Philosophy of Common Sense
Immortalist
communis of the Aristotelean and Scholastic philosophy; (2) the sum of
original principles found in all normal minds; (3) the ability to
judge and reason in accordance with those principles (recta ratio,
good sense). It is the second of these meanings that is implied in the
philosophy of common sense -- a meaning well expressed by Fenelon when
he identifies common sense with "those general ideas or notions which
I can neither contradict nor examine, but according to which I examine
and decide on everything; so that I smile rather than answer whenever
anything is proposed to me that obviously runs counter to those
unchangeable ideas" (De l'existence de Dieu, p. XXII, c. ii). The
philosophy of common sense sometimes called Scottish philosophy from
the nationality of its exponents (though not all Scottish philosophers
were adherents of the Common Sense School), represents one phase of
the reaction against the idealism of Berkeley and Hume which in
Germany was represented by Kant. The doctrine of ideas, which Locke
had adopted from Descartes, had been made use of by Berkeley as the
foundation of his theory of pure idealism, which resolved the external
world into ideas, without external reality, but directly impressed on
the mind by Divine power. Hume, on the other hand, had contended that
there was no ground for assuming the existence of any mental substance
as the subjective recipient of impressions and ideas, all that we know
of mind being a succession of states produced by experience. Thus,
between the two, both subject and object disappeared, and philosophy
ended in mere scepticism.
Thomas Reid (1710-1796), whose dissent from Locke's doctrine of ideas
had been to some extent anticipated by Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746),
set out to vindicate the common sense, or natural judgement, of
mankind, by which the real existence of both subject and object is
held to be directly known (natural realism). He argued that if it
cannot be proved that there is any real external world or continuously
existing mind, the true conclusion is not that these have no existence
or are unknowable, but that our consciousness of them is an ultimate
fact, which neither needs nor is capable of proof, but is itself the
ground of all proof. "All knowledge and all science must be built upon
principles that are self-evident; and of such principles every man who
has common sense is a competent judge" (Works, ed. 1863, p. 422).
Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), who followed Reid's method without serious
modification, was more precise, and gave greater prominence than Reid
to his doctrine of "suggestion", or the association of ideas. Dr.
Thomas Brook (1778-1820), while accepting Reid's main principal,
carried the analysis of the phenomena of perception further than
either Reid or Stewart, resolving some of their first principles into
elements of experience, particularly in his treatment of the notion of
causality. Sir James Mackintosh (1765-1832) adopted the principles of
common sense, but accepted the utilitarian criterion of morality, held
by the school of Hartly, and applied the analytic method to the moral
faculty which Reid had taken to be "an original power in man". Sir
William Hamilton (1788-1856) illustrated the prin- ciple of common
sense with wider learning and greater philosophical acumen than any of
his predecessors. He was much influenced by Kant, and he introduced
into his system distinctions which the Common Sense School had not
recognized. While professing himself a natural realist, he held a
somewhat extreme doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. His comments
on Reid indicate many ambiguities and inaccuracies on the part of that
author. James Oswald (l727-1793) made use of Reid's principles in
support of religious belief, and James Beattie (1735-1803) in defence
of the existence of a moral faculty.
The common sense philosophy, adopting the Baconian method of
"interrogation", or analysis, rejects, as contrary to the universal
convictions of mankind, the notion of ideas as a tertium quid
intervening between the object perceived and the perceiving subject.
All knowledge comes by way of sensation; and the reality of the
external object is implied in sensation, together with the
metaphysical principle of the existence of bodily and mental
substance, of causality, and of design and intelligence in causation.
What sensation is in itself it is impossible to say; it is an ultimate
fact, and cannot be described or defined. But sensations are clearly
not images or ideas of the objects which cause them; there is no
resemblance between the pain of a wound and the point of a sword. Reid
and his successors insist on the distinction between primary and
secondary qualities, the former (extension, figure, hardness, etc.)
being "suggested" by sensations as essentially belonging to the object
perceived, and the latter (as colour, taste, smell, etc.) being no
more than sensations in the subject arising from qualities of the
object which are only accidental or contingent. Hamilton, however,
subdivides secondary qualities into secondary and secundo-primary, a
distinction now generally considered to be ill-founded. The mental
powers are divided into intellectual and active, a distinction
corresponding to the peripatetic classification of cognitive and
appetitive. All cognition has thus an intellectual element, and takes
place by way of suggestion, or association (a theory in which Reid was
anticipated by Hutcheson). In cognition the mind is partly active and
partly passive; the notion that it is a mere receptacle for ideas is
rejected. Consciousness is regarded by Reid as a separate faculty,
somewhat resembling the scholastic sensus communis; Brown and Hamilton
dissent from this view, holding "consciousness" to be merely a general
expression for the fundamental condition of all mental activity. The
idea of causality, which implies the universal necessity of causation,
cannot be educed from experience, since necessity (as opposed to mere
invariableness) cannot be known by experience; it is therefore an
original principle in the mind. In like manner, the will is known
immediately as free; its freedom is not susceptible of proof but is
intuitively recognized; and it is from the consciousness of will-power
in ourselves that we derive our notion of causation. Brown, however,
while accepting Reid's intuitional view of the idea of causality,
inclines towards Hume in his definition of causation as no more than
invariable sequence; he also differs from Reid in making will a
modification of desire or appetite. The belief in the uniformity of
nature, on which all scientific discovery is based, is held by Reid to
be an original principle in the mind. Conscience, or the moral sense,
is taken to be an original faculty by the Common Sense School in
general, with the exception of Mackintosh, who derives the so-called
faculty in great measure from the influence of social experience upon
the will.
The psychological analysis of this school is valuable; but its main
principle has been considerably weakened by contact with Kantian
criticism and the evolutionist doctrine, and with Hamilton lost much
of its polemical effectiveness. "The philosophy of Common Sense,
devised by Reid as a safeguard against Scepticism and Idealism, was so
transmuted by Hamilton as to lead back again to the conclusion that
nothing can be known, and consequently that nothing can be affirmed or
denied, beyond the fleeting phenomena of consciousness" (Laurie,
Scottish Philosophy, p. 291). In France, Royer-Collard (1763-1845)
introduced the principles of the Scottish School; Jouffroy (1796-1842)
translated the works of Reid; and Cousin (1792-1867) in his
"Philosophie ecossaise" praised Reid's philosophy in the highest
terms. It may be safely said that the materialistic tendency of French
speculation was checked by the influences derived from the philosophy
of common sense.
Sir Frederick
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>http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04167a.htm
IMO, an important consideration when it comes to 'common sense',
is that 'humans' are not definitive structures, they are ad hoc pragmatic
structures.
It will be interesting to encounter the proverbial 'little green men'. as
their 'common sense' may be different. As it is 'we' are 'blessed'
with a lot of context variations and a lot of inter species encounters.
Even within each person are variations of value. Different 'modules'
of the human brain, evaluate the situation differently.
BOfL
Ive just finished a chapter on that very subject in "This Is Your
Brain On Music" by Daniel Levitin, where he describes the many nuances
of music, where they are each stored and how they are retrieved.
There are 'common' reactions to specific rythms, tones, pitch etc
(extremely well explained to the non musician), but only when the
specific neuron connections are not broken. Even in those situations
there are amazing compensatory effects.
A marvellous deeper insight into the 'Rythm Of Life', much of which
does little to contribute to the survival, but dramatically enhances
the quality of life.
The oldest and most 'mystical' of teachings all refer to the primal
sound or shabad as it is know in in the Sufi traditrion, as being the
source of life.
Dare I say "science catching up" once more (hopefully without Zinnic
ready to pounce :-) .
The yogic tradition advocates the use different sounds (ie mantras) to
open up different levels of consciousness, and in day to day life, it
is easy to see which type of music equates to specific behaviour
patterns.
Common 'sensual' perhaps.
BOfL
Justintruth
It seems to me that the times when I have understood most have not
been common at all. Common sense has repeatedly failed me. For
example: It is common sense that fire engines are red, there is such a
thing as the way things are right now, something can get from here to
there only by crossing a line between them, space exists. All of these
things are common sensical and yet dubious when carefully examined.
For me common sense is the beliefs that we have if we just don't think
too much or too carefully. Once you start thinking you quickly leave
the area of common sense and discover a different path. The only
positive thing I can say about it is that it has a kind of utilitarian
benefit. There are times when I see decisions made that do not seem to
have a hope of causing a good outcome and yet they are made. They
violate commons sense in some way. Whenever I make one of those I
always get burnt.
yvan....@skynet.be
Thank you for giving us some history and analysis about the words
"Commom Sense". However, a more "mathematical" point of view about
"what is" common sense might be interesting.
A mathematical object is not defined by what "it is" but by its
properties.
When you drink a cup of thea, you are not afraid that it can explode
in your face. You may be skeptical toward the second law of
thermodynamics, but, thinking of the probability of such an event you
firmly believe that it will not happen. That is commen sense.
And how to escape the nuclear threat that is still hanging over our
heads : with a bit more of common sense, speaking for politicians, of
course.
What is the difference between Pragmaticism and Good Sense ? Perhaps,
Good Sense is less directed to self interest.
Yvan
ZerkonXXXX
> Thomas Reid (1710-1796)
He set down six axioms which he regarded as an essential basis for
reasoning, all derived from "sensus communis":
* That the thoughts of which I am conscious are thoughts of a being
which I call myself, my mind, my person;
* That those things did really happen that I distinctly remember;
* That we have some degree of power over our actions, and the
determination of our will;
* That there is life and intelligence in our fellow men with whom we
converse;
* That there is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of
fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion;
* That, in the phenomena of nature, what is to be, will probably be
like what has been in similar circumstances.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Reid
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Maybe of interest here but a little adrift that the first axiom does not
apply to any other person apart from self. Others (can only) regard and
react to actions. These reactions by others also form a sense of self
("which I call myself"). Another quite slippery aspect of this is not all
actions by self are the result of consciousness nor are reactions by
others.
whatever the case the bottom line to all this seems to be there has to be
a bottom line to reason which I believe is summed up nicely in the last
axiom alone.
“For, before men can reason together, they must agree in first
principles; and it is impossible to reason with a man who has no
principles in common with you.”
A arbitrator might say it is impossible to reason without first finding
common principles which are always present.
> Reid and his successors insist on the distinction between primary and
> secondary qualities, the former (extension, figure, hardness, etc.)
> being "suggested" by sensations as essentially belonging to the object
> perceived, and the latter (as colour, taste, smell, etc.) being no
> more than sensations in the subject arising from qualities of the
> object which are only accidental or contingent.
Is this the holy quale?