art vs religion
Ron Evans
Picture rows 1-2 in an airplane. In row 1, an evangelist is
sitting next to an agnostic. She is describing the beauty of
her religion, and is telling him that if he could only admit
Jesus Christ as his Saviour, then he would experience that
beauty too. In row 2, an artist is describing the beauty of
Chagall's paintings to a bewildered janitor, trying to convey
to him the beauty she perceives and the beauty he could perceive
if he were to just understand.
Ignoring the subject matter, please give a comparative analysis
of the activity in rows 1 and 2. Do you see any fundamental
difference at all?
--
Ron Evans, Department of Mathematics, UCSD (rev...@math.ucsd.edu)
Russell Turpin
In article <19...@sdcc6.ucsd.edu> rev...@euclid.ucsd.edu (Ron Evans) writes:
> Picture rows 1-2 in an airplane. In row 1, an evangelist is
> sitting next to an agnostic. She is describing the beauty of
> her religion, and is telling him that if he could only admit
> Jesus Christ as his Saviour, then he would experience that
> beauty too. In row 2, an artist is describing the beauty of
> Chagall's paintings to a bewildered janitor, trying to convey
> to him the beauty she perceives and the beauty he could perceive
> if he were to just understand.
>
> Ignoring the subject matter, please give a comparative analysis
> of the activity in rows 1 and 2. Do you see any fundamental
> difference at all?
It is not clear to me whether Mr Evans means to restrict the
analysis to the airplane or not. Restricted to the airplane,
there might not be any fundamental difference, or at least,
none that can be detected in that restricted domain. But
it is not clear to me the importance of this, except that
when one imposes artificial restrictions, important differences
are sometimes lost.
The great difference becomes clear when the airplane lands. The
janitor says to the artist: "take me to that Chagall". Similarly,
the agnostic says to the evangelist: "take me to Jesus". Now,
the difference is great. The artist can do as requested, the
evangelist cannot.
Russell
Ron Evans
>The great difference becomes clear when the airplane lands. The
>janitor says to the artist: "take me to that Chagall". Similarly,
>the agnostic says to the evangelist: "take me to Jesus". Now,
>the difference is great. The artist can do as requested, the
>evangelist cannot.
I would say that, to the janitor, the beauty of Chagall is elusive,
while to the agnostic, the beauty of Jesus is ILLUSIVE.
But do I have a right to say this?
To born-again Christians, the beauty of
Christ may be as real as the beauty of Chagall is to artists.
Mikel Evins
>analysis to the airplane or not. Restricted to the airplane,
>there might not be any fundamental difference, or at least,
>none that can be detected in that restricted domain. But
>it is not clear to me the importance of this, except that
>when one imposes artificial restrictions, important differences
>are sometimes lost.
>
>The great difference becomes clear when the airplane lands. The
>janitor says to the artist: "take me to that Chagall". Similarly,
>the agnostic says to the evangelist: "take me to Jesus". Now,
>the difference is great. The artist can do as requested, the
>evangelist cannot.
That may not be so if we admit of a metaphorical
interpretation of the phrase "take me to Jesus".
In either case the "taker" may or may not be able
to convey the "takee" to the object of reverence.
In the case of a Chagall, the possible obstacles
are likely physical in nature. In the case of
Jesus, the obstacles may be more psychological
or cultural (and the manner of conveyance metaphorical).
Still and all, I have a fairly keen interest in
religions generally, and am quite happy to
treat them as works of art, and judge them on
that basis.
Russell Turpin
> elusive, while to the agnostic, the beauty of Jesus is ILLUSIVE.
>
> But do I have a right to say this? To born-again Christians, the
> beauty of Christ may be as real as the beauty of Chagall is to
> artists.
Does a non-believer necessarily dispute the *beauty* of Christ?
Somewhere along the way, Mr Evans has taken this conversation
into the aesthetic dimension. I am not well acquainted with
aesthetic philosophy, but it is far from clear to me that the
beauty of something is necessarily diminished by it being unreal
in certain important regards. (If this were the case, then all
fiction is necessarily ugly.) Typically, the non-believer
questions the *versimilitude* of Christianity, not its *beauty*.
Of course, one can talk about fictional paintings, even fictional
Chagall's. If our traveling artist has done this, then he will
be in the same sticky wicket as the evangelist when the plane
lands. (And even if not, some people might assert that
Christianity is more beautiful than the Chagall, despite the
former being fiction and the latter real.)
But it always seemed to me that the important issue for
Christianity was not its beauty, but its versimilitude. Here, we
get back to the difference to which I pointed. The artist can
show the janitor the painting of which he spoke; the evangelist
has more difficulty with his god.
Russell
Ron Evans
>Does a non-believer necessarily dispute the *beauty* of Christ?
Truth is beauty, and beauty is truth.
I hope this doesn't sound fatuous. To me, it is
the universal truths that impart beauty.
>Somewhere along the way, Mr Evans has taken this conversation
>into the aesthetic dimension. I am not well acquainted with
>aesthetic philosophy, but it is far from clear to me that the
>beauty of something is necessarily diminished by it being unreal
>in certain important regards. (If this were the case, then all
>fiction is necessarily ugly.) Typically, the non-believer
>questions the *versimilitude* of Christianity, not its *beauty*.
Good fiction is far from unreal. Consider the
verisimilitude (sic) of the characterizations,
the situations, etc.
Russell Turpin
>> Does a non-believer necessarily dispute the *beauty* of Christ?
In article <19...@sdcc6.ucsd.edu> rev...@euclid.ucsd.edu (Ron Evans) writes:
> Truth is beauty, and beauty is truth.
>> ... I am not well acquainted with aesthetic philosophy, but it
>> is far from clear to me that the beauty of something is
>> necessarily diminished by it being unreal in certain important
>> regards. ...
> Good fiction is far from unreal. Consider the verisimilitude (sic)
> of the characterizations, the situations, etc.
I understand the point that Mr Evans makes, but I think it does
not address the issue. Whatever real insights into human
psychology Dostoevski displays, Alexey Karamazov is a figure of
fiction, not history, and the events of his life are not real
events, even if they encapsulate some of what is very real about
the human condition. I think Mr Evans missed the importance of
my qualification. I realize that it is important for art to
reflect reality IN SOME REGARDS, what I said is that it does not
necessarily diminish the beauty of something if it is unreal
in CERTAIN IMPORTANT REGARDS.
A person can think that the Christian god is as beautiful a
work of art as are the characters of Dostoevski's novels, but
still be an atheist because he attributes to the Christian god
no more reality than he does to Hamlet, Sherlock Holmes, the
Ghost of Christmas Past, or Alexey Karamazov.
Russell
Mike Morgan in Colorado Springs
In article <19...@sdcc6.ucsd.edu>, rev...@euclid.ucsd.edu (Ron Evans) writes...
|Ignoring the subject matter, please give a comparative analysis
|of the activity in rows 1 and 2. Do you see any fundamental
|difference at all?
Relatively little, if any difference at all. Two memes are
attempting replication.
* No sig. needed. You know why.
John Wilkins
of epistemic and metaphysical values is ultimately an aesthetic choice based
upon culture and personality -- or should I say that aesthetic as well as
epistemic and metaphysical choices are all of the same cloth?
d0d...@zeus.tamu.edu
Actually, I think that you need to amend your scenario a bit.
Christians rarely characterize ther religion as "Beauty";
Christianity porpagates itself under the guise of "Truth",
so a better title for your post might be "Truth vs Beauty"
rather than "Religion vs Art".
Interestingly enough, try this variation on your question:
suppose the religionist is not a Christian, but a Buddhist
or a Daoist. Would this switch the answer?
Christianity (and Judaism and Islam) are religions based on
something tangiable: The Word. They have a specific Godhead,
a specific canon, catechisms, etc. Ultimately, they are legalistic,
and the adherents of these religions often seem to have their
actual faith in their Holy books rather than their Diety.
However, I do not seem to find those particualr qualities in
many of the Eastern mysticisms. Instead of carefully delieated
theology, Zen (for example) offers those maddening Koans.
However, I digress. My answer to your question? There is little
similarity between the Christian and the artist, since the medium
for their "beliefs" differ, the Christian's being Truth and the
artist's being "Beauty".
perhaps the more interesting question is, how do Truth and
Beauty relate to each other?
Dalem Dilieto
Russell Turpin
I wrote:
>> The great difference becomes clear when the airplane lands. The
>> janitor says to the artist: "take me to that Chagall". Similarly,
>> the agnostic says to the evangelist: "take me to Jesus". Now,
>> the difference is great. The artist can do as requested, the
>> evangelist cannot.
In article <May.16.11.14...@galaxy.rutgers.edu> lc...@andromeda.rutgers.edu (Louie Crew) writes:
> Everyone else seems to focus on the second clause of the last
> sentence. Will the janitor see what the other guy sees, or
> just a bunch of colors slapped all over the place?
I was expecting someone to raise this point.
Consider that this question exists with regard to the religion
also. There have been those who accepted the truth of
Christianity, but rather than seeing any beauty in it, saw a sad
and tragic cosmos ruled by a capricious and cruel god.
What I have tried to explain is that there are at least two
questions that can be raised respecting a religion or work of art
that is described to one. The first question is whether the
description is accurate. Does the described Chagall really
exist? (Perhaps the artist is deluded and is describing a
Chagall that exists only in his imagination, or has suffered a
small stroke and is therefore confusing two different paintings.)
Does the god really exist?
The second question is the aesthetic one. Given that the
description is accurate (or perhaps, regardless of whether or not
it is), how does one aesthetically evaluate what is described.
The advantage I described for the artist describing a (real)
Chagall concerns the first question only. He can show the
janitor the painting. The janitor might not see the beauty in
it, but he won't question its existence. Conversely, the
evangelist cannot show the agnostic her god, regardless of
whether she is able to convince him of her god's beauty.
Russell
Ron Evans
> The selection
>of epistemic and metaphysical values is ultimately an aesthetic choice based
>upon culture and personality -- or should I say that aesthetic as well as
>epistemic and metaphysical choices are all of the same cloth?
There are some who find beauty in the music of Madonna but are
totally bored with the likes of Mozart, Mendelssohn,
or Moussorgsky. I think they are missing something, but not in
the same way that a non-Christian is missing something by failure
to accept Jesus as Saviour. The difference relates to the verisimilitude
that Russell Turpin talked about, and which you don't address.
Ron Evans
>A person can think that the Christian god is as beautiful a
>work of art as are the characters of Dostoevski's novels, but
>still be an atheist because he attributes to the Christian god
>no more reality than he does to Hamlet, Sherlock Holmes, the
>Ghost of Christmas Past, or Alexey Karamazov.
My, aren't we well-read? :-)
I'm partial to the gods of Norse mythology, myself. But of course the
beauty to which the evangelist referred was a direct result of her
firm belief in the saving faith of Jesus Christ. I know, because
I had the misfortune of sitting next to her on a plane from
Dallas to San Diego.
Shostakovitch and Chagall were complete intangibles to her, while
the feeling of Christ within her was "real". She may have thought
I was deluded, and I thought the same about her.
As for our respective professions, I feel mine is superior.
I can SHOW her that the Euclidean axioms are plausible. I can
give her a protractor and she'll find that any triangle she
draws seems to have the sum of the angles total 180 degrees.
I can even show her a model which makes non-Euclidean geometry
tangible. What can she show me?
Louie Crew
>The great difference becomes clear when the airplane lands. The
>janitor says to the artist: "take me to that Chagall". Similarly,
>the agnostic says to the evangelist: "take me to Jesus". Now,
>the difference is great. The artist can do as requested, the
>evangelist cannot.
Everyone else seems to focus on the second clause of the last sentence.
Will the janitor see what the other guy sees, or just a bunch of
colors slapped all over the place?
Louie Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lc...@andromeda.rutgers.edu
Associate Professor . . . . . . . . . . . . . .lc...@draco.rutgers.edu
Academic Foundations Department . . . . . . . CompuServe No. 73517,147
Rutgers: The State University of New Jersey. . . . . . 201-485-4503 h
P. O. Box 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201-648-5434 o
Newark, NJ 07101 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201-648-5700 FAX
Only a dead fish floats with the current.
Louie Crew
The janitor may also reply, when she sees the Chagall, Goodness gracious,
vision seems to have fallen on hard times like everything else in this
culture. Is this way of seeing part of what has allowed more destruction
in this century than in any other. This speaks deconstruction, not
renaissance. But you don't have to live this way. You can live simply
as a poor janitor and keep your imagination alive.
Ron Evans
> Actually, I think that you need to amend your scenario a bit.
> Christians rarely characterize their religion as "Beauty";
Well, I was thinking of Beauty in the sense of the
following passage from Psalms 27:4,
"...that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my
life, to behold the beauty of the Lord,..."
But your point is good, so I will take your advice and amend the
scenario so that in row 2, the artist touting Chagall is now
replaced by a mathematician touting the four-color theorem.
How do you now compare the touting of the respective Truths in
rows 1 and 2? (To reply to your question, I think my answer
would be unchanged if the Christian in row 1 were replaced by
someone extolling Nirvana.)
d0d...@zeus.tamu.edu
>
>> Actually, I think that you need to amend your scenario a bit.
>> Christians rarely characterize their religion as "Beauty";
[...]
>"...that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my
>life, to behold the beauty of the Lord,..."
>
>But your point is good, so I will take your advice and amend the
>scenario so that in row 2, the artist touting Chagall is now
>replaced by a mathematician touting the four-color theorem.
>How do you now compare the touting of the respective Truths in
>rows 1 and 2? (To reply to your question, I think my answer
>would be unchanged if the Christian in row 1 were replaced by
>someone extolling Nirvana.)
>
>
>--
>Ron Evans, Department of Mathematics, UCSD (rev...@math.ucsd.edu)
Well, offhand, I can see different ways of looking at this.
To begin with, the four-color theorum has the advantage of
a formal proof that can be shown to the janitor here and
now; Jesus is, of course, a bit more elusive. Now, it
can be argued that the proof FCT is based on the
postulates of some geometry, and that Christianity is pretty
much a construct made out of a different sort of postulate.
However, the postulates of geometry have a tangiability that
Jesus Christ lacks; the postulates of geometry can be "demon-
strated" relatively easily with paper and pen. Try demon-
strating Jesus tangiably (on demand) someday.
Ultimately, tangiability is the dividing factor. Even if
Beauty is an undefineable abstract, the Janitor can still
go to the museum and see "The Poet (Half Past Three)" at
a local museum. Jesus Christ remains a totally metaphysical
entity, outside of the realm of empirical experience. Therefore,
I conclude that there is a difference between what is going
on in rows one and two.
The aspect of your original query --and my first response
to it-- that I find truly facinating is the difference,
between Beauty and Truth. I wonder if they are truly
different, or are they the same thing, or are they two
aspects of a something larger?
Dalen Dileto
Ron Evans
Some mathematics is ugly. But an elegantly
stated result which reveals deep insights may be called beautiful.
Conversely, I can be moved by the beauty of a passage in a Mozart
Piano Concerto (especially #23) without discovering any truths
(at least consciously). But perhaps I'm using the word "truth"
in too narrow a sense here.
Louie Crew
>He can show the
>janitor the painting. The janitor might not see the beauty in
>it, but he won't question its existence. Conversely, the
>evangelist cannot show the agnostic her god, regardless of
>whether she is able to convince him of her god's beauty.
>Russell
You state this a some sort of 60-minutes style expose. But most
religions make the same claim. All you have really said is
that "metaphysics is meta physics." St. Paul put it slightly
differently, "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence
of things not seen."
When you decide to go back to the Chagall, I suspect that you can
also substitute: "Aesthetics is the substance of things imagined,
the evidence (or the experience) of things not actually seen."
And of course everyone freely rejects certain faith claims or certain
aesthetics claims. What does not seem fair is to try to submit them m
to literalism that they make no claim of referencing.
Louie
d0d...@zeus.tamu.edu
>Some mathematics is ugly. But an elegantly
>stated result which reveals deep insights may be called beautiful.
>
>Conversely, I can be moved by the beauty of a passage in a Mozart
>Piano Concerto (especially #23) without discovering any truths
>(at least consciously). But perhaps I'm using the word "truth"
>in too narrow a sense here.
Well, that doesn't relly answer my qestion, now does it? Then
again, it's not the easiest question to even ponder, let alone
answer. However, you have provided a starting point, ie a
definition (or at least an operational definition) of the
key terms. defining the nature of Truth, or even domain of Truth
would be nice: A definition of the domain of Beauty (assuming
that Truth and Beauty have definable domains) would also be quite
nice.
Let me just throw this bit of meaty conjecture on the platter:
Assume the universe can divided into two aspects: objects, and
the connection between objects. Now, offhand it seems to me
that Truth mainly deals with objects, and beauty deals mainly
with the connections of the objects. How does this hold up as
a hypothesis?
Dalen Dilieto
Russell Turpin
I wrote:
>> [The artist] can show the janitor the painting. The janitor
>> might not see the beauty in it, but he won't question its
>> existence. Conversely, the evangelist cannot show the agnostic
>> her god, regardless of whether she is able to convince him of
>> her god's beauty.
In article <May.17.12.37....@galaxy.rutgers.edu> lc...@andromeda.rutgers.edu (Louie Crew) writes:
> You state this as some sort of 60-minutes style expose. But
> most religions make the same claim. All you have really said
> is that "metaphysics is meta physics." ...
>
> And of course everyone freely rejects certain faith claims or
> certain aesthetics claims. What does not seem fair is to try
> to submit them to literalism that they make no claim of
> referencing.
If I understand Mr Crew's objection, it is that not all religions,
nor even all forms of Christianity, make the kind of literal
claims upon which my distinction hangs. In essence, the artist
is making at least two claims: (1) that there is a Chagall as he
describes, and (2) that it is beautiful. I took the evangelist
to be making two similar kinds of claim: (1) that her god is real
and the important religions events to which she refers factual,
and (2) the her religion provides a worthy avenue for worship,
spiritual understanding, etc.
I am perfectly willing to admit the elusiveness of the second
kind of claim, in both cases. The distinction to which I point
concerns only the first kind of claim. Admittedly, there are
religions that do not hang on such 'literal' claims, and in recent
times, many Christians have also dropped or deemphasized the
literal claims that are traditional to it. This provides an
escape from the skeptic's criticisms.
But it also drastically changes the nature of the religion. In
my opinion, 'liberal' Christians are parasitic on their more
conservative brethren who believe more literally. Christianity
succeeded and continues to succed because of those who believe in
a real god, a literal afterlife, and a factual resurrection. A
Christianity that is purged of such literal beliefs will be as
free of skeptical objections as are the beliefs of the Society
for Creative Anacrhonism. But it will also be vastly different
from the religion that has existed for the past two millenia. It
remains to be seen whether a viable kind of Christianity can be
created that is free of such literalism.
Russell
Russell Turpin
> Assume the universe can divided into two aspects: objects, and
> the connection between objects. Now, offhand it seems to me
> that Truth mainly deals with objects, and beauty deals mainly
> with the connections of the objects. How does this hold up as
> a hypothesis?
I would say not well at all. Most physical laws describe
relationships between objects, and whether or not they should
be in the domain of beauty, they definitely belong in the
domain of truth.
Russell
Russell Turpin
> scenario so that in row 2, the artist touting Chagall is now
> replaced by a mathematician touting the four-color theorem.
> How do you now compare the touting of the respective Truths in
> rows 1 and 2? (To reply to your question, I think my answer
> would be unchanged if the Christian in row 1 were replaced by
> someone extolling Nirvana.)
In explaining the difference, I would like to offer a refinement
that I hope Mr Evans and others will view as keeping in the
spirit of this Gedanken. It is this: that both the evangelist
and the mathematician are capable expositors, and the janitor and
the agnostic are capable listeners, in that they are both able to
follow the arguments made by their respective seatmates, and will
honestly consider the issues. Obviously, one might have a
mathematician who does not well explain what math is about, or a
janitor who cannot follow it, or an evangelist who is unable or
unwilling to explore the presuppositions of his preaching, or an
agnostic who is unwilling to hear them. These kinds of problems
do not strike me as fundamental.
It has already been pointed out that mathematicians do not have
to attribute truth to any particular set of mathematical axioms.
The mathematical truths on this view are NOT the mathematical
theorems that one learns in point-set topology, abstract algebra,
real analysis, etc, but rather the fact that these theorems are
logical consequences of their axiom system. Thus, the claim is
not "Caley's theorem is true", but that "Cayley's theorem is a
logical consequence of the group axioms". [1]
This move does not entirely remove presuppositions from
mathematical discourse. Rather, it shifts the presuppositions
from the mathematical axioms of any particular field to the
presuppositions required to investigate "logical consequence".
The important point about the understanding of logical
consequence is that the presuppositions required for it are no
stronger than those necessary to the understanding of natural
languages. Indeed, formal logic can be viewed as an attempt to
capture part of natural language, that part which is easiest to
analyze. (Many people, including myself, would argue that the
inequality is strict, ie, that there are parts of natural
language that cannot be captured in current formalisms.)
It is true that the mathematician takes the use of logical
consequence into areas that most people do not. But (given the
assumptions I made about them above) the mathematician can
explain and the janitor can understand that all deductions the
mathematician uses are no different in character from ones that
the janitor uses in his own thinkings. (Any formal logic can
be put into a natural deduction system, where the only two rules
of inference are modus ponens and specialization. The first
formalizes deductions such as "if it is true that all red things
are colored, and if it is true that something is red, then it is
true that it is colored". The second formalizes deductions such
as "if it is true that all humans are mortal, then it is true
that any particular human is mortal".)
If the mathematician explains things well, the janitor (as well
as the agnostic and the evangelist) will see that the
mathematician is using only principles that they all accept and
have used all along, at least to the extent that they put stock
in the usual uses of language. The situation is far different
for the evangelist, at least, if he is propounding a traditional
form of Christianity. He too will come to some bottom
presuppositions without which his argument collapses. Some of
these will be the same as the mathematician's, at least to the
extent that the evangelist expresses his views in language. But
he also requires other presuppositions of a very different sort.
A typical evangelical presupposition is: "the Bible is the word
of god". (Typically, the evangelist is not as aware of his
presuppositions as the mathematician, and it takes the skeptic
considerable work to get the evangelist to admit that "yes, this
is what one must take on faith".) One is tempted to just point to
the two kinds of presuppositions, since their greatly different
nature should be clear to any intelligent reader. Nevertheless,
permit me to press the obvious and name some specific and
important ways in which they differ. First, the mathematician's
presuppositions are more *universal*. To the extent that someone
understands language, they make use of the mathematician's
presuppositions. Second, the mathematician's presuppositions are
more *general*. They do not entail anything in particular about
the world outside of human discourse, but rather, are implicit in
the notion that we are able to understand our own discourses. In
contrast, the evangelist's presuppositions are quite particular.
None of this is compelling in any absolute sense. If one wants
to believe that one cannot understand language, yet that the
Bible is the word of god, mere words will not prevent it. But to
those who take seriously ideas expressed in language -- and I
presume that that includes everyone reading this since otherwise
reading is a waste of time -- presuppositions that have the
qualities I described above, such as the mathematician's, are
necessary. Conversely, the evangelist's presuppositions are a
kind of faith that the mathematician's are not.
-----
[1] There are opposing views of the philosophy of mathematics,
and the tact I describe is consistent with logicism or formalism,
but not Platonism. Quite frankly, the more extreme forms of
mathematical Platonism I have heard seem to me to require a
faith not too different from the evangelist's, and in my view, it
should be condemned for this.
Russell
d0d...@venus.tamu.edu
>> with the connections of the objects. How does this hold up as
>> a hypothesis?
>
>I would say not well at all. Most physical laws describe
>relationships between objects, and whether or not they should
>be in the domain of beauty, they definitely belong in the
>domain of truth.
>
>Russell
You make a very strong statement here, Mr Turpin. Perhaps too
strong. Do physical laws contain *no* beauty at all? If
science has no beauty, then why do I hear physicists keep
talking about how Theory X is "elegant"? Why do I have this
strange, "artistic" feeling about the De Brogli Equation,
like there is something magic about De Brogli's discovery of
it? Now, I know that the earth I'm standing on here isn't
exactly firm here (or at least not as firm as that of, say,
navel contemplation), but I'm not sure, nor do I firmly
believe that, Science is exactly --in the mathematical sense,
of course-- Truth and, say, Art is exactly Beauty. Even the
paintings of Jackson Pollock, which look to me like messy
accidents with a fan and oil paints, can be described
verbally with regard to their "composition". It seems to me
that such description implies that there is some Truth to
the painting.
Dalen Dileto
Russell Turpin
In article <16...@helios.TAMU.EDU> d0d...@zeus.tamu.edu writes:
>>> ... Now, offhand it seems to me that Truth mainly deals with
>>> objects, and beauty deals mainly with the connections of the
>>> objects. How does this hold up as a hypothesis?
I responded:
>> I would say not well at all. Most physical laws describe
>> relationships between objects, and whether or not they should
>> be in the domain of beauty, they definitely belong in the
>> domain of truth.
In article <16...@helios.TAMU.EDU> d0d...@venus.tamu.edu writes:
> You make a very strong statement here, Mr Turpin. Perhaps too
> strong. ...
I make a strong statement, but it is not the one Mr Dileto proceeds
to criticize.
> ... Do physical laws contain *no* beauty at all? If science has
> no beauty, then why do I hear physicists keep talking about how
> Theory X is "elegant"? ...
Nowhere do I suggest that physical laws lack beauty. I do not even
hint that. I said that *regardless* of whether they are the kind
thing to which one can ascribe beauty, that they are definitely the
kind of thing of which one can investigate their truth. I also said
that most concern relationships between objects, thus refuting the
claim that truth has to do with objects, and not relationships
between them.
Russell
John Wilkins
from being a satisfaction function of the specific belief system in question.
On that basis, adopting the belief system cannot be due to its verisimilitude,
since to evaluate that one has to have adopted the belief system. Hence, if I
am right about the role of truth in theoretical systems such as religion,
science or art, the *reasons* for adopting a religion, etc, either depend upon
the truth satsifaction requirements of some other, already adopted and more
global belief system, or they do not depend upon truth satisfaction at all, but
upon some other (aesthetic?) preference satisfaction. Ultimately, the choices
will depend upon the preferences (ie, value system) of the individual, which
causally will be whatever that individual has been given by culture, personal
history and psychological disposition. NB, however, that these preferences will
not determine the outcome, but merely delimit the range of options available
for a specific individual.
Mike Morgan in Colorado Springs
|
|> The selection
|>of epistemic and metaphysical values is ultimately an aesthetic choice based
|>upon culture and personality -- or should I say that aesthetic as well as
|>epistemic and metaphysical choices are all of the same cloth?
|
|
|There are some who find beauty in the music of Madonna but are
|totally bored with the likes of Mozart, Mendelssohn,
|or Moussorgsky. I think they are missing something, but not in
|the same way that a non-Christian is missing something by failure
|to accept Jesus as Saviour. The difference relates to the verisimilitude
|that Russell Turpin talked about, and which you don't address.
In the past I've used the word "artform" with respect to one's
religious or worldview preference.
It still seems appropriate to me to say that when we project beauty
or elegance into a religious scheme or worldview we can sometimes
(in our models of reality) create beautiful works of art in our heads.
Thos models tend to influence our view(s) of reality.
Mike Morgan in Colorado Springs
(Louie Crew) writes...
|tur...@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin) writes:
|
|>The great difference becomes clear when the airplane lands. The
|>janitor says to the artist: "take me to that Chagall". Similarly,
|>the agnostic says to the evangelist: "take me to Jesus". Now,
|>the difference is great. The artist can do as requested, the
|>evangelist cannot.
|
|Everyone else seems to focus on the second clause of the last sentence.
|Will the janitor see what the other guy sees, or just a bunch of
|colors slapped all over the place?
We are presuming that the janitor has at least some interest in the
artist, whether it's artisitic appreciation or a practial or logial
point, it seems to still hold true for the example.
d0d...@zeus.tamu.edu
>In article <16...@helios.TAMU.EDU> d0d...@zeus.tamu.edu writes:
>>>> ... Now, offhand it seems to me that Truth mainly deals with
>>>> objects, and beauty deals mainly with the connections of the
>>>> objects. How does this hold up as a hypothesis?
>
>I responded:
>>> I would say not well at all. Most physical laws describe
>>> relationships between objects, and whether or not they should
>>> be in the domain of beauty, they definitely belong in the
>>> domain of truth.
>
>In article <16...@helios.TAMU.EDU> d0d...@venus.tamu.edu writes:
>> You make a very strong statement here, Mr Turpin. Perhaps too
>> strong. ...
>
>I make a strong statement, but it is not the one Mr Dileto proceeds
>to criticize.
>hint that. I said that *regardless* of whether they are the kind
>thing to which one can ascribe beauty, that they are definitely the
>kind of thing of which one can investigate their truth. I also said
>that most concern relationships between objects, thus refuting the
>claim that truth has to do with objects, and not relationships
>between them.
I must concede to part of Mr Turpin's point, I did misreply
to his his posting.
However, I must admit some confusion as to why Mr Turpin
brusqely casts aside any question of the domain of Beauty;
I do not think that Turpin's answer is valid unless he
considers the Beauty of physical laws.
The original question (I'll restate it, lest this thread
get too far away from it's point of origin) is:
what is the relationship between Truth and Beauty? Are
they two different things, or are they two facets of a
larger whole?
Dalen Dilieto
Chris Holt
but there's a side topic that perhaps should be considered with
all this, having to do with the role of mathematics and religion
as related to understanding.
tur...@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin) writes:
[about mathematics being based on logic, which can be understood
within the context of natural language (well, more or less); while
religion requires additional axioms to convey the idea of faith.
He then adds:]
> First, the mathematician's
>presuppositions are more *universal*. To the extent that someone
>understands language, they make use of the mathematician's
>presuppositions.
I'm not entirely convinced here. Since language is inherently
ambiguous, it would seem that logics derived from ordinary
human behaviour and language use must also contain an element
of ambiguity. The conflict between one person's natural logic
and another's manifests itself when some uneasiness arises as
to the meaning of a logic as a formal system (exclusion of
middle, and implication with a false antecedent come to mind
as problem areas).
It is not obvious that the world views reflected by all natural
languages yield the same kinds of logic. It is possible that
the various logics can be incorporated within an overall structure
that people can agree on; just as people can embed non-Euclidean
geometries in higher-dimensional Euclidean spaces, they can
fit logics in toposes. And certainly any time such an embedding
is employed, ambiguity is significantly reduced. But it
doesn't seem logically necessary :-) that there is a common
ground as precise as that which is suggested.
> Second, the mathematician's presuppositions are
>more *general*. They do not entail anything in particular about
>the world outside of human discourse, but rather, are implicit in
>the notion that we are able to understand our own discourses.
Many times, the use of words to describe something is an attempt
to come up with an approximation of what it is; the description
is an interactive process designed to elicit understanding, by
trying words to see if they fit or not. The mathematician's
words, being rather more crystalline, can be determined appropriate
or not rather more easily than the fuzzy alternatives. But
because they are precise, they are compelling; people are more
likely to accept an inaccurate description, or at least be less
likely to be able to further refine a description. People can
be "confused by facts".
>In contrast, the evangelist's presuppositions are quite particular.
Many religions are rather informal models of human psychology
and ethics. To the extent that they don't rely on precision,
and allow for flexibility of interpretation, they may be more
useful to some people than a (probably flawed) mathematical
equivalent.
>None of this is compelling in any absolute sense. If one wants
>to believe that one cannot understand language, yet that the
>Bible is the word of god, mere words will not prevent it.
But if one wants to believe that the word of god cannot be
expressed in words, but that it can still be understood to
a greater or lesser extent, then a dependence on language is
not helpful. [To forestall certain kinds of flames, I personally
don't believe in any such thing; but the position is consistent,
and can be used to put religion on a rather more even footing
with mathematics. I'm not addressing evangelists here.]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk Computing Lab, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
"And when they die by thousands why, he laughs like anything." G Chesterton
Russell Turpin
I agree with much of what Mr Holt says. Below, I offer one small
disagreement, and one amplification.
In article <1991May20.1...@newcastle.ac.uk> Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk (Chris Holt) writes:
> ... I'm not entirely convinced here. Since language is inherently
> ambiguous, it would seem that logics derived from ordinary
> human behaviour and language use must also contain an element
> of ambiguity. ...
Not necessarily. Natural language is richer than formal logic,
or to put it another way, formal logics only capture some aspects
of natural language. Remember, in a derivation, one sometimes
loses something along the way.
> But if one wants to believe that the word of god cannot be
> expressed in words, but that it can still be understood to
> a greater or lesser extent, then a dependence on language is
> not helpful. ...
The difficult thing with talking about religions in general is
that so many very different things are fit under that umbrella.
From what I know about it, Zen Buddhism would be a good example
of a religion that holds that its ultimate truths cannot be
expressed in words. In my experience, Zen Buddhists hardly ever
conflict with atheists (in the western sense), because they
neither assert ordinarily understood propositions that they push
as plain truths, nor deny those that others assert. In this,
they are quite consistent with the idea that the ultimate 'truth'
they hold cannot be expressed in words. (The quote marks I put
around truth are not meant to be derogatory, but because I
suspect that that is how a Zen Buddhist might want it.)
This tact is much less available to traditional Christians.
They often assert propositions as ordinary truth that they want
people to believe, and deny propositions others make. If they
then want to claim that some of their truths are beyond language,
they must be careful of hypocritically mixing these truths with
the ones that they are quick to put forward into ordinary
discourse.
Russell
Ron Evans
>and can be used to put religion on a rather more even footing
>with mathematics.
Consider the nondogmatic Christian who preaches
"This doctrine is a logical consequence
of our ASSUMPTION [not FACT] that the bible is the word
of God." Note that the mathematician similarly preaches
"Theorem x is a logical consequence of our AXIOM y."
Is this Christian on an even footing with the
mathematician? It seems that most posters to s.p.m
would say yes. Then how about the revisionist
historian who spins an elaborate, logical theory of
the consequences of "our ASSUMPTION that most evidence
for the gassings at Birkenau has been fabricated by
powerful Jewish groups" ? Of course, such fanatics are
usually dogmatic, but as soon as they concede that their
assumptions are just that, must we then put them on
even footing with mathematicians? Get real.
Chris Holt
>> ambiguous, it would seem that logics derived from ordinary
>> human behaviour and language use must also contain an element
>> of ambiguity. ...
>Not necessarily. Natural language is richer than formal logic,
>or to put it another way, formal logics only capture some aspects
>of natural language. Remember, in a derivation, one sometimes
>loses something along the way.
But can one actually lose something like ambiguity in this way?
It would seem to me analogous to Hilbert's infinite regression;
the language used to formally specify a logic must itself be
formally specified, etc. A Lisp interpreter written in Lisp
removes a lot of ambiguities, but some still remain, that must
be discussed outside the Lisp framework. However, if the
external linguistic framework is ambiguous, we can only get
"good enough" for whatever our purposes seem to be. It seems
to me that this is true throughout mathematics; even such things
as term rewriting systems cannot guarantee a lack of ambiguity.
Any axiomatic/equational system has unstated, implicit assumptions;
and it *must* have such things, I think.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk Computing Lab, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
"They have been at a great feast of languages, and stolen the scraps." - WS
Chris Holt
> Consider the nondogmatic Christian who preaches
> "This doctrine is a logical consequence
> of our ASSUMPTION [not FACT] that the bible is the word
> of God." Note that the mathematician similarly preaches
> "Theorem x is a logical consequence of our AXIOM y."
> Is this Christian on an even footing with the
> mathematician?
As long as one is talking about logical consequences alone, yes.
The problem arises when one tries to use a logical structure as
a model of reality; one then maps the real world to one's logical
antecedents, and claims that the consequences can be mapped back
to the real world. The example of gassing Jews in WWII can
produce a consistent and logical structure; the burden is then
on the revisionist historian to show that the assumptions do
match reality (as we clearly believe they do not).
> Of course, such fanatics are
> usually dogmatic, but as soon as they concede that their
> assumptions are just that, must we then put them on
> even footing with mathematicians? Get real.
Exactly the point; mathematicians are not dealing with reality.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk Computing Lab, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Cash
>The advantage I described for the artist describing a (real)
>Chagall concerns the first question only. He can show the
>janitor the painting. The janitor might not see the beauty in
>it, but he won't question its existence. Conversely, the
>evangelist cannot show the agnostic her god, regardless of
>whether she is able to convince him of her god's beauty.
Several people have remarked on the difficulty of showing "Jesus" or "God"
to people; they have contrasted this with showing a painting, or proving
the truth of a mathematical postulate. Doesn't this reveal a pretty narrow
way of thinking about what it means to _show_ a thing to someone?
In some circumstances, the way to show someone the truth is to be truthful.
To show someone mercy doesn't meant to have him look at it, or to make a
formal demonstration of its validity. One way to show someone Jesus is to
act in love.
--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist. |
Peter Cash | (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein) |ca...@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Ron Evans
> One way to show someone Jesus is to
>act in love.
You are referring to the TEACHINGS of Jesus. Oddly, the evangelist
I talked to on the plane told me that I would be going to Hell
even if I lived my whole life devoted to those teachings, unless
I accepted Jesus as Lord and Saviour. On the other hand, mass
murderer Ted Bundy, who became "born-again" on death row, will
be going to Heaven, she said.
Mike Morgan in Colorado Springs
In article <1991May22.1...@convex.com>, ca...@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes...
|
|Several people have remarked on the difficulty of showing "Jesus" or "God"
|to people; they have contrasted this with showing a painting, or proving
|the truth of a mathematical postulate. Doesn't this reveal a pretty narrow
|way of thinking about what it means to _show_ a thing to someone?
|
|In some circumstances, the way to show someone the truth is to be truthful.
|To show someone mercy doesn't meant to have him look at it, or to make a
|act in love.
There are several problems involved. When dealing with language and
with other humans it's generally best to be clear in one's language.
Vague, fuzzy, mystical animal noises (like "Truth" and "Love") doesn't go
very far when attempting to transmit a mental model from one human to
another.
Humans who know this sometimes limit their verbal or electonic noise
making to items and/or events which are empirical in nature. Empirical
items and/or events are such in nature that we can test them to establish
some degree of validity. Vague, mystical, fuzzy noise is impossible to
quantify and/or qualify.
If such an item or event is impossible to test, impossible to
manipulate, quantify or qualify, then for some people (including
myself) that item or event is meaningless because it has little, if
indeed nothing, to do with the human condition. Indeed we can not be
sure that such an unqualifiable item or event is nothing more than a
poorly thought out abstraction.
Your "truth" can be the death of ants (or any pest of any kind).
Your love can be perceived as infatuation or obsession by another
thinking individual. For many people the abstraction "Jesus" is based
upon vague, fuzzy, mystical animal noise. Indeed it is for me.
John Donald Collier
>
}In article <19...@sdcc6.ucsd.edu>, Ron Evans writes:
} Consider the nondogmatic Christian who preaches
} "This doctrine is a logical consequence
} of our ASSUMPTION [not FACT] that the bible is the word
} of God." Note that the mathematician similarly preaches
} "Theorem x is a logical consequence of our AXIOM y."
}
} Is this Christian on an even footing with the
} mathematician? It seems that most posters to s.p.m
} would say yes.
}
}
}The question is in what manner does the position of this Christian
}differ from that of the mathematician. I consider the analyses based
}on their respective "assumptions" or "presuppositions" slippery.
}
}One feature which I believe distinguishes the two is the degree of
}rigor in their methods. The stated criteria for success or failure are
}relatively clear in mathematics, and relatively difficult to discern
}in religion. (Whether the stated criteria for what constitutes a
}"proof" in mathematics are appropriate is contested by some.)
}
}This is not a hard-edged line; intermediate degrees of rigor exist. It
}is also not a justification for demanding rigor everywhere; some
}things can't be treated with mathematical rigor, and rejecting those
}questions as meaningless is unreasonably inflexible.
}
I think this treatment is overly generous. It isn't at all clear what
follows from the fact that the Bible is the word of God. God might have
perfectly adequate reasons for misleading us seriously, e.g., to test
whether we were likley to fall for all the inhumane stuff in the Bible.
The most staight-forward way of taking the statement is that it
implies the literal truth of the Bible (would God tell a lie?), but
that interpretation is ruled out by the fact that the Bible contains
contradictions. I don't know of any standard of rigour that allows
contradictions to be literally true.
It seems that we need some independent means for evaluating interpretations
of the Bible, and that puts us pretty much where we are without the
proposed deduction. In other words, the assumption that the Bible is
the word of God serves no purpose other than to imply a) that God exists
(assuming that the statement is not meant metaphorically), and b) that it
is of great significance. It leaves open entirely, however, the nature of
the significance (except that we know that it is not literally true --
contradictions we _can_ detect). Some statements might be true, some
false, and the purpose of each might have nothing to do with their
truth or falsity. These are just _loose_ standards of rigour. Any
rigour in Biblical studies (I am not denying that such exists), is
going to come from elsewhere than the assumption that the Bible is
the word of God.
--
John Collier Email: Col...@HPS.unimelb.edu.au
HPS -- University of Melbourne jcol...@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au
Parkville, Victoria, AUSTRALIA 3052 Fax: 61+3 344 7959
John Donald Collier
"These are not just _loose_ standards of rigour ... "
^^^^
Russell Turpin
In article <53...@apple.Apple.COM> mi...@Apple.COM (Mikel Evins) writes:
> My feeling is that some part of my experience is best
> alluded to in metaphor; it does not seem possible to
> describe discursively everything I experience. Some
> domain of my experience seems to be best expressed poetically,
> in metaphor. ...
I have no objection to this line of thought. What I would point
out is that one expects different attitudes from listeners
depending on whether one presents something poetically or
discursively. I do not raise evidential objections to liberal
Christians for whom the gospel story is *solely* poetry. But
most also want some of their assertions to be accepted in a
discursive and literal fashion.
Mr Cash wrote:
>>> ... One way to show someone Jesus is to act in love.
I responded:
>> Not at all. It makes as much sense to say "one way to show
>> someone Santa Claus is to give them Christmas gifts".
And Mr Evins comments:
> Understood metaphorically, I would agree that "one way to show
> someone Santa Claus is to give them Christmas gifts"; indeed
> this is very much the tack I have taken with my children. On
> the other hand, I am also explicit that Santa Claus is an
> anthropomorphic metaphor for bounty and generosity.
And if Mr Cash is only asserting that Jesus is a metaphor for
sacrifice and love, then he is correct in his assertion that one
"way to show someone Jesus is to act in love". But, if he is
asserting that Jesus was an actual avatar, who suffered a literal
crucifixion, had a literal resurrection, and is now a literal
god, then he is wrong that *this* Jesus can be shown by acting in
love. (Similarly, someone who asserts a literal Santa Claus does
not evince him by giving others Christmas gifts.)
There is nothing wrong with the poetic. The mistake comes when
one confuses the poetic with the literal. Literal claims cannot
be justified by metaphorical appeal to the poetic.
Russell
Russell Turpin
> "Jesus" or "God" to people; they have contrasted this with
> showing a painting, or proving the truth of a mathematical
> postulate. Doesn't this reveal a pretty narrow way of
> thinking about what it means to _show_ a thing to someone?
No.
It is a common tactic of religious believers to equivocate over
the meaning of words. "Faith," some declare, "is not opposed to
reason; it is just another word for trust." They then proceed
with their rhetoric, ignoring the important evidential
differences between the faith they urge in their god, and the way
a person reasonably trusts a friend who has proven reliable in
certain areas.
Mr Cash's suggestion that we are taking too narrow a view of what
it means to show someone something serves as a prelude to just
this kind of misconceived analogy. Thus, he proceeds:
> In some circumstances, the way to show someone the truth is
> to be truthful. ...
Yes, this shows the truth that one (sometimes) tells the truth,
as one perceives it. But it does not help the case of god at
all.
> ... To show someone mercy doesn't meant to have him look at
> it, or to make a formal demonstration of its validity. ...
True, but this does not help the case of god at all.
> ... One way to show someone Jesus is to act in love.
Not at all. It makes as much sense to say "one way to show
someone Santa Claus is to give them Christmas gifts".
Here, Mr Cash displays another pattern I have much seen in
religious argument. It is this: provide a sequence of examples,
usually three, all of which but the last are true, though
irrelevant to god, and the last of which is relevant to god, and
utterly false.
Russell
Keith Ramsay
"This doctrine is a logical consequence
of our ASSUMPTION [not FACT] that the bible is the word
of God." Note that the mathematician similarly preaches
"Theorem x is a logical consequence of our AXIOM y."
Is this Christian on an even footing with the
mathematician? It seems that most posters to s.p.m
would say yes.
I am not so sure about that.
The question is in what manner does the position of this Christian
differ from that of the mathematician. I consider the analyses based
on their respective "assumptions" or "presuppositions" slippery.
One feature which I believe distinguishes the two is the degree of
rigor in their methods. The stated criteria for success or failure are
relatively clear in mathematics, and relatively difficult to discern
in religion. (Whether the stated criteria for what constitutes a
"proof" in mathematics are appropriate is contested by some.)
This is not a hard-edged line; intermediate degrees of rigor exist. It
is also not a justification for demanding rigor everywhere; some
things can't be treated with mathematical rigor, and rejecting those
questions as meaningless is unreasonably inflexible.
For those of us who don't find the evangelist's message convincing,
there is a second difference as well. The evangelist's message appears
to cohere less well with our experience than does the mathematician's.
This, I suggest, is the source of our dispute with him and also with
the revisionist historian.
Let me propose an analogy to describe the situation I see as holding
in religion. When I am hiking in the mountains, I sometimes see signs
consisting of piles of stones, of scratched markings on rocks, or of
sticks lain out in a particular arrangement. In some cases, it is
quite clear what the meaning is: the trail is here, it is not here,
etc. Most sticks and rocks aren't human signs at all. In certain
cases, it may not be clear whether or not some sticks and stones are
meant as a message. It could be a source of dispute. Perhaps in
principle one could produce hard statistical criteria to distinguish,
but in practice it is a matter of perception and judgement.
Religion is in a similar position with respect to the whole of
reality; it proposes (typically) that there is a message, and offers
to tell you something about it.
The proponents of religion I have been familiar with do *not* consider
their religion to be something so purely "given" as to bear no
relation to their experience. Many of them consider their beliefs to
have been confirmed by experience. The beliefs are held in the
perception that they cohere well with experience.
The problem is that there is a natural tendency to see "meaningful
patterns" of certain kinds where they don't exist. Gamblers think they
see clusters or "runs" of "luck" in places where statistical analyses
indicate they don't exist. Believers in astrology think they see
connections between their horoscopes and their experience.
I, like many of us, re-weighed my experience/evidence (in the light of
facts about self-deception, and by introspection) and found that the
message of a religion was not entirely convincing anymore, although it
once was. I am agnostic, in the sense that I don't think the case is
closed, either.
Religion may be worth discussing, but I don't think this evaluation is
something which one ought to expect to nail down rigorously, let alone
by means of generalized arguments on the nature of the "root
assumptions" involved. This is surely frustrating to some, who like a
certain acquaintance of mine, believe that disagreements should always
be resolvable by logic. It just isn't so simple.
--
Keith Ramsay
ram...@zariski.harvard.edu <--Only through early June
Mikel Evins
>one confuses the poetic with the literal. Literal claims cannot
>be justified by metaphorical appeal to the poetic.
I completely agree. It is true that I sometimes try
to communicate matters poetically that I have
no means of communicating otherwise. These may
be factual things, in that they are matters of
direct experience. However, I must acknowledge
that in resorting to metaphor, I am acknowledging
that the matter under consideration *may* be
incommunicable. A metaphorical appeal can only
communicate to someone who understands the
metaphor in an analogous way, and cannot be shown
by logical means to be a correct representation
of the matter under discussion.
John Wilkins
>to people; they have contrasted this with showing a painting, or proving
>the truth of a mathematical postulate. Doesn't this reveal a pretty narrow
>way of thinking about what it means to _show_ a thing to someone?
>
>In some circumstances, the way to show someone the truth is to be truthful.
>To show someone mercy doesn't meant to have him look at it, or to make a
>formal demonstration of its validity. One way to show someone Jesus is to
>act in love.
What is the specificity here? How is "acting in love for Jesus' sake" different
to "acting in love as a parent"? In the days when I studied theology, there was
talk of "agape" being a specifically christian form of love, but how that
actually pans out to be different from general humanistic concern for others is
unclear.
On the other hand, to "show" someone a mathematical truth by use of axiomatic
proof is highly specific, as is the "showing", by pointing, of a painting.
The act of communication in the latter cases is clear, and the truth conditions
delimitable. In the former, it is not. I'm not saying that there is any sui
generis criterion for maths and physical "facts" that is not applicable to
religious "truths" (however construed), but that there is a difference of
degree and emphasis that ought not to be overlooked.
Mikel Evins
>In article <1991May22.1...@convex.com> ca...@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:
>> Several people have remarked on the difficulty of showing
>> "Jesus" or "God" to people; they have contrasted this with
>> showing a painting, or proving the truth of a mathematical
>> postulate. Doesn't this reveal a pretty narrow way of
>> thinking about what it means to _show_ a thing to someone?
>
[...]
>It is a common tactic of religious believers to equivocate over
>the meaning of words.
I agree with you, and I concur with your objections below,
which argue that this fuzzy form of rhetoric fails to
establish the factuality of any supernatural agency. Yet
I am sympathetic to Mr. Cash's theme in a certain way.
My feeling is that some part of my experience is best
alluded to in metaphor; it does not seem possible to
describe discursively everything I experience. Some
domain of my experience seems to be best expressed poetically,
in metaphor.
Now, it is arguable whether there is any utility in
such experience. It is also debatable whether it is
possible to communicate such things at all, by means
of metaphor or anything else. Still, experiences
occur that do not lend themselves to discursive
description, and the urge to share them also occurs.
For this reason I am inclined to defend fuzzy language
and the use of metaphor, though not the attempt to
use them to claim the establishment of factuality.
Indeed, it is my opinion that advocates of various
religions often make domain errors by trying to
present metaphor as factual description.
[...]
>> ... One way to show someone Jesus is to act in love.
>
>Not at all. It makes as much sense to say "one way to show
>someone Santa Claus is to give them Christmas gifts".
Understood metaphorically, I would agree that "one way to show
Peter Cash
>> One way to show someone Jesus is to
>>act in love.
>You are referring to the TEACHINGS of Jesus. Oddly, the evangelist
>I talked to on the plane told me that I would be going to Hell
>even if I lived my whole life devoted to those teachings, unless
>I accepted Jesus as Lord and Saviour. On the other hand, mass
>murderer Ted Bundy, who became "born-again" on death row, will
>be going to Heaven, she said.
You may not like this or agree with it, but what she told you is in
agreement with the historical teachings of the Christian church, and with
the New Testament. According to the mainstream of Christian theology, no
one is deserving enough to be saved; salvation comes out of a relationship
with God. Thus, it is entirely possible that Ted Bundy will spend eternity
with God, while Mahatma Gandhi is banished to the outer darkness.
And no, I wasn't referring to the teachings of Jesus, but to Jesus himself.
Chris Holt
I agree with the above, but would like to muddy the waters a bit :-)
by reminding you that *any* use of language has to be viewed as a
kind of poetic or metaphoric attempt at communication. The way
that words are defined and used ensures that any statement is no
more than an attempt to suggest a pattern in the listener's mind,
that corresponds to the pattern the speaker intended if the
message is understood.
Ron Evans
>>> One way to show someone Jesus is to
>>>act in love.
Ron Evans:
>>You are referring to the TEACHINGS of Jesus. Oddly, the evangelist
>>I talked to on the plane told me that I would be going to Hell
>>even if I lived my whole life devoted to those teachings, unless
>>I accepted Jesus as Lord and Saviour. On the other hand, mass
>>murderer Ted Bundy, who became "born-again" on death row, will
>>be going to Heaven, she said.
Peter Cash:
>You may not like this or agree with it, but what she told you is in
>agreement with the historical teachings of the Christian church, and with
>the New Testament. According to the mainstream of Christian theology, no
>one is deserving enough to be saved; salvation comes out of a relationship
>with God. Thus, it is entirely possible that Ted Bundy will spend eternity
>with God, while Mahatma Gandhi is banished to the outer darkness.
And it is entirely possible that Santa will get stuck in your
chimney next Christmas.
>And no, I wasn't referring to the teachings of Jesus, but to Jesus himself.
Well, I was trying to give you the benefit of the doubt.
Ron Evans
Mr. Cash wrote:
... One way to show someone Jesus is to act in love.
Mr. Siemon wrote:
... I know that Christ Jesus LIVES
in the Church, because *I met Him there* -- and recognized the same person
whom I meet in the pages of scripture.
I have previously mocked Christianity, but I realize that were I
to have a religious experience like that of Mr. Siemon, my attitude
would change. I would like to respectfully pose the following
questions to those who have met Jesus, in hopes that the answers
will enable me to better understand such an experience.
1) How do you know you met Jesus?
I realize this may be impossible to answer. I am unable
to wiggle my little toes. When I see my wife do it, I
say enviously, "How do you do that?" Of course, she is
unable to tell me.
Nevertheless, any description you could provide would
interest me. Did you see Him or hear Him, or was it
a feeling unrelated to the senses? What was specific
about the encounter which enabled you to say that you
met Jesus and not, say, Mary, or Mohammed? How does the
experience differ from, say, the feeling of overwhelming
peace one may achieve through Transcendental Meditation?
2) Do you make a distinction between personal reality and external
reality?
In other words, does it matter to you whether or not
the encounter was "all in your mind" ? Do you have
any reason to believe that Jesus exists outside of your
mind? (Have any of your friends'
descriptions of encounters with Jesus matched yours
in detail ?)
If I may make a loose analogy with art, I would say
that Van Gogh's Starry Night does indeed hang in the
N.Y. Museum of Modern Art, and I would resent it if
someone said that was all in my mind; however, if people
said the painting is ugly and that the beauty I see is
all in my mind, that wouldn't phase me.
Do you feel that your encounter was more comparable
to reception of beauty from an actual painting
than to reception of beauty from visualization of an
imagined painting? Why?
3) If someone claims after an intense experience in the Chicago
Museum of Art that he has actually encountered Gauguin himself,
would you say his experience may be comparable with yours,
or would you be more inclined to say "That's impossible,
Jesus exists and Gauguin doesn't."
Mikel Evins
>>It is true that I sometimes try
>>to communicate matters poetically that I have
>>no means of communicating otherwise. These may
>>be factual things, in that they are matters of
>>direct experience. However, I must acknowledge
>>that in resorting to metaphor, I am acknowledging
>>that the matter under consideration *may* be
>>incommunicable. A metaphorical appeal can only
>>communicate to someone who understands the
>>metaphor in an analogous way, and cannot be shown
>>by logical means to be a correct representation
>>of the matter under discussion.
>
>I agree with the above, but would like to muddy the waters a bit :-)
>by reminding you that *any* use of language has to be viewed as a
>kind of poetic or metaphoric attempt at communication. The way
>that words are defined and used ensures that any statement is no
>more than an attempt to suggest a pattern in the listener's mind,
>that corresponds to the pattern the speaker intended if the
>message is understood.
I quite agree. It seems to me that any nontrivial
attempt to communicate is an operation of
approximations to a resolution that may never
be shown unambiguously to have succeeded.
house ron
>>and can be used to put religion on a rather more even footing
>>with mathematics.
> Consider the nondogmatic Christian who preaches
> "This doctrine is a logical consequence
> of our ASSUMPTION [not FACT] that the bible is the word
> of God." Note that the mathematician similarly preaches
> "Theorem x is a logical consequence of our AXIOM y."
The only problem is that Xianity is NOT a logical consequence of its
assumptions. Any impartial reading of the teachings of Jesus must give
rise to views at wide variance with modern Xian teachings. Examples are
salvation by works and the unimportance of the resurrection.
--
Regards,
Ron House. (s64...@zeus.usq.edu.au)
(By post: Info Tech, U.C.S.Q. Toowoomba. Australia. 4350)
Peter Cash
>In article <1991May22.1...@convex.com> ca...@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:
>> Several people have remarked on the difficulty of showing
>> "Jesus" or "God" to people; they have contrasted this with
>> showing a painting, or proving the truth of a mathematical
>> postulate. Doesn't this reveal a pretty narrow way of
>> thinking about what it means to _show_ a thing to someone?
>It is a common tactic of religious believers to equivocate over
>the meaning of words. "Faith," some declare, "is not opposed to
>reason; it is just another word for trust." They then proceed
>with their rhetoric,...
In the remainder of his posting, Russell flatters me by ascribing a far
greater cleverness to my remarks than I can find in them myself. I should
probably leave well enough alone, but feel that honesty requires that I
dispel the false impression of philosophical acuity that Russell has
created about me.
I had thought that my remarks about "showing" were a pretty pedestrian--and
fairly obvious philosophical point. The question, "What is it to "show"
something to someone?" intrigued me. I had wanted to remark that there
can be many different kinds of "showing". (I suspected that the technical
background of many who post to these newsgroups skews their thinking about
the nature of "showing", so that they tend to think in terms of a physics
experiment, or a logical proof; I had wanted to point out that there are
other kinds of "showing" as well.)
>Mr Cash's suggestion that we are taking too narrow a view of what
>it means to show someone something serves as a prelude to just
>this kind of misconceived analogy. Thus, he proceeds:
Ahem. So you want to take a _narrow_ view, do you?
>> In some circumstances, the way to show someone the truth is
>> to be truthful. ...
>Yes, this shows the truth that one (sometimes) tells the truth,
>as one perceives it. But it does not help the case of god at
>all.
Well, I had thought it might go to show that "truth" is not necessarily a
property of sentences or "propositions", but that in a certain context it
might be correct to remark that one has found it in a person... But you may
wish to take the "narrow" view.
>> ... To show someone mercy doesn't meant to have him look at
>> it, or to make a formal demonstration of its validity. ...
>True, but this does not help the case of god at all.
Nor should it; nor was it intended to.
>> ... One way to show someone Jesus is to act in love.
>Not at all. It makes as much sense to say "one way to show
>someone Santa Claus is to give them Christmas gifts".
>Here, Mr Cash displays another pattern I have much seen in
>religious argument. It is this: provide a sequence of examples,
>usually three, all of which but the last are true, though
>irrelevant to god, and the last of which is relevant to god, and
>utterly false.
It is truly remarkable that anyone should think to discover an argument
here. I made no argument; if I were to make an argument, I would hope to do
better than this. (But since I do not think anyone can be compelled to
believe by arguments, I would think any such effort vain in any case.)
What I did hope to do was to make myself understood; I was hoping to convey
what I think it means to "show Jesus" to others. I was most certainly not
trying to argue anyone into conversion.
What I had hoped to clarify in these remarks was that talk about "showing
Christ" can make perfect sense if one does not take the narrow view of
"showing".
>... ignoring the important evidential
>differences between the faith they urge in their god, and the way
>a person reasonably trusts a friend who has proven reliable in
>certain areas.
Now _this_ is interesting. What are the differences between trusting a
friend, and trusting God? What is meant by calling these differences
"evidential"? I suspect that, for you, the difference is that you don't
think that you have a friend in God.
Peter Cash
>In article <1991May22.1...@convex.com> ca...@convex.com (Peter Cash)
>writes:
>> One way to show someone Jesus is to act in love.
>What is the specificity here? How is "acting in love for Jesus' sake"
>different to "acting in love as a parent"? In the days when I studied
>theology, there was talk of "agape" being a specifically christian form of
>love, but how that actually pans out to be different from general
>humanistic concern for others is unclear.
These are good questions. It's often been remarked that our language is
impoverished by having only one word for "love", and that this word is made
to refer indifferently to the attraction an adolescent feels toward
another, to the feeling a parent has for a child, the motivations of Mother
Theresa, and the preference for certain foods. There is little wonder that
this linguistic poverty causes confusion about "love".
The Greek word "agape" that you mention refers to disinterested, selfless
love. Translating this as "general humanistic concern for others" is
dubious; love requires an object--a lover an a beloved; it is not possible
for any man to love all mankind if only because the object of love would be
too diffuse for our limited capacities.
Agape should not be understood in such vague terms; agape is as specific as
erotic love--it is directed toward a particular object. When a volunteer
medic cares for a sick child in Ethiopia, then that is agape; the medic
loves the child, and not all children in general. (Notice that the medic
does not have to be a Christian; I would only say that being a Christian
helps one to love better.)
Note the connection between love and action: love is expressed in action.
To confuse love with emotion is one of the worst symptoms of our linguistic
impoverishment; we have taken romantic love (eros) as the model, and
measure all love by its standard. Thus, the question "Do you love him?" has
come to be a question about whether the lover feels certain strong emotions
toward the beloved.
If it is understood like this, the injunctions to "Love your neighbor", or
to "Love the Lord your God with all your heart" come to seem very
mysterious. How can one be suddenly, on command, filled with emotions of
love toward one's neighbor? The secret is that loving your neighbor (or
God) has no necessary connection with emotions. If you want to love your
neighbor or love God, then act in a loving way. Your emotions will follow
your actions.
Russell Turpin
On how equivocation is used to change the subject:
In article <1991May22.1...@convex.com> ca...@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:
>>> ... Doesn't this reveal a pretty narrow way of thinking about
>>> what it means to _show_ a thing to someone?
I wrote:
>> It is a common tactic of religious believers to equivocate over
>> the meaning of words. "Faith," some declare, "is not opposed to
>> reason; it is just another word for trust." They then proceed
>> with their rhetoric,...
In article <1991May27.1...@convex.com> ca...@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:
> ... I had wanted to point out that there are other kinds of
> "showing" as well.)
Everyone knows that words often have more than one meaning. In
particular, I think most people reading this newsgroup can
exhibit a dozen different uses of the word "show" without much
effort.
But remember what started this thread. There was the Gedanken of
an airplane, in which an artist was discussing a Chagall painting
with the plumber seating next to him, and an evangelical
Christian was discussing Jesus with the person next to her. The
question was posed: in what way is the "truth" one propounds
different from the "truth" the other propounds? One difference
occurs when the plane lands, and the artist can then show the
plumber the painting, so that (while the plumber might still not
appreciate its merits) he can see for himself that there really
is such a painting and can examine for himself its features.
"Showing" Jesus, in the way Mr Cash relates, is simply irrelevant
to the question. If the evangelist is able to show Jesus in this
way, that does not add to the truth of her claims, and if she
fails to show Jesus in this way, it does not detract from the
truth of her claims. By changing the use of the word, he has
ducked the question.
> Ahem. So you want to take a _narrow_ view, do you?
I don't want the meanings of words expanded so much that the
subject is furtively changed.
If someone asks whether it is possible for a man to run from
Austin to Freeport, another might respond:
You are taking a narrow view of the word "run". We also
know that water runs, and in fact that it runs downhill.
Freeport is downhill from Austin, so of course it is
possible to run from Austin to Freeport.
The first person would rightly respond that this is irrelevant,
and that this kind of running does not address the issue. When
the second person asks: "so you want to take a _narrow_ view, do
you?", the first person is fully justified in saying that the
meaning of the word "run" should be kept narrow enough to address
the question at hand.
I say the same to Mr Cash. For two postings now, he has talked
about showing Jesus, and in both he avoids the question of how
this is related to any of the important truths of Christianity,
in the sense he gives to the word "show". The reason is simple:
whether or not Christianity is true is independent of whether or
not certain Christians "show Jesus" in their behavior.
-----
On the value of arguments:
>> Here, Mr Cash displays another pattern I have much seen in
>> religious argument. It is this: provide a sequence of examples,
>> usually three, all of which but the last are true, though
>> irrelevant to god, and the last of which is relevant to god, and
>> utterly false.
> It is truly remarkable that anyone should think to discover an
> argument here. ...
If Mr Cash reads again my criticism, he will find I did not credit
his rhetoric as an argument. I would *like* to find arguments in
his writing; then I might learn something.
> ... But since I do not think anyone can be compelled to believe
> by arguments, I would think any such effort vain in any case.
Good arguments, and little else, determine my belief on many
things. In part, it was the lack of good arguments for Christian
belief (from the viewpoint of one who still believed!) that
caused me to lose that belief.
In my opinion, Mr Cash places far too little value on argument.
-----
On different uses of "trust":
> ... Now _this_ is interesting. What are the differences between
> trusting a friend, and trusting God? What is meant by calling
> these differences "evidential"? I suspect that, for you, the
> difference is that you don't think that you have a friend in God.
My trust in a friend is due in large part to personal observation
of that friend's behavior, and estimates from that about the
friend's character. Even when I thought god was my friend, I
came to realize that I had *no* way to distinguish his "behavior"
from his not being at all. I also observed that this was true
for most Christians I knew, and that they constructed
rationalizations for this. Furthermore, my beliefs about god's
character had nothing to do with his "behavior" that I
"observed", but rather derived from religious belief, ie, what
other people wrote and said about him. This raised the serious
question of whether anyone actually observed his behavior, or
whether such beliefs were built on the tissue of reinforced
desire to believe. (I did know some Christians who claimed to
talk with god *and* get a response. While I suspect that they
shared much with some of the founding religious figures in the
history of Christianity, I found little evidence for Christian
truths in their claims.)
In short, what generates trust in a friend entails good evidence
that the person exists, but this isn't the case for the Christian
god and the way in which Christians trust him. Far from Mr
Cash's guess about me, I realized this when I still thought I had
a friend in god.
Let me offer to Mr Cash an argument that his trust in god is
substantially different from his trust in people. One can lose
trust in friends. If they behave in certain ways, one decides
that their charcter has changed, or was not really what one
thought it was, and so one no longer views them as trustworthy.
I suspect Mr Cash can describe behavior that would cause him to
lose trust in a friend. Can he describe behavior that would
cause him to lose trust in his god, that would cause him to
decide that he was wrong about his god's character?
Russell
Ron Evans
>You may not like this or agree with it, but what she told you is in
>agreement with the historical teachings of the Christian church, and with
>the New Testament. According to the mainstream of Christian theology, no
>one is deserving enough to be saved; salvation comes out of a relationship
>with God. Thus, it is entirely possible that Ted Bundy will spend eternity
>with God, while Mahatma Gandhi is banished to the outer darkness.
Does it turn your stomach when someone says,
"Germany is the best country in the world"?
Does it turn your stomach when someone says,
"The Caucasian race is the supreme race"?
Does it turn your stomach when someone says,
"The Muslims will win this holy war because
God is on the side of Islam"?
If you answered "Yes" to the questions above, then I ask,
Does it turn your stomach when someone says,
"The only path to salvation is Christian faith"?
No? Then please explain to me why you are not a hypocrite.
Keith Ramsay
In article <20...@cs.utexas.edu>, Russell Turpin writes:
[...]
> The question was posed: in what way is the "truth" one propounds
> different from the "truth" the other propounds? One difference
> occurs when the plane lands, and the artist can then show the
> plumber the painting, so that (while the plumber might still not
> appreciate its merits) he can see for himself that there really
> is such a painting and can examine for himself its features.
I believe it was Al-Ghazzali who claimed that God was not formally
graspable for the following reason:
One distinction is that the love of God is (typically) supposed to be
universal, whereas the presence of a painting is not. This is one
barrier to expressing or pointing to the presence of God in things
(assuming that there is such a thing); one has examples of things
which are not paintings, so as to exhibit the difference, but God is
not a localized phenomenon.
I am not entirely convinced that this prevents one from formally
grasping the nature of God (again assuming there is one), but in
fairness to religion, the next time we go for a gedankenexperiment we
might want to compare the evangelist with someone else who is also
proposing something of a universal, non-localized nature.
Russell Turpin
In article <RAMSAY.91M...@brauer.harvard.edu> ram...@math.harvard.edu (Keith Ramsay) writes:
> One distinction is that the love of God is (typically) supposed to
> be universal, whereas the presence of a painting is not. This is
> one barrier to expressing or pointing to the presence of God in
> things (assuming that there is such a thing); one has examples of
> things which are not paintings, so as to exhibit the difference,
> but God is not a localized phenomenon.
It is quite easy for us to think about how global features of our
world might have been different. The classic example is Mr
Abbott's book on what it would be like to live in a universe
where space is two-dimensional. Even though all our experience
is with three-dimensional space, we can nonetheless deduce the
implications of this, and discern specific ways in which this
universe is different from a counterfactual one where space has
two dimensions, or four.
The argument Mr Ramsay relays above does not help the religious
believer at all. For it to work, god must be not only be
non-local, but must make no imaginable difference at all! And
this describes few gods. (The problem with the hidden "watch-
maker" god of the Enlightenment is not that he cannot be, but
that he does not matter, and that belief in him is unimportant.)
It is quite easy to imagine how the universe would be if it is
entirely natural, rather than created by an omniscient and
omnibenevolent god. Good and bad would make little difference to
the natural order of things, blessings and disasters would follow
natural law and would hence strike those who are good and those
who are evil alike, religious and moral beliefs would be tied to
the troubles an intelligent and social species has in a natural
world where it is yet a kind of an animal, and we would be able
to discern a natural history and development of man. We also
know what the universe would be like were it composed by an
omniscient and omnibenevolent creator with an active interest in
man. The universe would reflect his love and justice, he would
make clear his intentions and the authenticity of those who claim
to know them, the history of man would be shaped by his plans and
interventions, and all aspects of nature would reflect his being.
While this might not be a local phenomena, the presence of this
kind of god would make the universe a very different place from
one that merely follows natural law. The problem for the
religious believer is not that there would be no difference, but
that to the extent that we look for such differences, *this*
universe appears all too natural. The gods either don't exist,
or they hide their presence well. The seeming naturalness of our
universe, far from excusable because of the global nature of god,
is a critical, perhaps fatal, problem for those who believe in
a personal god.
> I am not entirely convinced that this prevents one from formally
> grasping the nature of God (again assuming there is one), but in
> fairness to religion, the next time we go for a gedankenexperiment
> we might want to compare the evangelist with someone else who is
> also proposing something of a universal, non-localized nature.
Such as a physicist who is explaining that macroscopic space has
three dimensions? Now, we don't have to wait for the airplane to
land to contrast this with the evangelist's spiel. The physicist
can demonstrate his claim without leaving his seat! Indeed, if
he had the right equipment, the occupants of the airplane could
test right there that the four dimensions of space and time have
a Lorenzian signature, or that physical laws are invariant under
different frames of reference.
Russell
Keith Ramsay
||You may not like this or agree with it, but what she told you is in
||agreement with the historical teachings of the Christian church, and with
||the New Testament. According to the mainstream of Christian theology, no
||one is deserving enough to be saved; salvation comes out of a relationship
||with God. Thus, it is entirely possible that Ted Bundy will spend eternity
||with God, while Mahatma Gandhi is banished to the outer darkness.
| Does it turn your stomach when someone says,
| "Germany is the best country in the world"?
| Does it turn your stomach when someone says,
| "The Caucasian race is the supreme race"?
In a manner of speaking, yes.
| Does it turn your stomach when someone says,
| "The Muslims will win this holy war because
| God is on the side of Islam"?
How much this bothers me depends on the circumstances. (Compare with
what I say below).
| If you answered "Yes" to the questions above, then I ask,
| Does it turn your stomach when someone says,
| "The only path to salvation is Christian faith"?
No, although it does remind me of a certain sense of frustration I
have in being unable to communicate with these people.
| No? Then please explain to me why you are not a hypocrite.
Whether something nauseates me depends on the motives a person seems
to have, and I don't think all Christians have the same intent as
bigots do.
There certainly exist professed Christians who use the claim
"Christianity is the only path to salvation" with a connotation
equally revolting to "the white race is the supreme race", but I think
you misunderstand the mind-set of many Christians to think that all
Christians who make exclusive claims are as self-superior as that.
Try to imagine someone who is in a theater and thinks that it is on
fire, and that everyone who doesn't leave will soon be killed. Try to
imagine that they think there is only one available exit. All of this
may be deluded, but it is not in and of itself offensive.
You may also think that this person must consider himself superior to
all the other theater goers, for having found the exit, and realized
that there is a fire, but as Mr. Cash points out, the traditional
Christian view is not that the people who are saved are saved by some
virtue of their own. The person in the theater thinks that a
beneficent higher power is helping him out, nay, has even dragged him
kicking and screaming away from a death which he richly deserved, and
wishes in gratitude to serve as the tool for God's extending similar
mercies to others.
Take offense at this type of religious person if you like, but try to
understand the psychology of it, because it is different from the
psychology motivating racists and bigots (IMHO).
Cross-posted to talk.religion.misc. I recommend that people drop
sci.philosophy.meta if they follow up to this.
Russell Turpin
> fire, and that everyone who doesn't leave will soon be killed. Try
>
> You may also think that this person must consider himself superior to
> all the other theater goers, for having found the exit, and realized
> that there is a fire, but as Mr. Cash points out, the traditional
> Christian view is not that the people who are saved are saved by some
> virtue of their own. The person in the theater thinks that a
> beneficent higher power is helping him out, nay, has even dragged him
Continuing this analogy, one soon stumbles across the greatest
lie in orthodox Christian belief.
Let's begin by considering the analogy in more detail. To
continue it, one must note that we unbelievers often listen to
the evangelicals who would direct us to salvation, but that when
we look around as suggested, we do not see any smoke, nor fire,
nor even any theatre. If, in fact, we are deluded, then I
welcome any beneficient higher power who would rescue me from a
conflagration that I cannot even see. If, in fact, I am about to
die from smoke inhalation, which has so overcome my senses and
thinking that I cannot even tell this is is happening, then I
praise the fireman who hauls me down a ladder, or the higher power
who plucks me through the roof. (Higher powers may take this
post, that in my delusion I think I am writing, when in fact I am
dying in a burning theatre, as permission to effect such rescue,
if they are foolish enough to think permission is needed under
such circumstance.)
The lie, which Mr Ramsay propagates, is that, in the cosmology he
draws, salvation is free rather than earned. In fact, the
Christian god demands that people accomplish specific tasks, the
major one of which can require great effort, indeed, that for
some, may be impossible. It is this: that people assent to
certain beliefs. They must do this even if on honest examination,
these beliefs seem false to them. The promised reward for
accomplishing this (and perhaps other tasks, depending on the
particular theology) is paradise; the promised punishment, eternal
perdition.
Evangelists work hard to get people to accomplish this task.
They motivate with the promised reward and threatened punishment.
So far, their stance is at least clear. But then, they say that
what they describe is not a system of rewards and punishments
based on how people behave. What gall! To promise rewards for
desired behavior, and then turn around and say that this is not
what their religion does. Even if I die in a burning theatre, I
will never experience a stench as noisome as that pouring off
this piece of hypocrisy!
This is easily put back into the analogy. The fireman (or higher
power) comes into the burning theatre, and finds there a man who
is suffering a siezure. The man cannot see the fireman, nor
anything beyond whatever hallucinations are produced by his
misfunctioning brain. Unfortunately, fireman (or higher power)
has an odd morality. He will only rescue those who praise him,
or who at least acknowledge his presence. So he leaves the man
to die.
Even this is not enough to make the analogy fit the Christian
god. If the fire exists, it is there because he created it. If
the man suffers a siezure, it is because the Christian god so
made his brain. The fireman is also the arsonist. He drugged the
occupants so that they cannot see the fire, nor him, nor even the
theatre. He decided to burn (not to death, but eternally!) those
who do not believe in him. What a loving god these Christians
have!
Russell
John Donald Collier
>
>Even this is not enough to make the analogy fit the Christian
>god. If the fire exists, it is there because he created it. If
>the man suffers a siezure, it is because the Christian god so
>made his brain. The fireman is also the arsonist. He drugged the
>occupants so that they cannot see the fire, nor him, nor even the
>theatre. He decided to burn (not to death, but eternally!) those
>who do not believe in him. What a loving god these Christians
>have!
>
Nice analysis, in my opinion. It is a fairly accurate (though not
unbiased) account of the views of many sophisticated practitioners of
the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. When I queried on these issues
myself, the reponse was summed up in the words, "I was a Hidden Treasure,
and I longed to be known, so I created the world that I could be known".
The reason that God plays arsonist as well, si to create the situation
in which people will come to know him, though most valuable thing in
the world. It justifies a world of sufferring.
Well, I don't buy it, but then I'm such a sinner that I would put
people ahead of any god, especially the God. What difference do my
doubts make if God is known, by emotional experience, to be the most
valuable thing in the world, and if ones knowledge of God is the most
valuable thing one has -- more valuable than life itself, we are told?
What difference does it make if I know that people can totally deceive
themselves with chemicals or concepts that make their synapses fire in
rewarding ways? What difference does it make that such people loose
much of their sense of proportion, and spawn fanatics? After all, they
are sincere, aren't they? And God loves sincere people who are
convinced to believe in him through his trickery. Or so we are told.
(Read, for example, the early chapters in Exodus, in which God keeps
hardening Pharoh's heart so that when the Isrealites are finally let
go it _had_ to be a miracle. Or the sacrifice of Jesus, the extremity
of his pain and suffering, depiste his innocence.)
The only thing I have against Christians is that I wish they had
stayed out of my life when I was young. Young children should not have
Christianity forced on them (I don't know enough about other religions
to speak about them as well). It took me 20 years to wind my way
through the piously delivered gibberish that impressed my developing
mind. In fact, I am not sure that I will ever be completely recovered
from it. I resent that, you bastards! (That last wasn't directed at
anyone in particular -- just a sort of pious image dressed in robes
leaning over me, telling me that I am a good boy.)
Peter Cash
>But remember what started this thread. There was the Gedanken of
>an airplane, in which an artist was discussing a Chagall painting
>with the plumber seating next to him, and an evangelical
>Christian was discussing Jesus with the person next to her. The
>question was posed: in what way is the "truth" one propounds
>different from the "truth" the other propounds? One difference
>occurs when the plane lands, and the artist can then show the
>plumber the painting, so that (while the plumber might still not
>appreciate its merits) he can see for himself that there really
>is such a painting and can examine for himself its features.
>"Showing" Jesus, in the way Mr Cash relates, is simply irrelevant
>to the question. If the evangelist is able to show Jesus in this
>way, that does not add to the truth of her claims, and if she
>fails to show Jesus in this way, it does not detract from the
>truth of her claims. By changing the use of the word, he has
>ducked the question.
I don't think I'm quite as shifty a character as Russell makes out.
However, to please him, I'll stop talking about what the evangelist shows.
I would, however, like to know a little more about what the _artist_ shows,
and how this "showing" settles the argument between him and the plumber.
Some people who have participated in the discussion in this thread seem to
think that the argument between the artist and the plumber can be
incontrovertibly settled by "showing Chagall" to him. On the other hand,
they think that the argument between the evangelist and the skeptic cannot
be resolved by "showing Jesus". And they think that because there is a way
of settling plumber/artist arguments that is not available for settling
evangelist/skeptic arguments, this means there is a clear difference
between these two different kinds of arguments.
Is that really true?
One of the problems with the example is that I don't know just what kind of
debate these frequent flyers are having. I know that the artist and the
plumber are at each other about Chagall, and the skeptic and the evangelist
are arguing about Jesus. But I could imagine many different sorts of
arguments that could be going on. Here are just three:
1) The plumber says Chagall is a second-rate artist, and doesn't deserve
the fame that has been accorded to him. (The parallell argument between the
evangelist and the skeptic is that Jesus is an overrated Rabbi.)
2) The plumber says Chagall never existed. (The parallell is that the
skeptic insists that there never was a Jesus.)
3) The plumber and the artist have some particular disagreement about one
of Chagall's paintings--perhaps whether or not the human figure in the
foreground of "I and my Village" is a self-portrait of Chagall. (The
parallell might be whether Jesus really turned water into wine during the
marriage feast at Cana.)
Can these versions of the dispute between the plumber and the artist be
easily settled by "showing Chagall"? I don't think so. Let's take the three
versions of the argument I've delineated above, assume that the artist has
dragged the plumber to the nearest museum, and see how the conversation
goes:
1)
Artist: "Here, look at this!" (gestures at Chagall painting). "How can you
say he's not a first-rate artist?"
Plumber: (Scratches his head) "I dunno. It looks pretty derivative of Klee
to me. I just could never see what people saw in this guy. Rockwell--now
_there_ was an artist!"
2)
Artist: "Here, look at this!" (gestures at Chagall painting). "A painting
by Marc Chagall. Look at the plaque--it says 'By Marc Chagall'. _Now_ do
you believe he really existed?"
Plumber: "Nope. I think that's actually a Klee. In fact, I've always
suspected that Chagall was a pseudonym Klee used for some of his more
second-rate works. Fooled everybody--but not me."
3)
Artist: "Here, look at this!" (gestures at Chagall's "I and My Village").
Clearly, that's the artist himself in the foreground.
Plumber: (Peers closely at the painting). "Nah. Looks more like his mother
to me. The animal--the goat or whatever--now maybe _that's_ a self
protrait. Yeah--he used an animal to show himself in the primitive simple
state of childhood.
---
Now, I may have missed something here--perhaps there is a version of the
plumber/artist argument that can be simply and incontrovertibly settled by
"showing Chagall". Perhaps Russell can think of a version of such an
argument (that can also serve as a reasonable parallell to the
evangelist/skeptic argument, of course). However, it seems to me that there
are many different arguments one can have about Chagall, and many ways that
one can show Chagall to a plumber.
>I say the same to Mr Cash. For two postings now, he has talked
>about showing Jesus, and in both he avoids the question of how
>this is related to any of the important truths of Christianity,
>in the sense he gives to the word "show". The reason is simple:
>whether or not Christianity is true is independent of whether or
>not certain Christians "show Jesus" in their behavior.
Yes... are we confused? Of course the truth or falsity of statements like
"Christ and God are one" is independent of whether anyone manages to prove
that they're true. Their truth is even independent of whether or not there is
anyone who _believes_ they're true (i.e., whether or not there are any
Christians.) Do you imagine I said something different?
Perhaps what you mean to say is that the ways in which I have suggested the
evangelist might "show" Jesus are not definitive demonstrations of the
truth of the evangelist's statements. Certainly, they aren't mathematical
proofs or experimental evidence of the kind that would satisfy a physicist;
I never suggested that they were. All I meant to say was that there are
topics other than mathematics and physics about which one can sensibly
disagree, and many ways in which truth or falsity can be "shown".
I had thought that the issue is the one I've attempted (once more) to
address above: that it's not so easy to draw a distinction between
arguments about Christ and arguments about Chagall (and between "showing
Chagall" and "showing Christ") as you seem to think.
Peter Cash
>In article <RAMSAY.91M...@brauer.harvard.edu> ram...@math.harvard.edu (Keith Ramsay) writes:
...things that make me think he has a good deal of sympathy and
understanding for Christians, even if he isn't one of us...
>Continuing this analogy, one soon stumbles across the greatest
>lie in orthodox Christian belief.
...
>The lie, which Mr Ramsay propagates, is that, in the cosmology he
>draws, salvation is free rather than earned. In fact, the
>Christian god demands that people accomplish specific tasks, the
>major one of which can require great effort, indeed, that for
>some, may be impossible. It is this: that people assent to
>certain beliefs. They must do this even if on honest examination,
>these beliefs seem false to them. The promised reward for
>accomplishing this (and perhaps other tasks, depending on the
>particular theology) is paradise; the promised punishment, eternal
>perdition.
This is a misunderstanding--and unfortunately one that is shared by many
Christians. According to mainstream Protestant theology (and I think the
Catholics have also now come around to this view), _nothing_ the believer
does gets him into heaven. No, not even the quality of his faith gets the
believer salvation--entry into heaven is due entirely to the grace of God.
Personally, I'm glad of this, since my faith is far too weak a reed for me
to ascend to such high places.
(I don't want to gloss over the fact that there are many differences among
Christian theologians on the issue of just how salvation is obtained. For
example, some think that though the quality of your faith has nothing to do
with it, you do have to _choose_ God; others think that you have no free
will whatever, and that God chooses you. But all these theologians would
agree that _nothing_ you do makes you deserving or capable of salvation.
Look at Thomas--he doubted Jesus' resurrection, and would only accept
tangible proof, yet the Lord did not reject him. Look at Peter--he
committed apostasy three times, yet the Lord told him to "Feed my sheep".)
>Evangelists work hard to get people to accomplish this task.
>They motivate with the promised reward and threatened punishment.
>So far, their stance is at least clear. But then, they say that
>what they describe is not a system of rewards and punishments
>based on how people behave. What gall! To promise rewards for
>desired behavior, and then turn around and say that this is not
>what their religion does. Even if I die in a burning theatre, I
>will never experience a stench as noisome as that pouring off
>this piece of hypocrisy!
Perhaps you should stop watching so much TV. All the wrong evangelists hang
out there.
>This is easily put back into the analogy. The fireman (or higher
>power) comes into the burning theatre, and finds there a man who
>is suffering a siezure. The man cannot see the fireman, nor
>anything beyond whatever hallucinations are produced by his
>misfunctioning brain. Unfortunately, fireman (or higher power)
>has an odd morality. He will only rescue those who praise him,
>or who at least acknowledge his presence. So he leaves the man
>to die.
How about this: the fireman will only rescue those who let him. He won't
force you to leave, if you like it there so much. (I'd highly recommend
reading C.S. Lewis' _The Great Divorce_ on this subject.)
>Even this is not enough to make the analogy fit the Christian
>god. If the fire exists, it is there because he created it. If
>the man suffers a siezure, it is because the Christian god so
>made his brain. The fireman is also the arsonist. He drugged the
>occupants so that they cannot see the fire, nor him, nor even the
>theatre. He decided to burn (not to death, but eternally!) those
>who do not believe in him. What a loving god these Christians
>have!
I certainly don't recognize Him in your description!
Peter Cash
In article <20...@cs.utexas.edu> tur...@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin) writes:
>This is easily put back into the analogy. The fireman (or higher
>power) comes into the burning theatre, and finds there a man who
>is suffering a siezure. The man cannot see the fireman, nor
>anything beyond whatever hallucinations are produced by his
>misfunctioning brain. Unfortunately, fireman (or higher power)
>has an odd morality. He will only rescue those who praise him,
>or who at least acknowledge his presence. So he leaves the man
>to die.
I didn't quite deal with the whole example as Russell constructed it: we're
supposed to envision a man having an epileptic seizuere in the burning
theatre; he can't choose to leave, and doesn't even know he's there. Thus,
unlike you or me, he's not even in a position to decide that he doesn't
like it there.
But of course God rescues him! Why in the world would you think He doesn't?
Remember, not even faith is a requirement.
Ron Evans
pet...@sirius.UVic.CA (Doug Peters) writes:
>3. You demonstrate a very shallow understanding of what Christianity
>teaches. Since you are in computer science you will recognize that it
OK, Mr. Peters, I will turn to you for enlightenment.
1) According to Christian tenets, is a Jew who follows the
teachings of Christ (but does not accept Christ as Saviour)
less likely to attain salvation than a good Christian?
2) Do you have any reason to believe that salvation is more
likely to be attained through Christ than through Mohammed?
Russell Turpin
In article <1991May31.1...@convex.com> ca...@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:
> ... According to mainstream Protestant theology (and I think the
> Catholics have also now come around to this view), _nothing_ the
>
> (I don't want to gloss over the fact that there are many differences
> among Christian theologians on the issue of just how salvation is
> obtained. For example, some think that though the quality of your
There is a direct and irresoluble contradiction between the
claims that (1) "nothing the believer does gets him into heaven",
and (2) that one has to "choose God" (whatever this means) in
order to be saved.
> ... others think that you have no free will whatever, and that God
> chooses you. ...
This is the only salvation scheme that is consistent with the
claim that "_nothing_ you do makes you deserving or capable of
salvation". Most American Christians do not believe in a
predestined election that leaves no room for a person's will.
But any salvation scheme that leaves such room *directly*
contradicts the claim that salvation is entirely the work of
their god.
>> Evangelists work hard to get people to accomplish this task
>> [to believe]. ...
> Perhaps you should stop watching so much TV. All the wrong
> evangelists hang out there. ...
Almost every Christian evangelist and apologist I have ever read,
from Paul to Thomas, and including also C S Lewis, who Mr Cash
recommends below, include this theme in their writings. All urge
belief in Christianity, and warn that salvation can hang on this.
I agree with Mr Cash that this theme is only *appropriate* to the
likes of Bakker, Robertson, and Falwell, rather than to anyone
who is thoughtful in their religion. But that does not change
the fact that this theme looms large in Christian writings.
(Calvinists, of course, would argue that Paul was a
predestinationist, but this clearly is not the case with Thomas
and Lewis. Quite frankly, I wish we would drop this aspect of
the issue. I admit that it provides an escape to the
contradiction I condemn. Indeed, avoiding this contradiction was
a major motivation behind Calvin's theology. But this does
nothing to resolve the problems of more orthodox Christian
belief. If Mr Cash believes in predestinationism, I apologize
for accusing him of harboring a contradiction that does not apply
to his beliefs. If not, then let's drop this side issue.)
> How about this: the fireman will only rescue those who let him.
> He won't force you to leave, if you like it there so much. ...
This does not accurately describe most nonbelievers. There are,
admittedly, a few people who both believe in the Christian
cosmology and at the same time reject the Christian god. These
are appropriately compared to people who say "thank you, but I'd
rather stay in this burning theatre". But most nonbelievers do
*not* reject god, rather they do not believe that he is there.
The correct analogy is *not* the person who refuses to leave a
flaming theatre, but the person lying unconscious on the floor
and who does not realize that the theatre is in flames.
> ... (I'd highly recommend reading C.S. Lewis' _The Great
> Divorce_ on this subject.)
I have read this. Lewis propagates precisely the fallacy I
condemn, made to sound good through his artful prose, but a
fallacy nonetheless. To the extent that his story works, it
contradicts traditional Christianity, as Lewis argues for it
elsewhere. To the extent that he remains faithful to the latter,
his story does not work and his analogy is as weak as Mr Cash's.
>> Even this is not enough to make the analogy fit the Christian
>> god. If the fire exists, it is there because he created it. If
>> If the man suffers a siezure, it is because the Christian god so
>> made his brain. The fireman is also the arsonist. He drugged the
>> occupants so that they cannot see the fire, nor him, nor even the
>> theatre. ...
> I certainly don't recognize Him in your description!
Perhaps Mr Cash would answer some questions that concern the
relevant details. Does he believe in hell? If so, who does he
believe created it? If the answers are "yes" and "god", we have
the arsonist in hand.
Russell
Russell Turpin
I am directing followups to t.r.m only, and will participate in
that newsgroup for a while to follow this thread.
-----
In article <PETERS.91M...@unet2.UVic.CA> pet...@sirius.UVic.CA (Doug Peters) writes:
> 1. If Christianity is anything-approaching-valid, (please allow
> yourself the openness of mind to permit this for the moment) then
> no analogy will be sufficient to represent the situation between
> God and man. So if you have problems with the analogy, don't
> project them onto Christianity.
It was Mr Cash, a Christian, who proposed the analogy of a
burning theatre. It should be noted that this analogy, or some
similar one, is commonly used by Christians to justify their
god's salvation scheme. I have tried to be careful when
discussing it to point to how I think it applies to Christian
doctrine, and how it fails in that regard. I concur with Mr
Peters that analogies are slippery kinds of arguments, but I
don't think I should be blamed for my willingness to discuss the
issues in terms of an analogy that Christians themselves put
forth.
I would be quite happy if all involved in such issues agreed that
analogies are too sloppy, and henceforth they would not use them
in discussing these issues. But I can understand Christians'
reluctance to do this, given the proclivity of their avatar to
rely so heavily on analogies -- known as parables -- in his
earthly teachings.
> 2. Your flame against evangelists is entirely inappropriate in this
> forum. There are thousands of sincere Christians out there who are
> made just as uncomfortable by these people as you are.
Again, I was not the one who first mentioned TV evangelists. My
respondent wanted to lay blame for certain aspects of Christian
teaching on them. I merely pointed out that these aspects of
Christian teaching are strongly featured in the writings of some
of the more skilled and famous Christian apologists throughout
history. For whatever else one might blame TV evangelists, they
cannot be credited with a tradition that was centuries old when
they were not yet born.
Even though I now only rarely participate, I suspect my history
in talk.religion.misc is longer than Mr Peters'. I well realize
that there are many different kinds of Christianity, and that the
aspects I criticize are not universal to all of them. Some
participants in t.r.m are rightly embarrassed by TV evangelists,
for example, Mr Siemon's sophistication and faith suffers by
being linked with these. Other participants want to disavow TV
evangelists, despite the fact that they and the TV evangelists
have beliefs that share their worst features. Others, such as
robert@kontu, provide an example next to which the TV evangelists
look intelligent and perceptive. I think these comments are
fully appropriate to this newsgroup.
> 3. You demonstrate a very shallow understanding of what
> Christianity teaches. ...
>
> You write:
> "the Christian god demands that people accomplish specific tasks..."
> in particular "that people assent to certain beliefs"
> (I believe that this is the gist of your posting)
>
> perhaps it is more accurate to state that
> "the Christian god demands that people admit to their inability to
> handle ultimate reality"
Does not "admitting to" something imply assent to a certain belief,
to wit, that the proposition "admitted to" is true? It seems to
me that Mr Peters' has accused me of falsely blaming Christianity
for the very thing that he turns around and asserts! I totally
fail to understand any substantial difference between requiring
people to "admit to" certain propositions, and requiring them to
assent to the belief that these propositions are true. (I would
also note that the proposition Mr Peters states is not
particularly Christian. It is held by many animists, Buddhists,
and even atheists. For a creed that is more particularly
Christian, I would urge him to consider the Nicene or one of the
other councillor creeds.)
> Incidentally, misconceptions like "God set the fire" result from
> taking a poor (Christian) model of ultimate reality and shoving it
> into a linear, one-dimensional structure of logic (of which the model,
> let alone the ultimate reality that it attempts to represent, was never
> meant to fit!)
Again, I have no idea what Mr Peters might mean here. Despite
having studied logic at the graduate level for several years, I
have not the faintest idea what a "linear, one-dimensional
structure of logic" is. The index of Barwise's "Handbook of
Mathematical Logic" has no reference to one-dimensional
structures, and the references to "linear" concern ordered sets,
whose applicability to this discussion I do not see. Would Mr
Peters perhaps explain what he means by this?
If Mr Peters proposes to teach me how I am wrong about what
Christianity teaches, or in how I discuss it, he will have to
make himself more clear than he has so far.
I would like to note that my major criticism of orthodox
Christianity in this thread (from which predestinationism is
excepted) stems from the recognition that "admitting to",
"believing", "assenting", etc, are themselves human acts. One
who believes that the Christian god demands any of these of
people to be saved (and seemingly, this includes Mr Peters),
contradict themselves if they then turn around and say that their
god's salvation scheme does not involve man doing anything.
Given such demands, the Christian salvation scheme is
straightforwardly one that rewards certain actions, and that
punishes others. By it, those who do certain things deserve
eternal bliss, and those who fail, eternal perdition. In short,
it is precisely the kind of thing that Christians claim it is
not! This criticism stands whether or not one believes that the
Christian god created hell, and whether or not this latter
includes active torment.
Russell
Russell Turpin
> it: we're supposed to envision a man having an epileptic seizuere
> in the burning theatre; he can't choose to leave, and doesn't even
> know he's there. Thus, unlike you or me, he's not even in a
> position to decide that he doesn't like it there.
Mr Cash, most of us nonbelievers are in no "position to decide
that we don't like" the doom to which Christians say we are
rushing, because we don't see that that is the case. I have
looked in the way evangelists prescribe, and I see neither a
burning theatre, nor the Christian god. Like an epileptic or
blind man in a theatre, I do not see what you describe.
But, as I wrote before, if I am deluded, and I am about to burn
to death in a theatre that I cannot see, then I welcome rescue.
> But of course God rescues him! ... Remember, not even faith
> is a requirement.
Good. Here, Mr Cash paints a kinder, gentler, and very
different god than does traditional Christianity.
Russell
Doug Peters
1. If Christianity is anything-approaching-valid, (please allow
yourself the openness of mind to permit this for the moment) then no
analogy will be sufficient to represent the situation between God and
man. So if you have problems with the analogy, don't project them
onto Christianity.
2. Your flame against evangelists is entirely inappropriate in this
forum. There are thousands of sincere Christians out there who are
made just as uncomfortable by these people as you are.
3. You demonstrate a very shallow understanding of what Christianity
teaches. Since you are in computer science you will recognize that it
is always easy to complain about a first-order model for a high-order
system:
You write:
"the Christian god demands that people accomplish specific tasks..."
in particular "that people assent to certain beliefs"
(I believe that this is the gist of your posting)
perhaps it is more accurate to state that
"the Christian god demands that people admit to their inability to
handle ultimate reality"
Now, if you can say that "on honest examination", this proposition
must be rejected, you surprise me! :-)
Incidentally, misconceptions like "God set the fire" result from
taking a poor (Christian) model of ultimate reality and shoving it
into a linear, one-dimensional structure of logic (of which the model,
let alone the ultimate reality that it attempts to represent, was never
meant to fit!)
regards
dp
Russell Turpin
I apologize if I have implied that Mr Cash has been purposely
deceptive in this thread. This was not my intent, nor do I have
any reason to think that he is consciously trying to fool anyone.
But I remain convinced that there is deception in his rhetoric.
We all, at times, adopt "shifty" ideas, and then (attempt to)
pass them on to others, especially when we are defending a dearly
held ideology. One can do this with good intent and honest
motivation. Those who propagate such deceptions are themselves
only earlier victims of these. Often, it takes confrontation
with these "lying thoughts" to realize that it is time to drop or
revise one's cherished beliefs.
> I would, however, like to know a little more about what the
> _artist_ shows, and how this "showing" settles the argument
> between him and the plumber. ...
>
> One of the problems with the example is that I don't know just
> what kind of debate these frequent flyers are having. I know
> that the artist and the plumber are at each other about Chagall,
> and the skeptic and the evangelist are arguing about Jesus. But
> I could imagine many different sorts of arguments that could be
> going on. Here are just three: ...
It is not surprising that none of the three arguments Mr Cash
lists parallel the argument between the evangelist and skeptic.
As has been discussed previously in this thread, aesthetic
evaluation and claims that something exists differ in important
ways. Similarly, concerns with particular features don't
parallel the discussion between the evangelist and skeptic
(though they might parallel the discussion between believers in
different gods).
There *is* a very simple and obvious parallel. The artist claims
that the picture he describes hangs in public display in the
building where the janitor cleans. The janitor says that not
only is this painting not in the building, but that there is no
evidence of *any* paintings in the building in question.
One might object that this kind of argument makes it too easy to
resolve the question by having the artist show the janitor the
painting in question, indeed, that this kind of thing is so
easily decided that it is rarely the topic of serious argument.
But it precisely parallels the other argument on the airplane.
The gods, if they exist and wish us to know it, could make
themselves as apparent as the Golden Gate bridge. It is only
because they are (if they are at all) less visible than the
aether that this thread continues. Most of what has transpired
here has been rhetorical attempts by believers to cross this
great chasm, and responses by skeptics that they don't even come
close.
> Now, I may have missed something here--perhaps there is a
> version of the plumber/artist argument that can be simply and
> incontrovertibly settled by "showing Chagall". Perhaps Russell
> can think of a version of such an argument (that can also serve
> as a reasonable parallell to the evangelist/skeptic argument,
> of course). ...
Mr Cash misses the obvious, because the deceptive memes in his
thoughts and apparent in his argument are still protecting his
cherished beliefs.
> Perhaps what you mean to say is that the ways in which I
> have suggested the evangelist might "show" Jesus are not
> definitive demonstrations of the truth of the evangelist's
> statements. Certainly, they aren't mathematical proofs or
> experimental evidence of the kind that would satisfy a
> physicist; I never suggested that they were. ...
The ways in which the evangelist "shows" Jesus does not provide
*any* evidence that Jesus really is. Again, the appropriate
analogy is not a mathematical proof, nor the subtle features
of physics examined in labs, but easily demonstrable features
of our world, such as the Golden Gate bridge.
If the gods are, and want to be known, they could be as apparent
and as easy to show as this manmade structure. Believers go to
great lengths to explain why this is not the case. But their
explanations are always empty and their analogies flawed. The
issue does not require mathematical precision, nor is it one of
aesthetics, nor (with skeptics) does it concern particular
aspects of god. The first question is merely what there is: show
me this god of which you speak. In this, believers fail
*totally*. To continue the analogy, it is as if the artist leads
the janitor into the building, takes a deep breath and says "isn't
it a beautiful oil painting!" The janitor looks around, sees no
painting, and asks, puzzled, "what are you talking about?" The
artist says "here, breathe deep, and then look". The janitor
breathes deep, and still sees no painting. The artist says "well,
first you have to believe it is there". The janitor asks "how
can I believe without first seeing?"
At this point, their discussion really does turn religious, and
rather than paralleling that between the evangelist and skeptic,
is practically identical with it. What believers need to realize
is that they are like the artist who sees paintings that others
see not at all.
Russell
Ron Evans
ram...@math.harvard.edu (Keith Ramsay) writes:
>There certainly exist professed Christians who use the claim
>"Christianity is the only path to salvation" with a connotation
>equally revolting to "the white race is the supreme race", but I think
>you misunderstand the mind-set of many Christians to think that all
>Christians who make exclusive claims are as self-superior as that.
>
>Try to imagine someone who is in a theater and thinks that it is on
>fire, and that everyone who doesn't leave will soon be killed. Try to
>imagine that they think there is only one available exit. All of this
>may be deluded, but it is not in and of itself offensive.
>You may also think that this person must consider himself superior to
>all the other theater goers, for having found the exit, and realized
>that there is a fire, but as Mr. Cash points out, the traditional
>Christian view is not that the people who are saved are saved by some
>virtue of their own.
The Christian even magnanimously beckons to people
standing by other exits, hoping they will see
the light and come over to "the only saving exit".
What revolts me is this. He
feels that his knowledge is so superior that when
some people decide to stick with their chosen exits,
he looks upon them with pity and has the gall to
preach that they will all burn for eternity.
>...
>Take offense at this type of religious person if you like, but try to
>understand the psychology of it, because it is different from the
>psychology motivating racists and bigots (IMHO).
You are right.
The Aryan supremacist, secure in the knowledge that
his race is superior, looks upon the Jew with scorn.
The Christian, secure in the knowledge that salvation
is attainable ONLY through Christ, looks upon the
Jew with pity.
Ron Evans
>I didn't quite deal with the whole example as Russell constructed it: we're
>supposed to envision a man having an epileptic seizuere in the burning
>theatre; he can't choose to leave, and doesn't even know he's there. Thus,
>unlike you or me, he's not even in a position to decide that he doesn't
>like it there.
>But of course God rescues him! Why in the world would you think He doesn't?
>Remember, not even faith is a requirement.
On the contrary, faith in Christ IS a requirement.
Some realize the lunacy of believing that people
who have never even heard of Jesus Christ are going
to burn in Hell. So they collect money to send bibles
to Russia, India, and China. That way, these
non-Christians are warned, and if they still decide to
pursue God through a different path, hey, pity them,
but it is THEIR CHOICE: they will burn in Hell.
Infants, imbeciles, and others incapable of
making a decision to choose Christ will be saved by
the goodness of God. What a consolation.
Keith Ramsay
Thank you.
> The Aryan supremacist, secure in the knowledge that
> his race is superior, looks upon the Jew with scorn.
> The Christian, secure in the knowledge that salvation
> is attainable ONLY through Christ, looks upon the
> Jew with pity.
The kind of delusion typical among the latter nauseates me less by
quite a bit. Misplaced pity simply offends me that much less than
misplaced scorn. For another thing, I find that understanding someone
well often diffuses one's sense of resentment at them, and I think my
experiences among Christians (having once been one) have given me a
certain amount of insight into their thoughts and feelings. This is
why I answered your question (directed at someone else) of how someone
could be nauseated by one and not the other, without being a
hypocrite.
For some people, the very idea that some minority of people could be
in possession of superior knowledge of the general situation of
mankind is absurd and possibly offensive. I don't share this point of
view; it is not the very idea which is absurd or offensive, but the
particular instances of it which are (nearly always) absurd and
(often) offensive.
--
If you want to write to me after June 6,
Keith Ramsay write c/o Harvard math dept., 1 Oxford St.,
ram...@zariski.harvard.edu Cambridge MA, 02138.
Keith Ramsay
> believer at all.
The discussion was not intended to help the believer, but to help
*you*. My objective is not to defend this or that religious belief,
but to improve the honesty and accuracy of the analysis of what makes
their belief and yours different.
There are many ways in which beliefs, and the process leading to
beliefs, may differ. You have been presenting us with examples of
non-religious belief which differ in many other ways from religious
belief than the ones you seem to regard as crucial.
Perhaps you lack the patience to examine them all, and perhaps this is
why you are so easily convinced that the differences you claim are the
crucial ones.
> For it to work, god must be not only be
> non-local, but must make no imaginable difference at all!
The universe need not be such that every property is available on
immediate inspection.
> And this describes few gods. (The problem with the hidden "watch-
> maker" god of the Enlightenment is not that he cannot be, but
> that he does not matter, and that belief in him is unimportant.)
I don't agree with your view of what is relevant.
> It is quite easy to imagine how the universe would be if it is
> entirely natural, rather than created by an omniscient and
> omnibenevolent god.
The problem with this is that you aren't specifying in any particulars
the kind of model of a natural world you require to make these
predictions. It is the easiest thing in the world to adapt your view
of what a natural world would be like to fit the world as it is. I am
sure it is obvious to you that believers adapt their view to fit the
world as it is, but have you any way of assuring me that you are not
doing something similar? It seems plausible to me that the world is
entirely natural, but there is little but a general impression of
plausibility to back this.
One might attempt a more refined notion of how the world would exist
purely naturally, based on information theory or some such. The last
time I tried to elicit from fellow netters a more well-defined concept
of what one may a priori expect from a natural world, I was likened to
Bullwinkle the Moose. This seems to be par for the net, at least in
those groups which pretend to discuss the nature of the universe.
> Good and bad would make little difference to
> the natural order of things, [...]
I do not understand why the universe should necessarily be as
functional and orderly as it is. Certain features of the world seem
poised delicately between small variations which would apparently have
made things much harder for life (like ice sinking instead of
floating).
You are no doubt going to think how terribly vague such notions are,
but just how precisely founded are your expectations of what the world
should "naturally" be like?
Have you for example a notion something like a prior probability
distribution on possible worlds, so as to allow us to infer whether
the way the world is really should be a surprise or not? The last time
we discussed this, you denied needing anything of the kind. I simply
do not know how one is supposed to evaluate such claims.
> We also know what the universe would be like were it composed by an
> omniscient and omnibenevolent creator with an active interest in
> man. The universe would reflect his love and justice, he would
> make clear his intentions and the authenticity of those who claim
> to know them, the history of man would be shaped by his plans and
> interventions, and all aspects of nature would reflect his being.
God would play big daddy, and hold our hands. The people chained up in
Plato's cave would be given a nice bright sun lamp so they wouldn't
have to worry about the darkness. Maybe. If I had a way of being
confident this were so, without making various presumptive assumptions
on what is *necessary* and what is *good*, I'd also disbelieve in an
omnipotent and entirely good God.
In some sense I take this type of argument as proof against the sort
of God who is capable of arranging any situation which can be
described by us, but I think this is too stringent an interpretation
of such phrases as "all powerful".
It is possible I suppose that in future years I'll see this situation
as being just as clear and clean-cut as you do, but for the time being
I don't find this kind of claim about the way the world would be very
helpful.
>> I am not entirely convinced that this prevents one from formally
>> grasping the nature of God (again assuming there is one), but in
>> fairness to religion, the next time we go for a gedankenexperiment
>> we might want to compare the evangelist with someone else who is
>> also proposing something of a universal, non-localized nature.
> Such as a physicist who is explaining that macroscopic space has
> three dimensions? [...]
Observant of you to qualify this with "macroscopic", now that we have
attempted theories which have 10 or 27 dimensions at a microscopic
scale. One question we can ask is whether the physicist will be able
to explain why he believes there is such a thing as space at all, and
not merely distance relationships between objects, as some have
proposed. "Isn't space just an abstract mathematical model for
relationships between bodies. After all, there's no such *real*
*thing* as space, is there?" Shouldn't this be an attractive view for
someone with an ontology like yours?
--
If you want to contact me after this week,
Keith Ramsay
In order to explain to Ron Evans why I think it is possible to be
disgusted by white supremacists and the like, and not to be disgusted
by Christians, without being a hypocrite, I described the attitude of
many Christians toward those whom they wish to "save". I used an
analogy with some kind of immanent disaster, a fire in a theater.
In article <20...@cs.utexas.edu>, Russell Turpin writes:
| Let's begin by considering the analogy in more detail. To
| continue it, one must note that we unbelievers often listen to
| the evangelicals who would direct us to salvation, but that when
| we look around as suggested, we do not see any smoke, nor fire,
| nor even any theatre.
I described the analogy specifically in terms of what the zealot
*thinks* is happening. I left open the possibility for the reader to
suppose, if desired, suppose there is no fire.
Is it also essential to your argument to assume that big disasters
will necessarily evidence themselves in some obvious form? Not
everyone makes this assumption; it is certainly not "implicit in human
discourse", as you say.
| If, in fact, we are deluded, then I
| welcome any beneficient higher power who would rescue me from a
| conflagration that I cannot even see.
Glory be! :-)
| [...] (Higher powers may take this
| post, that in my delusion I think I am writing, when in fact I am
| dying in a burning theatre,
Literalism is a fine thing, Russell, in its place, but you're twisting
the interpretation of the analogy in ways which I think you can tell
don't make sense.
| as permission to effect such rescue,
| if they are foolish enough to think permission is needed under
| such circumstance.)
Halleluia!
| The lie, which Mr Ramsay propagates, is that, in the cosmology he
| draws, salvation is free rather than earned.
I suppose it was inevitable that eventually someone would accuse me of
propagating "lies", but I am disappointed that it was the likes of
Russell Turpin who did it.
Your essential mistake here lies in superposing your own manner of
thinking onto your view of someone else's.
The question being answered was not even "Does the typical Christian
have a consistent world-view", but what their attitude is toward the
process of salvation. Now I grant you that it is a difficult job
absorbing any world-view which is substantially different from one's
own, but I would have thought that you, at least, as a fellow
ex-Christian, would have some degree of sensitivity to the nuances.
You may regard giving God all the credit for "salvation" as absurd,
but it is an accurate representation of typical Christian doctrine. At
I'm not sure it is worth the trouble to describe the ways in which
various Christian theologies try to embrace this notion.
I have explained before in talk.religion.misc that I regard the
overemphasis on belief in the majority of Christians and Christian
groups to be a symptom of basic self-deceptive processes at work.
Keith Ramsay
> claims that (1) "nothing the believer does gets him into heaven",
> and (2) that one has to "choose God" (whatever this means) in
> order to be saved.
It is clear that Christians generally have a concept of what makes one
intrinsically deserving of "credit" which is radically different from
yours.
Certain Christians would say that God *causes* you to accept
salvation. By this view, the fact that one also chooses to accept is a
side-effect of the work God has already done inside one. Salvation is
regarded as a transformation of your nature, and accepting the change
is part of it.
You appear to think that God causing you to make a certain choice is
incompatible with your having freely chosen it. (This is not exactly
what you said, of course.) In essence, this is the same contradiction
as certain people believe exists between determinism and free will in
general.
This happens not to be a view I share. I think the conclusion of
incompatibility rests on certain implicit views- epistemological
baggage, one might say- regarding causality and choice. It is a
notoriously tricky philosophical question, though, and if you want to
read up on it, it would probably be best to look in the philosophical
literature rather than usenet discussions on it.
> (Calvinists, of course, would argue that Paul was a
> predestinationist, but this clearly is not the case with Thomas
> and Lewis. Quite frankly, I wish we would drop this aspect of
> the issue. I admit that it provides an escape to the
> contradiction I condemn. Indeed, avoiding this contradiction was
> a major motivation behind Calvin's theology. But this does
> nothing to resolve the problems of more orthodox Christian
> belief. If Mr Cash believes in predestinationism, I apologize
> for accusing him of harboring a contradiction that does not apply
> to his beliefs. If not, then let's drop this side issue.)
As it happens, my own early exposure to Christianity was in a
Calvinist church (you might say, a "very" Calvinist church), and it
may well be that my views of general Christian belief are somewhat
tinged with Calvinist elements. I would be indeed amused to observe
you produce solid refutations of Christian theologies, but only of the
*non-Calvinist* ones. :-)
Perhaps from now on I should let the believing Christians answer
further questions about their beliefs, instead of attempting to answer
them for them.
Russell Turpin
In article <RAMSAY.91...@brauer.harvard.edu> ram...@math.harvard.edu (Keith Ramsay) writes:
> The question being answered was not even "Does the typical Christian
> have a consistent world-view", but what their attitude is toward the
> process of salvation. Now I grant you that it is a difficult job
> absorbing any world-view which is substantially different from one's
> own, but I would have thought that you, at least, as a fellow
> ex-Christian, would have some degree of sensitivity to the nuances.
>
> You may regard giving God all the credit for "salvation" as absurd,
It is *not* an accurate representation of typical Christian
doctrine. It is an accurate representation of how Christians want
to view their doctrine. There is a big difference.
I grant that Mr Ramsay accurately captures part of how many
Christians want to view the human condition. I think it is more
than just giving their god all credit for salvation. It is also
a matter of viewing their god as good, damnation as something
that their god (in some sense) has little choice about, and also
of distinguishing Christianity from other religions that they
(mistakenly) believe are all characterized by showing how man can
earn some kind of salvation.
While it may not have been Mr Ramsay's intent to address whether
this Christian way of looking at itself is consistent with its
own doctrines, that is expressly what I addressed.
Christianity's desired view of itself, as (well) described by Mr
Ramsay -- that salvation is god's work and man does not earn it
-- directly contradicts traditional doctrines concerning
salvation (with tangential streams such as universalism and
predestinationism excepted). Given the traditional salvation
scheme and traditional beliefs about human free will and the loss
of some souls from failure to believe, men *do* earn their
salvation. Traditional Christianity's desire to describe itself
otherwise is a lie.
> I suppose it was inevitable that eventually someone would accuse
> me of propagating "lies", but I am disappointed that it was the
> likes of Russell Turpin who did it.
Precisely because I do have a Christian background, and struggled
with the attempts of various Christian thinkers to resolve this
contradiction, from Aquinas to Pascal to Lewis, when I write
about it there is probably more vehemence that it deserves. I
apologize to Mr Ramsay for allowing this to spill over against
him.
Russell
Russell Turpin
I wrote:
> Precisely because I do have a Christian background, and struggled
> with the attempts of various Christian thinkers to resolve this
> contradiction, from Aquinas to Pascal to Lewis, when I write
That should read: "more THAN it deserves". This would have
been a truly embarrassing slip of the tounge were I not
confessing what it tends to reveal.
Russell
Charles Hedrick
>Christianity's desired view of itself, as (well) described by Mr
>Ramsay -- that salvation is god's work and man does not earn it
>-- directly contradicts traditional doctrines concerning
>salvation (with tangential streams such as universalism and
>predestinationism excepted). Given the traditional salvation
>scheme and traditional beliefs about human free will and the loss
>of some souls from failure to believe, men *do* earn their
>salvation. Traditional Christianity's desire to describe itself
>otherwise is a lie.
I can't speak for Catholics, but I can say that modern Protestants are
by and large in a rather odd situation. They claim to believe in
justification by faith, but reject the Biblical analysis used by the
Reformers to arrive at it. The "generic" American Protestant view is
rather similar to that of Luther's opponent, Erasmus: God is waiting
to save you, and needs only a small initial act from you. As Luther
points out, this still says that ultimately whether someone is saved
or not depends not upon God but upon something that they do, i.e.
whether they give their consent or not. The fact that the initial act
is trivial doesn't make things any better. Indeed Luther comments
that it may make things worse. At least Pelagius believed that
salvation required a serious commitment to living a good life. To say
that it depends upon a trivial act is not obviously an improvement.
At any rate, it is precisely this initial act of giving consent that
is impossible for Russell. If Russell is going to be saved, it's
going to in the Lutheran or Calvinist manner, because he's incapable
of making the initial move towards God on his own. This is of course
precisely the position that Luther believed all men are in.
Personally I suspect God has something up his sleeve for Russell
(though any attempt to turn this hope into a doctrine leads off in the
direction of universalism, a direction I am reluctant to follow). It
strikes me that responses to his attacks have more than a casual
resemblence to the responses of Job's friends. There is indeed a good
case to be made that God is immoral. Most attempts to justify him so
far have seemed rather unconvincing. I think the book of Job suggests
that God prefers the honesty of someone who protests against him than
attempts at justification.
Ron Evans
>You may not like this or agree with it, but what she told you is in
>agreement with the historical teachings of the Christian church, and with
>the New Testament. According to the mainstream of Christian theology, no
>one is deserving enough to be saved; salvation comes out of a relationship
>with God. Thus, it is entirely possible that Ted Bundy will spend eternity
>with God, while Mahatma Gandhi is banished to the outer darkness.
Mr. Cash says above that salvation comes out of a
relationship with God. In another post, he suggests that
faith in God is not a requirement for salvation. In another
post, he says that the "fireman will only rescue those who
let him". Are these consistent? To help me sort this out,
I'd appreciate answers to the following questions.
1) If faith in God is not a requirement, why might Mahatma Gandhi
be "banished to the outer darkness"?
2) If an atheist dies of a sudden heart attack, what happens to him?
Did he let the fireman rescue him or not?
3) If Ted Bundy will spend an eternity with God, who goes to Hell?
4) If Jesus indeed saves everybody, then as far as salvation goes,
do those Christians who had a personal relationship with Christ
realize any advantage?
If Mr. Ramsay wants to tackle these questions, I
admire his courage.
Ron Evans
>One way to show someone Jesus is to
>act in love.
>...
>And no, I wasn't referring to the teachings of Jesus, but to Jesus himself.
In a previous post, I complained about my disgust with the
superiority complex many Christians possess. I refer to the ones
who claim that their beliefs are the ONLY correct ones, e.g.,
salvation comes ONLY through Jesus Christ, etc. I received email
calling me a bigot for feeling disgust with a religion that I
don't agree with. Let me thus emphasize that there are many
religionists who do NOT disgust me, despite the fact that I don't
share their views. In another post, I related the Christian
superiority with that of a white supremacist, but I agree with
Mr. Ramsay that the latter is much more hateful, so let me try
a different comparison. The disgust is something like that I
might feel if Linus Pauling were to express his belief that
Vitamin C is effective against the common cold, that he had
absolutely no doubt of this, that contrary views were simply
wrong, and that moreover no other treatment can be effective.
Or, the disgust is like that I might feel if Rubenstein
expressed his belief that the only worthwhile music is
classical music, and that people who listen to jazz or rock or
folk music are listening to junk, are devoid of any
taste, and are pitiful. A Christian is entitled to feel that his
religion is best for HIM. But why can't he be tolerant of
other religions? Why must he claim that HE has a monopoly
on the truth and that the other religions are all wrong?
Why can't he admit that while he himself believes that salvation
comes through Jesus, it is equally likely that
salvation comes instead (or as well) by other means?
The opening quote above from Mr. Cash illustrates
the attitude of superiority to which I refer.. Could he go to
Bombay and say with a straight face that by acting in love, the
Indians will be "shown" Jesus himself? Can't he admit the
possibility that the Indians will instead encounter
Krishna?
Finally, let me hasten to add that I don't mean to
pick on Christians alone. Any Muslim who tells me that
he has absolutely no doubt that
Gabriel brought revelations to the prophet Muhammad from
God and that all contrary statements from
Christians have no chance of being correct, will display
an attitude of superiority that repels me.
No believer should claim that his faith gives him a monopoly
on the truth.
Scott Cattanach
>-----
>(mistakenly) believe are all characterized by showing how man can
>earn some kind of salvation.
>of some souls from failure to believe, men *do* earn their
>salvation. Traditional Christianity's desire to describe itself
>otherwise is a lie.
There is a difference between EARNING salvation and OBTAINING it. If
I win the Publisher's Clearing House Sweepstakes, I have OBTAINED
millions of dollars. That is a statement of fact. Most people would
make the value judgement that I have not EARNED the money, however.
You have to take the action of accepting a gift to obtain it, that does
not convert it from a gift to earned wages.
Mere possession of something does not mean it was earned or you deserve
it.
--
-catt (Scott Cattanach - ca...@uiuc.edu)
"Sometimes a scream is better than a thesis"
- Ralph Waldo Emerson
Peter Cash
In article <1991May31.1...@convex.com> ca...@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:
>> I would, however, like to know a little more about what the
>> _artist_ shows, and how this "showing" settles the argument
>> between him and the plumber. ...
>> [ I give three possible and (I think) plausible interpretations of what
>> the arguments between the artist and the plumber could be like...]
>It is not surprising that none of the three arguments Mr Cash
>lists parallel the argument between the evangelist and skeptic.
>As has been discussed previously in this thread, aesthetic
>evaluation and claims that something exists differ in important
>ways. Similarly, concerns with particular features don't
>parallel the discussion between the evangelist and skeptic
>(though they might parallel the discussion between believers in
>different gods).
>There *is* a very simple and obvious parallel. The artist claims
>that the picture he describes hangs in public display in the
>building where the janitor cleans. The janitor says that not
^^^^^^^
I thought he was a plumber, but never mind.
>only is this painting not in the building, but that there is no
>evidence of *any* paintings in the building in question.
This possibility had occurred to me, but I thought it so hostile to
Russell's position that I didn't dare mention it. For in this version of
the example, the janitor is radically defective in some way. If he works
every day in an art museum and does not know that it is filled with
paintings, then we must surmise that he does not know what a painting _is_.
He lacks an understanding of the word "painting"; he cannot recognize a
painting when he sees one.
Thus, the plumber's denial that there are paintings in the museum is a
meaningless sound; if he doesn't know what a painting is, then he can
neither deny nor affirm that they are in the building. Thus, there is no
dispute between the plumber and the artist on the airplane; there is only
an artist attempting to talk to a mental defective.
This fact is not altered if we later take the plumber by the hand and teach
him very patiently what a painting is. (Assuming that he has the capacity
to learn.) After we teach him, he will not dispute about the presence of
paintings in the museum; thus, there is no meaningful dispute either before
or after we teach the plumber.
>One might object that this kind of argument makes it too easy to
>resolve the question by having the artist show the janitor the
Too _easy_ ???
>painting in question, indeed, that this kind of thing is so
>easily decided that it is rarely the topic of serious argument.
>But it precisely parallels the other argument on the airplane.
You can't mean this--the skeptic is a babbling idiot? Good heavens,
Russell, are you arguing for my side?
>The gods, if they exist and wish us to know it, could make
>themselves as apparent as the Golden Gate bridge. It is only
He is--as apparent as the paintings in a museum, the furniture in your
house, and the Golden Gate bridge. If you can't see Him, the fault lies in
you.
>because they are (if they are at all) less visible than the
>aether that this thread continues. Most of what has transpired
>here has been rhetorical attempts by believers to cross this
>great chasm, and responses by skeptics that they don't even come
>close.
>aspects of god. The first question is merely what there is: show
>me this god of which you speak. In this, believers fail
>*totally*. To continue the analogy, it is as if the artist leads
Yes, often we fail. Some students are much more difficult to teach than
others.
Russell Turpin
In article <Jun.3.04.01....@athos.rutgers.edu> hed...@athos.rutgers.edu (Charles Hedrick) writes:
> ... Personally I suspect God has something up his sleeve for
> leads off in the direction of universalism, a direction I am
I am always a little reluctant to talk about "traditional" or
"orthodox" Christianity, because even though I suspect most
readers will understand what I mean by referral to American
Christianity, the history of how these different beliefs
developed is quite complex. Universalist ideas, for example, go
back as far as we can trace debate in the church. Origen
believed that hell was temporary, and that all souls would
eventually be saved after its cleansing action. Nothing in the
Nicene creed contradicts this. Seemingly, Augustine was
influential in establishing the idea of eternal damnation, with
which the reformers stuggled so greatly.
Even today, many Catholic writers are quite vague on these
issues. They leave considerable room for salvation of even those
who die in nonbelief or mortal sin, but at the same time, they
insist that some will be eternally damned. This vagueness
strikes me mostly as an attempt to avoid the contradictions by
not saying anything that can be pinned down.
Russell
Russell Turpin
In article <1991Jun3.1...@m.cs.uiuc.edu> ca...@uiuc.edu writes:
> There is a difference between EARNING salvation and
And it is on this very difference that I have pinned my criticism.
Many Christians today hold that belief is the first step in
salvation. Salvation does not just drop in one's lap, like
finding a sawbuck on the sidewalk. Rather, there are certain
acts that must be done to be saved, and failure to accomplish
these acts results in damnation. In short, salvation is earned,
not merely obtained.
> You have to take the action of accepting a gift to obtain it,
> that does not convert it from a gift to earned wages.
Very well, I accept it. Am I now saved? Most Christians would
say not; there is more to it than that.
I described the flaw of this analogy previously. Asking one to
believe something that they would not otherwise in the ordinary
course of thinking about it is *not* comparable to accepting a
gift or opening a box. Not at all. It is a task that for many
requires considerable effort, and that may even be impossible for
some. It would be more apt to compare this to doing Nobel prize
winning work than to accepting a lottery prize.
To demonstrate this, I ask Mr Cattanach the same question I asked
Mr Peters. For $10 million dollars, could Mr Cattanach (would
Mr Cattanach) truly adopt the belief that extraterrestrials are
raising purple cows in a cavern beneath the moon's surface? If
belief is no more than accepting a lottery win, then Mr Cattanach
should have no problem with this. Indeed, he should be willing
to do it for much less. I will again put my money where my mouth
is, and offer him $10 if only he truly adopts a belief in ELB's
(extraterrestrial lunar bovines). If it is so easy, Mr Cattanach,
tell us that you now believe this -- I will take your word on it
-- and tell me where to send the sawbuck. Otherwise, I ask you
to stop the silly comparison between adopting belief and
accepting a gift.
Russell
Russell Turpin
In article <1991Jun03....@convex.com> ca...@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:
> This possibility had occurred to me, but I thought it so
> hostile to Russell's position that I didn't dare mention
We'll see.
> ... For in this version of the example, the janitor is
> radically defective in some way. If he works every day in
> an art museum ...
I did not say the building was an art museum. Perhaps it is
on display in an office building.
> ... and does not know that it is filled with paintings, then we
> must surmise that he does not know what a painting _is_. He
> lacks an understanding of the word "painting"; he cannot recognize
> a painting when he sees one. ...
>
> This fact is not altered if we later take the plumber by the hand
> and teach him very patiently what a painting is. (Assuming that he
> has the capacity to learn.) After we teach him, he will not dispute
> about the presence of paintings in the museum ...
Close, Mr Ramsay, but no cigar. To keep this in line with what
happens between the evangelist and skeptic, the janitor does
indeed know what a painting is. He has been carefully taught
this in the past, and new attempts to teach him are not needed.
The strange thing is, when he looks at the painting in question,
he does not see it. He sees the dirt smudges on the wall behind
the painting, as if the pigments were invisible. When he goes to
wash the wall, his hand move right through the canvas, as if it
were insubstantial. He can hardly be blamed for thinking that a
painting is not there.
The artist can assume that the janitor's failure to sense the
painting is a defect in the janitor, but if so, it is a kind of
defectiveness that the janitor cannot work around. The painting
in question simply does not impinge on his world in any way he
can perceive.
This remains true even taking into account the janitor's
interactions with the artists who claim to see this painting.
The janitor has met several of these, and some claim to see a big
canvass that is a simle field of pure red, and others claim it is
a small portrait in which no red at all is used, and others claim
it isn't a painting, but a sculpture, and yet others claim it is
a metal mobile. The janitor's own careful investigations show
nothing. He is left with no way of knowing what, if anything,
is there.
It may indeed be that one of these artists has the capacity
to see what is really there, and that the janitor and other
artists are defective. Unfortunately, it is absolutely
impossible for the janitor to distinguish the artist with true
vision from the rest who are defective. Furthermore, there is no
way that the janitor can know that it is he that is defective,
rather than all the artists.
This is how the story of the janitor must unfold to remain
comparable to what happens with the evangelist and skeptic. It
brings us back to a god that reveals himself to some, presents an
illusion to others, and hides himself perfectly from yet others.
He sets a god-bit in our brains, that determines what we see, and
that is all she wrote. The state of some people's god-register
corresponds to reality, and everyone else is defective. It is
impossible for us to know which group we are in.
>> One might object that this kind of argument makes it too easy to
>> resolve the question by having the artist show the janitor the
>> painting in question, indeed, that this kind of thing is so
>> easily decided that it is rarely the topic of serious argument.
>> But it precisely parallels the other argument on the airplane.
> Too _easy_ ???
Yes, too easy. Because paintings, of course, do not behave this
way. Even the blind person can feel the canvas, and those who do
see agree on some features that they relate to those who are
blind. Only the gods behave in this strange fashion, where they
allow some people to see one thing, others to see something
totally different, and others to see nothing at all, and do this
in a way that none can know which group sees truly.
>> The gods, if they exist and wish us to know it, could make
>> themselves as apparent as the Golden Gate bridge. ...
> He is--as apparent as the paintings in a museum, the furniture
> in your house, and the Golden Gate bridge. If you can't see Him,
> the fault lies in you.
Maybe god is apparent, and I am defective in just the way
described. But there is no way that I can know this. Indeed,
there is no way that Mr Cash can know that he is not in the
defective group. He and I are like the artist and janitor above.
He says, "there is god". I look, and see no god. Others look,
and say, "that is not god, but a devil sent to deceive the
Christians".
In this, the gods are very different from the Golden Gate bridge,
or from a painting, neither of which display this strange
behavior. The bridge and painting impinge in a way that we can
all know they are there. (One might point out that some, such as
the catatonic or comatose, are so defective that this is not the
case for them. Pursuing this analogy does not favor the
evangelist. There is no point in arguing with a comatose person
that he fails to perceive the world as it is.) In short, the
evangelist is once again in quite a different position than the
artist.
Russell
Russell Turpin
> makes one intrinsically deserving of "credit" which is
> radically different from yours.
This, of course, is what they say. What I have been doing is not
to take Christians' word for what their teachings imply, but
rather, to look more directly at those teachings.
If one presupposes a god who defines what is right and wrong, and
if one accepts the usual Christian scheme of salvation by which
certain human acts enable one's salvation, and the failure to
accomplish these acts leads to one's damnation, then it is clear
that these acts are the ones on which Christianity places the
greatest value, and to which it grants the greatest credit. That
Christians shout "no, that is not what our religion does" reveals
only their hypocrisy in this regard.
> Certain Christians would say that God *causes* you to accept
> salvation. By this view, the fact that one also chooses to
> accept is a side-effect of the work God has already done
> inside one. ...
>
> You appear to think that God causing you to make a certain
> choice is incompatible with your having freely chosen it. ...
The real problem with predestinationism is not that it denies
free will, but that it makes a mockery of the moral outlook that
most Christians adopt. If belief is caused by god, and not to
one's credit, then non-belief is not to one's blame. There are
certainly passages that can be interpreted to support this view,
eg, the ones that describe god as hardening someone's heart, or
as the potter that makes some pots beautiful and some ugly, as he
would, and then throws away the ones he made ugly.
This view of the relationship between god and man is very
difficult to reconcile with the idea of eternal perdition for
those souls which god made incapable of obtaining salvation.
Today, most Christians' moral outlook is repulsed by this view
of god and man. It provides an escape from the logical
contradictions, but it plunges them into a moral dilemma.
Russell
William Mayne
>free will, but that it makes a mockery of the moral outlook that
>most Christians adopt. If belief is caused by god, and not to
>one's credit, then non-belief is not to one's blame. There are
>certainly passages that can be interpreted to support this view,
>eg, the ones that describe god as hardening someone's heart, or
>as the potter that makes some pots beautiful and some ugly, as he
>would, and then throws away the ones he made ugly.
>
>This view of the relationship between god and man is very
>difficult to reconcile with the idea of eternal perdition for
>those souls which god made incapable of obtaining salvation.
>Today, most Christians' moral outlook is repulsed by this view
>of god and man. It provides an escape from the logical
>contradictions, but it plunges them into a moral dilemma.
>
>Russell
I'm glad I found this newsgroup and particularly this thread, which I
have been following without feeling the need to contribute mainly
because anything I would have said (and more) has already been said
better by Russell. I'm jumping in now mainly to express my appreciation,
and secondly to comment on the moral and logical dilemma which I see
facing modern Xians.
On the surface Russell's last sentence is unclear to me. Is the "it"
which provides an escape the Calvinist view of God or the kinder,
gentler God which modern Xians seem to prefer? On careful re-reading,
it appears that Russell is saying the former, i.e. that the Calvinist
view is the logical one (within the assumptions of Xianity) but that
accepting it plunges them into a moral dilemma. I believe that this
is true, but I would put it differently. In order to escape from the
moral dilemma of admitting that God is so cruel and arbitrary (according
to their kinder morals) as their theological beliefs imply Xians plunge
into the logical dilemma which we see played out in this thread. Russell
correctly points out the logical contradiction and is accused of
distorting Xianity.
In reality it is the Xians who distort their own tradition and creeds.
Some appear to have a much higher tolerance for logical contradictions
than for either moral dilemmas or forthrightly admitting that their
beliefs depart from the logical implications of the Xian dogma which
they are unwilling to abandon. It is an example of the power of desire
(and sometimes social and family pressure) to lead people into fallacies
they might otherwise avoid.
I may be flamed for putting words into the Xians' mouths above, but
I speak from my own experience trying to reconcile the Xian beliefs
I was taught as a child with both reason and morality. My tolerance
for logical contradiction was apparently lower than non-Calvinist
Xians. I resolved the problem by rejecting the dogmas which I found
logically and morally defective and openly rejecting Xianity. This
has been a costly decision socially and in other ways, but in the
end I could do nothing else.
The remaining contradiction is that I wind up having a small measure
of respect for the intellectual integrity of the most hard hearted
and obnoxious Xians, and much less for those with whom I feel some
moral sympathy, those who, *in spite of* their religion are pretty
reasonable and decent folks.
Bill Mayne
Keith Ramsay
(Peter Cash) writes:
[...]
. Close, Mr Ramsay, but no cigar.
I believe you are confusing me with Peter Cash. I'm a doubter, and
he's a believer, if I'm not mistaken. I posted the "fire rescue"
analogy for how Christians view their evangelism; he has followed up
on that several times.
Mikel Evins
> In a previous post, I complained about my disgust with the
>superiority complex many Christians possess. I refer to the ones
>who claim that their beliefs are the ONLY correct ones, e.g.,
>salvation comes ONLY through Jesus Christ, etc. I received email
>calling me a bigot for feeling disgust with a religion that I
>don't agree with.
>A Christian is entitled to feel that his
>religion is best for HIM. But why can't he be tolerant of
>other religions? Why must he claim that HE has a monopoly
>on the truth and that the other religions are all wrong?
>Why can't he admit that while he himself believes that salvation
>comes through Jesus, it is equally likely that
>salvation comes instead (or as well) by other means?
Because to profess such an opinion would be to be at
odds with the doctrine of the religion to which the
Christian adheres. A central tenet of Christianity
is that there is a specific truth about the nature of
existence that is taught only by Christianity. (Permit
me to qualify this statement: there may be religions
that are called Christian by their adherents that
do not teach this doctrine; I am referring to mainstream
Christian doctrine).
I fear that my response does nothing to alleviate your
disgust. As far as I understand Christianity, the
attitude of superiority that you describe is endemic
in the doctrine, as it is in any doctrine of a
chosen people.
Russell Turpin
> he's a believer, if I'm not mistaken. I posted the "fire rescue"
> analogy for how Christians view their evangelism; he has followed
> up on that several times.
So it seems. My apologies to both gentlemen for this confusion.
I have no particular excuse; sometimes I just mess up when I
am engaged in a single thread with two or more people.
Russell
Peter Cash
> <1991May24....@convex.com> ca...@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:
>>You may not like this or agree with it, but what she told you is in
>>agreement with the historical teachings of the Christian church, and with
>>the New Testament. According to the mainstream of Christian theology, no
>>one is deserving enough to be saved; salvation comes out of a relationship
>>with God. Thus, it is entirely possible that Ted Bundy will spend eternity
>>with God, while Mahatma Gandhi is banished to the outer darkness.
> Mr. Cash says above that salvation comes out of a
>relationship with God. In another post, he suggests that
>faith in God is not a requirement for salvation. In another
>post, he says that the "fireman will only rescue those who
>let him". Are these consistent? To help me sort this out,
>I'd appreciate answers to the following questions.
I'm a pretty confused guy, but I'll try to help you out.
>1) If faith in God is not a requirement, why might Mahatma Gandhi
> be "banished to the outer darkness"?
I never said he would be; I said it was "entirely possible"--I freely admit
that I don't know. As I said elsewhere, it's God's call, and I don't have
to know His reasons. It's not my business to enumerate who will go to
heaven and who will go to hell; that's God's job, and (with a great sigh of
relief) I leave it to him.
>2) If an atheist dies of a sudden heart attack, what happens to him?
> Did he let the fireman rescue him or not?
Apparently not; but maybe He will anyway.
>3) If Ted Bundy will spend an eternity with God, who goes to Hell?
I never said he would; somebody else said that. I just said it was
possible.
>4) If Jesus indeed saves everybody, then as far as salvation goes,
> do those Christians who had a personal relationship with Christ
> realize any advantage?
A relationship with Christ is not a matter of "advantage"; it's not like a
contract you sign to get something in return. You can't come to love
somebody because you desire to gain an advantage from that love; that's not
how love works. If you love god, then you love him for his own sake, and
not because you gain anything for it.
Having said that, I will now say that though one cannot love in order to
gain, one does gain by loving God: one gains peace, and love, and joy.
Eternal life is not only something that takes place in the future--it is
happening now.
How does salvation "come out of" that relationship? That was a vague phrase
I used, and I retract it. What comes out of it is a _certainty_ that Christ
will save those whom he loves. _Assurance_ of salvation comes out of the
relationship; salvation itself is the work of God.
Second, I never said that Christ saves everybody; I just said that faith in
Christ is not an absolute, universal requirement. I believe that Christ
will save many who couldn't respond, and many who never heard of him. And
some who say they act in his name will not be saved. The company around
the banqueting table in paradise will be a complete surprise to a lot of
people.
> If Mr. Ramsay wants to tackle these questions, I
>admire his courage.
Mr. Ramsay is a courageous man, and his comments are always welcome.
Peter Cash
>There is a direct and irresoluble contradiction between the
>claims that (1) "nothing the believer does gets him into heaven",
>and (2) that one has to "choose God" (whatever this means) in
>order to be saved.
...
>Almost every Christian evangelist and apologist I have ever read,
>from Paul to Thomas, and including also C S Lewis, who Mr Cash
>recommends below, include this theme in their writings. All urge
>belief in Christianity, and warn that salvation can hang on this.
>I agree with Mr Cash that this theme is only *appropriate* to the
>likes of Bakker, Robertson, and Falwell, rather than to anyone
>who is thoughtful in their religion. But that does not change
>the fact that this theme looms large in Christian writings.
Don't be too quick to agree with me, Russell, because there's a lot I don't
understand about this issue of who is saved and why. I would, however,
venture a couple of observations on this question:
1) Why do you want to know? Surely the question is interesting only to
someone who wants to be saved, and you said that you have no such desire.
2) Who gets saved is entirely God's call.
3. Christ has promised that he'll save anybody who follows him, so I know
I'm getting in. I don't know why, but I'm getting in.
4) Do non-Christians get in too? Well, I'm sure that the ones who couldn't
follow (because they're retarded, or died as babies, or never heard the
Gospel) are getting in, because it wouldn't be in accord with my conception
of what God is like for him to deny entry to them.
5. Is Russell Turpin getting in? Well as I said in #2, that's God's call.
But if I were Russell, I wouldn't count on it.
...
>> ... (I'd highly recommend reading C.S. Lewis' _The Great
>> Divorce_ on this subject.)
>I have read this. Lewis propagates precisely the fallacy I
>condemn, made to sound good through his artful prose, but a
>fallacy nonetheless. To the extent that his story works, it
>contradicts traditional Christianity, as Lewis argues for it
>elsewhere. To the extent that he remains faithful to the latter,
>his story does not work and his analogy is as weak as Mr Cash's.
Which analogy is that?
Hmmm. I'm not clear about this contradiction in the book. As I recall,
there was a bus that commuted between heaven and hell, and any denizens of
hell ("hellions"?) that wanted to could go to heaven. Most of them didn't
like the place, and went right back. I thought that it was an interesting
way to look at salvation: sinners are just not the kind of people who would
like heaven.
This is pretty much a "free will" position; but in what sense is it
"contradictory"? Perhaps it would seem a contradictory thing to a
Calvinist; but you aren't a Calvinist, so why would it bother you? There's
no suggestion in Lewis' book that those who take the bus to heaven _deserve_
to stay there--they are allowed to stay if they want. Therefore, there's no
contradiction of "salvation by grace".
>Perhaps Mr Cash would answer some questions that concern the
>relevant details. Does he believe in hell?
Maybe. On odd-numbered days. Why is it important?
>If so, who does he believe created it?
When you step in front of a light, you cast a shadow on the wall. Does the
light make the shadow?
>If the answers are "yes" and "god", we have
>the arsonist in hand.
No.
Michael Siemon
+ It strikes me that responses to [Russell's] attacks have more than a casual
+ resemblence to the responses of Job's friends. There is indeed a good
+ case to be made that God is immoral. Most attempts to justify him so
+ far have seemed rather unconvincing. I think the book of Job suggests
+ that God prefers the honesty of someone who protests against him than
+ attempts at justification.
yes.
--
Michael L. Siemon I say "You are gods, sons of the
m.si...@ATT.COM Most High, all of you; nevertheless
- or - you shall die like men, and fall
panix!m...@cmcl2.NYU.EDU like any prince." Psalm 82:6-7
John A. Johnson
says:
>I'm a pretty confused guy, but I'll try to help you out.
>
>
>that I don't know. . . .
>
>
>Apparently not; but maybe . . .
>
> . . . I just said it was
>possible.
>
> . . . The company around
>the banqueting table in paradise will be a complete surprise to a lot of
>people.
It is probably unfair of me to extract only a few words out of the context of a
lengthy post, but I did this to make a point: How can one carry on a rational
discussion with someone whose generic response to logical and moral absurditie
s is, "Gee, I don't know--God works in mysterious ways!"
Although I am no Hindu, I do appreciate a Hindu friend's moral dilemma for the
Christian: An electrical short causes a fire which badly burns a newborn baby,
who suffers for a period of time and then dies. Why wouldn't a loving, all-kn
owing God simply prevent the short and save the innocent baby? The ignorant Ch
ristian response: Who knows, God's plan is His business and not mine to know.
The Hindu response: God is beyond our world and really doesn't know what is go
ing on here. My response: A lot of shitty things happen in this world (in bet
ween the nice things)--why do we have to think that life is fair?
Sometimes I wish there were a god so I could curse him for creating viruses tha
t cause my children to run high fevers and vomit all night while I do my best t
o comfort them. Or for allowing for genetic defects that afflict newborns in a
ll sorts of horrible ways (thank chance my children were not affected that way)
. Or for creating a race whose members are constantly hurting and killing each
other (often in His name). Or for creating an environment in which there are
often earthquakes, storms, draughts, and plagues that results in disease, starv
ation, suffering, and premature death.
God's people can be a problem, too. Their narrowminded intolerance and bigotry
can be a real threat to humanity. But, actually, most religious people I know
are quite okay--just a little confused and struggling to find meaning in a mea
ningless world. The really nasty ones (e.g., the ones who send me anonymous th
reats) can't help being that way--poor childrearing from sick parents. I wish
God existed so I could be angry at Him for creating such horrible people, and f
or all of the other horrors and injustices in the world. If God were real,I w
ouldn't let him off the hook for the mess I see around me, no sir. The only re
ason He can hide behind the "mysterious ways" defense is that there ARE no reas
ons because there is no god.
John
P.S. I am not just having a bad day.
Ron Evans
>3. Christ has promised that he'll save anybody who follows him, so I know
>I'm getting in. I don't know why, but I'm getting in.
>4) Do non-Christians get in too? Well, I'm sure that the ones who couldn't
>follow (because they're retarded, or died as babies, or never heard the
>Gospel) are getting in, because it wouldn't be in accord with my conception
>of what God is like for him to deny entry to them.
>5. Is Russell Turpin getting in? Well as I said in #2, that's God's call.
>But if I were Russell, I wouldn't count on it.
"He who believes in the Son has eternal life; he who does
not obey the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God
rests upon him."
John 3:36
I was unaware of this passage until today, and I'd
like to start believing, but I'm afraid it is too
late, because Christ will have that nagging doubt
about my real motivation for belief. Damnation!
If I'd just have let things be and not thumbed
through the Gospels, I'd have had a chance at
salvation under Rule #4 above. Now I'm going to fry
in Hell because of my damnable curiosity.
And I'll bet the place stinks of curry, too.
William Mayne
>4) Do non-Christians get in too? Well, I'm sure that the ones who couldn't
>follow (because they're retarded, or died as babies, or never heard the
>Gospel) are getting in, because it wouldn't be in accord with my conception
>of what God is like for him to deny entry to them.
Then missionaries are doing a great disservice to those to whom they
preach Christ. If He is preached to a group of people who otherwise
would never of heard the Gospel there is a high probability (almost
certainty) that some will not believe. Why should they believe? There
is no convincing evidence. These may be in danger of Hell - or if you
are one of the non-mainstream Chistians who don't believe in Hell just
say they may be denied entry into Heaven. They were better off before
the missionary came along and closed their loophole. And those who do
believe get only a finite benefit, since they would have gotten in
anyway. Their finite benefit is limited any earthly joy and comfort
they get from their belief, and maybe a shorter stay in Purgatory
if you believe in that.
Humanity would therefore be better off all Christians were to die off,
all Bibles to be burned, and all Usenet archives with these discussions
erased. Hearing the Gospel is just too dangerous. You Christians are
unfortunate in having been exposed to this virus, yet you go around
exposing others. You are like people with AIDS who continue having
unprotected sex and sharing needles with as many partners as possible.
Bill Mayne
William Mayne
>
>Although I am no Hindu, I do appreciate a Hindu friend's moral dilemma for the
>Christian: An electrical short causes a fire which badly burns a newborn baby,
> who suffers for a period of time and then dies. Why wouldn't a loving, all-kn
>owing God simply prevent the short and save the innocent baby? The ignorant Ch
>ristian response: Who knows, God's plan is His business and not mine to know.
>The Hindu response: God is beyond our world and really doesn't know what is go
>ing on here.
Although I like the tone and content of your article I think that you
misinterpret the Hindu response here. Actually there are a large number of
difference theologies associated with Hinduism. It is not a monolithic
religion, even in the limited sense in which Christianity is. Some, like
Advaita Vedanta, have a rather impersonal concept of god which has little
in common with the Christian god. Others do conceive of a diety or dieties
which know about what is going on here. I think the most common response to
the dilemma of the suffering baby would be appeal to theories of rebirth
and karma: The baby is suffering the results of bad action in another life.
This need not lead to fatalism and giving up on trying to relieve suffering
when possible.
> My response: A lot of shitty things happen in this world (in bet
>ween the nice things)--why do we have to think that life is fair?
That would be my response as well. I think the moral argument for rebirth,
which falls apart on this point. The argument goes like this: By the law
of karma we must suffer (or enjoy) the results of our bad (or good) actions.
Since we obviously don't see this happening completely in the current life
- sometimes the good suffer while the evil appear to prosper - there must
be another life in which the karma is played out. The weekness of this
argument is that it depends upon first accepting karma. Unlike the theories
of Christianity, karma and rebirth might work out so that there is cosmic
justice, and hence might have some moral appeal. But our wish for the
universe to be just does not constitute evidence that it is.
Similar arguments are used for other theories of an afterlife - without
necessarily postulating a previous life, and hence still not justifying
the current suffering of the innocent. Bertrand Russell had a great
answer to this: If you opened a crate of oranges and found those on top
were rotten, would you conclude that there must be good ones on the bottom
to redress the balance, or that the whole crate might be bad?
Bill Mayne
Keith Ramsay
> scheme and traditional beliefs about human free will and the loss
> of some souls from failure to believe, men *do* earn their
> salvation. Traditional Christianity's desire to describe itself
> otherwise is a lie.
I still don't agree with this. I think you are still reading your own
concept of earning and/or causality into the tradition. Since you are
setting aside predestinationism as non-traditional, though, I'm not
sure whether there's any point in disputing this further. For example,
if you ask Christians whether God knows whether you will be "saved"
before you convert, I think they will ordinarily say yes, and I think
this puts the fundamental tradition closer to predestinationism than
it might appear. It is also typical (of Christians I've met) to
suppose that failure to recognize that God exists involves a kind of
active opposition. I don't feel that acknowledging the air that we
breathe involves any special merit; it would be perverse not to. I am
not convinced that Christians feel any differently about God. These
are the kind of people, moreover, who think that God lives inside
them, and that whatever virtue they may have is due to *that*.
If you want to argue the absurdity of some combination of these ideas,
I think you would do better to take the self-described claims on face
value, and try to show that they are incompatible. I admit there is a
difference between what someone claims their views are, and what their
views actually are. Even internal contradictions, however, exist in
people's views. The person who wants to claim that if another person
holds that X, then necessarily he also holds that Y, even though he
claims that X does not lead to Y, is on thin ground.
> Precisely because I do have a Christian background, and struggled
> with the attempts of various Christian thinkers to resolve this
> contradiction, from Aquinas to Pascal to Lewis, when I write
> about it there is probably more vehemence that it deserves. I
> apologize to Mr Ramsay for allowing this to spill over against
> him.
Fine.
Jonathan M. Zweig
dance on the head of a pin?" phase.
-Johnny Comment
Keith Ramsay
> he does not see it. He sees the dirt smudges on the wall behind
> the painting, as if the pigments were invisible. When he goes to
> wash the wall, his hand move right through the canvas, as if it
> were insubstantial. He can hardly be blamed for thinking that a
> painting is not there.
The disagreements between theists and atheists sometimes take the
following form. The theist sees the physical universe as a work of
art, showing signs of intentional design, perhaps even conveying some
kind of message. The atheist sees the same physical form, but doesn't
recognize it as a work of art, and thinks there is no intensional
design in it, let along message.
So perhaps the skeptic in this scenario merely imagines that the
artist is referring to some hallucination, when in fact it is the dirt
smudges (purposely applied to the wall) he is talking about. It
certainly is not unheard of for people not to recognize the artistic
intent in a work. Just this spring I heard a musical work; at first I
was unsure whether the musicians were playing a piece, or just tuning
their instruments, although eventually one could discern a kind of
loose harmony which random tuning would probably not have produced.
On the other hand, it is also not unheard of that people imagine some
kind of brilliant artistic merit in something which is not the product
of artistic intention at all, just as people often see coincidences as
being less likely than they are. Allegedly some people attached a
brush to a donkey's tail, and the resulting works drew positive
critical acclaim until their origin was revealed.
It has sometimes been argued that no amount of artistic merit in the
universe could serve as adequate evidence for the existence of an
artist having created it; I disagree. It has been claimed that a
wholly good and powerful God would make the evidence blatantly obvious
to everyone; this I find more credible, but still not entirely
convincing. Whether there is any `extraordinary' artistic merit in the
universe, i.e., such as would not likely have occurred in a natural
universe, seems quite unclear to me.
> Maybe god is apparent, and I am defective in just the way
> described. But there is no way that I can know this.
I think there is a jump to a conclusion here. What makes you think
there would be _no_ way to know? You are pre-assigning limitations to
yourself unnecessarily. I remember how difficult it was for me to
disengage myself from this particular kind of automatic thinking. You
should carefully examine the thinking by which you arrive at this.
You hold open the door even to the possibility that you suffer from an
inability to observe certain tangible objects, of which you
_absolutely_ cannot cure yourself. But then, to compensate for your
generosity, you slam the door entirely on what I think is a much more
likely possibility, namely, that you would have a similar, but curable
defect, without knowing how to cure it yet. In the case of God, we
even have a variety of proposed cures, of varying degrees of
credibility. If you feel the one possibility is worth mentioning, why
not the other?
I think you need to find another solution to the dilemma. In fact I
think you have judged that you are relatively unlikely to have such a
defect, whether curable or not, and that this is why you aren't busy
seeking a guru or what-have-you to fix it. That you might find
ultimate enlightenment seems so improbable to you that it doesn't seem
worth the effort. Trying to eliminate any kind of reliance on such
judgements won't work.
[further description, which I take to be on the same lines, omitted]
> In this, the gods are very different from the Golden Gate bridge,
> or from a painting, neither of which display this strange
> behavior. The bridge and painting impinge in a way that we can
> all know they are there.
One easily arrives at a consensus on certain questions, and on others,
only with difficulty or not at all. You argue that the existence of a
good and powerful God ought to be especially obvious. Aside from this
expectation of obviousness, however, there is nothing particularly
weird about people being confused and disagreeable over the existence
of God.