private language
Elaine Jackson
"private language" argument is all about? I've looked at texts - honestly, I
have - but I just can't get a grasp on the idea. All contributions
gratefully received.
James Winter
whose primitive terms refer only to the speaker's subjective or private
sensations and perceptions. If I marked in my diary a term that referred
to some current sensation/perception that I experienced, I would have no way
of knowing in the future how to pick out the same sensation/perception--this
is to say that we do not stand in a relation of knowledge or some such
epistemic relation to our own private subjective experiences as we do to
those picked out by public language.
Qexugir
James Winter wrote:
> The short answer is that there cannot be a private language, i.e., a language
> whose primitive terms refer only to the speaker's subjective or private
> sensations and perceptions.
Seems to be true enough. Language communicates, and the unique cannot be
communicated.
> If I marked in my diary a term that referred
> to some current sensation/perception that I experienced, I would have no way
> of knowing in the future how to pick out the same sensation/perception--this
> is to say that we do not stand in a relation of knowledge or some such
> epistemic relation to our own private subjective experiences as we do to
> those picked out by public language.
Bunk. I know that I'm happy when I'm happy, or thinking of something when I'm
thinking of something, much more than I know whether Joe is happy when he says he's
happy, or married when he tells me he's single. Unless there are arguments being
compressed out of view here, Wittgenstein is out to lunch.
Qexugir
Pax Vitae
codes and stuff. Well that's how I look at it.
"Elaine Jackson" <elaineja...@home.com> wrote in message
news:YSfz9.728990$f05.29...@news1.calgary.shaw.ca...
Mike Dubbeld
What James Winter says is the answer as per all brain dead western
philosphy
camps will tell you is Wittgenstein's meaning. But Wittgenstein is wrong
and
was actually my biggest disappointment. First the subjective senses
include
your 'visceral senses' - line the inner surfaces of our bodies -
mouth/digestive track and some organs and the proprioceptive sensors -
muscles/tendons and
joints. You have to interpret W. in context. He came out of a world
attempting
to reduce all of mathematics to logic. Psychology was a desparate
science-wannabe. Logical Empiricism in the early days of W appeared
feasible - but
he changed his mind seeing it was going to fail in his later works. So
W.
like all others, stupidity in the name of science - attempted to disgard
all
subjective phenomena. (Logical Empiricism failed because it was not
self-referentially coherent - it could not use its own criterion to
explain
itself. So was the attempt to reduce all math to logic). So they were
carried
away with quantification/empiricism.
If you have a headache, your headache is no less real by your inability
to objectively quantify it to me. The basis for my believing you do have
a
headache is the fact that I also have headaches and the fact that you
have
no motive to lie about such a thing and your character. But science does
not want to hear about things like 'character'. Nobody ever measured a
character - so W went off the deep end with it - like a good little
science
mommys boy. Denied headaches and all other such things. Since that
time psychologists have learned to take a dim view of forcing phenomena
to fit their categories. Since that time also a clear distinction arose
between
'causal explanations' and 'reasons explanations'. The former is what
science
uses exclusively. Causal explanations follow natural deterministic
causes
like F=MA/gravity causing a shoe to fall to the earth by a deterministic
equation. 'Reasons causes' are what the rest of the world is required to
use
to explain things. Only Miss Science is exempted from having to provide
a reasons cause. Reasons causes are things that explain historical
events.
What were the motives/goals and aspirations of the political order of
Europe
during the time of Napoleons defeat at Waterloo. Historical events are
one-time events - they can not be studied empirically. The reason they
are
historical to begin with is that they are one time events. Empircism of
science and causal explanations like F=MA never will show why Napoleon
lost the battle at Waterloo. In like fashion if you tell me you did not
go
to work this morning because you did not feel good, you gave me a
reasons
cause. Not a medical diagonsis by a trained professional. (which may or
may
not provide a quantitative causal explanation) So reasons causes were
eliminated from the Wittgensteinian view as 'msytic'. W in my book was
an idiot attempting to appear politically correct as a science wannabe.
Today introspection (and for that matter the MENTAL life of animals is
discussed openly after a 50 year rein of Skinarian terror in the form of
idiotic Behaviorism - that was soundly trashed by Gestalt Psychology and
other fronts) is being looked at more closely for means to objectify it
but irregardless of whether it does or not - your headache will be no
less real. Also language is a big barrier like W said. Today in
Philosophy
abstact ideas/reality of them is hot - as well as 'consciousness' in
psychology. There are languages (Sanskrit and others) that contain words
for things for which there are not English equivalents. Eskimo's have
50 words for snow. I have seen languages constructed in private
institutions
for the very reason that the language used by the world is far too
ambiguous.
Of course the language is then only useful in those institutions. The
language
of the world is biased and misleading to a large extent. To get someone
to
use a word with a specifc meaning can be more difficult than simply
using a new word. The west has a lot of catching up to do on language
and
metaphysics.
Mike Dubbeld
"Elaine Jackson" <elaineja...@home.com> wrote in message
news:YSfz9.728990$f05.29...@news1.calgary.shaw.ca...
John Jones
to clear the ground of obscuring metaphysical rubble,
like 'subjective', and 'objective'.
JJ
Mike Dubbeld <mi...@erols.com> wrote in message
news:aqksv6$fru$1...@bob.news.rcn.net...
John Jones
'private language', but thinking about it again, it
seems to be this:
A personal language is not required for our personal
benefit, simply because we already have the meaning
that a language ordinarily tries to convey. For
example, we do not need to consider how we are feeling
by representing it in words to ourselves, for repeating
the words back to ourselves does not repeat the meaning
unless we remember that connection between word and
feeling. Nevertheless, we might forget, so we can
arrange a series of reminders, as of signs or codes in
a diary. We also do not think to ourselves in language
unless we make it a rule that a word represents the
same idea for which it was constructed. We already have
the idea, so the words become superfluous, except as
reminders.
There is no way we could 'work out' out what a sign
meant, because in working it out, we either need a
bigger sign that represents the method by which we DO
remember the meaning of the sign, or we already know
what the signs mean before working them out.
LW
Elaine Jackson <elaineja...@home.com> wrote in
message
news:YSfz9.728990$f05.29...@news1.calgary.shaw.ca...
Glen M. Sizemore
identical on this issue. It is the verbal community
(Skinner's term) that establishes the "meanings" of
terms, and they do so by "modeling," reinforcing
correct usage, punishing incorrect usage etc. Now, the
same thing is true about terms descriptive of private
events. We have to be "taught" how to use such terms.
But how does the verbal community reinforce and
punish responses descriptive of events to which they
have no access? The answer is that they count on
collateral stimuli and collateral responses. Additionally,
some verbal responses are descriptive of one's private
behavior and the description was established when the
behavior occurred publically. In a fourth method,
responses arise because they are controlled by stimuli
that share some properties as the current state, as in
"soda tastes like my foot is asleep."
"Elaine Jackson" <elaineja...@home.com> wrote in message news:<YSfz9.728990$f05.29...@news1.calgary.shaw.ca>...
Chad L
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsiz...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:6e2f1d09.02111...@posting.google.com...
> Wittgenstein's and Skinner's positions are nearly
> identical on this issue. It is the verbal community
> (Skinner's term) that establishes the "meanings" of
> terms, and they do so by "modeling," reinforcing
> correct usage, punishing incorrect usage etc. Now, the
> same thing is true about terms descriptive of private
> events. We have to be "taught" how to use such terms.
> But how does the verbal community reinforce and
> punish responses descriptive of events to which they
> have no access? The answer is that they count on
> collateral stimuli and collateral responses.
yes.
Additionally,
> some verbal responses are descriptive of one's private
> behavior and the description was established when the
> behavior occurred publicly.
I'm not sure how that's possible, and I think Wittgenstein (and Skinner) would say that it wasn't (currently) possible to describe
private behaviors, e.g., feelings or emotions. However, he would say that we can name these things, but such names are merely
tautologies that do not suffice to actually describe these private events. Basically, you'd just be pairing a vocal sound with an
event that cannot be verified by anyone save for yourself. This goes back to LW's beetle in the box analogy (#293, "From
Philosphical Investigations").
In a fourth method,
> responses arise because they are controlled by stimuli
> that share some properties as the current state, as in
> "soda tastes like my foot is asleep."
My foot is asleep is like pins and needles. Pins and needles is like -- "oww" (?). Oww is paired with my verbal report of my private
events and with my "collateral" public behaviors (e.g., jumping up and down, crying, waving my hand in front of my mouth, yelling,
etc.). My "oww" (or beetle) might not be anything at all like your "oww", assuming that you even have an "oww" at all - even though
you may do everything that I do publicly when reporting the "oww".
James Winter
as I know, however, W. never explicitly endorses behaviorism
in Philosophical Investigations.
Chad L
"James Winter" <win...@humnet.ucla.edu> wrote in message news:3DD02680...@humnet.ucla.edu...
Glen M. Sizemore
> GS: (previous)Wittgenstein's and Skinner's positions are
nearly > identical on this issue. It is the verbal
community > (Skinner's term) that establishes the
"meanings" of > terms, and they do so by "modeling,"
reinforcing > correct usage, punishing incorrect usage
etc. Now, the > same thing is true about terms
descriptive of private > events. We have to be "taught"
how to use such terms. > But how does the verbal
community reinforce and > punish responses
descriptive of events to which they > have no access?
The answer is that they count on > collateral stimuli and
collateral responses.
CL: yes.
GS: (previous):Additionally, > some verbal responses
are descriptive of one's private > behavior and the
description was established when the > behavior
occurred publicly.
CL: I'm not sure how that's possible, and I think
Wittgenstein (and Skinner) would say that it wasn't
(currently) possible to describe private behaviors, e.g.,
feelings or emotions.
GS: Well, I'm not completely sure about Wittgenstein.
In any event, Skinner would definitely say we can
describe behavior that has receded to the covert level. I
think I know what you're driving at, and it seems a
good point. But, at least according to Skinner, fairly
detailed descriptions of such behavior are possible
because we have acquired verbal responses descriptive
of our public behavior (and these may be fairly accurate
and rich, since the verbal community has access to our
public behavior and can sharpen discriminative control
in the usual ways). When the behavior recedes to the
covert level, enough of the stimulation remains to
control accurate description. I admit, though, that W.
would probably have had some problem with this. I
don't think Malcolm liked it much, though Malcolm (a
student of W.'s) says a lot of stuff that Skinnerians like.
Anyway, Skinner claimed that behavior that receded to
the covert level was the most accurately "known."
CL: However, he would say that we can name these
things, but such names are merely tautologies that do
not suffice to actually describe these private events.
Basically, you'd just be pairing a vocal sound with an
event that cannot be verified by anyone save for
yourself. This goes back to LW's beetle in the box
analogy (#293, "From Philosphical Investigations").
GS: Well, I'll defer (temporarily) to you on W.'s
position (did he really say "tautologies?" - "names" are
tautologies?). However, I can't agree with "Basically,
you'd just be pairing a vocal sound with an event that
cannot be verified by anyone save for yourself."
Especially the first part; establishing discriminative
control is not merely a matter of "pairing a vocal sound
with an event." It is more complicated than that. I do
agree that the "...event that cannot be verified by
anyone save for yourself." That's what makes it private.
However, Skinner's position (and apparently W.'s,
too) was that "meanings" are established via the same
"mechanisms" (which Skinner spelled out in detail) as
responses "about" public events. That's why, in fact,
there could be no such thing as private language.
GS: (previous) In a fourth method,> responses arise
because they are controlled by stimuli > that share
some properties as the current state, as in > "soda
tastes like my foot is asleep."
CL: My foot is asleep is like pins and needles. Pins and
needles is like -- "oww" (?). Oww is paired with my
verbal report of my private events and with my
"collateral" public behaviors (e.g., jumping up and
down, crying, waving my hand in front of my mouth,
yelling, etc.). My "oww" (or beetle) might not be
anything at all like your "oww", assuming that you even
have an "oww" at all - even though you may do
everything that I do publicly when reporting the "oww".
GS: Well, I agree with some of this, but not much. The
issue here is what dimension(s) of a stimulus is (are)
controlling behavior. Again, your description of the
acquisition of operant behavior is not accurate. The first
part is somewhat accurate, but it is not necessary for
the child to have acquired the response "pins and
needles" in order for the metaphorical extension "soda
tastes like my foot is asleep." What is necessary is that
some dimension of the event be similar enough to the
event acquiring the extension (so to speak). I agree that
one's pain might not be like another's pain, but this is
somewhat a red herring. The fact is that we can
establish verbal responses under discriminative control
of our own behavior, both public and (sometimes with
difficulty) private, as well as other sorts of conditions of
our bodies (to which only we may have access). We
certainly agree that sometimes one's foot "feels like
pins and needles." Also, we can produce limited
repertoires in nonhumans that can be useful
scientifically. The drug-discrimination literature is of this
sort, but one may get some argument concerning the
private nature of the controlling stimuli. It would be a
very interesting experiment (I need to remember this...I
might be able to get some lab space to do it at some
point) to see if rats can identify when they have been
injected with cocaine at doses which do not produce
observable behavioral changes as judged by trained
humans....that's a great experiment if I do not say so
myself!
"Chad L" <bluek...@mindspring.com> wrote in message news:<aqp1a2$8bp$1...@slb6.atl.mindspring.net>...
James Winter
James Winter
Chad L
mystical "explanations".
"James Winter" <win...@humnet.ucla.edu> wrote in message news:3DD04322...@humnet.ucla.edu...
Chad L
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsiz...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:6e2f1d09.02111...@posting.google.com...
>
> > GS: (previous)Wittgenstein's and Skinner's positions are
> nearly > identical on this issue. It is the verbal
> community > (Skinner's term) that establishes the
> "meanings" of > terms, and they do so by "modeling,"
> reinforcing > correct usage, punishing incorrect usage
> etc. Now, the > same thing is true about terms
> descriptive of private > events. We have to be "taught"
> how to use such terms. > But how does the verbal
> community reinforce and > punish responses
> descriptive of events to which they > have no access?
> The answer is that they count on > collateral stimuli and
> collateral responses.
>
> CL: yes.
>
> GS: (previous):Additionally, > some verbal responses
> are descriptive of one's private > behavior and the
> description was established when the > behavior
> occurred publicly.
>
> CL: I'm not sure how that's possible, and I think
> Wittgenstein (and Skinner) would say that it wasn't
> (currently) possible to describe private behaviors, e.g.,
> feelings or emotions.
>
> GS: Well, I'm not completely sure about Wittgenstein.
who is!? :)
> In any event, Skinner would definitely say we can
> describe behavior that has receded to the covert level.
Hm. Would he? He seems to give covert things like feelings and emotions an epiphenomenal status. "epiphenomena" being a word that
he himself has used. To me, that just seems like a name for what cannot be described - only named (because it is private).
I
> think I know what you're driving at, and it seems a
> good point. But, at least according to Skinner, fairly
> detailed descriptions of such behavior are possible
> because we have acquired verbal responses descriptive
> of our public behavior (and these may be fairly accurate
> and rich, since the verbal community has access to our
> public behavior and can sharpen discriminative control
> in the usual ways).
I agree. Verbal communities have acquired verbal repertoires that may "describe" *public* behavior - but can we do the same with
private behavior? Wouldn't it be fair to say that we cannot until we have made that private behavior no longer private, but public?
(e.g., via physiological brain studies). I know one lady who has measured her private thoughts about various things. You know;
counted the frequency of the number of times she thought about death or something like that - but then, those are no longer private
behaviors, thus we may only describe them in public terms.
When the behavior recedes to the
> covert level, enough of the stimulation remains to
> control accurate description.
I assume that you're talking about verbal behavior in particular, e.g., reading a book outloud, vs. silently reading the book.
However, it seems to me ( and I think Skinner agrees here, though I've only just begun reading Verbal Behavior), that such verbal
behavior cannot be done without a community - thus it must be public BEFORE it can 'recede to the covert level'; so what you say
above makes perfect sense - but it doesn't seem to capture the many other covert behaviors that have never really been public.
Honestly, I don't think Wittgenstein even considered how overt speach can recede to covert speach.
I admit, though, that W.
> would probably have had some problem with this. I
> don't think Malcolm liked it much, though Malcolm (a
> student of W.'s) says a lot of stuff that Skinnerians like.
> Anyway, Skinner claimed that behavior that receded to
> the covert level was the most accurately "known."
right. but again, that only covers public behavior that is made private - and not the vast amount of undescribable private events.
>
> CL: However, he would say that we can name these
> things, but such names are merely tautologies that do
> not suffice to actually describe these private events.
> Basically, you'd just be pairing a vocal sound with an
> event that cannot be verified by anyone save for
> yourself. This goes back to LW's beetle in the box
> analogy (#293, "From Philosphical Investigations").
>
> GS: Well, I'll defer (temporarily) to you on W.'s
> position (did he really say "tautologies?" - "names" are
> tautologies?).
I don't think he used the word "tautologies" in 'From Philosophical Investigations'; but I think he does *imply* (though I might be
mistaken) that in the Tractatus (and doesn't correct himself later). In any case, it seems to mesh well with the positivist
tradition. Another way of thinking about it is to say that a name analytically refers to its object; for example, the name "apple":
'This is an apple if and only if properties y,z,w, etc. are observed' (of course, all analytic definitions are tautologies). Keep
in mind however, that just because some expression is a tautology does not mean that it is nonsense (according to Witt). But don't
just take my "understanding" of it - here:
"3.203 A name signifies an object. The designated object is what the name means. ("A" is the same sign as "A".)"
and
"3.221 Objects can only be named. Signs represent them. I can only speak about objects: I cannot put them into words.
A sentence can only say how a thing is, not what it is. "
However, I can't agree with "Basically,
> you'd just be pairing a vocal sound with an event that
> cannot be verified by anyone save for yourself."
intresting.
> Especially the first part; establishing discriminative
> control is not merely a matter of "pairing a vocal sound
> with an event." It is more complicated than that.
naturally the organism must come in contact with the pairing. I think a behavior analyst would not say that a pairing had been
"successful", until there was some measurable proof
I do
> agree that the "...event that cannot be verified by
> anyone save for yourself." That's what makes it private.
> However, Skinner's position (and apparently W.'s,
> too) was that "meanings" are established via the same
> "mechanisms" (which Skinner spelled out in detail) as
> responses "about" public events.
I don't know if that's what W. thought; but I agree that Skinner sure did. W. doesn't seem to say much of anything at all about
reinforcement, punishment, etc., etc. nor does he say anything (as far as I know) about natural selection and consequences. Of
course, W. wasn't a scientist either.
That's why, in fact,
> there could be no such thing as private language.
>
> GS: (previous) In a fourth method,> responses arise
> because they are controlled by stimuli > that share
> some properties as the current state, as in > "soda
> tastes like my foot is asleep."
>
> CL: My foot is asleep is like pins and needles. Pins and
> needles is like -- "oww" (?). Oww is paired with my
> verbal report of my private events and with my
> "collateral" public behaviors (e.g., jumping up and
> down, crying, waving my hand in front of my mouth,
> yelling, etc.). My "oww" (or beetle) might not be
> anything at all like your "oww", assuming that you even
> have an "oww" at all - even though you may do
> everything that I do publicly when reporting the "oww".
>
> GS: Well, I agree with some of this, but not much. The
> issue here is what dimension(s) of a stimulus is (are)
> controlling behavior. Again, your description of the
> acquisition of operant behavior is not accurate. The first
> part is somewhat accurate, but it is not necessary for
> the child to have acquired the response "pins and
> needles" in order for the metaphorical extension "soda
> tastes like my foot is asleep."
I agree. I guess I should have explained what I meant better.
What is necessary is that
> some dimension of the event be similar enough to the
> event acquiring the extension (so to speak). I agree that
> one's pain might not be like another's pain, but this is
> somewhat a red herring.
The fact is that we can
> establish verbal responses under discriminative control
> of our own behavior, both public and (sometimes with
> difficulty) private, as well as other sorts of conditions of
> our bodies (to which only we may have access). We
> certainly agree that sometimes one's foot "feels like
> pins and needles." Also, we can produce limited
> repertoires in nonhumans that can be useful
> scientifically. The drug-discrimination literature is of this
> sort, but one may get some argument concerning the
> private nature of the controlling stimuli. It would be a
> very interesting experiment (I need to remember this...I
> might be able to get some lab space to do it at some
> point) to see if rats can identify when they have been
> injected with cocaine at doses which do not produce
> observable behavioral changes as judged by trained
> humans...
hasn't that already been done with pigeons? (Lubinski and Thompson, 1993).
.that's a great experiment if I do not say so
> myself!
>
> "Chad L" <bluek...@mindspring.com> wrote in message news:<aqp1a2$8bp$1...@slb6.atl.mindspring.net>...
cheers,
cl
James Winter
Glen M. Sizemore
misconceptions concerning radical behaviorism as did others then and
now.
James Winter <win...@humnet.ucla.edu> wrote in message news:<3DD02680...@humnet.ucla.edu>...
Glen M. Sizemore
the chicks!
James Winter <win...@humnet.ucla.edu> wrote in message news:<3DD04322...@humnet.ucla.edu>...
James Winter
You should read Chomsky's review of "Verbal Behavior" (from 1959, I believe)
which was interpreted by the academic community as devastating.
You can also look at any philosophy of mind textbook which includes work
on behaviorism to see how it failed philosophically.
Finally, to think that something like Cartesian dualism is the only alternative
to a behaviorist account of our mental lives is to radically overstate the
distinction between behaviorism and its rejection. That would be a false
dilemma.
Have you heard the joke: Two behaviorists finish making love. The one turns
to the other and says, "Well, it was good for you, how was it for me?"
Chad L
It is true that Chomsky had an excellent refutation of somebody's work, but it wasn't Skinner who he refuted. Skinner didn't reply
to Chomsky because it was apparant that Chomsky had hardly read Verbal Behavior. I suspect that you haven't read it either - and if
you haven't any background with behavior analysis, you'll most likely find it a difficult book to grasp (you'll want to start with
other books first). No matter, I've seen words like yours repeated over and over again in my own philosophy department and on
newsgroups like these. Unfortunately, the same mistake is repeated over and over again - and usually by people who haven't read or
understood Verbal Behavior much at all (they just parrot what their cognitive psychology or dualistic philosophy teacher parroted
from their teachers). Often Skinner's radical behaviorism is confused with Watsonian or Hullian behaviorism and/or logical
behaviorism associated with Ryle.
You want to talk about philosophy of mind books? Well, I can name one in particular - John Heil's "Philosophy of Mind", badly
screws up and misrepresents the radical behaviorists' methods and theories (as I'd imagine the sources he used were screwed up too).
In reality, its unfortunate because it deprives young students the opportunity to think for themselves about the issues at hand - as
they blindly accept the authority's opinions on the topic.
At any rate, Chomsky's review has been refuted by a few people in published print. Do a search on "MacQuorcodale".
But I digress from the actual issue. I believe that you might possibly have something to bring to the table - perhaps a
well-structured argument? Maybe you can express how exactly Chomsky allegedly refuted Skinner?
"James Winter" <win...@humnet.ucla.edu> wrote in message news:3DD07F8D...@humnet.ucla.edu...
James Winter
any particular strand of philosophical behaviorism, but I have rehearsed certain
of
the arguments at one time or another.
That said, I am happy to observe that behaviorism takes different forms both in
psychology
and in philosophy. To be more specific, then, if you'd like to focus on Skinner,
perhaps
you can tell me (1) whether Skinner was an eliminitavist about the mental, or
whether he held
some lesser claim (that, for example, the mental is irrelevant to the methodology
and practice
of empirical psychology), and (2) whether Skinner can be properly associated with
the
philosophy of analytic or logical behaviorism.
If the answer to either (1) or (2) is 'yes', I would like to hear how either view
can be defended
these days.
Three questions:
Do you take eliminativism about the mental to be the only valid response to
Cartesian dualism?
How exactly do you conceive of giving up your dualistic habits and mystical
"explanations"?
By 'mystical explanations' do you mean something like folk psychological
explanations?
James Winter
against
> any particular strand of philosophical behaviorism, but I have rehearsed certain
> of the arguments at one time or another.
>
> That said, I am happy to observe that behaviorism takes different forms both in
> psychology and in philosophy. To be more specific, then, if you'd like to focus on Skinner,
> perhaps you can tell me (1) whether Skinner was an eliminitavist about the mental, or
> whether he held some lesser claim (that, for example, the mental is irrelevant to the methodology
> and practice of empirical psychology), and (2) whether Skinner can be properly associated with
> the philosophy of analytic or logical behaviorism.
>
>
> Three questions:
>
> Do you take eliminativism about the mental to be the only valid response to Cartesian dualism?
>
>
> By 'mystical explanations' do you mean something like folk psychological explanations?
Chad L wrote:
>
> James,
>
> It is true that Chomsky had an excellent refutation of somebody's work, but it wasn't Skinner who he refuted. Skinner didn't reply
> to Chomsky because it was apparant that Chomsky had hardly read Verbal Behavior.
It does not seem clear to me that Chomsky had hardly read Verbal Behavior; he
discusses the book in fair detail. It is clear from Chomsky's later remarks
though that he was less interested in an attack on Skinner's specific
behaviorist methodology, or even Skinner's behavioral analysis of speech acts,
but more generally on the behaviorist/empirical approach to the study of the mind
and cognition.
I suspect that you haven't read it either - and if
> you haven't any background with behavior analysis, you'll most likely find it a difficult book to grasp (you'll want to start with
> other books first). No matter, I've seen words like yours repeated over and over again in my own philosophy department and on
> newsgroups like these. Unfortunately, the same mistake is repeated over and over again - and usually by people who haven't read or
> understood Verbal Behavior much at all (they just parrot what their cognitive psychology or dualistic philosophy teacher parroted
> from their teachers). Often Skinner's radical behaviorism is confused with Watsonian or Hullian behaviorism and/or logical
> behaviorism associated with Ryle.
As I mentioned, there are certainly differences within behaviorism, but I take it
these are variations on a
theme according to someone with Chomsky's interest in writing his review of Verbal
Behavior.
>
> You want to talk about philosophy of mind books? Well, I can name one in particular - John Heil's "Philosophy of Mind", badly
> screws up and misrepresents the radical behaviorists' methods and theories (as I'd imagine the sources he used were screwed up too).
I don't doubt it; that would certainly be unfortunate, but it would not necessarily
scew the issues for the
philosophy of mind that I'm sure are Heil's real interest.
> In reality, its unfortunate because it deprives young students the opportunity to think for themselves about the issues at hand - as
> they blindly accept the authority's opinions on the topic.
In my experience most young students are more sympathetic to behaviorism than not
when inititally introduced to it; many of them take it as obvious.
>
> At any rate, Chomsky's review has been refuted by a few people in published print. Do a search on "MacQuorcodale".
I don't think Chomsky was all that interested in Skinnerian behaviorism as much as
he was interested
in the general empiricist trend in, say, the philosophy of mind and epistemology
(Quine's eliminativism and naturalized epistemology of course comes to mind).
I wouldn't doubt that MacCorquodale seized on Chomsky's lack of attention to
Skinner's particular
empirical claims in behaviorist psychology (and about verbal behavior) in his
review. But that would
be to miss Chomsky's real target.
Glen M. Sizemore
(previous)Wittgenstein's and Skinner's positions are >
nearly > identical on this issue. It is the verbal >
community > (Skinner's term) that establishes the >
"meanings" of > terms, and they do so by "modeling," >
reinforcing > correct usage, punishing incorrect usage >
etc. Now, the > same thing is true about terms >
descriptive of private > events. We have to be "taught"
> how to use such terms. > But how does the verbal >
community reinforce and > punish responses >
descriptive of events to which they > have no access?
> The answer is that they count on > collateral stimuli
and > collateral responses.
> > CL (prvious): yes.
> > GS: (previous):Additionally, > some verbal
responses > are descriptive of one's private > behavior
and the > description was established when the >
behavior > occurred publicly. > > CL: I'm not sure
how that's possible, and I think > Wittgenstein (and
Skinner) would say that it wasn't > (currently) possible
to describe private behaviors, e.g., > feelings or
emotions. > > GS: Well, I'm not completely sure about
Wittgenstein.
CL: who is!? :)
GS (previous):> In any event, Skinner would definitely
say we can > describe behavior that has receded to the
covert level.
CL: Hm. Would he? He seems to give covert things
like feelings and emotions an epiphenomenal status.
"epiphenomena" being a word that he himself has used.
To me, that just seems like a name for what cannot be
described - only named (because it is private).
GS: I think we are mostly in agreement here, so I'll just
let what follows below handle this one.
GS: (previous): I > think I know what you're driving at,
and it seems a > good point. But, at least according to
Skinner, fairly > detailed descriptions of such behavior
are possible > because we have acquired verbal
responses descriptive > of our public behavior (and
these may be fairly accurate > and rich, since the verbal
community has access to our > public behavior and can
sharpen discriminative control > in the usual ways).
CL: I agree. Verbal communities have acquired verbal
repertoires that may "describe" *public* behavior - but
can we do the same with private behavior? Wouldn't it
be fair to say that we cannot until we have made that
private behavior no longer private, but public? (e.g., via
physiological brain studies). I know one lady who has
measured her private thoughts about various things.
You know; counted the frequency of the number of
times she thought about death or something like that -
but then, those are no longer private behaviors, thus we
may only describe them in public terms.
GS: I don't know if your first sentence is a mistake, but
I would say it is the individual who acquires verbal
repertoires. Skinner talks many times about
physiological instrumentation. Even if we may one day
convince ourselves that we are actually measuring (in
some sense) what is "being responded to" in an episode
involving private events, this has nothing to do with how
such phenomena "normally" emerge. So, of course, I
am arguing that it is not "...fair to say that we cannot
until we have made that private behavior no longer
private, but public." BTW, I disagree with your
assessment of the woman's behavior. The events she is
counting are private and reporting such data does not
make them public.
GS (previous): When the behavior recedes to the >
covert level, enough of the stimulation remains to >
control accurate description.
CL: I assume that you're talking about verbal behavior
in particular, e.g., reading a book outloud, vs. silently
reading the book.
GS: Not necessarily. I am talking as well about private
seeing, hearing etc. There is a great deal of behavior
that may become private (or has covert parts, see
below).
CL: However, it seems to me ( and I think Skinner
agrees here, though I've only just begun reading Verbal
Behavior), that such verbal behavior cannot be done
without a community - thus it must be public BEFORE
it can 'recede to the covert level'; so what you say
above makes perfect sense - but it doesn't seem to
capture the many other covert behaviors that have
never really been public.
GS: Yes, you are right about the fact that in order for
private events to be accurately described they usually
must have been public. But I think you are seriously
underestimating what sorts of behavior may become
covert. Or, another way to look at this is that the
person comes to respond to a part of the total response
that is available to the verbal community. The portion to
which the person responds is private but is similar to
what the verbal community observes. This seems
especially apropos to perceptual behavior.
CL: Honestly, I don't think Wittgenstein even
considered how overt speach can recede to covert
speach. <snip previous GS.>
GS: Probably not.
GS: I > don't think Malcolm liked it much, though
Malcolm (a > student of W.'s) says a lot of stuff that
Skinnerians like. > Anyway, Skinner claimed that
behavior that receded to > the covert level was the
most accurately "known."
CL: right. but again, that only covers public behavior
that is made private - and not the vast amount of
undescribable private events.
GS: My position should be clearer now.
> > CL (previous) : However, he would say that we
can name these > things, but such names are merely
tautologies that do > not suffice to actually describe
these private events. > Basically, you'd just be pairing a
vocal sound with an > event that cannot be verified by
anyone save for > yourself. This goes back to LW's
beetle in the box > analogy (#293, "From Philosphical
Investigations").
> > GS (previous): Well, I'll defer (temporarily) to you
on W.'s > position (did he really say "tautologies?" -
"names" are > tautologies?).
CL: I don't think he used the word "tautologies" in
'From Philosophical Investigations'; but I think he does
*imply* (though I might be mistaken) that in the
Tractatus (and doesn't correct himself later). In any
case, it seems to mesh well with the positivist tradition.
Another way of thinking about it is to say that a name
analytically refers to its object; for example, the name
"apple": 'This is an apple if and only if properties y,z,w,
etc. are observed' (of course, all analytic definitions are
tautologies). Keep in mind however, that just because
some expression is a tautology does not mean that it is
nonsense (according to Witt). But don't just take my
"understanding" of it - here: "3.203 A name signifies an
object. The designated object is what the name means.
("A" is the same sign as "A".)" and "3.221 Objects can
only be named. Signs represent them. I can only speak
about objects: I cannot put them into words. A
sentence can only say how a thing is, not what it is. "
GS: Later Wittgenstein would not assert any of this
stuff, I don't think. If you are quoting from the
Tractatus, you already know it is likely that W. rejected
it, despite your paranthetical , "and doesn't correct
himself later." If this is from PI, (I'm about halfway
through), keep in mind that he says many things and if
you're not careful you might think he was asserting
these things, when, in fact, he is sort of asserting them
from the standpoint of more traditional philosophy, and
then he proceeds to demolish them.
GS (previous): However, I can't agree with "Basically,
> you'd just be pairing a vocal sound with an event that
> cannot be verified by anyone save for yourself."
CL: intresting.
GS (previous): > Especially the first part; establishing
discriminative > control is not merely a matter of
"pairing a vocal sound > with an event." It is more
complicated than that.
CL: naturally the organism must come in contact with
the pairing. I think a behavior analyst would not say that
a pairing had been "successful", until there was some
measurable proof.
GS: Well, maybe I'm picking nits, but you were
attempting to give a sort of technical description and it
does not seem accurate (I'm not being mean here, I am
glad that you are saying much of what you are saying).
It may be that someone might just have to hear a
"name" in the presence of the thing, but this is not the
basic process of stimulus control (it is, in fact, an
enormously complex behavior composed of many
different units), which requires that the organism behave
in the presence of the SD and have the behavior
"consequated."
GS: (previous): I do > agree that the "...event that
cannot be verified by > anyone save for yourself."
That's what makes it private. > However, Skinner's
position (and apparently W.'s, > too) was that
"meanings" are established via the same >
"mechanisms" (which Skinner spelled out in detail) as >
responses "about" public events.
CL: I don't know if that's what W. thought; but I agree
that Skinner sure did. W. doesn't seem to say much of
anything at all about reinforcement, punishment, etc.,
etc. nor does he say anything (as far as I know) about
natural selection and consequences. Of course, W.
wasn't a scientist either.
GS: No, he certainly doesn't spell out the processes
(about which, I'm sure W. did not know much) but in
similar conditions he talks about the "training" that goes
on during the establishment of any language game, and
in fact, repeatedly emphasizes this. Again, I'm sure that
W. thought most of psychology was lame but, of
course, nobody made him aware (nor would he
probably have listened) that his position was close to
Skinner's.
GS (previous): That's why, in fact, > there could be no
such thing as private language. > > GS: (previous) In a
fourth method,> responses arise > because they are
controlled by stimuli > that share > some properties as
the current state, as in > "soda > tastes like my foot is
asleep."
> > CL (previous): My foot is asleep is like pins and
needles. Pins and > needles is like -- "oww" (?). Oww
is paired with my > verbal report of my private events
and with my > "collateral" public behaviors (e.g.,
jumping up and > down, crying, waving my hand in
front of my mouth, > yelling, etc.). My "oww" (or
beetle) might not be > anything at all like your "oww",
assuming that you even > have an "oww" at all - even
though you may do > everything that I do publicly when
reporting the "oww".
> > GS (previous): Well, I agree with some of this, but
not much. The > issue here is what dimension(s) of a
stimulus is (are) > controlling behavior. Again, your
description of the > acquisition of operant behavior is
not accurate. The first > part is somewhat accurate, but
it is not necessary for > the child to have acquired the
response "pins and > needles" in order for the
metaphorical extension "soda > tastes like my foot is
asleep."
CL: I agree. I guess I should have explained what I
meant better.
GS: (previous): What is necessary is that > some
dimension of the event be similar enough to the > event
acquiring the extension (so to speak). I agree that >
one's pain might not be like another's pain, but this is >
somewhat a red herring. The fact is that we can >
establish verbal responses under discriminative control
> of our own behavior, both public and (sometimes
with > difficulty) private, as well as other sorts of
conditions of > our bodies (to which only we may have
access). We > certainly agree that sometimes one's
foot "feels like > pins and needles." Also, we can
produce limited > repertoires in nonhumans that can be
useful > scientifically. The drug-discrimination literature
is of this > sort, but one may get some argument
concerning the > private nature of the controlling
stimuli. It would be a > very interesting experiment (I
need to remember this...I > might be able to get some
lab space to do it at some > point) to see if rats can
identify when they have been > injected with cocaine at
doses which do not produce > observable behavioral
changes as judged by trained > humans...
CL: hasn't that already been done with pigeons?
(Lubinski and Thompson, 1993)
GS: Maybe. I located the reference to Lubinski and
Thompson but I don't know if that paper includes the
critical portion of the experiment (see immediately
below). I know about Thompson and Lubinski (1987),
but this doesn't have the second part of the experiment
that looks at whether or not a human (or I suppose
another organism) could be trained to discriminate the
effects of cocaine in rats and comparing this behavior
with the rat's own "reports." The main question is,
"Can humans tell which rats have been injected with
cocaine and at what doses?" There is no question that
humans can tell cocaine-injected rats from saline-
injected rats, but if humans can only tell after the rats
have been injected with high doses - doses higher then
the rats themselves require - then the implication would
be that the rats may be responding to behavior that
would have to be called private. If the minimal
detectable doses are similar for the rats and the human
observers, then we may conclude that the rats may be
responding to the same stimuli as the humans but, of
course, from a different perspective.
Cordially,
Glen
"Chad L" <bluek...@mindspring.com> wrote in message news:<aqprg1$4pj$1...@slb3.atl.mindspring.net>...
Glen M. Sizemore
perhaps you can tell me (1) whether Skinner was an
eliminitavist about the mental
<snip>
GS: It depends on what you mean. He held that many
of the phenomena called "mental" were aspects of
one's behavior (both public and private) or states or
conditions of one's body. He did not argue that
because such events had to be studied by inference that
they were not part of science. Thus, Skinner did not
take the tack of the methodological behaviorists who
ruled subjective phenomena out of the bounds of
science because their existence could not be agreed
upon by more than one person. He believed that
private behavior could not held to be the "cause" of
public behavior, except in the sense that a
discriminative stimulus could be said to "cause" the
occurrence of operant behavior (not in any important
sense, the actions of the discriminative stimulus must be
understood as the products of the contingencies of
reinforcement, which is what Skinner viewed as the
"causes"). Private behavior (or public for that matter)
that exists because it allows us to "solve some problem"
(i.e., thinking) is more behavior to be explained by
pointing to contingencies of reinforcement. Thus,
Skinner eliminates "mental" as some kind of ontological
category, and argues that the subjective is not the same
as "mental" (which he views as akin to ether or
phlogiston). But he does not eliminate the phenomena
said to require "the mind" and he does not rule them
out of scientific consideration.
James Winter <win...@humnet.ucla.edu> wrote in message news:<3DD0C3C6...@humnet.ucla.edu>...
Immortalist
"John Jones" <scooby...@btopenworld.com> wrote in message
news:aqmq5l$aei$1...@knossos.btinternet.com...
> I don't exactly know what I meant when I wrote about
> 'private language', but thinking about it again, it
> seems to be this:
> A personal language is not required for our personal
> benefit, simply because we already have the meaning
> that a language ordinarily tries to convey. For
> example, we do not need to consider how we are feeling
> by representing it in words to ourselves, for repeating
> the words back to ourselves does not repeat the meaning
> unless we remember that connection between word and
> feeling. Nevertheless, we might forget, so we can
> arrange a series of reminders, as of signs or codes in
> a diary. We also do not think to ourselves in language
> unless we make it a rule that a word represents the
> same idea for which it was constructed. We already have
> the idea, so the words become superfluous, except as
> reminders.
>
> There is no way we could 'work out' out what a sign
> meant, because in working it out, we either need a
> bigger sign that represents the method by which we DO
> remember the meaning of the sign, or we already know
> what the signs mean before working them out.
>
> LW
> Do you experience an internal dialogue similar to the thing a lot of
> phychologists and others posit? If you do, can you describe it and if you
> don't do, you have any intuition that one exists? If you are sure that you
> don't, please expand.
>
The "self" needs drivers too, one may be self talk, or the inner monologue.
McCrone, The Ape That Spoke, "The Inner Voice" and it's influence on the
brain. Inner language may be one of the recent drivers of self awareness.
McCrone attaches a lot of importance to the "inner voice", an internal
running commentary which he thinks is the ((origin_of_self-awareness)) and
which he says is present in all of us, but he offers no evidence for his
claim that this is a universal human experience. Do forest-dwelling
hunter-gatherers (the few who are left), for example, have this inner voice,
and is it exactly the same with them as with us? For that matter, do all
members of our own society have it? And what happens to people who lose the
power of speech because of a stroke: does their inner voice then fall
silent, and, if so, are they no longer self-aware? The whole subject needs a
longer and fuller treatment than it gets here. McCrone says that little has
been written about the inner voice, which makes it rather risky on his part
to generalize about it. (He fails to mention Julian Jaynes, who did write
about it at length: see my essay, Julian Jaynes Revisited).
Jaynes's central idea is that our modern type of consciousness is a recent
development; indeed, that it began no more than 3,000 years ago. In earlier
times human mentality was characterized by auditory and sometimes visual
hallucinations, in which people heard the voices of the gods speaking to
them and telling them what to do. Only when this process became internalized
and recognized as coming from within the percipients' own minds did truly
modern consciousness begin. The minds of `preconscious' humans were split in
two (the `bicameral mind'), probably as a result of a dissociation between
the left and right hemispheres of the brain. Jaynes finds evidence of this
in Homer's `Iliad', in which the characters continually receive orders and
advice from various deities. This, he claims, is no mere literary trope but
is an accurate description of how people really experienced the world at the
time. In support of this view he cites the eminent classicist E.R. Dodds,
whose book `The Greeks and the Irrational' provides him with plenty of
evidence for his thesis.
The heroes of `The Iliad' do not have the kind of interior monologue that
characterizes our own consciousness today. Instead, their decisions, plans,
and initiatives are developed at an unconscious level and then are
`announced' to them, sometimes by the hallucinated figure of a friend or a
god, sometimes by a voice alone. `The Iliad', Jaynes believes, stands at a
watershed between two different types of human mentality and affords us an
insight into an older mode of being. Once we have begun to see history in
this way, we find the same process at work in the art and literature of
other ancient civilizations: for instance, those of Mesopotamia and of the
Hebrews (in the Old Testament).
Jaynes suggests that vestiges of the premodern kind of mentality are to be
found even today. Artistic inspiration and poetry are in this sense
atavistic. If Jaynes were writing now he would no doubt point to such modern
enthusiasms as the vogues for speaking with tongues, channelling, or
communicating with angels as further manifestations of the same phenomenon.
By Hannah Holmes
"Do profoundly deaf people who learn to talk have a voice in their head?"
-- Heather & Allen Exby
Not just those who learn to talk -- any deaf person may find that annoying
rattle of gibberish knocking around in her skull. The brain, it seems, is
determined to natter to itself, whether it does it in English, Swahili or
some private and non-transferable language.
For starters, though, rest assured that you can cogitate, daydream and
reminisce without employing any language system at all. "Have you ever been
driving along in your car, and four thousand things are going through your
head at once?" asks University of California at Irvine neurobiologist Greg
Hickok. "There's no way you can think all that in English. And then there
are those times when you say, 'I just can't find the words for it.' "
But when it comes time to capture and analyze those butterflies of thought,
a language does come in handy.
.
And sign language works as well as any other. In fact, Dr. Hickok's work
has shown that sign language, despite its physical and spatial nature,
operates out of the same brain departments as spoken language. People who
sign are not performing a physical translation of another language -- they
are using a complete, self-contained language.
Now the question of whether a deaf person's inner voice communicates in sign
language or English or Swahili is a complicated one. Most Americans who are
born deaf learn to read and write English, in addition to some variety of
sign language. Some learn to speak and lipread instead of signing. Other
people may go deaf after learning the sounds of speech.
But when I stumbled across an Internet discussion of the "inner voice"
question, I found people who were born deaf but who dreamed in spoken
English.
Huh?
I e-mailed Peter Hauser, a Ph.D. student in clinical psychology at Gallaudet
University. No one seems to have studied the question of deaf people's inner
language, but Hauser, who is deaf, responded with insights I hadn't
anticipated. Most interesting was his assertion that deaf people who were
born to deaf parents, and who read well, create sounds in their heads as
they learn to read.
"My best answer to this," Hauser wrote, "is that the brain has a special
capacity to develop phonological representations, even when it does not have
auditory input. The representations might be dramatically different from
what hearing individuals hear. Nevertheless, they function in the mind as
'sounds.'" Deaf schizophrenics, he continued, have auditory hallucinations,
and blind schizophrenics have visual ones.
The brain, it seems, has a mind of its own.
.
So yes, deaf people can have an auditory inner voice. They can also have a
signing one.
"I asked my undergraduate students last week about their dreams," Hauser
wrote to me. "Sometimes they are signing in their dreams, and sometimes they
are speaking, even though some of them never speak in the so-called real
world. BUT, they do not derive the message from the 'speaking' or 'signing'
of others in their dreams. It's like the message is being transmitted
through ESP!"
I had asked Hauser, who also studies American Sign Language linguistics, if
the Internet was inspiring slang signs. He's encountered none, but told me
about a sign with no English equal -- "a squeezing gesture with your hand in
front of your neck. If, for example, you tell me that deaf people cannot
have an inner voice, and I show you that they can, you would make that sign.
It means 'Gulp. You got me.'"
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
John Jones
I don't exactly know what I meant when I wrote about
'private language', but thinking about it again, it
seems to be this:
A personal language is not required for our personal
benefit, simply because we already have the meaning
that a language ordinarily tries to convey. For
example, we do not need to consider how we are feeling
by representing it in words to ourselves, for repeating
the words back to ourselves does not repeat the meaning
unless we remember that connection between word and
feeling. Nevertheless, we might forget, so we can
arrange a series of reminders, as of signs or codes in
a diary. We also do not think to ourselves in language
unless we make it a rule that a word represents the
same idea for which it was constructed. We already have
the idea, so the words become superfluous, except as
reminders.
There is no way we could 'work out' out what a sign
meant, because in working it out, we either need a
bigger sign that represents the method by which we DO
remember the meaning of the sign, or we already know
what the signs mean before working them out.
LW
Chad L
"James Winter" <win...@humnet.ucla.edu> wrote in message news:3DD0D214...@humnet.ucla.edu...
> I don't have Heil's book, and I certainly don't have an original argument
> against
> > any particular strand of philosophical behaviorism, but I have rehearsed certain
> > of the arguments at one time or another.
> >
> > That said, I am happy to observe that behaviorism takes different forms both in
> > psychology and in philosophy. To be more specific, then, if you'd like to focus on Skinner,
> > perhaps you can tell me (1) whether Skinner was an eliminitavist about the mental,
Dare I be his mouthpiece; I believe that Skinner left a position on the matter open to further investigation. Certainly he would be
simpathetic towards the eliminitavists - but on the other hand, he definitely does not seem to rule out the epiphenomalist's
position. It's hard to say what his final position on the matter is though (since he's not around anymore). At any rate, I doubt
it any sort of crux to his overall position about behavior and science; thus, I can say with confidence that Skinner would accept
any theory that better explained the data (and data that better verified a theory).
or
> > whether he held some lesser claim (that, for example, the mental is irrelevant to the methodology
> > and practice of empirical psychology), and (2) whether Skinner can be properly associated with
> > the philosophy of analytic or logical behaviorism.
for number 2 you'll have to be much more precise. There will be similarities and differences and I don't know what your criteria
for "association" entails.
> >
> > If the answer to either (1) or (2) is 'yes', I would like to hear how either view would be
> defended these days.
> >
> > Three questions:
> >
> > Do you take eliminativism about the mental to be the only valid response to Cartesian dualism?
> >
> > How exactly do you conceive of giving up your dualistic habits and mystical "explanations"?
You say "can this 3rd variable that I invented explain what is going on?" if the answer is "no". then you give it up because it
adds nothing to your investigation.
> >
> > By 'mystical explanations' do you mean something like folk psychological explanations?
sounds like that could be subsumed under mystical explanations, but what do you have in mind by 'folk psychological explanations'?
>
> Chad L wrote:
> >
> > James,
> >
> > It is true that Chomsky had an excellent refutation of somebody's work, but it wasn't Skinner who he refuted. Skinner didn't
reply
> > to Chomsky because it was apparant that Chomsky had hardly read Verbal Behavior.
>
> It does not seem clear to me that Chomsky had hardly read Verbal Behavior; he
> discusses the book in fair detail. It is clear from Chomsky's later remarks
> though that he was less interested in an attack on Skinner's specific
> behaviorist methodology, or even Skinner's behavioral analysis of speech acts,
> but more generally on the behaviorist/empirical approach to the study of the mind
> and cognition.
Honestly, I haven't read Chomsky's review. However, an old professor of mine did; he advocated it (he loved Chomsky); and gave a
synopsis of its main alleged "knock-down" arguments. I was wondering if you might do the same. Perhaps you saw things that my
professor did not and can offer a synopsis that is more formidable (believe me, I don't doubt that you can; my old professor was the
worst prof. I've ever had (and he hadn't read verbal behavior either)).
Really?! My experience has been opposite. Generally, people don't like determinism, or someone telling them that their anxiety is
not the cause of their behavior, etc. etc..
> >
> > At any rate, Chomsky's review has been refuted by a few people in published print. Do a search on "MacQuorcodale".
>
> I don't think Chomsky was all that interested in Skinnerian behaviorism as much as
> he was interested
> in the general empiricist trend in, say, the philosophy of mind and epistemology
> (Quine's eliminativism and naturalized epistemology of course comes to mind).
>
> I wouldn't doubt that MacCorquodale seized on Chomsky's lack of attention to
> Skinner's particular
> empirical claims in behaviorist psychology (and about verbal behavior) in his
> review. But that would
> be to miss Chomsky's real target.
Again, I'm interested in hearing your synopsis of Chomsky's main points. I do plan on getting around to Chomsky's review sometime
this year, but it would be nice to know what to look for.
Thanks
Chad L
can generally discriminate by the number of arrows, brackets, or colons before each sentence> I use arrows myself >>>>
scroll down
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsiz...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:6e2f1d09.02111...@posting.google.com...
> GS: (previous): I > think I know what you're driving at,
> and it seems a > good point. But, at least according to
> Skinner, fairly > detailed descriptions of such behavior
> are possible > because we have acquired verbal
> responses descriptive > of our public behavior (and
> these may be fairly accurate > and rich, since the verbal
> community has access to our > public behavior and can
> sharpen discriminative control > in the usual ways).
>
> CL: I agree. Verbal communities have acquired verbal
> repertoires that may "describe" *public* behavior - but
> can we do the same with private behavior? Wouldn't it
> be fair to say that we cannot until we have made that
> private behavior no longer private, but public? (e.g., via
> physiological brain studies). I know one lady who has
> measured her private thoughts about various things.
> You know; counted the frequency of the number of
> times she thought about death or something like that -
> but then, those are no longer private behaviors, thus we
> may only describe them in public terms.
>
> GS: I don't know if your first sentence is a mistake, but
> I would say it is the individual who acquires verbal
> repertoires.
communities wouldn't be communities without individuals. :)
Skinner talks many times about
> physiological instrumentation. Even if we may one day
> convince ourselves that we are actually measuring (in
> some sense) what is "being responded to" in an episode
> involving private events, this has nothing to do with how
> such phenomena "normally" emerge. So, of course, I
> am arguing that it is not "...fair to say that we cannot
> until we have made that private behavior no longer
> private, but public."
That's fine that you disagree with that, but note that it doesn't seem to be very consistent with empirical notions about behavior.
Look, if its "private", then it cannot be measured directly; instead what CAN be measured is say, public reports that are correlated
with events that we call private. I'm not sure why we're not connecting on this principle, maybe you could give me an example that
shows how a private behavior can be described without first making it public?
BTW, I disagree with your
> assessment of the woman's behavior. The events she is
> counting are private and reporting such data does not
> make them public.
I disagree with your disagreement on several levels. (1) the woman is also a listener; thus she is actually counting how many times
she reports a private behavior. The report (the actual thing she counts) is conceivably public (though correlated with the
private). (2) you're right; "reporting such data does not make them public", and I didn't mean to suggest that. Rather, when I
said that we may '...only describe them in public terms', I was only attempting to point out that we cannot describe private
behavior until it is no longer private because private behavior cannot be measured (analytically so; otherwise if private behavior
COULD be measured, then it would no-longer really be "private", now would it?)
>
> GS (previous): When the behavior recedes to the >
> covert level, enough of the stimulation remains to >
> control accurate description.
>
> CL: I assume that you're talking about verbal behavior
> in particular, e.g., reading a book outloud, vs. silently
> reading the book.
>
> GS: Not necessarily. I am talking as well about private
> seeing, hearing etc. There is a great deal of behavior
> that may become private (or has covert parts, see
> below).
I'm sorry; what is private seeing or hearing? I'm unfamiliar with these concepts (or constructs). At any rate, I assumed that you
were talking about verbal behavior mostly because the subject of the thread - "private language".
>
> CL: However, it seems to me ( and I think Skinner
> agrees here, though I've only just begun reading Verbal
> Behavior), that such verbal behavior cannot be done
> without a community - thus it must be public BEFORE
> it can 'recede to the covert level'; so what you say
> above makes perfect sense - but it doesn't seem to
> capture the many other covert behaviors that have
> never really been public.
>
> GS: Yes, you are right about the fact that in order for
> private events to be accurately described they usually
> must have been public.
what do you mean - 'usually'?
But I think you are seriously
> underestimating what sorts of behavior may become
> covert. Or, another way to look at this is that the
> person comes to respond to a part of the total response
> that is available to the verbal community.
The portion to
> which the person responds is private but is similar to
> what the verbal community observes.
I'm trying interpret your words in the strongest way I can - So what you are saying is that the behavior of attending (to a
portion of a stimulus) is private, right? But then isn't the behavior of attending to the entire stimulus also private, for
everyone?
I.e., what is the significance of distinguishing between portions of a stimulus perceived and whole stimuli perceived, when all
that is measured is NOT the stimuli itself, but rather what functional effects (e.g., responses) it has on the observer?
This seems
> CL: I don't think he used the word "tautologies" in
> 'From Philosophical Investigations'; but I think he does
> *imply* (though I might be mistaken) that in the
> Tractatus (and doesn't correct himself later). In any
> case, it seems to mesh well with the positivist tradition.
> Another way of thinking about it is to say that a name
> analytically refers to its object; for example, the name
> "apple": 'This is an apple if and only if properties y,z,w,
> etc. are observed' (of course, all analytic definitions are
> tautologies). Keep in mind however, that just because
> some expression is a tautology does not mean that it is
> nonsense (according to Witt). But don't just take my
> "understanding" of it - here: "3.203 A name signifies an
> object. The designated object is what the name means.
> ("A" is the same sign as "A".)" and "3.221 Objects can
> only be named. Signs represent them. I can only speak
> about objects: I cannot put them into words. A
> sentence can only say how a thing is, not what it is. "
>
> GS: Later Wittgenstein would not assert any of this
> stuff, I don't think.
I must disagree. While he did start over with PI, he didn't just throw everything in Tractatus away and start over from scratch.
Some of his views changed - definitely not all.
If you are quoting from the
> Tractatus,
sorry, I should have said so more explicitly. Yes I was quoting from Tract.
you already know it is likely that W. rejected
> it, despite your paranthetical , "and doesn't correct
> himself later." If this is from PI, (I'm about halfway
> through), keep in mind that he says many things and if
> you're not careful you might think he was asserting
> these things, when, in fact, he is sort of asserting them
> from the standpoint of more traditional philosophy, and
> then he proceeds to demolish them.
.
>
> GS (previous): > Especially the first part; establishing
> discriminative > control is not merely a matter of
> "pairing a vocal sound > with an event." It is more
> complicated than that.
>
> CL: naturally the organism must come in contact with
> the pairing. I think a behavior analyst would not say that
> a pairing had been "successful", until there was some
> measurable proof.
>
> GS: Well, maybe I'm picking nits, but you were
> attempting to give a sort of technical description and it
> does not seem accurate (I'm not being mean here, I am
> glad that you are saying much of what you are saying).
> It may be that someone might just have to hear a
> "name" in the presence of the thing, but this is not the
> basic process of stimulus control (it is, in fact, an
> enormously complex behavior composed of many
> different units), which requires that the organism behave
> in the presence of the SD and have the behavior
> "consequated."
Well. I hadn't mentioned stimulus control - but since you brought it up:
Of course we can state a technical definition of stimulus control, 'when an SD is presented, the probability of response increases;
and low probability for a response when the S-delta is presented'. but how do we know if we have acheived it? 1st, the organism
cannot offer a response after the SD that is anything but what we have targeted. 2nd the targeted response must happen immediately
following presentation of the SD. Naturally, this is the kind of thing you test for when you test for "stimulus control" -
especially if you want to know if your vocal sound was successfully paired with the event that affected you. :)
Just out of curiousity, what would you say "control" (by itself) is?
> GS: No, he certainly doesn't spell out the processes
> (about which, I'm sure W. did not know much) but in
> similar conditions he talks about the "training" that goes
> on during the establishment of any language game, and
> in fact, repeatedly emphasizes this. Again, I'm sure that
> W. thought most of psychology was lame but, of
> course, nobody made him aware (nor would he
> probably have listened) that his position was close to
> Skinner's.
well at least we agree on that! ;)
->
not sure how that could imply that 'the rats are responding to the same stimuli as the human [observers]', but it sounds like a
worthwhile experiement anyway. Good luck with it, Glen.
cl
Glen M. Sizemore
go to the trouble of putting our initials
before each paragraph, if you don't want
to. we
can generally discriminate by the
number of arrows, brackets, or colons
before each sentence> I use arrows myself
>>>>
scroll down
GS: Chad, on some of the servers, your posts are not
formatted properly. One needs to scroll to the right to
see what you have written. I usually set the right margin
at 4 in. and that makes it so your post fits on the screen.
BTW, observers just jumping into a thread can have a
hard time discriminating who said what.
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsiz...@yahoo.com>
wrote in message
news:6e2f1d09.0211120814.451fac2d@posting.
google.com...
> GS: (previous): I > think I know what you're driving at,
> and it seems a > good point. But, at least according to
> Skinner, fairly > detailed descriptions of such behavior
> are possible > because we have acquired verbal
> responses descriptive > of our public behavior (and
> these may be fairly accurate > and rich, since the verbal
> community has access to our > public behavior and can
> sharpen discriminative control > in the usual ways).
>
> CL: I agree. Verbal communities have acquired verbal
> repertoires that may "describe" *public* behavior - but
> can we do the same with private behavior? Wouldn't it
> be fair to say that we cannot until we have made that
> private behavior no longer private, but public? (e.g., via
> physiological brain studies). I know one lady who has
> measured her private thoughts about various things.
> You know; counted the frequency of the number of
> times she thought about death or something like that -
> but then, those are no longer private behaviors, thus we
> may only describe them in public terms.
>
> GS: I don't know if your first sentence is a mistake, but
> I would say it is the individual who acquires verbal
> repertoires.
CL: communities wouldn't be communities without individuals.
:)
GS: It is simply wrong to refer to the verbal community
as "acquiring a repertoire."
Skinner talks many times about
> physiological instrumentation. Even if we may one day
> convince ourselves that we are actually measuring (in
> some sense) what is "being responded to" in an episode
> involving private events, this has nothing to do with how
> such phenomena "normally" emerge. So, of course, I
> am arguing that it is not "...fair to say that we cannot
> until we have made that private behavior no longer
> private, but public."
CL: That's fine that you disagree with that, but note that it
doesn't seem to be very consistent with empirical notions
about behavior.
GS: What you are saying is that it is not consistent with
methodological behaviorism. It is not. It is radical
behaviorism.
CL: Look, if its "private", then it cannot be measured directly;
instead what CAN be measured is say, public reports that are
correlated
with events that we call private.
GS: This is methodological behaviorism. I am a radical
behaviorist, as was Skinner. You are welcome to
endorse whatever version of behaviorism that you want
to, but you have been implying that your position is
consistent with Skinner's. I am pointing out to you that
it is not. Radical behaviorism is not logical positivism. It
does not endorse "the arid philosophy of truth by
agreement." When a person tacts (VB, Chapt. 5) a
private event they are "measuring it" in the same sense
as when I emit a tact like "My dog saw the cat." More
than one person may observe my dog seeing the cat,
and this is not the case when I say "I am imagining my
old house and counting the windows." But radical
behaviorism holds that both of these are equivalent
ontologically and epistemologically......the differ only on
the dimension of accessibility.
CL: I'm not sure why we're not connecting on this
principle, maybe you could give me an example that
shows how a private behavior can be described without first
making it public?
GS: We are not connecting on this principle because
you do not understand radical behaviorism. Anyway,
first, let me make one clarification. I do not agree with
your distinction between naming and describing. If I say
"I am sad." I am emitting a tact, and the tact was
produced by exposure to three-term contingencies. If I
say, "I have a sharp pain" I am emitting a tact, that is
more than just naming, I am describing (but my point is
that this is not a useful distinction) the pain, just as I am
describing a function when I say something like, "It has
got a sharp peak around 30." Both are tacts, and both
are shaped by exposure to one or more three-term
contingencies. Yes, one's definition of private events,
UNLESS THE EVENT IS BEHAVIOR THAT HAS
RECEDED TO THE COVERT LEVEL LEVEL, will
be "descriptively limited" due to inaccessibility, and
that's the whole damn point. It is not a difference in
fundamental ontology or epistemology - IT IS NOT A
FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE IN KIND. Now
having said that, I can say that I have repeatedly shown
you examples where "...a private behavior can be described
without first making it public..." Perhaps you are insisting that
in order to be "described" it must be "describable" by more
than one person. This is logical positivism, the psychological
version is referred to as methodological behaviorism. You are
welcome to this version of behaviorism. It is not what I am
talking about.
BTW, I disagree with your
> assessment of the woman's behavior. The events she is
> counting are private and reporting such data does not
> make them public.
CL: I disagree with your disagreement on several levels. (1)
the woman is also a listener; thus she is actually counting how
many times
she reports a private behavior. The report (the actual thing
she counts) is conceivably public (though correlated with the
private). (2) you're right; "reporting such data does not make
them public", and I didn't mean to suggest that. Rather, when
I
said that we may '...only describe them in public terms', I was
only attempting to point out that we cannot describe private
behavior until it is no longer private because private behavior
cannot be measured (analytically so; otherwise if private
behavior
COULD be measured, then it would no-longer really be
"private", now would it?)
GS: And I am saying that to talk about private events
does not make them public - in any sense. Therefore, I
could hardly agree with "...we cannot describe private
behavior until it is no longer private because private behavior
cannot be measured..." The statement is either gibberish, or a
fundamental endorsement of methodological behaviorism and
logical positivism.
>
> GS (previous): When the behavior recedes to the >
> covert level, enough of the stimulation remains to >
> control accurate description.
>
> CL: I assume that you're talking about verbal behavior
> in particular, e.g., reading a book outloud, vs. silently
> reading the book.
>
> GS: Not necessarily. I am talking as well about private
> seeing, hearing etc. There is a great deal of behavior
> that may become private (or has covert parts, see
> below).
CL: I'm sorry; what is private seeing or hearing? I'm unfamiliar
with these concepts (or constructs). At any rate, I assumed
that you
were talking about verbal behavior mostly because the subject
of the thread - "private language".
GS:!?!?!? But the thread is about "talking about"
private events, and the private events themselves need
not be covert verbal behavior! What is "private seeing"
and "private hearing?" OK...I see. I thought that you
had read a lot more Skinner than you have. This is
where it gets tough, and your logical positivism is going
to get in the way. Anyway....as we come in contact
with contingencies of reinforcement, we learn to "see"
and "hear" the world. As we get older, we are
increasingly exposed to contingencies that produce
verbal behavior that is under discriminative control of
our perceptual responses, themselves. Skinner
frequently referred to this as "seeing that you're seeing"
and "hearing that you're hearing" etc. When our verbal
behavior is brought under stimulus control of other
aspects of our behavior that involve seeing and hearing
etc. we come to respond to some of the public things
that the verbal community uses to "teach us to talk
about what we are seeing," but he or she may also
come under control of behavioral events that only they
can see, and these may come to control behavior. Such
behavior is, presumably, what we are responding to
when we report "seeing or hearing in the absence of the
thing seen or heard." As when we say "I've had this
damn song running through my head all day!" etc. This
is fundamental radical behaviorism and gets at the origin
of many statements that Skinner made with which
beginners have difficulty. "Seeing is behavior," is a
good example. And if "seeing is behavior" then why
can't a portion of the behavior be private?
>
> CL: However, it seems to me ( and I think Skinner
> agrees here, though I've only just begun reading Verbal
> Behavior), that such verbal behavior cannot be done
> without a community - thus it must be public BEFORE
> it can 'recede to the covert level'; so what you say
> above makes perfect sense - but it doesn't seem to
> capture the many other covert behaviors that have
> never really been public.
>
> GS: Yes, you are right about the fact that in order for
> private events to be accurately described they usually
> must have been public.
CL: what do you mean - 'usually'?
GS: I mean that there are techniques that produce
limited description of events that have never been
public (recall what I said about the distinction between
naming and description). A "sharp pain" is one of them.
It may have been established during incidents in which
pain was caused by sharp objects (the origin of the
term "sharp" is undoubtedly precisely because the pains
induced by sharp objects is different than other pains)
but the "sharpness" of a person's pain has never been
public, though it is a description of a pain. The
description is limited (and remember, I am claiming that
"description" and "naming" are epistemologically
identical) and most times events that have never been
public are inaccurately observed if at all. Thus usually
something must have once been public to be accurately
described, and the only thing that fits this bill are
behaviors that were once public. Still, the verbal
community does produce SOME "description" of
SOME private events without them ever being public.
But I think you are seriously
> underestimating what sorts of behavior may become
> covert. Or, another way to look at this is that the
> person comes to respond to a part of the total response
> that is available to the verbal community. The portion to
> which the person responds is private but is similar to
> what the verbal community observes.
CL: I'm trying interpret your words in the strongest way I can -
So what you are saying is that the behavior of attending (to a
portion of a stimulus) is private, right? But then isn't the
behavior of attending to the entire stimulus also private, for
everyone?
I.e., what is the significance of distinguishing between
portions of a stimulus perceived and whole stimuli perceived,
when all
that is measured is NOT the stimuli itself, but rather what
functional effects (e.g., responses) it has on the observer?
GS: It is not a matter of whole or part, the issue is
whether or not a part is private. (There's a joke in
there.) Again, whether something is private vs. public
has enormous importance but it is not a distinction that
is fundamentally a difference of ontology or
epistemology. And the "stimulus" IS measured, and
related to the properties of the response - when the
stimulus is public - this is why we have a science of
stimulus discrimination. In a discriminated operant it
makes no sense to divorce the response from the
controlling stimulus as the definition of the response
includes the antecedent controlling stimulus as well as
the reinforcer.
This seems
> CL: I don't think he used the word "tautologies" in
> 'From Philosophical Investigations'; but I think he does
> *imply* (though I might be mistaken) that in the
> Tractatus (and doesn't correct himself later). In any
> case, it seems to mesh well with the positivist tradition.
> Another way of thinking about it is to say that a name
> analytically refers to its object; for example, the name
> "apple": 'This is an apple if and only if properties y,z,w,
> etc. are observed' (of course, all analytic definitions are
> tautologies). Keep in mind however, that just because
> some expression is a tautology does not mean that it is
> nonsense (according to Witt). But don't just take my
> "understanding" of it - here: "3.203 A name signifies an
> object. The designated object is what the name means.
> ("A" is the same sign as "A".)" and "3.221 Objects can
> only be named. Signs represent them. I can only speak
> about objects: I cannot put them into words. A
> sentence can only say how a thing is, not what it is. "
>
> GS: Later Wittgenstein would not assert any of this
> stuff, I don't think.
CL: I must disagree. While he did start over with PI, he didn't
just throw everything in Tractatus away and start over from
scratch.
Some of his views changed - definitely not all.
GS: You are welcome to disagree. I say it is nonsense
to say that "This is an apple if and only if properties
y,z,w, etc. are observed..." characterizes later
Wittgenstein (it flies in the face of "family resemblance"
notions, for example, where it is explicitly stated that
calling something a chair - or an apple - cannot be
described in terms of a particular list of attributes). The
philosophies endorsed by the Tractatus, and by PI are
diametrically opposed on virtually every important
topic.
CL: If you are quoting from the
> Tractatus,
GS: Your definition of stimulus control is wrong in so
far as the term is usually, (and in the context I was using
it) a reference to operant stimulus control. Your
definition fails to distinguish between discriminated
operants and conditioned reflexes. The rest of what you
say is hard to decipher, but seems to stem from a
conflation of discriminated operants and classically
conditioned reflexes.
> GS: No, he certainly doesn't spell out the processes
> (about which, I'm sure W. did not know much) but in
> similar conditions he talks about the "training" that goes
> on during the establishment of any language game, and
> in fact, repeatedly emphasizes this. Again, I'm sure that
> W. thought most of psychology was lame but, of
> course, nobody made him aware (nor would he
> probably have listened) that his position was close to
> Skinner's.
CL: well at least we agree on that! ;)
->
> CL: hasn't that already been done with pigeons?
> (Lubinski and Thompson, 1993)
>
> GS: Maybe. I located the reference to Lubinski and
> Thompson but I don't know if that paper includes the
> critical portion of the experiment (see immediately
> below). I know about Thompson and Lubinski (1987),
> but this doesn't have the second part of the experiment
> that looks at whether or not a human (or I suppose
> another organism) could be trained to discriminate the
> effects of cocaine in rats and comparing this behavior
> with the rat's own "reports." The main question is,
> "Can humans tell which rats have been injected with
> cocaine and at what doses?" There is no question that
> humans can tell cocaine-injected rats from saline-
> injected rats, but if humans can only tell after the rats
> have been injected with high doses - doses higher then
> the rats themselves require - then the implication would
> be that the rats may be responding to behavior that
> would have to be called private. If the minimal
> detectable doses are similar for the rats and the human
> observers, then we may conclude that the rats may be
> responding to the same stimuli as the humans but, of
> course, from a different perspective.
CL: not sure how that could imply that 'the rats are responding
to the same stimuli as the human
GS: Because the humans "are looking at something" in
order to say "that rat is on cocaine" and the rat could
be observing the very same "things," all be it from a
different perspective.
CL: [observers]', but it sounds like a worthwhile
experiement anyway. Good luck with it, Glen.
GS: It is, but it is unlikely I will get to it anytime soon.
"Chad L" <bluek...@mindspring.com> wrote in message news:<aqsqm8
John Jones
(Skinner's term) that establishes the "meanings" of
terms, and they do so by "modeling," reinforcing
correct usage, punishing incorrect usage etc<
Surely not. We don't deliberately teach language, as by
this method or by that method.
JJ
Glen M. Sizemore <gmsiz...@yahoo.com> wrote in
message
news:6e2f1d09.02111...@posting.google.com...
Glen M. Sizemore
or by that method.
GS: That's beside the point.
John Jones
Because it wouldn't be very nice if it was true. It
wouldn't be very nice if we needed to be smacked,
whipped, rewarded, expelled, hypnotically bored or
castrated every time we wanted to communicate.
Glen M. Sizemore <gmsiz...@yahoo.com> wrote in
message
news:6e2f1d09.02111...@posting.google.com...
James Winter
Chad L wrote:
>
> "James Winter" <win...@humnet.ucla.edu> wrote in message news:3DD0D214...@humnet.ucla.edu...
> > I don't have Heil's book, and I certainly don't have an original argument
> > against
> > > any particular strand of philosophical behaviorism, but I have rehearsed certain
> > > of the arguments at one time or another.
> > >
> > > That said, I am happy to observe that behaviorism takes different forms both in
> > > psychology and in philosophy. To be more specific, then, if you'd like to focus on Skinner,
> > > perhaps you can tell me (1) whether Skinner was an eliminitavist about the mental,
>
> Dare I be his mouthpiece; I believe that Skinner left a position on the matter open to further investigation. Certainly he would be
> simpathetic towards the eliminitavists - but on the other hand, he definitely does not seem to rule out the epiphenomalist's
> position. It's hard to say what his final position on the matter is though (since he's not around anymore). At any rate, I doubt
> it any sort of crux to his overall position about behavior and science; thus, I can say with confidence that Skinner would accept
> any theory that better explained the data (and data that better verified a theory).
>
> or
> > > whether he held some lesser claim (that, for example, the mental is irrelevant to the methodology
> > > and practice of empirical psychology), and (2) whether Skinner can be properly associated with
> > > the philosophy of analytic or logical behaviorism.
>
> for number 2 you'll have to be much more precise. There will be similarities and differences and I don't know what your criteria
> for "association" entails.
Does Skinner believe that statements containing mental vocabulary can be analyzed
into statements
containing just the vocabulary of physical behavior?
>
> > >
> > > If the answer to either (1) or (2) is 'yes', I would like to hear how either view would be
> > defended these days.
> > >
> > > Three questions:
> > >
> > > Do you take eliminativism about the mental to be the only valid response to Cartesian dualism?
> > >
> > > How exactly do you conceive of giving up your dualistic habits and mystical "explanations"?
>
> You say "can this 3rd variable that I invented explain what is going on?" if the answer is "no". then you give it up because it
> adds nothing to your investigation.
Does "He was thirsty and believed there was a water fountain in the hallway"
explain my walking into
the hallway and taking a drink?
>
> > >
> > > By 'mystical explanations' do you mean something like folk psychological explanations?
>
> sounds like that could be subsumed under mystical explanations, but what do you have in mind by 'folk psychological explanations'?
Belief-desire psychology and psychological explanation, like the example I gave
above.
>
> >
> > Chad L wrote:
> > >
> > > James,
> > >
> > > It is true that Chomsky had an excellent refutation of somebody's work, but it wasn't Skinner who he refuted. Skinner didn't
> reply
> > > to Chomsky because it was apparant that Chomsky had hardly read Verbal Behavior.
> >
> > It does not seem clear to me that Chomsky had hardly read Verbal Behavior; he
> > discusses the book in fair detail. It is clear from Chomsky's later remarks
> > though that he was less interested in an attack on Skinner's specific
> > behaviorist methodology, or even Skinner's behavioral analysis of speech acts,
> > but more generally on the behaviorist/empirical approach to the study of the mind
> > and cognition.
>
> Honestly, I haven't read Chomsky's review. However, an old professor of mine did; he advocated it (he loved Chomsky); and gave a
> synopsis of its main alleged "knock-down" arguments. I was wondering if you might do the same. Perhaps you saw things that my
> professor did not and can offer a synopsis that is more formidable (believe me, I don't doubt that you can; my old professor was the
> worst prof. I've ever had (and he hadn't read verbal behavior either)).
I haven't read the Chomsky in six years, but I'm tempted to pay it another visit
out of curiosity.
If I do I'll let you know.
If you ask students about the existence of mental items like beliefs a great many
of them say there
are no such things. Many of them think it's all physical, and so are kind of
unsophisticated
eliminativists, but even if they don't embrace physicalism explicitly or otherwise,
they think
talk of mental items like beliefs is dubious. If you talk about anxiety as the
cause of their
behavior they think that what you're really talking about are just physiological
and neuro-physiological
processes in the body.
Glen M. Sizemore
UNLESS THE EVENT IS BEHAVIOR THAT HAS
RECEDED TO THE COVERT LEVEL LEVEL, will
be "descriptively limited" due to inaccessibility, and
that's the whole damn point.
I should have written: Yes, one's DESCRIPTION of
private events, UNLESS THE EVENT IS
BEHAVIOR THAT HAS RECEDED TO THE
COVERT LEVEL LEVEL, will be "descriptively
limited" due to inaccessibility, and that's the whole
damn point.
gmsiz...@yahoo.com (Glen M. Sizemore) wrote in message
Chad L
>
> GS: Chad, on some of the servers, your posts are not
> formatted properly. One needs to scroll to the right to
> see what you have written.
okay. I changed the text wrap from 132 to 100. hope that will help.
I usually set the right margin
> at 4 in. and that makes it so your post fits on the screen.
> BTW, observers just jumping into a thread can have a
> hard time discriminating who said what.
eh. they figure out how it works eventually - once they get used to it. what newsgroup are you
posting from, anyway?
why? it takes 2 people to aquire a repertoire, and as far as I'm concerned it only takes 2 to make
a community.
>
>
> Skinner talks many times about
> > physiological instrumentation. Even if we may one day
> > convince ourselves that we are actually measuring (in
> > some sense) what is "being responded to" in an episode
> > involving private events, this has nothing to do with how
> > such phenomena "normally" emerge. So, of course, I
> > am arguing that it is not "...fair to say that we cannot
> > until we have made that private behavior no longer
> > private, but public."
>
> CL: That's fine that you disagree with that, but note that it
> doesn't seem to be very consistent with empirical notions
> about behavior.
> GS: What you are saying is that it is not consistent with
> methodological behaviorism. It is not. It is radical
> behaviorism.
oh. I didn't realize that that is what I was saying. :)
>
> CL: Look, if its "private", then it cannot be measured directly;
> instead what CAN be measured is say, public reports that are
> correlated
> with events that we call private.
>
> GS: This is methodological behaviorism. I am a radical
> behaviorist, as was Skinner. You are welcome to
> endorse whatever version of behaviorism that you want
> to, but you have been implying that your position is
> consistent with Skinner's. I am pointing out to you that
> it is not.
okay.
> Radical behaviorism is not logical positivism.
true.
It
> does not endorse "the arid philosophy of truth by
> agreement." When a person tacts (VB, Chapt. 5) a
> private event they are "measuring it"
but they're not really measuring "it". The measure is how they are effected by what they hypothesize
to be "it".
in the same sense
> as when I emit a tact like "My dog saw the cat."
More> than one person may observe my dog seeing the cat,
> and this is not the case when I say "I am imagining my
> old house and counting the windows."
more than one person may not observe you saying that?
But radical
> behaviorism holds that both of these are equivalent
> ontologically and epistemologically......the differ only on
> the dimension of accessibility.
I'm glad I'm talking to you; this will give me something to talk about later. However, I have a
feeling that using Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim, we would probably find that we have the same "beliefs"
about the world and behavior. I think it would be great if we could continue to talk about this -
afterall, it may just turn out to be that I'm not exactly the ideal "radical behaviorist".
>
> CL: I'm not sure why we're not connecting on this
> principle, maybe you could give me an example that
> shows how a private behavior can be described without first
> making it public?
>
> GS: We are not connecting on this principle because
> you do not understand radical behaviorism.
could be. I'm not even sure I understand what "understand" means, come to think of it. :)
Anyway,
> first, let me make one clarification. I do not agree with
> your distinction between naming and describing.
alright.
If I say
> "I am sad." I am emitting a tact,
The important question is: WHAT are you tacting? "sadness"? are you sure you can "describe" what
you are feeling with your tact?
and the tact was
> produced by exposure to three-term contingencies. If I
> say, "I have a sharp pain" I am emitting a tact, that is
> more than just naming, I am describing (but my point is
> that this is not a useful distinction) the pain, just as I am
> describing a function when I say something like, "It has
> got a sharp peak around 30." Both are tacts, and both
> are shaped by exposure to one or more three-term
> contingencies.
the idea that both are tacts, and both are shaped by 3term contingencies is not in dispute.
Yes, one's definition of private events,
> UNLESS THE EVENT IS BEHAVIOR THAT HAS
> RECEDED TO THE COVERT LEVEL LEVEL, will
> be "descriptively limited" due to inaccessibility, and
> that's the whole damn point.
I prefer whole damn points to mere points also. :)
It is not a difference in
> fundamental ontology or epistemology - IT IS NOT A
> FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE IN KIND. Now
> having said that, I can say that I have repeatedly shown
> you examples where "...a private behavior can be described
> without first making it public..."
we'll get there.
Perhaps you are insisting that
> in order to be "described" it must be "describable" by more
> than one person.
how are you using the word "describe"?
We're in agreement with that. Also, I do not dispute that we can talk ABOUT private events. What
I disagree with you on is that just because we can talk *about* the private event (only in public
terms), does not mean that we can use a tact to say *what* the event, e.g., sadness, is
(i.e., "describe" it). If you don't agree with that, then I challenge you to provide an example of
how a tact describes what say, "sadness" is (by not refering to publicly observable events). IF you
say that Skinner says that we can tact "sadness" or any other private event, then please quote.
Look, the way I read him is that we can only tact publicly observable events that are contiguous
with say, sadness. This goes back to how we learn what "sadness" is to begin with. Who tacts it?
The child's verbal community, e.g., a parent (given certain publicly observable contingencies). But
what exactly is the parent tacting? Other than those observable public contingencies, who the hell
knows? (and we're back to the beetle in the box) . So if the parent doesn't know what they are
tacting in the child exactly, then how can we honestly expect the child to be able to tact (or
"describe") his private emotion that he assumes is "sadness"?
(Note: It would be a mistake to think that I am refering to "sadness" as some kind of dualistic
entity - my words do not logically imply any such thing.)
Well I disagree already. No one has ever seen or heard the world. That's absurd. What we see and
hear is our own senses. Senses that cause and are sensitive to change in our body/brain. As
scientists and/or "realists" (generally speaking), we assume that what causes our senses to be
effected is the "outsided world", but we cannot directly observe that outside world. So we say and
assume that our senses are "sensitive" to the effects from the outer-environment.
For example, seeing a "chair" does not involve seeing some object beyond your being. All that
happens is that we assume that light hits our eyes in such-and-such a way that effects our brain in
such-and-such a way that we are able to respond with the vocal sound - "chair". What we "see" and
what is actually out there beyond our being could be vastly different. (though we assume that
the source of the stimulus and how the stimulus affects us are very similar). You understand or
agree with any of that (ever seen 'The Matrix')? the same is applicable to all the senses: touch,
sight, hearing, etc.
As we get older, we are
> increasingly exposed to contingencies that produce
> verbal behavior that is under discriminative control of
> our perceptual responses, themselves. Skinner
> frequently referred to this as "seeing that you're seeing"
> and "hearing that you're hearing" etc.
what does he mean by "seeing what you're seeing"? that the use of the word "seeing" has been
reinforced in 2 different contexts to refer to different events over a person's life-time (i.e.,
different semantical useages)? One use being "looking" ("at an object") and responding to it; the
other use being perceiving, realizing, or being consciously aware that an event (e.g., "looking") is
taking place. (same question for hearing that you're hearing.)
But are you saying that this is an example of private seeing? hmmmm.
When our verbal
> behavior is brought under stimulus control of other
> aspects of our behavior that involve seeing and hearing
> etc. we come to respond to some of the public things
> that the verbal community uses to "teach us to talk
> about what we are seeing,"
ok
but he or she may also
> come under control of behavioral events that only they
> can see, and these may come to control behavior.
thus private seeing. But if only they can see it, can they really describe it? (beetle in the
box).
Such
> behavior is, presumably, what we are responding to
> when we report "seeing or hearing in the absence of the
> thing seen or heard." As when we say "I've had this
> damn song running through my head all day!" etc.This
> is fundamental radical behaviorism and gets at the origin
> of many statements that Skinner made with which
> beginners have difficulty. "Seeing is behavior," is a
> good example. And if "seeing is behavior" then why
> can't a portion of the behavior be private?
I'm not saying it can't be private, I'm just saying that we can't describe that portion which is
truly private.
> >
> > CL: However, it seems to me ( and I think Skinner
> > agrees here, though I've only just begun reading Verbal
> > Behavior), that such verbal behavior cannot be done
> > without a community - thus it must be public BEFORE
> > it can 'recede to the covert level'; so what you say
> > above makes perfect sense - but it doesn't seem to
> > capture the many other covert behaviors that have
> > never really been public.
> >
> > GS: Yes, you are right about the fact that in order for
> > private events to be accurately described they usually
> > must have been public.
>
> CL: what do you mean - 'usually'?
>
> GS: I mean that there are techniques that produce
> limited description of events that have never been
> public (recall what I said about the distinction between
> naming and description). A "sharp pain" is one of them.
> It may have been established during incidents in which
> pain was caused by sharp objects (the origin of the
> term "sharp" is undoubtedly precisely because the pains
> induced by sharp objects is different than other pains)
> but the "sharpness" of a person's pain has never been
> public, though it is a description of a pain.
I think what I'd say about this can be covered above.
why is that relevant?
And the "stimulus" IS measured, and
> related to the properties of the response
the question is: how is that "relation" justified?
- when the
> stimulus is public - this is why we have a science of
> stimulus discrimination. In a discriminated operant it
> makes no sense to divorce the response from the
> controlling stimulus as the definition of the response
> includes the antecedent controlling stimulus as well as
> the reinforcer.
oh, I thought you were trying to say that the stimulus is the same as its source.
why doesn't that make sense to you?
characterizes later
> Wittgenstein (it flies in the face of "family resemblance"
> notions, for example, where it is explicitly stated that
> calling something a chair - or an apple - cannot be
> described in terms of a particular list of attributes). The
> philosophies endorsed by the Tractatus, and by PI are
> diametrically opposed on virtually every important
> topic.
analogy: Think of a bunch of ingredients that are used to make some sort of meal. Then think of
the tractatus as taking those ingredients and trying to make a cake. Think of FPI as taking a lot
of those same ingredients (but definitely not all) and trying to make soup - because the cake
couldn't really be made.
if you don't like that - then I suggest we start another thread. actually, I suggest we start many
more threads. Its rare that I get a chance to talk to a radical behaviorist in this particular
medium. I wish there were a newsgroup that was made just for ABA members.
Don't you mean Peirce and Epling's definition of stimulus control is wrong (Behavior Analysis
and Learning, 2nd Ed.; 1999)? (you might want to inform them immediately before the 3rd ed. comes
out!)
in so
> far as the term is usually, (and in the context I was using
> it) a reference to operant stimulus control.
Your> definition
fails to distinguish between discriminated
> operants and conditioned reflexes.
so? how is that relevant? the distinction between respondents and operants is artificial. (at any
rate you are definitely trying to pick nits - and I'm not too sure why.)
The rest of what you
> say is hard to decipher, but seems to stem from a
> conflation of discriminated operants and classically
> conditioned reflexes.
btw. the question I asked was how you define "control". :)
adios,
cl
Chad L
> <It is the verbal community
> (Skinner's term) that establishes the "meanings" of
> terms, and they do so by "modeling," reinforcing
> correct usage, punishing incorrect usage etc<
>
> Surely not. We don't deliberately teach language, as by
> this method or by that method.
> JJ
I don't think he meant that there is some kind of set formula that a community uses to teach its
members how to use language. Instead he was probably giving a general description of how exactly a
community does end up teaching its members how to use language. In other words, he was giving some
necessary and sufficient conditions that must be met for a person to learn to use language.
Chad L
"James Winter" <win...@humnet.ucla.edu> wrote in message news:3DD2E5E3...@humnet.ucla.edu...
I think he would say that a mental term like say, a "pain state", could be only be useful to talk
about if it could be empirically tested or used to explain data. Mental terms are neither
empirically testable, nor do they explain the data - so science must be silent about them. However,
I doubt he'd rule such "epiphenomena". He'd mostly likely say that mental phenomena such as
emotions or pain states, etc., are only by-products of physical behavior. This of course is open to
criticism and may not be resolved until there is a way to test for it. (personally, I don't like
epiphenomena - though I do like qualia! :)).
>
> >
> > > >
> > > > If the answer to either (1) or (2) is 'yes', I would like to hear how either view would
be
> > > defended these days.
> > > >
> > > > Three questions:
> > > >
> > > > Do you take eliminativism about the mental to be the only valid response to Cartesian
dualism?
> > > >
> > > > How exactly do you conceive of giving up your dualistic habits and mystical
"explanations"?
> >
> > You say "can this 3rd variable that I invented explain what is going on?" if the answer is
"no". then you give it up because it
> > adds nothing to your investigation.
>
> Does "He was thirsty and believed there was a water fountain in the hallway"
> explain my walking into
> the hallway and taking a drink?
Here's how an Skinnerian might put it: "He was deprived of water, and had a history of finding
water fountains in hallways" - "Thus, given his deprivation and his history of reinforcement and
other environmental stimuli (e.g. a waterfountain and a hallway) he took a drink".
This explaination has an advantage over assuming that the organism (human in this case) was
"thirsty". Maybe he was thirsty - but asserting such does not add anything to the science of
behavior that can already sufficiently explain it.
> >
> > > >
> > > > By 'mystical explanations' do you mean something like folk psychological explanations?
> >
> > sounds like that could be subsumed under mystical explanations, but what do you have in mind by
'folk psychological explanations'?
>
> Belief-desire psychology and psychological explanation, like the example I gave
> above.
Yes. and you know - I think a lot of Skinnerians would agree with Dennett's intentional stance when
talking about beliefs and desires. Have you seen that particular reductio absurdum of his?
> >
> > >
> > > Chad L wrote:
> > > >
> > > > James,
> > > >
> > > > It is true that Chomsky had an excellent refutation of somebody's work, but it wasn't
Skinner who he refuted. Skinner didn't
> > reply
> > > > to Chomsky because it was apparant that Chomsky had hardly read Verbal Behavior.
> > >
> > > It does not seem clear to me that Chomsky had hardly read Verbal Behavior; he
> > > discusses the book in fair detail. It is clear from Chomsky's later remarks
> > > though that he was less interested in an attack on Skinner's specific
> > > behaviorist methodology, or even Skinner's behavioral analysis of speech acts,
> > > but more generally on the behaviorist/empirical approach to the study of the mind
> > > and cognition.
> >
> > Honestly, I haven't read Chomsky's review. However, an old professor of mine did; he advocated
it (he loved Chomsky); and gave a
> > synopsis of its main alleged "knock-down" arguments. I was wondering if you might do the same.
Perhaps you saw things that my
> > professor did not and can offer a synopsis that is more formidable (believe me, I don't doubt
that you can; my old professor was the
> > worst prof. I've ever had (and he hadn't read verbal behavior either)).
>
> I haven't read the Chomsky in six years, but I'm tempted to pay it another visit
> out of curiosity.
> If I do I'll let you know.
great. maybe we'll read it about at the same time and compare notes.
really?! wow, did you go to a private school? well, I go to a state school, loi.
Many of them think it's all physical, and so are kind of
> unsophisticated
> eliminativists, but even if they don't embrace physicalism explicitly or otherwise,
> they think
> talk of mental items like beliefs is dubious. If you talk about anxiety as the
> cause of their
> behavior they think that what you're really talking about are just physiological
> and neuro-physiological
> processes in the body.
intresting
cheers,
cl
Elaine Jackson
> The short answer is that there cannot be a private language, i.e., a
language
> whose primitive terms refer only to the speaker's subjective or private
> sensations and perceptions. If I marked in my diary a term that
referred
> to some current sensation/perception that I experienced, I would have no
way
> of knowing in the future how to pick out the same
sensation/perception--this
> is to say that we do not stand in a relation of knowledge or some such
> epistemic relation to our own private subjective experiences as we do to
> those picked out by public language.
Elaine Jackson
first one to answer my original question. Actually this is addressed to
everybody. My position is that I'm a bear of very little brain trying to
grasp the point of Wittgenstein's "private language argument". Not to verify
it, mind you, or to refute it, just to understand the point of it. So here's
what I've gleaned so far...
My uncle Wiggy is telling me there's something I can't do, something that's
impossible in principle, and that thing is to HAVE a PRIVATE LANGUAGE.
Alright, let's examine this. Presumably a private language is so-called
because it's a LANGUAGE that's PRIVATE. So what is a language? Well, since
uncle Wiggy was such a keen logician, probably we're talking about a LOGICAL
language. Good stuff. And what is meant by "private"? Well, a private
language is one whose "primitive terms refer only to the speaker's
subjective or private sensations and perceptions." Moreover, it is a
language that is "logically inaccessible to anyone but the speaker."
That would be scanned (Hamlet). How does the second property follow from the
first? (Both are quoted from the same respondent.) What is the discourse
domain of this language? Are there nonlogical constants (definition
available on request) in this language that refer to volition as well as
perception? What exactly is it that uncle Wiggy is telling me I can't do?
Somebody said something about writing in a diary. Could anybody expand on
that? Why would I want to do this impossible thing?
PS: One of the really fascinating things that has already come out of this
discussion is the suggestion that, up until early historical times, "hearing
voices" and even "seeing visions" was a normal experience for
psychologically healthy people.
***********************************************************
Glen M. Sizemore
unusual for you) at the same time that you are trying to
equate reinforcement contingencies with coercion, and
also saying that all planned behavioral control must be
bad. Our behavior IS controlled by contingencies of
reinforcement, and it is via contingencies that our verbal
behavior comes about. I'm sorry that you don't like it.
"John Jones" <scooby...@btopenworld.com> wrote in message news:<aqu9nl$3r0
Glen M. Sizemore
CL: why? it takes 2 people to aquire a repertoire, and
as far as I'm concerned it only takes 2 to make a
community.
GS: It is a matter of both common usage and technical
usage. We talk about an individual's repertoire, and
behavior being an individual phenomenon. This is not to
say that selection does not operate on the repertoires of
individuals that share a culture and the cultural
mechanisms that make this possible, it is to say that it is
best to keep them separate for purposes of analysis.
> > > Skinner talks many times about > >
physiological instrumentation. Even if we may one day
> > convince ourselves that we are actually measuring
(in > > some sense) what is "being responded to" in an
episode > > involving private events, this has nothing to
do with how > > such phenomena "normally" emerge.
So, of course, I > > am arguing that it is not "...fair to
say that we cannot > > until we have made that private
behavior no longer > > private, but public."
> > CL: That's fine that you disagree with that, but
note that it > doesn't seem to be very consistent with
empirical notions > about behavior.
> GS: What you are saying is that it is not consistent
with > methodological behaviorism. It is not. It is
radical > behaviorism.
CL: oh. I didn't realize that that is what I was saying. :)
GS: Not uncommon.
> > CL: Look, if its "private", then it cannot be
measured directly; > instead what CAN be measured is
say, public reports that are > correlated > with events
that we call private.
> > GS: This is methodological behaviorism. I am a
radical > behaviorist, as was Skinner. You are
welcome to > endorse whatever version of behaviorism
that you want > to, but you have been implying that
your position is > consistent with Skinner's. I am
pointing out to you that > it is not.
CL: okay.
> Radical behaviorism is not logical positivism.
CL: true.
It > does not endorse "the arid philosophy of truth by >
agreement." When a person tacts (VB, Chapt. 5) a >
private event they are "measuring it"
CL: but they're not really measuring "it". The measure is
how they are effected by what they hypothesize to be
"it". in the same sense
GS: Say I am a behavioral researcher and I am
conducting an experiment that is not automated. I count
responses, time them etc. I am measuring behavior.
When I tact my private events I am doing the same
thing.
> as when I emit a tact like "My dog saw the cat."
More> than one person may observe my dog seeing
the cat, > and this is not the case when I say "I am
imagining my > old house and counting the windows."
CL: more than one person may not observe you saying
that?
GS: That is not the issue.
But radical > behaviorism holds that both of these are
equivalent > ontologically and epistemologically......the
differ only on > the dimension of accessibility.
CL: I'm glad I'm talking to you; this will give me
something to talk about later. However, I have a feeling
that using Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim, we would
probably find that we have the same "beliefs" about the
world and behavior. I think it would be great if we
could continue to talk about this - afterall, it may just
turn out to be that I'm not exactly the ideal "radical
behaviorist".
GS: Don't know much about Peirce, and the half of his
book that I read was, IMO, useless.
> > CL: I'm not sure why we're not connecting on this
> principle, maybe you could give me an example that
> shows how a private behavior can be described
without first > making it public? > >
GS: We are not connecting on this principle because >
you do not understand radical behaviorism.
CL: could be. I'm not even sure I understand what
"understand" means, come to think of it. :)
Anyway, > first, let me make one clarification. I do not
agree with > your distinction between naming and
describing.
alright.
If I say > "I am sad." I am emitting a tact,
CL: The important question is: WHAT are you tacting?
"sadness"? are you sure you can "describe" what you
are feeling with your tact? and the tact was
GS: You are tacting some aspect of your behavior
(public and/or private) or some condition of your body.
And I already addressed all the points implied by the
second part. 1.) Naming and describing (to use sort of
colloquial language) are both tacts. 2.) Even were we
to make the distinction "describing" is still possible,
THOUGH USUALLY LIMITED, because of
collateral stimuli, collateral responses, and metaphorical
extension. These all have the potential to produce crude
"description," as you appear to define it. BTW, the part
you quoted was not meant to be "description" (but, you
will recall that I am downplaying the usefulness of the
distinction. The critcal part is below, but you do not
address the issue there.
> produced by exposure to three-term contingencies. If
I > say, "I have a sharp pain" I am emitting a tact, that
is > more than just naming, I am describing (but my
point is > that this is not a useful distinction) the pain,
just as I am > describing a function when I say
something like, "It has > got a sharp peak around 30."
Both are tacts, and both > are shaped by exposure to
one or more three-term > contingencies.
CL: the idea that both are tacts, and both are shaped
by 3term contingencies is not in dispute. Yes, one's
definition of private events,
GS: You have missed the point. "Sharp" is a
description of "pain." And the pain has never been
public, but yet it was described.
> UNLESS THE EVENT IS BEHAVIOR THAT
HAS > RECEDED TO THE COVERT LEVEL
LEVEL, will > be "descriptively limited" due to
inaccessibility, and > that's the whole damn point.
CL: I prefer whole damn points to mere points also. :)
It is not a difference in > fundamental ontology or
epistemology - IT IS NOT A > FUNDAMENTAL
DIFFERENCE IN KIND. Now > having said that, I
can say that I have repeatedly shown > you examples
where "...a private behavior can be described > without
first making it public..."
CL: we'll get there.
Perhaps you are insisting that > in order to be
"described" it must be "describable" by more > than
one person.
CL: how are you using the word "describe"?
GS: In both the colloquial way (you are the one who
made a distinction between naming and describing). But
if I were to translate YOUR implied definition into
behaviorese, I would say that you are distinguishing
between tacts in which the controlling dimensions of the
stimulus are not "specified," and those tacts that are
under control of particular dimensions or properties of
the controlling stimulus (complex).
This is logical positivism, the psychological > version is
referred to as methodological behaviorism. You are >
welcome to this version of behaviorism. It is not what I
am > talking about. > > > BTW, I disagree with your >
> assessment of the woman's behavior. The events she
is > > counting are private and reporting such data
does not > > make them public. > > CL: I disagree
with your disagreement on several levels. (1) > the
woman is also a listener; thus she is actually counting
how > many times > she reports a private behavior.
The report (the actual thing > she counts) is
conceivably public (though correlated with the >
private). (2) you're right; "reporting such data does not
make > them public", and I didn't mean to suggest that.
Rather, when > I > said that we may '...only describe
them in public terms', I was > only attempting to point
out that we cannot describe private > behavior until it is
no longer private because private behavior > cannot be
measured (analytically so; otherwise if private >
behavior > COULD be measured, then it would no-
longer really be > "private", now would it?) > > GS:
And I am saying that to talk about private events >
does not make them public - in any sense.
CL: We're in agreement with that. Also, I do not
dispute that we can talk ABOUT private events. What
I disagree with you on is that just because we can talk
*about* the private event (only in public terms), does
not mean that we can use a tact to say *what* the
event, e.g., sadness, is (i.e., "describe" it).
GS:!?!?!?!? That is exactly what the event is. Or rather,
there are no doubt a bunch of different events. But if I
observe an object and emit the tact "chair," how is that
any different than me observing aspects of my behavior
or conditions of my body and emitting the tact "sad."
CL: If you don't agree with that, then I challenge you to
provide an example of how a tact describes what say,
"sadness" is (by not refering to publicly observable
events).
GS: I have given several of these and won't give
anymore.
CL: IF you say that Skinner says that we can tact
"sadness" or any other private event, then please quote.
GS: Why bother? Just read the chapter (5) in VB on
tacts, particularly that large portion under the major
subheading, Verbal Behavior Under the Control of
Private Stimuli (which starts on page 130, at least in the
hardcover). IOW, tacts of private events.
CL: Look, the way I read him is that we can only tact
publicly observable events that are contiguous with say,
sadness.
GS: Read chapt. 5
CL: This goes back to how we learn what "sadness" is
to begin with. Who tacts it? The child's verbal
community, e.g., a parent (given certain publicly
observable contingencies). But what exactly is the
parent tacting? Other than those observable public
contingencies, who the hell knows? (and we're back to
the beetle in the box) .
GS: Nonsense. The parent is tacting public events, but
any private events that reliably accompany these, may
come to control the behavior of the child. It IS
nonsense to ask: "But what exactly is the parent
tacting? Other than those observable public
contingencies, who the hell knows?" The parent
CAN'T BE TACTING ANYTHING ELSE BESIDE
THE PUBLIC EVENTS. That is the definition of
private! Jeesh!
CL: So if the parent doesn't know what they are tacting
in the child exactly, then how can we honestly expect
the child to be able to tact (or "describe") his private
emotion that he assumes is "sadness"? (Note: It would
be a mistake to think that I am refering to "sadness" as
some kind of dualistic entity - my words do not
logically imply any such thing.)
GS: I have already answered this question several
times.
CL: Well I disagree already. No one has ever seen or
heard the world. That's absurd. What we see and hear
is our own senses.
GS: OK, now things are clearer. You're really just a
representationalist cognitivist. You simply espousing the
tiresome notions that we don't respond to the world
but, rather a representation or copy. This is what is
absurd, and Skinner attacks the position repeatedly. It
is absurd for two reasons 1.) if seeing the world
requires copies, why doesn't seeing the copies? 2.) The
"meaning" of "see," "hear" etc. involves the observation
of behavior (both for first person and 3rd person, but
the issue is clearer for the third person); that is, "seeing"
and "hearing" etc. is a form of action, not reproduction.
You're just espousing standard cognitive philosophy
now.
CL: Senses that cause and are sensitive to change in
our body/brain. As scientists and/or "realists" (generally
speaking), we assume that what causes our senses to
be effected is the "outsided world", but we cannot
directly observe that outside world. So we say and
assume that our senses are "sensitive" to the effects
from the outer-environment. For example, seeing a
"chair" does not involve seeing some object beyond
your being. All that happens is that we assume that light
hits our eyes in such-and-such a way that effects our
brain in such-and-such a way that we are able to
respond with the vocal sound - "chair". What we "see"
and what is actually out there beyond our being could
be vastly different. (though we assume that the source
of the stimulus and how the stimulus affects us are very
similar). You understand or agree with any of that (ever
seen 'The Matrix')? the same is applicable to all the
senses: touch, sight, hearing, etc.
GS: Needless to say I disagree with this cognitive
nonsense, as did W. and Skinner.
As we get older, we are > increasingly exposed to
contingencies that produce > verbal behavior that is
under discriminative control of > our perceptual
responses, themselves. Skinner > frequently referred to
this as "seeing that you're seeing" > and "hearing that
you're hearing" etc.
CL: what does he mean by "seeing what you're
seeing"? that the use of the word "seeing" has been
reinforced in 2 different contexts to refer to different
events over a person's life-time (i.e., different
semantical useages)? One use being "looking" ("at an
object") and responding to it; the other use being
perceiving, realizing, or being consciously aware that an
event (e.g., "looking") is taking place. (same question
for hearing that you're hearing.) But are you saying that
this is an example of private seeing? hmmmm.
GS: Try to pay attention for a change. The rest of what
you say is the same sort of misinformed BS peddled by
cognitive "science" and has, thus, already been
discussed numerous times. You are not interested in understanding what
radical behaviorism has to say, and you are wrong about virtually
every position that you have attributed to him.
"Chad L" <bluek...@mindspring.com> wrote in message news:<aqv2on$p62
James Winter
"Glen M. Sizemore" wrote:
>
> You still seem to be missing the point (which is not at all
> unusual for you) at the same time that you are trying to
> equate reinforcement contingencies with coercion, and
> also saying that all planned behavioral control must be
> bad. Our behavior IS controlled by contingencies of
> reinforcement,
I have trouble seeing how this could be true other than trivially.
How is it that my behavior is in fact controlled by contingencies
of reinforcement (and what is the sense of 'contingencies' here)?
To take an example from the conversation with Chad, he suggested that
instead of the explanation "He was thristy and believed there was a water
fountain in the hallway" for why I walked into the hallway and took a
drink, Skinner might say "He was deprived of water, and had a history
of finding water fountains in hallways" - "Thus, given his deprivation
and his history of reinforcement and other environmental stimuli
(e.g. a waterfountain and a hallway) he took a drink".
I don't know that Chad was claiming that this was an example of my behavior
being controlled by contingencies of reinforcement, but if it can serve as
an example then I am missing something, because it seems clear that it could
be true that I had a history of being deprived of water and of finding water
fountains in hallways, and yet not true that I went out and took a drink.
The 'given this, therefore that' in this example is clearly not an exceptionless
law of any sort, and neither of course is the folk psychological explanation that
says I took a drink of water because I was thirsty. It is true that I can 'test'
the former empirically whereas I cannot the latter (at least, if we are assuming
there
is no empirical test for mental states), but the explanatory power of the two seem
the
same. In fact, I would say that the psychological explanation will predict my
behavior more accurately because there are certainly many times when the Skinner
statement will be true but not followed by water drinking behavior, but very
infrequently will the psychological explanation be true but not followed by water
drinking behavior.
So what am I missing from Skinner?
Chad L
We don't need to be coerced into using language! lol. :)
However, its really interesting to note what causes us to use language. What "causes" us to use
language (or do anything) is what we might call "control". If there were no control, then we
wouldn't use language. I understand that the term control is often associated with coercion, lying,
and cheating, bribery etc. but that association is only one side of the coin. For example, when
you stop at a red light - we say that the red light exerts control over your behavior (you stop).
When I ask you a question - the question is said to exert control over your behavior (you respond).
E.g., "What kind of computer do you own?" you say, "pentium (or whatever)." My question controlled
your behavior. Similarly the consequence of my asking the question (consequence: your response)
presumably has control over my own behavior (I may be more or less likely to ask you a question
again). The use of language has its own rewards and punishments conditioned within it, based on
the consequences (throughout history) of its use.
note also, if you don't respond to my question (even silently), then we may say that my question had
no control over your behavior (same with the stop light). The reasons that it had no control might
be because it was never successfully conditioned; or perhaps there are competing stimuli in the
environment - competing for control over your behavior.
"John Jones" <scooby...@btopenworld.com> wrote in message
news:aqu9nl$3r0$1...@knossos.btinternet.com...
Chad L
> news:6e2f1d09.0211120814.451fac2d@posting. >
> google.com... > >
> > > > > GS: I don't know if your first sentence is a
> mistake, but > > I would say it is the individual who
> acquires verbal > > repertoires.
>
> > > CL: communities wouldn't be communities without
> individuals. > :)
>
> > > GS: It is simply wrong to refer to the verbal
> community > as "acquiring a repertoire."
>
> CL: why? it takes 2 people to aquire a repertoire, and
> as far as I'm concerned it only takes 2 to make a
> community.
>
> GS: It is a matter of both common usage and technical
> usage. We talk about an individual's repertoire, and
> behavior being an individual phenomenon
not important in this context (or probably any other). or so "we" say.
Oh. Well, if you're one of those who likes to use the word "pragmatic" alot, then it would be a
good idea to read, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (Charles Sanders Peirce). In it you'll find the
pragmatic maxim. he's actually the father of the term - then used by the others (Dewey and James) -
who also seems to influence Skinner. Hope you look it up, its not a terribly long essay. :)
>
> > > CL: I'm not sure why we're not connecting on this
> > principle, maybe you could give me an example that
> > shows how a private behavior can be described
> without first > making it public? > >
>
> GS: We are not connecting on this principle because >
> you do not understand radical behaviorism.
> CL: could be. I'm not even sure I understand what
> "understand" means, come to think of it. :)
>
> Anyway, > first, let me make one clarification. I do not
> agree with > your distinction between naming and
> describing.
>
> alright.
>
> If I say > "I am sad." I am emitting a tact,
>
> CL: The important question is: WHAT are you tacting?
> "sadness"? are you sure you can "describe" what you
> are feeling with your tact? and the tact was
> GS: You are tacting some aspect of your behavior
yeah, thats the question alright - WHICH aspect?
> (public and/or private) or some condition of your body.
> And I already addressed all the points implied by the
> second part. 1.) Naming and describing (to use sort of
> colloquial language) are both tacts. 2.) Even were we
> to make the distinction "describing" is still possible,
> THOUGH USUALLY LIMITED,
for a second there I thought you might continue to apply the generalities you are speaking of into a
specific example. (just stick with "sadness" for example.)
because of
> collateral stimuli, collateral responses, and metaphorical
> extension.
yeah, and because we can't describe it because its private.
These all have the potential to produce crude
> "description," as you appear to define it. BTW, the part
> you quoted was not meant to be "description" (but, you
> will recall that I am downplaying the usefulness of the
> distinction. The critcal part is below, but you do not
> address the issue there.
> > produced by exposure to three-term contingencies. If
> I > say, "I have a sharp pain" I am emitting a tact, that
> is > more than just naming, I am describing (but my
> point is > that this is not a useful distinction) the pain,
> just as I am > describing a function when I say
> something like, "It has > got a sharp peak around 30."
> Both are tacts, and both > are shaped by exposure to
> one or more three-term > contingencies.
> CL: the idea that both are tacts, and both are shaped
> by 3term contingencies is not in dispute. Yes, one's
> definition of private events,
> GS: You have missed the point. "Sharp" is a
> description of "pain." And the pain has never been
> public, but yet it was described.
I think I've understood your point for quite a while now. What I'm trying to get you to say is
that "sharp" is not a description of pain because it doesn't tell you what pain is - rather sharp is
merely a tacting of pain. You however, are not acknowledging a distinction between "describe" and
"tact" - a distinction that I am observing. I imagine our difference is born out of different
histories of reinforcement (particularly for using the words "describe" and "tact"). But then
again, speculation only: it could also be that my challenges to your hard earned knowledge are
somewhat aversive to you; causing you to avoid further aversive stimulation by dissenting from just
about everything I say - as to do otherwise would cause you to come in contact with further aversive
stimulation by letting go of some of your hard earned knowledge (that you obviously find
reinforcing).
But listen, more importantly, I've been doing these message boards for about 5 years now, and I've
come up with a few techniques that allow the reader to be a bit more charitable (i.e., "principle of
charity") and patient when interpreting the words of others - read the words of your interlocutor in
a different "mind's voice", than the one that you normally use. If you think I'm really that stupid
compared to you about behaviorism and philosophy, then read my words as if Barney the Purple
Dinosaur were speaking them to you in Barney's voice (Or use the voice of your favorite comedian,
e.g, Dennis Leary). Who could find Barney threatening and get defensive at anything he says?? :)
I have found that such a technique can make one much less defensive and worried about how others
"measure" one; thus, facillitating more constructive communication. Try it! (chances are, the way
you read my words - and the way I've intended them are not the same - so its best to kind of,
lighten up, and try to follow the principle of charity).
>
> > UNLESS THE EVENT IS BEHAVIOR THAT
> HAS > RECEDED TO THE COVERT LEVEL
> LEVEL, will > be "descriptively limited" due to
> inaccessibility, and > that's the whole damn point.
>
> CL: I prefer whole damn points to mere points also. :)
>
> It is not a difference in > fundamental ontology or
> epistemology - IT IS NOT A > FUNDAMENTAL
> DIFFERENCE IN KIND. Now > having said that, I
> can say that I have repeatedly shown > you examples
> where "...a private behavior can be described > without
> first making it public..."
>
> CL: we'll get there.
> Perhaps you are insisting that > in order to be
> "described" it must be "describable" by more > than
> one person.
>
> CL: how are you using the word "describe"?
> GS: In both the colloquial way (you are the one who
> made a distinction between naming and describing). But
> if I were to translate YOUR implied definition into
> behaviorese, I would say that you are distinguishing
> between tacts in which the controlling dimensions of the
> stimulus are not "specified," and those tacts that are
> under control of particular dimensions or properties of
> the controlling stimulus (complex).
*important and dense distinction coming up (read closely)* :
good. but when I use "describe" I mean coming under the stimulus control of a vocal sound that has
been paired with any other sensation from any modality (e.g., sight hearing touch, etc). So when I
"describe" something (e.g., a red balloon), I am emitting vocal sounds that have been paired (and
conditioned) to some other sensation[s] in my history (e.g., the "red", the shape, the feel, etc.)
by my public verbal community. However, the vocal sounds that I emit in the presense of various
stimuli are learned publicly and can only verifiably be paired with public stimuli (or
stimuli that can conceivably be made public). Therefore, it cannot count as a "description" unless
it can verifiably be experienced by others (For example, you cannot "describe" colors to a blind
person). This sequence of sounds that I emit then is both a tact AND a description (of the red
balloon and abstractions of it). BUT when the stimuli that I experience cannot even conceivably be
made public - then all I may do is associate any arbitrary vocal sound (or whatever my lanugage
medium is) to its presense. In that case, it cannot be verified by anyone - and in that case I
cannot not verify if anyone else can experience it - thus I am not describing anything at all. I'm
merely associating a sound with a private experience, i.e., only tacting (not describing).
And of course, any such tact of that experience is reducable to a tautology.
(note* this is also why people born deaf have such a hard time learning to read. the alaphabet is
meaningless to them, we cannot describe vocal sounds or any sound to them, we can only tact
wavelengths and mouthmovements etc.).
explain what the tact "sad" refers to? At least with the chair, we can empirically verify (with
high accuracy) that we're talking about the same effects on our senses. Can't do that with "sad".
also, can't do that with "color" when talking to one born blind.
>
> CL: If you don't agree with that, then I challenge you to
> provide an example of how a tact describes what say,
> "sadness" is (by not refering to publicly observable
> events).
> GS: I have given several of these and won't give
> anymore.
yes, this thread is getting long.
> CL: IF you say that Skinner says that we can tact
> "sadness" or any other private event, then please quote.
>
> GS: Why bother? Just read the chapter (5) in VB on
> tacts, particularly that large portion under the major
> subheading, Verbal Behavior Under the Control of
> Private Stimuli (which starts on page 130, at least in the
> hardcover). IOW, tacts of private events.
read that chapter last year, I'll re-read it again soon - but probably won't have time until the
weekends over.
>
> CL: Look, the way I read him is that we can only tact
> publicly observable events that are contiguous with say,
> sadness.
> GS: Read chapt. 5
> CL: This goes back to how we learn what "sadness" is
> to begin with. Who tacts it? The child's verbal
> community, e.g., a parent (given certain publicly
> observable contingencies). But what exactly is the
> parent tacting? Other than those observable public
> contingencies, who the hell knows? (and we're back to
> the beetle in the box) .
> GS: Nonsense. The parent is tacting public events,
I think the words made sense just fine. Of course the parent is tacting public events - the whole
point is to show you that this is the only thing that the parent CAN tact. Thus if the child learns
its words from the parent, how can it describe its private events to the parent or anyone else (with
those words or any words)? The distinction btwn describe and tact is important (even if its not in
chapter 5).
but
> any private events that reliably accompany these, may
> come to control the behavior of the child. It IS
> nonsense to ask: "But what exactly is the parent
> tacting? Other than those observable public
> contingencies, who the hell knows?" The parent
> CAN'T BE TACTING ANYTHING ELSE BESIDE
> THE PUBLIC EVENTS. That is the definition of
> private! Jeesh!
:)
now now, don't take the easy way out just because you're mad(ing) that I've challenged your
authority on the subject (you're gonna have to get used to challenges, Glen - so try not to take it
so personally). I don't have to refer to any representations or copies at all, nor do my words
logically imply such. You're reading too much (and probably too little) into it. (I'm using the
word "imply" very technically).
This is what is
> absurd, and Skinner attacks the position repeatedly. It
> is absurd for two reasons 1.) if seeing the world
> requires copies, why doesn't seeing the copies? 2.) The
> "meaning" of "see," "hear" etc. involves the observation
> of behavior (both for first person and 3rd person, but
> the issue is clearer for the third person); that is, "seeing"
> and "hearing" etc. is a form of action, not reproduction.
> You're just espousing standard cognitive philosophy
> now.
lol, oh? I didn't realize I was doing that. :)
>
> CL: Senses that cause and are sensitive to change in
> our body/brain. As scientists and/or "realists" (generally
> speaking), we assume that what causes our senses to
> be effected is the "outsided world", but we cannot
> directly observe that outside world. So we say and
> assume that our senses are "sensitive" to the effects
> from the outer-environment. For example, seeing a
> "chair" does not involve seeing some object beyond
> your being. All that happens is that we assume that light
> hits our eyes in such-and-such a way that effects our
> brain in such-and-such a way that we are able to
> respond with the vocal sound - "chair". What we "see"
> and what is actually out there beyond our being could
> be vastly different. (though we assume that the source
> of the stimulus and how the stimulus affects us are very
> similar). You understand or agree with any of that (ever
> seen 'The Matrix')? the same is applicable to all the
> senses: touch, sight, hearing, etc.
> GS: Needless to say I disagree with this cognitive
> nonsense, as did W. and Skinner.
blah blah blah, you have to understand it before you can really disagree with it. Least you could do
is be a sport and ask me some constructive questions about it. (you'd think we were playing for
different teams or something! :))
>
> As we get older, we are > increasingly exposed to
> contingencies that produce > verbal behavior that is
> under discriminative control of > our perceptual
> responses, themselves. Skinner > frequently referred to
> this as "seeing that you're seeing" > and "hearing that
> you're hearing" etc.
>
> CL: what does he mean by "seeing what you're
> seeing"? that the use of the word "seeing" has been
> reinforced in 2 different contexts to refer to different
> events over a person's life-time (i.e., different
> semantical useages)? One use being "looking" ("at an
> object") and responding to it; the other use being
> perceiving, realizing, or being consciously aware that an
> event (e.g., "looking") is taking place. (same question
> for hearing that you're hearing.) But are you saying that
> this is an example of private seeing? hmmmm.
>
> GS: Try to pay attention for a change.
The rest of what
> you say is the same sort of misinformed BS peddled by
> cognitive "science" and has, thus, already been
> discussed numerous times. You are not interested in understanding what
> radical behaviorism has to say, and you are wrong about virtually
> every position that you have attributed to him.
if you say so, Glen. ;)
cheers,
cl
Chad L
"James Winter" <win...@humnet.ucla.edu> wrote in message news:3DD3ECA3...@humnet.ucla.edu...
>
>
> "Glen M. Sizemore" wrote:
> >
> > You still seem to be missing the point (which is not at all
> > unusual for you) at the same time that you are trying to
> > equate reinforcement contingencies with coercion, and
> > also saying that all planned behavioral control must be
> > bad. Our behavior IS controlled by contingencies of
> > reinforcement,
>
> I have trouble seeing how this could be true other than trivially.
> How is it that my behavior is in fact controlled by contingencies
> of reinforcement (and what is the sense of 'contingencies' here)?
>
> To take an example from the conversation with Chad, he suggested that
> instead of the explanation "He was thristy and believed there was a water
> fountain in the hallway" for why I walked into the hallway and took a
> drink, Skinner might say "He was deprived of water, and had a history
> of finding water fountains in hallways" - "Thus, given his deprivation
> and his history of reinforcement and other environmental stimuli
> (e.g. a waterfountain and a hallway) he took a drink".
>
> I don't know that Chad was claiming that this was an example of my behavior
> being controlled by contingencies of reinforcement,
Yes, but its only general; and I think you are definitlely asking the right sorts of questions that
will take us to the specifics.
but if it can serve as
> an example then I am missing something, because it seems clear that it could
> be true that I had a history of being deprived of water and of finding water
> fountains in hallways, and yet not true that I went out and took a drink.
so then the question would be - "why didn't you go out and get a drink?" right? In terms of
contingencies of reinforcement, it may be that there are other stimuli that are "competing for your
behavior" (sic). E.g., perhaps there is a naked intern in the room and you have not just had
sex
with her, but are feeling much more of an urge to be with her than to be with the waterfountain.
Or, perhaps you are taking a test, and the consequences of leaving the room for the water are too
aversive for you to risk getting a drink. (Or perhaps the act of drinking (or even breathing) itself
has become aversive to
you - depending upon the contingencies of reinforcement.)
In short, the environment controls our behavior. "Contingincies of reinforcement [and/or
punishment]" is meant to more specifically describe the environment in terms of its functions in
relation to organisms. (is that kosher?)
Note though, if I may borrow from a phyics analogy: When you push against a wall - the wall pushes
back just as hard. Humans are the environment too, and its not a one way relationship of control.
We control
the environment as much as it controls us (at the same time); the "control" is in the interaction.
Similarly, the "force" between the wall and you is in the - interaction - when you push against
eachother.
>
> The 'given this, therefore that' in this example is clearly not an exceptionless
> law of any sort,
You're right to pick up on that. Notice contingent means "not necessary" and the contingencies in
the environment are not necessarily the case in all situations, i.e., other contingencies could
be the case.
and neither of course is the folk psychological explanation that
> says I took a drink of water because I was thirsty. It is true that I can 'test'
> the former empirically whereas I cannot the latter (at least, if we are assuming
> there
> is no empirical test for mental states), but the explanatory power of the two seem
> the
> same.
I don't understand. If you can test the one, and not the other, then how are the explanatory powers
the same?
Also, in my opinion, pragmatically speaking we can reduce the use of mentalistic terms into
behavioral terms. So perhaps in that way the explanatory power would be similar. For example: Wh
en you say that the man is thirsty, I'll say, 'what is "thirsty"'? Then if you continue using
mentalistic terms, you might say, 'thirsty is a "desire" to have a drink'. I'll say, 'what is a
"desire"'?
At this point you are either going to go with a dualistic account, and the game will end there as
you may conclude that it is a kind of mystical phenomenon OR you are going to go for a kind of
empirical physicalistic type of answer; in the latter case you may describe a "desire"
pragmatically - which will probably put you on the level of the scientific explanation that the
behaviorist will use. The difference btwn explanations then becomes one of utility. So which
explanation is more cumbersome? Well it seems to me that the first explaination with mentalistic
terms is more cumbersome because you (1) have to reduce it to empirical phenomena and (2) have to
deal with accidentally confusing the terms you're using to be causal entities rather than
descriptions of functional relationships in the environment. (I think that Dennett's "intentional
stance" and instrumental approach covers this beautifully).
What I mean by functional relationships is the observation of contingencies in the environment. For
example, I observe the man kicking the ball, then I observe the ball moving forward. (this is a
functional relationship).
In fact, I would say that the psychological explanation will predict my
> behavior more accurately because there are certainly many times when the Skinner
> statement will be true but not followed by water drinking behavior, but very
> infrequently will the psychological explanation be true but not followed by water
> drinking behavior.
tell me if I've covered your first concern, and as far as the second - well, we can't really know if
the organism is "thirsty" or not (as you've agreed, its not testable) especially for non-verbal
organims (!).
Glen M. Sizemore
seem to be missing the point (which is not at all >
unusual for you) at the same time that you are trying to
> equate reinforcement contingencies with coercion,
and > also saying that all planned behavioral control
must be > bad. Our behavior IS controlled by
contingencies of > reinforcement,
JW: I have trouble seeing how this could be true other
than trivially. How is it that my behavior is in fact
controlled by contingencies of reinforcement (and what
is the sense of 'contingencies' here)?
GS: I'll assume you'll add something below to make
the first sentence meaningful. As to the second
question, I'm not sure how to take this, but given your
parenthetical question, I have to assume that, though
you bad-mouth Skinner's interpretive analysis of verbal
behavior, you haven't got the foggiest notion
concerning what he says, since the book is about
contingencies of reinforcement. Save conclusion?
Anyway, a contingency of reinforcement (without
getting too long-winded) refers to certain types of
relations between behavior and the environment; that is,
behavior has effects on the environment, and these
consequences, in turn, affect the form and probability of
the responses. So a contingency of reinforcement (or
punishment) is a dependency between behavior and its
consequences. If the dependency alters behavior, the
consequence is said to be a reinforcer (increases p) or
a punisher (decreases p). A three-term contingency
(the main explanatory vehicle for radical behaviorism) is
a relation such that certain responses have certain
consequences in the presence of a particular setting, as
in Setting; Response–>Consequence. As to "How is it
that my behavior is in fact controlled by contingencies
of reinforcement?" the answer depends on what you
are asking. One answer is that such processes have
evolved via natural selection because organism's whose
behavior may be so altered are more successful,
ultimately, at living to produce offspring etc. Another
answer (if you are trying to point to physiology) is "No
one knows."
JW: To take an example from the conversation with
Chad, he suggested that instead of the explanation "He
was thristy and believed there was a water fountain in
the hallway" for why I walked into the hallway and took
a drink, Skinner might say "He was deprived of water,
and had a history of finding water fountains in hallways"
- "Thus, given his deprivation and his history of
reinforcement and other environmental stimuli (e.g. a
waterfountain and a hallway) he took a drink".
GS: Wow! Chad actually got something right!
JW: I don't know that Chad was claiming that this was
an example of my behavior being controlled by
contingencies of reinforcement, but if it can serve as an
example then I am missing something, because it seems
clear that it could be true that I had a history of being
deprived of water and of finding water fountains in
hallways, and yet not true that I went out and took a
drink.
GS: I am having trouble seeing the scientific import of
this bit of "logic."
JW: The 'given this, therefore that' in this example is
clearly not an exceptionless law of any sort, and neither
of course is the folk psychological explanation that says
I took a drink of water because I was thirsty. It is true
that I can 'test' the former empirically whereas I cannot
the latter (at least, if we are assuming there is no
empirical test for mental states), but the explanatory
power of the two seem the same. In fact, I would say
that the psychological explanation will predict my
behavior more accurately because there are certainly
many times when the Skinner statement will be true but
not followed by water drinking behavior, but very
infrequently will the psychological explanation be true
but not followed by water drinking behavior.
So what am I missing from Skinner?
GS: To answer the last question first, what you are
missing is some sort of clue as to what science is and
the relation between logic and science. You are,
further, missing the difference between facile reification
and real, grown-up, scientific explanations. Say I have
a rat in an operant chamber that I have exposed to a
contingency whereby lever-presses produce food. Say
the rat lives in the chamber and we observe him, you
and I, over a period of days, and we notice that every
now and then the rat gets up (or stops what it is doing if
there are other things in the chamber) walks over to the
lever, presses it (upon which the light above the lever
goes out and a light in a recessed cup is illuminated),
then walks over to the cup and eats a food pellet that
has been dispensed there. It might continue this for
some time, then move on to other things. Now the
question arises "What explains this behavior?" You say,
"The rat became hungry, and believed it could procure
food by pressing the lever." I reply, of course, that
"pressing the lever has led, in the past, to the delivery of
food pellets, and this behavior becomes more probable
as a function of, among other things, time since eating
last." Both appear to have equal explanatory value in
some logical sense, but mine is far more useful, and
yours is, at best, superfluous. Even if exposure to the
contingencies produces a "belief," and food-deprivation
produces "hunger," one has no predictive power if
"beliefs" and "hunger" are not observable, and it certainly
says nothing about how to produce the behavior. One
has to mention the contingencies in order to produce
the behavior, and in order to predict it (at least roughly)
one must know the rat's recent eating history (among
other things). You could make arguments about beliefs
and such being "brain states" or some such but, but even if
true, these would not negate the importance of the
contingencies and deprivation in producing the "states."
I could construct a host of arguments that you might
make, because I have heard every one of them
countless times, but I'll let you make your own
arguments and then demolish them. That saves me
some typing time.
BTW, nothing against Chad (well nothing I'm going to
bring up right now) but you should NOT take him to be
an expert (by any means) on Skinner either with regard
to the experimental analysis of behavior, or its
philosophy, radical behaviorism.
Glen
Chad L
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsiz...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:6e2f1d09.02111...@posting.google.com...
James, see what happens when a little person gains a little bit of knowledge? Suddenly they think
they're special and should not be challenged in their little comfort zone. Please don't think that
all people with knowledge in this field are as arrogant as Glen.
cl
James Winter
"Glen M. Sizemore" wrote:
>
> "Glen M. Sizemore" wrote: > > You still
> seem to be missing the point (which is not at all >
> unusual for you) at the same time that you are trying to
> > equate reinforcement contingencies with coercion,
> and > also saying that all planned behavioral control
> must be > bad. Our behavior IS controlled by
> contingencies of > reinforcement,
>
> JW: I have trouble seeing how this could be true other
> than trivially. How is it that my behavior is in fact
> controlled by contingencies of reinforcement (and what
> is the sense of 'contingencies' here)?
>
> GS: I'll assume you'll add something below to make
> the first sentence meaningful.
The sentence is meaningful, I just haven't told you why
the view seems trivially true to me.
As to the second
> question, I'm not sure how to take this, but given your
> parenthetical question, I have to assume that, though
> you bad-mouth Skinner's interpretive analysis of verbal
> behavior, you haven't got the foggiest notion
> concerning what he says, since the book is about
> contingencies of reinforcement.
I'm quite familiar with behaviorism, especially its philosophical
varieties, and the arguments against trying to interpret the mind
in terms of behavior. Not knowing the details of Skinner's behaviorism
does not mean that I would have no idea of what might be wrong generally
with behaviorism.
Save conclusion?
> Anyway, a contingency of reinforcement (without
> getting too long-winded) refers to certain types of
> relations between behavior and the environment; that is,
> behavior has effects on the environment, and these
> consequences, in turn, affect the form and probability of
> the responses. So a contingency of reinforcement (or
> punishment) is a dependency between behavior and its
> consequences. If the dependency alters behavior, the
> consequence is said to be a reinforcer (increases p) or
> a punisher (decreases p). A three-term contingency
> (the main explanatory vehicle for radical behaviorism) is
> a relation such that certain responses have certain
> consequences in the presence of a particular setting, as
> in Setting; Response–>Consequence. As to "How is it
> that my behavior is in fact controlled by contingencies
> of reinforcement?" the answer depends on what you
> are asking.
I was asking what YOU meant by the claim, obviously.
At this point I decline to even read further, since you obviously
have some sort of axe to grind and I'm not the least bit interested
in suffering your insolence. You first chimed into this conversation
with the mature observation "Wow! that's one heck of an argument.
You must get all the chicks," when I had never feigned to be giving
an argument in the first place.
So take your marbles and go down the street to play with the other
kiddies who are willing to put up with your juvenile need for a show
of pomposity and arrogance.
Glen M. Sizemore
the view seems trivially true to me.
GS: Which is, of course, how we began this "discussion." You making empty
assertions about behaviorisms of various kinds.
JW: I'm quite familiar with behaviorism, especially its philosophical
varieties, and the arguments against trying to interpret the mind
in terms of behavior. Not knowing the details of Skinner's behaviorism
does not mean that I would have no idea of what might be wrong generally
with behaviorism.
GS: I was talking about more of your assertions concerning Skinner's book,
and Skinner. Obviously, you know nothing about the book or the man's
position.
JW: I was asking what YOU meant by the claim, obviously.
GS: No, you asked: ""How is it that my behavior is in fact controlled by
contingencies of reinforcement?" Which I answered, but you'd rather whine
than read.
JW: At this point I decline to even read further, since you obviously
have some sort of axe to grind and I'm not the least bit interested
in suffering your insolence. You first chimed into this conversation
with the mature observation "Wow! that's one heck of an argument.
You must get all the chicks," when I had never feigned to be giving
an argument in the first place.
So take your marbles and go down the street to play with the other
kiddies who are willing to put up with your juvenile need for a show
of pomposity and arrogance.
GS: Right. That's always the way out for someone who is more comfortable
with propagating misrepresentations when they're confronted.
Glen M. Sizemore
or, at least, this sub-portion. First you have Winter's
Proclamations. He's the sort of Usenet guy who pops
in with grandiose proclamations but no explanation, as
if all of us lesser thinkers should stand there
dumbfounded. Of course, he can offer canned
academic quips if he is challenged, and so it was no
surprise to me that he would trot out Chomsky or some
other institutionalized strawman. Winter's
Proclamations always imply that if you are on the other
side of the issue, you are an uninformed idiot. For
example, his, "Yes, W. and Skinner were confused in
similar ways. As far as I know, however, W. never
explicitly endorses behaviorism in Philosophical
Investigations." as if the mighty James Winter were
capable of felling two of the greatest thinkers of all time
with his sophomoric (and of course, non-backed-up)
quip. The implication can only be that anyone who
champions W. and Skinner's philosophies are
"confused." Right? How else can one take this? Then
his other little proclamation:
"You should read Chomsky's review of "Verbal
Behavior" (from 1959, I believe) which was interpreted
by the academic community as devastating.
You can also look at any philosophy of mind textbook
which includes work
on behaviorism to see how it failed philosophically.
Of course, he can't defend his own position, so he (in
all his magnificent) wisdom sends us out to read
Chomsky's review. But since he never read it, and
certainly never read Skinner's book (or any Skinner, it
appears) he doesn't know that neither did Chomsky,
and the whole thing is irrelevant. But so what? A lot of
idiots do that on Usenet. But, of course, what is
infuriating about second-rate, sophomoric jerks like
Winter, is that when you call them on it, and use a little
richly-deserved sarcasm, they want to claim the moral
high ground. Telling them in a matter-of-fact manner
why they are wrong, of course, elicits their anger and
gets you dubbed arrogant, and insolent.
Then there's idiots like little Chad. He's sort of a rare
bird. Since most critics of behaviorism are like Winter
(i.e., ignrorant of the positions that they criticize, little
Chad thinks he's found a niche where he can be a big
fish. So he reads a book (or part of one) or takes an
introductory course, and he sets out to dazzle with his
newfound "expertise." Of course, sooner or later, he's
bound to bump into a bona-fide expert, and then his
little world is troubled. It is interesting that Chad
actually seems to know next-to-nothing about Skinner,
but he tries to give the impression that he is well read
on the philosophical aspects (and even implying
expertise in the experimental analysis of behavior). He
is even forced to fib about (at least by implication) the
books he read. He writes:
"Skinner didn't reply to Chomsky because it was
apparant that Chomsky had hardly read Verbal
Behavior. I suspect that you haven't read it either - and
if you haven't any background with behavior analysis,
you'll most likely find it a difficult book to grasp (you'll
want to start with other books first). No matter, I've
seen words like yours repeated over and over again in
my own philosophy department and on newsgroups
like these."
Now, look at that. Implied, of course, is that Chad has
a "background in behavior analysis" (one intro
undergraduate course is my guess) and that he has read
a bunch of books including Verbal Behavior! But,
having been in the field for more than 20 years, I can
see right away that he knows next to nothing, and is
only interested in defending his hastily drawn
conclusions. When you tell him he's wrong, he either
tries to make it sound like he was saying what you are
saying all along. Or just bulls his way into more mis-
statements. My favorite is: "IF you say that Skinner
says that we can tact "sadness" or any other private
event, then please quote." This is particularly damaging
to little Chad because there is a whole section in the
Chapter on the tact where Skinner repeatedly talks
about tacts which are under the control of private
events. Of course, he also does so in numerous other
places, Science and Human Behavior, for example, but
doesn't use the term "tact." So....it is clear that our little
expert, 1.) has little or no background in behavior
analysis, and 2.) has not read the books that implies
that he has. And then he calls me a "little man with a
little knowledge." I just call ‘em as I see ‘em but, of
course, this doesn't sit well with the likes of Winter and
Chad, who take any frank confrontation of their
nonsense as a cue to stomp off morally outraged; of
course, it also allows them to duck the fight under their
pretense of outrage.
Sincerely,
Glen M. Sizemore
Sincerely,
Glen
BuddhaThu
You must take Wittgenstein in terms of history. Before Wittgenstein,
Descartes, Locke, Hobbes, Hume et al. believed in a one to one
correspondence theory of knowledge, and that knowledge is private and
subjective, that is, focusing on the experience of the private
subject.
But that is not how language operates. Language by nature is public
and is necessarily so. I cannot know that "this patch is red" unless
my mother and father taught me the grammar rules of how to use the
very words "This patch is red". This happens naturally without the
child knowing about it, and it is extremely public and social. It
could be that we encounter a society that calls what is "red", "blue"
for instance, and they could justifiably be right.
Now, imagine a child dropped on an island without any encounter of
people. How would this child know that "a patch is red." The answer,
he won't.
I hoped that I helped.
"Elaine Jackson" <elaineja...@home.com> wrote in message news:<YSfz9.728990$f05.29...@news1.calgary.shaw.ca>...
BuddhaThu
imports alot of behavioral theories of causation into his views and
this is so very unWittgenstein. W. shuns all theories of causes and
always opts for the descriptive role of science. In this, he is deeply
Humean.
What W. is trying to say is that I don't have to develop a theory on
language in order to understand it. My mind just picks it up when I
was child. Again, think about how child picks up language. He can do
this whether or not you reinforce it with rewards or punishments.
Children will just pick it up because their brain is geared towards
it. ***No theory of causation*** i.e. in terms of rewards and
punishments is necessary.
gmsiz...@yahoo.com (Glen M. Sizemore) wrote in message news:<6e2f1d09.02111...@posting.google.com>...
> Wittgenstein's and Skinner's positions are nearly
> identical on this issue. It is the verbal community
> (Skinner's term) that establishes the "meanings" of
> terms, and they do so by "modeling," reinforcing
> correct usage, punishing incorrect usage etc. Now, the
> same thing is true about terms descriptive of private
> events. We have to be "taught" how to use such terms.
> But how does the verbal community reinforce and
> punish responses descriptive of events to which they
> have no access? The answer is that they count on
> collateral stimuli and collateral responses. Additionally,
> some verbal responses are descriptive of one's private
> behavior and the description was established when the
> behavior occurred publically. In a fourth method,
> responses arise because they are controlled by stimuli
> that share some properties as the current state, as in
> "soda tastes like my foot is asleep."
>
Chad L
"BuddhaThu" <runnin...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:dc4fc79e.02111...@posting.google.com...
> No, you are wrong... W. and S. are diametrically opposed. Skinner
> imports alot of behavioral theories of causation into his views and
> this is so very unWittgenstein.
By the way Wiggy talks at the end of PI, it doesn't seem that he's all that far apart from behavior
views.
W. shuns all theories of causes and
> always opts for the descriptive role of science.
actually - that is exactly what Skinner does (or at least radical behaviorism today).
In this, he is deeply
> Humean.
>
> What W. is trying to say is that I don't have to develop a theory on
> language in order to understand it. My mind just picks it up when I
> was child. Again, think about how child picks up language. He can do
> this whether or not you reinforce it with rewards or punishments.
that sounds more like what chomsky was saying. but if you say that Wiggy says that, then I'd like
ya to quote what passages seem to suggest that.
Chad L
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsiz...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:6e2f1d09.02111...@posting.google.com...
> or, at least, this sub-portion. First you have Winter's
> Proclamations. He's the sort of Usenet guy who pops
> in with grandiose proclamations but no explanation, as
> if all of us lesser thinkers should stand there
> dumbfounded. Of course, he can offer canned
> academic quips if he is challenged, and so it was no
> surprise to me that he would trot out Chomsky or some
> other institutionalized strawman. Winter's
> Proclamations always imply that if you are on the other
> side of the issue, you are an uninformed idiot. For
> example, his, "Yes, W. and Skinner were confused in
> similar ways. As far as I know, however, W. never
> explicitly endorses behaviorism in Philosophical
> Investigations." as if the mighty James Winter were
> capable of felling two of the greatest thinkers of all time
> with his sophomoric (and of course, non-backed-up)
> quip.
so Winter overextended by saying that W. and Skinner were confused, so what? its an
institutionalized thing to say now-a-days. Besides, who knows? maybe they were both confused
about the same thing! From the personal stories I've heard about Skinner from people who knew
him - he'd probably be the first to admit that he was confused about something (remember? it didn't
take him 20 years to write that book because he had an arthritic hand.) Plus the 'Technology of
Teaching', I'm told, he said was one of his most frustrating works - for which he was never
completely satisfied with, just as he probably wasn't completely satisfied with verbal behavior. so
what?)
The implication can only be that anyone who
> champions W. and Skinner's philosophies are
> "confused." Right? How else can one take this?
How about - with a grain of salt?
*seriously Glen, count to ten or something*
Then
> his other little proclamation:
>
> "You should read Chomsky's review of "Verbal
> Behavior" (from 1959, I believe) which was interpreted
> by the academic community as devastating.
standard talk in most academic communities, (right or wrong).
>
> You can also look at any philosophy of mind textbook
> which includes work
> on behaviorism to see how it failed philosophically.
standard rhetoric. no biggie.
> Of course, he can't defend his own position, so he (in
> all his magnificent) wisdom sends us out to read
> Chomsky's review.
he admitted that he hadn't read it in a long time and doesn't remember the details. so what?
But since he never read it, and
> certainly never read Skinner's book (or any Skinner, it
> appears) he doesn't know that neither did Chomsky,
> and the whole thing is irrelevant. But so what? A lot of
> idiots do that on Usenet. But, of course, what is
> infuriating about second-rate, sophomoric jerks like
> Winter, is that when you call them on it, and use a little
> richly-deserved sarcasm, they want to claim the moral
> high ground.
are you really "infuriated"? wow! lol I should go back and count how many words you've used that
are generally associated with "negative" emotions. it'd make an excellent graph! it'd probably
slope at about a times 2 celeration then jump to a times 3 here around the last few messages you've
written. but something about this whole thread you find very reinforcing (wonder what that could
be?) - why else would you come back for more? this is great! what else to you have to show? I
should do my poster on YOU, Glen! (do you have a picture you could send? so people'll know where
the data came from.)
Telling them in a matter-of-fact manner
> why they are wrong, of course, elicits their anger and
> gets you dubbed arrogant, and insolent.
I understand that you have a need to explain behavior, including your own, based on emotional
constructs - I won't hold it against you.
But seriously, Glen - shouldn't you go lie down and rest for awhile? (him gets gwumpy when him
doesn't get his nappy poo, huh?)
>
> Then there's idiots like little Chad.
Hi! I'm little Chad! (not to be confused for dimpled, or hanging, or "the chad")
He's sort of a rare
> bird.
thank ye kindly. I noticed that too.
Since most critics of behaviorism are like Winter
> (i.e., ignrorant of the positions that they criticize, little
> Chad thinks he's found a niche where he can be a big
> fish.
oh yes! I'm the little big fish! watch me swim!
So he reads a book (or part of one) or takes an
> introductory course, and he sets out to dazzle with his
> newfound "expertise." Of course, sooner or later, he's
> bound to bump into a bona-fide expert,
ooooo... in walks Gleeeen. Spooookie BIG MAN, infuuuuuriated Glen (with a frown on his BIG face) -
the "bona-fide" "expert".
and then his
> little world is troubled.
oh no! my little world is troubled by Glen's maaasive expertise! me oh my oh me, what is a little
big fish to do? <great story so far, Glen! I suggest telling it with more "umph" though next
time - that'll really convince your readers then.>
It is interesting that Chad
> actually seems to know next-to-nothing about Skinner,
eh? Glen's interested in something other than Glen and Glen's big expert knowledge?
> but he tries to give the impression that he is well read
> on the philosophical aspects (and even implying
> expertise in the experimental analysis of behavior). He
> is even forced to fib about (at least by implication) the
> books he read. He writes:
>
> "Skinner didn't reply to Chomsky because it was
> apparant that Chomsky had hardly read Verbal
> Behavior. I suspect that you haven't read it either - and
> if you haven't any background with behavior analysis,
> you'll most likely find it a difficult book to grasp (you'll
> want to start with other books first). No matter, I've
> seen words like yours repeated over and over again in
> my own philosophy department and on newsgroups
> like these."
>
> Now, look at that. Implied, of course, is that Chad has
> a "background in behavior analysis" (one intro
> undergraduate course is my guess)
oh, oh Glen <lol/sigh> - your words - I hope they don't come to bite you in the ass to hard
someday. I'm convinced you are an undergrad. Who else would react so foolishly? You can't
even control yourself.
and that he has read
> a bunch of books including Verbal Behavior!
I admitted that I hadn't read it (except for chapter 5 last year) to everyone - so what?
But,
> having been in the field for more than 20 years, I can
> see right away that he knows next to nothing,
20 years! wow. I'm sorry. (you'd think that after 20 years one would be able to apply at something
(beyond the lab) about what they've learned).
and is
> only interested in defending his hastily drawn
> conclusions. When you tell him he's wrong, he either
> tries to make it sound like he was saying what you are
> saying all along. Or just bulls his way into more mis-
> statements. My favorite is: "IF you say that Skinner
> says that we can tact "sadness" or any other private
> event, then please quote." This is particularly damaging
> to little Chad because there is a whole section in the
> Chapter on the tact where Skinner repeatedly talks
> about tacts which are under the control of private
> events.
ah, I see you still have misunderstood (and that is partially my fault - partially yours). Let me
put it too you this way, glen. how would a computer tact or describe sadness? wouldn't it just
say what we've taught it to say based soley on empirical observations? would we know if it was
really was tacting "sadness"? that private feeling.
<make any sense to you? big 20 year expert man?>
Of course, he also does so in numerous other
> places, Science and Human Behavior, for example, but
> doesn't use the term "tact." So....it is clear that our little
> expert, 1.) has little or no background in behavior
> analysis, and 2.) has not read the books that implies
> that he has. And then he calls me a "little man with a
> little knowledge."
I just call 'em as I see 'em but, of
> course, this doesn't sit well with the likes of Winter and
> Chad, who take any frank confrontation of their
> nonsense as a cue to stomp off morally outraged; of
> course, it also allows them to duck the fight under their
> pretense of outrage.
your problem, Glen. is that you thought it was a "fight".
But to call them how you see them: You are a little man with little knowledge. But who isn't? The
difference is that you just think that because you have a little bit more knowledge in your
field of comfort that you've suddenly become "big" - relative to others. But you and your
knowledge is still infintesimally tiny and weak compared to all the things that you don't know
(even in your own field!). The difference between you (or anyone) and a 40 year old highschool
dropout truly isn't that significant AND one who studys learning and behavior should be MOST aware
of that (moreso than in other disciplines)! (you should be ashamed of your behavior on this
newsgroup, Glen - 20 years! and this is how you react? what am I going to say to you in San
Francisco? how embarrasing.)
Chad L
fascinating. I bet it took you some time. Never-the-less, you might want to enroll in a logic
course. I suggest reading "Informal Logic: a handbook for critical argumentation". Douglass Walton
writes it, and it's a fabulous book.
cheers,
cl
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsiz...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:6e2f1d09.02111...@posting.google.com...
Glen M. Sizemore
in this thread
> or, at least, this sub-portion. First you have Winter's
> Proclamations. He's the sort of Usenet guy who pops
> in with grandiose proclamations but no explanation, as
> if all of us lesser thinkers should stand there
> dumbfounded. Of course, he can offer canned
> academic quips if he is challenged, and so it was no
> surprise to me that he would trot out Chomsky or some
> other institutionalized strawman. Winter's
> Proclamations always imply that if you are on the other
> side of the issue, you are an uninformed idiot. For
> example, his, "Yes, W. and Skinner were confused in
> similar ways. As far as I know, however, W. never
> explicitly endorses behaviorism in Philosophical
> Investigations." as if the mighty James Winter were
> capable of felling two of the greatest thinkers of all time
> with his sophomoric (and of course, non-backed-up)
> quip.
CL: so Winter overextended by saying that W. and
Skinner were confused, so what?
GS: And I escalated.....so what? See, how that works?
Winter arrogantly "disposes" of W. and Skinner with a
sweep of His hand, and then turns around and calls me
arrogant? Overextended? Basically he called anyone
who is sympathetic to radical behaviorism an idiot. I
take umbrage at it. I retaliate. So?
CL: its an
institutionalized thing to say now-a-days.
GS: Tough.
CL: Besides, who knows? maybe they were both confused
about the same thing! From the personal stories I've
heard about Skinner from people who knew
him - he'd probably be the first to admit that he was
confused about something (remember? it didn't
take him 20 years to write that book because he had an
arthritic hand.)
GS: You mean Verbal Behavior? My understanding
was that it was mostly completed before WWII, and
courses had been taught at, I think, both Harvard and
Columbia. The war, and Project Pelican took a large
chunk of time. Anyway, that wasn't Winter's intent,
and you know it, unless you are hopelessly naive. His
statements were meant as slur, and I don't like it. I see
no reason to not address it in like fashion (the typical
response of ignoring the institutionalized ad hominem
does not appear to be working).
CL: Plus the 'Technology of
Teaching', I'm told, he said was one of his most
frustrating works - for which he was never
completely satisfied with, just as he probably wasn't
completely satisfied with verbal behavior. so
what?)
GS: Needless to say, this is beside the "point" that
Winter was making.And that point was clearly that only
an uninformed idiot would even consider Skinner's position.
The implication can only be that anyone who
> champions W. and Skinner's philosophies are
> "confused." Right? How else can one take this?
CL: How about - with a grain of salt?
GS: Why? You're never going to change the mind of a
bigot like Winter, so let other people see that there are
those that do not agree - and do so with as much
obvious disdain as their opponents show - with the anti-
behaviorist rhetoric.
CL: *seriously Glen, count to ten or something*
GS: Whatever.
Then
> his other little proclamation:
>
> "You should read Chomsky's review of "Verbal
> Behavior" (from 1959, I believe) which was interpreted
> by the academic community as devastating.
CL: standard talk in most academic communities, (right
or wrong).
GS: So? Again, I don't like being called an idiot by the
likes of Winter, and the "turn the other cheek"
philosophy has failed.
>
> You can also look at any philosophy of mind textbook
> which includes work
> on behaviorism to see how it failed philosophically.
CL: standard rhetoric. no biggie.
GS: Wrong.
> Of course, he can't defend his own position, so he (in
> all his magnificent) wisdom sends us out to read
> Chomsky's review.
CL: he admitted that he hadn't read it in a long time and
doesn't remember the details. so what?
GS: The point is that, even though occasionally
applicable, the debated position should be covered, at
least somewhat, by the person advancing that position.
Again, it's the sort of arrogance that characterizes guys
like Winter.....he'll graciously tell what you need to
read. Right?
But since he never read it, and
> certainly never read Skinner's book (or any Skinner, it
> appears) he doesn't know that neither did Chomsky,
> and the whole thing is irrelevant. But so what? A lot of
> idiots do that on Usenet. But, of course, what is
> infuriating about second-rate, sophomoric jerks like
> Winter, is that when you call them on it, and use a little
> richly-deserved sarcasm, they want to claim the moral
> high ground.
CL: are you really "infuriated"? wow! lol I should go
back and count how many words you've used that
are generally associated with "negative" emotions. it'd
make an excellent graph! it'd probably
slope at about a times 2 celeration then jump to a times
3 here around the last few messages you've
written.
GS: See, you are capable of some good ideas.
CL: but something about this whole thread you find
very reinforcing (wonder what that could
be?) - why else would you come back for more? this is
great! what else to you have to show? I
should do my poster on YOU, Glen! (do you have a
picture you could send? so people'll know where
the data came from.)
GS: I'd have to approve of the quality of your poster
before I could do anything like that. ;) But I agree, my
behavior is no mystery, I choose to attack my
opponents....this all can be discussed in terms of
operants and establishing operations.
Telling them in a matter-of-fact manner
> why they are wrong, of course, elicits their anger and
> gets you dubbed arrogant, and insolent.
CL: I understand that you have a need to explain
behavior, including your own, based on emotional
constructs - I won't hold it against you.
GS: See? You muddle EVERY topic you can get your
hands on. There is nothing "nonbehavioristic" in talking
about emotions - certain stimuli and operations are, I'm
sure you're aware, referred to as establishing
operations. Much of the field of emotion is really a
categorization of certain sorts of specific establishing
operations, as well as their general principles (like
"opponent-process theory?").
CL: But seriously, Glen - shouldn't you go lie down and
rest for awhile? (him gets gwumpy when him
doesn't get his nappy poo, huh?)
GS: Now your showin' your stones, Chad. Good for
you! You're still wrong, but we'll work on that.
>
> Then there's idiots like little Chad.
CL: Hi! I'm little Chad! (not to be confused for
dimpled, or hanging, or "the chad")
GS: I thought of those same jokes myself.
He's sort of a rare
> bird.
CL: thank ye kindly. I noticed that too.
GS: But, unfortunately, not too rare. Plus, don't you
find it the least bit amusing that you think I crossed the
line, and you feel justified in attacking me, I think that
Winter (and you somewhat but in less offensive ways)
crossed the line and I attack him (and you - but not
until the bald-faced name-calling)? I do. What is the
issue, Chad, or should I say Ghandi? My "fuse" is too
short? Or... "it" is never justified? Then how do you
defend your behavior? See? You're just so short-
sighted, Chad. But....why think things through, right?
Since most critics of behaviorism are like Winter
> (i.e., ignrorant of the positions that they criticize, little
> Chad thinks he's found a niche where he can be a big
> fish.
CL: oh yes! I'm the little big fish! watch me swim!
GS: Nice wiggle, but I'm married.
So he reads a book (or part of one) or takes an
> introductory course, and he sets out to dazzle with his
> newfound "expertise." Of course, sooner or later, he's
> bound to bump into a bona-fide expert,
CL: ooooo... in walks Gleeeen. Spooookie BIG MAN,
infuuuuuriated Glen (with a frown on his BIG face) - the
"bona-fide" "expert".
GS: You did start the name calling.....remember Chad?
and then his
> little world is troubled.
CL: oh no! my little world is troubled by Glen's
maaasive expertise! me oh my oh me, what is a little
big fish to do? <great story so far, Glen! I suggest
telling it with more "umph" though next
time - that'll really convince your readers then.>
GS: Well I can only "describe it like I see it." You
spend all of your time defending whatever spew comes
out of you rather than considering anything said to you.
Yeah, I think I got your overblown ego correct.
It is interesting that Chad
> actually seems to know next-to-nothing about Skinner,
CL: eh? Glen's interested in something other than Glen
and Glen's big expert knowledge?
GS: Funny, I had the same impression of you.
> but he tries to give the impression that he is well read
> on the philosophical aspects (and even implying
> expertise in the experimental analysis of behavior). He
> is even forced to fib about (at least by implication) the
> books he read. He writes:
>
> "Skinner didn't reply to Chomsky because it was
> apparant that Chomsky had hardly read Verbal
> Behavior. I suspect that you haven't read it either - and
> if you haven't any background with behavior analysis,
> you'll most likely find it a difficult book to grasp (you'll
> want to start with other books first). No matter, I've
> seen words like yours repeated over and over again in
> my own philosophy department and on newsgroups
> like these."
>
> Now, look at that. Implied, of course, is that Chad has
> a "background in behavior analysis" (one intro
> undergraduate course is my guess)
CL: oh, oh Glen <lol/sigh> - your words - I hope they
don't come to bite you in the ass to hard
someday. I'm convinced you are an undergrad. Who
else would react so foolishly? You can't
even control yourself.
GS: Are you controlling yourself right now? Aren't you
doing exactly what you condemn in me? Why are you
so stupid?
and that he has read
> a bunch of books including Verbal Behavior!
CL: I admitted that I hadn't read it (except for chapter
5 last year) to everyone - so what?
GS: Not in the post in question. I have called you right.
Here's what happened. I picked on your pitiful,
misinformed interpretations of Skinner's writings, and
that pissed you off. Then I refuse to take getting
Winter's spit in my face, he conveniently gets outraged,
and you think you have an ally (small-minded
opportunist that you are) so you shift gears into your
current rant (that, at least, equals my response to
Winter)!
But,
> having been in the field for more than 20 years, I can
> see right away that he knows next to nothing,
CL: 20 years! wow. I'm sorry. (you'd think that after
20 years one would be able to apply at something
(beyond the lab) about what they've learned).
GS: Already commented on this.
and is
> only interested in defending his hastily drawn
> conclusions. When you tell him he's wrong, he either
> tries to make it sound like he was saying what you are
> saying all along. Or just bulls his way into more mis-
> statements. My favorite is: "IF you say that Skinner
> says that we can tact "sadness" or any other private
> event, then please quote." This is particularly damaging
> to little Chad because there is a whole section in the
> Chapter on the tact where Skinner repeatedly talks
> about tacts which are under the control of private
> events.
CL: ah, I see you still have misunderstood (and that is
partially my fault - partially yours). Let me
put it too you this way, glen. how would a computer
tact or describe sadness? wouldn't it just
say what we've taught it to say based soley on
empirical observations? would we know if it was
really was tacting "sadness"? that private feeling.
<make any sense to you? big 20 year expert man?>
GS: Who cares about a computer? The point is that our
behavior appears to have both private and public
aspects, the verbal community establishes tacts "based
on publicly observable phenomena" but the person can
come to respond "on the basis" of private aspects.
Finally, there is nothing that is "really sadness," this
mentalistic foolishness and your question is, from that
standpoint, stupid. I tried to tell you that in nicer ways,
but I see no reason for that now. Do you?
Of course, he also does so in numerous other
> places, Science and Human Behavior, for example, but
> doesn't use the term "tact." So....it is clear that our little
> expert, 1.) has little or no background in behavior
> analysis, and 2.) has not read the books that implies
> that he has. And then he calls me a "little man with a
> little knowledge."
I just call 'em as I see 'em but, of
> course, this doesn't sit well with the likes of Winter and
> Chad, who take any frank confrontation of their
> nonsense as a cue to stomp off morally outraged; of
> course, it also allows them to duck the fight under their
> pretense of outrage.
CL: your problem, Glen. is that you thought it was a
"fight".
GS: Not at first, but when you were more interested in
casting Skinner's position in terms of your mentalistic
nonsense, and I tried to gently correct you, and saw
that that made you ever so much more determined to
"prove me wrong" I figured.......wel, you know.
CL: But to call them how you see them: You are a little
man with little knowledge. But who isn't? The
difference is that you just think that because you have a
little bit more knowledge in your
field of comfort that you've suddenly become "big" -
relative to others. But you and your
knowledge is still infintesimally tiny and weak compared
to all the things that you don't know
(even in your own field!). The difference between you
(or anyone) and a 40 year old highschool
dropout truly isn't that significant AND one who studys
learning and behavior should be MOST aware
of that (moreso than in other disciplines)! (you should
be ashamed of your behavior on this
newsgroup, Glen - 20 years! and this is how you react?
what am I going to say to you in San
Francisco? how embarrasing.)
GS: There's nothing new here, and I have already
defended myself against it. I doubt that I will be in SF,
but I am not embarrassed.
"Chad L" <bluek...@mindspring.com> wrote in message news:<ar61fm$ig2
John Jones
JJ
Chad L <bluek...@mindspring.com> wrote in message
news:ar62i6$aen$1...@slb6.atl.mindspring.net...
John Jones
manner of our picking it up the language itself?
There is nothing 'there' to speak 'of'.
JJ
Chad L
You take things much too personally. He didn't call anyone an idiot, and even if he did, who cares?
Remember, its just behavior (albeit verbal) - its basically just sound waves traveling through the
air that we talking monkeys have been naturally selected to produce. Com'n, you know that; put
those 20 years to use, man! It's no big deal. :)
>
> CL: its an
> institutionalized thing to say now-a-days.
>
> GS: Tough.
>
> CL: Besides, who knows? maybe they were both confused
> about the same thing! From the personal stories I've
> heard about Skinner from people who knew
> him - he'd probably be the first to admit that he was
> confused about something (remember? it didn't
> take him 20 years to write that book because he had an
> arthritic hand.)
>
> GS: You mean Verbal Behavior? My understanding
> was that it was mostly completed before WWII,
yeah, what was it all but the last 2 chapters? and the numerous corrections made (some more minor
than others).
and
> courses had been taught at, I think, both Harvard and
> Columbia. The war, and Project Pelican took a large
> chunk of time. Anyway, that wasn't Winter's intent,
> and you know it, unless you are hopelessly naive.
what is "intent"? put that in behavioral terms please. (com'n! get off those mentalistic terms!)
> GS: Needless to say, this is beside the "point" that
> Winter was making.And that point was clearly that only
> an uninformed idiot would even consider Skinner's position.
He's not that bad; don't you see? You're letting your ER's get in the way of your thinking
behavior.
>
> The implication can only be that anyone who
> > champions W. and Skinner's philosophies are
> > "confused." Right? How else can one take this?
>
> CL: How about - with a grain of salt?
>
> GS: Why? You're never going to change the mind of a
> bigot like Winter,
so what? how does one go about changing a "mind" anyway? (com'n, man! I know you're trained in this
field, probably better than I - so act like it for christ sake!)
so let other people see that there are
> those that do not agree - and do so with as much
> obvious disdain as their opponents show - with the anti-
> behaviorist rhetoric.
what does counter control often beget? wasn't it Skinner who gave the analogy of the boys on the
ship tethered to the ship's mast who were charged with whipping each other for the other sailor's
amusement? what generally happens, glen?
> Then
> > his other little proclamation:
> >
> > "You should read Chomsky's review of "Verbal
> > Behavior" (from 1959, I believe) which was interpreted
> > by the academic community as devastating.
>
> CL: standard talk in most academic communities, (right
> or wrong).
>
> GS: So? Again, I don't like being called an idiot by the
> likes of Winter, and the "turn the other cheek"
> philosophy has failed.
so now its reduced to a mere "philosophy"???? correct me if I'm wrong but you seem to lean towards
the experimental side - why let your ER's get in the way of that?
>
> > Of course, he can't defend his own position, so he (in
> > all his magnificent) wisdom sends us out to read
> > Chomsky's review.
>
> CL: he admitted that he hadn't read it in a long time and
> doesn't remember the details. so what?
>
> GS: The point is that, even though occasionally
> applicable, the debated position should be covered, at
> least somewhat, by the person advancing that position.
> Again, it's the sort of arrogance that characterizes guys
> like Winter.....he'll graciously tell what you need to
> read. Right?
remember glen, we're all talking monkeys - even you. don't let the mystical foundation of the term
"meaning" evoke ER's in you.
>
> But since he never read it, and
> > certainly never read Skinner's book (or any Skinner, it
> > appears) he doesn't know that neither did Chomsky,
> > and the whole thing is irrelevant. But so what? A lot of
> > idiots do that on Usenet. But, of course, what is
> > infuriating about second-rate, sophomoric jerks like
> > Winter, is that when you call them on it, and use a little
> > richly-deserved sarcasm, they want to claim the moral
> > high ground.
>
> CL: are you really "infuriated"? wow! lol I should go
> back and count how many words you've used that
> are generally associated with "negative" emotions. it'd
> make an excellent graph! it'd probably
> slope at about a times 2 celeration then jump to a times
> 3 here around the last few messages you've
> written.
>
> GS: See, you are capable of some good ideas.
thank you! (I assume all of us talking monkeys are capable of good "ideas" from time to time)
>
> CL: but something about this whole thread you find
> very reinforcing (wonder what that could
> be?) - why else would you come back for more? this is
> great! what else to you have to show? I
> should do my poster on YOU, Glen! (do you have a
> picture you could send? so people'll know where
> the data came from.)
>
> GS: I'd have to approve of the quality of your poster
> before I could do anything like that. ;) But I agree, my
> behavior is no mystery, I choose to attack my
> opponents....this all can be discussed in terms of
> operants and establishing operations.
If I didn't know better I'd say you were mellowing out. cool.
>
>
> Telling them in a matter-of-fact manner
> > why they are wrong, of course, elicits their anger and
> > gets you dubbed arrogant, and insolent.
>
> CL: I understand that you have a need to explain
> behavior, including your own, based on emotional
> constructs - I won't hold it against you.
>
> GS: See? You muddle EVERY
I was messin with you! lol. (I knew that'd trip your trigger more than just about anyone you could
do a google.com search on).
haha, talking monkey #1 gets talking monkey #2's goat!
topic you can get your
> hands on. There is nothing "nonbehavioristic" in talking
> about emotions - certain stimuli and operations are, I'm
> sure you're aware, referred to as establishing
> operations. Much of the field of emotion is really a
> categorization of certain sorts of specific establishing
> operations, as well as their general principles (like
> "opponent-process theory?").
>
> CL: But seriously, Glen - shouldn't you go lie down and
> rest for awhile? (him gets gwumpy when him
> doesn't get his nappy poo, huh?)
>
> GS: Now your showin' your stones, Chad. Good for
> you! You're still wrong, but we'll work on that.
>
> >
> > Then there's idiots like little Chad.
>
> CL: Hi! I'm little Chad! (not to be confused for
> dimpled, or hanging, or "the chad")
>
> GS: I thought of those same jokes myself.
>
> He's sort of a rare
> > bird.
>
> CL: thank ye kindly. I noticed that too.
>
> GS: But, unfortunately, not too rare.
har har.
Plus, don't you
> find it the least bit amusing that you think I crossed the
> line, and you feel justified in attacking me,
talking monkeys are "hypocritical", glen. fact of life.
I think that
> Winter (and you somewhat but in less offensive ways)
> crossed the line and I attack him (and you - but not
> until the bald-faced name-calling)? I do. What is the
> issue, Chad, or should I say Ghandi?
oh seriously, I was going to go as Ghandi this halloween during seaba, but thank gawd nobody wanted
to dress up! (I have a bald head).
My "fuse" is too
> short? Or... "it" is never justified? Then how do you
> defend your behavior? See? You're just so short-
> sighted, Chad.
I know. :)
But....why think things through, right?
>
>
> Since most critics of behaviorism are like Winter
> > (i.e., ignrorant of the positions that they criticize, little
> > Chad thinks he's found a niche where he can be a big
> > fish.
>
> CL: oh yes! I'm the little big fish! watch me swim!
>
> GS: Nice wiggle, but I'm married.
>
>
> So he reads a book (or part of one) or takes an
> > introductory course, and he sets out to dazzle with his
> > newfound "expertise." Of course, sooner or later, he's
> > bound to bump into a bona-fide expert,
>
> CL: ooooo... in walks Gleeeen. Spooookie BIG MAN,
> infuuuuuriated Glen (with a frown on his BIG face) - the
> "bona-fide" "expert".
>
> GS: You did start the name calling.....remember Chad?
I did? I don't think so (I believe it was you who started in with the ad homenims, both
circumstantial and abusive, along with, might I add, 'poisoning the well') so I'll leave it up to
you to prove that assertion - if it still matters that much to you.
>
>
> and then his
> > little world is troubled.
>
> CL: oh no! my little world is troubled by Glen's
> maaasive expertise! me oh my oh me, what is a little
> big fish to do? <great story so far, Glen! I suggest
> telling it with more "umph" though next
> time - that'll really convince your readers then.>
>
> GS: Well I can only "describe it like I see it."
true dat, dawg.
You
> spend all of your time defending whatever spew comes
> out of you rather than considering anything said to you.
oh? I seem to remember concedeing to various points you made. (though on the reverse, you only
tepidly did on the first coupla of communications with me - and then bam! everything I said was
"wrong"; remember "my" (peirce & epling's actually) definition of stimulus control that you said was
"wrong"? And Glen, I'm secure enough to know that while everything I say isn't correct, I DO
occasionally (and frequently too) make relevant points - points that by the end your ER's allowed
you to unilaterally dismiss (either as nonsense, or cognitive crap, or what have you). but, I'm so
not worried about it. really! I'm sure you're an alright guy (once one gets past that giant block
of wood on your shoulder! har har).
> Yeah, I think I got your overblown ego correct.
lego my ego.
>
> It is interesting that Chad
> > actually seems to know next-to-nothing about Skinner,
>
> CL: eh? Glen's interested in something other than Glen
> and Glen's big expert knowledge?
>
> GS: Funny, I had the same impression of you.
yeah, I'm sure no matter what we do we'll always come off as arrogant in someone's eyes at some
point in time.
"stupid": under the stimulus control of the "wrong" contingencies.
Glen, I don' t know. I guess I can't help but be stupid sometimes - that's why I've got people
around me to bring me back to reality. how bout that?
>
>
> and that he has read
> > a bunch of books including Verbal Behavior!
>
> CL: I admitted that I hadn't read it (except for chapter
> 5 last year) to everyone - so what?
>
> GS: Not in the post in question. I have called you right.
> Here's what happened. I picked on your pitiful,
> misinformed interpretations of Skinner's writings, and
> that pissed you off.
Not particularly, Glen. Remember, when I asked you to try reading my words in a different "mind's
voice"? I think you interpreted my words as "pissed off" - when in fact that is just a reflection
of how you yourself would have used those words
in that kind of context. I admit, my interpretation of Skinner isn't going to be perfect by any
means (and my words have generally qualified that if you look back) - and your interpretation (after
20 yrs.) should sometimes (perhaps often) be closer to what Skinner meant (becaues you've read more
of his books than me, I assume - I've only read 'BF&D' and 'Tech of Teaching' and some publications
in JEAB, Behavior Analyst, and JABA (I think thats where they came from, anyway) plus all kinds of
stories and explanations from various people who knew him and studied under him when he was still
vigorous). But he's not special, and he would be the first to say so. what he is (now) - is a
reference point for some very provocative ideas and methods - we are expected, eventually, to
deviate from him towards =======> the data. right?
Then I refuse to take getting
> Winter's spit in my face, he conveniently gets outraged,
> and you think you have an ally (small-minded
> opportunist that you are)
ally schmallie. winter and I have been through disagreements and collaberations before you ever
came along here.
so you shift gears into your
> current rant (that, at least, equals my response to
> Winter)!
you might be right about that. I don't know. does it really matter?
>
> and is
> > only interested in defending his hastily drawn
> > conclusions. When you tell him he's wrong, he either
> > tries to make it sound like he was saying what you are
> > saying all along. Or just bulls his way into more mis-
> > statements. My favorite is: "IF you say that Skinner
> > says that we can tact "sadness" or any other private
> > event, then please quote." This is particularly damaging
> > to little Chad because there is a whole section in the
> > Chapter on the tact where Skinner repeatedly talks
> > about tacts which are under the control of private
> > events.
>
> CL: ah, I see you still have misunderstood (and that is
> partially my fault - partially yours). Let me
> put it too you this way, glen. how would a computer
> tact or describe sadness? wouldn't it just
> say what we've taught it to say based soley on
> empirical observations? would we know if it was
> really was tacting "sadness"? that private feeling.
> <make any sense to you? big 20 year expert man?>
>
> GS: Who cares about a computer?
its an analogy. not a cog. analogy, and not to be taken literally.
The point is that our
> behavior appears to have both private and public
> aspects,
without an iota of dispute from me.
the verbal community establishes tacts "based
> on publicly observable phenomena"
again, zero dispute on my end there.
but the person can
> come to respond "on the basis" of private aspects.
again, never in dispute by me!
> Finally, there is nothing that is "really sadness,"
ah. there is the dispute. I mean this literally; do not by any means take this personally; but that
statement is literally nonsense BECAUSE it cannot be verified or falisfied in anyway. MOREOVER, a
human actor will report the difference between behaving as if they are "sad", and actually being
"sad". (are you familiar with qualia and zombies - philosophically speaking?) Now THIS is the kind
of "epiphenomena" (again, a term that Skinner
himself! employed - I will sight the source if you don't believe me (though I'll have to spend
much effort digging it up, you bastard ;))) that I was attempting to arrive at in the past (though
we didn't really get there - maybe we still can?). This "epiphenomena" can it be described?
(tentavely assuming that my distincition between a tact and a description holds).
this
> mentalistic foolishness and your question is, from that
> standpoint, stupid. I tried to tell you that in nicer ways,
glen you've been about as "nice" as a pit viper! lol (yes, sometimes I laugh at my own jokes, call
me corny).
> but I see no reason for that now. Do you?
glen, in all honestly, in my book, there has been no damage done. all I ask is for a bit of
latitude. can I have some latitude, please? even if it means going beyond accepted speech in our
shared behavioral verbal community?
>
>
> Of course, he also does so in numerous other
> > places, Science and Human Behavior, for example, but
> > doesn't use the term "tact." So....it is clear that our little
> > expert, 1.) has little or no background in behavior
> > analysis, and 2.) has not read the books that implies
> > that he has. And then he calls me a "little man with a
> > little knowledge."
> I just call 'em as I see 'em but, of
> > course, this doesn't sit well with the likes of Winter and
> > Chad, who take any frank confrontation of their
> > nonsense as a cue to stomp off morally outraged; of
> > course, it also allows them to duck the fight under their
> > pretense of outrage.
>
>
> CL: your problem, Glen. is that you thought it was a
> "fight".
>
> GS: Not at first, but when you were more interested in
> casting Skinner's position in terms of your mentalistic
> nonsense,
You never gave me a chance to explain. You should note that I'm posting from a group called
"alt.PHILOSOPHY". I am the ONLY person here who is trained in scientific behavioral analysis (UF
#1!). I must attempt to reconcile the clash between the 2 (and more!) verbal communities
(philosophy vs. rad. behav) that often occurs. Most people, regardless of what the source was,
maintain a thinking behavior that is "anti-behavioral". You have seen this first hand. It is my task
to merge the other academic pursuits with radical behaviorism. This necessarily involves augmenting
the use of various terms and even creating new terms for the sake of efficient FUNCTION(!). It is
waaaay to easy to dismiss someone else's arguments (often because of the ERs we emit) when our words
do not connect in constructive (and/or reinforcing) ways. Why were you aware, for example, of the
difference in the way the word "contingent" is used in the two verbal communities??? In philosophy,
the word means "not necessary"! (I've noted that this often comes as a surprise to senior members
of ABA).
Now I'm bound to make mistakes when trying to reconcile the two; but not everything or even most of
what I do is necessarily a mistake - so try not to be so quick to strike until you're certain that
there's very little chance that you've set up a staw man. Latitude, glen, thats all I ask (I don't
demand 1 to 1 agreement - remember I've been on these boards for 5 years, I've been through
offensive monkey-talk and reacted the way you have (and worse) many times over in the past - your
words or anyone else's can no longer elicit very strong ER's in me - I've learned better! its just
determined behavior! my worth is measured soley in the consequences of my actions, and not in the
eyes or words of other talking monkeys. Know what I mean? Skinner was a talking monkey too! and he
was oookay with it!)
and I tried to gently correct you, and saw
> that that made you ever so much more determined to
> "prove me wrong" I figured.......wel, you know.
>
> CL: But to call them how you see them: You are a little
> man with little knowledge. But who isn't? The
> difference is that you just think that because you have a
> little bit more knowledge in your
> field of comfort that you've suddenly become "big" -
> relative to others. But you and your
> knowledge is still infintesimally tiny and weak compared
> to all the things that you don't know
> (even in your own field!). The difference between you
> (or anyone) and a 40 year old highschool
> dropout truly isn't that significant AND one who studys
> learning and behavior should be MOST aware
> of that (moreso than in other disciplines)! (you should
> be ashamed of your behavior on this
> newsgroup, Glen - 20 years! and this is how you react?
> what am I going to say to you in San
> Francisco? how embarrasing.)
>
> GS: There's nothing new here, and I have already
> defended myself against it. I doubt that I will be in SF,
> but I am not embarrassed.
well, good. sorta. I'm sorry you won't be attending the san fran conference. I think there is a
chance that I'd like to talk (informally) with you in person.
take er easy,
cl
Glen M. Sizemore
opposed. Skinner
imports alot of behavioral theories of causation into his
views and
this is so very unWittgenstein. W. shuns all theories of
causes and
always opts for the descriptive role of science. In this,
he is deeply
Humean.
GS: You know, I've heard this about W., but I don't
know if I buy it. He certainly is against the notion that
there is some discrete event, or type of event, common
to aspects of behavior like "understanding," or
"knowledge," that is causing the behavior that we
observe when we say that someone "knows" or
"understands." But it is pretty clear to me that, for
example, he attributes the nature of a person's
participation in a language game as some product of
their interaction with the larger community, even
referring to it as "training" at one point (If I am not
mistaken).
CL: What W. is trying to say is that I don't have to
develop a theory on
language in order to understand it. My mind just picks it
up when I
was child.
GS: No, he does not appear to say this.
CL: Again, think about how child picks up language.
He can do
this whether or not you reinforce it with rewards or
punishments.
GS: Needless to say, I disagree.
CL; Children will just pick it up because their brain is
geared towards
it. ***No theory of causation*** i.e. in terms of
rewards and
punishments is necessary.
GS: Needless to say, I disagree. And where W. would
probably not have held to an explanation in terms of
"rewards and punishments," (but I certainly don't know
this for sure) he clearly sees it as somehow being
produce by training provided by the other players of
that particular language game.
There are numerous ways in which W.'s and Skinner's
views on many topics are similar....there are, no doubt,
places where they are different, but I am struck by the
similarities every time I pick up PI.
runnin...@yahoo.com (BuddhaThu) wrote in message
Chad L
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsiz...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:6e2f1d09.02111...@posting.google.com...
Glen M. Sizemore
my mistake means we're "going steady."
"Chad L" <bluek...@mindspring.com> wrote in message news:<arc4tv$2kd$1...@slb9.atl.mindspring.net>...
Wordsmith
> No, you are wrong... W. and S. are diametrically opposed. Skinner
> imports alot of behavioral theories of causation into his views and
> this is so very unWittgenstein. W. shuns all theories of causes and
> always opts for the descriptive role of science. In this, he is deeply
> Humean.
>
> What W. is trying to say is that I don't have to develop a theory on
> language in order to understand it. My mind just picks it up when I
> was child. Again, think about how child picks up language. He can do
> this whether or not you reinforce it with rewards or punishments.
> Children will just pick it up because their brain is geared towards
> it. ***No theory of causation*** i.e. in terms of rewards and
> punishments is necessary.
W has no need of a Chomskian, monad-like "black box".
Wordsmith :)
Chad L
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsiz...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:6e2f1d09.02111...@posting.google.com...
Chad L
"Wordsmith" <word...@rocketmail.com> wrote in message
news:cddcc385.02111...@posting.google.com...
> runnin...@yahoo.com (BuddhaThu) wrote in message
news:<dc4fc79e.02111...@posting.google.com>...
> > No, you are wrong... W. and S. are diametrically opposed. Skinner
> > imports alot of behavioral theories of causation into his views and
> > this is so very unWittgenstein. W. shuns all theories of causes and
> > always opts for the descriptive role of science. In this, he is deeply
> > Humean.
> >
> > What W. is trying to say is that I don't have to develop a theory on
> > language in order to understand it. My mind just picks it up when I
> > was child. Again, think about how child picks up language. He can do
> > this whether or not you reinforce it with rewards or punishments.
> > Children will just pick it up because their brain is geared towards
> > it. ***No theory of causation*** i.e. in terms of rewards and
> > punishments is necessary.
>
> W has no need of a Chomskian, monad-like "black box".
>
> Wordsmith :)
you mean a "[chumpskian], monad-like "black box".