The notion of truth proposed by essentialistic realism, interpretation and first thoughts about a contra position.
J.G.H.
I need to write a paper and give a lecture about a position against the
conception of truth as given by essentialistic realism. I started explaining
essentialistic realism and the corresponding notion of truth. You'll find
this below. It's not very detailed, but I don't need to do that. Before I
give my lecture, a fellow student has presented the pro position.
I'd like some comments on my interpretation of essentialistic realism and
the corresponding notion of truth. Also if anyone can give me directions for
constructing my contra position I'd like to hear that too. Finally, all
other comments, including comments on my English, are very welcome. You're
help is greatly appreciated.
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Essentialistic realism
Central to most notions of realism are the following propositions:
1. The reality outside of us exists.
2. About this reality we can gather real knowledge.
Essentialistic realism is introduced by Kripke and Putnam and should be seen
in close relation to their theory of causal reference. Essentialistic
realism poses that natural kinds exists and that science is working to
reveal their essence. The causal reference theory is constructed out of
three components.
(I'll use a reconstruction of the causal reference theory as proposed by
Visser in a Dutch article. For references contact me by email).
(i) Meanings are object-involving. (Meanings have an intrinsic bonding with
objects)
(ii) The obtaining-mechanism uses real series of events, like "causal
chains", that connect the using of a name by an individual with the
original act of name-giving.
(iii) The act of obtaining of the meaning isn't part of the meaning itself.
Straight on to the corresponding conception of truth. The notion of truth
proposed here is an redone version of the traditional adequatio rei et
intellectus. First of all, certain properties, like roundness, will be
attributed to the objects itself, and so become external. (Traditional these
properties were located in the head of the individual.) Secondly, after
these properties are located externally, there will be two ways to grasp the
conception of truth, namely through the object itself, or through the
description of the essence of the object. The subject - predicate form is no
longer suitable and will be replaced by a new form: situation / type. This
new model rests on two conventions. First, the descriptive convention (the
possibility to speak a language correctly). Secondly, the demonstrative
convention (what you can see happening and about what you are talking).
Conclusion: The adequatio rei et intellectus is now between the proposition
and the situation, and the proposition includes both a structural
abstraction (type) and the realia (situation).
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Till now I've presented the pro position. I need to defend a contra
position. What I'm planning to do is to attack the rather metaphysical
notion of "natural kinds". I will argue the natural kinds exists, indeed, as
many as you like, and that will make this notion at least problematic. From
there I'll try to defend an anti-realism and an anti-realistic notion of
truth. I'm not sure what a anti-realistic notion of truth looks like.
Marcel
>
> Essentialistic realism
> Central to most notions of realism are the following propositions:
> 1. The reality outside of us exists.
> 2. About this reality we can gather real knowledge.
>
> Till now I've presented the pro position. I need to defend a contra
> position. What I'm planning to do is to attack the rather metaphysical
> notion of "natural kinds". I will argue the natural kinds exists, indeed, as
> many as you like, and that will make this notion at least problematic. From
> there I'll try to defend an anti-realism and an anti-realistic notion of
> truth. I'm not sure what a anti-realistic notion of truth looks like.
It seems you are asking people to write your paper for you. You want to
defend
an anti-realist notion of truth, but don't know what it looks like. Why
do you
want to defend it? If you specify one or more questions there might be
some
answers.
Marcel
J.G.H.
No, no, please, no. Sometimes when the deadline seems close, it would be
nice if someone
could write a paper for you. But i would never be satisfied with it...
(would you?)
I just posted this, cause i wasn't to sure about my interpretation of
essentialistic realism.
I tried to explain the setting in which this very lame explanation of
essentialistic realism should be seen.
Guess i should post real QUESTIONS or statements if i want to post something
to a newsgroup.
>>You want to defend an anti-realist notion of truth, but don't know what it
looks like. Why
do you want to defend it?
Well, i need to defend a contra postion to essentialistic realism.
Guess i'm gonna try to do a bit Dummett.
>>If you specify one or more questions there might be some answers.
Thanks, i will in the future!
Jeroen.