Mind and matter
chupacabra
human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated structure of
neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in and
take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
"spirit' and "soul", and even consider believing in such phenomena to
be a kind of superstition. Apart from my strong intuitive feeling of
faultiness of the concept of human as a kind of "biological machine",
and general view of life as an "ultracomplicated self-organizing,
self-evolving material system", I found some strong logical objections
against such "holistic reductivism".
Let`s make the thought experiment. Imagine some Mr. Smith dying from
uncurable form of cancer once in a distant (or maybe not so distant)
future. At the moment of death the overall structure of his brain
(placement and connections of neurons, DNA structure etc.) is scanned
and put to a quantum computer matrix. Later the complete set of
bodyparts are grown e. g. from stem cells and put together, whereupon,
as a final and the most complicated procedure, the recorded brain
matrix is strictly reconstructed by means of e. g. molecular
engineering.
All this is, of course, impossible with the present state of
technology and knowledge, but from the theoretical point of view there
is nothing prohibiting (if mind is taken to be a solely material
phenomenon).
The fish we get here is, from the coherent materialistic point of
view, just the resusciated Mr. Smith cause he has the same memories,
traits, behaviour etc. as the late Mr. Smith, and, in fact, identifies
himself with the later. It simple cannot be otherwise because ALL
matherial (and informational) components of the Smith`s mind are
strictly reconstructed (up to now, in fact, a trivial scifi story).
Now imagine that Mr. Smith has, in fact, not died, with his mind,
howewer, being scanned and later reproduced in another body. What we
have now are 2 strictly identical, but disconnected minds. What will
happen with the unique mind of the original person? If you thing at
this point of a kind of "split personality"phenomenon, notice that
there wasn`t actually any substantial physical interference affecting
human brain. The more, these "twin" persons could be separated by a
long distance and devoid of any contact bw. each other. Being the same
person at awakening, they will surely represent different ones a year
after, owing to different living expierences. The original Mr. Smith
remains to be himself and could even have noticed little about an
"operation". But what's about his newly-born twin? Is he another
person, or the same, or what?
As an inference, this thought experiment clearly demonstrates the
great difficulty of reconciling the inherent uniqueness of human mind
and the notion of the latter as a purely material phenomenon.
Leonardo Dasso
"chupacabra" <al...@ukr.net> wrote in message
news:3b2931c3.03062...@posting.google.com...
I hope you are just trying to be funny.
regards
leo
Josef Balluch
In a message sent 'round the world, chupacabra poured fuel on the fire
with the following:
...
> Apart from my strong intuitive feeling of
> faultiness of the concept of human as a kind of "biological machine",
> and general view of life as an "ultracomplicated self-organizing,
> self-evolving material system", I found some strong logical objections
> against such "holistic reductivism".
...
> As an inference, this thought experiment clearly demonstrates the
> great difficulty of reconciling the inherent uniqueness of human mind
> and the notion of the latter as a purely material phenomenon.
Ummmmm, ........... so where are the "strong logical objections" you
found? All we have here is your assumption of the "inherent uniqueness
of the human mind".
Regards,
Josef
No brain is stronger than its weakest think.
-- Thomas L. Masson
Mark Richardson
In what way?
What's the problem?
Mark.
CoffeeFiend
> <snipped to save space>
I think the same point could be made much more elegantly with the
example of a hypothetical teleportation device, where two copies of one
human being could be made. For example, if the original human being,
from which information was extracted to create a copy in another place,
was left intact.
Anyway, there is really no difficulty from a purely materialistic point
of view, there would simply be two instances of one person running
around B-). One that is still standing in the teleportation device and
another that has the memory of standing in the teleporation device just
a moment ago, but now is in another place. Simple. Not any harder than
imagining that two people with identical bodies but different memories
could exists.
Now if you were to ask if it is morally right to destroy one of the
copies, then we'd get into the heavy stuff.
Al Klein
alt.atheism:
>An appreciable majority of modern biologists tend to believe that
>human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated structure of
>neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in and
>take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
>"spirit' and "soul"
Since there's absolutely no evidence that either one exists (let alone
a cogent definition of either), there's nothing for science to
address.
--
"I can't activate two neurons simultaneously, and I vote"
- The theistic majority
rukbat at optonline dot net
Abner Mintz
> As an inference, this thought experiment clearly demonstrates the
> great difficulty of reconciling the inherent uniqueness of human mind
> and the notion of the latter as a purely material phenomenon.
I'm afraid your thought experiment boils down to 'Minds are unique
right now because we don't have any way to copy them - but if we
did have a way to copy them, they would no longer be unique.'
I don't see how minds being unique if you can't copy them and
not unique if you can copy them causes *any* problems at all for
the idea of the mind as a purely material phenomenon.
John Popelish
>
> An appreciable majority of modern biologists tend to believe that
> human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated structure of
> neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in and
> take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
> "spirit' and "soul", and even consider believing in such phenomena to
> be a kind of superstition.
Yes. Belief in 'spirit' and 'soul' are certainly within the
definition of superstition, "an irrational belief arising from
ignorance or fear". Since we cannot observe any direct or indirect
evidence of spirit or soul, we are ignorant of such hypothetical
things.
> Apart from my strong intuitive feeling of
> faultiness of the concept of human as a kind of "biological machine",
> and general view of life as an "ultracomplicated self-organizing,
> self-evolving material system", I found some strong logical objections
> against such "holistic reductivism".
Do you think you might be too close to this to be an unbiased
observer?
He is something that has never existed before, a replica of another
person, but a separate person in his own right. He is the first
person but living different circumstances.
> As an inference, this thought experiment clearly demonstrates the
> great difficulty of reconciling the inherent uniqueness of human mind
> and the notion of the latter as a purely material phenomenon.
Why? This experiment, if successful would prove conclusively that
mind is strictly physical. That it contradicts your preconceived
prejudice for soul and spirit is the only thing about it that is
difficult (for you).
--
John Popelish
johac
al...@ukr.net (chupacabra) wrote:
> An appreciable majority of modern biologists tend to believe that
> human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated structure of
> neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in and
> take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
> "spirit' and "soul", and even consider believing in such phenomena to
> be a kind of superstition. Apart from my strong intuitive feeling of
> faultiness of the concept of human as a kind of "biological machine",
> and general view of life as an "ultracomplicated self-organizing,
> self-evolving material system", I found some strong logical objections
> against such "holistic reductivism".
So? That's just the way things are. BTW, do you have ny evidence for
"spirit" or "soul"?
Assuming such a procedure were possible, so what?
> As an inference, this thought experiment clearly demonstrates the
> great difficulty of reconciling the inherent uniqueness of human mind
> and the notion of the latter as a purely material phenomenon.
If your brain, a material entity, is removed your mind, unique or not,
will cease all activity.
--
John Hachmann, aa #1782
"In those parts of the world where learning and science has prevailed,
miracles ceased; but in those parts that are barbarous and ignorant,
miracles are still in vogue." -Letters of Ethan Allen to Thomas Jefferson
Richard Smol
> An appreciable majority of modern biologists tend to believe that
> human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated structure of
> neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in and
> take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
> "spirit' and "soul", and even consider believing in such phenomena to
> be a kind of superstition.
And how would the human body and this immaterial "soul"
interact? If there is any interaction of sorts, it should
be measurable. Can you make any scientific predictions what
one would find if you do measure this? Do you have a model for
anything you claim?
RS
Mark K. Bilbo
> As an inference, this thought experiment clearly demonstrates the
> great difficulty of reconciling the inherent uniqueness of human mind
> and the notion of the latter as a purely material phenomenon.
What inherent uniqueness?
--
Mark K. Bilbo #1423 EAC Department of Linguistic Subversion
________________________________________________________________
"The problem with defending the purity of the English language
is that English is about as pure as a cribhouse whore. We don't
just borrow words; on occasion, English has pursued other
languages down alleyways to beat them unconscious and rifle their
pockets for new vocabulary."
[James D. Nicoll]
chupacabra
> chupacabra wrote:
> > An appreciable majority of modern biologists tend to believe that
> > human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated structure of
> > neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in and
> > take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
> > "spirit' and "soul", and even consider believing in such phenomena to
> > be a kind of superstition.
>
> And how would the human body and this immaterial "soul"
> interact? If there is any interaction of sorts, it should
> be measurable.
Yes, it should. I'm not a great specialist in quantum physics, but I
tend to believe the clue is somewhere there. Spiritual substance
associated with mind and consciousness could somehow resolve quantum
uncertainties, collapse wave
functions in some brain cells etc. Being ampified by trigger effects,
that may cause voluntary acts like a moving of person`s hand.
>Can you make any scientific predictions what
> one would find if you do measure this? Do you have a model for
> anything you claim?
>
> RS
Of course, I have no comprehensive and final theory about all this.
Such would be a greatest theory of all times, and I suppose we are
still too far from it. What I try is to show some limitations and
shortcomings of a classical purely
materialistic worldview. The latter is replete with its own
superstitions wich slower considerably a scientific progress.
By the way, in my thought experiment I used an accepted scientifically
method of introspection. Just can`t imagine my unique mind being split
into many.
Chupacabra
keith
> > An appreciable majority of modern biologists tend to believe that
> > human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated structure of
> > neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in and
> > take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
> > "spirit' and "soul", and even consider believing in such phenomena to
> > be a kind of superstition.
>
> And how would the human body and this immaterial "soul"
> interact? If there is any interaction of sorts, it should
> be measurable.
I don't why that would be.
Keith
keith
> chupacabra wrote:
> >
> > An appreciable majority of modern biologists tend to believe that
> > human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated structure of
> > neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in and
> > take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
> > "spirit' and "soul", and even consider believing in such phenomena to
> > be a kind of superstition.
>
> Yes. Belief in 'spirit' and 'soul' are certainly within the
> definition of superstition, "an irrational belief arising from
> ignorance or fear". Since we cannot observe any direct or indirect
> evidence of spirit or soul, we are ignorant of such hypothetical
> things.
I'd say: you have not shown that belief in spirit is an irrational
belief at all, much less one based on ignorance or fear. Chupacabra's
argument is a good one. If you are nothing but material, the supposing
an exact physical copy of you was produced, would *you* experience
things through the original or the copy? Certainly not both. If the
original, why?
(snip)
Keith
Ron Baker
"keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> Richard Smol <jazzcat...@dds.nl> wrote in message
news:<jFfLa.8963$gs1.9...@amsnews03.chello.com>...
> > chupacabra wrote:
> > > An appreciable majority of modern biologists tend to believe that
> > > human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated structure of
> > > neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in and
> > > take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
> > > "spirit' and "soul", and even consider believing in such phenomena to
> > > be a kind of superstition.
> >
> > And how would the human body and this immaterial "soul"
> > interact? If there is any interaction of sorts, it should
> > be measurable.
>
> I don't why that would be.
If it is not measurable or detectible how do you know
there is a soul in a body?
Do dogs have souls?
Do cats have souls?
Ron Baker
Does the original have a soul and keep that soul?
Does the copy have a soul?
Is it a new soul?
When we experience things do we experience with
the mind or the soul or both?
Jim Jastrzebski
Message-id: <KsqLa.1556$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>
>
>When we experience things do we experience with
>the mind or the soul or both?
I know roughly what "mind" is but what is "soul"?
-- Jim
BernardZZ
said...
> On Fri, 27 Jun 2003 17:51:21 -0700, chupacabra wrote:
>
> > As an inference, this thought experiment clearly demonstrates the
> > great difficulty of reconciling the inherent uniqueness of human mind
> > and the notion of the latter as a purely material phenomenon.
>
> What inherent uniqueness?
>
Technically the two would be unique with the uncertainty principle and
as they experienced different effects they would more apart.
keith
I'd say the original does indeed have a soul. What do you mean by "keep" the soul?
> Does the copy have a soul?
I believe it would. Chup's argument doesn't depend in that.
> Is it a new soul?
I believe it would be. But chup's argument doesn't depend on that.
> When we experience things do we experience with
> the mind or the soul or both?
What's the difference between mind and soul?
Keith
keith
1. Suppose we wouldn't know; still that doesn't give any reason to
think there isn't.
2. One way to know there is a soul is by using another source of
information about souls and all.
3. Another way is to use chup's argument (assuming his argument is
sound) to conclude that humans having souls is the simplest way to
fully explain our awareness of the external world.
>
> Do dogs have souls?
> Do cats have souls?
I believe they both do.
Keith
Ron Baker
On rereading, I could have answered more directly the
first time.
I am the original. I have not changed. I still have my experiences.
<>
> > When we experience things do we experience with
> > the mind or the soul or both?
>
>
> What's the difference between mind and soul?
Well, we can both look up the dictionary definitions
and see that they are different.
I would add that the mind is real and the soul is not.
Ron Baker
That is an excellent reason to think there is no soul.
The fact that I can't detect monsters under my bed
gives me reason to think there are none.
>
> 2. One way to know there is a soul is by using another source of
> information about souls and all.
Sure. Lets use all available information. Lets evaluate
and cross check the sources. Lets test the information.
>
> 3. Another way is to use chup's argument (assuming his argument is
> sound) to conclude that humans having souls is the simplest way to
> fully explain our awareness of the external world.
We see quite clearly how the physical condition
of the brain affects awareness.
Therefore the soul can not fully explain awareness.
Maybe your position is that it might complete
the explanation of awareness.
You said the soul can't be measured or detected so
how can you even connect it with awareness?
> > Do dogs have souls?
> > Do cats have souls?
Do spiders have souls?
Al Klein
in alt.atheism:
[piggybacking]
>"keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
>> "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message news:<KsqLa.1556$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
>> > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>> > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
>> > > I'd say: you have not shown that belief in spirit is an irrational
>> > > belief at all
There's a logical reason to believe in spirit? No? Then it's
irrational.
>much less one based on ignorance
Your objective evidence of spirit? None? Then the belief is based on
ignorance.
> or fear.
Fear of dying being final.
>> > > Chupacabra's
>> > > argument is a good one. If you are nothing but material, the supposing
>> > > an exact physical copy of you was produced, would *you* experience
>> > > things through the original or the copy? Certainly not both. If the
>> > > original, why?
The one experiencing the things would experience them. If my double
put his hand in water, would I feel wet? Of course not - my hand
wouldn't be wet.
--
"I believe in Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the harmony of all that exists, but
not in a God who concerns himself with the fate and actions of human beings."
-A. Einstein (1929 -- Einstein Archive 33-272)
Al Klein
in alt.atheism:
>"keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
>> 3. Another way is to use chup's argument (assuming his argument is
>> sound) to conclude that humans having souls is the simplest way to
>> fully explain our awareness of the external world.
>We see quite clearly how the physical condition
>of the brain affects awareness.
>Therefore the soul can not fully explain awareness.
If the soul has a physical effect on the body, it must have a physical
component, whether we can detect it or not. So where does it reside
if the body is destroyed?
Oops.
--
"If knowledge can create problems, it is not through ignorance that we can
solve them."
-Isaac Asimov
&
There are three kinds of men:
The ones that learn by reading. The few who learn by observation. The rest of them have to pee on the electric fence.
- (Will Roger
keith
> "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<MnqLa.1555$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> > > > Richard Smol <jazzcat...@dds.nl> wrote in message
> news:<jFfLa.8963$gs1.9...@amsnews03.chello.com>...
> > > > > chupacabra wrote:
> >
> >
> > 1. Suppose we wouldn't know; still that doesn't give any reason to
> > think there isn't.
>
> That is an excellent reason to think there is no soul.
>
> The fact that I can't detect monsters under my bed
> gives me reason to think there are none.
Could you explain the reasoning then?
>
> >
> > 2. One way to know there is a soul is by using another source of
> > information about souls and all.
>
> Sure. Lets use all available information. Lets evaluate
> and cross check the sources. Lets test the information.
Suppose there is only one source.
>
> >
> > 3. Another way is to use chup's argument (assuming his argument is
> > sound) to conclude that humans having souls is the simplest way to
> > fully explain our awareness of the external world.
>
> We see quite clearly how the physical condition
> of the brain affects awareness.
> Therefore the soul can not fully explain awareness.
I don't see your point. Soulism includes the idea that physical
conditions affect your expereiences, but chupacabra's argument points
against our awareness being *reducible* to physical conditions, I'd
say.
> Maybe your position is that it might complete
> the explanation of awareness.
> You said the soul can't be measured or detected so
> how can you even connect it with awareness?
Chup's argument points against awareness being reducible to physical
conditions; if chup's argument is sound (and I think it is) then there
likely exists a non-physical aspect of awareness. By definition, that
would be the soul.
>
>
> > > Do dogs have souls?
> > > Do cats have souls?
>
> Do spiders have souls?
maybe.
Keith
keith
> On Sun, 29 Jun 2003 22:00:54 GMT, "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> posted
> in alt.atheism:
>
> >"keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> >news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
>
> >> 3. Another way is to use chup's argument (assuming his argument is
> >> sound) to conclude that humans having souls is the simplest way to
> >> fully explain our awareness of the external world.
>
> >We see quite clearly how the physical condition
> >of the brain affects awareness.
> >Therefore the soul can not fully explain awareness.
>
> If the soul has a physical effect on the body, it must have a physical
> component, whether we can detect it or not.
Why?
> So where does it reside
> if the body is destroyed?
I dunno.
Keith
keith
I should have read the original thought experiment better; the
original doesn't exist any more. But assuming it does: what is it
about the original that makes is so that *you* would experience stuff
from through that batch of meat?
>
> <>
>
> > > When we experience things do we experience with
> > > the mind or the soul or both?
> >
> >
> > What's the difference between mind and soul?
>
> Well, we can both look up the dictionary definitions
> and see that they are different.
> I would add that the mind is real and the soul is not.
Dictionaries; who gives a damn:-) Seriously though; I am using both
words to mean the "center of awareness", or sme such thing. You have a
subjective experience of Self; that self is the mind or the soul, I'd
say.
Keith
keith
> On Sun, 29 Jun 2003 21:19:52 GMT, "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> posted
> in alt.atheism:
>
> [piggybacking]
>
> >"keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> >news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> >> "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message news:<KsqLa.1556$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> >> > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> >> > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
>
> >> > > I'd say: you have not shown that belief in spirit is an irrational
> >> > > belief at all
>
> There's a logical reason to believe in spirit? No? Then it's
> irrational.
I'd say: that doesn't follow. *Irrational* means "contrary to reason"
and ASAICS no one has shown that reason points to the non-existence of
spirit.
>
> >much less one based on ignorance
>
> Your objective evidence of spirit? None? Then the belief is based on
> ignorance.
Please demonstrate that without objective evidence a belief in spirit
is not knowledge.
>
> > or fear.
>
> Fear of dying being final.
Why should anyone accept your assertion that belief in souls is a
reaction to fear of death being final?
>
> >> > > Chupacabra's
> >> > > argument is a good one. If you are nothing but material, the supposing
> >> > > an exact physical copy of you was produced, would *you* experience
> >> > > things through the original or the copy? Certainly not both. If the
> >> > > original, why?
>
> The one experiencing the things would experience them. If my double
> put his hand in water, would I feel wet? Of course not - my hand
> wouldn't be wet.
What is it about the original you that would make it so that *you*
experienced things through the original?
Keith
Ron Baker
If I was the original and the original still exists
then I haven't changed.
I am me and I experience my experiences.
An exact copy of me is a copy and not me.
An exact copy would of necessity be physically
separate and thus inevitably have different experiences.
As far as I know no physical being has ever
directly experienced the experiences of another
separate physical being.
> >
> > <>
> >
> > > > When we experience things do we experience with
> > > > the mind or the soul or both?
> > >
> > >
> > > What's the difference between mind and soul?
> >
> > Well, we can both look up the dictionary definitions
> > and see that they are different.
> > I would add that the mind is real and the soul is not.
>
>
> Dictionaries; who gives a damn:-)
OK.
> Seriously though; I am using both
> words to mean the "center of awareness", or sme such thing. You have a
> subjective experience of Self; that self is the mind or the soul, I'd
> say.
OK, but semantics are important.
To me the words mean different things.
Your earlier statements seem to imply a distinction
between mind and soul.
Your statement just above muddles the distinction.
Which way is it?
Mark Richardson
>John Popelish <jpop...@rica.net> wrote in message news:<3EFD0B81...@rica.net>...
>> chupacabra wrote:
>> >
>> > An appreciable majority of modern biologists tend to believe that
>> > human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated structure of
>> > neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in and
>> > take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
>> > "spirit' and "soul", and even consider believing in such phenomena to
>> > be a kind of superstition.
>>
>> Yes. Belief in 'spirit' and 'soul' are certainly within the
>> definition of superstition, "an irrational belief arising from
>> ignorance or fear". Since we cannot observe any direct or indirect
>> evidence of spirit or soul, we are ignorant of such hypothetical
>> things.
>
>
>I'd say: you have not shown that belief in spirit is an irrational
>belief at all, much less one based on ignorance or fear. Chupacabra's
>argument is a good one.
I couldn't detect an argument!
> If you are nothing but material, the supposing
>an exact physical copy of you was produced, would *you* experience
>things through the original or the copy?
Which "you" are you referring to?
In any case that's a question not an argument.
It seems to me that question only posses a problem *IF* the soul
exists seperate from the physical being.
> Certainly not both. If the
>original, why?
If we are purely physical, then the original would experience "his"
own experiences only , and the copy would experience "his" experiences
only. There is no (metaphysical) problem.
If an immaterial soul existed - then I have no idea.
Again, there is no argument here.
Mark.
--
Mark Richardson mDOTrichardsonATutasDOTeduDOTau
Member of S.M.A.S.H.
(Sarcastic Middle aged Atheists with a Sense of Humour)
-----------------------------------------------------
Ron Baker
> "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
news:<qkJLa.1636$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> > news:<MnqLa.1555$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> > > > > Richard Smol <jazzcat...@dds.nl> wrote in message
> > news:<jFfLa.8963$gs1.9...@amsnews03.chello.com>...
> > > > > > chupacabra wrote:
> (snip)
>
> > >
> > >
> > > 1. Suppose we wouldn't know; still that doesn't give any reason to
> > > think there isn't.
> >
> > That is an excellent reason to think there is no soul.
> >
> > The fact that I can't detect monsters under my bed
> > gives me reason to think there are none.
>
>
> Could you explain the reasoning then?
Are you messin' with me?
Are you saying I still ought to think there are
monsters under my bed?
> >
> > >
> > > 2. One way to know there is a soul is by using another source of
> > > information about souls and all.
> >
> > Sure. Lets use all available information. Lets evaluate
> > and cross check the sources. Lets test the information.
>
>
> Suppose there is only one source.
Are you suggesting that there is only one source
or are you suggesting that we ignore all but one source?
Why would I do any supposing?
> >
> > >
> > > 3. Another way is to use chup's argument (assuming his argument is
> > > sound) to conclude that humans having souls is the simplest way to
> > > fully explain our awareness of the external world.
> >
> > We see quite clearly how the physical condition
> > of the brain affects awareness.
> > Therefore the soul can not fully explain awareness.
>
>
> I don't see your point. Soulism includes the idea that physical
> conditions affect your expereiences, but chupacabra's argument points
> against our awareness being *reducible* to physical conditions, I'd
> say.
I think you just restated that last statement of mine.
If, as you point out, physical conditions affect your experiences
and if the soul is separate from the physical then
the soul does not fully explain experience.
>
> > Maybe your position is that it might complete
> > the explanation of awareness.
> > You said the soul can't be measured or detected so
> > how can you even connect it with awareness?
>
> Chup's argument points against awareness being reducible to physical
> conditions; if chup's argument is sound (and I think it is) then there
> likely exists a non-physical aspect of awareness. By definition, that
> would be the soul.
Which part of awareness is not explained by
the physical?
> > > > Do dogs have souls?
> > > > Do cats have souls?
<I accidently snipped your affirmative response
in a prior post.>
> >
> > Do spiders have souls?
>
> maybe.
Hmmm. I think you are saying you don't know.
How do we make the determination?
Do mice have souls?
Do worms have souls?
Elf M. Sternberg
> Let`s make the thought experiment. Imagine some Mr. Smith dying from
> uncurable form of cancer once in a distant (or maybe not so distant)
> future. At the moment of death the overall structure of his brain
> (placement and connections of neurons, DNA structure etc.) is scanned
> and put to a quantum computer matrix.
Why bother with a "quantum computer matrix?" Despite all of the
rhetoric about the human brain, there's nothing in naturalistic studies
to indicate that the brain operates by any other than classical forces,
such as chemistry, biology, electricity. Quantum mechanics is probably
not necessary to describe brain state.
> The fish we get here is, from the coherent materialistic point of
> view, just the resusciated Mr. Smith cause he has the same memories,
> traits, behaviour etc. as the late Mr. Smith, and, in fact, identifies
> himself with the later
Yup. Provided it's a well-done job, he's a faithful copy of the
original.
> Now imagine that Mr. Smith has, in fact, not died, with his mind,
> howewer, being scanned and later reproduced in another body. What we
> have now are 2 strictly identical, but disconnected minds.
Incorrect. Because brain state is related to experience; as we
experience events, our brains undergo changes. If you inflict pain on
Smith #1 and pleasure on Smith #2, their experiences bifurcate in the
most mundane of manners and they exhibit behaviors unique to their
experiences.
> Is he another person, or the same, or what?
Simple. You have two different Mr. Smiths. They have the same
experiences and memories at the moment of bifurcation, but they are
otherwise unique individuals with no particularly "supernatural"
relationship to one another.
While there might be interesting legal and social challenges to
the experiment you propose, philosophically there's nothing remarkable
about your description. Your problem is in your notion that the brain--
and with it the persona-- is a static "thing" separate from and
insensate to its environment.
Elf
--
Elf M. Sternberg, Proud to be an Extinctionist
http://www.drizzle.com/~elf/
"The apocalypse may be closer at hand than even John Derbyshire thinks:
what the hell is Elf Sternberg doing reading Derb's columns?"
-- Charles Murtaugh
Robert J. Kolker
chupacabra wrote:
> An appreciable majority of modern biologists tend to believe that
> human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated structure of
> neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in and
> take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
> "spirit' and "soul", and even consider believing in such phenomena to
> be a kind of superstition.
And for good reason. There is not a scintilla of objective evidence for
the existence of nonmaterial factors. By nonmaterial I mean factors that
or not reducible to physical entities for processes nor epiphenoma
thereof. The idea of spirit, soul or mind being a substantial existing
object is absurd and unsupported by any empirical evidence.
Bob Kolker
All there is is matter and motion.
keith
> "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<YJILa.1634$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> > > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<KsqLa.1556$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > > > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> > > > > > John Popelish <jpop...@rica.net> wrote in message
> news:<3EFD0B81...@rica.net>...
> >
> > > On rereading, I could have answered more directly the
> > > first time.
> > > I am the original. I have not changed. I still have my experiences.
> >
> > I should have read the original thought experiment better; the
> > original doesn't exist any more. But assuming it does: what is it
> > about the original that makes is so that *you* would experience stuff
> > from through that batch of meat?
>
> If I was the original and the original still exists
> then I haven't changed.
> I am me and I experience my experiences.
But what if some of your atoms were replaced? Would that change
things?
>
> An exact copy of me is a copy and not me.
> An exact copy would of necessity be physically
> separate and thus inevitably have different experiences.
As chupacabra noted, that's correct *after*. But both versions would
hav ethe exact same memories. You seem to be saying that since you
*were* the original and the original is made of the same matter, you'd
experience things through this original. But if the matter on your
body were changed one by one so that eventually all the matter was
different; would that matter? Suppose the original exchanged one by
one the atoms of the copy. What difference would *that* make?
>
> As far as I know no physical being has ever
> directly experienced the experiences of another
> separate physical being.
>
> > >
> > > <>
> > >
> > > > > When we experience things do we experience with
> > > > > the mind or the soul or both?
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > What's the difference between mind and soul?
> > >
> > > Well, we can both look up the dictionary definitions
> > > and see that they are different.
> > > I would add that the mind is real and the soul is not.
> >
> >
> > Dictionaries; who gives a damn:-)
>
> OK.
>
> > Seriously though; I am using both
> > words to mean the "center of awareness", or sme such thing. You have a
> > subjective experience of Self; that self is the mind or the soul, I'd
> > say.
>
> OK, but semantics are important.
> To me the words mean different things.
> Your earlier statements seem to imply a distinction
> between mind and soul.
> Your statement just above muddles the distinction.
> Which way is it?
In my opinion the mind and the soul are the same.
Keith
keith
> On 28 Jun 2003 16:02:12 -0700, keit...@yahoo.com (keith) wrote:
>
> >John Popelish <jpop...@rica.net> wrote in message news:<3EFD0B81...@rica.net>...
> >> chupacabra wrote:
> >> >
>
> >I'd say: you have not shown that belief in spirit is an irrational
> >belief at all, much less one based on ignorance or fear. Chupacabra's
> >argument is a good one.
>
> I couldn't detect an argument!
I don't agree.
>
> > If you are nothing but material, the supposing
> >an exact physical copy of you was produced, would *you* experience
> >things through the original or the copy?
>
> Which "you" are you referring to?
> In any case that's a question not an argument.
There's only one *you*. froend mark, the one looking out your eye
holes. His question implied an answer I'd say: materialism cannot
offer an answer to this question.
>
> It seems to me that question only posses a problem *IF* the soul
> exists seperate from the physical being.
I don't agree.
>
> > Certainly not both. If the
> >original, why?
>
> If we are purely physical, then the original would experience "his"
> own experiences only , and the copy would experience "his" experiences
> only. There is no (metaphysical) problem.
I think you are mistakenly ignoring the *subject* of this
experience--you. You know who you are--you;re the one peeping out of
your own eye holes. The question isn't whether the copy would have
experiences or the original. The question is: which would be *you*? If
the original, why?
>
keith
keith
> "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ba696799.0306...@posting.google.com...
> > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<qkJLa.1636$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> > > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<MnqLa.1555$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > > > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> > > > > > Richard Smol <jazzcat...@dds.nl> wrote in message
> news:<jFfLa.8963$gs1.9...@amsnews03.chello.com>...
> > > > > > > chupacabra wrote:
(snip)
> > > The fact that I can't detect monsters under my bed
> > > gives me reason to think there are none.
> >
> >
> > Could you explain the reasoning then?
>
> Are you messin' with me?
> Are you saying I still ought to think there are
> monsters under my bed?
Where did I say such? I merely asked you to explain your reasoning. I
am challenging the sweeping generalization that not beingh able to
detect X is a good reason to believe that X doesn't in fact exist. I
think it;s not that simple.
>
> > >
> > > >
> > > > 2. One way to know there is a soul is by using another source of
> > > > information about souls and all.
> > >
> > > Sure. Lets use all available information. Lets evaluate
> > > and cross check the sources. Lets test the information.
> >
> >
> > Suppose there is only one source.
>
> Are you suggesting that there is only one source
> or are you suggesting that we ignore all but one source?
> Why would I do any supposing?
I know of *no* source that shows there *isn't* a soul. You mentioned
checkingone source against another, I mentioned the possibility of
there being only one source, so that no such cross-checking is
possible. I am asking you to consider the consequences of that
possibility, not to believe that it is an actuality.
>
> > >
> > > >
> > > > 3. Another way is to use chup's argument (assuming his argument is
> > > > sound) to conclude that humans having souls is the simplest way to
> > > > fully explain our awareness of the external world.
> > >
> > > We see quite clearly how the physical condition
> > > of the brain affects awareness.
> > > Therefore the soul can not fully explain awareness.
> >
> >
> > I don't see your point. Soulism includes the idea that physical
> > conditions affect your expereiences, but chupacabra's argument points
> > against our awareness being *reducible* to physical conditions, I'd
> > say.
>
> I think you just restated that last statement of mine.
> If, as you point out, physical conditions affect your experiences
> and if the soul is separate from the physical then
> the soul does not fully explain experience.
Soulism doesn't say that the soul fully explains experience; I'm sorry
if I gave that impression.
>
> >
> > > Maybe your position is that it might complete
> > > the explanation of awareness.
> > > You said the soul can't be measured or detected so
> > > how can you even connect it with awareness?
> >
> > Chup's argument points against awareness being reducible to physical
> > conditions; if chup's argument is sound (and I think it is) then there
> > likely exists a non-physical aspect of awareness. By definition, that
> > would be the soul.
>
> Which part of awareness is not explained by
> the physical?
I don't think that's an applicable question. Chup's argument is that
an account of awareness that doesn't include the soul is not as
complete as one that includes it. It;s not that the soul explains part
and physical explains the other. It;s more like the soul is a
necessary *ingredient* of awareness.
>
> > > > > Do dogs have souls?
> > > > > Do cats have souls?
>
> <I accidently snipped your affirmative response
> in a prior post.>
>
> > >
> > > Do spiders have souls?
> >
> > maybe.
>
> Hmmm. I think you are saying you don't know.
> How do we make the determination?
I can't think of a way.
>
> Do mice have souls?
I tend to think they do.
> Do worms have souls?
I dunno.
Keith
Ron Baker
Depends. If the atoms of my brain were replaced with
berillium that would make a big change.
If three atoms in my left little toenail were changed
we probably couldn't tell.
In your post of Saturday June 28 4:02 pm
you said:
"supposing an exact physical copy of you was produced"
> >
> > An exact copy of me is a copy and not me.
> > An exact copy would of necessity be physically
> > separate and thus inevitably have different experiences.
>
> As chupacabra noted, that's correct *after*. But both versions would
> hav ethe exact same memories. You seem to be saying that since you
> *were* the original and the original is made of the same matter, you'd
> experience things through this original. But if the matter on your
> body were changed one by one so that eventually all the matter was
> different; would that matter?
(Pun intended?)
Not much. As I understand it it is happening. The atoms of the body
are being replaced.
Is the you of now the same as the you when you were 18?
> Suppose the original exchanged one by
> one the atoms of the copy. What difference would *that* make?
It doesn't matter where the replacement atoms come from.
The atoms of an element are generally fungible.
> >
> > As far as I know no physical being has ever
> > directly experienced the experiences of another
> > separate physical being.
> >
> > > >
> > > > <>
> > > >
> > > > > > When we experience things do we experience with
> > > > > > the mind or the soul or both?
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > What's the difference between mind and soul?
> > > >
> > > > Well, we can both look up the dictionary definitions
> > > > and see that they are different.
> > > > I would add that the mind is real and the soul is not.
> > >
> > >
> > > Dictionaries; who gives a damn:-)
> >
> > OK.
> >
> > > Seriously though; I am using both
> > > words to mean the "center of awareness", or sme such thing. You have a
> > > subjective experience of Self; that self is the mind or the soul, I'd
> > > say.
> >
> > OK, but semantics are important.
> > To me the words mean different things.
> > Your earlier statements seem to imply a distinction
> > between mind and soul.
> > Your statement just above muddles the distinction.
> > Which way is it?
>
>
> In my opinion the mind and the soul are the same.
Ah. OK. You *are* using nonstandard definitions.
So in your parlance mind=soul="center of awareness".
You also mentioned spirit.
I was assuming that that is synonymous with soul.
Is spirit the same as mind/soul?
So I would take it that only things with awareness have mind/soul.
Can the mind/soul exist without a physical body?
Ron Baker
Surely you are not saying that
not being able to detect X is good reason to believe
that X exists, are you?
What *is* good reason to believe X exists?
What is the disadvantage to believing X does not exist
when it can't be detected?
> >
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > 2. One way to know there is a soul is by using another source of
> > > > > information about souls and all.
If the soul can't be detected, as you have agreed,
how can there be any information on it?
There might be opinions but is that information?
> > > >
> > > > Sure. Lets use all available information. Lets evaluate
> > > > and cross check the sources. Lets test the information.
> > >
> > >
> > > Suppose there is only one source.
> >
> > Are you suggesting that there is only one source
> > or are you suggesting that we ignore all but one source?
> > Why would I do any supposing?
>
>
> I know of *no* source that shows there *isn't* a soul. You mentioned
And you know of no source that shows that
there is a soul either, do you?
> checkingone source against another, I mentioned the possibility of
> there being only one source, so that no such cross-checking is
> possible. I am asking you to consider the consequences of that
> possibility, not to believe that it is an actuality.
So it is a hypothetical then.
I am not able to tell you how I would respond
unless it were an actuality.
I think so.
You said "there likely exists a non-physical aspect of awareness".
Did you mean that?
What is, or even might be, that aspect?
> Chup's argument is that
> an account of awareness that doesn't include the soul is not as
> complete as one that includes it. It;s not that the soul explains part
> and physical explains the other. It;s more like the soul is a
> necessary *ingredient* of awareness.
How is it necessary?
socode
> Where did I say such? I merely asked you to explain your reasoning. I
> am challenging the sweeping generalization that not beingh able to
> detect X is a good reason to believe that X doesn't in fact exist. I
> think it;s not that simple.
It is that simple. Even the effects of magnetism can be "detected".
On the other hand, if you are postulating something that cannot be
"detected" directly or indirectly, why are you suggesting that we
should have any credence for it?
Answer with specific regard to the following X:
1) There are invisible green aliens in your ass.
2) There are invisible red aliens in your ass.
3) There are invisible blue aliens in your ass.
socode
keith
> "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ba696799.03063...@posting.google.com...
> > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<OeRLa.1702$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > news:ba696799.0306...@posting.google.com...
> > > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<qkJLa.1636$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > > > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> > > Are you messin' with me?
> > > Are you saying I still ought to think there are
> > > monsters under my bed?
> >
> >
> > Where did I say such? I merely asked you to explain your reasoning. I
> > am challenging the sweeping generalization that not beingh able to
> > detect X is a good reason to believe that X doesn't in fact exist. I
> > think it;s not that simple.
>
> Surely you are not saying that
> not being able to detect X is good reason to believe
> that X exists, are you?
I didn't say that either. I said I didn't think it was as simple as
you seemed to say.
>
> What *is* good reason to believe X exists?
There are lot's of possible good reasons. Having sufficient objective
evidence would be one. Personally experiencing X would be another.
>
> What is the disadvantage to believing X does not exist
> when it can't be detected?
That depends. If your goal is to avoid being killed by something
(say, like a bullet in a gun) it might be a good idea to believe the
gun loaded until you have evidence to the contrary. But here we are
talking about truth and such. If your goal is believing the truth you
ought believe whatever happens to be true, whether or not it can be
detected.
>
>
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > 2. One way to know there is a soul is by using another source of
> > > > > > information about souls and all.
>
> If the soul can't be detected, as you have agreed,
> how can there be any information on it?
> There might be opinions but is that information?
Why would *our* being unable to detect the soul imply that there is
*no* source of information about it?
> (snip)
> > > > Suppose there is only one source.
> > >
> > > Are you suggesting that there is only one source
> > > or are you suggesting that we ignore all but one source?
> > > Why would I do any supposing?
> >
> >
> > I know of *no* source that shows there *isn't* a soul. You mentioned
>
> And you know of no source that shows that
> there is a soul either, do you?
Scientific source? None that I can think of, which means there is
nothing for me to *ignore* if I don't consider science when I consider
the notion of the soul. Do I know *a* source for info about the soul.
I believe I do, but you probably don't share my religious view and I
wouldn't want to offend you by "demanding" you accept my religion as a
source of knowledge.
>
> > checkingone source against another, I mentioned the possibility of
> > there being only one source, so that no such cross-checking is
> > possible. I am asking you to consider the consequences of that
> > possibility, not to believe that it is an actuality.
>
> So it is a hypothetical then.
> I am not able to tell you how I would respond
> unless it were an actuality.
OK; and your not interested in trying to reflect on how you *would*
react?
> (snip)
(snip)
> > > > Chup's argument points against awareness being reducible to physical
> > > > conditions; if chup's argument is sound (and I think it is) then there
> > > > likely exists a non-physical aspect of awareness. By definition, that
> > > > would be the soul.
> > >
> > > Which part of awareness is not explained by
> > > the physical?
> >
> >
> > I don't think that's an applicable question.
>
> I think so.
> You said "there likely exists a non-physical aspect of awareness".
> Did you mean that?
> What is, or even might be, that aspect?
I explain why I think your question was not applicable below.
>
> > Chup's argument is that
> > an account of awareness that doesn't include the soul is not as
> > complete as one that includes it. It;s not that the soul explains part
> > and physical explains the other. It;s more like the soul is a
> > necessary *ingredient* of awareness.
>
> How is it necessary?
By chub's argument (and I agree with chub here) it is that without the
idea of a soul awareness doesn't make sense.
>
> > >(snip)
Keith
keith
> keith:
> > Where did I say such? I merely asked you to explain your reasoning. I
> > am challenging the sweeping generalization that not beingh able to
> > detect X is a good reason to believe that X doesn't in fact exist. I
> > think it;s not that simple.
>
> It is that simple. Even the effects of magnetism can be "detected".
Even magnetism? :-) That's not relevant, I'd say. That magtnetism
*can* be detected doesn't show that whatever exists can be detected.
>
> On the other hand, if you are postulating something that cannot be
> "detected" directly or indirectly, why are you suggesting that we
> should have any credence for it?
I'd say: because as chup showed, if materialism were true then
awareness wouldn't make any sense.
>
> Answer with specific regard to the following X:
>
> 1) There are invisible green aliens in your ass.
> 2) There are invisible red aliens in your ass.
> 3) There are invisible blue aliens in your ass.
No to all 3.
Keith
>
> socode
keith
> "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ba696799.03063...@posting.google.com...
> > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<mMQLa.1700$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> > > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<YJILa.1634$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > >
> > > If I was the original and the original still exists
> > > then I haven't changed.
> > > I am me and I experience my experiences.
> >
> >
> > But what if some of your atoms were replaced? Would that change
> > things?
>
> Depends. If the atoms of my brain were replaced with
> berillium that would make a big change.
> If three atoms in my left little toenail were changed
> we probably couldn't tell.
>
> In your post of Saturday June 28 4:02 pm
> you said:
> "supposing an exact physical copy of you was produced"
yes. WE address the issue below; see you there:-)
>
> > >
> > > An exact copy of me is a copy and not me.
> > > An exact copy would of necessity be physically
> > > separate and thus inevitably have different experiences.
> >
> > As chupacabra noted, that's correct *after*. But both versions would
> > hav ethe exact same memories. You seem to be saying that since you
> > *were* the original and the original is made of the same matter, you'd
> > experience things through this original. But if the matter on your
> > body were changed one by one so that eventually all the matter was
> > different; would that matter?
>
> (Pun intended?)
> Not much. As I understand it it is happening. The atoms of the body
> are being replaced.
> Is the you of now the same as the you when you were 18?
yes I am But here's the point: if your atoms were one by one exchanged
for the ones in your copy, then the "original" would have the same
structure and same matter as the copy did, while the copy would have
the same structure and matter as the original did. But you seem to be
saying that you would experience things from the body that was
composed of the same matter as the copy was. Why?
>
> > Suppose the original exchanged one by
> > one the atoms of the copy. What difference would *that* make?
>
> It doesn't matter where the replacement atoms come from.
> The atoms of an element are generally fungible.
More to my point, I;d say. if the individual atoms don't matter, then
it seems to me that on materialism what matters is the way the atoms
are arranged. But if that were the case then why would you see things
from the original's eye holes instead of the identical copy's?
> (snip)
> > > OK, but semantics are important.
> > > To me the words mean different things.
> > > Your earlier statements seem to imply a distinction
> > > between mind and soul.
> > > Your statement just above muddles the distinction.
> > > Which way is it?
> >
> >
> > In my opinion the mind and the soul are the same.
>
> Ah. OK. You *are* using nonstandard definitions.
> So in your parlance mind=soul="center of awareness".
I suppose so; I did try to make my usage clear. I think I am using the
word "mind" the way philosopher's do, however.
>
> You also mentioned spirit.
> I was assuming that that is synonymous with soul.
> Is spirit the same as mind/soul?
I'm not distinguishing them.
>
> So I would take it that only things with awareness have mind/soul.
> Can the mind/soul exist without a physical body?
I see no reason *in principle* why not. But I do not know if it's
actually possible.
Keith
chupacabra
What about thousands of accounts about UFOs, poltergeist and other
paranormal phenomena? Even when the most are faked, something remains
for consideration.
"The moon doesn`t exist when nobody looks at it". Don`t remember
exactly who`ve claimed that, just that he was a well-known physicist.
Mark Richardson
>Mark Richardson <mark.ri...@die.spammers.die> wrote in message news:<rumvfv83bsm3c2ann...@4ax.com>...
>> On 28 Jun 2003 16:02:12 -0700, keit...@yahoo.com (keith) wrote:
>>
>> > If you are nothing but material, the supposing
>> >an exact physical copy of you was produced, would *you* experience
>> >things through the original or the copy?
>>
>> Which "you" are you referring to?
>> In any case that's a question not an argument.
>
>
>There's only one *you*. froend mark, the one looking out your eye
>holes.
Sure.
The "copy" would feel exactly the same way.
> His question implied an answer I'd say: materialism cannot
>offer an answer to this question.
The answer is automatic (I would say intrinsic) in the case of
materialism - the problem only exist if there is an immaterial soul to
worry about.
The problem of "who gets the soul" is a tricky one - glad I don't have
to solve it.
I would be happy to hear your solution when you get one.
8-)
>>
>> It seems to me that question only posses a problem *IF* the soul
>> exists seperate from the physical being.
>
>
>I don't agree.
Really? I thought it fairly obvious.
>>
>> > Certainly not both. If the
>> >original, why?
>>
>> If we are purely physical, then the original would experience "his"
>> own experiences only , and the copy would experience "his" experiences
>> only. There is no (metaphysical) problem.
>
>I think you are mistakenly ignoring the *subject* of this
>experience--you.
You still missunderstand.
"I" would be me, whether "I" was the original OR the copy.
There is no true "I" in the case of materialism - the "problem"
literally un-asks itself - it has no possible objective meaning.
The sense of identity is subjective - each individual would feel that
they were themselves.
And they would both be right.
One might be the original - but they would both be "real" people.
Remember that from the moment of their creation they would begin to be
different people - have different experiences - only at the moment of
their creation they would be the same person.
(One of the beings might have the very disconcerting experience of
being told they were a copy which would conflict with their memories
of who they are - a psychological trauma of massive proportions and a
very cruel state of affairs. It wouldnt matter *which* being was told
they were the copy, the effect would be identical.)
Remember - you cannot be wrong about your own subjective reality.
>You know who you are--you;re the one peeping out of
>your own eye holes.
Exactly!
> The question isn't whether the copy would have
>experiences or the original. The question is: which would be *you*?
Both entities would experience "being themselves".
The question has no possible meaning IF materialism is true.
However:
If there is an immortal spirit then which one is "you"?
Does it divide and each physical body get an identical "soul" - how?
(An aside: How come identical twins don't have a porblem - or does
only one twin have a soul? How could you tell if a person was a
souless piece of meat - how would they be different? Would they know
it themselves?)
That is a real question and a philosophically "hard" one.
I can't answer that one, I'll leave it to you.
A case of "Somebody else's problem"
8-)
> If
>the original, why?
What is the sound of one hand clapping?
Robert J. Kolker
chupacabra wrote:
> What about thousands of accounts about UFOs, poltergeist and other
> paranormal phenomena? Even when the most are faked, something remains
> for consideration.
Has it occurred to you that these people were hallucinating, or lying,
or mistaking what they saw for something else of a material nature.
Hearsay is not evidence.
>
> "The moon doesn`t exist when nobody looks at it". Don`t remember
> exactly who`ve claimed that, just that he was a well-known physicist.
Well, he was wrong.
Bob Kolker
Ron Baker
"keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:ba696799.03063...@posting.google.com...
> "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
news:<_r_La.1755$Va5.5...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > news:ba696799.03063...@posting.google.com...
> > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> > news:<OeRLa.1702$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > > news:ba696799.0306...@posting.google.com...
> > > > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> > news:<qkJLa.1636$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > > > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > > > > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> (snip)
<>
> > > am challenging the sweeping generalization that not beingh able to
> > > detect X is a good reason to believe that X doesn't in fact exist. I
> > > think it;s not that simple.
> >
> > Surely you are not saying that
> > not being able to detect X is good reason to believe
> > that X exists, are you?
>
> I didn't say that either. I said I didn't think it was as simple as
> you seemed to say.
But maybe it is that simple.
How complex does it have to be?
It is certainly simple for me to type "There is no evidence
of the soul so it doesn't exist."
But the subject has been a great matter of interest and
debate, discussion, and investigation for ages.
There have been many arguments for the soul.
The total extent of yours seems to be, it can't be disproven and
it makes "sense" to you.
Not a very compelling argument.
> >
> > What *is* good reason to believe X exists?
>
>
> There are lot's of possible good reasons. Having sufficient objective
> evidence would be one.
Which you acknowledge we don't have.
> Personally experiencing X would be another.
Which is totally subjective isn't it.
That doesn't translate from one person to another.
> >
> > What is the disadvantage to believing X does not exist
> > when it can't be detected?
>
>
> That depends. If your goal is to avoid being killed by something
> (say, like a bullet in a gun) it might be a good idea to believe the
> gun loaded until you have evidence to the contrary.
That's obviously different. Bullets are real. Anybody can
see bullets. Anybody can see them come out of guns.
> But here we are
> talking about truth and such. If your goal is believing the truth you
> ought believe whatever happens to be true, whether or not it can be
> detected.
How can something be true and not detectable?
If it can't be detected why can't I ignore it?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > 2. One way to know there is a soul is by using another source
of
> > > > > > > information about souls and all.
> >
> > If the soul can't be detected, as you have agreed,
> > how can there be any information on it?
> > There might be opinions but is that information?
>
> Why would *our* being unable to detect the soul imply that there is
> *no* source of information about it?
With regard to the soul, what would be information?
> > (snip)
>
>
> > > > > Suppose there is only one source.
> > > >
> > > > Are you suggesting that there is only one source
> > > > or are you suggesting that we ignore all but one source?
> > > > Why would I do any supposing?
> > >
> > >
> > > I know of *no* source that shows there *isn't* a soul. You mentioned
> >
> > And you know of no source that shows that
> > there is a soul either, do you?
>
>
> Scientific source? None that I can think of, which means there is
> nothing for me to *ignore* if I don't consider science when I consider
> the notion of the soul. Do I know *a* source for info about the soul.
> I believe I do, but you probably don't share my religious view and I
> wouldn't want to offend you by "demanding" you accept my religion as a
> source of knowledge.
So you are a Christian then?
The soul is necessary to make some parts of
the bible at least superficially consistent.
Hasn't the argument for the soul seemed rather desparate
to you so far, trying to argue it on its own?
True but undetectable? Isn't that stretching logic past its limits?
You wouldn't claim anything outside of religion is true
but undetectable, would you?
> >
> > > checkingone source against another, I mentioned the possibility of
> > > there being only one source, so that no such cross-checking is
> > > possible. I am asking you to consider the consequences of that
> > > possibility, not to believe that it is an actuality.
> >
> > So it is a hypothetical then.
> > I am not able to tell you how I would respond
> > unless it were an actuality.
>
>
> OK; and your not interested in trying to reflect on how you *would*
> react?
Why would I?
Why not?
You have not been consistent in your definition and usage
of the term awareness.
You defined mind/soul/awareness as one thing.
"Dictionaries; who gives a damn:-) Seriously though; I am using both
words [mind and soul] to mean the "center of awareness","
And you have distinguished between them.
"without the idea of a soul, awareness doesn't ...."
"likely exists a non-physical aspect of awareness. By definition, that
would be the soul."
"an account of awareness that doesn't include the soul is not as
complete as one that includes "
Which is it?
Ron Baker
"keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:ba696799.03063...@posting.google.com...
> "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
news:<czZLa.1753$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > news:ba696799.03063...@posting.google.com...
> > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> > news:<mMQLa.1700$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > > news:ba696799.03062...@posting.google.com...
> > > > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> > news:<YJILa.1634$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
<>
> >
> > In your post of Saturday June 28 4:02 pm
> > you said:
> > "supposing an exact physical copy of you was produced"
>
>
> yes. WE address the issue below; see you there:-)
> >
> > > >
> > > > An exact copy of me is a copy and not me.
> > > > An exact copy would of necessity be physically
> > > > separate and thus inevitably have different experiences.
> > >
> > > As chupacabra noted, that's correct *after*. But both versions would
> > > hav ethe exact same memories. You seem to be saying that since you
> > > *were* the original and the original is made of the same matter, you'd
> > > experience things through this original. But if the matter on your
> > > body were changed one by one so that eventually all the matter was
> > > different; would that matter?
> >
> > (Pun intended?)
> > Not much. As I understand it it is happening. The atoms of the body
> > are being replaced.
> > Is the you of now the same as the you when you were 18?
>
>
> yes I am But here's the point: if your atoms were one by one exchanged
> for the ones in your copy, then the "original" would have the same
> structure and same matter as the copy did
No.
"one by one" implies that it is not done instantaneously.
Both the original and the copy would undergo changes
while the exchange was taking place.
In fact it would not be possible to do such an exchange
because there would not be a one for one corespondence
between the atoms of the two.
(If the exchange were accomplished instantaneously then
you have merely traded their locations.)
>, while the copy would have
> the same structure and matter as the original did. But you seem to be
> saying that you would experience things from the body that was
> composed of the same matter as the copy was. Why?
Obviated by my explanation above.
> >
> > > Suppose the original exchanged one by
> > > one the atoms of the copy. What difference would *that* make?
> >
> > It doesn't matter where the replacement atoms come from.
> > The atoms of an element are generally fungible.
>
>
> More to my point, I;d say. if the individual atoms don't matter, then
> it seems to me that on materialism what matters is the way the atoms
> are arranged.
OK.
> But if that were the case then why would you see things
> from the original's eye holes instead of the identical copy's?
Whuh?
That sound like the equivalent of saying that since Ford
Torus #1374 is driving down the I5 then Ford Torus #1375
is also driving down the I5.
(Is this term "eye holes" your invention or is that
common speech in your region?)
Twins start from one cell that splits into two
identical cells.
Do they each see through the other's "eye holes"?
> > (snip)
>
>
> > > > OK, but semantics are important.
> > > > To me the words mean different things.
> > > > Your earlier statements seem to imply a distinction
> > > > between mind and soul.
> > > > Your statement just above muddles the distinction.
> > > > Which way is it?
> > >
> > >
> > > In my opinion the mind and the soul are the same.
> >
> > Ah. OK. You *are* using nonstandard definitions.
> > So in your parlance mind=soul="center of awareness".
>
>
> I suppose so; I did try to make my usage clear. I think I am using the
> word "mind" the way philosopher's do, however.
You have not been consistent.
You have distinguished between awareness
and soul in previous writings.
<>
> > Is spirit the same as mind/soul?
>
> I'm not distinguishing them.
OK.
> >
> > So I would take it that only things with awareness have mind/soul.
> > Can the mind/soul exist without a physical body?
>
> I see no reason *in principle* why not. But I do not know if it's
> actually possible.
Do you want to believe it is possible?
If a mind/soul/awareness is not in a physical body,
where can it be?
If you were not in your body, where would you
want to be?
Ron Baker
"chupacabra" <al...@ukr.net> wrote in message
news:3b2931c3.03063...@posting.google.com...
> "Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:<3F004A57...@attbi.com>...
> > chupacabra wrote:
> > > An appreciable majority of modern biologists tend to believe that
> > > human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated structure of
> > > neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in and
> > > take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
> > > "spirit' and "soul", and even consider believing in such phenomena to
> > > be a kind of superstition.
> >
> > And for good reason. There is not a scintilla of objective evidence for
> > the existence of nonmaterial factors. By nonmaterial I mean factors that
> > or not reducible to physical entities for processes nor epiphenoma
> > thereof. The idea of spirit, soul or mind being a substantial existing
> > object is absurd and unsupported by any empirical evidence.
> >
> > Bob Kolker
> >
> > All there is is matter and motion.
>
> What about thousands of accounts about UFOs, poltergeist and other
> paranormal phenomena? Even when the most are faked, something remains
> for consideration.
What remains?
>
> "The moon doesn`t exist when nobody looks at it". Don`t remember
> exactly who`ve claimed that, just that he was a well-known physicist.
But we can look at it. Billions of us. Quite easily in fact.
There are millions of pictures of the moon.
How many pictures of souls are there?
socode
> Even magnetism? :-) That's not relevant, I'd say. That magtnetism
> *can* be detected doesn't show that whatever exists can be detected.
That is not an argument for assuming that _anything_ which cannot be
detected exists. i.e. What reason is there to believe that something
exists if it cannot be detected?
socode
Rev. 11D Meow!
The brain exhibits mechanical aspects in its biological world so that's the
way biologists talk about it.
Isn't it psychologists and some others that are interested in the mind?
I don't think they give out degrees in holistology yet, do they?
Leonardo Dasso
> socode <x...@x.com_where_x=socode> wrote in message
news:<bdps9u$i4i$1...@ngspool-d02.news.aol.com>...
> > keith:
> > > Where did I say such? I merely asked you to explain your
reasoning. I
> > > am challenging the sweeping generalization that not beingh able to
> > > detect X is a good reason to believe that X doesn't in fact exist.
I
> > > think it;s not that simple.
> >
> > It is that simple. Even the effects of magnetism can be "detected".
>
>
> Even magnetism? :-) That's not relevant, I'd say. That magtnetism
> *can* be detected doesn't show that whatever exists can be detected.
> >
> > On the other hand, if you are postulating something that cannot be
> > "detected" directly or indirectly, why are you suggesting that we
> > should have any credence for it?
>
>
> I'd say: because as chup showed, if materialism were true then
> awareness wouldn't make any sense.
Please note that chupacabra's post did not "show" anything of the sort.
He just presented an imaginary experiment and ended up saying: "hey,
this is problematic for materialism". He did not present any argument
why his imaginary experiment is in any way problematic for materialism.
regards
leo
Jeff Young
Why does anyone need a _reason_ to believe something exists? It's
irrelevant to the fact that you've given no reason not to believe,
_whatever_ the reason for the belief in the first place, even if there
is _no_ such reason. A _lack_ of any reason _to_ believe does not
constitute a reason _not_ to believe. Fallacy of Argument from
Silence. One form of fallaciously trying to shift the burden of
proof. IOW, put up a real refutation, or else you have to let the man
believe what he wants, whether _you_ like it or not.
Jeff
socode
> socode <x...@x.com_where_x=socode> wrote in message news:<bdrh2f$gcl$2...@ngspool-d02.news.aol.com>...
>
>>keith wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Even magnetism? :-) That's not relevant, I'd say. That magtnetism
>>>*can* be detected doesn't show that whatever exists can be detected.
>>
>>That is not an argument for assuming that _anything_ which cannot be
>>detected exists. i.e. What reason is there to believe that something
>>exists if it cannot be detected?
> Why does anyone need a _reason_ to believe something exists?
You can arbitrary believe any number of an infinity of ridiculous
beliefs if you want.
socode
Leonardo Dasso
> > chupacabra wrote:
> > >
> > > An appreciable majority of modern biologists tend to believe that
> > > human mind is just the holistic result of the complicated
structure of
> > > neural connections inside human brain. They refuse to believe in
and
> > > take into account nonmaterial, transcendent phenomena concerning
> > > "spirit' and "soul", and even consider believing in such phenomena
to
> > > be a kind of superstition.
> >
> > definition of superstition, "an irrational belief arising from
> > ignorance or fear". Since we cannot observe any direct or indirect
> > evidence of spirit or soul, we are ignorant of such hypothetical
> > things.
>
>
> belief at all, much less one based on ignorance or fear. Chupacabra's
> an exact physical copy of you was produced, would *you* experience
> original, why?
> (snip)
>
> Keith
This argument is silly to the extreme. It is not even an argument. You
are you, so you experience things through you. You can think of
identical twins as copies of each other, however, nobody is stupid
enough to ask whether one of the twins experiences things through the
other.
regards
leo
Billy Goat
> socode <x...@x.com_where_x=socode> wrote in message news:<bdrh2f$gcl$2...@ngspool-d02.news.aol.com>...
> > keith wrote:
> >
> > > Even magnetism? :-) That's not relevant, I'd say. That magtnetism
> > > *can* be detected doesn't show that whatever exists can be detected.
> >
> > That is not an argument for assuming that _anything_ which cannot be
> > detected exists. i.e. What reason is there to believe that something
> > exists if it cannot be detected?
>
> Why does anyone need a _reason_ to believe something exists?
Because beliefs are not choices. Beliefs have to be caused.
--Billy
Rhode Island Red
"Jeff Young" <jie...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:6f553a4.03070...@posting.google.com...
> Why does anyone need a _reason_ to believe something exists?
Duh!
The principles of valid argument (logic), knucklehead.
Testifying that you are convinced that X may exist when you cannot produce
any logicallly satisfactory evidence of any such thing is undesirable
behavior, knucklehead.
http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE5/Agn-X.html
Agnosticism and Christianity [1899]
Collected Essays V
"It was inevitable that a conflict should arise between Agnosticism and
Theology ..."
Religious belief is simply unsupported personal subjective conviction.
"Atheism is characterized by an absence of belief in the existence of gods."
http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/intro.html
Agnostics also have an absence of belief in the existence of gods, and go
one step further to righteously deny and repudiate unsupported religious
belief in the existence of gods.
"This principle [the agnostic principle] may be stated in various ways, but
they all amount to this: that it is wrong for a man to say that he is
certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can produce
evidence which logically justifies that certainty. This is what Agnosticism
asserts; and, in my opinion, it is all that is essential to Agnosticism.
That which Agnostics deny and repudiate, as immoral, is the contrary
doctrine, that there are propositions which men ought to believe, without
logically satisfactory evidence." -- Thomas Huxley, who coined the term
'agnostic' http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE5/Agn-X.html
Jeff Young
> "Jeff Young" <jie...@aol.com> wrote in message
> news:6f553a4.03070...@posting.google.com...
>
>
>
> > Why does anyone need a _reason_ to believe something exists?
>
I note that you do not present any principles of valid argument
supporting your answer. Fallacy of Argument by Assertion, Septic.
> Testifying that you are convinced that X may exist
Is not synonymous with believing that X exists. Fallacy of the
Strawman, Septic.
Septic remains the completely fallacious, mendacious, and discredited
old slimy idiot fool lying loser of alt.atheism.
Jeff
Jeff Young
And more to the point, any number of an infinity of ridiculous reasons
for those beliefs, or no reasons at all. Until someone presents a
reason _not_ to believe, people can and will believe all sorts of
things, for perhaps _no_ reason. Your burden to present the reason
against. Got one?
Jeff
Jeff Young
Then you've answered socode's question -- what reason is there to
believe that something exists if it cannot be detected? Well, the
reason is that something or someone _caused_ one to believe it, if one
believes it (i.e. "I can't help but believe"). BTW, is a lack of
belief in something's existence also _caused_ in a person, iyo?
Jeff
Leonardo Dasso
So belief in X is the default position. We are born believing in X, we
are genetically determined to believe in X and we will go on believing
in X until somebody kindly presents us with a reason not to believe in
X. Impeccable logic.
regards
leo
keith
> "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ba696799.03063...@posting.google.com...
> > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<czZLa.1753$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > news:ba696799.03063...@posting.google.com...
> > > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<mMQLa.1700$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
Hi Ron
At some point in our discussion you observed that it doesn't matter
which individual atoms make up your body, just so the organization of
those atoms is the same as actual (you didn't say this exactly, but it
seemed to me to follow from what you *did* say). Given that, I think
the whole "exchange atoms one by one" is a distraction from the main
point, so I'll snip that part of the discussion
(snip0
> > > It doesn't matter where the replacement atoms come from.
> > > The atoms of an element are generally fungible.
> >
> >
> > More to my point, I;d say. if the individual atoms don't matter, then
> > it seems to me that on materialism what matters is the way the atoms
> > are arranged.
>
> OK.
>
> > But if that were the case then why would you see things
> > from the original's eye holes instead of the identical copy's?
>
> Whuh?
> That sound like the equivalent of saying that since Ford
> Torus #1374 is driving down the I5 then Ford Torus #1375
> is also driving down the I5.
>
> (Is this term "eye holes" your invention or is that
> common speech in your region?)
>
> Twins start from one cell that splits into two
> identical cells.
> Do they each see through the other's "eye holes"?
Twins do *not* see things from the same eye hole which I think
supports the point I am trying to make. Let me try to explain what I
mean by "seeing through eye holes"--as far as I know nobody normally
uses that phrase. to answer your question:-)
Think about your subjective experience of "seeing the world". I'd say
you seem to yourself to be looking out of your eye holes on your face.
You see your hands, when you try to look at your nose you can sort of
see the side of your nose through one eye etc. Because you understand
what this subjective experience is like you can imagine your mind
being located in a different person's body; you can imagine seeing
things through GW Bush's body for example.
So here's what I'm saying. You seem to agree that it wouldn't matter
if each atom in your body were different individual of the same kind,
if every carbon atom were a different carbon atom etc, still you'd
have the same experiences. But if so, then on the assumption of
materialism what matters is the molecular pattern of the body, not
which individual atoms make up the structure. So which pair of eye
holes you see out of is a matter of that pattern; wherever that
pattern exists there are the eye holes you are looking out of.
If so (and this seems to me to follow from materialism and what you
already agreed to) then you'd be looking out of two sets of eye holes
if yuor pattern were twice exemplified. Since this would be ridiculous
(I'd say), therefore materialism most likely isn't true. That's how
it seems to me.
> (snip0
> > > Ah. OK. You *are* using nonstandard definitions.
> > > So in your parlance mind=soul="center of awareness".
> >
> >
> > I suppose so; I did try to make my usage clear. I think I am using the
> > word "mind" the way philosopher's do, however.
>
> You have not been consistent.
> You have distinguished between awareness
> and soul in previous writings.
If so, sorry. I don't remember doing so but I must have been thinking
something if I did. I'd have to see an example to explain what I meant
back then.
>
> <>
> (snip)
> > > So I would take it that only things with awareness have mind/soul.
> > > Can the mind/soul exist without a physical body?
> >
> > I see no reason *in principle* why not. But I do not know if it's
> > actually possible.
>
> Do you want to believe it is possible?
I'm indifferent, actually. I am a Christian so I do believe that death
is not the end, but whether I am ever a disembodied soul doesn't
matter much.
> If a mind/soul/awareness is not in a physical body,
> where can it be?
No clue; maybe location isn't even an appropriate category for a
disembodied soul.
> If you were not in your body, where would you
> want to be?
Some good place, some heavenly place:-)
Keith
keith
Are you speaking in general? If the existence of the undetectable
thing were the best way to explain a given set of phenomenon, that'd
be one reason to believe. Another would be if the existence was
revealed to you without your being able to detect the thing. But none
of that matters since the issue we were discussing was your claim that
*not* being detected was a reason to *not* believe. It's not that
simple, it's a case by case thing, I'd say.
Keith
>
> socode
keith
> On 30 Jun 2003 08:24:00 -0700, keit...@yahoo.com (keith) wrote:
>
> >Mark Richardson <mark.ri...@die.spammers.die> wrote in message news:<rumvfv83bsm3c2ann...@4ax.com>...
> >> On 28 Jun 2003 16:02:12 -0700, keit...@yahoo.com (keith) wrote:
> >>
> >> > If you are nothing but material, the supposing
> >> >an exact physical copy of you was produced, would *you* experience
> >> >things through the original or the copy?
> >>
> >> Which "you" are you referring to?
> >> In any case that's a question not an argument.
> >
> >
> >There's only one *you*. froend mark, the one looking out your eye
> >holes.
> Sure.
> The "copy" would feel exactly the same way.
Exactly: he would feell that there is only one *him*. He'd probably
think he was the original just as you'd think you are, but that's a
whole different matter.
>
> > His question implied an answer I'd say: materialism cannot
> >offer an answer to this question.
>
> The answer is automatic (I would say intrinsic) in the case of
> materialism - the problem only exist if there is an immaterial soul to
> worry about.
> The problem of "who gets the soul" is a tricky one - glad I don't have
> to solve it.
> I would be happy to hear your solution when you get one.
> 8-)
here's my solution: both would have different souls because both would
have numberically different experiences.
>
> >>
> >> It seems to me that question only posses a problem *IF* the soul
> >> exists seperate from the physical being.
> >
> >
> >I don't agree.
>
> Really? I thought it fairly obvious.
I don't think so at all:-)
>
> >>
> >> > Certainly not both. If the
> >> >original, why?
> >>
> >> If we are purely physical, then the original would experience "his"
> >> own experiences only , and the copy would experience "his" experiences
> >> only. There is no (metaphysical) problem.
> >
> >I think you are mistakenly ignoring the *subject* of this
> >experience--you.
>
> You still missunderstand.
> "I" would be me, whether "I" was the original OR the copy.
> There is no true "I" in the case of materialism - the "problem"
> literally un-asks itself - it has no possible objective meaning.
But you *know* there *is* a "you". From the outside looking in I might
not be able to distinguish between the two versions, but *you* know
that you would only experience things from one point of view.
>
> The sense of identity is subjective - each individual would feel that
> they were themselves.
> And they would both be right.
Exactly.
> One might be the original - but they would both be "real" people.
I think so as well, in fact that's my point. If you'd be the same
person if say any one of the carbon atoms in your body were a
different carbon atom, it seems to follow that if all the atoms in yur
body were different versions of the actual atoms you'd still be you.
In that case, if materialism were true then you'd have to subjectively
experience things from both versions of your body. Since obviously you
wouldn't experience things that way, it must be that materialism isn't
true.
(snip)
>
> Remember - you cannot be wrong about your own subjective reality.
>
> >You know who you are--you;re the one peeping out of
> >your own eye holes.
> Exactly!
>
> > The question isn't whether the copy would have
> >experiences or the original. The question is: which would be *you*?
>
> Both entities would experience "being themselves".
> The question has no possible meaning IF materialism is true.
That's not what I asked though. I asked *you* which one would be
*you*?
>
> However:
> If there is an immortal spirit then which one is "you"?
> Does it divide and each physical body get an identical "soul" - how?
> (An aside: How come identical twins don't have a porblem - or does
> only one twin have a soul? How could you tell if a person was a
> souless piece of meat - how would they be different? Would they know
> it themselves?)
> That is a real question and a philosophically "hard" one.
> I can't answer that one, I'll leave it to you.
Each individual would have a separate soul, I'd say. I have no idea
how souls become attached to bodies; maybe they are inherently
attached to bodies.
Keith
Mark Richardson
I haven't the faintest idea what that means, sorry.
>>
>> >>
>> >> It seems to me that question only posses a problem *IF* the soul
>> >> exists seperate from the physical being.
>> >
>> >
>> >I don't agree.
>>
>> Really? I thought it fairly obvious.
>
>
>I don't think so at all:-)
>>
>> >>
>> >> > Certainly not both. If the
>> >> >original, why?
>> >>
>> >> If we are purely physical, then the original would experience "his"
>> >> own experiences only , and the copy would experience "his" experiences
>> >> only. There is no (metaphysical) problem.
>> >
>> >I think you are mistakenly ignoring the *subject* of this
>> >experience--you.
>>
>> You still missunderstand.
>> "I" would be me, whether "I" was the original OR the copy.
>> There is no true "I" in the case of materialism - the "problem"
>> literally un-asks itself - it has no possible objective meaning.
>
>
>But you *know* there *is* a "you". From the outside looking in I might
>not be able to distinguish between the two versions, but *you* know
>that you would only experience things from one point of view.
Yes and my copy would only experience things from one point of view.
So there is no problem no dilemma.
>>
>> The sense of identity is subjective - each individual would feel that
>> they were themselves.
>> And they would both be right.
>
>
>Exactly.
>
>
>> One might be the original - but they would both be "real" people.
>
>
>I think so as well, in fact that's my point. If you'd be the same
>person if say any one of the carbon atoms in your body were a
>different carbon atom, it seems to follow that if all the atoms in yur
>body were different versions of the actual atoms you'd still be you.
The material that makes up my body changes constantly.
You eat and excrete - what remains is the overall form and pattern -
but even that changes slowly over time.
It isnt simply my body that changes either.
The subjective "I" (that is my "soul" , not my atoms) is not the same
"I" that was 5 years ago.
What is important is I have a sense of continuity and memory and I am
very similar to the person I was 5 years ago.
"Can you ever step into the same river twice?"
The Buddhist's are right - the idea that there is some fixed *you* is
just an illusion.
Everything is flux and motion - all permanence is vain illusion.
>In that case, if materialism were true then you'd have to subjectively
>experience things from both versions of your body.
!!!!!
No, that does not follow.
For that to be true there would have to be a connection between the
two - and there is not.
> Since obviously you
>wouldn't experience things that way, it must be that materialism isn't
>true.
You obviously wouldn't experience things that way - which is *exactly*
what you would expect if materialism is true!
For you to experience the other beings experiences you would need a
shared soul or some such non material thing.
So you seem to have it exactly backwards and I don't see how you
arrived at that bizarre state of affairs.
(I am genuinely perplexed !)
>> > The question isn't whether the copy would have
>> >experiences or the original. The question is: which would be *you*?
>>
>> Both entities would experience "being themselves".
>> The question has no possible meaning IF materialism is true.
>
>
>That's not what I asked though. I asked *you* which one would be
>*you*?
>
There *is* no answer to your question.
If you insist I give an answer then "Paris" is as good as any, or
"artichoke".
I am perfectly serious about that.
socode
> socode <x...@x.com_where_x=socode> wrote in message news:<bdsluh$cpo$2...@ngspool-d02.news.aol.com>...
>
>>Jeff Young wrote:
>>
>>>socode <x...@x.com_where_x=socode> wrote in message news:<bdrh2f$gcl$2...@ngspool-d02.news.aol.com>...
>>>
>>>
>>>>keith wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>Even magnetism? :-) That's not relevant, I'd say. That magtnetism
>>>>>*can* be detected doesn't show that whatever exists can be detected.
>>>>
>>>>That is not an argument for assuming that _anything_ which cannot be
>>>>detected exists. i.e. What reason is there to believe that something
>>>>exists if it cannot be detected?
>>>Why does anyone need a _reason_ to believe something exists?
>>You can arbitrary believe any number of an infinity of ridiculous
>>beliefs if you want.
> And more to the point, any number of an infinity of ridiculous reasons
> for those beliefs, or no reasons at all.
You seem to be unable to grasp the point- _you_ can believe what _you_
want. To expect me to accept it, would require a reason.
socode
Ron Baker
> "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
news:<RW8Ma.1870$Va5.5...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > news:ba696799.03063...@posting.google.com...
> > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> > news:<czZLa.1753$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > > news:ba696799.03063...@posting.google.com...
> > > > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> > news:<mMQLa.1700$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> (snip)
>
> Hi Ron
>
> At some point in our discussion you observed that it doesn't matter
> which individual atoms make up your body, just so the organization of
> those atoms is the same as actual (you didn't say this exactly, but it
> seemed to me to follow from what you *did* say).
That is not quite right.
("same as actual"? What is actual?)
I am this collection of atoms.
Any atom may be replaced with a different atom
of the same element to practically no effect (as long as we
exclude radioactive isotopes).
If you were to make an exact copy of me using a new
set of atoms without disturbing me, I would say
that the original with the original
set of atoms is still me and the other one with the new set
of atoms is the copy.
At the instant of creation they would be identical in
form and state. They would be in different environments
and have different perceptions.
They would instantly diverge and become different
due to interacting with their different environments.
Consider this scenario which I think is close to the
point you are trying to make.
Suppose we took a person and enough material to
make a copy of that person.
Suppose in making the copy, for each atom in each
location, we randomly used an atom from the original
versus from the pile of raw atoms.
After the copying process you would have two
persons each containing half of the atoms of the
original.
I think two different views would be valid.
You could say you have distroyed the
original and created two copies.
Or if the original is not moved while half of its
atoms are being taken and replaced then you
could say it is the original.
Suppose you had a person and, without disturbing
them, made an exact copy.
Then suppose you started exchanging atoms between
them over time.
You couldn't do it because they wouldn't have
the same atoms in the same configurations.
In any case, if you start off with two physically identical
persons, they must be in different places, and
therefore have different environments.
The light entering each person's eyes is different.
The light entering person A's eyes is registered
on person A's retina, travels over person A's nerves
to person A's brain.
None of that can jump over to person B.
Overall it is as if you had two cars
each with its vehicle ID stamped on
every part.
They could start off identical but they are
not the same car.
Turning the key in one doesn't start the engine
in the other.
If you start trading parts between the cars
how do you identify which car is which?
If you exchange only one part then you
could easily say that their identities haven't
changed.
If you exchange half the parts then it
is a little harder to say.
If car A maintains its integrity and stays in
one place while you are exchanging the parts
then you could say that it is still car A.
If you exchanged 90% of the parts then
it is harder to call it car A.
I no case will turning the key in one car
start the engine in the other.
Humans are about same the except that the
parts are always changing.
> Given that, I think
> the whole "exchange atoms one by one" is a distraction from the main
> point, so I'll snip that part of the discussion
> (snip0
I don't think that is true.
Could you explain that?
(You originally asked the question, "But if the matter on your
body were changed one by one so that eventually all the matter was
different; would that matter?")
Do you disagree that the atoms and their configuration
in a body are constantly changing?
>
>
> > > > It doesn't matter where the replacement atoms come from.
> > > > The atoms of an element are generally fungible.
> > >
> > >
> > > More to my point, I;d say. if the individual atoms don't matter, then
> > > it seems to me that on materialism what matters is the way the atoms
> > > are arranged.
> >
> > OK.
> >
> > > But if that were the case then why would you see things
> > > from the original's eye holes instead of the identical copy's?
> >
> > Whuh?
> > That sound like the equivalent of saying that since Ford
> > Torus #1374 is driving down the I5 then Ford Torus #1375
> > is also driving down the I5.
You didn't address that.
> >
> > (Is this term "eye holes" your invention or is that
> > common speech in your region?)
> >
> > Twins start from one cell that splits into two
> > identical cells.
> > Do they each see through the other's "eye holes"?
>
>
> Twins do *not* see things from the same eye hole which I think
> supports the point I am trying to make.
If twins don't see things from the same "eye hole" why
would these material copies we've been talking about
see things from the same "eye hole"?
> Let me try to explain what I
> mean by "seeing through eye holes"--as far as I know nobody normally
> uses that phrase. to answer your question:-)
Cool. Thanks for the clarification.
>
> Think about your subjective experience of "seeing the world". I'd say
> you seem to yourself to be looking out of your eye holes on your face.
> You see your hands, when you try to look at your nose you can sort of
> see the side of your nose through one eye etc. Because you understand
> what this subjective experience is like you can imagine your mind
> being located in a different person's body; you can imagine seeing
> things through GW Bush's body for example.
I'm with you so far.
>
> So here's what I'm saying. You seem to agree that it wouldn't matter
> if each atom in your body were different individual of the same kind,
> if every carbon atom were a different carbon atom etc, still you'd
> have the same experiences. But if so, then on the assumption of
> materialism what matters is the molecular pattern of the body, not
> which individual atoms make up the structure.
(Maybe. I don't think that is complete.
What is materialism? What is what matters?
Two carbon atoms may be identical and function identically
under indentical conditions
but they are distinct, separate, and not the same carbon atom.
They will do different things in different environments.)
> So which pair of eye
> holes you see out of is a matter of that pattern; wherever that
> pattern exists there are the eye holes you are looking out of.
If you are saying that the material and pattern of one person
includes that person's brain and connected eyes and that
the material and pattern of an identical copy is made
up of separate, but the same type of,
material in the identical pattern constituting a brain and
connected eyes in a different location, ... then the first will
"see" what comes into its eyes and the copy will
see what comes into the copy's eyes.
>
> If so (and this seems to me to follow from materialism and what you
> already agreed to) then you'd be looking out of two sets of eye holes
> if yuor pattern were twice exemplified.
No.
A person is a physical example of a pattern.
A person is matter in a pattern.
A person is not just the pattern.
A copy of a person would be a collection of matter of the
same type in the same pattern.
The copy would be a distinct physical individual.
Two physical persons in the same pattern
is not one person.
The sense that it is "one" pattern would not make
those two physical individuals one and the same person.
They would not see through each other's eyes.
They wouldn't be like the Corsican brothers.
Light entering the eye of A would interact with
the matter of A and change its pattern.
It would not affect B.
> Since this would be ridiculous
> (I'd say), therefore materialism most likely isn't true. That's how
I agree that the materialsm you have described is not true.
<>
> > > > Ah. OK. You *are* using nonstandard definitions.
> > > > So in your parlance mind=soul="center of awareness".
> > >
> > >
> > > I suppose so; I did try to make my usage clear. I think I am using the
> > > word "mind" the way philosopher's do, however.
> >
> > You have not been consistent.
> > You have distinguished between awareness
> > and soul in previous writings.
>
> If so, sorry. I don't remember doing so but I must have been thinking
> something if I did. I'd have to see an example to explain what I meant
> back then.
"likely exists a non-physical aspect of awareness. By definition, that
would be the soul."
<>
> I'm indifferent, actually. I am a Christian so I do believe that death
> is not the end, but whether I am ever a disembodied soul doesn't
> matter much.
? What is there after death?
Separate question:
At what moment does a person acquire a soul?
Billy Goat
AFAICT, everyone starts life without beliefs. So, a lack of belief is
not caused, unless birth is considered a "cause".
--Billy
keith
> On 1 Jul 2003 21:15:26 -0700, keit...@yahoo.com (keith) wrote:
>
> >Mark Richardson <mark.ri...@die.spammers.die> wrote in message news:<30n1gv089jd4h04tm...@4ax.com>...
> >> On 30 Jun 2003 08:24:00 -0700, keit...@yahoo.com (keith) wrote:
> >>
> >> >Mark Richardson <mark.ri...@die.spammers.die> wrote in message news:<rumvfv83bsm3c2ann...@4ax.com>...
> >here's my solution: both would have different souls because both would
> >have numberically different experiences.
>
> I haven't the faintest idea what that means, sorry.
I doubt if this clears it up, but the word should have been
"numerically" [different experiences]. Here's what I mean: one version
saw event X and the other saw the same event, still they would be
separate experiences.
>
>(snip)
>> >
> >> >I think you are mistakenly ignoring the *subject* of this
> >> >experience--you.
> >>
> >> You still missunderstand.
> >> "I" would be me, whether "I" was the original OR the copy.
> >> There is no true "I" in the case of materialism - the "problem"
> >> literally un-asks itself - it has no possible objective meaning.
> >
> >
> >But you *know* there *is* a "you". From the outside looking in I might
> >not be able to distinguish between the two versions, but *you* know
> >that you would only experience things from one point of view.
>
> Yes and my copy would only experience things from one point of view.
> So there is no problem no dilemma.
That's not the dilemma. I comment on that below.
>
> >> (snip0
> >
> >> One might be the original - but they would both be "real" people.
> >
> >
> >I think so as well, in fact that's my point. If you'd be the same
> >person if say any one of the carbon atoms in your body were a
> >different carbon atom, it seems to follow that if all the atoms in yur
> >body were different versions of the actual atoms you'd still be you.
>
> The material that makes up my body changes constantly.
> You eat and excrete - what remains is the overall form and pattern -
> but even that changes slowly over time.
>
> It isnt simply my body that changes either.
> The subjective "I" (that is my "soul" , not my atoms) is not the same
> "I" that was 5 years ago.
> What is important is I have a sense of continuity and memory and I am
> very similar to the person I was 5 years ago.
>
> "Can you ever step into the same river twice?"
1. But if the over all pattern is what matters, if it's the pattern
and not the atoms that your subjective "I" is attached to, then if
there were two identical examplifications of that pattern as in the
thought experiment, then the subjective "you" would be attached to
bothh versions, it seems to me.
2. I also do not agree that you are a different "you" than five years
ago. Certainly you have some different properties, but if you were not
the same you from moment to moment then agreements between people
would not be valid--you could say "*I* didn;t agree to anything; you
made an agreement with somebody else". It must be the case that there
is an identity that persists through time.
>
> The Buddhist's are right - the idea that there is some fixed *you* is
> just an illusion.
> Everything is flux and motion - all permanence is vain illusion.
I like the Buddhists and all, but I do not agree with this doctrine of
their's.
>
> >In that case, if materialism were true then you'd have to subjectively
> >experience things from both versions of your body.
> !!!!!
> No, that does not follow.
> For that to be true there would have to be a connection between the
> two - and there is not.
If you (the subjective "you) are attached to a "pattern" and not
individual atoms then you'd be attached everytime that pattern was
exemplified, it seems to me.
(snip)
(
> >That's not what I asked though. I asked *you* which one would be
> >*you*?
> >
> There *is* no answer to your question.
> If you insist I give an answer then "Paris" is as good as any, or
> "artichoke".
> I am perfectly serious about that.
If what I wrote above in this post doesn't end your perplexity about
what I am asking (regardless of whether you agree with me or not) then
I'm thinking we have hit old "intuitive impasse".
your pal
Keith
>
> Mark.
keith
> "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:ba696799.03063...@posting.google.com...
> > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<_r_La.1755$Va5.5...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > "keith" <keit...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > > news:ba696799.03063...@posting.google.com...
> > > > "Ron Baker" <rba...@msnn.com> wrote in message
> news:<OeRLa.1702$Va5.4...@dca1-nnrp1.news.algx.net>...
> > > Surely you are not saying that
> > > not being able to detect X is good reason to believe
> > > that X exists, are you?
> >
> > I didn't say that either. I said I didn't think it was as simple as
> > you seemed to say.
>
> But maybe it is that simple.
> How complex does it have to be?
> It is certainly simple for me to type "There is no evidence
> of the soul so it doesn't exist."
> But the subject has been a great matter of interest and
> debate, discussion, and investigation for ages.
> There have been many arguments for the soul.
> The total extent of yours seems to be, it can't be disproven and
> it makes "sense" to you.
> Not a very compelling argument.
In fact, what you cite above *isn't* an argument for the soul. It is a
responde to an argument *against* the soul.
>
> > >
> > > What *is* good reason to believe X exists?
> >
> >
> > There are lot's of possible good reasons. Having sufficient objective
> > evidence would be one.
>
> Which you acknowledge we don't have.
>
> > Personally experiencing X would be another.
>
> Which is totally subjective isn't it.
> That doesn't translate from one person to another.
Correct, which means it can't be used to convince a person who hadn't
had the experience.
>
> > >
> > > What is the disadvantage to believing X does not exist
> > > when it can't be detected?
> >
> >
> > That depends. If your goal is to avoid being killed by something
> > (say, like a bullet in a gun) it might be a good idea to believe the
> > gun loaded until you have evidence to the contrary.
>
> That's obviously different. Bullets are real. Anybody can
> see bullets. Anybody can see them come out of guns.
Of course. But the particular bullet in the particular gun? YOu might
not be able top detect that one at all, and yet it might be a good
idea to believe it's there.
>
>
> > But here we are
> > talking about truth and such. If your goal is believing the truth you
> > ought believe whatever happens to be true, whether or not it can be
> > detected.
>
> How can something be true and not detectable?
There are zillions of instances. It could be that Lincoln ate fish
right before he gave the Gettysburg address and it could be that we
have no way to determine such.
>
> If it can't be detected why can't I ignore it?
That's a different question. If the issue is truth, your question is
not relevant.
> (snip)
> > > If the soul can't be detected, as you have agreed,
> > > how can there be any information on it?
> > > There might be opinions but is that information?
> >
> > Why would *our* being unable to detect the soul imply that there is
> > *no* source of information about it?
>
> With regard to the soul, what would be information?
Divine relelation could perhaps give us that information; is that what
you were asking?
> (snip0
> > > And you know of no source that shows that
> > > there is a soul either, do you?
> >
> >
> > Scientific source? None that I can think of, which means there is
> > nothing for me to *ignore* if I don't consider science when I consider
> > the notion of the soul. Do I know *a* source for info about the soul.
> > I believe I do, but you probably don't share my religious view and I
> > wouldn't want to offend you by "demanding" you accept my religion as a
> > source of knowledge.
>
> So you are a Christian then?
> The soul is necessary to make some parts of
> the bible at least superficially consistent.
Inasmuch as the bible says we have souls, yes.
> Hasn't the argument for the soul seemed rather desparate
> to you so far, trying to argue it on its own?
> True but undetectable? Isn't that stretching logic past its limits?
> You wouldn't claim anything outside of religion is true
> but undetectable, would you?
I don't see how it stretches logic at all. I haven't thought mich
about whether ot not I might claim something is undetectable but true.
>
> > >
> > > > checkingone source against another, I mentioned the possibility of
> > > > there being only one source, so that no such cross-checking is
> > > > possible. I am asking you to consider the consequences of that
> > > > possibility, not to believe that it is an actuality.
> > >
> > > So it is a hypothetical then.
> > > I am not able to tell you how I would respond
> > > unless it were an actuality.
> >
> >
> > OK; and your not interested in trying to reflect on how you *would*
> > react?
>
> Why would I?
You might just think the question is interesting to think about (I
guess not though:-)
>
(snip0
> > >
> > > > Chup's argument is that
> > > > an account of awareness that doesn't include the soul is not as
> > > > complete as one that includes it. It;s not that the soul explains part
> > > > and physical explains the other. It;s more like the soul is a
> > > > necessary *ingredient* of awareness.
> > >
> > > How is it necessary?
> >
> >
> > By chub's argument (and I agree with chub here) it is that without the
> > idea of a soul awareness doesn't make sense.
>
> Why not?
>
> You have not been consistent in your definition and usage
> of the term awareness.
> You defined mind/soul/awareness as one thing.
> "Dictionaries; who gives a damn:-) Seriously though; I am using both
> words [mind and soul] to mean the "center of awareness","
> And you have distinguished between them.
> "without the idea of a soul, awareness doesn't ...."
> "likely exists a non-physical aspect of awareness. By definition, that
> would be the soul."
> "an account of awareness that doesn't include the soul is not as
> complete as one that includes "
> Which is it?
I'm sorry for my confusing use of terms. The soul and the mind and
awareness are the same. So what I should have said is that any account
of awareness that tried to reduce the soul to materialism is not as
complete as one that doesn't.
keith
Rhode Island Red
"Leonardo Dasso" <Lda...@btinternet.com> wrote in message
news:bdte3a$112ten$1...@ID-102497.news.dfncis.de...
Im-peckerable, since Jeffie's logic is not fecund. 8^)
Jeffie never stops trying to shift the burden of proof concerning his
imaginary playmate, "God."
Rhode Island Red
"Jeff Young" <jie...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:6f553a4.03070...@posting.google.com...
> "Rhode Island Red" <rirroos...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:<CRnMa.1193$C36....@rwcrnsc51.ops.asp.att.net>...
> > "Jeff Young" <jie...@aol.com> wrote in message
> > news:6f553a4.03070...@posting.google.com...
> >
> >
> >
> > > Why does anyone need a _reason_ to believe something exists?
> >
> > The principles of valid argument (logic), knucklehead.
>
> I note that you do not present any principles of valid argument
The readers will notice that you snipped and ignored the principle of valid
argument (logic) presented, knucklehead, and posted your argument _ad
nauseum_ instead.
[unsnip]
"This principle [the agnostic principle] may be stated in various ways, but
they all amount to this: that it is wrong for a man to say that he is
certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can produce
evidence which logically justifies that certainty. ...
Jeff Young
> "Jeff Young" <jie...@aol.com> wrote in message
> news:6f553a4.03070...@posting.google.com...
> > "Rhode Island Red" <rirroos...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:<CRnMa.1193$C36....@rwcrnsc51.ops.asp.att.net>...
> > > "Jeff Young" <jie...@aol.com> wrote in message
> > > news:6f553a4.03070...@posting.google.com...
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > > Why does anyone need a _reason_ to believe something exists?
> > >
> > > The principles of valid argument (logic), knucklehead.
> >
> > I note that you do not present any principles of valid argument
> > supporting your answer. ...
>
> The readers will notice
The readers will note that you did not present any principles of valid
argument which support your answer, Septic.
Septic remains the completely refuted, mendacious, fallacious, and
discredited old idiot fool liar of alt.atheism.
Jeff
Jeff Young
Didn't say that either. I said people can and will believe until you
give a reason not to. You're tilting at windmills. (I.e. Strawman
Fallacy.)
Jeff
Mxsmanic
> As an inference, this thought experiment clearly
> demonstrates the great difficulty of reconciling
> the inherent uniqueness of human mind and the notion
> of the latter as a purely material phenomenon.
They cannot be reconciled, because consciousness is not a physical
phenomenon.
--
Transpose hotmail and mxsmanic in my e-mail address to reach me directly.
Mxsmanic
> All we have here is your assumption of the "inherent uniqueness
> of the human mind".
It is unique in that it can only be experienced, not observed.
Everything else in the universe can be observed, but not experienced.
Mxsmanic
> Now if you were to ask if it is morally right
> to destroy one of the copies, then we'd get into
> the heavy stuff.
If consciousness is a purely physical phenomenon, there is no "heavy
stuff" to worry about, because there are no morals.
Mxsmanic
> Does the original have a soul and keep that soul?
Yes.
> Does the copy have a soul?
Indeterminate.
> Is it a new soul?
If it has one, it is a _different_ soul from that of the original.
> When we experience things do we experience with
> the mind or the soul or both?
That depends on your definitions. All experience occurs in
consciousness. The seat of consciousness is metaphysical (not
physical); however, it does communicate with the physical universe,
somehow, and vice versa.
Mxsmanic
> ... nobody is stupid enough to ask whether one of
> the twins experiences things through the other.
The real question boils down to: What aspect of physical reality is the
seat of consciousness? What is it that makes a human being self-aware?
It's a question that will never be answered, because the seat of
consciousness is not physical. But it may be a very long time before
the more scientifically-inclined are willing to accept that.
Mxsmanic
> If your brain, a material entity, is removed your mind,
> unique or not, will cease all activity.
Any proof of that?
Mxsmanic
> And how would the human body and this immaterial "soul"
> interact?
That is a persistent mystery.
> If there is any interaction of sorts, it should
> be measurable.
Not necessarily. The only measurements we know how to make are phsyical
measurements. The interaction is likely to be only partially physical,
or perhaps not at all, so it may not be measurable.
> Can you make any scientific predictions what
> one would find if you do measure this?
Science only predicts observations, not experiences.
Mxsmanic
> If it is not measurable or detectible how do you know
> there is a soul in a body?
Because you are conscious.
> Do dogs have souls?
> Do cats have souls?
Most metaphysical theories say yes. But there is actually no way to
know if anything in the universe is conscious, apart from oneself.
In general, consciousness is associated with life. Anything alive is
conscious to some extent. The position with respect to non-living
matter is less clear.
And life, incidentally, can be defined as physical processes that defy
thermodynamics. For example, living creatures are distinctive in the
universe in that they tend towards greater complexity, and not the other
way around.
(Which, incidentally, makes one wonder what would happen if the arrow of
time were reversed--would rocks come alive and cats and dogs cease to
live?)
Mxsmanic
> We see quite clearly how the physical condition
> of the brain affects awareness.
No, we cannot. We see apparent correlations, but cause and effect
cannot be demonstrated, because the actual mechanism of consciousness is
unknown.
> You said the soul can't be measured or detected so
> how can you even connect it with awareness?
The fact that you are aware proves its existence.
> Do spiders have souls?
They are probably conscious. Soul is not a synonym of consciousness in
most contexts, so that is a more difficult question to answer.
Mxsmanic
> If the soul has a physical effect on the body,
> it must have a physical component, whether we
> can detect it or not.
If a human being can drive a car, then some part of the human being must
be a part of the car, whether we can detect it or not.
> So where does it reside if the body is destroyed?
So where does a human driver reside if his car is destroyed?
Mxsmanic
> Which part of awareness is not explained by
> the physical?
All of it.
> I think you are saying you don't know.
> How do we make the determination?
We can't. The only consciousness we can verify as existing is our own.
We _know_ with _certainty_ that we are individually conscious, but we
have no way of knowing whether anything else in the universe is
conscious.
Mxsmanic
> And you know of no source that shows that
> there is a soul either, do you?
The fact that you are able to contemplate the question is the source
that you seek.
Mxsmanic
> Which is totally subjective isn't it.
Not in the case of consciousness. Experiencing it is proof that it
exists.
You realize, of course, that subjectivity requires consciousness.
Nothing unconscious is ever subjective, so if something is "totally
subjective," then consciousness exists.
> That's obviously different. Bullets are real. Anybody can
> see bullets. Anybody can see them come out of guns.
Not at the OK Corral.
> True but undetectable?
It's interesting to see someone arguing against his own existence.
"How can I possibly exist? Where's the proof! I cannot believe I exist
unless someone proves it to me!"
david asman
Mxsmanic wrote:
> CoffeeFiend writes:
>
> > Now if you were to ask if it is morally right
> > to destroy one of the copies, then we'd get into
> > the heavy stuff.
>
> If consciousness is a purely physical phenomenon, there is no "heavy
> stuff" to worry about, because there are no morals.
>
How do you get from point a to z, without going through steps b,c,d. . .?
Could you explain your logic for making this conclusion, IOW?
Dave
Mxsmanic
> On the other hand, if you are postulating something
> that cannot be "detected" directly or indirectly, why
> are you suggesting that we should have any credence for it?
Because, in this case, we all experience it, and so we have absolute
certainty of its existence, without any need for "detection."
Mxsmanic
> What inherent uniqueness?
The fact that it is experienced, whereas everything else is observed.
Mxsmanic
> There is not a scintilla of objective evidence for
> the existence of nonmaterial factors.
Incorrect. Consciousness provides irrefutable evidence of this.
Mxsmanic
> But we can look at it. Billions of us. Quite easily in fact.
That's why the moon seems to stay out there all the time.
Mxsmanic
> How do you get from point a to z, without going
> through steps b,c,d. . .?
Morals are constructs of the human mind ... of consciousness. If there
is no consciousness, there are no morals. In a universe in which
consciousness is nothing more than a physical phenomenon, it has no
unique status, and thus is no more suited to the conception of morals
than anything else.
Mxsmanic
> Yes. Ever heard of brain scans?
Brain scans are observation, not experience. Consciousness is
experience, not observation. Prove that experience ceases when the
physical brain is destroyed.
david asman
Mxsmanic wrote:
> david asman writes:
>
> > How do you get from point a to z, without going
> > through steps b,c,d. . .?
>
> Morals are constructs of the human mind ... of consciousness. If there
> is no consciousness, there are no morals. In a universe in which
> consciousness is nothing more than a physical phenomenon, it has no
> unique status, and thus is no more suited to the conception of morals
> than anything else.
Why does consciousness have to a "unique status?" I could see perfectly good
reasons for the non-mystical development of consciousness and morals. Hint:
Humans that work and live better together tend to have a higher chance of
survival. . .
Dave
Mark K. Bilbo
> Mark K. Bilbo writes:
>
>> What inherent uniqueness?
>
> The fact that it is experienced, whereas everything else is observed.
Which means what?
--
Mark K. Bilbo #1423 EAC Department of Linguistic Subversion
________________________________________________________________
"The problem with defending the purity of the English language
is that English is about as pure as a cribhouse whore. We don't
just borrow words; on occasion, English has pursued other
languages down alleyways to beat them unconscious and rifle their
pockets for new vocabulary."
[James D. Nicoll]
Mike Smith
=chupacabra writes:
=
=> As an inference, this thought experiment clearly
=> demonstrates the great difficulty of reconciling
=> the inherent uniqueness of human mind and the notion
=> of the latter as a purely material phenomenon.
=
=They cannot be reconciled, because consciousness is
=not a physical phenomenon.
It is an activity of a physical phenomenon.
__________________________________________
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
Mike Smith | aa #1164 | Founder of SMASH
__________________________________________
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
"notsayingonewordonthematteryouwillhavetofigure
itoutforyourselfifyouwanttoknowproveit." - skypher
Mike Smith
=Josef Balluch writes:
=
=> All we have here is your assumption of the "inherent uniqueness
=> of the human mind".
=
=It is unique in that it can only be experienced, not observed.
=Everything else in the universe can be observed, but not
=experienced.
Ideas? Emotions?
Elf M. Sternberg
> Robert J. Kolker writes:
>
>> There is not a scintilla of objective evidence for
>> the existence of nonmaterial factors.
> Incorrect. Consciousness provides irrefutable evidence of this.
Only if you've a-priori rejected metaphysical naturalism in
favor of incoherence.
Elf
Robert J. Kolker
Mxsmanic wrote:
>
> They cannot be reconciled, because consciousness is not a physical
> phenomenon.
Horseshit. It lights up a PET scan and an MRI. Everything that exists is
physical.
Bob Kolker
>
Robert J. Kolker
Mxsmanic wrote:
> johac writes:
>
>
>>If your brain, a material entity, is removed your mind,
>>unique or not, will cease all activity.
>
>
> Any proof of that?
Every person whose brain has been destroyed has died. No life, no mind.
Bob Kolker
>