The role of logic in the scientific method

[Mike]

Recently I had a challenging debate in this newsgroup
about the nature of the scientic method. I don't think
the issues raised there have been adequately resolved.
And it seems that these questions are vital to the
foundations of physics. No doubt that the definition
of the scientific method and the role of logic and
reason in science can spark an exhilarating debate. And
the debate at times may go around in circles until the
main issues are recognized. But I can think of no
better place to debate these questions than in a
foundation of physics forum.

As I understand it, the scientic method involves making
educated guesses at what mathematics is used to
describe physical process. This is called an hypothosis
or a theory. Then we make predictions based on that
theory about things not observed yet. If the predictions
are actually observed, then this lends credibility to
that theory. But we can never say that a theory has been
proven absolutely true in all circumstances, since there
may be measurements not made yet that may contradict the
theory. A theory can be falsified but never proven
universally valid.

But we are beginning to construct theories about
incredibly large and small things that we can not hope to
measure, stings at the Planck scale, multiple universe
beyond our cosmological event horizon. And so it seems we
are left to measure the validity of a theory by its
internal consistency. This only begs the question as to if
a theory can be derived from logical consistency alone. Or
does that violate the scientific method. Some would say
that theory must be based on empirical evidence. Others
may think that we don't expect observation to ever violate
any principle of logical consistency.

Quantum mechanics offers the biggest challenge to our
intuition about the nature of reality. And it is
frustrating to listen to one scientist after another say
that we really don't know why reality is quantum mechanical.
It's just an ad hoc curve fitting process of finding
mathematical constructs that are used only because they
work. But no one really understands where it comes from.

Is there a logical explanation for the laws of physics? Can
a valid theory be derived from reason alone? I have a
theory that attempt to derive at least QM from logic alone.
And I can offer it as a point of reference to spark debate.
But I have to wonder if there is really anything in principle
that would automatically rule out such a derivation. And I
would appreciate your comments on this subject.
Thank you.

[Mike]

On Wednesday, February 27, 2013 7:14:43 PM UTC-5, Mike wrote:
> Recently I had a challenging debate in this newsgroup
>
> about the nature of the scientic method. I don't think

Sorry for the misspellings. My spellchecker doesn't work
very well; it inserts corrections in between words, and
I sometimes miss those errors. Coupled with having to
reload the forum page if I take too long, I forget to
correct myself. I suppose it wouldn't hurt to wait a few
hours before proofreading so I forget what I thought I
meant. Then I'd probably catch all those errors. Please
try to overlook those errors and address the content.
Thanks.

[Ken S. Tucker]

Mike wrote:
...

> Quantum mechanics offers the biggest challenge to our
> intuition about the nature of reality. And it is
> frustrating to listen to one scientist after another say
> that we really don't know why reality is quantum mechanical.
> It's just an ad hoc curve fitting process of finding
> mathematical constructs that are used only because they
> work. But no one really understands where it comes from.

...
What definition of "Quantum mechanics" are you writing about?
Ken

[Mike]

On Thursday, February 28, 2013 12:58:02 PM UTC-5,

Ken S. Tucker wrote:

> What definition of "Quantum mechanics" are you
writing about?
>
> Ken

How many definitions of QM are there? I think there
still may be some confusion about why there would be
a superposition of wavefunctions that are squared to
get probabilities, why complex numbers enter the
formalism, why the uncertainty principle, Hilbert
spaces, zero point energy, particle wave duality, etc,
etc. This all begs for an explanation and seems to
suggest that there must be something more basic that
gives rise to it.

Now, I have my own explanation for all of this which
basically describes quantum theory as being derived
from logic alone apart from postulating any physical
objects like strings, branes, oscillators, fields, etc.
Its only premise is that reality consists of a
consistent set of non-specific things described as
propositions that are in conjunction with each other.
But that then begs the question of the role of logic in
the scientIFic method. Is it fair to start with such a
premise? Or must one pose some object which can be
observed as the basis of everything else?

My website is found at:

http://webpages.charter.net/majik1/QMlogic.htm

It might take a few minutes to load. (Slow server)

[Tom Roberts]

On 2/27/13 2/27/13 6:14 PM, Mike wrote:
> As I understand it, the scientic method involves making
> educated guesses at what mathematics is used to
> describe physical process. This is called an hypothosis
> or a theory. Then we make predictions based on that
> theory about things not observed yet. If the predictions
> are actually observed, then this lends credibility to
> that theory. But we can never say that a theory has been
> proven absolutely true in all circumstances, since there
> may be measurements not made yet that may contradict the
> theory. A theory can be falsified but never proven
> universally valid.

Yes. "True" does not apply to physical theories, it only applies to math and logic.

> But we are beginning to construct theories about
> incredibly large and small things that we can not hope to

> measure, [...]

Insofar as they are untestable, they are not scientific. There is a rather large
literature on this aspect of string theory, such as _Not_Even_Wrong_ by Peter Woit.

> Quantum mechanics offers the biggest challenge to our
> intuition about the nature of reality. And it is
> frustrating to listen to one scientist after another say
> that we really don't know why reality is quantum mechanical.
> It's just an ad hoc curve fitting process of finding
> mathematical constructs that are used only because they
> work. But no one really understands where it comes from.

Actually, relativity poses an equally difficult challenge to most peoples'
intuition about the world.

Bottom line: people acquire their intuition during their formative years, and
there's no reason to expect such notions to apply in regimes far removed from
experiences in childhood. In fact, the world does indeed behave quite
differently. Intuition is a VERY BAD guide to the world we inhabit, except in
regimes where it was acquired.

Flies walk on ceilings, yet their scale differs from humans by
less than 3 orders of magnitude, relativity and QM act at
scales more than 6 orders of magnitude away.

> Is there a logical explanation for the laws of physics?

Why should anyone expect that? Logic and math are wholly divorced from the world
we inhabit, and it is quite clear that Nature uses neither in operating the
world around us. As Wigner famously wrote, it is unreasonable that mathematics
is so effective in modeling the world. And yet, our mathematical theories are
quite good at modeling the world we inhabit.


Tom Roberts

[Ken S. Tucker]

Michael, it loaded well for me, no prob, clearly
notated.
Your last questions ask for a judgment, myself I find
the QM (as you well describe), based and basically derivable
from General Relativity, by solving the Field Equations for
electrical interactions.
I find GR itself can be deduced from mathematical principles
alone, so one keep do as they please.
Regards
Ken S. Tucker

[Mike]

> Tom Roberts

This is exactly the issue I'm trying to resolve.

Yes, logic applies to fiction as well as to fact. And yes
logic is a language of argument forms without regard to the
reality of those arguments. But at what point does reason
stop being applicable to reality? Are we supposed to stop
with the discovery of some particle or field or string with
no more questions as to how that thing came about? If
absolutely everything is subject to reason, does that mean
that reason itself is the governing force of everything?
Does that mean that we should expect to derive physics from
logic eventually? I think so.

[b...@birdband.net]

On Thursday, February 28, 2013 11:52:32 PM UTC-5, Tom Roberts wrote:

There are many things in QM that seem to defy OUR logic. Our logic is only logical to our knowledge.

John Wheeler once said that the universe has a life no equation can reflect and that is because there are many variables and conditional aspects that make formulating equations not a simple or elegant solution. a computer algorithm can sometimes be more effective for solving physical calculations because of the flexibility of setting initial conditions, time frames, work flows, etc, things than a flat lifeless complicated equation with variable arguments could never have.

Algorithm design is the path to understandings the most counter intuitive processes we know as it has been shown before in the past.

r.y


======================================= MODERATOR'S COMMENT:
Posting via the new google groups is messed up; you need to manually do a carriage return at around 72 characters for UseNet.. Thanks. -fd

[Mike]

On Friday, March 1, 2013 1:19:44 PM UTC-5, Mike wrote:

> Yes, logic applies to fiction as well as to fact. And yes
> logic is a language of argument forms without regard to the
> reality of those arguments. But at what point does reason
> stop being applicable to reality? Are we supposed to stop
> with the discovery of some particle or field or string with
> no more questions as to how that thing came about? If
> absolutely everything is subject to reason, does that mean
> that reason itself is the governing force of everything?
> Does that mean that we should expect to derive physics from
> logic eventually? I think so.

So the question is, what principles of logic can we expect
to apply to reality irregardless of the facts? Can we say,
for example that reality it a consistent set of facts even
if we don't know the exact nature of the fundamental
constituents of those facts? It seems hard to deny that
premise.

But others would say that the ultimate logic of the
universe remains to be discovered, and they would rather
let the scientific method proceed until the correct logic
is revealed.

Yet we still have the concepts of things existing or not.
And this allows us to apply the logic of true and false
propositions to the binary states of existence or not. If
we cannot escape describing real things with propositions,
then how can we escape using the rules of logical
consistency to those propositions? If the rules of logic
are unescapable, and describing thing with propositions is
unescapable, then it seems unavoidable that we can apply
the rules of logic to the things of nature irregardless of
the make up of those things. That means that logical
consistency between facts in reality is a valid premise to
start a derivation of physics. Although I appreciate your
input if you feel differently.

[b...@birdband.net]

On Wednesday, March 6, 2013 9:12:32 AM UTC-5, Mike wrote:
> On Friday, March 1, 2013 1:19:44 PM UTC-5, Mike wrote:
> > Does that mean that we should expect to derive physics from
> > logic eventually? I think so.
>
> So the question is, what principles of logic can we expect
> to apply to reality irregardless of the facts? Can we say,
> for example that reality it a consistent set of facts even
> if we don't know the exact nature of the fundamental
> constituents of those facts? It seems hard to deny that
> premise.
>

Well that is what making theories is all about!, but
theories don't go anywhere unless they make predictions
that can be testable so, whats the point?

>
> But others would say that the ultimate logic of the
> universe remains to be discovered, and they would rather
> let the scientific method proceed until the correct logic
> is revealed.
>

that is the best way to fill out the holes of the puzzle
in a manner that doesn't become personal. the logic of
a ant is not equal to that of a tiger or a person.
in fact, there may be different magnitude orders in what
you mean by logic!

>
> Yet we still have the concepts of things existing or not.
> And this allows us to apply the logic of true and false
> propositions to the binary states of existence or not. If
> we cannot escape describing real things with propositions,
> then how can we escape using the rules of logical
> consistency to those propositions? If the rules of logic
> are unescapable, and describing thing with propositions is
> unescapable, then it seems unavoidable that we can apply
> the rules of logic to the things of nature irregardless of
> the make up of those things. That means that logical
> consistency between facts in reality is a valid premise to
> start a derivation of physics. Although I appreciate your
> input if you feel differently.
>

relational thinking helps understanding workings in general
but each of these workings has constituents of there own that may not be
in any way related or simmilar to other constituents in other workings.

to reach a "universal logic" is the same as reaching a TOE.
theory and experiment are essential to the task and
the order in wish they are performed doesn't change the outcome.
a theory or "logic" that doesn't provide ideas on how to proceed
empirically doesn't do much for science or industry.

there may be a simple and elegant principle behind it all but we don't
get anywhere near this answer without getting down into the details

r.y

[Mike]

On Wednesday, March 6, 2013 6:58:26 PM UTC-5, b...@birdband.net wrote:

>
> relational thinking helps understanding workings in general
> but each of these workings has constituents of there own that may not be
> in any way related or simmilar to other constituents in other workings.
>
> to reach a "universal logic" is the same as reaching a TOE.
> theory and experiment are essential to the task and
> the order in wish they are performed doesn't change the outcome.
> a theory or "logic" that doesn't provide ideas on how to proceed
> empirically doesn't do much for science or industry.
>
> there may be a simple and elegant principle behind it all but we don't
> get anywhere near this answer without getting down into the details
>
> r.y

I agree that the whole purpose of theorizing is to make
predictions that are confirmed by observation. If a
theory were to be developed on principle alone, it would
still need to be confirmed by observation. Otherwise,
one would suspect that an error has been made in the math
or that the starting premises are not correct.

Still, I am not comfortable with just building a theory
by curve fitting the data in an ad-hoc manner that is
useful only because it works. That leaves too many
questions as to why nature complies with that math. I
think it would be much more satisfying if theory could be
derived instead of contrived. Answers are inherent in a
good explanation.

So I have to wonder if theory could be derived from logic
alone, apart from any input from experimental data. That,
of course, forces the issue of how much faith one has in
logic. Do you believe that the binary logic of true or
false propositions can be applied to the binary state of
things existing or not? Humans may consider the
possibility of things not existing, but reality only
consists of things that do exist, right? How is the state of
non-existence relevant to reality? Is this where
probabilities enter the equation? Yet, the same thing
could be asked about probabilities. How is the probability
that something may exist relevant to the fact that it does
or does not actually exist? It seems probabilities are
only a human device to characterize uncertainty. Yet
probabilities seems to work just as well as propositional
logic. I'm sure this all has something to do with the
wavefunction collapsing to only one alternative.

[Mike]

On Thursday, March 7, 2013 12:22:19 PM UTC-5, Mike wrote:
>
> Do you believe that the binary logic of true or
> false propositions can be applied to the binary state of
> things existing or not?

This may work to answer why there is something rather than nothing. Things are described by propositions to which logic is applied. logic cannot apply when there are no propositions. You cannot apply reason to nothing. The only logical alternative is that there be something to which logic can be applied.

Does this state in other words that reality is derived from logic since logic necessitates existence in this argument?


======================================= MODERATOR'S COMMENT:
Posting via googlegroups is messed up; please manually wrap your lines at around 72 characters per line. Use a text editor then copy and paste to googleroups. -fd

[ben...@hotmail.com]

On Thursday, 7 March 2013 17:22:19 UTC, Mike wrote:
> On Wednesday, March 6, 2013 6:58:26 PM UTC-5, b...@birdband.net wrote:

<snip>
> ...

> logic. I'm sure this all has something to do with the
> wavefunction collapsing to only one alternative.

A few ideas, but I am not expert in any of this.
Hari Seldon in Asimov's fictional Foundation trilogy applied the law of
large numbers to psychology/sociology/politics/ etc somehow. The idea was
that with billions of planets in the Foundation bloc, the outcome for the
aggregate was much more certain than for any single planet.

If the law of large numbers could similarly be applied (maybe still only in
fiction alas!) to the collection of multiverses, then maybe the structure
of the whole assemblage would be more certain than the structure of what we
can see of our universe. In bodies, some parts are hands and some are
feet. The DNA in the cells in one body are presumably the same, so the
determination of which cells form feet and which form hands may be
determined by interaction between cells. Ie to more fully understand the
functioning of the DNA, maybe you need to see it at work in the whole body
not just in one cell.

So looking at the logic (or DNA) in our one universe may not give you the
picture for a multiverse without seeing many universes interacting? Is our
universe a bit of a hand or a bit of a foot? Maybe we need to see a much wider
picture to get the workings of the logic?

My idea of a multiverse is not one of entangled states. It is just a
simple fractal-like collection of universes at many orders of magnitudes.
Our universe is of course not the biggest nor the smallest order of size.
And our universe can interact with other universes just like particles
interact.

If a set has two attractor points A and B as elements within it then, when
the set boundary is drawn tight at a wave function collapse, the outcome
may be very uncertain as to whether the Implication is going to settle on
A or B. This would introduce chance into the collapse. Collapsing at A
may help to form a hand while collapse at B may contribute to a foot. The
odds of A and B happening may be influenced by what is causing the
collapse ie another particle, or applying this to our universe, another
neighbouring universe may influence the collapse point of our universe in
an exterior spacetime.

This is not physics, but if two universes can interact like particles then
that interaction affects both separate universes taking part in the
collision. It may not be quick enough to influence us or worry us, so it
can be dismissed. Except my idea of dark energy is an energy provided by
such an interaction. And that energy will probably cause a wave function
collapse of our universe (at a CCC end of cycle). It is odd that in CCC,
the energy stretching out the universe to a cold isolated end is actually
stretching us out to a point ending, as a completely stretched out
universe loses its metric. The point of collapse of our universe is a
point in an exterior space time, not in ours.

The Foundation trilogy goes on to apply the law of large numbers to
individual people which seemed a flaw in the supposed use of such a law.
(Though it is excusable in the requirement of making an interesting story.)
Similarly I don't see how you can know whether logic points to a making of a
hand or a foot in a particular event, without taking in the overall picture.
It reminds me of Bohm's implicate and explicate orders?

Sorry for rambling.

Ben

[Mike]

On Friday, March 8, 2013 9:17:21 AM UTC-5,

> Similarly I don't see how you can know whether
> logic points to a making of a hand or a foot in
> a particular event, without taking in the overall
> picture.
>

By "hand or foot", I assume you mean that since logic
applies to everything, how can it specify anything in
particular. By "without taking in the overall picture",
I assume you mean, without taking into account
observations. Sorry, best interpretation I can give to
your statement. These are fair questions.

I would take the approach that the most basic laws of
physics like logic are general and apply to everything
whether hand or foot and govern what is observable in
the overall picture. The idea is that logic may have a
natural extention into math that gives rise to laws of
physics.

[Mike]

On Friday, March 8, 2013 2:59:57 AM UTC-5, Mike wrote:
> On Thursday, March 7, 2013 12:22:19 PM UTC-5, Mike wrote:
>
> >
>
> > Do you believe that the binary logic of true or
> > false propositions can be applied to the binary state of
> > things existing or not?
>
> This may work to answer why there is something rather than
> nothing. Things are described by propositions to which
> logic is applied. logic cannot apply when there are no
> propositions. You cannot apply reason to nothing. The only
> logical alternative is that there be something to which
> logic can be applied.
>

Perhaps this goes even further. Logic is defined in terms of
the relationships between propositions, ANDs and ORs and
IMPLICATTIONS, etc. In other words, you can't argue anything
about one proposition, but you can determine the type of
relationship between two or more propositions. I think this
means that you cannot use reason on reality until there is a
set of facts to determine relationships about. One thing is
not sufficient; you must have a set of things in order to
apply reason and logic. Reason is only relevant to a group of
things.

If this is a necessary truth about using reason on existence,
does that specify a principle with which to derive physics
irregardless of what the beginning set of facts are, since
you know you need a set of things before you can use reason
to establish the kind of relationships between them? I think
so, but I would respect your views if you think otherwise.

[Richard D. Saam]

On 3/8/13 10:23 AM, Mike wrote:.

>
> I would take the approach that the most basic laws of
> physics like logic are general and apply to everything
> whether hand or foot and govern what is observable in
> the overall picture. The idea is that logic may have a
> natural extention into math that gives rise to laws of
> physics.
>

Albert Einstein
'The miracle of the universe is that it is comprehensible'

Kurt Goedel
'The miracle of the universe is that it is incomprehensible'

[ben...@hotmail.com]

On Friday, 8 March 2013 23:45:04 UTC, Mike wrote:
<snip>

>
> ... Reason is only relevant to a group of things.
>

My analogy is that the same DNA in every cell is responsible for making
that cell to be part of a hand or a foot. The DNA in a cell has evolved
so as to make a whole creature. DNA that did not make a whole creature
would not be successful and would not replicate.

But if one were limited to look only at one cell and try to understand the
logic in the DNA, then I suppose you are correct. I guess that I mean
that one is limited to observing one cell. Ie we may observe in one part
of our universe, up to a horizon. But just as understanding the DNA
structure needs observations on the whole creature, then understanding the
logic of the multiverse would need observations to be made on the
multiverse, not just on one small part of one universe.

Is this like Godel's incompleteness? Manipulation of logic within one set
of rules leads to some questions that are not resolvable? So you need to
change the rules, or need to look at the wider multiverse? And so on, and
so on, to more and more turtles.

The logic of creature growth could, I suppose, get to the point where you
only need to look at one cell's DNA in order to predict the exact form of
a creature. Likewise, the logic within our universe could be extrapolated
to the multiverse. But I don't see that happening without lots of data
being available from the multiverse first in order to find, check and
cross-check the application of the logic in other universes.

The logic in the DNA is held in the double helix. Where is the logic of
the universe kept? It is a few years since I wrote here in detail about
using the Rasch pairs model to form a metric. If the universe is a
holographic projection then the data (and logic) to form our universe
could be kept somewhere else. Eg like in the projector room being where
the reel and projector are kept for a movie. I am not sure about object
oriented programming being appropriate where the logic lies within
particles, or the vacuum, in the universe. But I suspect the data are
kept with the particles. The Rasch model only needs binary input for two
particles at a time for software to place the particles on a ratio metric.
And you need more than one particle to form a scale. Two isolated groups
of particles would not use a common scale but they could later integrate
to a common scale if brought together.

I did have the idea some years ago that spin might be the binary data of a
fermion used in constructing the metric of space. But I could not think
why it was so. Electrons tend to change spin state to fit in with nearby
electrons in a magnetic field say. Also, the spin state could be "+" from
0 to 360 deg but that would change to spin "-" between 361 to 720 deg. So
maybe two electrons having the same spin puts them closer together in the
metric generating logic than two electrons having opposite spins? And the
metric only is amended when the spin is measured at an interaction. But that is
very speculative.

I am not sure if the concept of "one thing" is meaningful. In my idea of
a fractal universe every single thing is a composite thing. So reason
could apply between its parts.

Does your 0/1 logic cater for entangled states? Ie where the state is "0
OR 1" and you may never know the Implication? So do you really have three
states: 0, 1 and 0/1?

My preon model has 24 preons or universes making up an electron. Maybe
our universe is one of 24 universes making up a much grander 'electron'.
My model needs logic applied to wider than just our universe. I cannot
think how it could come about that universes could cooperate like that.
But I cannot comprehend, either, how the DNA came about to make cells
cooperate, yet it does. But if universes interact all the time in a
multiverse then it would be evolution at work. But, again, "where is the
logic kept"?

Ben

[Mike]

On Saturday, March 9, 2013 5:38:09 PM UTC-5, ben...@hotmail.com wrote:
> On Friday, 8 March 2013 23:45:04 UTC, Mike wrote:

>
> then understanding the
> logic of the multiverse would need observations to be made on the
> multiverse, not just on one small part of one universe.

The observation sufficient to apply logic is the fact that something exists. It is assigned that value of True.

>
>
>
> Is this like Godel's incompleteness? Manipulation of logic within one set
> of rules leads to some questions that are not resolvable? So you need to
> change the rules, or need to look at the wider multiverse? And so on, and
> so on, to more and more turtles.
>

Godel's proved propositional logic is complete. I don't even try to find every possible equation that's derivable with math. I simple use the Dirac delta function to represent material implication of logic. The rest follows from that.

>
>
> Does your 0/1 logic cater for entangled states? Ie where the state is "0
> OR 1" and you may never know the Implication? So do you really have three
> states: 0, 1 and 0/1?
>

I've found where the wavefunction comes from and superpositions of them. I suppose that entanglement is part of that.


PS. I had trouble wading through your long post to get to the relevant part. I hope I captured your concerns. I would appreciate it if you could take your time and be a little more concise next time. Thanks.

[Mike]

On Friday, March 8, 2013 6:45:04 PM UTC-5, Mike wrote:

> If this is a necessary truth about using reason on existence,
> does that specify a principle with which to derive physics
> irregardless of what the beginning set of facts are, since
> you know you need a set of things before you can use reason
> to establish the kind of relationships between them?

I suppose the next thing to consider is how to form a manifold from a set of "facts". For it seems everything in reality is described by various things at various points in space. Does a set of facts lend itself to the construction of a manifold with coordinate systems on it? For if it can, then one can apply the typical tools of tensor analysis on it as is done in modern physics.

A coordinate systems is just a convenient way to label distinct points. And of course, we could lable "facts" with individual coordinates. How to label them is arbitrary, and I suppose one could use coordinates infinitismally apart so that the space of "facts" could be represented by a conintuously connected set of points.

Or, each proposition could be equated to a conjunction of a great number of other propositions/facts until there is an infinite number of facts being represented as points labeled with a continuous set of coordinates.

This would make the point set "connected", meaning that between any two points in the set there is a continuous path constructed from points in that set.

But the point set also needs to have the property of being Hausdorff, meaning that any two points, no matter how close, can each be surrounded by a neighborhood that does not intersect the neighborhood around the other point. Every point lives in its own little haus (house). The interesting thing about my formalism, when I use the Dirac measure to represent implication, this states for each point a region exists around it that's used to determine set inclusion or not. I'm not sure yet, but this sounds like the definitions of Hausdorff. So I think I'm on my way to proving that my formalism naturally forms a manifold.

If there are people well informed about topology and differential geometry, I'd appreciate your comments. Thank you.


======================================= MODERATOR'S COMMENT:
Posting via the new google groups is messed up; you need to manually do a carriage return at around 72 characters for UseNet. Thanks. -fd

[Tom Roberts]

On 3/6/13 3/6/13 - 8:12 AM, Mike wrote:
> Yet we still have the concepts of things existing or not.

> [...]

YOU may have those concepts, but QFT does not. There are problems with both
"things" and "existing" which I think you have not thought about adequately.

When gauge bosons multiply without bound in an infrared
divergence, are they "things"? Do they "exist"? Ditto for
the virtual particles of the dynamic and active sea that
is the vacuum. I think English words are inadequate, and
with them your "logic".

Your approach of trying to "derive physics from logic" is far too much in the
old school of "armchair physics", and I think it is doomed to failure. Logic is
completely divorced from the world we inhabit, and you are basically attempting
to impose your hopes and dreams -- your THOUGHTS -- onto nature; she of course
goes blithely on her way without reference to your attempts.

In short: logic is thoughts; nature is not.


Tom Roberts

[Tom Roberts]

On 3/8/13 3/8/13 - 9:50 PM, Richard D. Saam wrote:
> Albert Einstein
> 'The miracle of the universe is that it is comprehensible'
>
> Kurt Goedel
> 'The miracle of the universe is that it is incomprehensible'

"God is in the details." -- unknown

"The Devil is in the details." -- unknown


Tom Roberts

[b...@birdband.net]

On Thursday, March 7, 2013 12:22:19 PM UTC-5, Mike wrote:

but the binary nature of it all doesn't rely on things NOT existing!
Everything EXISTS in binaries. you can't say that an electron
doesn't exist because is not a proton or a wave is not made of
particles, etc. . . that is the dual nature of the universe.

even what we think of nothing is something in some way.
and if you think of death as something nonexistent, then
there is where your logic fails.

our whole computer logic is set by yes or no, 1's and 0's and
0's are as important as 1's to make up byte's of data.

that is the whole point of propositional logic in the digital world
that can replicate with accuracy our analog reality.

and yes, it is a matter of probability what makes the wave function
collapse to one alternative while the other remains away from observation.

r.y

[Mike]

On Monday, March 11, 2013 2:00:09 PM UTC-4, Tom Roberts wrote:

>
> Your approach of trying to "derive physics from logic" is
> far too much in the old school of "armchair physics", and
> I think it is doomed to failure.

Don't try to dissuade me from my efforts. I'm too close. I
derived quantum theory from logic, both quantum mechanics and
QFT. And I even got the U(1)SU(2)SU(3) symmetry. At this point
the only thing that will get me to stop is a fundamental math
error. I'm passed the phylosophical justification and into the
math. See more at:

http://webpages.charter.net/majik1/QMlogic.htm

> Logic is completely divorced from the world we inhabit, and

> you are basically attempting impose your hopes and dreams

> -- your THOUGHTS -- onto nature; she of course goes blithely
> on her way without reference to your attempts.
>
>

Then what keeps the facts in nature consistent with each other?
What keeps the laws of nature constant with time or space?

Consistency is a construct of logic. So there must be some sort
of Logic keeping one set of facts over there consistent with
this other set of facts over here.

[Mike]

For effects to propagate does there need to be an
intermediate physical medium? Logically, cause and
effect is represented by material implication. In
case you have not ever studies logic, p implies q
when p is true and q is true, or when p is false
and q is false, or when p is false and q is true.
But if p is true and q is false, then p does not
imply q. Material implication is symbolized as p=>q,
and the usual truth table for material implication is:

pq|p=>q
FF| T
FT| T
TF| F
TT| T

What I'm wondering is if A=>C necessitates intermediate
states as B such that (A=>C) requires (A=>B)AND(B=>C).
When you write out the truth table, you find that (A=>C)
does not imply (A=>B)AND(B=>C). But instead it is true
that (A=>B)AND(B=>C) implies (A=>C).

But what does that last sentence mean? If there are
intermediate states, then you can get between A and C.
But there does not need to be intermediate states to get
from A to C. A could imply C without the need of
intermediate states? But how could one thing effect
another if there is no intervening medium to carry the
propagation along?

[Tom Roberts]

On 3/11/13 3/11/13 5:24 PM, Mike wrote:
> On Monday, March 11, 2013 2:00:09 PM UTC-4, Tom Roberts wrote:
>> Logic is completely divorced from the world we inhabit, and
>> you are basically attempting impose your hopes and dreams
>> -- your THOUGHTS -- onto nature; she of course goes blithely
>> on her way without reference to your attempts.
>
> Then what keeps the facts in nature consistent with each other?
> What keeps the laws of nature constant with time or space?

NOTHING, except however it is that nature operates. It is a HUMAN interpretation
that there is "consistency" and "constancy" in nature. Nature herself just goes
blithely on her way without reference to such concepts (or indeed to any
concepts at all).

As Wigner said, it is unreasonable that our mathematics models
nature so well. We can (and do!) capitalize on the fact that
this is so, even though we know not why it happens to be so.

> Consistency is a construct of logic. So there must be some sort
> of Logic keeping one set of facts over there consistent with
> this other set of facts over here.

a) you could easily be mistaken about that "consistency" you see in nature. b)
there is no "must", it's just that at present the known laws of nature are the
same over there as over here -- your MIND generated that "must" by applying
logic, but that is an INVALID application of logic, as nature is not contained
in its domain.

(I'm ignoring your conflating "facts" with "laws" -- the facts
about nature are CLEARLY not the same everywhere, but the laws
we know are.)

You are bound in your HUMAN thoughts. Nature is not.


Tom Roberts

[Mike]

On Tuesday, March 12, 2013 7:00:02 PM UTC-4, Tom Roberts wrote:

> > Then what keeps the facts in nature consistent with each other?
> > What keeps the laws of nature constant with time or space?
>
>
> NOTHING, except however it is that nature operates. It is a HUMAN
> interpretation that there is "consistency" and "constancy" in nature.
> Nature herself just goes blithely on her way without reference to
> such concepts (or indeed to any concepts at all).

I don't think you have any chance at all of proving that. For proof already assumes some level of consistency such that if it works in the lab once or many times, you assume it will work again else where. Proof is a construct of logic. Falsification is a construct of logic. Math is a construct of logic. So if you apply any of these techniques to theories of reality, then you are automatically assumming that reality complies with logical principles so that such technique should work.


======================================= MODERATOR'S COMMENT:

[Tom Roberts]

On 3/12/13 3/12/13 11:00 PM, Mike wrote:
> On Tuesday, March 12, 2013 7:00:02 PM UTC-4, Tom Roberts wrote:
>>> Then what keeps the facts in nature consistent with each other? What
>>> keeps the laws of nature constant with time or space?
>> NOTHING, except however it is that nature operates. It is a HUMAN
>> interpretation that there is "consistency" and "constancy" in nature.
>> Nature herself just goes blithely on her way without reference to such
>> concepts (or indeed to any concepts at all).
>
> I don't think you have any chance at all of proving that.

OF COURSE NOT! I have no intention of "proving" that, because PROOF IS
IRRELEVANT, and IMPOSSIBLE for the real world. Go back and re-read my
contributions to this thread, as you clearly have not understood what I am
saying: you are attempting to apply an operation (proof) from the realm of
mathematics to the real world -- that's INAPPLICABLE. And therefore hopeless.

> For proof already
> assumes some level of consistency such that if it works in the lab once or
> many times, you assume it will work again else where.

That comes nowhere near the usual meaning of "proof". But as I keep saying,
proof is IRRELEVANT and IMPOSSIBLE for the real world.

> Proof is a construct of
> logic. Falsification is a construct of logic. Math is a construct of logic.

Yes! Though to me logic is a sub-field of math.

> So if you apply any of these techniques to theories of reality, then you are
> automatically assumming that reality complies with logical principles so that
> such technique should work.

I repeat: you are attempting to apply an operation (proof) from the realm of
mathematics to the real world -- that's INAPPLICABLE. There is no expectation
whatsoever that "such technique should work". But we humans are incredibly lucky
that such techniques actually do work in our everyday lives, and we have clearly
evolved to take advantage of them.

As I have also said before: it is rather astounding that our mathematical models
should apply to nature as well as they do. Everything you think you "understand"
about the world is really an understanding of some MODEL you have of the world.

You have been constructing such models since birth, and could
not carry out your everyday life without them being very good
-- humans evolved so this is so. Science extends this making of
models to realms far removed from our everyday lives, and
evolution could not have molded our minds so we automatically
construct correct models in such realms -- that's why the
scientific method is necessary (of course the scientific method
is just a generalization of how we construct the models of
our everyday lives).

An example of such a model: you have constructed a mental model
of the geometry of your house and its neighborhood. To find your
bed at night you mentally navigate the model (e.g. up the stairs,
turn left, through the door, to the bed), then physically follow
the path you determined from the model. You construct and follow
such models automatically, without thinking about it. To find
your bed in a strange hotel you must explore to construct such
a model before you can find your bed. Such exploration is
equivalent to making experiments on the world, observing their
results, and modifying your model to agree with the results
-- i.e. science.


Tom Roberts

[Mike]

Granted, logic and math are used to build models
about reality. And models are not the reality itself.
But you are assuming that models, like every analogy,
must break down somewhere. You are not admitting that
it's possible to derive a perfect model. This is where
we differ. I think logic does provide a means of
deriving a perfect model that describes everything.
And I've made some progress in that regard, though
I've not achieved completeness yet.

It simply stands to reason that logic and math alone
can derive a perfect and complete model of reality. For
if questions remain as to why things are the way they
are and why something doesn't comply with expectations,
the arbiter of questions is reason. Logic determines
what is true or false, about reality as well as
abstractions. We may not yet know exactly how all thing
comply with reason, but we are sure that there is a
reasonable explanation for everything.

Science can only proceed from the assumption that there
is a reason for everything and that all things comply
with logic. For anything else is an immediate show
stopper that would prevent us from even trying to
understand. We can only continue the search under the
assumption that we will find that answer will comply
with logic. And to say that there is a reason for
everything is equivalent to saying physics can be
derived from logic.

[Mike]

On Tuesday, March 12, 2013 11:10:02 AM UTC-4, Mike wrote:

> But what does that last sentence mean? If there are
> intermediate states, then you can get between A and C.
> But there does not need to be intermediate states to get
> from A to C. A could imply C without the need of
> intermediate states? But how could one thing effect
> another if there is no intervening medium to carry the
> propagation along?

So it seems for pure logic statements you don't need intermediate states for A to imply(cause) B. But when you assign coordinates for each fact and use time to distinguish cause from effect, then you get into issues of propagation and the need for intermediate states to form a chain of events. So if one could prove the necessity of intermediate states on logical grounds, that might prove the necessity of a spacetime metric in a continuum used in propagation.

I suppose that requires a better understanding of material implication. When we say A implies B, that means all combinations of truth-values are allowed for A and B except A cannot be true with B false. You could have B true with A either true or false. Is that because there may be other reasons why B may be true without the need of A? What if there can only exist a certain set of statements? Then does that mean that there must be some true fact that implies that B is true? Is it then that no fact can be true without the truth of some other fact implying it, since you're then accounting for every possibility that may make a fact true?

I do know that when you have a conjunction of statements, then each statement implies every other statement. In that case, no statement is true without the truth of some other statement implying it; there's always something causing an effect.


======================================= MODERATOR'S COMMENT:

[Tom Roberts]

On 3/14/13 3/14/13 - 1:24 PM, Mike wrote:
> On Thursday, March 14, 2013 10:30:05 AM UTC-4, Tom Roberts wrote:

>> [...]

> Granted, logic and math are used to build models
> about reality. And models are not the reality itself.
> But you are assuming that models, like every analogy,
> must break down somewhere. You are not admitting that
> it's possible to derive a perfect model.

It is not possible to KNOW that this or that model is "perfect" (in quotes,
because that concept does not apply to nature, or to humans "understanding" nature).

I suppose that by happenstance somebody could hit upon a model of nature that
actually corresponds to "how nature works". But we humans could never test it in
all possible realms, and thus could not know that it happened to be "perfect".
This seems OUTRAGEOUSLY unlikely to me.

> This is where
> we differ. I think logic does provide a means of
> deriving a perfect model that describes everything.

Yes, we certainly differ there, and it is clear to me that your quest is greatly
flawed and hopeless.

> And I've made some progress in that regard, though
> I've not achieved completeness yet.

You are just deluding yourself.

> It simply stands to reason that logic and math alone
> can derive a perfect and complete model of reality.

No! There is no "reason" in nature, this is ALL IN YOUR MIND. But nature goes on
her way completely oblivious to what happens to be in your mind.

IOW: you are completely unable to make nature behave as you wish (i.e. according
to the "logic" you are using).

We humans cannot "control" nature. What we can do is
use our understanding of our models of nature's behavior
to manipulate aspects of our local environment so that
natural processes result in a desired outcome. This is how
we do things from building a house to operating physics
experiments. But it only works insofar as our models
accurately represent nature's behavior. The models we use
in everyday life are extremely good within that domain, in
part because our minds evolved so this is true; those same
models have proven to be quite useless in domains far
removed from everyday life....

> For
> if questions remain as to why things are the way they
> are and why something doesn't comply with expectations,
> the arbiter of questions is reason.

NO! Not even close. In physics the arbiter is EXPERIMENTS, not reason. The
repeated and consistent failure of armchair physicists like yourself
demonstrates the futility of your claims.

And the "why" questions you ask are not within the realm of
science, either. Science builds models; it has no ability
to discuss "why" those models are accurate, it can only
assess their accuracy in different regimes, via experiments.

> Logic determines
> what is true or false, about reality as well as
> abstractions.

NO! Logic only applies to abstractions IN YOUR MIND. The real world is outside
your mind and not subject to logic (yours or any other). Logic can succeed in
generating models of nature, based on experimental results, but they necessarily
have limited domains (bounded by the limitations of the experiments). THAT is
science; your dreaming is not.

> We may not yet know exactly how all thing
> comply with reason, but we are sure that there is a
> reasonable explanation for everything.

Dream On! For that's all this is: A DREAM. Nature needs no "explanations" -- you
are attempting to impose your HUMAN notions onto nature, which is both invalid
and hopeless.


> Science can only proceed [... further nonsense based on these errors]

Science proceeds by EXPERIMENTS, and by interpreting those experiments into
models of nature. Your hopes and dreams do not qualify.


Tom Roberts

[b...@birdband.net]

a classic example on how human logic can fail in understanding the workings
of nature is the M-Phemba effect. even the very sense we have on how thermodynamical
laws work could be redefined by bose-einsteins condensates studies and other extreme
temperature types of research.

r.y

[Mike]

What do hopes, dreams, and preferences have to do with
true or false? You ignore the evidence all around you.
And you ignore the assumptions of what you are doing.
And you refuse to listen to anyone who has mathematical
proof.

For all your observations can only prove that there is
a conjunction of facts, this thing over here and that
thing over there, etc. The rest of my formulation
proceeds inescapably from that. And you refuse to even
look at the math lest you be converted.

What can any experiment prove except as a true or false
case that confirms some theory. Did you notice I used
the word "proof" in regard to experiment? You can't use
the word experiment outside the context of proving or
not some theory. Experiment, like proof itself, is a
construct of logic, and has no meaning outside proving
something. If experiment proves anything, then it proves
that logic is at the heart of physical theory. I'd like
to see you construct any theory or design any experiment
without logic. Go ahead, name me one instance?

You don't even see what you're doing. You say this set
of facts over here is consistent with those set of facts
over there. You say that experiment is consistent with
this theory, and that data conflict with that other
theory. And thus you yourself are only using experimental
data for its truth-value in confirming theory, but claim
that data takes precedence over true and false. You're
practically using logic in every sentence but deny its
preeminence. You can't even construct a coherent sentence
without logic, much less a physical theory. So how can
you say that logic is not at the foundations of physics?

[Tom Roberts]

On 3/20/13 3/20/13 10:29 AM, Mike wrote:
> What do hopes, dreams, and preferences have to do with
> true or false?

You keep coming back to the same WRONG question. You must UNASK the question
before you can progress (shades of Zen and R. Hofstadter).

The question you should be asking is: what do true and false have to do with the
world we inhabit?

Hint: the answer is the same as for your question: nothing.

> You ignore the evidence all around you.

What evidence? That hopes and dreams have something to do with true or false? Or
that true and false have something to do with the world around us? -- I see no
evidence for either.

I certainly do see evidence that (for example) Newtonian mechanics is an
accurate model of the world I observe in everyday life. But that has nothing
whatsoever to do with "is Newtonian mechanics true?" -- true and false don't
apply; NM is _VALID_ in the domain of our everyday lives. And it is not valid in
the domain of elementary particle physics (I see LOTS of evidence of that, too,
as that is the field of physics in which I make my livelihood).

> And you ignore the assumptions of what you are doing.
> And you refuse to listen to anyone who has mathematical
> proof.

Nonsense. I certainly do read about mathematical proofs, but only within their
domain, which does not include the world we inhabit. Theories and models of
physics certainly do involve mathematical proofs; but their relationship to the
world DOES NOT.

> For all your observations can only prove that there is
> a conjunction of facts, this thing over here and that
> thing over there, etc.

You have not been listening. I cannot "prove" that, BECAUSE PROOF IS IRRELEVANT
TO THE WORLD WE INHABIT. I do indeed OBSERVE, and therefore KNOW, that at that
place and time, thus-and-so happened. But there is no "proof" involved.

Proof is a mathematical and logical deduction of some proposition,
starting from clearly defined axioms. It only applies when the
quantities appearing the the proposition actually satisfy the
axioms. In the real world a) we have no idea what the axioms ought
to be, and b) it is QUITE clear that for any set of axioms the
objects in the world satisfy them at best approximately. And, of
course, objects in the world behave according to how nature
make them behave, not according to any axioms or deductions some
human might make up.

I repeat: you have it BACKWARDS: we humans make models of how nature behaves;
there is no constraint on nature to behave according to our models.

> The rest of my formulation
> proceeds inescapably from that.

I'll stipulate that it does. Still, it has NOTHING WHATSOEVER to do with how
nature behaves, except being at best a MODEL of how nature behaves in some
limited domain (limited by the domain of validity of your axioms and your
deductive process).

> And you refuse to even
> look at the math lest you be converted.

Not really. If someone claimed that by simply flapping our arms we humans could
fly to the moon, would you bother to spend time listening to his arguments? What
you are trying to do is equally impossible. But YOU simply are unable to see the
complete dissociation between math and logic on one hand, and the world we
inhabit on the other.

Here are some relationships having the same basic structure:
logic : world [#]
map : territory [@]
model : world (aka theory : world)
knowing : doing
understanding : being
There is of course a pattern here: on the left are mental constructs,
and on the right are aspects of the world we inhabit.

[#} I mean "logic" in the sense you use it; nobody else would
include this here.

[@] I use "map" in the mathematical sense; a paper street map is
merely a bunch of marks on paper, the map itself is the abstract
correspondence between those marks and the actual roads and streets.

It seems that you may well have derived some of the equations of our current
MODELS via your "logic". Well, and good, but that does not interest me. And does
not come close to living up to your claims.

> What can any experiment prove except as a true or false
> case that confirms some theory.

You sure phrased that funny, using "true and false" in a place where they don't
really belong. Experiments either confirm or refute the predictions of any given
theory (as it applies to the experimental conditions). And as I keep saying,
this is not "proof", because that word means something completely different (see
above).

> Did you notice I used
> the word "proof" in regard to experiment?

Yes. And you used it incorrectly. Again.

This is going nowhere. Goodbye.


Tom Roberts

[Mike]

On Friday, March 22, 2013 12:10:02 AM UTC-4, Tom Roberts wrote:
>
> This is going nowhere. Goodbye.
>
>

I'm sorry you feel this way. But I really didn't expect to resolve
the issue. I thought we might make progress in identifying the issues.

So far I have the impression that you are content with the old paradigm
- proposing some mathematical structure and seeing if the observations
agree with it. This is really nothing more than curve fitting the data
to some equation or other math structure. This does not allow us to make
any claim as to what nature actually is because the paradigm always
admitts the possibility of correction. Every theory is only provisional
and subject to falsification, so nothing permanent can be said about what nature actually is.

But I don't think this curve-fitting paradigm should be used to deny the efficacy of logic to existence. It seems to me that more fundamental than
the curve-fitting paradigm is the expectation that all things in nature
are completely logical whether or not it happens to fit some proposed
curve. Just because we don't as yet know why data fits our present models
doesn't mean that there is no reason. We keep searching in order to find
the reasons why a model is correct. The underlying premise of this is that there is a reason for all things. Or said another way, physics can be
derived from logic.

You might think that logic is just an abstract language tool applicable
to axiomatic systems and does not necessarily have anything to do with
reality. But the first and most obvious thing we can say about reality
is that it exists, as opposed to the only alternative of not existing.
Since we necessarily have to consider the possibility of things both
existing or not existing, this immediately makes the true and false of
propostional logic applicable to any theory about existence. And so it
seems inescapable that logic is the first theory of physical reality,
which is not to say that logic isn't also applicable to other axiomatic systems. The only trouble with this is how to derive some mathematical structure from the logic. I think I've made progress with this.

Where does this leave the curve-fitting paradigm? Since those theories
are not derived from logic, it is inconsequential if some data fits this
curve or that. They make no comment and pose no threat to a theory
derived from logic. We can't know if the math involved with these
curve-fitting efforts is ultimate or just an effective theory. So we
can't know if it has any bearing on the ultimate theory. The only way to actually prove that the ultimate theory is actually correct is to derive
it from something more fundamental than empirical data such as logic. It
is only satisfying to see that my efforts to derive physics from logic is actually leading to formulations of physics we are already familiar with.

The derivation is found at:

http://webpages.charter.net/majik1/QMlogic.htm

[Mike]

On Friday, March 22, 2013 11:40:02 AM UTC-4, Mike wrote:

> Where does this leave the curve-fitting paradigm? Since those theories
> are not derived from logic, it is inconsequential if some data fits this
> curve or that. They make no comment and pose no threat to a theory
> derived from logic. We can't know if the math involved with these
> curve-fitting efforts is ultimate or just an effective theory. So we
> can't know if it has any bearing on the ultimate theory. The only way to
> actually prove that the ultimate theory is actually correct is to derive
> it from something more fundamental than empirical data such as logic. It
> is only satisfying to see that my efforts to derive physics from logic is
> actually leading to formulations of physics we are already familiar with.
>
>

Well, of course, whatever theory is derived has to make predictions
that match experimental data, or it's not a theory of physics. But
empirical data does not address how the theory is derived. A theory
could be developed by ad-hoc methods of trial and error designed to
find curves and math that fit the data. Or it might also be derived
from first principles of reason and logic. With curve fitting efforts
there's never any proof that you have the correct theory since they
are always subject to further observations. But with theories derived
from logic, there is by definition proof that it is correct. The
proof that it is a theory of physics, however, is that it matches
observations. Yet, if a theory from logic did make at least one
prediction confirmed by observation, could it be wrong about another
prediction? If logic derives one observation, then we'd be tempted
to think that the method must be valid and, therefore, able to derive
everything.

[Mike]

On Saturday, March 23, 2013 10:50:03 AM UTC-4, Mike wrote:

> Well, of course, whatever theory is derived has to make predictions
> that match experimental data, or it's not a theory of physics. But
> empirical data does not address how the theory is derived. A theory
> could be developed by ad-hoc methods of trial and error designed to
> find curves and math that fit the data. Or it might also be derived
> from first principles of reason and logic.

For that matter, a theory could be developed by a computer algorithm
that writes every equation imaginable, and eliminates those that
don't match the data. Or theories could be developed by throwing dice
to determine the next character in the equation, again eliminating
those equations that don't match the data. So the question is what
merit is there to any method of generating theories? I resent the
idea that it's an arbitrary fanciful dream to derive theory from
logic. It seems to me that the only method of developing theory which
is completely justified by reason is by definition a theory derived
from logic.

[Mike]

I wonder if there is any confusion between how a theory is derived (or contrived) and the input of a theory that gives output that's measured. Perhaps all theories necessarily use input values obtainable from measurement to calculate output values that can also be measured. Do we say in that case that the theory itself was developed or in any way derived from these input-output measurements? Is the search for the mathematical relationship between input and output all that's involved in theory development? Or are deeper concerns about ultimate consistency really the thing that is driving theory?


======================================= MODERATOR'S COMMENT:
Posting via the new google groups is messed up; you need to manually do a carriage return at around 72 characters per line for UseNet. Thanks. -fd

[Poutnik]

Mike posted Thu, 28 Mar 2013 12:13:15 CST

>
> I wonder if there is any confusion between how a theory is derived (or
> contrived) and the input of a theory that gives output that's measured.
> Perhaps all theories necessarily use input values obtainable from
> measurement to calculate output values that can also be measured. Do we
> say in that case that the theory itself was developed or in any way
> derived from these input-output measurements? Is the search for the

> mathematical relationship between input and output allthat's involved

> in theory development? Or are deeper concerns about ultimate
> consistency really the thing that is driving theory?
>

I see big danger in conflict with highly logical approach
and newly observed nature behaviour than is not able to be predicted.

Logical outcome of logical theory versus illogical measurement values.

Logic can be use to analyse these "illogical data"
by optimizing methodology of creation working hypothesis.

--
Poutnik

[Mike]

On Tuesday, March 12, 2013 11:10:02 AM UTC-4, Mike wrote:

>
> But what does that last sentence mean? If there are
>
> intermediate states, then you can get between A and C.
>
> But there does not need to be intermediate states to get
>
> from A to C. A could imply C without the need of
>
> intermediate states? But how could one thing effect
>
> another if there is no intervening medium to carry the
>
> propagation along?

Intuitively it seems necessary to have some medium at all points for an effect to propagate. For otherwise effects could not propagate across nothing. Or they would propagate instantaneously, and you would not know which way they are propagating.

[Tom Roberts]

On 4/3/13 4/3/13 5:20 PM, Mike wrote:
> Intuitively it seems necessary to have some medium at all points for an
> effect to propagate. For otherwise effects could not propagate across
> nothing. Or they would propagate instantaneously, and you would not know
> which way they are propagating.

Hmmm. Unless the effects are propagated by particles, which can presumably
propagate across a void. For instance, as in the perturbation approximation to
QED where electrodynamic effects are propagated by photons. But then, maybe not,
as the underlying theory has continuous fields (which cannot really be described
as a "medium").

Also, I believe that both string theory and loop quantum gravity are
counterexamples to your "intuition". Neither of them have any continuous
structure on which you could erect a "medium". Indeed, they don't even have a
manifold, so the concept of "points" does not apply, and you have to re-think
your entire approach.... [I am not expert in either.]


Tom Roberts

[ben...@hotmail.com]

On 4/3/13 4/3/13 5:20 PM, Mike wrote:

> Intuitively it seems necessary to have some medium at all points for an
> effect to propagate. For otherwise effects could not propagate across
> nothing. Or they would propagate instantaneously, and you would not know
> which way they are propagating.

If space and time are emergent properties, then you do not need to expect a
fundamental particle to have been following a particular interpolated
trajectory. If bosons are the messengers making the comparisons between
fermions for calculating fermion positions in space and time, then at every new
interaction the fermion positions on a metric can be updated. And that
transition could be instantaneous. Except if the time location is also plotted,
then it may not be instantaneous, depending on the 'when' as well as the 'where'
the fermion is plotted.

Ben

[Mike]

On Friday, April 5, 2013 12:40:02 PM UTC-4, ben...@hotmail.com wrote:

>
>
> If space and time are emergent properties, then you do not need to expect a
>
> fundamental particle to have been following a particular interpolated
>
> trajectory.

Particles are only identified as such by there spacetime coordinates. Quantum mechanics seems to indicate that particles can take every possible path. That assumes there is always something we can identify as spacetime through which to create paths no matter how small a scale we're talking about.

[Mike]

On Friday, April 5, 2013 9:00:02 AM UTC-4, Tom Roberts wrote:
>
> Hmmm. Unless the effects are propagated by particles, which can presumably
>
> propagate across a void. For instance, as in the perturbation approximation to
>
> QED where electrodynamic effects are propagated by photons. But then, maybe not,
>
> as the underlying theory has continuous fields (which cannot really be described
>
> as a "medium").

If you mean particles can propagate across a void meaning empty space, then I would suggest space is something continuous through which it propagates. There are gravitational waves that can propagate through space, so space is not nothing. It's a medium. But it would be hard to visualize anything propagating through no-space.

>
>
>
> Also, I believe that both string theory and loop quantum gravity are
>
> counterexamples to your "intuition". Neither of them have any continuous
>
> structure on which you could erect a "medium". Indeed, they don't even have a
>
> manifold, so the concept of "points" does not apply, and you have to re-think
>
> your entire approach.... [I am not expert in either.]
>

As I recall, superstrings assume a background spacetime in which they travel and vibrate. And LQG expresses things in terms of lengths of lines joining points in a kind of lattice; so at least there is something between points.

[Mike]

On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 5:30:02 PM UTC-4, Mike wrote:
> On Tuesday, March 12, 2013 11:10:02 AM UTC-4, Mike wrote:
>
>
>
> >
> > But what does that last sentence mean? If there are
> > intermediate states, then you can get between A and C.
> > But there does not need to be intermediate states to get
> > from A to C. A could imply C without the need of
> > intermediate states? But how could one thing effect
> > another if there is no intervening medium to carry the
> > propagation along?
>

Again, I'm trying to logically justify a continuum as a
means of propagaing an effect from a cause, since it seems
odd for any cause to have an effect across nothings. If
two things are completely and absolutely isolated from each
other, how can one thing have an effect on the other. It
seems intuitive to have some chain of events even at the
smallest scales in order to propagate cause to effect. But
I don't know if one can logically justify a continuum of
intermediate states used in a chain of events that
propagates cause to effect.


Well... maybe I had the answer all along and just forgot.
It seems I managed to equate A=>B to an infinite number of
disjunctions (ORs) of an infinite number of conjunctions of
intermediate implications (paths). So it seems one can
always construct a path of an infinite number of
intermediate implications between A and B. When we assign
different coordinates to each state, does the infinite
number of intermediate states (points) constitute a
continuous path? See paragraph starting with "So how are
paths constructed?" at:

http://webpages.charter.net/majik1/QMlogic.htm

which starts on page 5 of the pdf version.

[Mike]

On Sunday, April 7, 2013 2:20:02 PM UTC-4, Mike wrote:

> Well... maybe I had the answer all along and just forgot.
> It seems I managed to equate A=>B to an infinite number of
> disjunctions (ORs) of an infinite number of conjunctions of
> intermediate implications (paths). So it seems one can
> always construct a path of an infinite number of
> intermediate implications between A and B. When we assign
> different coordinates to each state, does the infinite
> number of intermediate states (points) constitute a
> continuous path? See paragraph starting with "So how are
> paths constructed?" at:
>
> http://webpages.charter.net/majik1/QMlogic.htm
>
> which starts on page 5 of the pdf version.

The equality with even an infinite number of states formed
into paths is that the (A=>B) is OR'd in with the rest of
the paths. If (A=>B) is true, then the equality is true
because (A=>B) to true OR'd in with the paths, making the
equality true. But if (A=>B) is false, then this can only
be when B is false, meaning every path will contain at least
one term with a true premise but a false conclusion, which
makes each path term false and thus the whole equality
false. See the above reference if you need more explanation.

The point is that it does not seem to matter how many true
or false states are formed into paths that are OR'd in with
(A=>B). Yes there may be an equality, but I don't see the
necessity. So are the infinite number of states formed into
paths there because the (A=>B) is equal to them? Or are those
states not there because they are not necessary? I see the
equality but not the necessity.

If you're having trouble understanding my question, it's like
know p=p^p^p^p^....
Yes, the extra p's in conjunction are equal to p, but they are
not necessary. You can include them if you want for some
purpose. But you can't say they are needed.

So can I say that the extra states in the paths necessarily
form a continuum between A and B? There is the equality
but I don't see the necessity.

[ben...@hotmail.com]

Isn't this the same as the problem of infinities and the need for
renormalisation? There may be an infinite number of possible paths because
of an infinite number of possible virtual interactions but the effects of a
lot of them may cancel out. But that cancellation was proved theoretically in
QED and QCD, rather than assumed. Maybe the effects of the infinities are not
a problem in your method which, if that were the case, would be an advantage
for your method.

If you fill in the path with lots more true/false states, then I don't see
that as forming a continuum. As an analogy, if you are standing at point A
and are moving to point B by random hopping then you can reach B in many
different ways. Adding more states is like adding more random hops on route,
it is a possible path but is not really defining a continuum from A to B.

By the way, does your logic cater for QCD, too? I hope it can, and wish you
well.

Ben
Not a physicist

[Mike]

On Monday, April 15, 2013 9:20:04 AM UTC-4, ben...@hotmail.com wrote:

> > So can I say that the extra states in the paths necessarily
> > form a continuum between A and B? There is the equality
> > but I don't see the necessity.
>
>
>
> Isn't this the same as the problem of infinities and the need for
> renormalisation? There may be an infinite number of possible paths because
> of an infinite number of possible virtual interactions but the effects of a
> lot of them may cancel out. But that cancellation was proved theoretically
> in QED and QCD, rather than assumed. Maybe the effects of the infinities are > not a problem in your method which, if that were the case, would be an
> advantage for your method.
>

What I seem to have done is derive the Feynman path integral. I suppose that would imply all the problems associated with the Feynman path integral.

>
>
> If you fill in the path with lots more true/false states, then I don't see
> that as forming a continuum. As an analogy, if you are standing at point A
> and are moving to point B by random hopping then you can reach B in many
> different ways. Adding more states is like adding more random hops on route,
> it is a possible path but is not really defining a continuum from A to B.
>

When I treat coordinate points as propositions and consider the implication between them, I wonder how any cause at one point can propagate to another point. If points are completely isolated from each other, then how can cause at one point have an effect on another point through nothing? Nothing would seem to be a barrior to propagation.

When I use the gaussian form of the Dirac delta function to represent implication, the exponential in the gaussian has a term (x-x0)^2 in it and integrals of dx also in it. This would seem to imply a continuity in order to do the integration. So if there is an infinite number of points along the continuity that enables integration, then since each point represents a proposition, there must be an infinite number of propositions in the logic, right?

The logic seems to allow imposing an infinite number of other propositions between the first and last points of a path. The truth or falsity of these other propositions doen't change the truth of the original implication between the first and last points. But I still don't see the necessity of doing so. Perhaps this is like being able to impose a coordinate system on a manifold if you want to, but coordinates are not a necessary construction either.

>
>
> By the way, does your logic cater for QCD, too? I hope it can, and wish you
>

I have an iteration process where implications between propositions are replaced by implications between implications. First I place complex numbers in for implications between propositions and get quantum mechanics. Then when I replace the propositions with implications again, and get implications between implications, the complex numbers also get iterated to quaternions which are a representation of SU(2) and is part of the Standard Model symmetry.

But I can iterate again and then quaternions become octonions which are used in the SU(3) representation of the SM. I'm not really all that sure about the details of all this. I've seen papers that suggest these relationships. But it's beginning to look like the parts and pieces are all there waiting to fall into place.

[Mike]

On Monday, April 15, 2013 7:00:03 PM UTC-4, Mike wrote:

> When I treat coordinate points as propositions and consider
> the implication between them, I wonder how any cause at one
> point can propagate to another point. If points are completely
> isolated from each other, then how can cause at one point have
> an effect on another point through nothing? Nothing would seem
> to be a barrior to propagation.

So maybe I need to justify a bit more treating points as
propositions. Propositions are appropriate when describing
individual circumstances that have unique properties. And
each point in a topology is supposed to be unique and
distinct from every other point. Each point can have a
different neighborhood from other points, for example.
And when a coordinate system is imposed on a topology
that qualifies as a manifold, then each point has the
unique property of the individual coordinates assigned to
that point.

And like propostions which are either true or false,
one can consider whether it is true or false if some
point is actually included in the topology of some
manifold. For example, one can consider the real line
without the origin point, denoted R-{0}. Here it is false
that the point 0 is part of the manifold denoted by
R-{0}.

In this context it seems perfectly legitimate to say
that a topology can be described by the conjunction of
all the individual points that form it. For we can
consider if it is true or false whether each individual
point is or is not part of that topology. Then once we
start considering a conjunction of propositions, we can
talk about this conjunction implying implications between
them.

It's already common in topology to talk about sets and
subsets of points which serve as the elements of those sets.
And it's already common to ask whether it is true or false
if some object is an element or not of some set. So I don't
think it should be unusual to consider the conjunction and
implications between these point, since they are being
treated as propositions in other contexts.

[Mike]

On Saturday, April 20, 2013 12:30:02 AM UTC-4, Mike wrote:

> So maybe I need to justify a bit more treating points as

> propositions...

>
> And like propostions which are either true or false,
> one can consider whether it is true or false if some
> point is actually included in the topology of some

> manifold...

>
> In this context it seems perfectly legitimate to say
> that a topology can be described by the conjunction of
> all the individual points that form it. For we can
> consider if it is true or false whether each individual

> point is or is not part of that topology...

>
> It's already common in topology to talk about sets and
> subsets of points which serve as the elements of those sets.
> And it's already common to ask whether it is true or false
> if some object is an element or not of some set.

So maybe I need to justify the use of set inclusion as a means of representing the material implication of propositional logic.

I've talked about how an element of a set can be treated as a proposition - it is either true or false that the element has the properties that define a set. But how can whole sets be considered either true or false such that the truth-value of a set implies the truth-value of its elements?

Consider the syllogism: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

The first sentence; All men are mortal, asserts the existence of a set of all men. And it is also a statement whose truth-value can be evaluated. It is either true or false that all men are mortal. So here we have a true or false statement assigned to a set. And, of course, the second sentence; Socrates is a man, is a true or false statement. Notice that if the element is included in a set, then the truth of the set is transfered to the truth of the element. If Socrates is a member of the set of all men, then the truth that all men are mortal implies that Socrates is mortal. What's true of the set is true of its members, but not the other way around.

And I suppose you can completely abstract this and state that it is true that a set contains all its elements. Then the truth that a set contains its elements implies that its elements belong to that set. Does this make sense?

[Mike]

On Wednesday, May 15, 2013 7:20:08 PM UTC-4, Mike wrote:

>
> And I suppose you can completely abstract this and state that
> it is true that a set contains all its elements. Then the truth
> that a set contains its elements implies that its elements
> belong to that set. Does this make sense?

I think there might be some who would disagree. Some relate
logical implication to set theory such that if there are two sets,
X and Y, then aEX, (a element of X) implies aEY, if and only if
X is a subset of Y.

Here the propositional logic statements are aEX and aEY, which are
either true or false statements. But this doesn't seem to address
the truth of sets to the truth of elements. It only addresses
the truth of elements. And implication, here, is only between
one element and another element.

I used the Dirac measure to go from logic to numbers, by counting
an element as 1 if it were contained in some set. But in order to
use the Dirac measure to represent material implication, I need to
be able to show that the truth of sets implies the truth of
elements. I need the premise of the implication to be a set with
a truth-value like a proposition, and I need the consequence of
the implication to be an element with a truth-value like a
proposition. How do I do that?

One way is to create some ability of assigning a truth-value to a
set just as easily as to an element. I suppose that just as a
proposition can be made of statements of the form aEX, a
proposition can be made of the form X={a,b,c,d,...}. Both these
kinds of statements are either true or false. For example, if it
were not true that dEX, then X={a,b,c,d,...} would be a false
statement. Already we can see how implication will work between
this statements. If X={a,b,c,d,...} is a true statement, then it is
necessarily true that dEX is also a true statement. But if
X={a,b,c,d,...} is a false statement, this says nothing about
whether dEX is true or false. dEX could also be false. Or dEX
might still be true and X is false because aEX is false, for
example. We see the truth-table for x=>d in this paragraph.

But then the set X needs to be able to also be used as a
consequence of an implication as well as a premise. So when
can a set be treated like an element? If you have a set of one
element, X={x}, is there any context in which we can say that
X = x, that a set is equivalent to an element? Maybe not in the
context of set operations, but perhaps in the context in which
we treat them as propositions with a truth-value.

This is not a diary. If you have any thoughts on the matter, I
would appreciate it.

[Mike]

If it is understood that one is ONLY considering sets of one
element, then xEX would be both logically and set theoretically
equal to X={x}, right?

[ben...@hotmail.com]

< This is not a diary. If you have any thoughts on the matter, I
< would appreciate it.

I will take that as an invitation.... though you already know that my
ideas are too non-standard to be of much use to you.
I equate implication with a wave function collapse. So the propositions
are the extended particle in its wave form. Particles in
their wave form are described in more dimensions than 4D spacetime, and
hence the need for QM. Susskind said that set theory does apply to QM.
So, logic also should not apply to QM?? But your paper impresses in me
that you have indeed successfully done so. But not without using Dirac
delta functions. Does that mean you have extended the field of logic,
too, by adding Dirac Delta function to the logic toolbag?

In my model, the particles in waveform are in three 4D colour branes of
string theory, ie 12D in all. Some kind of calculation is going on to
decide where the particle can collapse in spacetime. Ie the
implications are positions in 4D spacetime. At any place/time when the
particle is in waveform, calculations must be ongoing as to where the
particle would go if it were to collapse at that instant ie sort of
virtual places in spacetime. But the virtual place it collapses to needs
to be consistent with the external energies (this is the set being drawn
to an implication by a tightening of a surrounding circle) acting on the
wave to try to make it collapse to an implication. After the
implication it is instantly back to 3 time 4D of QM again.

So I see your propositions as quasi-spacetime events, with Rasch-like
calculations going on constantly with bosons acting as information
carriers between fermions to decide where and when the implication can
legitimately be placed in spacetime. Then it immediately turns back to a
wave in 12D, which is not in 4D spacetime.

Ben

[Mike]

On Thursday, May 23, 2013 12:20:03 PM UTC-4, ben...@hotmail.com wrote:

>
> Susskind said that set theory does apply to QM.
> So, logic also should not apply to QM?? But your paper impresses in me
> that you have indeed successfully done so. But not without using Dirac
> delta functions. Does that mean you have extended the field of logic,
> too, by adding Dirac Delta function to the logic toolbag?

That is a very good question. Thank you for your comments, Ben.

I don't know the context of Susskind's comments. I also heard Steven
Wienberg saying that physics cannot be derived by logic. But the trouble
with these comments is that the speakers don't actually prove their
statements. It just seems to be an intuition they have based on a loose
definition of terms they are using. Or, in other words, they don't seem to
really know what they are talking about.

My efforts are still considered speculative because there is no consenses
on the matter. But I believe that I justified every bit of my work so that
by definition there is no speculation at any point in the development.

There is no doubt that the Dirac Measure inherently involves set theoretic
issues at the most basic of all levels of definition. The Dirac Measure
returns a numeric value of 1 if the specified element is an element of the
specified set. And it returns a 0 if the element is not a member of the set.
What could be more basic than that?

I just happened to stumble across it and was able to notice that if the set
specified by the Dirac Measure was reduced to a single element, then it can be
made to represent the Kronecker delta in a descrete space. And when it is
generalized to the Dirac delta function in a continuous space, as is
typically done, it could be manipulated into the Path Integral of Quantum
Mechanics, assumming a complex gaussian form of the Dirac delta function.

I recognized that the Dirac delta could be used to give a mathematical
representation for the material implication of propositional logic. This
allowed me to go from an equation of logic to a numerical theory of physics.
That was the trick. And I think it is at the heart of your question.

I know of no other way to get from logic (of propositions or set) to math.
I suspect that your answer may lay in seeing how it is used in other areas.
But the wikipedia.org site does states that the Dirac Measure is a kind of
probability measure and a kind of distribution. It's easy to see how this is
a distribution. When forming how values are distributed for a given process,
the Dirac Measure represents the first instance of measureing a part and putting
it in the appropriate bin. Doing this many times will give a distribution of
the values for a process as you count how many measurements are put in the
various bins. And it's easy to go from there to a probability distribution.

More formally, set theory is intimately connected to probability theory. And
the Dirac Measure is a type of probability measure. So I think your answer
would be found in a careful study of how set theory relates to probabilities
and how the Dirac Measure is a fundamental set theoretic and a probablity
theoretic device. There is probably something very basic there.

[ben...@hotmail.com]

I wrongly wrote: "Susskind said that set theory does apply to QM." I
should have written "... does not ...", but you seem to have interpreted
it correctly despite my error. I heard him say it early on in a course
of online introductory lectures on QM.

I have checked my notes. What I have written there is that he said that,
in set theory, AND is equivalent to INTERSECTION, while OR is
equivalent to UNION but in QM this is not true. This was in lecture #2 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KokditqpAJg&list=PL84C10A9CB1D13841
(which I have not re-played). In Lecture 3 he introduces the Dirac
delta Function and in Lecture 4 he says that is is not a well-defined
function as it would need to be infinitely high at a point.

As for proof of set theory not holding ... I don't know. But a good
example of the failure of set theory is Bell's Inequality where it is
very easy to use Venn diagrams to show that AB' + BC' > OR = AC' [where
the symbol ' means 'not'], whereas this does not hold in QM.

I am not an expert on anything and especially not on the Dirac Delta
function. However, I can see that the Delta function is supplying a
useful effect in two different ways. First, I don't worry about
infinity as that is in a limit as ∂x tends to a point. The function
seems to be the distribution of the possible positions of the mean of a
nearly infinite set of points. That fits in nicely with what I
described in my previous post. Ie the particle in its wave form is in
12D which are not the 4D of spacetime. The delta distribution is the
distribution of possible places the mean (or implication) might be
placed in spacetime. All but one of these places in the distribution
will never materialise as the implication. So the distribution is
virtual or quasi although it represents genuinely potential points in
spacetime. As the net is drawn tighter to find the implication, ∂x tends
to a point and the distribution tends to an infinitely high peak of a
delta function. The interpretation of delta as a distribution of a mean
of an near infinite set seems to suit the forming of an implication
perfectly well.

The second way that delta suits my view is that although the net seems
to be cast over spacetime, it could mask that a net is really being
drawn over 12D to squeeze an implication into an allowable event in
spacetime.

[NB Of course, the sd of the mean gets smaller in proportion to
1/root n where n is the number of points in the set. So for a near
infinte n, the sd is almost zero and so the height of the distribution
is almost infinite and its width is almost zero.]

[Mike]

On Friday, May 24, 2013 10:10:06 AM UTC-4, ben...@hotmail.com wrote:

>
>
> I have checked my notes. What I have written there is that he said that,
>
> in set theory, AND is equivalent to INTERSECTION, while OR is
>
> equivalent to UNION but in QM this is not true. This was in lecture #2 at
>
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KokditqpAJg&list=PL84C10A9CB1D13841
>
> (which I have not re-played). In Lecture 3 he introduces the Dirac
>
> delta Function and in Lecture 4 he says that is is not a well-defined
>
> function as it would need to be infinitely high at a point.

Actually, I don't think my derivation is relying heavily on set theory.
I only use it to relate material implication to set inclusion. And even
that set is shrunk down to a single element to get the Kronecker delta.
I'm not using union or intersection.

If my use of the Dirac delta is troubling you, I'm not sure it is
absolutely necessary. I got the path integral by iterating the
sifting property of the Dirac delta and using the complex gaussian
form of the Dirac delta funciton. But that same iteration process
can be accomplished with the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation which is
in integral equation that is solved by the gaussian form of the
exponential function. I can give reference if needed.

>
> As for proof of set theory not holding ... I don't know. But a good
>
> example of the failure of set theory is Bell's Inequality where it is
>
> very easy to use Venn diagrams to show that AB' + BC' > OR = AC' [where
>
> the symbol ' means 'not'], whereas this does not hold in QM.

You lost me in notation here.

>
> in a limit as ∂x tends to a point.

Oh dear, how did you get the ∂ symbol? What other math symbols are possible
in these forums?

[ben...@hotmail.com]

On Friday, 24 May 2013 17:40:02 UTC+1, Mike wrote:

> > As for proof of set theory not holding ... I don't know. But a good
> > example of the failure of set theory is Bell's Inequality where it is
> > very easy to use Venn diagrams to show that AB' + BC' > OR = AC' [where
> > the symbol ' means 'not'], whereas this does not hold in QM.
>
> You lost me in notation here.
>

It is Bell's Inequality and I was pointing out that it is almost trivial to
check, using a Venn Diagram, that the inequality holds. Though it is not true
in QM.

> > in a limit as ∂x tends to a point.
>
> Oh dear, how did you get the ∂ symbol? What other math symbols are possible
> in these forums?

Yes, sorry. I was looking for the normal delta but couldn't see it in my
selection of symbols. It was there but I couldn't find it. I wasn't deliberately
implying a partial derivative.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_alphanumeric_symbols_Unicode_block
ν γ λ ε α β θ δ κ λ τ φ ∂ ω σ ρ ς ε
ζ η ι μ ξ ο π υ χ ϰ ϕ
Γ Δ Θ Λ Ξ Ψ Σ Ω ∇ Π

Use these symbols as required and then set the text file type to unicode on
saving your text file.

Yes, Susskind was only talking about set theory, as I wrote in the previous
post.

The complex gaussian form is presumably needed because the particle, in its
uncollapsed wave form, is not in 4D spacetime. Or not in spacetime only.
If you have done the same job without using a complex form, then that is
interesting. I am not concerned about you using the delta function.