? Quantum
> mechanics itself is determinstic. It makes forecasts of the outcomes
> of experiments. It makes claims about what will be observed in the
> world. But what's determined in QM isn't the trajectories of billiard
> balls. In QM it's not the billiard balls which are the essential
> elements of the world.
>
> So the question again is, what PRECISELY do *you* mean by nature
> being deterministic?
That is the point. I don't think that most physicists would say thatQM is deterministic. QM does
predict the results of experiments
when the experiments measure the probalistic results of ensembles
of sub-experiments.
I don't think that you want to claim that QM can predict the result
of a single experiment that involves a single object.
If that is what you were trying to say, then I don't think that
you expressed it very well. But I probably didn't do that either.
QM is pretty hard to explain to people who don't understand
physics or math.
John Anderson
>
Edward Green
:-))))
(Sorry -- that was a plagerized laugh ;-).
Mitchell
If someone found something new Jeff you would be offended as you
are bloated with the authority of knowing what these men have said.
It is precisely what they have missed that will pave a pathway
to the future. If you have found what they have missed you are
a messiah.
The future of physics is from those having the insight of finding the
problems left by what has been missed.
Mark Martin
> > So the question again is, what PRECISELY do *you* mean by nature
> > being deterministic?
>
> That is the point. I don't think that most physicists would say thatQM is deterministic. QM does
> predict the results of experiments
> when the experiments measure the probalistic results of ensembles
> of sub-experiments.
>
> I don't think that you want to claim that QM can predict the result
> of a single experiment that involves a single object.
>
> If that is what you were trying to say, then I don't think that
> you expressed it very well. But I probably didn't do that either.
>
> QM is pretty hard to explain to people who don't understand
> physics or math.
>
> John Anderson
Yes of course. I didn't mean that QM will predict an individual
detection event, which not only would be technically wrong, but would
pretty much make the whole issue moot if it were true. QM will
forecast the distribution of many detection events, and that's what I
was trying to get across to him, that the theory is deterministic on
its own terms. Nature is necessarily deterministic in one way or
another in order for dynamic systems to meaningfully undergo changes
of state.
-Mark Martin
Jeff Relf
" Other means must be found to deal with [ Jeff Relf ] . "
This should be a good test of his Gnus skills !
Gnus Vs. XNews .
I rank people from -1 to 9 , zero is the default score .
Replies get an extra 10 . My posts always get a 100 .
My XNews comes up sorting on this scoring , showing me
only the unread posts with a score of one or better .
Jeff Relf
" Do you know of any other way to find out
about ' reality ' than through observations ? "
Yes , theories . Theories are a kind of vision .
Paul :
" Can you name something which
is ' real [ yet ] not observed ' ? "
Yes ... everything that science has yet to discover ...
and infinitely more .
Jeff Relf
" Nature is necessarily deterministic in one way or another
in order for dynamic systems
to meaningfully undergo changes of state . "
Right ... so you're a soft determinist ...
while I'm a Hard Strong determinist .
The only difference between us is our level of conviction .
The Order-Randomness pair is a duality ...
and just like all dualities ...
it's fabricated by some mind somewhere ...
it's not reality .
Unobserved nature is immutable ...
Unobserved time is spatial .
Jeff Relf
Dolores : Open your eyes ... Please !
... You might get squished .
Jeff Relf
" The future of physics is from those having the
insight of finding the problems
left by what has been missed . "
Right , but you must start with the same assumption that
all the great scientists started with , namely :
Total Determinism , i.e. :
The order-randomness duality is local to a mind ...
and a mind is mostly blind .
Unobserved nature doesn't have randomness ... or order .
Haines Brown
> Bilge wrote:
> > Jeff Relf:
> >
> >> Really ? Unobserved nature is probabilistic ?
> >
> > In all likelyhood, nature at the fundamental level
> > is probabilistic.
My contribution to this discussion does not seem to have made it to
the group, and so let me try again. The issue, if I may phrase it a
little differently, is whether a probabilistic causality is de re
natura, that is, is it universal? For reasons I'll not explore here,
this seems one of the most important questions we could possibly
address.
There are particular contexts in which a probabilistic causality might
arise: a) The many-body problem in physics, where the solutions for
equations of motion are non-linear; b) in quantum mechanics, where
causality is inherently probababilistic because the objects concerned
are themselves probabilistic distributions of qualities; c) arising
from this is the Heisenberg indeterminancy principle that an
observation necessarily reduces the object observed, changing it
radically; d) the subjectivity problem that any observation entails
observational hypotheses, so there are no "raw facts"; e) in
thermodynamics, where our concern is to define an aggregate behavior
of motions that cannot be individiually observed.
While each of these domains might point to a probabilistic causality,
none of them are universal. Some involve an observer and so are
special cases; some refer to a specific scale of objects. So I'd like
to propose an argument that suggests that a probabilistic causality
can in fact be considered universal, so that the absence of a
probabilistic causality is limited to marginal or special situations.
My argument presumes the theory of the Big Bang. While I understand
that this theory has its problems, I believe it still represents the
consensus view in lieu of any other generally satisfactory
theory. Therefore it suffices as an axiom. Further, if nature is
fundamentally probabilistic, then that must be a feature of the Big
Bang, when the entire cosmos was in thermodynamic communication.
Roughly and in non-technical terms, the Big Bang started when a highly
improbable virtual state (quantum fluctuation in the perfect vacuum)
became a real state when for some reason it got "hung up"--it became
accidentally constrained by a virtual structure such as a Higgs Field.
While this rough scenario may be shakey, there's some agreement over
its outcome: the universe started out as a highly improbable state
that _by definition_ must hurry back to a more probable
state. Normally this would have been an almost instantaneous return to
the perfect vacuum, but once constrained, virtual matter became real
matter stretched out in time. The universe had come into being and
there could be no instantaneous recovery.
The universe therefore inherits a drive to return to the most probable
state possible--ultimately "heat death." Once real structures exist,
this cosmic dissipation is constrained by them in that they experience
reduced degree of freedom. This reduction means the necessary
emergence of new improbable structures, which in turn further
constrain cosmic dissipation. New structures emerge in the universe
almost as much as old structures dissipate, and the net entropy change
is positive. The universe manifests almost as much a creative
emergence as it does a dying process.
This is the Second Law of Thermodyamics, where adiabatic systems must
move toward a more probable state, but, if constrained also
necessarily give rise to new improbable states and represent what we
call a thermodynamic engine. This tells us three things of great
importance: a) all things by their nature are processes, not bundles
of static qualities, b) causality is by its nature probabilistic, c)
creative emergence is de re natura.
How do we then represent things as processes in our thinking? It seems
to me that what is needed is to define things not only in terms of
their qualities, but also as having a causal connection. It is not
important to specify what is at the other end of that causal
connection or its specific effect other than to ensure the "object" is
a process. What is crucial is to make the causal relation essential,
not accidental.
For example, our explanations often start with a definition of a
static state of things, as a bundles of both essential and accidental
qualities. We then bring these things into a causal relation to see or
predict the uniquivocal effect, treating empirical qualities as
themselves having causal efficacy rather than as merely constraints on
cosmic dissipation, the ultimate engine of change. However, if the
causal relation is taken to be a priori, so that the objects are by
definition processes, then there are principle no static qualities,
and the outcome of interactions must be probabilistic.
My own interest in this issue lies in the area of human behavior: a)
development of a theory of social action that reconciles free will and
determinism thanks to a probabilistic causality, b) an XML
historiographic markup language that represents all facts as
processes, c) a definition of social class as an emergent process
having a causal relation with the means of production, and c) an
explanation of how social processes in the world's past that had no
direct causal relation nevertheless represent a unity. However, these
things are OT for the group, and probably of little interest to
anyone.
--
Haines Brown
bro...@hartford-hwp.com
kb1...@arrl.net
www.hartford-hwp.com
Bilge
>> Bilge wrote:
>> > Jeff Relf:
>> >
>> >> Really ? Unobserved nature is probabilistic ?
>> >
>> > In all likelyhood, nature at the fundamental level
>> > is probabilistic.
>
>My contribution to this discussion does not seem to have made it to
>the group, and so let me try again. The issue, if I may phrase it a
>little differently, is whether a probabilistic causality is de re
>natura, that is, is it universal? For reasons I'll not explore here,
>this seems one of the most important questions we could possibly
>address.
>There are particular contexts in which a probabilistic causality might
>arise: a) The many-body problem in physics, where the solutions for
>equations of motion are non-linear; b) in quantum mechanics, where
>causality is inherently probababilistic because the objects concerned
>are themselves probabilistic distributions of qualities; c) arising
>from this is the Heisenberg indeterminancy principle that an
>observation necessarily reduces the object observed, changing it
>radically; d) the subjectivity problem that any observation entails
>observational hypotheses, so there are no "raw facts"; e) in
>thermodynamics, where our concern is to define an aggregate behavior
>of motions that cannot be individiually observed.
You need to differentiate "chaotic", which arises from non-linearity
(as in the many-body problem) and "probabilistic". Chaotic does not
imply probabilistic, nor vice-versa.
>While each of these domains might point to a probabilistic causality,
>none of them are universal. Some involve an observer and so are
>special cases; some refer to a specific scale of objects. So I'd like
>to propose an argument that suggests that a probabilistic causality
>can in fact be considered universal, so that the absence of a
>probabilistic causality is limited to marginal or special situations.
I think the entropy of black hole pretty much points to probability
as a fundamental feature of the universe. More about this may be
found by searching for bekenstein and entropy.
>My argument presumes the theory of the Big Bang. While I understand
>that this theory has its problems, I believe it still represents the
>consensus view in lieu of any other generally satisfactory
>theory. Therefore it suffices as an axiom. Further, if nature is
>fundamentally probabilistic, then that must be a feature of the Big
>Bang, when the entire cosmos was in thermodynamic communication.
>
>Roughly and in non-technical terms, the Big Bang started when a highly
>improbable virtual state (quantum fluctuation in the perfect vacuum)
>became a real state when for some reason it got "hung up"--it became
>accidentally constrained by a virtual structure such as a Higgs Field.
In the words of alan guth, the universe is the ultimate free lunch.
[...]
>My own interest in this issue lies in the area of human behavior: a)
>development of a theory of social action that reconciles free will and
>determinism thanks to a probabilistic causality, b) an XML
>historiographic markup language that represents all facts as
>processes, c) a definition of social class as an emergent process
>having a causal relation with the means of production, and c) an
>explanation of how social processes in the world's past that had no
>direct causal relation nevertheless represent a unity. However, these
>things are OT for the group, and probably of little interest to
>anyone.
They are of interest to lots of people, but at the moment are beyond
the ability of physics to address.
Bilge
>
> > Jeff Relf:
> >
> >> Really ? Unobserved nature is probabilistic ?
> >
> > In all likelyhood, nature at the fundamental level
> > is probabilistic.
>
>
>Good, one, "in all likelyhood" :-).
>But I am in a rut here.
Then stop rutting.
>Now take an example of a goalkeeper in soccer.
>The ball with inertia, he can see it coming, quickly
>predict its trajectory and catch it.
>
>It already gets problematic if the ball comes at him at
>higher speeds.
>
>But now the ball comes at infinite speeds and any
>molecule of air can deflect its trajectory, it has no
>inertia. (this is an analogy, so do not go nitpicking)
>
>After so many tries the goalkeeper says "I do not see a
>ball, but I know that the chance of it hitting my body
>versus the chance it hitting the net is exactly
>proportional to the surfaces of my body versus the
>surface of the goal.
There is a grave mistake in your analogy. What if the "goal"
is a charge, the "goalkeeper" is a neutrino and the "ball" is a
photon? In that case, the "goalkeeper" will never see the "ball",
under any circumstances, since neutrinos do not interact with
photons. The "ball" will go "through" the "goalkeeper" as if
it didn't exist, every time. (why do you think a photon gets
stopped at the earth's surface while a neutrino hardly even
notices the earth exists?)
dolores
"Jeff Relf" <____Je...@NCPlus.NET> wrote in message
> Dolores suggests that " Buses " are real but not observed ?
I havent seen one single bus all day......all week......all year!!
>
>
>
> Dolores : Open your eyes ... Please !
>
> ... You might get squished .
What!....By a bus....not likely!
Jeff Relf
In answer to my request that you watch the buses ,
you say : " What ! ... By a bus ... not likely ! "
You must not do much walking in the city .
As dusty , noisy , and generally obnoxious as they are ,
you must pay close attention to the bus' proximity ...
If you're walking ,
and you don't identify what
cars are hidden behind it ... Splat !
nightbat
Bilge wrote:
>
> Haines Brown:
> >Hayek <hay...@nospam.xs4all.nl> writes:
> >> Bilge wrote:
> >> > Jeff Relf:
> >> >
> >> >> Really ? Unobserved nature is probabilistic ?
> >> >
> >> > In all likelyhood, nature at the fundamental level
> >> > is probabilistic.
> >
> >My contribution to this discussion does not seem to have made it to
> >the group, and so let me try again. The issue, if I may phrase it a
> >little differently, is whether a probabilistic causality is de re
> >natura, that is, is it universal? For reasons I'll not explore here,
> >this seems one of the most important questions we could possibly
> >address.
>
> Bilge
> It happens to be a question that is being addressed.
nightbat
Sure, that's what all those sci.physics TOE theories are about.
And one of the most important questions we could possibly address, I
don't know, I rate World peace pretty high up on the list. But since you
asked,
>
> >There are particular contexts in which a probabilistic causality might
> >arise: a) The many-body problem in physics, where the solutions for
> >equations of motion are non-linear; b) in quantum mechanics, where
> >causality is inherently probababilistic because the objects concerned
> >are themselves probabilistic distributions of qualities; c) arising
> >from this is the Heisenberg indeterminancy principle that an
> >observation necessarily reduces the object observed, changing it
> >radically; d) the subjectivity problem that any observation entails
> >observational hypotheses, so there are no "raw facts"; e) in
> >thermodynamics, where our concern is to define an aggregate behavior
> >of motions that cannot be individiually observed.
>
> Bilge
> You need to differentiate "chaotic", which arises from non-linearity
> (as in the many-body problem) and "probabilistic". Chaotic does not
> imply probabilistic, nor vice-versa.
nightbat
Well the quantum can appear to be probabilistic especially when
trying to quantify or deduce to lowest base invisible energy state. Like
when you lose your set of car keys, you know they are around but just
can't seem to find them.
>
> >While each of these domains might point to a probabilistic causality,
> >none of them are universal. Some involve an observer and so are
> >special cases; some refer to a specific scale of objects. So I'd like
> >to propose an argument that suggests that a probabilistic causality
> >can in fact be considered universal, so that the absence of a
> >probabilistic causality is limited to marginal or special situations.
>
> Bilge
> I think the entropy of black hole pretty much points to probability
> as a fundamental feature of the universe. More about this may be
> found by searching for bekenstein and entropy.
nightbat
Sure, like death and taxes, the black hole where a lot of your
money goes until you're let off the hook at the definite outcome but
indeterminate time.
>
> >My argument presumes the theory of the Big Bang. While I understand
> >that this theory has its problems, I believe it still represents the
> >consensus view in lieu of any other generally satisfactory
> >theory. Therefore it suffices as an axiom. Further, if nature is
> >fundamentally probabilistic, then that must be a feature of the Big
> >Bang, when the entire cosmos was in thermodynamic communication.
> >
> >Roughly and in non-technical terms, the Big Bang started when a highly
> >improbable virtual state (quantum fluctuation in the perfect vacuum)
> >became a real state when for some reason it got "hung up"--it became
> >accidentally constrained by a virtual structure such as a Higgs Field.
>
> Bilge
> In the words of alan guth, the universe is the ultimate free lunch.
nightbat
Si Fi theorists are fun, if they can't figure out the real
universe they have, they just make up new ones. And the free lunch they
are after is usually at your gullible expense.
>
> [...]
>
> >My own interest in this issue lies in the area of human behavior: a)
> >development of a theory of social action that reconciles free will and
> >determinism thanks to a probabilistic causality, b) an XML
> >historiographic markup language that represents all facts as
> >processes, c) a definition of social class as an emergent process
> >having a causal relation with the means of production, and c) an
> >explanation of how social processes in the world's past that had no
> >direct causal relation nevertheless represent a unity. However, these
> >things are OT for the group, and probably of little interest to
> >anyone.
>
> Bilge
> They are of interest to lots of people, but at the moment are beyond
> the ability of physics to address.
nightbat
Don't be so quick Bilge to underestimate your brilliance and of
your good fellows, and in the interest of Mr. Brown's most important
felt asked question, the nightbat " Continuing Universe Rule " humbly
addresses same and uses only one universe to do it. For a Psychology
guy, Mr. Brown, you have a very elegant way of presenting your inquiries
into the most noble World class sci.physics fellow Aluminati group.
the nightbat
Hayek
Bilge wrote:
The purpose of an analogy is to explain something. The
purpose of an analogy is not to find the seven errors in it.
Hayek
Haines Brown
The points you raised give no hint that you disagree with my
conclusions. So let me state them again somewhat more expansively:
1. All things are essentially processes rather than bundles of
static properties. A system's properties represent the
effect of its parent system's constrained degrees of
freedom - that is, a causal relations are primary;
qualities are a secondary effect.
2. The basic engine of all emergent change is environmental
dissipation (second law of thermodynamics). If there is a
constraint on a system's degrees of freedom, novel
strurctures emerge from it. So empirical properties
(structures) become effects rather than causes.
3. In principle, all causality is probabilistic, although in
some situations can be treated as unequivocal to facilitate
an approximate answer. The probabilistic nature of
causality reconciles freedom and determinism.
dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) writes:
> I think the entropy of black hole pretty much points to probability
> as a fundamental feature of the universe. More about this may be
> found by searching for bekenstein and entropy.
>
> In the words of alan guth, the universe is the ultimate free lunch.
OK, so my next question is, am I preaching to the choir here? That is,
a) to what extent do the three propositions above represent the
consensus of the scientific community, and b) how would one decide if
they do represent the consensus?
> >My own interest in this issue lies in the area of human behavior:
> >a) development of a theory of social action that reconciles free
> >will and determinism thanks to a probabilistic causality, b) an
> >XML historiographic markup language that represents all facts as
> >processes, c) a definition of social class as an emergent process
> >having a causal relation with the means of production, and c) an
> >explanation of how social processes in the world's past that had
> >no direct causal relation nevertheless represent a unity. However,
> >these things are OT for the group, and probably of little interest
> >to anyone.
>
> They are of interest to lots of people, but at the moment are beyond
> the ability of physics to address.
True, they all come under what we might call historical sociology or
perhaps political economy. Different levels of reality emerge from
more univeral/general levels, and as a result each emergent level must
incorporate the general laws of its parent, but also go on to develop
behaviors that are novel and distinguish the emergent level from its
parent.
Now just what is the most universal science is debated. Some would
suggest thermodynamcs (Tisza), others might suggest quantum
mechanics. But in any case, the most universal level represents a
physical reality. So while the issues I raised probably only can be
addressed in the context of historical sociology, it must be with a
full appreciation of the material conditions imposed by physics.
galathaea
> Jeff Relf:
>
> >Really ? Unobserved nature is probabilistic ?
>
> In all likelyhood, nature at the fundamental level is probabilistic.
>
> >behaviors of wave-particles describe " Reality " ?
>
> >A coin toss seems probabilistic ... that is ...
> >to the man who doesn't know all of the forces involved .
>
> You are attempting to address a rather deep question with a superficial
> example that presupposes anyone with some intelligence could be confused
> by mere appearance.
>
> >Does this ignorant man's observations of probabilistic
> >behaviors describe " Reality " too then ?
>
> No, it describes his ignorance. One can perform objective tests to
> determine that something is _not_ random. Here is a simple method.
> Consider your "experiment" to be a black box which accepts some input and
> produces some output. In the case of a coin toss, the input would be all
> of the information related to the initial conditions of the toss, like the
> mass of the coin, the momentum with which the coin is tossed, the forces
> involved, etc. All of the input parameters may be chosen arbitrarily and
> varied at will. The output would be either heads or tails. A random
> process is then one in which the output is independent of the input.
>
> If it is impossible to know from the input, what the output will be with
> better precision than just guessing (i.e., a 50-50 chance in this case),
> then the process is random. There is no restriction on what one specifies
> for the input, so one is free to specify _anything_ than might influence
> the output.
>
> You also cannot assume that there is some aspect which only makes the
> output appear random, becaause it isn't necessary to know anything about
> how the black box uses the input to produce the output. All that is
> necessary is to change the input (like the forces involved), such that
> it alters the probability of of getting heads or tails. If it does,
> the coin toss isn't random. Obviously, it's possible to specify forces
> which _do_ alter the probability of getting heads or tails, so a coin
> toss _cannot_ be a true random process. Coin tosses are are only used
> as examples of random processes because it's a picturesque way of getting
> the point across and most examples qualify that by saying "fair coin
> toss". No one believes any real coin toss is actually random.
And if you put _all_ the parameters for a system into Bohm's ontology,
you get deterministic output as well, which completely matches
experimental prediction to that of any other QM interpretation. I
thouhgt, since Relf does mention Bell and others in his posts, that
this is precisely his point. Things just appear random.
Dennis McCarthy
> Jeff Relf:
>
> >Really ? Unobserved nature is probabilistic ?
>
> In all likelyhood, nature at the fundamental level is probabilistic.
>
> >Why do you assume that our observations of probabilistic
> >behaviors of wave-particles describe " Reality " ?
>
> >A coin toss seems probabilistic ... that is ...
> >to the man who doesn't know all of the forces involved .
>
> You are attempting to address a rather deep question with a superficial
> example that presupposes anyone with some intelligence could be confused
> by mere appearance.
>
> >Does this ignorant man's observations of probabilistic
> >behaviors describe " Reality " too then ?
>
> No, it describes his ignorance. One can perform objective tests to
> determine that something is _not_ random. Here is a simple method.
> Consider your "experiment" to be a black box which accepts some input and
> produces some output. In the case of a coin toss, the input would be all
> of the information related to the initial conditions of the toss, like the
> mass of the coin, the momentum with which the coin is tossed, the forces
> involved, etc. All of the input parameters may be chosen arbitrarily and
> varied at will. The output would be either heads or tails. A random
> process is then one in which the output is independent of the input.
Dennis: This innocent analogy presupposes that we know and can measure
the all the (hidden) variables of, say, radioactive decay to the same
extent that we can for coin tosses.
>
> If it is impossible to know from the input, what the output will be with
> better precision than just guessing (i.e., a 50-50 chance in this case),
> then the process is random. There is no restriction on what one specifies
> for the input, so one is free to specify _anything_ than might influence
> the output.
>
> You also cannot assume that there is some aspect which only makes the
> output appear random, becaause it isn't necessary to know anything about
> how the black box uses the input to produce the output. All that is
> necessary is to change the input (like the forces involved), such that
> it alters the probability of of getting heads or tails. If it does,
> the coin toss isn't random.
Dennis: Well, let's take a hypothetical slot machine instead -- which
scientists, at the moment, have no way of opening or peering inside.
No alteration of input (it doesn't matter how hard you pull the lever
down) changes the statistics of the output. In such a situation, the
more fanciful types would probably assume the situation is purely
random (and once again gleefully declare the death of deterministic
materialism).
Obviously, it's possible to specify forces
> which _do_ alter the probability of getting heads or tails, so a coin
> toss _cannot_ be a true random process. Coin tosses are are only used
> as examples of random processes because it's a picturesque way of getting
> the point across and most examples qualify that by saying "fair coin
> toss". No one believes any real coin toss is actually random.
It's hard to believe anyone thinks anything is "actually random." But
there it is.
Bilge
>news:<slrnbefkn4....@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net>...
>
>you get deterministic output as well, which completely matches
>experimental prediction to that of any other QM interpretation.
No, you don't.
see: Suarez, et al, phys rev lett 88, 120404 (2002)
ghose, arxiv:quant-ph/0001024
>I thouhgt, since Relf does mention Bell and others in his posts, that
>this is precisely his point. Things just appear random.
It's possible to distinguish a causal process from a random one
via the black-box analysis I described. If you cannot do so, then
the causality is merely an illusion with no physical import.
Jeff Relf
" And if you put _ all _ the parameters for a system
into Bohm's ontology , you get deterministic output as well ,
which completely matches experimental prediction to that
of any other QM interpretation . "
As always , Galathaea , I appreciate your input on this topic .
But I think I have my own ontology .
In a way , an ontology is an examination of the examiner :
From Dictionary.COM , Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary ,
(c) 1996, 1998 , " Ontology " is :
" The metaphysical study of the nature of being and existence . "
From the exact same source as above , " Meta- " is :
" Prefix meaning one level of description higher .
If X is some concept then meta-X is data about ,
or processes operating on , X . "
So my ontology ( my interpretation of QM ) is simply this :
For the last thousand years or so ,
it's been very useful to believe that
pure nature is immutable ...
further , this is thee most likely pure reality .
Jeff Relf
" It's hard to believe anyone thinks anything is
I'm always surprised by this too ...
These " Positivists " are everywhere !
_ Pure _ nature is obviously immutable ...
a least it's obvious to me ...
It's the most likely _ Pure _ reality .
Mark Martin
Why would it be beyond imagination for any events to be randomly
generated? As you say, we can't observe the whole cosmos to indefinite
range & precision. So how would any mere mortal know for sure that
anything has a continuously tracible history attached to it? That's
just a tacit assumption on your part. You see, the real scientists
already know perfectly well that people are just plain ignorant, and
that theories are for our benefit, not nature's, and that at any time
you might get 'round a corner and, WHAM!, nothing appears the way it
did ten minutes ago. That's precisely what has happened a number of
times in the history of exploration, including the Copernican
revolution, and when quantum mechanics was discovered, just to name a
couple of the best known cases.
The paradigm of strong determinism is just that, a paradigm. Nature
is what it is what it is what it is. If one is actually curious about
nature, as opposed to just trying to authorise some manifesto of human
nature, then you allow evidence itself to take the lead and you follow
wherever it goes. It's not always flattering, but it can be satisfying
to have learned from nature just the same.
-Mark Martin
galathaea
> galathaea:
> >dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) wrote in message
> >news:<slrnbefkn4....@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net>...
>
> >
> >And if you put _all_ the parameters for a system into Bohm's ontology,
> >you get deterministic output as well, which completely matches
> >experimental prediction to that of any other QM interpretation.
>
> No, you don't.
>
> see: Suarez, et al, phys rev lett 88, 120404 (2002)
> ghose, arxiv:quant-ph/0001024
Multisimultaneous interpretations are an additional assumption beyond
the foundational Bohm interpretation. They suffer from some of the
same problems as the empty wave guide interpretations, in particular
having different predictions than QM (which at least show that the
theory is fertile, even though the theoretical births have so far been
stillborn). The foundational Bohm interpretation differs in nor
respect from the predictions of QM, as it is merely a reinterpretation
of the same equations in a deterministic form.
> >I thouhgt, since Relf does mention Bell and others in his posts, that
> >this is precisely his point. Things just appear random.
>
> It's possible to distinguish a causal process from a random one
> via the black-box analysis I described. If you cannot do so, then
> the causality is merely an illusion with no physical import.
Deterministic QM is not distinguished from other deterministic systems
by such a black box. One must merely know the exact quantities of all
initial conditions and one gets predictable output. If one is not
allowed to know all such initial conditions, the result is similar to
a deterministic chaotic system, where no probabilities are
fundamental.
Jeff Relf
and you follow wherever it goes . "
Everything supports the theory that Pure nature is
devoid of any intrinsic order-randomness duality ...
Noting contradicts it .
This " Credo " has always been
the main pillar of all the sciences .
Bilge
>dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) wrote in
>message news:<slrnbenvpi....@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net>...
>> galathaea:
>> >dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) wrote in message
>> >news:<slrnbefkn4....@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net>...
>>
>> >
>> >And if you put _all_ the parameters for a system into Bohm's ontology,
>> >you get deterministic output as well, which completely matches
>> >experimental prediction to that of any other QM interpretation.
>>
>> No, you don't.
>>
>> see: Suarez, et al, phys rev lett 88, 120404 (2002)
>> ghose, arxiv:quant-ph/0001024
>
>Multisimultaneous interpretations are an additional assumption beyond
>the foundational Bohm interpretation.
Not really. The experiment only addresses multisimultaneity to
the extent that multisimultaneity attempts to solve a basic problem
with bohmian mechanics in a relativitic context. The problem still
exists and the experiment is much more broadly applicable since it
directly addresses the issue of a preferred frame of reference and
the unique time ordering such a reference implies for the polarization
measurements of an epr pair. Since bohmian mechanics attempts to
provide a causal relationship between the measurents, there must be
a unique time ordering to the measurement of the polarizations
in the two moving frames. The multisimultaneity model does not factor
into that, but the experiment does rule out the notion that the
time ordering is unique in any inertial frame.
>They suffer from some of the same problems as the empty wave guide
>interpretations, in particular having different predictions than QM
>(which at least show that the theory is fertile, even though the
>theoretical births have so far been stillborn). The foundational
>Bohm interpretation differs in nor respect from the predictions of QM,
>as it is merely a reinterpretation of the same equations in a
>deterministic form.
The equations are _not_ the same. In particular, the so-called
guiding equation in bohmian mechanics has a physical interpetation
which is imcompatible with the interpretation of standard quantum
theory. Bohmian mechanics relies on an additional assumption, namely
the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, in order to assert _statistical_
equivalence. Bohm himself allowed for the possibility of distinguishing
between the interpretations. He states in his first paper on the
subject that the impetus for developing the theory was to provide
an alternative interpretation, which is testable, in principle.
You apparently didn't read the second article referenced, in which
such a test is described. The quantum equilibrium hypothesis cannot
merely be a magic statement that wipes out the consequences of the
ontology by declaring them non-existent.
>> It's possible to distinguish a causal process from a random one
>> via the black-box analysis I described. If you cannot do so, then
>> the causality is merely an illusion with no physical import.
>
>Deterministic QM is not distinguished from other deterministic systems
>by such a black box.
Sure it is. There is _no_ arithemtic procedure which can result in
a random distribution, so that in principle, _any_ deterministic system
must produce a distribution which differs from one which is random.
If the output of the black box depends _in__any__way_ on _any_ input,
then in principle, one can alter the input to show the dependence.
>One must merely know the exact quantities of all initial conditions
>and one gets predictable output.
That is not true. One needs only to find _some_ input upon which the
output depends. Once all of the dependence upon the input is removed,
then either the output never changes for a given input or else the
there exists an inherent randomness.
>If one is not allowed to know all such initial conditions, the result
>is similar to a deterministic chaotic system, where no probabilities are
>fundamental.
It's not similar. Deterministic chaotic systems are non-ergodic and
characterized by having more degrees of freedom than conserved quantities.
Quantum mechanics is ergodic in the standard interpretation and all
of the information in the system is obtained from a complete set of
commuting observables. For example, two particles in a singlet state
are a single system with total S = |s1 - s2|. The system is non-decomp-
osable.
This is not the case with the bohmian description. Bohmian mechanics
asserts only _statistical_ equivalence to stamdard quantum theory.
Because the individual particles are distinct and follow well defined
trajectories. The bohmian system is therefore, decomposable and in
fact, the decomposability into distinct particles with well-defined
trajectories, is what distinguishes bohmian mechanics from standard
quantum theory. The decomposability means that bohmian mechanics is
not ergodic.
The quantum equilibrium hypothesis does not magically extend to the
interpretation of identical particles by asserting statistical
equivalence to the probabilistic interpretation of the schroedinger
equation. The single particle wavefunctions of a system of particles
satisfies the schroedinger equation, whether or not the particles are
identical. The assumption in bohmian mechanics is that this equivalence
holds regardless of how the physical solutions are interpreted in
standard quantum mechanics. That does not follow.
In standard quantum mechanics, the single particle wavefunctions
for identical (fermions) bosons are (anti-)symmeterized into a
_single_ wavefunction which is _interpreted_ to mean the system
is physically non-decomposable into its constituents. Standard qauntum
theory interprets this composition as a _single_, indecomposable object.
This obviously conflicts with bohmian ontology, which insists that
the object really consists of those constituents, each of which really
have positions and trajectories. The statistics are obviously different
for fermions, bosons and classical particles, but the quantum equilibrium
hypothesis does not add any additional interpretation that guarantees
bohmian mechanics can interpret this differently and still not make
different predictions. The quantum equilibrium hypotheis does not say
anything more about identical particles than does the schroedinger
equation.
For a 2 particle, (fermionic) bosonic wavefunction, written as
\Psi_ab(x1,x2,t) = (\phi_a(x1,t)\phi_b(x2,t) +/-
\phi_a(x2,t)\phi_b(x1,t))
Nothing in the quantum equilibrium hypothesis guarantees that the
ontology of bohmian mechanics can be maintained while simultaneously
asserting statistical equalence to standard quantum theory vice versa.
The second article I referenced gives an explicit case in which the
trajectories calculated from such a wavefunction do not make the same
predictions by virtue of imposing the bosonic symmetry and a geometric
symmetry in the detector configuration.
Personally, I would go further and say that the entropy alone is
sufficient to distinguish between the two systems and the requirement of
proper boltzmann counting rules out bohmian mechanics. It is not
necessary to be able to determine the bohmian trajectories as a
practical matter or even in principle. The additional degrees of freedom
that result from the mere _existence_ of particles having distinct
positions and trajectories should be present in the entropy and it is
not. That was the entire reasoning behind the interpretation of
identical particles as single quantum state in the standard
interpretation.
Mark Martin
Not everything. Absolute determinism doesn't have a blank check. In
case you never noticed it, this whole dabate is made possible by the
very thing you claim makes it obviously true, our functional ignorance
of 99.999...9% of all the stuff going on in the Universe. If Jeff Relf
can't trace the trajectories of all those field excitations, then that
sure doesn't mean that he can know one way or the other. Jeff Relf is
as ignorant as anyone else, and is saddled with the same statistical
data as everyone else. But the fact is, that the stats don't
categorically contradict micro-determinism. They fit right into a
normal distribution. The question is unanswered, except perhaps to
you. But you have an agenda other than basic curiosity.
And as I said before, the "credo" is only a paradigm. Paradigms can
change. That's what happened when QM was discovered. (In this case, it
was made more sophisticated.) The paradigm will very likely change
again, and again.
-Mark Martin
galathaea
Take a quote from Suarez's 2001 paper outlining his program:
"The first attempt to cast nonlocality into a temporal
scheme has been Bohm's theory [6]. It uses a unique
preferred frame or absolute time, in which one event is
caused by some earlier event by means of instantaneous
action at a distance. This description makes the same
predictions as Quantum Mechanics, and the assumed instantaneous
influences cannot be used for superluminal
communication. The assumption of one preferred frame
has been invoked recently as the most natural way to incorporate
quantum nonlocality [8]. Nevertheless, if one
tries to cast nonlocal causality into only one preferred
frame it is not more reasonable to connect a "cause"
event to an "effect" event in that frame rather than in
some other frame. Effectively a single preferred frame
("quantum ether") is "experimentally indistinguishable"
[1]: The predictions would remain the same if one assumes
that the preferred frame is a virtual entity changing
from experiment to experiment. One is tempted to
think that Bohm introduces absolute time just because
he wishes to justify a causal description, but in the end,
an untraceable "quantum ether" is essentially the same
as deciding arbitrarily which event depends on which
one. What is more, in the particular case, possible in
principle, of both measurements taking place at exactly
the same time in the preferred frame, the only way of
establishing which event depends on which is by arbitrary
decision. Actually Bohmian Mechanics and any
theory using only one preferred frame, can be considered
a causal description but not a real temporal one.
Work in recent years proposed to imbed nonlocality in
a real relativistic time ordering by using several relevant
frames. The main motivation of such a proposal is to create
an experimental test allowing us to decide whether
nonlocal influences can be measured by means of several
real clocks. The result is a nonlocal description called
Multisimultaneity or Relativistic Nonlocality..."
Note how he makes it clear the distinction he is making. Although some of
philosophical distinctions are not those normally made (his idea of
causality versus temporality is quite controversial, for example, and not by
any means accepted universally), even he agrees that Bohm's ontology in and
of itself is untestable.
> >They suffer from some of the same problems as the empty wave guide
> >interpretations, in particular having different predictions than QM
> >(which at least show that the theory is fertile, even though the
> >theoretical births have so far been stillborn). The foundational
> >Bohm interpretation differs in nor respect from the predictions of QM,
> >as it is merely a reinterpretation of the same equations in a
> >deterministic form.
>
> The equations are _not_ the same. In particular, the so-called
> guiding equation in bohmian mechanics has a physical interpetation
> which is imcompatible with the interpretation of standard quantum
> theory. Bohmian mechanics relies on an additional assumption, namely
> the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, in order to assert _statistical_
> equivalence. Bohm himself allowed for the possibility of distinguishing
> between the interpretations. He states in his first paper on the
> subject that the impetus for developing the theory was to provide
> an alternative interpretation, which is testable, in principle.
> You apparently didn't read the second article referenced, in which
> such a test is described. The quantum equilibrium hypothesis cannot
> merely be a magic statement that wipes out the consequences of the
> ontology by declaring them non-existent.
I read both articles and earlier referrences. I've read Bohm's papers as
well. I do understand that Bohm wanted to create a theory that could be
tested, much as deBroglie had done. However, the great understanding that
came from Bohm's paper was that one did not require distinct predictions to
give a deterministic theory of QM, which had been the understanding of many
physicists who had misinterpreted von Neumann's earlier "no go" theorem.
Bohm and Hiley go over the possibilities in greater detail in their book,
showing both the equivalence that one may arrive at in the ontology as well
as potential extensions to the theory that could be testable.
> >> It's possible to distinguish a causal process from a random one
> >> via the black-box analysis I described. If you cannot do so, then
> >> the causality is merely an illusion with no physical import.
> >
> >Deterministic QM is not distinguished from other deterministic systems
> >by such a black box.
>
> Sure it is. There is _no_ arithemtic procedure which can result in
> a random distribution, so that in principle, _any_ deterministic system
> must produce a distribution which differs from one which is random.
> If the output of the black box depends _in__any__way_ on _any_ input,
> then in principle, one can alter the input to show the dependence.
True. And such a dependence is possible in deterministic QM.
> >One must merely know the exact quantities of all initial conditions
> >and one gets predictable output.
>
> That is not true. One needs only to find _some_ input upon which the
> output depends. Once all of the dependence upon the input is removed,
> then either the output never changes for a given input or else the
> there exists an inherent randomness.
True. If one knows completely the position of the particle and the exact
form of the quantum potential for the entire system, deterministic QM gives
a single result.
> >If one is not allowed to know all such initial conditions, the result
> >is similar to a deterministic chaotic system, where no probabilities are
> >fundamental.
>
> It's not similar. Deterministic chaotic systems are non-ergodic and
> characterized by having more degrees of freedom than conserved quantities.
> Quantum mechanics is ergodic in the standard interpretation and all
> of the information in the system is obtained from a complete set of
> commuting observables. For example, two particles in a singlet state
> are a single system with total S = |s1 - s2|. The system is non-decomp-
> osable.
>
> This is not the case with the bohmian description. Bohmian mechanics
> asserts only _statistical_ equivalence to stamdard quantum theory.
> Because the individual particles are distinct and follow well defined
> trajectories. The bohmian system is therefore, decomposable and in
> fact, the decomposability into distinct particles with well-defined
> trajectories, is what distinguishes bohmian mechanics from standard
> quantum theory. The decomposability means that bohmian mechanics is
> not ergodic.
In what way decomposable? Are you claiming the quantum potential is
decomposable?
But this is an old argument that does not work. The solution is found in
the idea that the quantum potential is exactly what enforces the equivalence
between entropies. When one attempts decompositions of entangled quantum
potentials, one arrives at the same solution forms as found in standard QM
decompositions, ie. extended probabilities. The second paper you mention
performs the same error in calculation seen in early attempts at
decomposition theorems in standard QM interpretations. And such
decompositions give the same unphysical results.
Jeff Relf
" The question is unanswered , except perhaps to you ... "
... and to Einstein , to Newton , to John Bell , etc. .
Bilge
>"Bilge" wrote:
>> Not really. The experiment only addresses multisimultaneity to
>> the extent that multisimultaneity attempts to solve a basic problem
>> with bohmian mechanics in a relativitic context. The problem still
>> exists and the experiment is much more broadly applicable since it
>> directly addresses the issue of a preferred frame of reference and
>> the unique time ordering such a reference implies for the polarization
>> measurements of an epr pair. Since bohmian mechanics attempts to
>> provide a causal relationship between the measurents, there must be
>> a unique time ordering to the measurement of the polarizations
>> in the two moving frames. The multisimultaneity model does not factor
>> into that, but the experiment does rule out the notion that the
>> time ordering is unique in any inertial frame.
>
>Take a quote from Suarez's 2001 paper outlining his program:
The paper I referenced was from 2002. Let me take a few quotes
from that one, since it contains experimental data.
Fisrt, the authors describe bohm's model and note the following with
regard to the time ordering of events (such as the polarization
measurements of an epr pair):
"Further if one assumes a priveleged reference frame (e.g., the
cosmic ray background radiation) determines the time ordering,
then [bohm's] model is self-consistent. However, when time is
relative as in special relativity, it is ambiguous. Indeed, it
is then no longer defined which measurement modifies the wave first,
and which particle is then guided."
So, first off, multisimultaneity is an attempt to remedy a defect
that exists in bohm's model. It does not introduce any defects that
weren't already there. Whatever applies to multisimultaneity also
applies to bohmian mechanics, short of someone having a remedy to
explain the data. However, the experiment is quite general. In
the concluding remarks, the authors go on to summarize the results
of the data and say:
"The results stress the oddness of quantum correlations. Not only
are they independent of the distance, but also it seems impossible
to cast them in any real time ordering. Hence one cannot maintain
any causal explanation in which an earlier event influences a later
one by arbitrarily fast communication. In this sense, quantum correlations
are a basic (i.e., primary) concept, not a secondary concept reducible
to that of causality between events. Quantum correlations are directly
caused by the quantum state in such a way that one event cannot be
considered a `cause' and the other the `effect'."
[...]
>decision. Actually Bohmian Mechanics and any
>theory using only one preferred frame, can be considered
>a causal description but not a real temporal one.
>Work in recent years proposed to imbed nonlocality in
>a real relativistic time ordering by using several relevant
>frames. The main motivation of such a proposal is to create
>an experimental test allowing us to decide whether
>nonlocal influences can be measured by means of several
>real clocks. The result is a nonlocal description called
>Multisimultaneity or Relativistic Nonlocality..."
>
>Note how he makes it clear the distinction he is making. Although some of
>philosophical distinctions are not those normally made (his idea of
>causality versus temporality is quite controversial, for example, and not by
>any means accepted universally),
(1) I don't see how it's controversial, except perhaps to someone who
dismisses relativity in favor of a preferred frame and doesn't wish
to believe their model lacks the temporal property for which it
was constructed.
(2) His comments here are irrelevant to the experimental data. The
data describe moving reference frames in which each reference
frame gives a different time ordering of the events and rules
out the existence of a preferred frame which could determine
an absolute time ordering to define cause and effect.
> even he agrees that Bohm's ontology in and of itself is untestable.
Bohm didn't believe that. Read bohm's first paper. Current incantations
of bohm's model make an attempt at rendering a comparison impossible,
but that doesn't necessarily mean the attempts have succeded, as the
second paper I've referenced makes clear.
>> The equations are _not_ the same. In particular, the so-called
>> guiding equation in bohmian mechanics has a physical interpetation
>> which is imcompatible with the interpretation of standard quantum
>> theory. Bohmian mechanics relies on an additional assumption, namely
>> the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, in order to assert _statistical_
>> equivalence. Bohm himself allowed for the possibility of distinguishing
>> between the interpretations. He states in his first paper on the
>> subject that the impetus for developing the theory was to provide
>> an alternative interpretation, which is testable, in principle.
>> You apparently didn't read the second article referenced, in which
>> such a test is described. The quantum equilibrium hypothesis cannot
>> merely be a magic statement that wipes out the consequences of the
>> ontology by declaring them non-existent.
>
>I read both articles and earlier referrences.
If so, then your responses should have addressed my comments regarding
those papers, not an irrelevant earlier paper on multisimultaneity.
[...]
>> Sure it is. There is _no_ arithemtic procedure which can result in
>> a random distribution, so that in principle, _any_ deterministic system
>> must produce a distribution which differs from one which is random.
>> If the output of the black box depends _in__any__way_ on _any_ input,
>> then in principle, one can alter the input to show the dependence.
>
>True. And such a dependence is possible in deterministic QM.
In that case, it is possible to distinguish between a probabilistic
quantum theory and bohmian mechanics. "Deterministic quantum mechanics"
sounds like an oxymoron.
>> That is not true. One needs only to find _some_ input upon which the
>> output depends. Once all of the dependence upon the input is removed,
>> then either the output never changes for a given input or else the
>> there exists an inherent randomness.
>
>True. If one knows completely the position of the particle and the exact
>form of the quantum potential for the entire system, deterministic QM gives
>a single result.
One does not need to know these things. It is not necessary to
understand the correlations or even be aware of precisely what factors
used as input result in correlations between the input and output. All one
needs to know is that varying _something_ results in a change to the
output that can be predicted with a probability which differs from 0.5. If
I have some small iron object sitting such that it periodically jumps or
is lifted and I have rows of knobs and switches in front of me, I can
determine if one or more of those knobs and switches has any effect on the
apparatus, merely by adjusting them arbitrarily and then guessing the
result. If I do better than I could do guessing prior to turning the knobs
and switches, I've discovered a correlation between some set of those
knobs and switches and the ball being lifted and dropped by the apparatus.
I do not need to know how the apparatus affects the object, nor what
the knobs and switches do.
>> This is not the case with the bohmian description. Bohmian mechanics
>> asserts only _statistical_ equivalence to stamdard quantum theory.
>> Because the individual particles are distinct and follow well defined
>> trajectories. The bohmian system is therefore, decomposable and in
>> fact, the decomposability into distinct particles with well-defined
>> trajectories, is what distinguishes bohmian mechanics from standard
>> quantum theory. The decomposability means that bohmian mechanics is
>> not ergodic.
>
>In what way decomposable?
The two particles in an epr pair, for instance, according to bohmian
mechanics, (1) are two distinct particles, not a single quantum state,
and (2) each have distinct trajectories, whether or not one can actually
measure the trajectories directly.
>Are you claiming the quantum potential is decomposable?
I'm not claiming anything about the quantum potential. Bohmian mechanics
treats two particles as two distinct particles as a fundamental part of
the ontology. That means that in principle, the particles can be labeled
by their positions (which is also fundamental to the ontology). The
practical aspect of actually doing so, is also irrelavent. Bohmian
mechanics asserts that two identical bosons have real positions and
real trajectories, ergo, the system is decomposable into two particles,
each with its own trajectory.
[...]
>> that result from the mere _existence_ of particles having distinct
>> positions and trajectories should be present in the entropy and it is
>> not. That was the entire reasoning behind the interpretation of
>> identical particles as single quantum state in the standard
>> interpretation.
>
>But this is an old argument that does not work. The solution is found
>in the idea that the quantum potential is exactly what enforces the
>equivalence between entropies.
The funny thing is, I've been told any number of things regarding
some concept or other in bohmian mechanics that "enforces" some
equivalence, or other, but to date, no one seems to want to show
explicitly how that happens. I find your claim also rather far-
fetched. That would mean you have to start with the _classical_
grand canonical ensemble and unsert the quantum potential in the
term represented by the chemical potential and particle number
and show that leads to eliminating an overall factor of N! in
addition to insertion of the correct sign for the term that
differentiates between bosons and fermions. Feel free to demonstrate,
but as far as I can tell, at the very least the argument will
be circular.
>When one attempts decompositions of entangled quantum potentials, one
>arrives at the same solution forms as found in standard QM decompositions,
>ie. extended probabilities. The second paper you mention performs the same
>error in calculation seen in early attempts at decomposition theorems in
>standard QM interpretations. And such decompositions give the same
>unphysical results.
In that case, start with that paper and point specifically to
the equation(s) that are at fault, state explicitly why those
equations are incorrect and give me the correct expressions
which reproduce the quantum mechanical predictions. From what you've
said, it doesn't even sound as if you've read the second paper,
since the results in the second paper are obtained by simply
showing that the correct bosonic wavefunction gives trajectories
that are inconsistent with the probabilities obtained from standard
quantum theory for certain detector geometries.
Paul B. Andersen
"Jeff Relf" <____Je...@NCPlus.NET> skrev i melding news:Xns9398EB3...@130.133.1.4...
> Paul B. Andersen asks :
>
> " Do you know of any other way to find out
>
> about ' reality ' than through observations ? "
>
>
>
> Yes , theories . Theories are a kind of vision .
So when you, Reff Relf, stated:
| It just says that the observed probabilistic nature of
| wave-particles is just that ... observed ... not real .
then your point was that the probabilistic nature of
wave-particles is not real like theories are?
> Paul :
>
> " Can you name something which
>
> is ' real [ yet ] not observed ' ? "
>
>
>
> Yes ... everything that science has yet to discover ...
>
> and infinitely more .
But since you, Reff Relf, stated:
| It just says that the observed probabilistic nature of
| wave-particles is just that ... observed ... not real .
I suppose science cannot discover what's real by observation.
So to sum it up:
According to Jeff Relf, science can discover what's real
only by theorizing, not by observing nature.
Have I got you right?
Paul
Mark Martin
> Listing the exceptions , Mark Martin writes :
> " The question is unanswered , except perhaps to you ... "
>
>
>
> ... and to Einstein , to Newton , to John Bell , etc. .
Please illuminate me: how does your tactic of name dropping lend
any weight to your case? (In other words, how is it supposed to
convince me or anyone else?)
-Mark Martin
galathaea
"Bilge" <dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net> wrote in message
news:slrnbetr2o....@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net...
I _understand_ that you referenced the 2002 paper. However, I read it and
was still unclear about some of the foundational points of
Multisimultaneity, so I followed the references and found his 2001 paper
where he outlined his program. I have never made the claim that Bohm's
ontology does not suppose a preferred reference frame. He makes that quite
clear in his work. The point is that the preferred reference frame becomes
_undetectable_ in the presence of a relativistic quantum potential, as his
book with Hiley go to great lengths in showing. And this does not violate
any physical laws at the observer level. The attempts at programs like
Multisimultaneity are attempts to regain locality at the level below
observation, and unfortunately it is now quite clear that such locality can
most likely not be maintained in a straightforward fashion. Bohm's ontology
is a nonlocal interpretation, so the concept of causality must be
interpreted in terms of this preferred reference frame, nonlocal ontology
and not the local, relativistic one. This is the fundamental problem with
Multisimultaneity, and the reason behind Bohm's excursions into more
esoteric ontological musings (such as the holographic principle). But
Bohm's deterministic ontology is entirely self-consistent and equivalent to
QM at the observer level. When one looks at introducing concepts from other
ontologies (like relativistic notions of causality), it is not surprising
one gets different results.
> [...]
> >decision. Actually Bohmian Mechanics and any
> >theory using only one preferred frame, can be considered
> >a causal description but not a real temporal one.
> >Work in recent years proposed to imbed nonlocality in
> >a real relativistic time ordering by using several relevant
> >frames. The main motivation of such a proposal is to create
> >an experimental test allowing us to decide whether
> >nonlocal influences can be measured by means of several
> >real clocks. The result is a nonlocal description called
> >Multisimultaneity or Relativistic Nonlocality..."
> >
> >Note how he makes it clear the distinction he is making. Although some
of
> >philosophical distinctions are not those normally made (his idea of
> >causality versus temporality is quite controversial, for example, and
not by
> >any means accepted universally),
>
> (1) I don't see how it's controversial, except perhaps to someone who
> dismisses relativity in favor of a preferred frame and doesn't wish
> to believe their model lacks the temporal property for which it
> was constructed.
Exactly. Look at how Bohm's ontology is derived in the Dirac equation. One
has relativistic observables in a nonrelativistic, nonlocal ontology. It
doesn't lack a temporal quality until one starts trying to enforce the
relativistic, local ontology on it. Like Multisimultaneity.
> (2) His comments here are irrelevant to the experimental data. The
> data describe moving reference frames in which each reference
> frame gives a different time ordering of the events and rules
> out the existence of a preferred frame which could determine
> an absolute time ordering to define cause and effect.
No. That is the _whole_ point. The experimental data does not in any way
rule out a preferred frame. It doesn't even quite rule out a preferred
frame at the observer level. It rules out only a preferred frame at the
observer level when one applies a particular relativistic notion of
causality to Bohm's ontology.
> > even he agrees that Bohm's ontology in and of itself is untestable.
>
> Bohm didn't believe that. Read bohm's first paper. Current incantations
> of bohm's model make an attempt at rendering a comparison impossible,
> but that doesn't necessarily mean the attempts have succeded, as the
> second paper I've referenced makes clear.
I've already mentioned that I've read Bohm's paper. I've read a lot of
them, plus his books, plus numerous technical papers since Bohm on the
ramifications of his derivations. Bohm does not own his theory any more
than Einstein owns the photon concept. What has been acknowledged is that
in Bohm's derivation there exists a completely deterministic interpretation
of QM that is isomorphic in its predictions. Of course Bohm's ontology
opens up the possibilities for extensions that are testable. That is why I
said it is a fertile theory. Unfortunately, all such extensions to date
have failed experimental verification. That in no way rules out the basic
isomorphism found in the derivation.
> >> The equations are _not_ the same. In particular, the so-called
> >> guiding equation in bohmian mechanics has a physical interpetation
> >> which is imcompatible with the interpretation of standard quantum
> >> theory. Bohmian mechanics relies on an additional assumption, namely
> >> the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, in order to assert _statistical_
> >> equivalence. Bohm himself allowed for the possibility of
distinguishing
> >> between the interpretations. He states in his first paper on the
> >> subject that the impetus for developing the theory was to provide
> >> an alternative interpretation, which is testable, in principle.
> >> You apparently didn't read the second article referenced, in which
> >> such a test is described. The quantum equilibrium hypothesis cannot
> >> merely be a magic statement that wipes out the consequences of the
> >> ontology by declaring them non-existent.
> >
> >I read both articles and earlier referrences.
>
> If so, then your responses should have addressed my comments regarding
> those papers, not an irrelevant earlier paper on multisimultaneity.
Not irrelevant. I've been arguing to the discussion and the points made,
not to the man, as is proper in scientific discourse.
> [...]
> >> Sure it is. There is _no_ arithemtic procedure which can result in
> >> a random distribution, so that in principle, _any_ deterministic
system
> >> must produce a distribution which differs from one which is random.
> >> If the output of the black box depends _in__any__way_ on _any_ input,
> >> then in principle, one can alter the input to show the dependence.
> >
> >True. And such a dependence is possible in deterministic QM.
>
> In that case, it is possible to distinguish between a probabilistic
> quantum theory and bohmian mechanics. "Deterministic quantum mechanics"
> sounds like an oxymoron.
No. Here is where you are making your fundamental flaw. In standard QM
interpretations that take the wave equation as fundamental, one assumes that
a system has much less information in it. Predictions based on setting the
"initial conditions" of a wave equation experiment presuppose a
probabilistic interpretation and derive a probabilistic outcome. The
Bohmiam ontology states that there are variables one has in the theory whose
existence makes the theory deterministic. These variables are unobservable
in principle because the process of attempts to measure these variables
disturb the system according to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (thus
the epitaph "hidden"). However, there is nothing inconsistent in the
theory. _If_ one were able (like the various Daemons of natural philosophy)
to "know" the initial conditions completely, the result is deterministic
prediction of the results. This is why the term ontology is used to
describe Bohm's interpretation. It goes beyond the epistemic description of
nature. This is also why it is exactly like a particular class
deterministic chaotic systems, where attempts to refine measurements through
particular observation chains fails to narrow the intial conditions set
because of disturbance (in fact, that is exactly what it is).
> >> That is not true. One needs only to find _some_ input upon which the
> >> output depends. Once all of the dependence upon the input is removed,
> >> then either the output never changes for a given input or else the
> >> there exists an inherent randomness.
> >
> >True. If one knows completely the position of the particle and the exact
> >form of the quantum potential for the entire system, deterministic QM
gives
> >a single result.
>
> One does not need to know these things. It is not necessary to
> understand the correlations or even be aware of precisely what factors
> used as input result in correlations between the input and output. All one
> needs to know is that varying _something_ results in a change to the
> output that can be predicted with a probability which differs from 0.5. If
> I have some small iron object sitting such that it periodically jumps or
> is lifted and I have rows of knobs and switches in front of me, I can
> determine if one or more of those knobs and switches has any effect on the
> apparatus, merely by adjusting them arbitrarily and then guessing the
> result. If I do better than I could do guessing prior to turning the knobs
> and switches, I've discovered a correlation between some set of those
> knobs and switches and the ball being lifted and dropped by the apparatus.
> I do not need to know how the apparatus affects the object, nor what
> the knobs and switches do.
The point is that one must set up all of the systems initial condition
variables through the knobs and switches. Otherwise, the unset variables
may perturb the system. This is exactly the same as in chaotic systems
which are deterministic. Remember this, in Bohm's ontology, there is more
than just Phi. In a standard QM interpretation, all you can set is Phi, and
one is left with probabilistic results. Bohm's ontology says there is more
information out there which determines the system.
> >> This is not the case with the bohmian description. Bohmian mechanics
> >> asserts only _statistical_ equivalence to stamdard quantum theory.
> >> Because the individual particles are distinct and follow well defined
> >> trajectories. The bohmian system is therefore, decomposable and in
> >> fact, the decomposability into distinct particles with well-defined
> >> trajectories, is what distinguishes bohmian mechanics from standard
> >> quantum theory. The decomposability means that bohmian mechanics is
> >> not ergodic.
> >
> >In what way decomposable?
>
> The two particles in an epr pair, for instance, according to bohmian
> mechanics, (1) are two distinct particles, not a single quantum state,
> and (2) each have distinct trajectories, whether or not one can actually
> measure the trajectories directly.
Bohmian mechanics says there are two distinct particles _and_ a quantum
potential.
> >Are you claiming the quantum potential is decomposable?
>
> I'm not claiming anything about the quantum potential. Bohmian mechanics
> treats two particles as two distinct particles as a fundamental part of
> the ontology. That means that in principle, the particles can be labeled
> by their positions (which is also fundamental to the ontology). The
> practical aspect of actually doing so, is also irrelavent. Bohmian
> mechanics asserts that two identical bosons have real positions and
> real trajectories, ergo, the system is decomposable into two particles,
> each with its own trajectory.
The trajectories are coupled through the quantum potential. This is the
source of the nonlocality of Bohm's ontology. You cannot just look at the
two particles and say that you can decompose the system in to them. They
are moving under the guidance of the quantum potential, which couples the
system and makes it indecomposable. Unless one is willing to allow for
extended probabilities, where one could then decompose the system even
though it is still coupled.
> [...]
> >> that result from the mere _existence_ of particles having distinct
> >> positions and trajectories should be present in the entropy and it is
> >> not. That was the entire reasoning behind the interpretation of
> >> identical particles as single quantum state in the standard
> >> interpretation.
> >
> >But this is an old argument that does not work. The solution is found
> >in the idea that the quantum potential is exactly what enforces the
> >equivalence between entropies.
>
> The funny thing is, I've been told any number of things regarding
> some concept or other in bohmian mechanics that "enforces" some
> equivalence, or other, but to date, no one seems to want to show
> explicitly how that happens. I find your claim also rather far-
> fetched. That would mean you have to start with the _classical_
> grand canonical ensemble and unsert the quantum potential in the
> term represented by the chemical potential and particle number
> and show that leads to eliminating an overall factor of N! in
> addition to insertion of the correct sign for the term that
> differentiates between bosons and fermions. Feel free to demonstrate,
> but as far as I can tell, at the very least the argument will
> be circular.
Read Bohm and Hiley. The basis for the calculation is in there, and its
pretty much the exact same derivation as in the quantum mechanical
treatment, except on the quantum potential.
> >When one attempts decompositions of entangled quantum potentials, one
> >arrives at the same solution forms as found in standard QM
decompositions,
> >ie. extended probabilities. The second paper you mention performs the
same
> >error in calculation seen in early attempts at decomposition theorems in
> >standard QM interpretations. And such decompositions give the same
> >unphysical results.
>
> In that case, start with that paper and point specifically to
> the equation(s) that are at fault, state explicitly why those
> equations are incorrect and give me the correct expressions
> which reproduce the quantum mechanical predictions. From what you've
> said, it doesn't even sound as if you've read the second paper,
> since the results in the second paper are obtained by simply
> showing that the correct bosonic wavefunction gives trajectories
> that are inconsistent with the probabilities obtained from standard
> quantum theory for certain detector geometries.
It is all hidden in that innocent looking |DeltaT| < v d / c^2. Actually,
that's not the whole picture, but its based on the concept of
Multisimultaneity in general and the idea that there is a before-before
frame where the correlations must disappear, and that equation expresses the
conditions for time ordering in such an experiment. By making the
assumption of a relativistic (and local) time ordering, Multisimultaneity
has decomposed the quantum potential into relativistic time-like and
space-like sections of space-time and derives from this separation
probability correlations that violate classical QM. This is why I went to
Suarez's 2001 paper, because this decomposition is made clear. However,
such a decomposition is only possible in the realm of extended probabilities
applied to the quantum potential, and violated by the local decomposition of
Suarez's papers. To understand this more clearly, I refer you to the 1995
paper by Saul Yousseff found here:
http://xxx.lanl.gov/PS_cache/hep-th/pdf/9406/9406184.pdf
There are many other papers detailing this connection in regards to
particular correlation experiments. What I have been saying, and what
Suarez himself appears to completely agree with, is that the basic Bohm
deterministic ontology is not the same as the assumptions of
Multisimultaneity. And he also agrees with the deduction that Bohm's
ontology makes no different predictions than QM. What people have been
attempting to do since Bohm is try to remove the unobservable preferred
reference frame from the theory because it violates the principles of
relativity at the ontological level. That is certainly a valid research
programme, but it has so far failed to provide a theory that matches
experiment. Nonlocality, though, is not an outrageous condition in a theory
in and of itself. Even the string and branal theories predict a level of
nonlocality due to the extended nature of their objects. And some have even
shown how a preferred reference frame then arises. See for example:
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/hep-th/pdf/0207/0207042.pdf
This, in my view, is the whole point of my end of the discussion: that we
still have the possibility for deterministic interpretation of quantum
mechanics, that such an interpretation is logically consistent, and that
such an interpretation agrees isomorphically with the predictions of the
standard QM interpretations.
I myself do not use the Bohm interpretation in any of the work I do. I have
merely studied it and the many other interpretations of QM to give myself a
better understanding of what possibilities exist in the ontology of the
world. I _do_ however agree with the sentiment that determinism is the best
muse for a physicist.
Jeff Relf
is not real like theories are ? "
You wording is far too vague for me .
Did you mean to say :
" Does the way QM models observed probabilities of wave-particles
depict _ Pure _ nature less accurately than
some other theories ? "
QM doesn't model _ Pure _ nature ,
it models _ Observed _ nature .
Total determinism ,
i.e. the theory that Pure nature
is devoid of all intrinsic randomness ,
is a limit ...
... Just like Einstein's limit
on the speed of light in a local inertial frame .
... Just like Gödel's limits ... where :
- The more understandable you make your mental model
the less it looks like pure nature .
- The more you make your model look like pure nature
the less understandable it becomes .
Q. Why is the total determinism theory useful ?
A. Because it draws us closer to Pure nature ...
and farther away from our delusions .
Jeff Relf
" I _ do _ however agree with the sentiment that
Thanks .
I've enjoyed reading about
your description of the Bohm interpretation .
The total determinism theory says :
" Pure nature is devoid of intrinsic randomness . "
This is a limit ,
just like the speed of wave-particles are limited
to the speed of light in a local inertial frame .
The total determinism theory is very similar to Gödel's limits :
- The more understandable you make your mental model
the less it looks like pure nature .
- The more you make your model look like pure nature
the less understandable it becomes .
Q. Why is the total determinism theory useful ?
A. Because it draws scientists closer to Pure nature ...
and farther away from their delusions .
keith stein
> ... Just like Einstein's limit
> on the speed of light in a local inertial frame .
But Einstein did not just place a limit on the speed of light
" in a LOCAL inertial frame " - that wouldn't have been so bad.
Einstein placed a limit on the speed of light in a REMOTE inertial frame.
Thus the speed of light in a space ship travelling at 0.9 c is still equal
to c,
relative to us, according to Einstein's special relativity eh! Which is
daft eh!
> Q. Why is the total determinism theory useful ?
That's what is called a " leading question ".... But no problem,
since we are still free to answer or not answer, as we choose eh!
keith stein
Bilge
>> that exists in bohm's model. It does not introduce any defects that
>> weren't already there. Whatever applies to multisimultaneity also
>> applies to bohmian mechanics, short of someone having a remedy to
>> explain the data. However, the experiment is quite general. In
>> the concluding remarks, the authors go on to summarize the results
>> of the data and say:
>>
>> "The results stress the oddness of quantum correlations. Not only
>> are they independent of the distance, but also it seems impossible
>> to cast them in any real time ordering. Hence one cannot maintain
>> any causal explanation in which an earlier event influences a later
>> one by arbitrarily fast communication. In this sense, quantum correlations
>> are a basic (i.e., primary) concept, not a secondary concept reducible
>> to that of causality between events. Quantum correlations are directly
>> caused by the quantum state in such a way that one event cannot be
>> considered a `cause' and the other the `effect'."
>
>I _understand_ that you referenced the 2002 paper. However, I read it and
>was still unclear about some of the foundational points of
>Multisimultaneity, so I followed the references and found his 2001 paper
>where he outlined his program.
My pount is that the experiment addresses more than just multi-
simultaneity. It addresses the compatibility of bohmian mechanics
and lorentz invariance directly.
>I have never made the claim that Bohm's ontology does not suppose
>a preferred reference frame.
And I have never claimed that you had. In fact, I stressed the point
about the preferred frame for that very reason. A preferred frame
introduces an absolute time ordering of events and the paper _does_
address that issue.
>He makes that quite clear in his work. The point is that the preferred
>reference frame becomes _undetectable_ in the presence of a relativistic
>quantum potential, as his book with Hiley go to great lengths in showing.
>And this does not violate any physical laws at the observer level.
But it does. If two events have an absolute time ordering, then the
events have an absolute time ordering in _every_ inertial frame because
the separation is timelike or at most lightlike (although, I would debate
the lightlike part to an extent, but that's standard, so I'll take that to
be the case). It is not possible to perform a lorentz transform which
changes spacelike interval into into one which is timelike or lightlike.
If the interval is spacelike, it's spacelike, prferred frame or not.
[...]
>is a nonlocal interpretation, so the concept of causality must be
>interpreted in terms of this preferred reference frame, nonlocal ontology
>and not the local, relativistic one.
That would not be a problem if those promoting bohmian mechanics
were placing teir efforts in that direction. But, that isn't the
case. Physicists like sheldon goldstein, who seems to be one of the
biggest fans leading the charge, so-to-speak, seem to concentrate
quite a lot of effort into casting bohmian mechanics into a relativistic
framework.
>This is the fundamental problem with
>Multisimultaneity, and the reason behind Bohm's excursions into more
>esoteric ontological musings (such as the holographic principle). But
>Bohm's deterministic ontology is entirely self-consistent and equivalent to
>QM at the observer level. When one looks at introducing concepts from other
>ontologies (like relativistic notions of causality), it is not surprising
>one gets different results.
Unfortumately (for the bohmian position), relativity seems to
be well grounded in experiment.
[...]
>>
>> (1) I don't see how it's controversial, except perhaps to someone who
>> dismisses relativity in favor of a preferred frame and doesn't wish
>> to believe their model lacks the temporal property for which it
>> was constructed.
>
>Exactly. Look at how Bohm's ontology is derived in the Dirac equation.
I don't see any bohmian ontology in the dirac equation.
>One has relativistic observables in a nonrelativistic, nonlocal ontology.
That isn't true. In fact, the imposition of local gauge invariance on
the dirac lagrangian leads directly to the field of the electron and a
completely local interaction. This is also where I think bohmian mechanics
misses the boat in a very big way. I find it rather ironic that bohm is
partly responsible for the impetus for field theory to utilize the
otherwise meaningless phase to obtain fields and local conservation laws,
leaves the aharanov-bohm effect well-defined in terms of a completely
local theory.
>It doesn't lack a temporal quality until one starts trying to enforce the
>relativistic, local ontology on it. Like Multisimultaneity.
Sure, but there is no evidence that relativity is incorrect. The fact
that one has to dismiss relativity in order to incorporate a preferred
frame, which is ostensibly unobservable (by fiat), in order to acheive
the same thing that existed without the bohmian interpretation in
the first place, seems rather bizarre. I see no reason to introduce
something which is unobservable to explain something you didn't need
in the first place. It would be different if the direction of bohmian
mechanics was toward distinguishing between quantum mechanics and
bohmian mechanics, but it isn't. Everyone who has ever argued with
me in favor of bohmain mechanics has quite the opposite idea and
is bound and determined that nothing can distinguish between the
two. Insofar as I see very good reasons for probability to be
of real physical significance, I think experiment weighs in my
favor and that isn't likely to change through any effort coming from
the bohmian advocates. Their goal seems mainly to do whatever it takes
to be in agreement with quantum mechanics, even where a particular
experiment hasn't been performed.
>
>> (2) His comments here are irrelevant to the experimental data. The
>> data describe moving reference frames in which each reference
>> frame gives a different time ordering of the events and rules
>> out the existence of a preferred frame which could determine
>> an absolute time ordering to define cause and effect.
>
>No. That is the _whole_ point. The experimental data does not in any way
>rule out a preferred frame. It doesn't even quite rule out a preferred
>frame at the observer level. It rules out only a preferred frame at the
>observer level when one applies a particular relativistic notion of
>causality to Bohm's ontology.
It rules out a preferred frame, consistent with any relativistic
concept of "preferred frame", since that preferred frame cannot
be reached by a lorentz transform from any of the events.
[...]
>opens up the possibilities for extensions that are testable. That is why I
>said it is a fertile theory. Unfortunately, all such extensions to date
>have failed experimental verification. That in no way rules out the basic
>isomorphism found in the derivation.
Then perhaps you should emphasize that to others who are bohmian
advocates. My experience with those who support bohmian mechanics
may be summarized by the assertion mase to me, that falsifying quantum
mechanics, unequivocally falsifies bohmian mechanics - no ands, ifs or
buts. Any test which is designed to provide a means of distinguishing
between the two theories is rejected, a priori, as not being possible.
I have no problem with bohmian mechanics as an alternative theory,
but I do have a problem if the theory ignores the possible consequences
of its own ontology in order to insure no prediction to an experiment
disagrees with standard quantum theory just to keep the ontology
alive. That renders the ontology as being no more useful than the
tooth fairy for explaining the money under a pillow.
[...]
>> In that case, it is possible to distinguish between a probabilistic
>> quantum theory and bohmian mechanics. "Deterministic quantum mechanics"
>> sounds like an oxymoron.
>
[...]
>theory. _If_ one were able (like the various Daemons of natural philosophy)
>to "know" the initial conditions completely, the result is deterministic
>prediction of the results. This is why the term ontology is used to
>describe Bohm's interpretation.
This is not true. Chaotic systems are unpredictable, but not
probabilistic. They are unpredictable for a completely different
reason than quantum mechanics is probabilistic.
>It goes beyond the epistemic description of nature. This is also why it
>is exactly like a particular class deterministic chaotic systems, where
>attempts to refine measurements through particular observation chains
>fails to narrow the intial conditions set because of disturbance (in fact,
>that is exactly what it is).
Entropy is nothing more than a counting argument. If you have N classical
particles in n_1,...,n_j states, then there are N!/(n_1! n_2!...n_j) ways
to interchange them. It matters not whether practical considerations limit
ones ability to carry this out in practice. It's a simple matter of the
mere existence of distinct particles.
[...]
>> and switches, I've discovered a correlation between some set of those
>> knobs and switches and the ball being lifted and dropped by the apparatus.
>> I do not need to know how the apparatus affects the object, nor what
>> the knobs and switches do.
>
>The point is that one must set up all of the systems initial condition
>variables through the knobs and switches. Otherwise, the unset variables
>may perturb the system.
I'm sorry, but that's getting carried away. Are you trying to tell
me that after performing one trial, that the initial conditions for the
next trial will depend upon the first trial regardless of how much
time elapses betweenb the two trials? That would seem to contradict
the quantum equilibrium hypothesis.
>This is exactly the same as in chaotic systems which are deterministic.
No, it isn't the same. Chaotic systems and probabilistic systems
are completely different. The 3-body problem is chaotic. Planetary
motion can be chaotic. None of those are probabilistic.
>Remember this, in Bohm's ontology, there is more than just Phi.
Yes, I know.
>In a standard QM interpretation, all you can set is Phi, and one is
>left with probabilistic results. Bohm's ontology says there is more
>information out there which determines the system.
Yes, I know. But that "additional" information plays an important
part in quantum mechanics, too, as it leads to conservation laws
based upon that factor having no physical importance.
If I have a wavefunction,
\Psi(x,t) = R(x,t)\exp(iS/hbar)
Bohmian mechanics attaches importance to the phase factor. Quantum
mechanics _also_ attaches importance to this phase factor, but for an
entirely different reason. In standard quantum theory, it's essential that
the the phase factor have no physical importance, because it gives rise to
conserved quantities. In particular, when going over to a relativistic
formulation, the invariance under a _local_ change of phase in the dirac
lagrangian forces there to be an electromagnetic field which conserves
charge _locally_. It's important to the non-relativistic case as well (and
this is what I consider ironic). The aharanov-bohm effect may be
explained as a result of the phase invariance of the wavefunction. In
otherwords, the results cannot depend upon the phase factor. This
particular idea carries over directly to quantum field theory, the
entirety of which hinges upon that same invariance. With that principle
alone, I can start with E^2 = p^2 + m^2 and the quantum substitutions
p = -i\hbar\grad and E = i\hbar d/dt, and obtain the qed lagrangian in
less than two pages of arithmetic. I have no idea how one would get there
by using bohmian mechanics.
>> The two particles in an epr pair, for instance, according to bohmian
>> mechanics, (1) are two distinct particles, not a single quantum state,
>> and (2) each have distinct trajectories, whether or not one can actually
>> measure the trajectories directly.
>
>Bohmian mechanics says there are two distinct particles _and_ a quantum
>potential.
Right.
>> mechanics asserts that two identical bosons have real positions and
>> real trajectories, ergo, the system is decomposable into two particles,
>> each with its own trajectory.
>
>The trajectories are coupled through the quantum potential.
You can see an example worked out in arxiv:quant-ph/0103126
>This is the
>source of the nonlocality of Bohm's ontology. You cannot just look at the
>two particles and say that you can decompose the system in to them. They
>are moving under the guidance of the quantum potential, which couples the
>system and makes it indecomposable. Unless one is willing to allow for
>extended probabilities, where one could then decompose the system even
>though it is still coupled.
Ergodicity is not guaranteed by the existence of a potential.
>> >> that result from the mere _existence_ of particles having distinct
>> >> positions and trajectories should be present in the entropy and it is
>> >> not. That was the entire reasoning behind the interpretation of
>> >> identical particles as single quantum state in the standard
>> >> interpretation.
>> >
>> >But this is an old argument that does not work. The solution is found
>> >in the idea that the quantum potential is exactly what enforces the
>> >equivalence between entropies.
>>
>> The funny thing is, I've been told any number of things regarding
>> some concept or other in bohmian mechanics that "enforces" some
>> equivalence, or other, but to date, no one seems to want to show
>> explicitly how that happens. I find your claim also rather far-
>> fetched. That would mean you have to start with the _classical_
>> grand canonical ensemble and unsert the quantum potential in the
>> term represented by the chemical potential and particle number
>> and show that leads to eliminating an overall factor of N! in
>> addition to insertion of the correct sign for the term that
>> differentiates between bosons and fermions. Feel free to demonstrate,
>> but as far as I can tell, at the very least the argument will
>> be circular.
>
>Read Bohm and Hiley. The basis for the calculation is in there, and its
>pretty much the exact same derivation as in the quantum mechanical
>treatment, except on the quantum potential.
Why don't you just derive it for me (or give a reference I can access
on line)? Just a brief _mathematical_ sketch will suffice. I can fill
in the details.
>probability correlations that violate classical QM. This is why I went to
>Suarez's 2001 paper, because this decomposition is made clear. However,
I'm not interested in multisimultaneity, per se. What I'm interested
in are the results which come directly from the experiment in the 2002
paper. If you don't have a relativistic version of bohmian mechanics
that can circumvent the restrictions determined empirically, then just
say so.
[...]
>I myself do not use the Bohm interpretation in any of the work I do. I have
>merely studied it and the many other interpretations of QM to give myself a
>better understanding of what possibilities exist in the ontology of the
>world. I _do_ however agree with the sentiment that determinism is the best
>muse for a physicist.
I disagree. In my opinion, the indeterminacy is the only sensible
means of obtaining macroscopic causality.
Paul B. Andersen
"Jeff Relf" <____Je...@NCPlus.NET> skrev i melding news:Xns939DEB8...@130.133.1.4...
> Paul B. Andersen asks : " Then your point was that
> the probabilistic nature of wave-particles
> is not real like theories are ? "
>
>
>
> You wording is far too vague for me .
Your vague wording was my very point.
> Did you mean to say :
> " Does the way QM models observed probabilities of wave-particles
> depict _ Pure _ nature less accurately than
> some other theories ? "
No, I didn't mean to say anything.
I asked you what you meant to say.
Jeff Relf stated:
| It just says that the observed probabilistic nature of
| wave-particles is just that ... observed ... not real .
And Jeff Relf stated:
| Paul B. Andersen asks :
|
| " Do you know of any other way to find out
| about ' reality ' than through observations ? "
|
| Yes , theories . Theories are a kind of vision .
So YOU are stating that what's observed
- like the probabilistic nature of wave-particles -
is NOT real, but theories are real.
Does that make sense to you?
So what DID you mean to say?
Paul
Jeff Relf
" So YOU are stating that what's observed -
like the probabilistic nature of wave-particles -
is NOT real , but theories are real . "
I'm sorry Paul ,
but I'm sure that you won't understand my point .
I'm not sure why you won't understand it ...
I'm not sure if I even care why you won't understand it .
All I can do is repeat my point again :
( Just like you keep repeating yourself . )
QM doesn't model _ Pure _ nature ,
it models _ Observed _ nature .
( i.e. It's " Artificial " ... " Virtual " . )
Total determinism ,
i.e. the theory that Pure nature
is devoid of all intrinsic randomness ,
is a limit ...
( Even though there can never be complete proof of this ...
it's still very likely to be true . )
... Just like Einstein's limit
on the speed of wave-particles in a local inertial frame .
( Even though there can never be complete proof of this ...
it's still very likely to be true . )
... Just like Gödel's limits ... where :
- The more understandable you make your mental model
the less it looks like pure nature .
- The more you make your model look like pure nature
the less understandable it becomes .
Q. Why is the total determinism theory useful ?
A. Because it draws scientists closer to Pure nature ...
and farther away from their delusions .
( I assume that this is
why P.B.A. doesn't like the total determinism theory . )
Jeff Relf
To the uninformed ,
a single toss of a coin _ Seems _ random .
But , toss that coin one hundred times ,
and that same ignorant person
can tell you what the probabilities are like .
Likewise , QM is , as you say , " Causal " ...
but only _ In the Long Run _ ...
or , as you say , " Macroscopically " .
This is why :
The QM model is called " Virtual " ... " Artificial " ...
Not " Real " ... Not " Pure Nature " .
The theory of total determinism outlines these limits ...
i.e. Pure nature is devoid of intrinsic randomness .
Unlike such renowned scientists as Newton , Maxwell ,
Einstein , Bell , etc. ...
The common scientist can't give up
the delusion of intrinsic randomness .
Jeff Relf
No , The wave-particles from a remote inertial frame
have to travel to the local inertial frame ...
so , by the time it arrives , the wave-particles are bound
by the speed of light limit of the local frame ... eh !
Time is local ... at it's most pure , ( i.e. Unobserved ) ,
Time is spatial ... merely yet another dimension of space .
The units of the speed of light are length over time ...
i.e. length divided by length ...
hence the speed of light limit is a fundamental ,
( Unitless ) , constant .
dlzc@aol.com (formerly)
"Jeff Relf" <____Je...@NCPlus.NET> wrote in message
news:Xns939EB89...@130.133.1.4...
...
> The theory of total determinism outlines these limits ...
> i.e. Pure nature is devoid of intrinsic randomness .
"Pure nature" is devoid of life apparently. Evolution is about randomness.
As are coin tosses, tornados, and tidal waves.
"Pure nature" is the polite face that reality appears to have for those old
folks who are "hard of seeing".
David A. Smith
Bilge
>Bilge wrote : " In my opinion , the indeterminacy is
> the only sensible means of obtaining macroscopic causality . "
>To the uninformed ,
> a single toss of a coin _ Seems _ random .
And since you equate quantum mechanics to a non-random
coin toss, you are uniformed. Pay attention. I've already
addressed it. If you didn't get it the first time, read
it again instead of reposting the same crap.
keith stein
"Jeff Relf" <____Je...@NCPlus.NET> wrote in message
> keith stein wrote : " Which is daft eh ! "
>
> No , The wave-particles from a remote inertial frame
> have to travel to the local inertial frame ...
> so , by the time it arrives , the wave-particles are bound
> by the speed of light limit of the local frame ... eh !
Yes, But Einstein did not just place a limit on the speed of light
" in a LOCAL inertial frame " - that wouldn't have been so bad.
Einstein placed a limit on the speed of light in a REMOTE inertial frame.
Thus the speed of light IN a space ship travelling at 0.9 c is still equal
to c, RELATIVE TO US, according to Einstein's special relativity eh!
Which IS daft..... eh!
keith stein.
Jeff Relf
IN a space ship traveling at 0.9 c is still equal to c ... "
First of all , only wave-particles can move at .9 c ,
not " Space Ships " ... eh !
Second of all , The funny thing about remote inertial frames
is that they are _ Always _ remote .
In other words , SR is describing
how a remote inertial frame will be " Sensed "
by a local inertial frame ... i.e. the _ Local _ reality .
But , as the Hafele-Keating experiment tells us ,
these space-time warps have a tangible " Local Reality "
to them ... it's not an illusion .
From http://www.dipmat.unipg.it/~bartocci/hafkeat.htm :
" These results provide an unambiguous empirical resolution
of the famous clock ' paradox ' with macroscopic clocks . "
Jeff Relf
You are the one that's out of the loop .
What do you know that John Bell somehow missed ?
Bilge
> to a non-random coin toss , you are uniformed . "
>You are the one that's out of the loop .
>What do you know that John Bell somehow missed ?
Paul B. Andersen
"Jeff Relf" <____Je...@NCPlus.NET> skrev i melding news:Xns939EAF8...@130.133.1.4...
> Paul B. Andersen wrote :
> " So YOU are stating that what's observed -
> like the probabilistic nature of wave-particles -
> is NOT real , but theories are real . "
>
>
>
> I'm sorry Paul ,
> but I'm sure that you won't understand my point .
>
> I'm not sure why you won't understand it ...
> I'm not sure if I even care why you won't understand it .
>
> All I can do is repeat my point again :
> ( Just like you keep repeating yourself . )
I keep repeating myself because you invariably
snipp the issue and talk about something else.
The issue was your statement:
| It just says that the observed probabilistic nature of
| wave-particles is just that ... observed ... not real .
Specifically: "observed .. not real".
You have carefully avoided to even try to answer
my question about the meaning of that statement.
Like this:
> QM doesn't model _ Pure _ nature ,
> it models _ Observed _ nature .
> ( i.e. It's " Artificial " ... " Virtual " . )
>
> Total determinism ,
> i.e. the theory that Pure nature
> is devoid of all intrinsic randomness ,
> is a limit ...
> ( Even though there can never be complete proof of this ...
> it's still very likely to be true . )
>
> ... Just like Einstein's limit
> on the speed of wave-particles in a local inertial frame .
> ( Even though there can never be complete proof of this ...
> it's still very likely to be true . )
>
> ... Just like Gödel's limits ... where :
> - The more understandable you make your mental model
> the less it looks like pure nature .
> - The more you make your model look like pure nature
> the less understandable it becomes .
>
> Q. Why is the total determinism theory useful ?
>
> A. Because it draws scientists closer to Pure nature ...
> and farther away from their delusions .
>
> ( I assume that this is
> why P.B.A. doesn't like the total determinism theory . )
So what's observed isn't real because that draw
scientists closer to Pure nature?
Sorry.
You don't make sense.
Paul
galathaea
I think we might be talking past each other. So let me try to restate
things in a way that will underline the difference between what the
paper is testing and Bohm's ontology.
-- In Bohm's theory, space-time does not transform inertial frames
according to Lorentz transformations. It is a Galilean world view.
-- However, Bohm's ontology when applied to relativistic quantum
mechanics gives _observable_predictions_ that do obey Lorentz
covariance.
-- The point being: this is not a "defect" in the theory, any more
than preferred reference frames are "defects" in modern aether
theories, in CMBR, in string and branal theories, etc. All
observations agree with experiment to the limits the particular model
expresses.
> >He makes that quite clear in his work. The point is that the preferred
> >reference frame becomes _undetectable_ in the presence of a relativistic
> >quantum potential, as his book with Hiley go to great lengths in showing.
> >And this does not violate any physical laws at the observer level.
>
> But it does. If two events have an absolute time ordering, then the
> events have an absolute time ordering in _every_ inertial frame because
> the separation is timelike or at most lightlike (although, I would debate
> the lightlike part to an extent, but that's standard, so I'll take that to
> be the case). It is not possible to perform a lorentz transform which
> changes spacelike interval into into one which is timelike or lightlike.
> If the interval is spacelike, it's spacelike, prferred frame or not.
You see here how you assume that the ontology still should give a
space-time that obeys such classifications of time-like and space-like
that are invariant to Lorentz transformations. You are imposing a
different spacetime condition than Bohm's ontology is derived in. The
Bohm interpretation does give a time ordering, but it is unique.
Transformations this frame respects do not change ordering. This
experiment does not test anything related to this interpretation. It
tests a different interpretation that attempted to transfer Lorentz
invariance down to the ontology.
[...]
> >This is the fundamental problem with
> >Multisimultaneity, and the reason behind Bohm's excursions into more
> >esoteric ontological musings (such as the holographic principle). But
> >Bohm's deterministic ontology is entirely self-consistent and equivalent to
> >QM at the observer level. When one looks at introducing concepts from other
> >ontologies (like relativistic notions of causality), it is not surprising
> >one gets different results.
>
> Unfortumately (for the bohmian position), relativity seems to
> be well grounded in experiment.
Here again you confuse the ontology with the observable predictions.
Let me clarify this:
-- it is possible for a theory to produce observable, relativistic
predictions while still being nonrelativistic at its ontology.
I have been giving plenty of examples.
> [...]
> >>
> >> (1) I don't see how it's controversial, except perhaps to someone who
> >> dismisses relativity in favor of a preferred frame and doesn't wish
> >> to believe their model lacks the temporal property for which it
> >> was constructed.
> >
> >Exactly. Look at how Bohm's ontology is derived in the Dirac equation.
>
> I don't see any bohmian ontology in the dirac equation.
I'm sorry I can't provide web references (I don't know any), but did
you look. I provided the Bohm, Hiley book as a reference, but you are
responding as if you don't need to study the topic you are debating.
And earlier in this discussion you were accusing me of doing that when
it wasn't at all true, and I had in fact studied not only the
reference you provided but had followed the referrence trail. I want
to have an intelligent discussion here, but I am getting the
impression that you are being stubborn without exploration.
I will try to give more detailed explanations, but you can try as well
not to respond with premature judgements.
> Sure, but there is no evidence that relativity is incorrect. The fact
> that one has to dismiss relativity in order to incorporate a preferred
> frame, which is ostensibly unobservable (by fiat), in order to acheive
> the same thing that existed without the bohmian interpretation in
> the first place, seems rather bizarre. I see no reason to introduce
> something which is unobservable to explain something you didn't need
> in the first place. It would be different if the direction of bohmian
> mechanics was toward distinguishing between quantum mechanics and
> bohmian mechanics, but it isn't. Everyone who has ever argued with
> me in favor of bohmain mechanics has quite the opposite idea and
> is bound and determined that nothing can distinguish between the
> two. Insofar as I see very good reasons for probability to be
> of real physical significance, I think experiment weighs in my
> favor and that isn't likely to change through any effort coming from
> the bohmian advocates. Their goal seems mainly to do whatever it takes
> to be in agreement with quantum mechanics, even where a particular
> experiment hasn't been performed.
You are arguing in two different directions here. Bohm's ontology
gives isomorphic predictions to standard QM. Yet, it provides a new
ontological existents whose properties can be questioned, making it a
fertile theory. This is one of the major driving forces for Bohm
introducing the interpretation, because he felt the standard QM
ontology was unrealistic and sterile. Adding a more fundamental
ontology breaks past the veil of probabilities and opens up more
avenues for research. There is a solid connection with the basic Bohm
ontology and standard QM, so that it is as founded in experiment as
the standard interpretation. But, as is the entire topic of this
thread, one has "determinism as a muse" beyond the unobserved.
[...]
> I have no problem with bohmian mechanics as an alternative theory,
> but I do have a problem if the theory ignores the possible consequences
> of its own ontology in order to insure no prediction to an experiment
> disagrees with standard quantum theory just to keep the ontology
> alive. That renders the ontology as being no more useful than the
> tooth fairy for explaining the money under a pillow.
It is a muse to further theories. An ontological foundation. The
point being that ontologies provide a basis for exploring new
theories. Why does one give preference to the probabilistic ontology?
Why, after more than a half century, aren't more physicists at least
familiar with the idea that Bohm's ontology is an equally valid
interpretation? You have been debating with me that Bohm's theory is
testable, and given papers to support your argument where the authors
themselves state the opposite. Do you think all of the other
interpretations are "tooth fairy" explanations? If not, why do you
have such a problem seeing Bohm as yet another possible
interpretation, with its own line of research programmes?
> >> In that case, it is possible to distinguish between a probabilistic
> >> quantum theory and bohmian mechanics. "Deterministic quantum mechanics"
> >> sounds like an oxymoron.
> >
> [...]
> >theory. _If_ one were able (like the various Daemons of natural philosophy)
> >to "know" the initial conditions completely, the result is deterministic
> >prediction of the results. This is why the term ontology is used to
> >describe Bohm's interpretation.
>
> This is not true. Chaotic systems are unpredictable, but not
> probabilistic. They are unpredictable for a completely different
> reason than quantum mechanics is probabilistic.
Again we are talking past each other and you are assuming what you
want to prove.
-- Bohm's interpretation of QM is not probabilistic in the way that
standard interpretations of QM are. Bohm's interpretation is
probabilistic in the way that chaotic yet deterministic theories are.
It is a theory which attributes well defined trajectories to the
motion of particles.
[...]
> >> and switches, I've discovered a correlation between some set of those
> >> knobs and switches and the ball being lifted and dropped by the apparatus.
> >> I do not need to know how the apparatus affects the object, nor what
> >> the knobs and switches do.
> >
> >The point is that one must set up all of the systems initial condition
> >variables through the knobs and switches. Otherwise, the unset variables
> >may perturb the system.
>
> I'm sorry, but that's getting carried away. Are you trying to tell
> me that after performing one trial, that the initial conditions for the
> next trial will depend upon the first trial regardless of how much
> time elapses betweenb the two trials? That would seem to contradict
> the quantum equilibrium hypothesis.
No, that's not at all what I am saying. I am saying:
-- Standard QM gives the thing to set to be the wave function. This
is fundamentally probabilistic.
-- Bohm's QM gives the thing to set the quantum potential and the
initial conditions for the particle in phase space (its position and
momentum). This is deterministic.
I am not even talking about successive trials. Since you set the
conditions with knobs and switches, there are no dependencies between
trials. Each is ab initio.
> >This is exactly the same as in chaotic systems which are deterministic.
>
> No, it isn't the same. Chaotic systems and probabilistic systems
> are completely different. The 3-body problem is chaotic. Planetary
> motion can be chaotic. None of those are probabilistic.
I will repeat this:
"Chaotic systems and probabilistic systems are completely different.
The 3-body problem is chaotic. Planetary motion can be chaotic. None
of those are probabilistic."
Exactly. What is Bohm's ontology? From these past comments, I am
beginning to think you have not read anything about Bohm's ontology.
Yet, instead of coming to this thread with a "could you explain that
to me better" approach, you come in arguing against it with a paper
that both presupposes a knowledge of the ontology and states quite
clearly the opposite of your argument.
Exactly the same way. Bohm's mechanics doesn't do anything tricky or
remarkable. It just shows a method of producing trajectory bundles
that have a density measure equivalent to the probabilistic
interpretation of the wave function. You can still calculate on the
density. In fact, that's usually the first step.
[...]
Very briefly. One can go two ways, as in standard QM. Either one can
look at non-relativistic QM and put spin-statistics in by hand as
another postulate, or one can look at relativistic QM and derive it.
In either case, one always has the same starting equation
(Schroedinger or Dirac) in either theory. One performs the same
calculations as in standard QM and gets the wave function. This has
the statistics required (by hand or by derivation). Now take the
standard steps of Bohm to derive a bundle of classical trajectories
whose density matches the probability distribution predicted. There
really is nothing mystical about Bohm.
> >probability correlations that violate classical QM. This is why I went to
> >Suarez's 2001 paper, because this decomposition is made clear. However,
>
> I'm not interested in multisimultaneity, per se. What I'm interested
> in are the results which come directly from the experiment in the 2002
> paper. If you don't have a relativistic version of bohmian mechanics
> that can circumvent the restrictions determined empirically, then just
> say so.
Again the same error followed with a fallacy.
> [...]
> >I myself do not use the Bohm interpretation in any of the work I do. I have
> >merely studied it and the many other interpretations of QM to give myself a
> >better understanding of what possibilities exist in the ontology of the
> >world. I _do_ however agree with the sentiment that determinism is the best
> >muse for a physicist.
>
> I disagree. In my opinion, the indeterminacy is the only sensible
> means of obtaining macroscopic causality.
I think it is most sensible to actually research theories before one
commits to an opposition of it.
Shambolic
> to c, RELATIVE TO US, according to Einstein's special relativity eh!
>
> Which IS daft..... eh!
No, it's how the universe works. There IS no other logical conclusion,
from the postulates of SR (which in another post, I have explained to
be accurate).
Moreover, it has been PROVEN by experiment, time and again.
Jeff Relf
that I somehow missed ? "
Just like Newton , Maxwell , Einstein etc. ,
Bell went to his grave believing in the theory that says :
Pure nature is devoid of intrinsic randomness .
John S. Bell , " Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics "
http://samvak.tripod.com/string02.html :
" ... conventional formulations of quantum theory ,
and of quantum field theory in particular ,
are unprofessionally vague and ambiguous .
Professional theoretical physicists
ought to be able to do better . Bohm has shown us a way . "
John S. Bell , " Against ' Measurement ' "
http://samvak.tripod.com/string02.html :
" It would seem that the theory [ quantum mechanics ]
is exclusively concerned about " results of measurement " ,
and has nothing to say about anything else .
What exactly qualifies some physical systems
to play the role of " measurer " ?
Was the wavefunction of the world waiting to jump
for thousands of millions of years until
a single-celled living creature appeared ?
Or did it have to wait a little longer ,
for some better qualified system ... with a Ph.D. ?
If the theory is to apply to anything but
highly idealized laboratory operations ,
are we not obliged to admit that
more or less " measurement-like " processes
are going on more or less all the time ,
more or less everywhere .
Do we not have jumping then all the time ?
The first charge against " measurement " ,
in the fundamental axioms of quantum mechanics ,
is that it anchors the shifty split of the world
into " system " and " apparatus " .
A second charge is that the word comes
loaded with meaning from everyday life , meaning which
is entirely inappropriate in the quantum context .
When it is said that something is " measured "
it is difficult not to think of the result as referring to
some preexisting property of the object in question .
This is to disregard Bohr's insistence that
in quantum phenomena the apparatus
as well as the system is essentially involved .
If it were not so , how could we understand , for example ,
that " measurement " of
a component of " angular momentum " ...
in an arbitrarily chosen direction ...
yields one of a discrete set of values ? "
This is the artificial dualism that I keep talking about ...
Bilge , you are Insane if you don't see this ...
Insane ... I tell you !
J.S. Bell continues :
" When one forgets the role of the apparatus ,
as the word " measurement " makes all too likely ,
one despairs of ordinary logic ...
hence " quantum logic " .
When one remembers the role of the apparatus ,
ordinary logic is just fine.
In other contexts ,
physicists have been able to take words from ordinary language
and use them as technical terms with no great harm done .
Take for example the " strangeness " , " charm " ,
and " beauty " of elementary particle physics .
No one is taken in by this " baby talk " . ...
Would that it were so with " measurement " .
But in fact the word has had such a damaging effect
on the discussion , that I think
it should now be banned altogether in quantum mechanics . "
Jeff Relf
" You have carefully avoided to even try to answer
my question about the meaning of that statement . "
No , It's you who has taken great pains to not understand .
Keep your foolish delusions ... You no doubt need them .
keith stein
> First of all , only wave-particles can move at .9 c ,
> not " Space Ships " ... eh !
And how fast could another galaxy be moving relative to ours,
do you think Mr Relf ?
And could there not be "Space Ships" already on them ?
> Second of all , The funny thing about remote inertial frames
> is that they are _ Always _ remote .
>
> In other words , SR is describing
> how a remote inertial frame will be " Sensed "
> by a local inertial frame ... i.e. the _ Local _ reality .
SR is BULLSHIT Mr.Relf.
http://groups.google.com/groups?q=keith+stein&hl=en&lr=&safe=off&site=groups
> But , as the Hafele-Keating experiment tells us ,
> these space-time warps have a tangible " Local Reality "
> to them ... it's not an illusion .
The "space-time warps" exist only in warped minds eh!
> From http://www.dipmat.unipg.it/~bartocci/hafkeat.htm :
>
> " These results provide an unambiguous empirical resolution
> of the famous clock ' paradox ' with macroscopic clocks . "
Hafele and Keating's claimed confirmation is a FRAUD Mr. Relf.
http://www.mywebpages.com/asps/H&Kpaper.htm
--
keith stein
Mark Martin
More name droppings. Watch where you step.
-Mark Martin
keith stein
news:e37c3dcf.03061...@posting.google.com...
Well here is an experiment for you which DISPROVES it eh!
A light----> B <-you
< ----------- L --------------> v m/s
Use synchronised clocks at A and B to time how long it takes
light to travel a distance of L meters across the laboratory..
Speed of light relative to the laboratory = L/ (tB - tA) = c
where 'tA' is the time at which the light left A
and 'tB' is the at which the light arrived at B
Now repeat the experiment while running towards B at v m/s
Note that 'in your frame of reference' the point B is moving ,
so that the light must travel an extra distance = v * (tB - tA)
which is the distance B has moved as the light travels from
A to B.
Therefore:
Speed of light relative to you= Light Path / Time Interval
= (L+ v * (tB - tA)) / (tB - tA)
= c + v
keith stein
Bilge
>-- In Bohm's theory, space-time does not transform inertial frames
>according to Lorentz transformations. It is a Galilean world view.
Sure, but the issue is whether or not it can be made compatible
with relativity.
>-- However, Bohm's ontology when applied to relativistic quantum
>mechanics gives _observable_predictions_ that do obey Lorentz
>covariance.
Rather than assert that, give a specific example.
>-- The point being: this is not a "defect" in the theory, any more
>than preferred reference frames are "defects" in modern aether
>theories, in CMBR, in string and branal theories, etc. All
>observations agree with experiment to the limits the particular model
>expresses.
(1) A preferred frame _is_ a defect,
(2) The CMBR is not a theory.
(3) A "preferred frame" in string or brane theories are _not_ preferred
frames in the sense the term is used in ether theories or bohmian
mechanics. At most, a preferred frame in string or brane theories
is preferred in the same sense that an inertial frame might be
considered preferred in general relativity - a frame in which the
physics is simplest. In fact, I have a two volume set of lectures
on string theory and quantum field theory, edited by ed witten and
I do not see strings connected with any preferred frame.
>> But it does. If two events have an absolute time ordering, then the
>> events have an absolute time ordering in _every_ inertial frame because
>> the separation is timelike or at most lightlike (although, I would debate
>> the lightlike part to an extent, but that's standard, so I'll take that to
>> be the case). It is not possible to perform a lorentz transform which
>> changes spacelike interval into into one which is timelike or lightlike.
>> If the interval is spacelike, it's spacelike, prferred frame or not.
>
>You see here how you assume that the ontology still should give a
>space-time that obeys such classifications of time-like and space-like
>that are invariant to Lorentz transformations. You are imposing a
>different spacetime condition than Bohm's ontology is derived in.
No, I'm imposing a consistency requirement. Newtonian mechanics is
_consistent_ with special relativity because special relativity can
be reduced to newtonian mechanics in a limit. But, newtonian mechanics
does not employ a "preferred frame" as part of its ontology, either.
>The Bohm interpretation does give a time ordering, but it is unique.
>Transformations this frame respects do not change ordering. This
>experiment does not test anything related to this interpretation.
You seem to be confusing a test of the interpretation with a test
of whether or not the interpretation agrees with reality.
>It tests a different interpretation that attempted to transfer Lorentz
>invariance down to the ontology.
That happens to be a rather important consideration.
>>
>> Unfortumately (for the bohmian position), relativity seems to
>> be well grounded in experiment.
>
>Here again you confuse the ontology with the observable predictions.
>Let me clarify this:
>
>-- it is possible for a theory to produce observable, relativistic
>predictions while still being nonrelativistic at its ontology.
I maintain that bohmian mechanics does not do that.
>I have been giving plenty of examples.
No, you yet to give one at all.
[...]
>> I don't see any bohmian ontology in the dirac equation.
>
>I'm sorry I can't provide web references (I don't know any), but did
>you look.
In lieu of a reference, explain it yourself. Don't simply assert it.
You shouldn't need to supply a web reference except as a matter of
convenience. Sorry if this is asking too much, but if you are going to
assert something, you should be able to support without needing to
reference it. If a suitable reference exists such that it is a conven-
ience, that's fine. If not, use your own understanding of the the
theory to come up with an example. The latter also has the advantage
that there is no question of what the author meant.
>I provided the Bohm, Hiley book as a reference, but you are
>responding as if you don't need to study the topic you are debating.
At this juncture, you've given me no reason to believe I do.
>And earlier in this discussion you were accusing me of doing that when
>it wasn't at all true, and I had in fact studied not only the
>reference you provided but had followed the referrence trail.
>I want to have an intelligent discussion here, but I am getting the
>impression that you are being stubborn without exploration.
If so, then say something concrete.
>I will try to give more detailed explanations, but you can try as well
>not to respond with premature judgements.
Then do so. "Detailed" does not mean simply a more verbose version
of the original. Include the mathematics which represents the ontology
in those details.
[...]
>You are arguing in two different directions here. Bohm's ontology
>gives isomorphic predictions to standard QM.
I'm arguing that it does not. It gives predictions which are
isomorphic to quantum mechanics when standard quantum theory is
restricted to the scroedinger equation for non-identical particles.
Half of what I've been arguing concerns the situation where there exists a
likelyhood that bohmian ontology is not consistent with a very specific
combination of symmetries, and therefore must give a different prediction
(i.e., ghose' article).
Furthermore, I do not see how the bohmian _ontology_ is consistent
with invariance of _any_ sort. An ontology with a preferred frame is
considerably different than an ontology based upon invariance. In
particular, invariance precludes a preferred frame.
>Yet, it provides a new ontological existents whose properties can
>be questioned, making it a fertile theory. This is one of the major
>driving forces for Bohm introducing the interpretation, because he
>felt the standard QM ontology was unrealistic and sterile.
But qm is neither sterile nor unrealistic. Just look at the number of
articles in the last decade which have emphasized the information
theoretic aspects of quantum mechanics or look at complexity theory which
address such things as obtaining lorentz invariance as a consequence of an
inerently _probabilistic_ theory. Frankly, it's getting a bit annoying to
have people insist that a probabilistic interpretation is nothing more
than a positivistic viewpoint, lacking any underlying motivation.
That simply isn't the case.
>Adding a more fundamental ontology breaks past the veil of probabilities
>and opens up more avenues for research.
It has then probably never occured to you that the probabilities
may be seen not as a "veil", but as an essential part of an ontology.
The most annoying thing about those who believe the bohmian ontology
is that they see themselves as somehow "rescuing" quantum mechanics
from being "plagued" by probabilities and cannot conceive of the
possibility that a probabilistic interpretation might be seen as
a desirable feature which eliminates the problems with a deterministic
theory.
>There is a solid connection with the basic Bohm ontology and standard
>QM, so that it is as founded in experiment as the standard interpretation.
I disagree. Bohm's theory is determinstic. Standard quantum theory
is not. The ontologies are incompatible. ANY deterministic theory
should be able to distinguish itself from one which is inherently
non-deterministic.
>But, as is the entire topic of this thread, one has "determinism as
>a muse" beyond the unobserved.
Observation does not necessarily mean "direct observation by humans". If
that were the case, it would be impossible to study the nucleus. Also, if
there is some process that really does give quantum mechanics a causal
basis, then in principle, it should be possible to show the cause and
effect, via the black box argument I made. If the output is independent of
the input, for any input, then the input cannot be the cause of the
output. It isn't necessary to know the input. If what bohmian mechanincs
is saying through the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, is that by assuming
a random distribution, one can imagine a causal process as input which
reproduces the random distribution at the output, then the interpretation
is rather shallow. While I don't believe that was bohm's interpretation,
I do believe that is what the interpretation has become.
[...]
>
>It is a muse to further theories. An ontological foundation. The
>point being that ontologies provide a basis for exploring new
>theories.
So is a probabilistic ontology.
>Why does one give preference to the probabilistic ontology?
For one reason, such an interpretation is natural in the context
of information theory and entropy. I can obtain the entropy of a
black hole in terms of bits simply from considering the smallest
region of space in which it is possible to specify the loctation
of an object. The inability to specify a location to a point has
implications about what it means for spacetime to be a continuum.
> Why, after more than a half century, aren't more physicists at least
>familiar with the idea that Bohm's ontology is an equally valid
>interpretation?
Maybe because the arguments aren't very convincing.
>You have been debating with me that Bohm's theory is testable, and
>given papers to support your argument where the authors themselves
>state the opposite.
The authors have _not_ stated the opposite. What the authors in both
papers have said is that the theory is not testable when restricted
to some subset of quantum phenomena describable by standard quantum
theory. In the case of multisimultaneity, it's the compatibility with
relativity that is the issue. In ghose' paper, the issue is with identical
particles.
Ghose only states that the theory is untestable for gibbs ensembles.
The quantum equilibrium hypothesis asserts this equivalence and this
equivalence only. But, a pair of fermions or bosons is _not_ a gibbs
ensemble. Bohmian mechanics _presumes_ that the symmeterization of
the wavefunction will yield trajectories which are indistinguishable
from the quantum probabilities given the assumption that the particles
are chosen randomly from a gibbs ensemble intitially. That assumption
is just that - an assumption. It doesn't follow from anything contained
in the interpretation. (I really don't see how bohmian ontology justifies
the use of symmeterized wavefunctions in the first place, but that's
a separate issue and it isn't necessary to address that for ghose
argument).
>Do you think all of the other interpretations are "tooth fairy"
>explanations?
I have various opinions about other interpretations. I find the "tooth
fairy" analogy especially appropriate to the bohmian ontology (at least
in its present form). In terms of thhe same analogy, one might say that
bohm's intent was to discover whether or not the "tooth fairy" was real.
The intent of the current interpretation is to declare the "tooth fairy"
to be real, and assert that she wears a disguise that makes her look
just like your parents if you happen to catch one of them replacing
the tooth with a coin or in the event that you really do see the "tooth
fairy", the "tooth fairy" explanation and the "parents" theory are
simultaneously rendered false.
This was certainly not bohm's intent. Bohm intended to offer an
interpretation which allowed for the possibility of falsifying the
standard interpretation and leave it as a limiting case of his own.
He states that in his first article in prl where he presents the
theory.
>If not, why do you have such a problem seeing Bohm as yet another
>possible interpretation, with its own line of research programmes?
Primarily because the metaphysics in bohmian mechanics has been given
precedence over what it implies to the extent that the interpretation
is completely devoid of anything that could seriously be called deter-
ministic. The entire "program" seems to be centered on insuring that
the ontology doesn't interfere with its own implications.
I consider the "program" comparable to an ether "program". Ether
advocates are especially fond of asserting that the ether provides a
"mechanism" for the conatant velocity of light in special relativity, yet
when asked to do something as simple as justify the transversality of a
light wave in their ether, thus demonstrating the mechanism, none can do
so. Even supposing I hand them that as a freebie and ask why the
"mechanism" describing light should apply universally, and in particular,
to phenomena which are manifestly non-electromagnetic, most do not even
understand the question. Like bohmian mechanics, if there is something
deeper involved, it certainly is not evident from the discussions in this
newsgroup. The discussions in this newsgroup tend to indicate the opposite
- the belief comes from an even more simplistic and naive view of reality
than I would have thought reasonable given the degree of insistence.
>> This is not true. Chaotic systems are unpredictable, but not
>> probabilistic. They are unpredictable for a completely different
>> reason than quantum mechanics is probabilistic.
>
>Again we are talking past each other and you are assuming what you
>want to prove.
What am I trying to prove by that statement? It's a simple statement
of fact. Chaotic theories are not inherently probabilistic. The
three body problem in gravitation is deterministic and chaotic.
>
>-- Bohm's interpretation of QM is not probabilistic in the way that
>standard interpretations of QM are.
Yes. I know. That's the point. The fact that the probability in bohmian
mechanics is only a statistical equivalence allows for the possibility
of real differences in the predictions of the two interpretations if one
adheres to the ontology.
>Bohm's interpretation is probabilistic in the way that chaotic yet
>deterministic theories are. It is a theory which attributes well
>defined trajectories to the motion of particles.
Sure. I didn't say that it wasn't If we are "talking past each other",
it's not you talking past me. I understand what you are saying and you
don't need to keep repeating it. In fact, what you are trying to explain
here is the basis of the point I was trying to make above. The fact that
probabilities in bohmian mechanics have a different origin than in
standard quantum theory is precisely why nothing, a priori, rules out
the possibility that the two interpretations could lead to different
predictions, if one adheres to the ontology.
>> I'm sorry, but that's getting carried away. Are you trying to tell
>> me that after performing one trial, that the initial conditions for the
>> next trial will depend upon the first trial regardless of how much
>> time elapses betweenb the two trials? That would seem to contradict
>> the quantum equilibrium hypothesis.
>
>No, that's not at all what I am saying. I am saying:
>
>-- Standard QM gives the thing to set to be the wave function. This
>is fundamentally probabilistic.
>-- Bohm's QM gives the thing to set the quantum potential and the
>initial conditions for the particle in phase space (its position and
>momentum). This is deterministic.
>
>I am not even talking about successive trials. Since you set the
>conditions with knobs and switches, there are no dependencies between
>trials. Each is ab initio.
That was not my understanding of your objection.
>I will repeat this:
>
>"Chaotic systems and probabilistic systems are completely different.
>The 3-body problem is chaotic. Planetary motion can be chaotic. None
>of those are probabilistic."
Don't keep repeating it, since that fact is part of my argument.
You are assuming that I couldn't possibly understand this point and
subsequently disagree with bohmian mechanics being indistinguishable
from standard quantum theory. Not only does that not follow, the
opposite is true. Because the origin of the probabilities is different,
the probabilities should manifest themselves differently in at least
some physical phenomena.
[...]
>> entirety of which hinges upon that same invariance. With that principle
>> alone, I can start with E^2 = p^2 + m^2 and the quantum substitutions
>> p = -i\hbar\grad and E = i\hbar d/dt, and obtain the qed lagrangian in
>> less than two pages of arithmetic. I have no idea how one would get there
>> by using bohmian mechanics.
>
>Exactly the same way.
Come on. First you say that I can't apply the concepts of lorentz
invariance to bohmian mechanics and then you say that I can obtain
a lorentz invariant theory from bohmian mechanics the same way one
can extend quantum mechanics.
[...]
>I think it is most sensible to actually research theories before one
>commits to an opposition of it.
Then perhaps you should do so. What happended to fulfilling the
statement you made above:
>I will try to give more detailed explanations, but you can try as well
>not to respond with premature judgements.
My judgements are not premature. They reflect the fact that you make
assertions without supporting them.
Bilge
> that I somehow missed ? "
[*snip*]
Cutting and pasting quotes didn't answer the question.
Jeff Relf
" Cutting and pasting quotes didn't answer the question . "
You're a fucking baby .
Jeff Relf
" More name droppings. Watch where you step . "
I provide support from the world's most renowned scientists ,
While you're just a dropping .
Just like Newton , Maxwell , Einstein etc. ,
Bell went to his grave believing in the theory that says :
Pure nature is devoid of intrinsic randomness .
John S. Bell , " Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics "
Jeff Relf
" And how fast could another galaxy be moving relative to ours ,
do you think Mr Relf ? "
Nowhere near .9 c ... eh !
keith stein
So you do think !
An excellent answer.... eh!
keith stein