Published in hardback in February 2004, John Robert Marlow's techno-thriller Nano is a tale about humanity's close brush with extinction at the hands of "the Final Technology."
The book tells a seat-gripping story, describing one possible "advanced nanotechnology" scenario. And while society as a whole must start discussing the possibilities that Marlow raises, there are issues, such as the economic disruption (discussed to a lesser extent in Marlow's book) that could accompany near-term limited nanotech, that have a more urgent need. To learn more about near-term issues, there is no better place to go than CRN (the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology).
In Nano's appendix, Marlow postulates something he calls the "Superswarm," a means by which we may find a measure of safety once we achieve advanced nanotechnology. The following interview was conducted to address this concept.
Mr. Marlow's book and interviews _GROSSLY_ overstate the maximum possible rate that rogue nanobots can replicate. Based on extremely general physical principles, such as the conservation of energy and the limits of available energy vs. the characteristic energies of chemical bonds, Dr. Robert Frietas has shown that the maximum possible "biomass to nanobot" conversion rate of self-replicating nanobots cannot possibly be greatly larger than that of already-existing self-replicating organic lifeforms such as bacteria, so that far from "destroy[ing] the planet in a matter of days," the timescale for complete "ecophagy" (conversion of the entire biosphere into nanobots) is in fact quite long --- on the order of _TWO YEARS_, not two days. In particular, exponential growth of a nanite infestation cannot possibly be sustained past the earliest, initial stage of the infestation, due to energy and resource limitations, as well as production of waste heat by the nanobots; hence, late growth can only occur at polynomial rather than exponential rates, and at the surface of the expanding colony rather than throughout its volume. Therefore, the response time required to deal with a rogue nanotech infestation will _NOT_ be on the order of "minutes" as Mr. Marlow claims, but rather on the order of days or weeks --- i.e., comparable to the response time currently required to deal with an epidemic outbreak of a typical infectious disease.
In short, Mr. Marlow has paid too much attention to the overblown and scientifically inaccurate claims of doomsday science fiction writers (many of whom are scientifically illiterate luddites), and too little attention to the physical limitations imposed on _ALL_ forms of nanotech by real-world physical laws.
>Published in hardback in February 2004, John Robert Marlow's >techno-thriller Nano is a tale about humanity's close brush with >extinction at the hands of "the Final Technology."
>The book tells a seat-gripping story, describing one possible >"advanced nanotechnology" scenario. And while society as a whole must >start discussing the possibilities that Marlow raises, there are >issues, such as the economic disruption (discussed to a lesser extent >in Marlow's book) that could accompany near-term limited nanotech, >that have a more urgent need. To learn more about near-term issues, >there is no better place to go than CRN (the Center for Responsible >Nanotechnology).
>In Nano's appendix, Marlow postulates something he calls the >"Superswarm," a means by which we may find a measure of safety once we >achieve advanced nanotechnology. The following interview was conducted >to address this concept.
JRM: complex technologies are inherently totalitarian because most people do not understand them and are therefore not competent to oversee their use. As technologies become more complex, the number of people who understand them fully-and who will therefore control them, and through them the societies which cannot survive without those technologies-diminishes. In this way, complex technologies drive us toward totalitarian technocracies.
======
That's a very strange thing to say. A tiny fraction of the population understands printing, copy machines, fax machines, telephones, airplanes, or how the Web works. But all of these things have been enormous forces for spreading learning and for democratizing the world.
Besides, any complex technology needs a lot of practitioners, and any useful technology will be taught in trade schools and colleges en mass.
But, for Pete's sake, this guy is a techno-thriller novelist.
> Mr. Marlow's book and interviews _GROSSLY_ overstate the maximum possible > rate that rogue nanobots can replicate. Based on extremely general physical > principles, such as the conservation of energy and the limits of available > energy vs. the characteristic energies of chemical bonds, Dr. Robert Frietas > has shown that the maximum possible "biomass to nanobot" conversion rate of > self-replicating nanobots cannot possibly be greatly larger than that of > already-existing self-replicating organic lifeforms such as bacteria, so > that far from "destroy[ing] the planet in a matter of days," the timescale > for complete "ecophagy" (conversion of the entire biosphere into nanobots) > is in fact quite long --- on the order of _TWO YEARS_, not two days.
I read somewhere that assemblers should be able to replicate themselves in about 20 minutes, and that given enough raw materials and energy they would be able to fill the solar system in a matter of days.
In article <c18lbv02...@enews4.newsguy.com>, Bootstrap Bill wrote: > I read somewhere that assemblers should be able to replicate themselves in > about 20 minutes, and that given enough raw materials and energy they would > be able to fill the solar system in a matter of days.
First, go read Freitas' paper on the subject. It's really rather interesting.
Second, ask yourself this very important question: Fill the solar system *with what*? There's not each stuff in the solar system to fill it now...!
-- John S. Novak, III j...@cegt201.bradley.edu The Humblest Man on the Net
> In article <c18lbv02...@enews4.newsguy.com>, Bootstrap Bill wrote:
> > I read somewhere that assemblers should be able to replicate themselves in > > about 20 minutes, and that given enough raw materials and energy they would > > be able to fill the solar system in a matter of days.
> First, go read Freitas' paper on the subject. It's really rather > interesting.
> Second, ask yourself this very important question: Fill the solar > system *with what*? There's not each stuff in the solar system to fill > it now...!
"given enough raw materials and energy", if assemblers can double their numbers every 20 minutes, they would outweigh the solar system in a matter of days.
> On 21 Feb 2004 04:02:01 GMT, ro...@future-is-here.com (Rocky Rawstern) > wrote:
> >Published in hardback in February 2004, John Robert Marlow's > >techno-thriller Nano is a tale about humanity's close brush with > >extinction at the hands of "the Final Technology."
> >The book tells a seat-gripping story, describing one possible > >"advanced nanotechnology" scenario. And while society as a whole must > >start discussing the possibilities that Marlow raises, there are > >issues, such as the economic disruption (discussed to a lesser extent > >in Marlow's book) that could accompany near-term limited nanotech, > >that have a more urgent need. To learn more about near-term issues, > >there is no better place to go than CRN (the Center for Responsible > >Nanotechnology).
> >In Nano's appendix, Marlow postulates something he calls the > >"Superswarm," a means by which we may find a measure of safety once we > >achieve advanced nanotechnology. The following interview was conducted > >to address this concept.
> JRM: complex technologies are inherently totalitarian because most > people do not understand them and are therefore not competent to > oversee their use. As technologies become more complex, the number of > people who understand them fully-and who will therefore control them, > and through them the societies which cannot survive without those > technologies-diminishes. In this way, complex technologies drive us > toward totalitarian technocracies.
> ======
> That's a very strange thing to say. A tiny fraction of the population > understands printing, copy machines, fax machines, telephones, > airplanes, or how the Web works. But all of these things have been > enormous forces for spreading learning and for democratizing the > world.
> Besides, any complex technology needs a lot of practitioners, and any > useful technology will be taught in trade schools and colleges en > mass.
> But, for Pete's sake, this guy is a techno-thriller novelist.
> John
#####
In response, I would have to say that your post makes my point: How many people understand the inner workings of the phone system, fax machines, broadcast transmissions, or--most importantly--the internet? Relatively few (a "tiny fraction of the population," as you put it)--which is why those few can develop and deploy technological tools with totalitarian implications. Tools such as ECHELON, Carnivore, TIAS, Magic Lantern, and a host of other mechanisms which effectively monitor and selectively trace and record electronic communications (some would say ALL electronic communications) at will.
And this is but the beginning; societies would survive if these complex technologies--even the internet--failed tomorrow. Soon, we will have no choice but to rely upon far more complex technologies, without which our societies will not be able to survive--and even fewer people will understand those.
Which, of course, leads us ever farther down the path toward totalitarian technocracies...
> "Gordon D. Pusch" <g_d_pusch_remove_undersco...@xnet.com> wrote in message > news:c1892v02f7n@enews3.newsguy.com... > > Mr. Marlow's book and interviews _GROSSLY_ overstate the maximum possible > > rate that rogue nanobots can replicate. Based on extremely general > physical > > principles, such as the conservation of energy and the limits of available > > energy vs. the characteristic energies of chemical bonds, Dr. Robert > Frietas > > has shown that the maximum possible "biomass to nanobot" conversion rate > of > > self-replicating nanobots cannot possibly be greatly larger than that of > > already-existing self-replicating organic lifeforms such as bacteria, so > > that far from "destroy[ing] the planet in a matter of days," the timescale > > for complete "ecophagy" (conversion of the entire biosphere into nanobots) > > is in fact quite long --- on the order of _TWO YEARS_, not two days.
> I read somewhere that assemblers should be able to replicate themselves in > about 20 minutes, and that given enough raw materials and energy they would > be able to fill the solar system in a matter of days.
There are bacteria that replicate themselves in much less then 20 minutes. I do not see green goo over taking me as I type this. Besides a neutron bomb or any other nuclear device would most like take them out, EMP is a great thing.
Gordon D. Pusch wrote: > Mr. Marlow's book and interviews _GROSSLY_ overstate the maximum possible > rate that rogue nanobots can replicate. Based on extremely general physical > principles, such as the conservation of energy and the limits of available > energy vs. the characteristic energies of chemical bonds, Dr. Robert Frietas > has shown that the maximum possible "biomass to nanobot" conversion rate of > self-replicating nanobots cannot possibly be greatly larger than that of > already-existing self-replicating organic lifeforms such as bacteria,
Um, I don't think he said that. He said that waste heat was "a major restriction." He cited Drexler's estimate of 100 MJ/kg of final product. And he also assumed that the goo would be working slowly to avoid detection. Under this assumption, it would indeed take 40 months (20 in the final cycle). If it's working at the same efficiency but just under the boiling point of water, it'd be 50 times as fast.
But Freitas also pointed out that Drexler says that energy dissipation may in theory be as low as 0.1 MJ/kg for carefully planned reactions. Thermal-limited speed decreases in inverse proportion to efficiency, so this would allow conversion to happen 1000 times as fast.
Natural enzyme chemistries are closer to 100 MJ/kg; plants fix biomass at 38 MJ/kg, and plants have evolved for eons for efficiency. And so even a moderately more efficient 10 MJ/kg would allow a factor of 10 speedup on top of the 50.
In my opinion, plants should not be taken as the gold standard for efficiency. They have to raise significant amounts of water; resist parasite attack; use photons in a wide energy range; and maintain metabolism overnight. So I think 10 MJ/kg cannot be ruled out.
So a moderately efficient goo, not trying to avoid detection, could in theory convert the biosphere in 2.44 days. Note that at the _start_ of this period, according to the scenario, the biosphere would already be near-boiling, and the damage we care about would already be done. But note also that this scenario requires global dispersal of the initial goo-bots, which, I think, most goo designs (including Marlow's) do not adequately take into account. The real issue is not how quickly goo can work. And how quickly it reaches its thermal limits is totally irrelevant, since it'll reach the thermal limits of living biomass first. The important question is whether nanobots or larger nano-built weapons can access the globe without being intercepted. If so, anyone with an enemy is toast.
> In particular, exponential growth of a nanite infestation cannot possibly be > sustained past the earliest, initial stage of the infestation, due to energy > and resource limitations, as well as production of waste heat by the nanobots; > hence, late growth can only occur at polynomial rather than exponential > rates, and at the surface of the expanding colony rather than throughout > its volume. Therefore, the response time required to deal with a rogue > nanotech infestation will _NOT_ be on the order of "minutes" as Mr. Marlow > claims, but rather on the order of days or weeks --- i.e., comparable to > the response time currently required to deal with an epidemic outbreak of a > typical infectious disease.
A gray goo will be very hard to build. It'll need a metabolism, a fabricator, a control computer with full blueprints, and an environmental shell with chemical/mechanical interfaces... all in a very small package. Note that this means that there's no way a nanofactory can accidentally mutate into a gray goo. If gray goo happens, it will be deliberate.
Long before goo is designable, it'll be possible to design UAV's (unmanned aerial vehicles; think cruise missiles) that can spread it very quickly. But why bother spreading goo? With much simpler robotics/avionics, you can just kill the person (or city) you want to kill; no need to destroy the world in the process.
If we ever get to the point where script kiddies can release dangerous gray goo, we're probably doomed--since it'll surely be harder to stop goo than to stop slow-moving slow-thinking meat robots from pushing the wrong buttons. But we will have much more severe dangers to deal with before that point. Like nano-arms races with weapons much more rapidly destructive than gray goo--and much more controllable, hence easier to justify using.
> In short, Mr. Marlow has paid too much attention to the overblown and > scientifically inaccurate claims of doomsday science fiction writers > (many of whom are scientifically illiterate luddites), and too little > attention to the physical limitations imposed on _ALL_ forms of nanotech > by real-world physical laws.
I'd feel more comfortable with this assertion if I didn't think you had misread Freitas' paper. Again, the 20 month final cycle time was apparently the most optimistic one he could come up with--not anywhere close to the physical limits. The least optimistic scenarios make it clear that, without a very rapid response prepared, a widely distributed goo would be extremely bad news for any biomass within the contaminated zone.
Even though John Marlow has his nanobots doing impossible things--like rapidly eating low-energy materials, and building things too fast--I don't think it would change the book much if he had written it to conform to reasonable physical limitations. Less chemistry, more micro-scale robotics... and you'd get much the same impact.
Another question is how quickly advanced nanotech designs could be developed. I think he's very over-optimistic there, but he invokes a wildcard that I can't say is absolutely impossible.
In any event, the book actually scared me--and I've been thinking about this stuff for a long time, and I know all about doing the math on physical limitations, and I spotted lots of places where things couldn't work the way he wrote them. But the strength of the story is that it doesn't really depend on the technological details. Make a powerful enough technology--and diamondoid molecular manufacturing certainly qualifies--and you're opening the door to all sorts of human-invoked destruction.
I think gray goo is not a big concern, at least initially--but only because other, more dangerous possibilities must be survived first.
Chris
-- Chris Phoenix cphoe...@CRNano.org Director of Research Center for Responsible Nanotechnology http://CRNano.org
On 22 Feb 2004 20:04:35 GMT, john_q_mar...@yahoo.com (John Robert
Marlow) wrote:
>#####
>In response, I would have to say that your post makes my point: How >many people understand the inner workings of the phone system, fax >machines, broadcast transmissions, or--most importantly--the internet? >Relatively few (a "tiny fraction of the population," as you put >it)--which is why those few can develop and deploy technological tools >with totalitarian implications. Tools such as ECHELON, Carnivore, >TIAS, Magic Lantern, and a host of other mechanisms which effectively >monitor and selectively trace and record electronic communications >(some would say ALL electronic communications) at will.
The truly large-scale development and deployment of new technologies is increasingly commercial, not military. Consumer goods are where the power and the money really lie. There is not one laser weapon (in the sense of a laser itself destroying a target) deployed, but millions of CD-burner VCSEL lasers are manufactured every day. A breakthrough technology is *too valuable* to be restricted to military use. Military hardware is increasingly COTS - commercial off-the shelf - because the commercial stuff is ahead of the custom designs.
I can easily encrypt my email, using readily available, free utilities, such that the CIA couldn't crack it in 10,000 years.
>And this is but the beginning; societies would survive if these >complex technologies--even the internet--failed tomorrow. Soon, we >will have no choice but to rely upon far more complex technologies, >without which our societies will not be able to survive--and even >fewer people will understand those.
Actually, society as we know it would be decimated if critical modern technologies were somehow to fail. Key to feeding the current world population are transportation; agricultural fuels, fertilizers, pesticides; energy; industrial production. But I can't envision any way any of these can suddenly "fail". We could certainly survive without the internet; we'd likely get a lot *more* work done.
As far as spying goes, the more the better. Wars are caused as often as not by lack of information - and resulting paranoia, or over-confidence - about a potential enemy.
>Which, of course, leads us ever farther down the path toward >totalitarian technocracies...
I think the bottom line is this: some people see technology as a threat, and extrapolate cataclysmic results from its advances. There is virtually no historical justification for this position, although it may sell novels. The fax machine was an important tool in bringing down the USSR; the Internet is democratizing China.
Imagine a plausible nanotech device: a tiny key-ring USB-2 device that stores petabytes of data cheaply. Unlimited copies of books, movies, lectures, computer programs, music, whatever could be copied and transported anywhere, with no really practical means of interception. The consequences of that will be anything but totalitarian.
