Mind is not directly observable, hence; the Theory of Mind
Immortalist
intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc. - to oneself and others
and to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions
that are different from one's own.
Theory of Mind is a ‘theory’ insofar as the “mind” is not "directly
observable.". The presumption that others have a mind is termed a
"theory of mind" because each human can only prove the existence of
his or her own mind through introspection, and one has no direct
access to others' minds. It is typically assumed that others have
minds by analogy with one's own, and based on the reciprocal nature of
social interaction, as observed in joint attention,the functional use
of language, and understanding of others' emotions and actions. Having
a theory of mind allows one to attribute thoughts, desires, and
intentions to others, to predict or explain their actions, and to
posit their intentions. As originally defined, it enables one to
understand that mental states can be the cause of - and thus be used
to explain and predict - others’ behavior. Being able to attribute
mental states to others and understanding them as causes of behavior
implies, in part, that one must be able to conceive of the mind as a
“generator of representations”. If a person does not have a complete
theory of mind it may be a sign of cognitive or developmental
impairment.
Theory of mind appears to be an innate potential ability in humans,
but one requiring social and other experience over many years to bring
to fruition. Different people may develop more, or less, effective
theories of mind. Empathy is a related concept, meaning experientially
recognizing and understanding the states of mind, including beliefs,
desires and particularly emotions of others, often characterized as
the ability to "put oneself into another's shoes."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_mind
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/
BOfL
I see there is no reference to the 'universal mind'. Of course, once
discovered, the term 'theory' in invalid.
BOfL
Immortalist
>
> I see there is no reference to the 'universal mind'. Of course, once
> discovered, the term 'theory' in invalid.
>
> BOfL
Probably wrong because the overarching theory of all theories is that
everything is a theory; all your allowed to say is that there may be a
theory of universal mind, that is until you can defend your
implication that there is some sort of certainty available to us
monkees.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JmH9ahaTt7k
You mean if we suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that
is, empirical beliefs which are epistemically justified, and whose
justification does not depend on that of any further empirical
beliefs, since for a belief to be epistemically justified requires
that there be a reason why it is likely to be true and a belief is
justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession of such a
reason, then a person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only
if he believes with justification the premises from which it follows
that the belief is likely to be true, but the premises of such a
justifying argument must include at least one empirical premise,
whence the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is,
emperical beliefs which are epistemically justified, making it so
there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely justified
skeptical beliefs?
walterimlenz
> because each human can only prove the existence of
> his or her own mind through introspection
What happens, if this proof by means of introspection fails? E.g.,
something like this: I search for my feelings, qualia etc. and say:
"Oh, there aren't any. So I must be an unconscious being!" - But if
it's inconceivable that the proof fails, can you still call it a
proof?
Introspection can't prove the existence of my mind.
Walter Imlenz
John Jones
> Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states - beliefs,
> intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc. - to oneself and others
> and to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions
> that are different from one's own.
Immediately, that places 'mind' as a list of 'objects'.
> Theory of Mind is a �theory� insofar as the �mind� is not "directly
> observable.".
The assumption that the mind is an object is elaborated.
I'm not reading the rest. You made no comment.
dorayme
<f4a493fe-18d7-4b42...@s16g2000vbp.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> Introspection can't prove the existence of my mind.
'X is spending the day introspecting' entails 'X has a mind'
--
dorayme
walterimlenz
> In article
> <f4a493fe-18d7-4b42-b8da-7f4b0125d...@s16g2000vbp.googlegroups.com>,
>
> walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
> > Introspection can't prove the existence of my mind.
>
> 'X is spending the day introspecting' entails 'X has a mind'
>
> --
> dorayme
??
Walter Imlenz
Sir Frederick
>Immortalist wrote:
>> Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states - beliefs,
>> intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc. - to oneself and others
>> and to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions
>> that are different from one's own.
>
>Immediately, that places 'mind' as a list of 'objects'.
>
>
>> Theory of Mind is a �theory� insofar as the �mind� is not "directly
>> observable.".
>
>The assumption that the mind is an object is elaborated.
>
>I'm not reading the rest. You made no comment.
"La,la,la,la".
Sir Frederick
In our brain based virtual reality (model),
even magic may occur. Even deceit.
dorayme
<a1cd98e0-6802-4305...@o30g2000vbc.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
A case of introspecting being a proof. Let's face it, the whole idea of
proving that one has a mind is simply silly. So we may as well carry on.
--
dorayme
Bill Taylor
Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> who wrote:
> Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states - beliefs,
> intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc. - to oneself & others
> and to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions
> that are different from one's own.
> ...
> ... based on the reciprocal nature of social interaction,...
> ...
> Having a theory of mind allows one ...to predict or explain
> their actions, and to posit their intentions.
>
> ... often characterized as the ability to
> "put oneself into another's shoes."
EXCELLENT! I didn't know you were such a good article writer.
That's a wonderful potted summary of the "common sense" view of
the world of people and our place in it, and of the practical
basis of most moral and psychological systems.
It also seems to be a slap in the face for phenomenologists,
which is probably a good thing. ;-)
-- Bill of basics.
** If you talk to god it's called religion.
** If god talks to you it's called insanity.
BOfL
>
> Probably wrong because the overarching theory of all theories is that
> everything is a theory; all your allowed to say is that there may be a
> theory of universal mind, that is until you can defend your
> implication that there is some sort of certainty available to us
> monkees.
All Im allowed to say by whom..?
Too late for me, but you are close, in that people who haven't yet
moved beyond that state of consciousness 'arnt allowed to hear it'.
The term 'defend' is an excellent indicator of a 'groupie'. :-)
>> You mean if we suppose,
And here's another one...if 'we' suppose. The universal mind only
exists in the world of comparison. Comments like 'you mean', or "is
this what you meant to say" are all examples of the inter relationship
within that entity. Either 'for or against' is welcome, but not
neutrality (an indicator of the emerging individuality...not popular
as reactions and fabrications about my contributions indicate.
> that there are basic empirical beliefs, that
> is, empirical beliefs which are epistemically justified, and whose
> justification does not depend on that of any further empirical
> beliefs, since for a belief to be epistemically justified requires
> that there be a reason why it is likely to be true and a belief is
> justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession of such a
> reason, then a person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only
> if he believes with justification the premises from which it follows
> that the belief is likely to be true, but the premises of such a
> justifying argument must include at least one empirical premise,
> whence the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
> on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
> contradicting that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is,
> emperical beliefs which are epistemically justified, making it so
> there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely justified
> skeptical beliefs?-
You have covered the world of beliefs, both empirical epistemic and
satirical.
Even ontology doesnt cover it. Just a more refined mental approach.
Knowing, in a spiritual sense, needs or seeks no comparison.
Re reading many 'masterful works', the analogous style which many used
can be recognised as an attempt to communicate 'singularity' to
'group'.
"You are all individuals" was just too much,. Look what happened to
poor old Brian.
BOfL
>
> - Show quoted text -
john keats
Does this involve the psychology of the mind? Or does it involve
psychologists predicting the minds of others? But many persons can the
read the minds of others and particularly pyschologists.
John Keats
walterimlenz
walterimlenz
> A case of introspecting being a proof. Let's face it, the whole idea of
> proving that one has a mind is simply silly. So we may as well carry on.
It doesn't seem so silly in the case of robots or aliens. At least you
can make it plausible with respect to their behavior.
Walter Imlenz
Charlie-Boo
> Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states - beliefs,
> intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc. - to oneself and others
> and to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions
> that are different from one's own.
No. Thinking is merely artificially recreating what your 5 senses
produce.
Remember that anything as pure and fundamental as thought must have a
simple definition.
Can you see why?
C-B
Ed
Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states - beliefs,
intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc. - to oneself and others
and to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions
that are different from one's own.
Theory of Mind is a ‘theory’ insofar as the “mind” is not "directly
observable.". The presumption that others have a mind is termed a
"theory of mind" because each human can only prove the existence of
his or her own mind through introspection, and one has no direct
access to others' minds.
So, it's not a theory that there is (a) mind, one's own; that fact is
established so it's not a theory anymore. It's really the Theory of
Other Minds.
Why don't we talk of a Theory of Lower Intestines? In ordinary social
intercourse I don't have direct access to knowledge of whether you
have a lower intestine like I do; I have to infer it just as I have
to infer that you have (a) mind. Why do we see these as so
different? My lower intestine is directly observable only to me,
especially after a lunch of bean soup, in a manner analogous to the
way my mind is observable, only to me. I know the analogy breaks down
if pushed far enough, but the point is that there is much about others
that we assume that is not directly observable but in philosophy only
mind gets singled out to have a Theory.
LudovicoVan
> Remember that anything as pure and fundamental as thought must have a
> simple definition.
>
> Can you see why?
I can't. I can't even see how you can define "thinking" at all in any
non-circular way...
-LV
Bill Taylor
Pernicketty! But I would still say it's a theory of minds.
Just as outre' cosmologists speak of "a theory of universes",
even though one is directly observable and the others (if any) aren't.
0-1 against you so far.
> Why don't we talk of a Theory of Lower Intestines?
Nice one! Though not a great analogy - that would be analogous to
a theory of brains. Perhaps if you studied a theory of blood
circulation
you'd be on a closer analogy! (no goal either way here.)
> I don't have direct access to knowledge of whether you
> have a lower intestine like I do; I have to infer it
Actually, this is just part of a theory of lower intestinal
*discomfort*.
Which is a subtheory of the theory of mind, OC. We should also have
a theory of headaches. And many other things.
> if pushed far enough, but the point is that there is much about others
> that we assume that is not directly observable but in philosophy only
> mind gets singled out to have a Theory.
A fair observation! But as noted, theory of mind covers those other
things... at least in my usage of "mind". Mind includes both
thoughts
and sense impressions, in my book, as well as secondary feelings like
anger and lust.
So I'm still unsure whether to allow that last goal... is it 0-1 or
1-1...?
-- Wobbly William
................
** Buy our home testing kit to see if you REALLY have a headache! **
Charlie-Boo
Excellent point (but drop the "even".)
"artificially recreating what your 5 senses produce" self-applied
means copying a copy.
Reality is picked up by your 5 senses and stored into your memory.
Thinking takes memory and determines the original sensory input that
created it and runs it again.
But it goes in with a stack/tree-path of "pretend" appended. (Some
people lose the apendage.)
No, this is not a non-simple definition. It is writing programs in
this base of computing. (In case anyone wondered.)
C-B
> -LV
Charlie-Boo
>
> > Remember that anything as pure and fundamental as thought must have a
> > simple definition.
>
> > Can you see why?
>
> I can't.
If a pure fundamental concept has a complex definition, assuming that
your system of definitions is well-designed in that the primitives
used to define things can be combined in a variety of orders and
numbers (how many primitives are used in the definition and how they
are combined), then definitions using a subset/smaller number of
primitives than the complex one would define smaller concepts than the
fundamental concept being defined, contradicting its being
fundamental.
This is very common in published definitions. Definitions of
Mathematics, Science, how to resolve problems such as the Liar paradox
etc. often suffer from consisting of long, redundant lists of
synonyms.
(Note that proofs can be any size - that is the wonder of Mathematics
- simple problems take 350 years to solve. And Occam likes it!)
C-B
jesko
The problem is always the same.
Was Maxwell able to measure Ether?
He affirmed that it was an hard task.
Thinking is a special kind of ether.
So....
LudovicoVan
> Thinking takes memory and determines the original sensory input
> that created it and runs it again.
IMO, that (at best) seems a descriptive approach, quite short of any
definition or "explanation".
> No, this is not a non-simple definition. It is writing programs
> in this base of computing. (In case anyone wondered.)
Indeed, I am not a believer in strong AI, nor in any other form of
reductionism...
-LV
LudovicoVan
> On Jun 7, 4:39 pm, LudovicoVan <ju...@diegidio.name> wrote:
> > On 7 Giu, 21:01, Charlie-Boo <shymath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > Remember that anything as pure and fundamental as thought must have a
> > > simple definition.
>
> > > Can you see why?
>
> > I can't.
>
> If a pure fundamental concept has a complex definition, assuming that
> your system of definitions is well-designed in that the primitives
> used to define things can be combined in a variety of orders and
> numbers (how many primitives are used in the definition and how they
> are combined), then definitions using a subset/smaller number of
> primitives than the complex one would define smaller concepts than the
> fundamental concept being defined, contradicting its being
> fundamental.
I don't think that follows: surely a smaller number of primitives
might entail longer definitions in general, yet the definiens is not
the definiendum (the means is *not* the message), and meaning is not
algorithmic... unless in reductionism. In practice: that the same
notion might be expressed by smaller or longer formulations (if at
all) does not entail that the extension of the notion itself (in the
realm of meaning) is any different.
-LV
mrdilligent
> Theory of Mind is a ‘theory’ insofar as the “mind” is not "directly
> observable.". The presumption that others have a mind is termed a
> "theory of mind" because each human can only prove the existence of
> his or her own mind through introspection, and one has no direct
> access to others' minds.
The word _theory_ comes from the Greek for Idea; i.e., not res, or of
matter.
Because of this, ANY idea is a theory: a guess is a theory, a knowing
is a theory, a dream is a theory, and so forth.
I can have a concept (i.e., a theory) in my mind that anything made of
matter contains the amount of energy in it that is the mass of that
matter multiplied by the square of the speed of light. Now which is
the theory here, the concept? the mind? something made of matter?
mass? the speed of light? or the speed of light multiplied by itself?
Obviously, all. I can plan to go to a grocery store and pick up a box
of spaghetti; that is a theory. Even when my body gets to the brick-
and-morter grocery store and my hand grasps a box of spaghetti off the
shelf, that is only IMPLEMENTING the theory. In other words,
EVERYTHING is a theory until it is implemented by and in matter, or
"realized" as we say.
Any idea is a product of mind. Maybe not a human mind, but some
mind. So how can the mind be a theory if it produces theories? And
grasps theories? How could anything exist without a mind of some
sort? How could (other) theories exist if there were no mind, if mind
was just a theory?
My dog has a mind; it shows (realizes) in its behavior that it wants
to eat. It has a THEORY. And it has a theory because it has a mind.
That is not theory.
All living organisms have a mind (matter does not), whether humans are
perceptive (mind) enough to know (theorize) it or not. But among us
humans, we would know NOTHING---and no theories---if we did not have
minds.
Immortalst's post is a barrel of crock.
Charlie-Boo
> On 8 Giu, 04:40, Charlie-Boo <shymath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Thinking takes memory and determines the original sensory input
> > that created it and runs it again.
>
> IMO, that (at best) seems a descriptive approach, quite short of any
> definition or "explanation".
No, it doesn't just state what is. It is algorithmic and states how.
Charlie-Boo
> On 8 Giu, 05:00, Charlie-Boo <shymath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Jun 7, 4:39 pm, LudovicoVan <ju...@diegidio.name> wrote:
> > > On 7 Giu, 21:01, Charlie-Boo <shymath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > Remember that anything as pure and fundamental as thought must have a
> > > > simple definition.
>
> > > > Can you see why?
>
> > > I can't.
>
> > If a pure fundamental concept has a complex definition, assuming that
> > your system of definitions is well-designed in that the primitives
> > used to define things can be combined in a variety of orders and
> > numbers (how many primitives are used in the definition and how they
> > are combined), then definitions using a subset/smaller number of
> > primitives than the complex one would define smaller concepts than the
> > fundamental concept being defined, contradicting its being
> > fundamental.
>
> I don't think that follows: surely a smaller number of primitives
> might entail longer definitions in general,
It is not the number of primitives available in the system of
defining, but rather which are used - moreover how they are used - in
the definition of the fundamental concept. If you say that thought is
A and B and C then I ask what would A and B define? A and C? And we
find something more primitive than the given primitive.
> yet the definiens is not
> the definiendum (the means is *not* the message), and meaning is not
> algorithmic... unless in reductionism. In practice: that the same
> notion might be expressed by smaller or longer formulations (if at
> all) does not entail that the extension of the notion itself (in the
> realm of meaning) is any different.
>
> -LV- Hide quoted text -
Michael Gordge
> Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states - beliefs,
About what?
> intents,
About what?
> desires,
Of what?
> pretending,
What?
> knowledge,
Of what?
> etc. -
Notice how your dopey theory idea means absolutely nothing unless and
until there is something in reality (i.e. independent of the mind) to
theorize about?
MG
Charlie-Boo
> On Jun 7, 2:41 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states - beliefs,
>
> About what?
>
> > intents,
>
> About what?
>
> > desires,
>
> Of what?
>
> > pretending,
>
> What?
>
> > knowledge,
>
> Of what?
>
> > etc. -
You just proved that all English statements are deficient.
LudovicoVan
> On Jun 8, 8:05 am, LudovicoVan <ju...@diegidio.name> wrote:
> > On 8 Giu, 05:00, Charlie-Boo <shymath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Jun 7, 4:39 pm, LudovicoVan <ju...@diegidio.name> wrote:
> > > > On 7 Giu, 21:01, Charlie-Boo <shymath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > Remember that anything as pure and fundamental as thought must have a
> > > > > simple definition.
>
> > > > > Can you see why?
>
> > > > I can't.
>
> > > If a pure fundamental concept has a complex definition, assuming that
> > > your system of definitions is well-designed in that the primitives
> > > used to define things can be combined in a variety of orders and
> > > numbers (how many primitives are used in the definition and how they
> > > are combined), then definitions using a subset/smaller number of
> > > primitives than the complex one would define smaller concepts than the
> > > fundamental concept being defined, contradicting its being
> > > fundamental.
>
> > I don't think that follows: surely a smaller number of primitives
> > might entail longer definitions in general,
>
> It is not the number of primitives available in the system of
> defining, but rather which are used - moreover how they are used - in
> the definition of the fundamental concept. If you say that thought is
> A and B and C then I ask what would A and B define? A and C? And we
> find something more primitive than the given primitive.
Not necessarily.
"There is no reason to suppose that the emerging principles will be
straightforward, simple, and easy to exploit. Evolution has been
working on language for a long time, possibly adding patch on top of
hack, just as programmers do when in a hurry to make something work.
Occam's razor may not apply." (P.H. Winston, "Artificial
Intelligence", Addison-Wesley)
Actually, I wouldn't invoke evolution. Complex systems are just not of
the same nature as classical ones.
-LV
LudovicoVan
> On Jun 8, 8:04 am, LudovicoVan <ju...@diegidio.name> wrote:
> > On 8 Giu, 04:40, Charlie-Boo <shymath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > Thinking takes memory and determines the original sensory input
> > > that created it and runs it again.
>
> > IMO, that (at best) seems a descriptive approach, quite short of any
> > definition or "explanation".
>
> No, it doesn't just state what is. It is algorithmic and states how.
Yet, and even if you had given a complete specification, you have not
told "how" our "mind" goes from "running a tape" to "thinking".
-LV
LudovicoVan
> On Jun 9, 3:41 am, Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
> > On Jun 7, 2:41 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states - beliefs,
>
> > About what?
>
> > > intents,
>
> > About what?
>
> > > desires,
>
> > Of what?
>
> > > pretending,
>
> > What?
>
> > > knowledge,
>
> > Of what?
>
> > > etc. -
>
> You just proved that all English statements are deficient.
Deficient might be their usage. In fact, I think this idea that
natural language is "deficient" is quite a deficient idea itself.
There is indeed some "magic" in our linguistic competence, but even
semiotics has made a clear distinction between sign and symbol. In any
direct comparison, the inadequacy is on the side of formalisations and
-again- the implied reductionism.
-LV
Errol
I have an existential map. it says Storyland all over it.
The index on storyland says "where quales and hubris exist."
Charlie-Boo
It is defined with a subset of the primitives of the given fundamental
subset. It necessarily utilizes less concepts in its definition.
How would you define "more primitive" in a way that is not satisfied
by something that uses a subset of the concepts of that which it is
said to be more primitive than?
Therefore your original concept is not so primitive after all.
> "There is no reason to suppose that the emerging principles
What does this have to do with emerging principles?
> will be
> straightforward, simple, and easy to exploit. Evolution has been
> working on language for a long time, possibly adding patch on top of
> hack, just as programmers do when in a hurry to make something work.
> Occam's razor may not apply." (P.H. Winston, "Artificial
> Intelligence", Addison-Wesley)
>
> Actually, I wouldn't invoke evolution. Complex systems are just not of
> the same nature as classical ones.
What is wrong with my argument? Show me a complex definition and I
will show you more primitive concepts than the one being defined. If
I am wrong then provide the complex definition and I will show you.
C-B
> -LV
>
>
>
> > > yet the definiens is not
> > > the definiendum (the means is *not* the message), and meaning is not
> > > algorithmic... unless in reductionism. In practice: that the same
> > > notion might be expressed by smaller or longer formulations (if at
> > > all) does not entail that the extension of the notion itself (in the
> > > realm of meaning) is any different.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
LudovicoVan
Your definition of "more primitive" is quite conventional: it's your
"therefore" that is unwarranted. There are systems where a reduction
to few basic principles is just not possible: see "complex systems".
> > "There is no reason to suppose that the emerging principles
>
> What does this have to do with emerging principles?
The quote was to give an example. Language is an example of a complex
system. As to the relevance of emerging principles or properties,
there is a taxonomy of complexity and of complex systems where that
notion is relevant: Wikipedia provides an overview.
> > will be
> > straightforward, simple, and easy to exploit. Evolution has been
> > working on language for a long time, possibly adding patch on top of
> > hack, just as programmers do when in a hurry to make something work.
> > Occam's razor may not apply." (P.H. Winston, "Artificial
> > Intelligence", Addison-Wesley)
>
> > Actually, I wouldn't invoke evolution. Complex systems are just not of
> > the same nature as classical ones.
>
> What is wrong with my argument?
Your argument is, strictly speaking, a fallacy. Not only because, as
said, there are systems where reduction to few basic principles is
just not possible (complex systems); also because, implicitly, you
assume that there is a bottom to this regression to basic principles,
which is never the case (knowledge is encyclopedic in nature). Indeed,
reductionism is an ideology more than a methodology, and much more
could be said on the socio-cultural sides of the underlying debate.
> Show me a complex definition and I
> will show you more primitive concepts than the one being defined. If
> I am wrong then provide the complex definition and I will show you.
There is no simple definition of a complex system other than its name:
say, Language. There is no complex definition of Language other than
the whole debate on Language across the times. Could you "reduce" the
definition of Language?
-LV
George Dance
> Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states - beliefs,
> and to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions
> that are different from one's own.
>
> observable.". The presumption that others have a mind is termed a
> "theory of mind" because each human can only prove the existence of
> his or her own mind through introspection, and one has no direct
> access to others' minds.
I agree that with the point about other minds, but I have to take
issue with the idea it's merely a theory, for anyone, that he or she
has a mind. Sure, we know about our minds only by introspection, but
introspection is experience as much as observation, and far more
reliable: If you think you see a red light, for example, there may be
only a small chance that there's no red light there; but there's a far
smaller chance that you're not seeing one. In fact, some introspective
ideas have a truth-probability of 1 -- Descartes' famous "I think,"
for example -- which is something no amount of observation can be
claimed to yield.
Admittedly, an introspection can't be intersubjectively tested as one
observation can; but anyone can test a claim of an introspection for
himself on his own mind -- while that proves only that he knows he has
a mind, and I know I have a mind, we can verbally compare results,
which provides way more evidence for the 'analogy' argument that
others have minds, BTW.
I'm agnostic on a lot of things, but I certainly believe I have a
mind; the evidence is overwhelming.
kap208
> All living organisms have a mind (matter does not), whether humans are
> perceptive (mind) enough to know (theorize) it or not. But among us
> humans, we would know NOTHING---and no theories---if we did not have
> minds.
If you take the traditional mind/body problem seriously, theorizing (or
believing, intending, desiring, etc.) might conceivably not require a
mind, but only a brain (or a CPU, if you want to entertain the
possibility of thinking machines).
(i) You might find the concept of mind problematic because it seems to
need more explaining than it explains (a common assessment of
Descartes's dualism).
(ii) So, you might agree that minds really exist but hold, on
theoretical grounds, that they are really nothing but brains (and it is
brain concepts that have the sought-after explanatory power).
(iii) Or, you might insist that minds don't exist after all, only brains
(cf. rather than saying unicorns are just narwhals seen under distorting
atmospheric conditions, which implies that they exist but were
misunderstood as to their true nature, you might instead that unicorns
don't exist period. Also cf: latent heat got reconceived as mean kinetic
energy whereas talk of phlogiston got dropped altogether).
(iv) You might agree that there is no actual entity such as a mind but
that it is still a useful construct, not a mere fiction but rooted in
actual features of the world, e.g. perhaps in the way that centres of
gravity are useful constructs.
So while there surely must be organisms (or possibly machines) that are
theorizers in order for there to be theories, and while there must be
something theorizers have that make them capable of theorizing, it
doesn't follow that what they have must be a mind.
Cheers,
K
Woody
"kap208" <karl.p...@usask.ca> wrote in message
news:4A3FAD36...@usask.ca...
I had a hilarious conversation with a sophomore math student at Cal Tech.
When I asked her what a mind was she said "neurons firing." When I asked her
what she experienced when she saw the colour red, she said "my neurons
firing." So I asked her if she was consciously aware of her neurons firing,
and she said the conversation had become tiresome and she wanted to change
the subject.
This is a common problem I've found with people who specialize in the
sciences and study them at an advanced level. Their grasp on non-scientific
issues, including philosophical ones, tends to be crude and unconsidered.
Also, because they've been dog-trained from childhood to regard the sciences
as superior and look down their noses at the other disciplines, they tend to
be snotty and condescending towards philosophy students. I find trying to do
philosophy with them frustrating because scientific rigor is so different
from philosophical rigor, and, besides a vague acquaintance with formal
logic, they have no training in systematically using their heads.
Anyway: To say that the mind doesn't exist at all is a problematic
contention. Most serious and credible physicalists agree that we do have a
mind, but have their own theories as to what the mind is. Quite a few are
epiphenomenalistrs and can argue their position in a philosophically
respectable way. They are troubled by the existence of qualia and make
serious attempts to explain how qualia can exist and what they are.
Woody
--
NOTE TO NEWSGROUP USERS: My reply-to email address is valid. For a safe
valid reply-to address of your own go to www.hushmail.com
dorayme
"Woody" <durw...@hushmail.com> wrote:
> I find trying to do
> philosophy with them frustrating because scientific rigor is so different
> from philosophical rigor, and, besides a vague acquaintance with formal
> logic, they have no training in systematically using their heads.
It is frustrating trying to do philosophy with philosophers, many never
seem to have any systematic training in using their heads. Be careful
before looking down your own long nose at scientists until you are
perhaps a more accomplished philosopher. And then you will not be
wanting to do this!
--
dorayme
john joseph
> [... snip tiring verbosity...]
> [... snip previously stated, and the obvious...]
and nothing is left.
Next?
Errol
> "kap208" <karl.pfei...@usask.ca> wrote in message
No! They are troubled by the hypothetical existance of qualia.
Could one supporter of the existance of qualia, please tell me where
they exist; in the brain, or in some kind of common, external akashic
memory, or in a separate (from brain)construct they call mind?
If they are in the brain, then they are nothing but convenient labels
for brain processes.
If they are not, please explain.
mrdilligent
Date: Mon, Jun 22 2009 9:11 am
From: kap208
mrdilligent wrote:
> All living organisms have a mind (matter does not), whether humans are
> perceptive (mind) enough to know (theorize) it or not. But among us
> humans, we would know NOTHING---and no theories---if we did not have
> minds.
<<If you take the traditional mind/body problem seriously, theorizing
(or
believing, intending, desiring, etc.) might conceivably not require a
mind, . . .>>
My point was, how can mind be only a theory if there is no mind to
create and to grasp a theory???
Probably too subtle for you.
<<but only a brain (or a CPU, if you want to entertain the
possibility of thinking machines).>>
Machines do not think. They have no cognition, which is what enables
mind to think. Does your household circuit board KNOW when the
livingroom light is on or off? Does the lamp at the end of the
circuit?
Does your water Main KNOW when it is turned on or off, thus
controlling the taps upstairs? Do the taps know when their handles
have been turned? Does a river or other stream KNOW when its pathway
has been blocked by a dam?
Computers are just this simple at base. They use tiny integrated
circuits, and can pass massive numbers of electrons (or photons) very
very quickly through or around a lot of "dams," but that is the only
difference between them and the above examples. It is MAN, with his
mind, that does all the thinking---to design the hardware, to write
the software (which is just matter, too), and to interpret the
outputted results.
Granted, a brain qua brain is just a computer, except that it is
composed of living cells who function as a kind of "bucket brigade."
In a human bucket brigade passing buckets of water to squash a fire,
the humans have minds, the brigade does not; it is just a machine made
of living humans. Ditto for the cells of any multicellular organism;
the cells are living organisms too, and have minds---cognition.
Trouble is, the world that cells have to think about is the microcosm,
involving only atoms, molecules, and other microbes, not the mesocosm
most mammals deal with. So while a cell knows heat, it does not know
fire; it knows wet and dry, but not lakes and deserts; and so on.
There is no such thing as a "smart neuron" that can recognize a human
face.
<<(i) You might find the concept of mind problematic because it seems
to
need more explaining than it explains (a common assessment of
Descartes's dualism).>>
I do not find the concept of mind in the least problematic. I DO find
COMMUNICATING the concept of mind problematic, however, because as
Woody says, so many contemporary people have been "dog-trained since
childhood." It was not always thus; prior to 1960, there were more
minded people to accepted the concept of mind than there were not---
especially during the days of Renee DesCartes---because there was
(relatively) less cultural conditioning.
Have you ever actually READ DesCartes? Or are you just spouting what
you heard or read ABOUT "Cartesian Dualism"? I think if you actually
read---and understood---some of DesCartes' contributions to
philosophy, you would see for yourself the fundamental vapidness that
undergirds the verbal sophistry of "anti-dualists."
<<(ii) So, you might agree that minds really exist but hold, on
theoretical grounds, that they are really nothing but brains (and it
is
brain concepts that have the sought-after explanatory power).>>
Agree?? With whom? I KNOW minds actually exist, because I have
studied them. My mind has studied other minds. Can you say the same?
Have you ever studied your own mind?
Only minds have explanatory power; brains do not. But brains can
implement this explanatory power; mind alone cannot (in this world, at
least).
<<(iii) Or, you might insist that minds don't exist after all, only
brains
(cf. rather than saying unicorns are just narwhals seen under
distorting
atmospheric conditions, which implies that they exist but were
misunderstood as to their true nature, you might instead that
unicorns
don't exist period. Also cf: latent heat got reconceived as mean
kinetic
energy whereas talk of phlogiston got dropped altogether).
(iv) You might agree that there is no actual entity such as a mind
but
that it is still a useful construct, not a mere fiction but rooted in
actual features of the world, e.g. perhaps in the way that centres of
gravity are useful constructs.>>
Here you are merely data-processing out loud. There is no THOUGHT
here. Just data to be processed.
<<So while there surely must be organisms (or possibly machines) that
are
theorizers in order for there to be theories, and while there must be
something theorizers have that make them capable of theorizing, it
doesn't follow that what they have must be a mind.>>
Sounds to me like you have no idea what a theory is. That's about par
for the contemporary course.
mrdilligent
Date: Mon, Jun 22 2009 4:29 pm
From: "Woody"
"kap208" <karl.p...@usask.ca> wrote in message
news:4A3FAD36...@usask.ca...
> mrdilligent wrote:
>
>> All living organisms have a mind (matter does not), whether humans are
>> perceptive (mind) enough to know (theorize) it or not. But among us
>> humans, we would know NOTHING---and no theories---if we did not have
>> minds.
[snip].
I sympathize,Woody; that has been my experience too. But it has also
been my experience often with those who would be "philosophers."
People who never learned to think, but only to memorize in the name of
"learning," always duck out when the thinking surpasses their level of
ability.
Talking philosophy has always been my "thing," but one cannot
understand true philosophy without also understanding true science,
and, for that matter, true religion (not the so-called "religion" of
superstitions and blind ideologies). When you get down to the
fundamentals---or up to the top of understanding (depending on what
spatial analogies one wants to use)---they are all one and the same
endeavor, IMO: to seek, perhaps to find, the answers to the "eternal
questions" of Who are we? Where did we come from? How did we get
here? and so forth.
So-called "scientists" and "philosophers" (actually, sophists) come up
with superstitions (ideas that are not cosmoterrestrial fact, but only
cultural fads) and vain ideologies every bit as much as do the so-
called "religious." None of such people---the bulk during the course
of civilization---ever developed their natural minds. As you say,
they have been "dog-trained since chidhood."
mrdilligent
Date: Mon, Jun 22 2009 4:44 pm
From: dorayme
Just what do you each mean by "systematic"???
Good thinkers are always systematic in their mental work. Doesn't
matter what, if any, "field."
kap208
> Anyway: To say that the mind doesn't exist at all is a problematic
> contention.
I myself agree.
Most serious and credible physicalists agree that we do have a
> mind,
Almost certainly true. But not that subspecies known as eliminativists,
of which Paul & Patricia Churchland are the prime examples. Moreover,
although both philosophers, they have also published in Scientific
American and other scientific venues.
Karl
mrdilligent
> If they are not, please explain.- Hide quoted text -
Ok, could one supporter of the existence of principles please tell me
where they exist; in the brain, or in some kind of common, esternal
akashic memory, or in a separate (from brain) construct they call
mind?
Who HAS seen a principle? Say, the principle of thermodynamics?
Where can I find such a thing (res)? Surely not in any brain.
kap208
> == 1 of 4 ==
> Date: Mon, Jun 22 2009 9:11 am
> From: kap208
>
> mrdilligent wrote:
>
>
>>All living organisms have a mind (matter does not), whether humans are
>>perceptive (mind) enough to know (theorize) it or not. But among us
>>humans, we would know NOTHING---and no theories---if we did not have
>>minds.
>
>
> <<If you take the traditional mind/body problem seriously, theorizing
> (or
> believing, intending, desiring, etc.) might conceivably not require a
> mind, . . .>>
>
> My point was, how can mind be only a theory if there is no mind to
> create and to grasp a theory???
>
> Probably too subtle for you.
> Sounds to me like you have no idea what a theory is. That's about par
> for the contemporary course.
Well, I do know that a mind can't "be only a theory" because a mind per
se can't be a theory -- that would be a category mistake. A mind could
be a theoretical entity though. Even if you assume _a priori_ that
higher primates like us have minds, it surely is an open question
whether much simpler organisms do, i.e. whether it is necessary to
postulate a mind as mediating between environmental inputs and
behavioral outputs or whether a simple physiological mechanism will suffice.
You're assuming I am defending the theoretical options I outlined, which
I'm not. But I don't just reject them out of hand either.
I have a brain and maybe in some sense I have a mind. I am probably some
sort of dualist, but if so, sort of a property-dualist -- definitely not
a substance dualist. (I prefer the notion of a _self_ to that of a
mind.) But OK, I'll agree, for the nonce, that I have a mind. But
neither my mind nor my brain grasps theorizes, creates, etc: _I_ do, and
having a brain or a mind is what enables me to do it.
> Have you ever actually READ DesCartes? Or are you just spouting what
> you heard or read ABOUT "Cartesian Dualism"? I think if you actually
> read---and understood---some of DesCartes' contributions to
> philosophy, you would see for yourself the fundamental vapidness that
> undergirds the verbal sophistry of "anti-dualists."
I have read enough to know that he was a substance dualist, which was
regarded as problematic for mind-body interaction even in his day (which
is why Leibniz and Malebranche concocted their bizarre theistic variants
of dualism) and the problem of interaction remains unsolved for
Cartesian dualists.
K
Michael Gordge
> Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states - beliefs,
> intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc.
So what's the theory of mental states, beliefs, intents, desires,
petending, knowledge, etc.?
MG
Michael Gordge
> You just proved that all English statements are deficient.
Unless and until the origin of the statement was triggered by at very
least an attempt to identify an entity of existence (matter and or its
nature).
e.g. "god exists" as a deficient statement about reality, but does
exist as an utterly useless mind dependent non-sense a crutch for the
desperate, just like socialism.
MG
Michael Gordge
>
> - Show quoted text -
Thats right, if language is deficient, then that is a deficient
statement about language, therefore ignore it as arbitrary Kantian
mind dependent garbage.
MG
Zinnic
Gordgeous, when are you going to stop repeating your infantile truism
that something must exist before it can be theorized on (in plain
language -- thought about). You are like a deaf athlete crouched in
the starting block waiting for the gun to go off whilst other
athletes are already way down the track.
Zinnic
Michael Gordge
> Mr Gordge, when are you going to stop repeating your infantile truism
> that something must exist before it can be theorized on (in plain
> language -- thought about).
Never, too many people here, including yourself, are confused over the
meaning of exist. e.g. many people, including those who call
themselves athiests, will say "god doesn't exist", which is in fact an
oxymoron, its self contradicting.
To exist means to have identity, and the theory deals with "how" it
exists and giving what exists its very own identity. e.g. does it
exist as mind dependent (god and the leftist retard's nasal whining
nauseating chant the greater good) or matter dependent (the smallest
being an atom), and the Kantians of course do not recognize there's a
difference between mind and matter, hence their garbage about trees
not making a noise bla bla bla and your bloody garbage about there's
no color without eyes etc etc.
And then man must explain, in the identity, how does it differs from
any and all other concepts or matter, how do you know etc, giving each
and every entity (including ideas, your ideas do exist) its very own
unique identity and recognizing that the nature of an entity is
included in its identity, which is another aspect of the law of
identity which you silly Kantians are required to ignore or reject.
MG
Zinnic
> On Jun 24, 7:17 am, Zinnic <zeenr...@gate.net> wrote:
>
> > Mr Gordge, when are you going to stop repeating your infantile truism
> > that something must exist before it can be theorized on (in plain
> > language -- thought about).
>
> Never, too many people here, including yourself, are confused over the
> meaning of exist. e.g. many people, including those who call
> themselves athiests, will say "god doesn't exist", which is in fact an
> oxymoron, its self contradicting.
Picky, picky. It is an oxymoron if 'God' refer to the concept of God
which, of course, does exist in people's minds. I doubt if you would
be as pedantic over claims that Santa Claus and a host of other
mythic entities do not exist.
> To exist means to have identity, and the theory deals with "how" it
> exists and giving what exists its very own identity. e.g. does it
> exist as mind dependent (god and the leftist retard's nasal whining
> nauseating chant the greater good) or matter dependent (the smallest
> being an atom), and the Kantians of course do not recognize there's a
> difference between mind and matter, hence their garbage about trees
> not making a noise bla bla bla and your bloody garbage about there's
> no color without eyes etc etc.
It is inarguable that there is no experience of color in the absence
of receptive eyes. My claim is that color is an experience. Hence,
it is entirely dependent on brain function. I welcome your proof
that I am in error.
> And then man must explain, in the identity, how does it differs from
> any and all other concepts or matter, how do you know etc, giving each
> and every entity (including ideas, your ideas do exist) its very own
> unique identity and recognizing that the nature of an entity is
> included in its identity, which is another aspect of the law of
> identity which you silly Kantians are required to ignore or reject.
>
All you are saying is that if there is a difference, there is more
than one entity whereas if there is no difference, there is only a
single entity.
Thus, if the mind is identical to the brain then it is a single
entity. If the mind is a function of the brain, then the mind and its
function two different entities. That is, the mind exists as a
functional entity. I accept the latter as just plain common sense.
So why not demonstrate your common sense by being a little more
agreeable? :-)
Zinnic.
Errol
> Where can I find such a thing (res)? Surely not in any brain.- Hide quoted text -
>
If not in the brain then please explain where they do exist.
Patricia Aldoraz
> == 3 of 4 ==
> Date: Mon, Jun 22 2009 4:44 pm
> From: dorayme
>
>
> "Woody" <durwoo...@hushmail.com> wrote:
> > I find trying to do
> > philosophy with them frustrating because scientific rigor is so different
> > from philosophical rigor, and, besides a vague acquaintance with formal
> > logic, they have no training in systematically using their heads.
>
> <<It is frustrating trying to do philosophy with philosophers, many
> never
> seem to have any systematic training in using their heads. Be careful
> before looking down your own long nose at scientists until you are
> perhaps a more accomplished philosopher. And then you will not be
> wanting to do this!>>
>
> Just what do you each mean by "systematic"???
>
> Good thinkers are always systematic in their mental work. Doesn't
> matter what, if any, "field."
Perhaps dorayme means the same as what you would mean. He is objecting
here to someone else "looking down their nose" - as he so aptly and
colourfully puts it - at scientists, whose special skills are not in
philosophy. I think his point is that many would be philosophers
themselves, and possibly the person lamenting about scientists
himself, are extremely sloppy and unsystematic.
Michael Gordge
> It is inarguable that there is no experience of color in the absence
> of receptive eyes.
Oh for fucks sake, how pathetic, get lost ewe context dropping idiot.
MG
mrdilligent
Date: Tues, Jun 23 2009 1:03 pm
From: kap208
<<Well, I do know that a mind can't "be only a theory" because a mind
per
se can't be a theory -- that would be a category mistake. A mind
could
be a theoretical entity though. >>
EVERYTHING a human knows, thinks, perceives, infers, believes, etc.
etc. is a "theooretical entity." Even unicorns. Which just goes to
show that a theoretical entity does not have to exist; it can be a
phantom or fiction. But most "theoortical entities" do actually
exist---that is what makes up the human world. The point here is that
we can't stuff into our minds (or our brains, for that matter) any
material entity or thing.
So a "theoretical entity"is an idea, and any idea is an abstraction;
it is "invisible" (undetectable via the material senses). We live
virtually 100 % of our lives with "theooretical entities," the
exceptions being such as taking in nourishment, as one in a coma or
brain-dead. This is because we have minds. Minds require the
"invisible." Brains require the senses, but even brains "abstract"
what the senses detect and convert it into material code, code which
SYMBOLIZES, or represents, the thing sensed. The mind accesses the
material (neural) code and turns it into a "theooretical entity," a
perception. A perception is an idea.
What Immortalist should have been talking about, btw, is the
PHILOSOPHY of mind, not the theory of mind. But more on that,
perhaps, another time.
<<Even if you assume _a priori_ that
higher primates like us have minds, it surely is an open question
whether much simpler organisms do, i.e. whether it is necessary to
postulate a mind as mediating between environmental inputs and
behavioral outputs or whether a simple physiological mechanism will
suffice.>>
Anyone who STUDIES anything does not assume a priori. What is truly
studied comprises at least a part of one's EXPERIENCE. Of course, I
do not mean "study books"; whatever is memorized from books is,
indeed, a priori, no matter who wrote the written work. Any
speculation not based on experience is also a priori. Any speculation
that is based on experience is at least partially a posteriori.
Vocationally, I have studied human minds (including my own), but
avocationally, I have studed the minds of the "simpler organisms."
Almost any veterinarian, animal behaviorist, etc., today will
acknowledge that such "simpler organisms" as dogs, cats, horses,
pigs, . . . have minds---have cognition; they perceive, think, infer,
and know. The CONTENT of their minds differs greatly from the content
of human minds, but there is an overlap of many things and ideas.
What few people do know, because they don't bother to---too full of a
priori assumptions---is that insects also have minds, as do plants.
Purely avocationally and from first-hand experience, I have studied
apines and flies---too long to elucidate, but I assure you, these
insects do have minds. Their observable behavior proves it just as
much as observable human behavior proves the existence of human
minds. Thing is, these insects do not have much in the way of a
brain. Bees, for example, think with what we call "emotions"---
hormones. They can "read" human emotions, such as fear. When a human
is frightened of a bee or hornet, the bee or hornet will attack; why?
because it assumes there is something to be frightened OF, and takes
defensive mode (stings).
This will suffice as a VERY simple example, because you have heard
info that supports this; everyone has.
What few people today do know is that in the 1960s and '70s,
experiments on plants were conducted which showed that plants "emote"
to circumstances. No one hears about these anymore, I guess.
Electrodes were attached to plants and the plants "friends" and
"relatives" were masacred. The electrical output from the
experimental plants was "wild," illustrating strong "emotional"
reaction. First-hand experience with raspberry plants has
demonstrated to me that they LEARN not to send root shoots into open
land that is regularly mowed. Anything that truly learns (not talking
about such as "memory foam") has a mind.
<<You're assuming I am defending the theoretical options I outlined,
which
I'm not. But I don't just reject them out of hand either.>>
Heh heh; I kinda thought you were "thinking out loud."
<<I have a brain and maybe in some sense I have a mind. I am probably
some
sort of dualist, but if so, sort of a property-dualist -- definitely
not
a substance dualist.>>
Maybe you can explain to me, then, just what "dualism" is. I have
read philosophical treateses on it till I'm blue in the face, and
thought I understood until I began to come across all these anti-
dualist arguments. Are dual carburators a "dualism"? Are identical
twins? Are a married couple? Is matter/anti-matter a "dualism"? Is
polarity? Etc. etc.
In my day and only philosophically, there were two kinds of dualism:
Good and evil, and mind-body/matter-nonmatter. The former got me
athinking; dark is just the absence of light (emf); cold is just the
absence of heat (mass-energy); ergo, evil is just the absence of good
(and mental illness is just the absence of mental health). Things
like that. But that was before black holes, and surely before "dark
energy" and "dark matter."
So, do light (emf) matter and "dark matter" constitute a dualism?
<<(I prefer the notion of a _self_ to that of a
mind.)>>
Oh, _mind_ is a terrible word! But it's all we got. _Self_ won't do
for more reasons than I can here list; I prefer _cognition_, even
though this word is terribly abused these days.
<< But OK, I'll agree, for the nonce, that I have a mind. But
neither my mind nor my brain grasps theorizes, creates, etc: _I_ do,
and
having a brain or a mind is what enables me to do it.>>
Good start on real thinking! Yes, brains DO enable their owners to do
what they volutionally do; also what they don't volitionally do. The
mediator is the mind, which must LEARN to do some things and NOT to do
other things. This is part of cognitive development. Without
cognition (do not confuse with consciousness), the brain will run both
body and mind. Many people today are ideationally run by their
brians---like computers---and not by their minds. But they are still
selves, no?
. . .
<<I have read enough to know that he was a substance dualist, which
was
regarded as problematic for mind-body interaction even in his day
(which
is why Leibniz and Malebranche concocted their bizarre theistic
variants
of dualism) and the problem of interaction remains unsolved for
Cartesian dualists.>>
Most of the academic Western philosophers since ancient Greek days
have been a priori speculators, on the ideas written by others, not on
their own experience. ALL of them lacked the knowledge of the
cosmoterrestrial realm that we today have (even if we don't use it
wisely). And virtually all had a powerful mental set of religion,
whether they were "believers" or not. Therefore, the writings they
left behind must be read and understoood with these considerations in
mind. Still, some of them said some amazing things that we should pay
attention to.
By "substance dualism" you mean the physical-metaphysical one, right?
Well, think about that. Most anti-dualists seem to place the
metaphysical (those "invisibles," such as the mind) SIDE BY SIDE. But
the metaphysical doesn't occupy space! Matter does. The metaphysical
is not spatialy IN space, nor is it spatially OUT of space. Nor is it
temporally IN time, or temporally OUT of time; It is, er, "everywhere"
at the same "time." Thus they cannot be side by side.
They can coexist in the universe, though. If nothing else does,
surely black holes and dark energy/matter tell us that much. But we
don't really need these physics' data; take democracy; is it a THING?
Matter? No. Yet it exists, and "everywhere" at the same "time." It
does not MANIFEST everywhere at the same time, but it does exist. We
can only select examples of its (at least partial) manifestation, but
that doesn't mean it doesn't exist where it isn't manifested. Since
the word itself means "rule by the people," or self-rule by a social
population of humans, democracy miight be argued not to have existed
before humans came along, but at least since there were families of
hominims, democracy has existed---and probably was manifested in human
tribes from paleolithic to neolithic times. Democracy is an idea in
the old Indo-European sense; it is an "invisible."
You can go through any dictionary of English for words that label such
"invisibles." So why should we, today, have so much trouble from
epiphenominalism (an impressively big word for absolutely zilch)?
john joseph
> EVERYTHING a human knows, thinks, perceives, infers, believes, etc.
> etc. is a "theooretical entity."
Yah, but don't get all wrapped up in that while driving down the
freeway. IOW, our perceptions are close enough to keep us out of
disasters unless you ruminate instead of looking outward.
Wanna drag?
Zinnic
There! thereI, Gordgeous. Don't take on so.
I know you cannot help lashing out when you are challenged to
think.Your first thought would indeed wr be painful but if you
persevere you will get used to it. For some, thinking actually
becomes a pleasant experience but you should not set your hopes too
high. Take it step by step. Easy as she goes!I
One day you may learn that Baa, Baa Humbug! is not an appropriate
response.
Zinnic
mrdilligent
Date: Wed, Jun 24 2009 5:26 pm
From: john joseph
mrdilligent wrote:
Driving involves a lot of "theoretical entities." One has to KNOW how
to drive; must PERCEIVE the road and traffic; must INFER much from
what is in his vision what is outside of his peripheral vision; and so
forth.
Our perceptions are not all sensory; inference from what is sensed
must be perceived, too. This is nonsensory perception, the sort of
perception that grasps the "invisibles." (Unconsciously, at least.)
Also, there are TWO realms from which mind can (and must) perceive:
the empirical realm which you mention in "looking outward," and the
existential realm within from which, among other activities,
rumination derives. The balance between these two realms in mind
comprises cognitive homeostasis. Go off homeostasis, and you're in
Big Trouble.
The most salient (not necessarily cogent) example of this homeostatic
relationship between existential and empirical perception is, say,
hunger: IF one is in bodily need of nourishment, one perceives the
existential sense we call "hunger," and goes in empirical search of
food; if one is not in need of nourishment, this sense is inactive,
and so one cannot perceive a sense of hunger.
If one is a healthy-minded being, that is. With so much obesity and
anorexia around these days, there is clearly not much homeostasis
between the existential sense of "hunger" and the empirical senses of
seeing, smelling, tasting food among contemporary humans.
mrdilligent
> It is inarguable that there is no experience of color in the absence
> of receptive eyes.
Color is a perception, not a physical fact like emf. For that matter,
all experience is ideational in one way or another, including, of
course, sensory perception. "Receptive eyes" have nothing to do with
it except to be the viaduct of the physical stimulation that permits
the mind to perceive such as color.
Some 4 billion terrestrial years' experience with homeostasis has
honed all organisms living today with an exquisite balance between the
existential realm, which must be sustained, and the emprical realm
which contains the matter required for that sustenance, and the matter
that threatens existence. Hence, for humans, "color" closely matches
the emf for same, and all empirical objects closely match what is
perceived by way of the empirical senses. The individual differences
in what is perceived are called "qualia."
mrdilligent
Date: Wed, Jun 24 2009 2:54 am
From: Patricia Aldoraz
"Scientists" as members of the INSTITUTION we call "science"? Or
scientists as those who truly know and understand the facts of their
institutional, or noninstitutional, fields? There is a huge
difference, and failing to take notice of this is itself "sloppy and
unsystematic" thinking.
For my part, most contemporary scientists, and philosophers (and
airplane mechanics, etc., for that matter) are sloppy and unsystematic
thinkers. In my view, true thinking---which comes automatically to
natural cognition if developed---is stifled by the "Educational
Establishment" from an early age.
Any warmblood needs to be guided through its development of mind and
body to the adult stage, so that in this main stage of life, it can be
an autonomous being, responsible not only for its own well-being and
survival, but also for some of that in fellows (such as the young).
There is a natural process of development, but it is dependent on
certain empirical criteria---like, for the body, regular natural
nourishment, water, exercise, and so on. For natural cognitive
development it is, in a word, experience. The young warmblood is
guided, but not controlled, through experience by adults of the
species which have already undergone most of this experience, and thus
can help to mediate the experience for the young so that the latter
will come to understand its own experience and can thus deal with it
successfully. The adult cannot control the experience which comes to
the young, nor can it do its thinking for it. Rather, the adult must
stimulate the young's natural thinking ability as soon as it reaches
its baseline, and from then on to the threshold of adulthood.
Reading books and memorizing subjectmatter is not experience, and it
is counter-developmental. So is "protecting the stage of childhood
because it only comes once." The end result of such antinurture is
nonthinking adults whose heads have been overstuffed so that they
could not think if they knew how. They are, metaphorically, like
personal computers the memories and hard drives of which are so full
that no computing can be done. Such adults know NOTHING about
reality, and have no way of either thinking their way through it or
dealing appropriately with it. Their "knowledge" comes purely from
reading materials and oral verbiage of a similar sort from their
professional peers. THAT is called "science" today.
I "look down my nose at" those who can't or don't think, and/or at
those who assume that they do think because they have content in their
conscious minds. I do NOT disdain failure to know this or that,
because no one can know everything, and because knowledge is so easily
attained---IF one knows how to think.
mrdilligent
Date: Wed, Jun 24 2009 1:45 am
From: Errol
How about "in a separate (from brain) construct they call mind"?
Ideas don't exist in the brain. The brain contains only proteins,
neurotransmitters, and brain cells such as neurons. Partials of ideas
can have been encoded in the matter and stored as memories in the
brain, but the idea qua idea exists only in the mind. To ressurect an
idea from brain storage ("memory"), mind must retrieve it from brain,
decode it into the partial idea and then fill it out with what was not
encoded. (This all takes place beneath the threshhold of
consciousness, so we are not aware of this activity.)
John Stafford
78122ec3-0dfd-415e...@l5g2000vbp.googlegroups.com,
"mrdilligent" <oso...@aol.com> wrote:
> For my part, most contemporary scientists, and philosophers (and
> airplane mechanics, etc., for that matter) are sloppy and unsystematic
> thinkers. In my view, true thinking---which comes automatically to
> natural cognition if developed---is stifled by the "Educational
> Establishment" from an early age.
You might enjoy this:
http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/ken_robinson_says_schools_kill_creativity.
html
dorayme
<72c04b0d-be1c-4979...@p23g2000vbl.googlegroups.com>,
mrdilligent <oso...@aol.com> wrote:
> The individual differences
> in what is perceived are called "qualia."
Oh, really, is it that simple? And abstract? Qualia, my foot!
--
dorayme
dorayme
<78122ec3-0dfd-415e...@l5g2000vbp.googlegroups.com>,
mrdilligent <oso...@aol.com> wrote:
> "Scientists" as members of the INSTITUTION we call "science"? Or
> scientists as those who truly know and understand the facts of their
> institutional, or noninstitutional, fields? There is a huge
> difference, and failing to take notice of this is itself "sloppy and
> unsystematic" thinking.
A huge difference between what and what? WTF has this got to do with
someone looking down their noses at scientists because scientists are
not skilled in philosophy? Are you just showing off everything you know
whether it be relevant or not?
>
...
>
> I "look down my nose at" those who can't or don't think, and/or at
> those who assume that they do think because they have content in their
> conscious minds. I do NOT disdain failure to know this or that,
> because no one can know everything, and because knowledge is so easily
> attained---IF one knows how to think.
>
WTF has this got to do with you and who *you* look down *your* nose at?
You weren't the joker I was referring to. It was some other joker who
carried on about scientists' grasp of non-scientific issues, including
philosophical ones, tending to be crude and unconsidered. It was that
character who really wants folk to email him and poses as some kind of
wanting-to-learn guy and makes idiotic speeches about older people
needing to be wiped out and hero worships Obama.
The way you are going, you will get a free pass to Rec Room and andy-k's
basket weaving course! <g>
--
dorayme
Phil Roberts, Jr.
> == 2 of 6 ==
>
> Ideas don't exist in the brain. The brain contains only proteins,
> neurotransmitters, and brain cells such as neurons. Partials of ideas
> can have been encoded in the matter and stored as memories in the
> brain, but the idea qua idea exists only in the mind. To ressurect an
> idea from brain storage ("memory"), mind must retrieve it from brain,
> decode it into the partial idea and then fill it out with what was not
> encoded. (This all takes place beneath the threshhold of
> consciousness, so we are not aware of this activity.)
How about in a postulated non-observable causal substrate presumed
to give rise to our perception of a brain residing in four
co-ordinates of spacetime via one route and our apperception of
thoughts and feelings residing in a single co-ordinate of time
(presumably) via another route?
Errol
I don't disagree with what you are saying about the brain containing
only proteins, etc as well as how memory is retrieved and that much is
beneath the threshhold of consciousness, but I do disagree that mind
is a separate entity from brain. Mind (IMO) is a specialised function
of the brain that filters out distractions such as remembering to
breathe, commanding the muscles, and controlling bodily functions,
giving the impression that it is isolated. Specialised areas of the
brain create the impression that we are separate from the rest of the
universe and this aids the impression of isolation. I.O.W.s self is
an illusion, concocted by the brain for evolutionary advantage.
Are you saying that mind has capability extending beyond the brain?
I am interested in your ideas on this.
My POV doesn't necessary mean that we are insignificant 'meat'
zombies, as the fact of our existance is miraculous enough for me to
have a deep sense of awe and wonderment at the universe.
I just feel it is pointless to believe in what cannot be proven, ever.
John Stafford
doraymeRidThis-29A...@news.albasani.net, "dorayme"
<dorayme...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> I "look down my nose at" those who can't or don't think, and/or at
> those who assume that they do think because they have content in their
> conscious minds.
That reminds me of the time I was being prepared for surgery and talking to
the anesthetist. He learned that I work for a university and hit me up for a
conversation about consciousness. He was deeply into studies of such for
years. It was a cool experience until it was time to be wheeled into the
operatory because HE FORGOT to prep me. I went in fully awake and aware and
pretty scared.
So it goes both ways. :)
John Stafford
tMudnYKtqpBBDN7X...@earthlink.com, "Phil Roberts, Jr."
<phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
You might want to look back in this thread for just such a description, but
put in terms of mapped sensory impressions. The maps have an irregular
geometry and intersect. Consciousness was posited as another of our senses,
the sense of processing and maintaining the maps.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Thanks John.
Who posted it?
Also, my thesis is as much if not more an answer to the question
of where ideas "exist", and as such intended as an alternative
ontology to idealism and materialism (what I refer to as 'tongue-
in-cheek dualism) rather than a thesis about our differing
modes of sense perception.
Phil
John Stafford
Rs2dncKDub3tAd7X...@earthlink.com, "Phil Roberts, Jr."
<phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> John Stafford wrote:
>>
>> You might want to look back in this thread for just such a description, but
>> put in terms of mapped sensory impressions. The maps have an irregular
>> geometry and intersect. Consciousness was posited as another of our senses,
>> the sense of processing and maintaining the maps.
>>
>
> Thanks John.
>
> Who posted it?
Moi, but by your next statement it doesn't address your question.
>
> Also, my thesis is as much if not more an answer to the question
> of where ideas "exist", and as such intended as an alternative
> ontology to idealism and materialism (what I refer to as 'tongue-
> in-cheek dualism) rather than a thesis about our differing
> modes of sense perception.
Penrose and Hameroff suggested that consciousness is commingled with the
quantum realm. It's vaguely like a New Platonism.
Patricia Aldoraz
>
> <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> > I "look down my nose at" those who can't or don't think, and/or at
> > those who assume that they do think because they have content in their
> > conscious minds.
>
> That reminds me of the time I was being prepared for surgery and talking to
> the anesthetist. He learned that I work for a university and hit me up for a
> conversation about consciousness. He was deeply into studies of such for
> years. It was a cool experience until it was time to be wheeled into the
> operatory because HE FORGOT to prep me. I went in fully awake and aware and
> pretty scared.
>
> So it goes both ways. :)
Well, this would give you a right to look down your nose (when you had
finished suffering the indignities) at him for a failure *in his own
field* not in a failure in a field he has not studied.
(Maybe the anaesthetist thought you were andy-k and was thinking that
a dose of conscious operational experience might shake him out of his
basket-weaving complacency).
mrdilligent
Date: Thurs, Jun 25 2009 8:13 am
From: Errol
On Jun 25, 3:59 pm, mrdilligent <osop...@aol.com> wrote:
> > Who HAS seen a principle? Say, the principle of thermodynamics?
> > Where can I find such a thing (res)? Surely not in any brain.
Errol:
> <<If not in the brain then please explain where they do exist>>
Dilligent;
> How about "in a separate (from brain) construct they call mind"?
>
> Ideas don't exist in the brain. The brain contains only proteins,
> neurotransmitters, and brain cells such as neurons. Partials of ideas
> can have been encoded in the matter and stored as memories in the
> brain, but the idea qua idea exists only in the mind. To ressurect an
> idea from brain storage ("memory"), mind must retrieve it from brain,
> decode it into the partial idea and then fill it out with what was not
> encoded. (This all takes place beneath the threshhold of
> consciousness, so we are not aware of this activity.)
Errol:
<<I don't disagree with what you are saying about the brain containing
only proteins, etc as well as how memory is retrieved and that much is
beneath the threshhold of consciousness, but I do disagree that mind
is a separate entity from brain. Mind (IMO) is a specialised function
of the brain that filters out distractions such as remembering to
breathe, commanding the muscles, and controlling bodily functions,
giving the impression that it is isolated. Specialised areas of the
brain create the impression that we are separate from the rest of the
universe and this aids the impression of isolation. I.O.W.s self is
an illusion, concocted by the brain for evolutionary advantage.>>
Actually, as I think it is well understood, brain is a specialized
fuction of the BODY. And actually it is the brain that filters out
distractions (on orders from the mind). The brain also controls
breathing, neuromuscular activity, heart-pumping and blood pressure,
and all so-called "autonomic" bodily functions---but only on orders
from the mind. Back close to the 1960s, the autonomic nervous system
was thought to control these totally unconscious physiological
functions, but then the Maharishi came along and showed (by
implication from meditation, I suppose) that by "biofeedback"
measures, even this "autonomic" part of the nervous system could be
regulated by mind. By the conscious "peep-hole" section of mind.
Except that consciousness isn't doing it; the deeper reaches of the
mind is. Conscioous is needed to reach these deeper reaches in this
type of circumstance..
Of course, there are many people who need no biofeedback machine in
order to control these "autonomic" functions; in fact, people ARE
controlling them all the time---mostly for worse---by improper use of
their minds.
I am not aware of any "specialized areas of the brain [which] create
the impression that we are separate from the rest of the universe."
Could you please elucidate?
All quanta of matter are "separate," in space, from one another, but
organisms' bodies are composed of the same matter as throughout the
universe, so I would say that makes us not so separate. Further, when
some of these quanta are observed in special test circumstances, it
seems that a particle CAN exist in more than one space at one time,
and, if we could test for it, we might also observe that a particle
can exist in more than one time in one space. IOW, our collective
minds just may be composed of cosmic mind.
I think what hangs antidualists up is their implicit assumption that
the abstract must be like matter, and occupy space/time. Only MATTER
occupies space/time. The abstract---like mind, for example---is
neither spatially or temporallly IN space or time, nor spatially or
temporally OUT of space-time. Where, in space, for example, would one
find any principle? Even gravity is metaphysical (outside the
parameters of matter); no one has ever seen it. It is presumed to
occupy space, but it may be spatially as much outside of space as in
it. What we call "gravity" is one of those "invisibles," like mind,
that must be INFERRED to exist---from what can be sensed. Newton came
up with the idea of such an "invisiblle" owing to the apple, which his
eyes could see.
dorayme
<299981bb-6cc2-49ba...@s31g2000yqs.googlegroups.com>,
mrdilligent <oso...@aol.com> wrote:
> Actually, as I think it is well understood, brain is a specialized
> fuction of the BODY.
The brain is a part of the body, not a function of it. The brain has a
function, or many functions...
--
dorayme
walterimlenz
> In article
> <299981bb-6cc2-49ba-9bbe-d4fea1e88...@s31g2000yqs.googlegroups.com>,
>
> mrdilligent <osop...@aol.com> wrote:
> > Actually, as I think it is well understood, brain is a specialized
> > fuction of the BODY.
>
> The brain is a part of the body, not a function of it. The brain has a
> function, or many functions...
>
> --
> dorayme
But it would make sense to call the MIND a specialized function of the
body.
Walter Imlenz
dorayme
<3ba0641f-9da2-4b31...@j32g2000yqh.googlegroups.com>,
walterimlenz <goo...@mwelzel.de> wrote:
We don't go around calling "the mind" a "specialised function" of
anything. That is something philosophers might do. You can give anything
sense if you try a bit and make things clear. When you think what minds
do, you might hesitate to say it has "a specialised function".
I have expanded at greater length in the thread Robot Consciousness on
how the word "mind" has come through many hundreds if not thousands of
years, through periods of great scientific ignorance as well as periods
of exciting discoveries and better education in recent centuries and
especially decades. And that there are whole families of uses for it,
each family - of course - having threads of connections with other
families. It is no wonder that some families do not share too much in
common with some other families.
The upshot is that some uses are more central than other uses. To worry
ones head about uses that do not connect well to what is known of the
world is a dead end. For example, it is ridiculous and absurd - yes I am
fully aware of the distinction you are wanting to make here but methinks
you build the second out of the first because you have little else to go
on - to suppose, says you, and a mind is the sort of thing that can have
weight or can be sliced or perhaps even have a location. It does not
make sense, you plead, to say this. And you might even take an opinion
poll on the matter and use it as some sort of confirmation. But to no
avail to show that there is no sense in which it is perfectly sensible
to suppose these things.
--
dorayme
mrdilligent
Date: Sat, Jul 4 2009 6:32 pm
From: dorayme
In article
<299981bb-6cc2-49ba...@s31g2000yqs.googlegroups.com>,
mrdilligent <oso...@aol.com> wrote:
> Actually, as I think it is well understood, brain is a specialized
> fuction of the BODY.
<<The brain is a part of the body, not a function of it. The brain has
a
function, or many functions...>>
Yes, the brain is a part of the body, and yes, it is also a function
of the body, as in:
~A function of the body is to locomote (arms and legs)
~A function of the body is to detect what is outside of its skin (the
external senses)
~A function of the body is to codify and store, and retrieve, data
(one of the subfunctions of
the brain). . . .
and so forth. Note that arms and legs, e.g., are functions of the
body only when they are integrally connected to the living (mind-
active) body; otherwise, they are ONLY body parts. The same is true
of the brain.
Anyway, my response above was to Errol, who said that the MIND is a
"specialized" function of the brain. The context is entirely
different.
--