New Carrier Plan
Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
Anybody knwo how much the A-6 re-winging will cost? I was just
wondering if we couldn't *not* pay for it, and instead use F-18's. We
could start by moving the 72 F-18's that the Marines have aboard ship,
to replace the 72 worst A-6's. These could of course be stripped for
parts. Then we replace the rest of the with F-18E/F's as they are
produced. Remember that some of the A-6's have the new metal wings,
and will last quite a while. So there is some time.
Here are the good points:
- Saves money to enable to the production of more F-18 E/F's.
- Reduces the types of planes aboard ship, and in inventory,
simplifing logistics and training.
- Increases the flexibility of the air wing, by replacing a single
purpose plane (A-6) with a dual purpose plane (F-18).
Here are some practial questions:
- How much space does an F-18 take compared to an A-6. Could
we maybe get MORE aboard, or do we struggle to keep the same number.
- How do the planes compare for maintanace? I know that F-14s are
maintance hogs, but how do F-18's and A-6's compare. The A-6 is
simpler yet older.
- How much money do we save this way? In other words, what does
re-winging cost?
- Are they really going to replace the F-14's with F-18's. If so,
there must be something to be said for the commonality taht replacing
the A-6's with F-18's would bring.
- I already know that this pulls planes form the Marine Corps.
However, in this era of downsizing, that seems an advantage to me.
They will still have the Harriers, which fits Marine doctorine better
that the F-18's do. Further, the Marines have not gone ashore with
AirForce help in my lifetime (or the lifetime of these planes).
However, isn't there a *law* setting the minimum size of the Marine
Corps. Does it cover the air component?
ga...@stsci.edu
From ga...@stsci.edu
In article <Buq4p...@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>,
ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
> Anybody knwo how much the A-6 re-winging will cost? I was just
> wondering if we couldn't *not* pay for it, and instead use F-18's. We
> could start by moving the 72 F-18's that the Marines have aboard ship,
> to replace the 72 worst A-6's. These could of course be stripped for
> parts. Then we replace the rest of the with F-18E/F's as they are
> produced. Remember that some of the A-6's have the new metal wings,
> and will last quite a while. So there is some time.
Ahhh... those Marine VMFA's do deploy already. I really think the CinC's have
plans for the USMC naval aviators already in their OffAir and AD roles. The
short ToT of F/A-18's and relatively short legs would do nothing to replace the
all-weather/night/long-range capabilities of the A-6.
> Here are the good points:
> - Saves money to enable to the production of more F-18 E/F's.
> - Reduces the types of planes aboard ship, and in inventory,
> simplifing logistics and training.
> - Increases the flexibility of the air wing, by replacing a single
> purpose plane (A-6) with a dual purpose plane (F-18).
Maybe you should review some of the missions flown by Intruders before
you conclude that they're single purpose planes.
[various "practical questions" deleted]
> - I already know that this pulls planes form the Marine Corps.
> However, in this era of downsizing, that seems an advantage to me.
I see. Last year we gave up our SP Artillery because we have air assets
that can provide the same type of bombardment. Now you want us to give
up our air assets?
> They will still have the Harriers, which fits Marine doctorine better
> that the F-18's do.
Sez you. Maybe you'd like to get the opinion of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Air at HQMC? Here's my own: The Harrier is a great weapons platform that can
be on target quickly. It also has NO protective armor and is very vulnerable
to IR SAM's because of its midship exhaust. An F/A-18 hit by a SAM-7 gets some
tailfeathers blown off and comes home, an A/V-8B hit by a SAM-7 becomes a
two-piece airplane and the pilot MAY have time to eject. Last time I looked we
were planning to have to go up against bozos armed with SAM's. Do you suppose
that this might be the reason our Fighter/Attack Squadrons kept Phantoms until
the F-18 became available? Only the Attack Squadrons have Harriers, and they
need F/A-18D's to act as Fast FAC's for them for night ops.
> Further, the Marines have not gone ashore with
> AirForce help in my lifetime (or the lifetime of these planes).
What !?!??? Have you heard of Graneda? Panama? Kuwait??? In all cases
there was an Air Force Air Component Commander who was issuing an Air
Tasking Order that included USMC assets.
> However, isn't there a *law* setting the minimum size of the Marine
> Corps. Does it cover the air component?
Yep. The law stipulates the number and type of squadrons we are to maintain.
Of course it can be changed (has been several times). It may be of interest to
many out there that the squadron is the highest level air command in the USMC
with a real TO. All higher commands such as group and wing are task organized
(some would say ad hoc).
The Navy needs a medium range attack bomber like the A-6. The F/A-18 is not
the plane for this job. Yes, the USMC has converted one all-weather squadron
from A-6E's to F/A-18D's. The pilots will tell you that while they gained
speed and possible weapons load-out with the Hornet, they lost a lot of good
radar capability and range. The Navy also needs a follow on fighter to replace
the F-14, and the Hornet really isn't the plane for this role either -- though
it comes closer to being a Tomcat replacement than an Intruder replacement.
Simply stated, the Intruder will be with the fleet until a new A-?? comes
along. Cobbling together some sort of goofy bomber from the F/A-18 to put
aboard multi-billion $$$$ aircraft carriers would make about as much sense as
buying a custom .357 and only shooting .38 special ammo. The Hornet is a great
war-bird, and I hope it's with the FMF for a long time. It is not a medium
range bomber, and the A-6 is.
-Bill Gawne, Space Telescope Science Institute
GySgt USMCR
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Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
ga...@stsci.edu writes:
I wrote ...
>> Further, the Marines have not gone ashore with
>> AirForce help in my lifetime (or the lifetime of these planes).
ga...@stsci.edu wrote ...
>What !?!??? Have you heard of Graneda? Panama? Kuwait??? In all cases
>there was an Air Force Air Component Commander who was issuing an Air
>Tasking Order that included USMC assets.
I thought that there were air force planes involved in Graneda. If
I'm wrong, I'm sorry. As for Panama, we already had troups, (and air
bases) there, didn't we?
Now, about Kuwait. I wrote that the marines always had air force
help. Now I'm *quite* sure that the air force flew tens of thousands
of missions during that war, and that the navy flew thousands more.
The marine-air-force was at best a small component of the total air
power involved.
My point is that whenever the marines need air support, there are
always available air assets of the air force or naval carriers to
provide it. That the marine corps has it's own air force seems a
needless duplication of function. In this day and age, every dollar
wasted is a dollar less spent on the important things.
Let me turn the question around. Given that something needs to be
Michael Lanham
From jum...@garfield.catt.ncsu.edu (Michael Lanham)
ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>My point is that whenever the marines need air support, there are
>always available air assets of the air force or naval carriers to
>provide it. That the marine corps has it's own air force seems a
>needless duplication of function. In this day and age, every dollar
>wasted is a dollar less spent on the important things.
>Let me turn the question around. Given that something needs to be
One of the most striking reasons could be found if you asked the guys on the
ground. I have read stories, testimonials, and seen citations of
reports(though I could not begin to name them) where the infantry folks, FA
folks, and anyone else who was got in a near and dirty fight that Marine
Aircover was by far better than airforce. The reason: Marine pilots flew
low, slow, dirty and stayed around to do the job right. Air force pilots have
been and are traditionally loath to fly near the ground. When they do they
are flying at 400-600knots and you only have 2-3 seconds to aquire and engage
a target.
My impression is that it is far more romantic, glamourous and healthy to have
plenty of air around you as a pilot than to be near the mud with the foot
soldiers. But foot soldiers love the ones who get dirty with 'em.
He who will not reason, is a bigot; he who cannot is a fool;
and he who dares not is a slave. --- Sir William Drummond
Michael Lanham mjla...@eos.ncsu.edu & jum...@catt.ncsu.edu
MegaZone23
From mega...@obsidian.WPI.EDU (MegaZone23)
In article <BvG07...@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>My point is that whenever the marines need air support, there are
>always available air assets of the air force or naval carriers to
>provide it. That the marine corps has it's own air force seems a
>needless duplication of function. In this day and age, every dollar
>wasted is a dollar less spent on the important things.
Randy, I don't want to be patronizing, but look at history a little closer...
The reason the Marines have their own air power is because the Navy and
Air Force AREN'T always available to support them.
And the major consideration is coordination between air and ground/sea assets
which having all those involved from the same branch provides.
It's is the same reason the Army operates it's helicopters, and is fighting
to operate CAS fixed wing aircraft. When the Air Force was going to retire
the A-10 the Army said they wanted them.
It provides more security and safety for the troops, and LESS command staff.
This way in battle you don't need extra Marine attaches with the AF and vice-
versa to cooradinate attacks. A Marine cammander can be sure of his assets,
and doesn't have to worry about the other service diverting them for a 'better'
target. The Army and Air Force have been fighting forever. The Army claims the
Air Force is caught up in glamor and glitz, only buying fast fighters...
And as much as I like the AF, I agree. They wanted to drop the A-10 for the
A-16 so they could have more F-16s. That is considered to by ridiculous by
most everyone outside AF command. The Army flipped at that idea. Imagine if
the Army had to coordinate with the Air Force for Helicopters. That would be
utter chaos.
The basic principle is you give each branch what the will need to do their
job with the least outside dependance. The Army has their helicopters and
some aircraft (hopefully more CAS in the future), the Air Force has their
aircraft and ground trops for security, the navy has its aircraft and ships,
and the Marines have their helicopters, aircrafter, and ground forces.
(yes I know helicopters are aircraft, I wanted to distinguish them from fixed
wing types.)
There is some interaction, and that's good. But in service coordination means
less confusion, more action, and less friendly fire.
At least historically.
###############################################################################
# I have one prejudice, and that is against stupidity. Use your mind, think! #
#Email mega...@wpi.wpi.edu Moderator, WPI anime FTP site 130.215.24.1 /anime#
###############################################################################
Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
I write ...
>>My point is that whenever the marines need air support, there are
>>always available air assets of the air force or naval carriers to
>>provide it. That the marine corps has it's own air force seems a
>>needless duplication of function. In this day and age, every dollar
>>wasted is a dollar less spent on the important things.
Mega...@obsidian.WPI.EDU (MegaZone23) writes ...
>Randy, I don't want to be patronizing, but look at history a little closer...
>The reason the Marines have their own air power is because the Navy and
>Air Force AREN'T always available to support them.
Actually, I *knew* that. However, my understanding is that the Air
Force/Naval Air has always had the planes needed to support the
Marines. It seems that sometimes these services do not support the
Marines to the satisfaction of the Marines, being distracted by other
things. You allude to this in part of the article I have edited out.
My problem is this. There seems needless duplication of forces. It
would be better if those same planes that helped the carriers fight
their way to the beach could support the Marines on the beach.
Further, it seems that there is *no way* the Marines are going ashore
until the navy has the surrounding sea firmly in control. This
implies that those naval planes are free to support the Marines.
Finally, once a beach head is secured, the Air Force should be able to
fly in land-based fighters to continue to support the Marines.
Therefore I argue that at no point due the Marines need their own air
force. Your argument seems to be that the Air Force/Naval Air fails
to provide the support that they should. This seems to me to *not*
call for a whole Marine air force to make up the deficiancy, but
instead that the Air Force / Naval Air should be fixed.
I argue that the Marine Air Force should be cut simply because
something needs to be cut (for bugetary and political reasons) and
that the Marine Air Force performs a function that can be carried by
the other forces.
Like I said, what would *you* cut????
-Randy
Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
jum...@garfield.catt.ncsu.edu (Michael Lanham) writes:
>One of the most striking reasons could be found if you asked the guys on the
>ground. I have read stories, testimonials, and seen citations of
>reports(though I could not begin to name them) where the infantry folks, FA
I don't doubt that the Marine air force isn't wonderful. I too have
heard this. Still, somethubg needs to be cut. I'm quite sure of
that. Even if you disagree with me, it seems clear that political
realities will *require* substancial cuts in defence budgets.
Here is my latest hair-brained idea. From what I read, a modenr
carrier has about 16 ASW helocopters aboard. Why cannot we replace
these with F-18's (there seem to be enough). This woudl trade ASW
strength for air power.
I think this is a good trade. The most obvious uses for American
carriers is off the coast of third world nations. Although many of
these nations have sub fleets, it is much more common to have an air
force. Further, most nations (especially third world ones) put much
more money into their air force than the sub fleet. Finally, much of
our ASW capacity was built to counter the soviet threat. Now that
this threat has dissapiated, we have room to cut the ASW capability.
Also, notice that many ships (crusiers, distroyers, frigates) can
carry helocopters, only the carrier can carry attack planes.
Why is this a budget cut. By increasing the power of each carrier, we
can perhaps make do with fewer.
Dan Sorenson
From vik...@iastate.edu (Dan Sorenson)
jum...@garfield.catt.ncsu.edu (Michael Lanham) writes:
>From jum...@garfield.catt.ncsu.edu (Michael Lanham)
>ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>>My point is that whenever the marines need air support, there are
>>always available air assets of the air force or naval carriers to
>>provide it. That the marine corps has it's own air force seems a
>>needless duplication of function. In this day and age, every dollar
>>wasted is a dollar less spent on the important things.
One thing overlooked: the Air Force and Navy use very expensive,
well-maintained airports (although one floats) because they launch very
high-tech and sensitive aircraft, the Navy's being less-so than the AF,
but still much more than the Marines. A Marine air squadron will fly
off of a gravel road if necessary; nobody else will, and that means a
reduced response time from airport to front lines.
>One of the most striking reasons could be found if you asked the guys on the
>ground. I have read stories, testimonials, and seen citations of
>reports(though I could not begin to name them) where the infantry folks, FA
>folks, and anyone else who was got in a near and dirty fight that Marine
>Aircover was by far better than airforce. The reason: Marine pilots flew
>low, slow, dirty and stayed around to do the job right.
In talking to various Marine friends who are veterans of everything
from World War II to Desert Storm, my impression is that they could give a
whit about anything but ground support and keeping their own aircraft
overhead. Strangely enough, veterans of both WWII/Korea and Korea/Vietnam
actually felt the best ground support was from machine guns and napalm
on prop-driven planes, with the preferred plane being (get this) the WWII
warbirds like the F4U, P51, and even a P47. The Vietnam veteran even
preferred this to an F4 Phantom dropping napalm, as the F4 drops and leaves
while the props and helos can stick around for a while. Most figure
helos and A-10's would provide the best of both worlds.
To summarize, the former Marines I talked to want F-18's to keep
the skies clear, and A-10's to give them the ground support they need.
Being former Navy, I have to insert this: *ALL* of them wanted
an Iowa-class battleship supporting them if they are near a coast. The
Vietnam veterans even preferred naval artillery to Army artillery due
to the greater firepower of the naval guns, but every one who had seen
an Iowa-class fire remembers those incoming rounds fondly.
Perhaps the opinions of the ground-pounders should be taken
into account? I'd bet the Marine Corps would be willing to operate
the Iowas if the Navy doesn't want them anymore.
<Dan Sorenson, DoD #1066 |"I see angels on Ariels in leather and>
<z1...@exnet.iastate.edu | chrome, Swooping down from heaven to >
<vik...@iastate.edu | carry me home." --- R. Thompson >
<ISU thinks I need more education, which they provide for a fee.>
Jeffery Capt. Shue
From mc...@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Jeffery Capt. Shue)
There seem to be a couple of misconceptions in this posting that I
think need clarification.
1. In Desert Shield/Storm Marine fixed wing air assets made up at least
10% of the total U.S. fixed wing air assets (I don't recall the exact
numbers). These aircraft include AV-8Bs, F/A-18s, A-6s, and OV-10s.
This was not an insignificant contribution to the air war.
This doesn't include the large number of rotary wing aircraft.
2. Why does the Marine Corps have their own air assets? There are a
number of doctrinal reasons.
a. Marine units are organized as Marine Air Ground Task Forces.
Each MAGTF has a Ground Combat Element (GCE), an Air Combat Element
(ACE) and a Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). As such they are
fully integrated combined arms teams. What the GCE may lack in the way
of artillery or armor support is made up for by the flexibility of the
ACE.
b. Don't always use Desert Storm as a model. The U.S. was lucky
this time to have bases to deploy to. If a forced entry was required
then Marines would have had to go across the beach. The Air Force with
out bases in the area may not have been able to provide adequate support
during the assault phase. Navy carrier air would initially provide support
but once ashore the Marines could bring their own air ashore and free
up the carriers for other missions. The AV-8B allows the Marine Corps
to operate from Expeditionary Airfeilds with very little preparation.
c. Every Marine Aviator has had some basic training as an infantry
officer. This gives Marine pilots a unique perspective and also focuses
Marine aviation toward Close Air Support and support of the grunt in
the field. Marine FACs are also assigned down to the company level which
gets him up where the action is. The point of all this is that the
Marine GCE and the Marine ACE work together to provide an integrated
team. A team who trusts one another and who talks the same language.
The importance of this trust and bonds in combat cannot be overstressed.
My personal opinion here-- I would rather have a Marine do CAS for me
rather than anyone else, regardless of aircraft type or fancy avionics.
This is simply because that Marine pilot and I have had similar experiences.
I,ll get off my soap box now. No flames intended, I just wanted to point
out the reason the Marine Corps has their own aircraft is because of
different operational requirements.
J.P. SHUE
All these opinions are my own.
Ryan Montieth Gill
From la...@emory.edu (Ryan Montieth Gill)
I would have to say that if we were to replace the A-6-s with
f-18's then we would loose about 500 nm range from the carrier's
air reach.thats a third of its reach. I think this would be very
bad. a 1500 nm round trip range is a hell of a reach that no other
carrier aircraft can boast. The f-18 and a-6 designs and intended
roles are too different. the A-6 is designed to carry a large store
of weapons and find a target a hell of a long way away. Sure they
dont have cannons but they do have a tremendous amount of surface
search sensors. The f-18 was designed to replace the a-7 corsair,
here different design philosopies. A long range slow attack air
craft is going to have a different area of speciality than a high
speed shorter range fighter/attack aircraft will.
One thing that bothers me is the plans to demobilise the f-14's
in favor of the f-18s as the air protection. Loss of the pheonix
would reduce the air to air range from 110nm to 24nm. The ability
to reach out and touch someone without their ability to touch back
is a huge advantage. The soviets have this advantage with their
type 65 torpedoes (65 nm range). Again the ability to reach out and
touch someone is very great here. Think about it.
Ryan M. Gill
la...@slab.cc.emory.edu
fs...@acad3.alaska.edu
From fs...@acad3.alaska.edu
***moderator: this is very long, and is a borderline flame. if you decide not
to go with it, i'll understand. :) -James
In article <BvnEL...@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>
> From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
>
> jum...@garfield.catt.ncsu.edu (Michael Lanham) writes:
>
>
>>One of the most striking reasons could be found if you asked the guys on the
>>ground. I have read stories, testimonials, and seen citations of
>>reports(though I could not begin to name them) where the infantry folks, FA
>
> I don't doubt that the Marine air force isn't wonderful. I too have
> heard this. Still, somethubg needs to be cut. I'm quite sure of
> that. Even if you disagree with me, it seems clear that political
> realities will *require* substancial cuts in defence budgets.
Mr Appleton:
``Political realities'' don't really intrude on military science, but as they
do affect budgetary considerations, and therefore the equipment purchased, it
might do to take a look at them.
If you look at the threats faced by the U.S. currently, barring any radical
change in situation such as 1989-90, you will see mainly regional conflicts
with `smaller' nations such as Iraq. You will see a variety of possible
threats in a variety of possible places, none of them predictable.
The Army and Air Force have been structured and trained for 40 years to fight
the big fight, and i think correctly. If you look at the mission statements of
the respective armed services, it basically boils down to: Army- fighting
protracted land campaigns. They've added a strike capability with the airborne
also. Air Force- fighting protracted air wars in support of the Army. AF
equipment is designed and built to fly from bases protected by the Army ground
units. Their SP's are good at catching infiltrators and guerrilla
units, but could not stop a regular infantry unit of any size for long. The
Army and Air Force are set up to fight the Russians in Europe, or the Koreans,
etc. That mission is reduced now, and that is where most of the cuts are being
made. The Navy has a lot of fleet assets for open ocean control that were also
designed for the `big fight' that are of questionable value now.
With Iraq, we got lucky. The Army Corps of Engineers has been working with the
Saudi government for years designing and building huge military bases in the
middle of the desert, capable of fielding whole Air Force wings from modern
airfields with modern radar and modern defences. King Kahlid Military City
(spelling?) is a combination air/ground base south of the Iraqi border that
could house the entire military establishment of Saudi Arabia (including
reserves, excluding the Navy for obvious reasons). When Desert Shield arrived,
it was nice to be able to land troops in Saudi Arabia at or near preconstructed
bases that could support them. Just because you saw a lot of CNN feed about
troops in the desert, don't assume they were all there. And *all* of the feed
you saw with the F-15's and F-16's taking off to do battle was from these
pre-constructed bases. Desert Storm was the ideal best-case scenario for the
Air Force, less so fro the Army because we did not have heavy equipment
pre-positioned there. So they had to make do with their airborne/airmobile
troops until something better got there, and if Iraq had sent armor across the
border in August, the airborne would have had a nice fight on their hands
(hopefully the A-10's would be enough- again, from their prepositioned bases).
Most of our recent actions have been along similar lines: we had a fully
operational ground and air base in Panama, and didn't have to move much at all.
Grenada was within range for direct flights from ConUS for most support that
the carrier didn't do (mainly because the AF did not want to be cut out of the
picture). Although if you look closely at what was accomplished by whom,
you'll see the benefits of coming ashore from sea vs. coming ashore from an
aircraft. (IMHO)
Now let's look at an unlucky war, in which we need to get troops ashore quickly
with the ability to stay there for thirty days or longer. The opponent is
reasonably competent, has an air force, and even a small navy. Ground forces
are organized, and they have some armor and artillery. That should cover most
of the world. Now lets say that said country is more than 2000nm from the US.
That's also most of the world. The people that will be there first are the
people aboard the nearest MEU floating about. You'll have a Marine Battalion
(roughly) with integral air support, and the supporting naval vessels, and
(hopefully) a carrier battle group. You won't see a single F-15 unless the
other guys are flying it. With air-to-air refueling, you could have Air Force
assets for CAS if you really needed it, but it would be similar to the Tripoli
bombing raid- planned well in advance, with all the preparations (waiting
tankers) in the air hours beforehand. The infantry commander on the ground
can't always call in a close air support mission twelve or more hours
beforehand. That cuts the Air Force out of the CAS role, although i'm sure
they would play an important part in other ways. So, political realities would
imply that you want to maintain a Marine Corps and Navy that would be able to
project military force where you need it when you need it.
Now, why does Marine Air exist? Given our unlucky war, assuming a carrier is
present, CAS would be taken up by the Marine pilots that are probably on the
carrier already (if it was travelling with a MEU, it's likely). Why not Navy
pilots? Because the Marine pilots are trained to do CAS, and they practice CAS
*all the time*. They're good at it. They can do, and also train for air to
air missions, or anti-shipping missions, but for the most part a Marine pilot
exists to help out the rifleman on the ground. The Navy pilots will be the
ones who concentrate on the other guy's planes and ships- because that's what
they practice *all the time*. They're good at it. They can do, and also train
for, CAS missions, but for the most part a Navy pilot exists to protect his
fleet and sink the other one.
Instead of looking at the service name painted on the side of the aircraft,
look at the pilots. A modern weapons system doesn't exist in a vacuum. A
Harrier or F-18 isn't a good CAS aircraft by itself- it is the pilot flying it.
Marine Air exists because Marine pilots more or less invented CAS in the 30's.
If you look at Marine Air, it is tailored for supporting the Marines on the
ground, and takes up other missions only secondary -- keeping enemy
fighter/attack aircraft away from the beachhead is to protect those Marines.
By taking Marine Air away, you would force the Marine Corps to rely on pilots
from other services who don't share the same traditions and loyalties as the
pilots we've got now. And there's no guarantee that these pilots even know
what a LAV looks like. (now, if you really think the Marine Corps is spending
too much money, why don't you paint Navy over all of our aircraft, but leave us
the pilots. That way the Navy can do all of the recordkeeping, maintenence,
supply... Of course, they may not want us to play with their toys though...)
So if you want to base cutting Marine Air on political realities, why don't you
cut the B-2 program? Do we really need a strategic nuclear bomber? Do we need
Seawolf submarines, or will the average Los Angeles boat do the trick? There
are a lot of programs with big ticket items that can be cut with an eye to the
strategic position we find ourselves in now. By messing with the Navy/Marine
Corps, you're messing with the most flexible, best power projection tool we've
got.
[stuff about ASW capabilities and carriers deleted: i'll let some Navy man
explain how effective a good diesel electric sub can be on a big fat carrier]
James Zuelow
FS...@acad3.alaska.edu (flames to me please, not the net)
Chad Barret Wemyss
From chad...@wpi.WPI.EDU (Chad Barret Wemyss)
In article <BvnEL...@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>I think this is a good trade. The most obvious uses for American
>carriers is off the coast of third world nations. Although many of
>these nations have sub fleets, it is much more common to have an air
>force. Further, most nations (especially third world ones) put much
>more money into their air force than the sub fleet. Finally, much of
>our ASW capacity was built to counter the soviet threat. Now that
>this threat has dissapiated, we have room to cut the ASW capability.
>
>Also, notice that many ships (crusiers, distroyers, frigates) can
>carry helocopters, only the carrier can carry attack planes.
First point: Even though the Soviet Union is no more, and global war seems
less likely than ever, there are still several hundred ex-Soviet (now Russian,
Ukranian, and just about anyone else's) submarines out there somewhere.
Second point: While it is true that every carrier embarks several ASW helos,
and that most other American ship classes can also carry them, the carriers
have some things that the others do not. First, the carriers also carry S-3
Viking ASW aircraft, a fixed-wing partner to the SH-3 and SH-60 helos carried.
Working together, these two aircraft form one of the deadliest ASW combinations
at sea. Second, only the carriers have the space needed for the extensive
ASW control centers. These centers are vital for a coordinated ASW operation.
Michael Gallagher
From gall...@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Michael Gallagher)
In sci.military, ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>realities will *require* substancial cuts in defence budgets.
>
>Here is my latest hair-brained idea. From what I read, a modenr
>carrier has about 16 ASW helocopters aboard. Why cannot we replace
>these with F-18's (there seem to be enough). This woudl trade ASW
>strength for air power.
Your logic is really hair-brained!
How are we going to save $$'s (implied by your statement to make
"substantial cuts") by throwing away perfectly useful and needed equipment
(ASW assets) for more F-18s?
Do you know of a stockpile of F-18s available free for the taking?
The submarine threat has not gone away (note Irans purchase of 3
surplus diesel subs from Russia).
ga...@stsci.edu
From ga...@stsci.edu
In article <BvnEL...@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>,
ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
[rehash of previously stated ideas deleted]
> Like I said, what would *you* cut????
>
> -Randy
Perhaps it was lost in the length of my first reply to you, so I'll
say it again.
Last year the USMC gave up ALL of its self-propelled artillery, largely
on the strength of the argument that Marine air in the Close Air Support
role could deliver the same ordnance loads on the same targets, given that
we were now equipped with F/A-18's in all Fighter/Attack Squadrons.
So the question is not so much what would we cut, as it is "...what
HAVE we cut?"
Curtis Fennell
From ch...@harvey.gte.com (Curtis Fennell)
>From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
>
>Actually, I *knew* that. However, my understanding is that the Air
>Force/Naval Air has always had the planes needed to support the
>Marines. It seems that sometimes these services do not support the
>Marines to the satisfaction of the Marines, being distracted by other
>things. You allude to this in part of the article I have edited out.
>
>My problem is this. There seems needless duplication of forces. It
>would be better if those same planes that helped the carriers fight
>their way to the beach could support the Marines on the beach.
>Further, it seems that there is *no way* the Marines are going ashore
>until the navy has the surrounding sea firmly in control. This
>implies that those naval planes are free to support the Marines.
>Finally, once a beach head is secured, the Air Force should be able to
>fly in land-based fighters to continue to support the Marines.
There are several problems with your assumptions that have not been
addressed by other posters:
1. The Navy may be able to take control of the sea temporarily to
force a landing, but might be unwilling or unable to maintain a
carrier in the area. With modern stand-off weapons technology,
aircraft can launch from thousands of miles away, fly to the area that
the carrier is stationed and launch anti-ship missiles. Some modern
anti-ship missiles have ranges in excess of 250 miles.
2. The Air Force requires a fair amount of base support to use their
aircraft. Even the A-10 requires some kind of runway and support to
operate. This takes time to build, especially in a combat environment
and would be the first target of enemy air strikes. Harriers and
helicopters are much more easily hidden and can operate from any open
area.
>I argue that the Marine Air Force should be cut simply because
>something needs to be cut (for bugetary and political reasons) and
>that the Marine Air Force performs a function that can be carried by
>the other forces.
There is something else that you are apparently unaware of - all
Marine air assets are technically part of Naval aviation and are used
to support the Navy when required. In other words, Marine air
squadrons are considered part of available assets for the fleet - that
is the reason all appropriate Marine fixed wing squadrons must remain
carrier qualified.
Frequently, Marine squadrons will embark aboard carriers as part of
the carrier air wing when Navy squadrons aren't available. This is
particularly true of F-18 and EA-6 squadrons and to a lesser extent,
A-6 squadrons.
So, politically, the Navy counts on those Marine squadrons as part of
it's force structure. That means that if you cut them, the Navy would
also be losing part of it's available assets.
And, financially, the Marines, with their traditional austerity,
provide more aircraft at less cost that either the Navy or the Air
Force.
>Like I said, what would *you* cut????
If it were up to me, every service would lose some, but the Air Force
would lose the most.
--
Curt Fennell * ch...@gte.com
Unix System Administrator * (617) 466-2142
GTE Labs, 40 Sylvan Road * "Get down off that cross!
Waltham, MA, 02254 * Somebody needs the wood"
Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
mc...@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Jeffery Capt. Shue) writes:
>1. In Desert Shield/Storm Marine fixed wing air assets made up at least
>10% of the total U.S. fixed wing air assets (I don't recall the exact
>numbers).
So what? If there were no Marine Air Corps, then the Air Force would
have had more room and more transport to fly in it's own air planes.
I don't doubt that the Marine air force isn't very useful. However, I
*stil* argue that they are doing nothing that either could/should be
done by the air force and naval air arms.
> b. Don't always use Desert Storm as a model. The U.S. was lucky
>this time to have bases to deploy to. If a forced entry was required
>then Marines would have had to go across the beach. The Air Force with
>out bases in the area may not have been able to provide adequate support
>during the assault phase. Navy carrier air would initially provide support
>but once ashore the Marines could bring their own air ashore and free
>up the carriers for other missions. The AV-8B allows the Marine Corps
>to operate from Expeditionary Airfeilds with very little preparation.
I'm not using just Desert Storm. Even in WWII the Marines always had
other air assets available to them.
I've never suggested that the Marines loose the AV-8B's. Those planes
are unique, and seem to fit beautifully with Marine doctorine. In
fact, I always wondered why the Marines didn't have more of them. We
both agree that the Marines should keep them. I don't think I said it
specifically, and I should have. Thanks for reminding me.
However, let's look at the rest of your scenerio. Before the
beachhead is established, only the navy can provide air support. The
marine air craft sit on the sidelines and look shiney. When a beach
head is established, then there are bases that the Air force can fly
into. These bases are the very same bases that you would have the
Marine air force fly into. So the way I see it, the Marine Air Corps
just duplicates the function of other services.
> c. Every Marine Aviator has had some basic training as an infantry
>officer. This gives Marine pilots a unique perspective and also focuses
>Marine aviation toward Close Air Support and support of the grunt in
>the field.
But what about the poor Army grunts. They have no Army Air Corps to
support them. All they have is the Air Force. Are they getting
sub-standard service?
Actually, I believe many in the Army would argue exactly that, and
envy the Marines for their air fleet. What I suggest is that if the
Air Force is doing a sub-standard job, then it needs to be fixed. I
suggest that having a Marine Air Corps is no substitute for fixingthe
air force, if it is broken. I also suggest that once this is done,
that there remains no reason for the Marines to keep there own air
fleet.
>I,ll get off my soap box now. No flames intended, I just wanted to point
>out the reason the Marine Corps has their own aircraft is because of
>different operational requirements.
No flames recieved. However, I still don't see the differing
requirements. I do see a different doctorine, but basically the same
requirements. It almost seems like the Marines have given up on both
Naval air and the Air Force, and that the Army was not allowed to give up.
I'll keep asking. If you don't like this idea, what would you cut?
-Randy
Gary Coffman
From ke4zv!ga...@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman)
In article <BvnEL...@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>
>Here is my latest hair-brained idea. From what I read, a modenr
>carrier has about 16 ASW helocopters aboard. Why cannot we replace
>these with F-18's (there seem to be enough). This woudl trade ASW
>strength for air power.
Fixed wing strike aircraft and ASW helicopters require different
storage space and handling facilities. A carrier carries as many
strike aircraft as possible, that's it's main role. It carries
air superiority aircraft for fleet protection. It carries ASW assets
for fleet protection. And it has AA guns and missiles for the carrier's
last ditch protection. The ship is built around these requirements and
there isn't space provided to change the mix substantially. About the
only tradeoff that can be made is in the mix of air superiority fighters
and attack aircraft. You *have* to defend the carrier, or your strike
forces are worthless since they will have no base.
>I think this is a good trade. The most obvious uses for American
>carriers is off the coast of third world nations. Although many of
>these nations have sub fleets, it is much more common to have an air
>force. Further, most nations (especially third world ones) put much
>more money into their air force than the sub fleet. Finally, much of
>our ASW capacity was built to counter the soviet threat. Now that
>this threat has dissapiated, we have room to cut the ASW capability.
The CIS still has as many fast attack submarines as they ever did,
and other navies around the world continue to acquire attack submarines.
It's unwise to structure forces around *temporary* political alignments.
Building a sea lane control force takes years, political re-alignments
take days. If you must control the sea to project power, and the US
must, then you must retain sea lane control. Restructuring the Navy
to deal only with third world conflicts is saying that you are
surrendering to second and first world threats that may reappear with
the changing of political mood.
>Why is this a budget cut. By increasing the power of each carrier, we
>can perhaps make do with fewer.
The US Navy is structured to fight a two ocean war. That takes a certain
number of carriers just to cover the geography. If we are willing to
*concede* certain oceans to our potential adversaries, then we can cut
the number of carriers. Our ability to project force anywhere on the globe
at any time has kept the world mostly at peace for the last 47 years.
Giving up that ability now could be very destablizing. There is no
assurance that five or ten years down the road we won't be embroiled
in another major war. If we don't have the assets to maintain a
credible deterrent force in other areas at such a time, many nations
would be tempted to go adventuring to our detriment.
Giving up a blue water navy can be costly, as the British found out in
the Falklands. They were lucky, and they know it, that the Argentines
weren't as aggressive as they could have been. If the fight had had to
be carried to the mainland, the British would have been helpless without
mainforce carriers. Note that the Argentines only made their move *after*
the Brits retired their last fleet carrier.
Our national politicians have to make a decision, are they to continue to
carry out the primary responsiblity assigned to them by the Constitution,
or are they to abandon that role in order to usurp further the proper role
of state and local governments in social services. The money isn't there
to do both, I agree with you there. They have to decide what the proper
role of the US government is, then we can structure forces to meet whatever
threats they are willing to counter.
Gary
Gary Coffman
From ke4zv!ga...@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman)
In article <BvnEL...@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>
>My problem is this. There seems needless duplication of forces. It
>would be better if those same planes that helped the carriers fight
>their way to the beach could support the Marines on the beach.
>Further, it seems that there is *no way* the Marines are going ashore
>until the navy has the surrounding sea firmly in control. This
>implies that those naval planes are free to support the Marines.
>Finally, once a beach head is secured, the Air Force should be able to
>fly in land-based fighters to continue to support the Marines.
Look at the island campaigns in the Pacific to see the flaws in this
approach.
>Therefore I argue that at no point due the Marines need their own air
>force. Your argument seems to be that the Air Force/Naval Air fails
>to provide the support that they should. This seems to me to *not*
>call for a whole Marine air force to make up the deficiancy, but
>instead that the Air Force / Naval Air should be fixed.
Our concept of dividing forces into air, land, and sea has become
obsolete. These aren't natural separate roles, and trying to force
them to be that way has led to serious problems such as the coordination
problems faced on Grenada and in Panama. When a ground force has to make
a credit card call back to the States to get air support, the system is
badly broken.
The air force has recently changed it's structure to be more mission
oriented, but that doesn't go far enough. The marine model of integrated
air, sea, and land forces is a *total* mission structure. CAS is a natural
fit with a ground assualt force and should be part of that force rather
than an asset begged from another command whose main orientation is
air superiority and strategic bombing. A mission commander needs all his
forces directly under one command with one central focus.
The natural division of forces would be into a Strategic Strike force
consisting of strategic bombers, missiles, missile firing submarines,
and theater based air superiority assets; a Sealane Control force consisting
of land based air, carrier based air, surface combatants, and submarine
attack forces; an Invasion Force structure built along the lines of a beefed
up Marine Expeditionary force; and an Air/Land Battle Force consisting of
Army and Army Air Force elements.
>I argue that the Marine Air Force should be cut simply because
>something needs to be cut (for bugetary and political reasons) and
>that the Marine Air Force performs a function that can be carried by
>the other forces.
>
>Like I said, what would *you* cut????
This is a false and dangerous philosophy of military structuring. The
decision needs to be made as to what missions the US military must
be capable of carrying out, and then the forces necessary to carry
out those missions must be structured. Once that's done, you add up
the bill and pay it, or change the mission structure. Half a loaf
is *not* better than none in combat. Either you have the assets to
carry out the mission, or you abandon the mission. Any other course
leads to defeat and needless waste of lives.
Gary
MegaZone23
From mega...@obsidian.WPI.EDU (MegaZone23)
In article <BvnEL...@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>Mega...@obsidian.WPI.EDU (MegaZone23) writes ...
>>The reason the Marines have their own air power is because the Navy and
>>Air Force AREN'T always available to support them.
>Force/Naval Air has always had the planes needed to support the
>Marines. It seems that sometimes these services do not support the
>Marines to the satisfaction of the Marines, being distracted by other
>things. You allude to this in part of the article I have edited out.
The problem is training. The AF and Navy don't train with the Marines enough.
While they have good records at the bombing competitions, the major obstacle
is fighting with the Marines on the ground/ Good coordiantion is needed to be
effective. And I don't see haw the AF and Navy have enough planes. They're
complaining they need more, and they were all busy during Desert Storm. If you
take the Marine's planes away they'd end up being replaced by more Naval
aircraft. (I don't the AF would do it...)
And the Marines have their own needs. Why would the navy need Super Stallions?
The Marines are leading the fight for the Osprey, and reconditioning the Sea
Knights. Who else would operate the Harrier?
If you are going to grant them their helicopters and CAS aircraft, why take
away just the air cover which is so vital ot the survival of the rest of the
forces. You won't save much money. Administrative cost would go up as offices
were established for joint control of the aircraft. The Navy certainly wouldn't
want to cut back on it's fleet. (My opinion that the F/A-18 is a jack of all
trades master of none notwithstanding.) The F/A-18 is just one small aspect
of the Marine airwing and cutting it wouldn't really make all that much
difference cost wise, while creating more beaurocratic headaches.
>My problem is this. There seems needless duplication of forces. It
>would be better if those same planes that helped the carriers fight
>their way to the beach could support the Marines on the beach.
And who is going to provide aircover? The worst thing to assume is that since
you fought your way in the enemy won't try and take it back. Remember, the
Navy also said they will be shrinking their forces and using the F/A-18 as a
fleet air defense aircraft to replace the F-14. (IMHO, damn stupid.)
Are you going to pull aircraft off the carriers and put them on the ground
the Marines. If not they'll be no good. So once they are on the ground you
will basically have to turn them over to the Marines to command. More damn
headaches. So, wouldn't it make sense to simply leace them in the Marines
hands to help fight the way in and then once a beachhead is established move
them to the shore? It's been done that way for a long time now.
>Further, it seems that there is *no way* the Marines are going ashore
>until the navy has the surrounding sea firmly in control. This
Buzz. Many times you can be faced with an dash landing in a hostile zone. The
Marines train for it. Sometimes you can't get control of an area and a fast
landing to divert forces is the option chosen. It is a dangerous mission, and
one the Marines may have to use.
>Finally, once a beach head is secured, the Air Force should be able to
>fly in land-based fighters to continue to support the Marines.
Again, command and contol. Why cause more headaches and lengthen the chain of
command?
>call for a whole Marine air force to make up the deficiancy, but
>instead that the Air Force / Naval Air should be fixed.
And defeat your cost argument by increaing command staffs and training needed
to work together. Not to mention increasing the complexity of the command
structure, which Doesn't bode well for thsoe in the field.
>Like I said, what would *you* cut????
Me, despite my love of tech:
The B-2, the F/A-18E/F, the Midgetman, SDI, cut back on the M1A2/M1A3 program
(The M1A1 seems to have proven to be years ahead of anything else.), retire
carriers early, or slow down SLEP,
I'd push programs like the Osprey, the heavy-light helicopter, the ATF, the
Naval ATF, C-17, the new airdroppable tank, air cushion landing craft, the
ALRAAM; and retire old high maintenance items like the Sea Knight, C-141,
Sky Cranes, Jolly Greens, Old F-15s and F-14s as these programs came on line.
The current command staff streamlining is a good idea too.
MegaZone23
From mega...@obsidian.WPI.EDU (MegaZone23)
In article <BvnEL...@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
>Here is my latest hair-brained idea. From what I read, a modenr
>carrier has about 16 ASW helocopters aboard. Why cannot we replace
>these with F-18's (there seem to be enough). This woudl trade ASW
>strength for air power.
Never be done. First helicopters are useful for more than ASW, such as SAR, or
cargo transfer. Many of the smaller ships carry the small Sea Sprite helo,
while the carrier has room for the Sea King and possible follow-ons. (If onle
the USN would by the EH101)
>I think this is a good trade. The most obvious uses for American
>carriers is off the coast of third world nations. Although many of
>these nations have sub fleets, it is much more common to have an air
It seems that nearly every third world nation with a coast and the cash has
at least a sub. (ok, I'm exagerating.) Many purchased old US WWII subs, and
they're still going. Plus many European countries will sell small Diesel
subs to anyone with cash. All it takes in one sub and a few lucky shots.
>our ASW capacity was built to counter the soviet threat. Now that
>this threat has dissapiated, we have room to cut the ASW capability.
Well, the subs are still out there. The question is now, who controls them?
>Also, notice that many ships (crusiers, distroyers, frigates) can
>carry helocopters, only the carrier can carry attack planes.
And amny can only carry small choppers, like the Sea Sprite. The Sea Hawk
isn't very big either. The Sea King is fairly large. Plus at times Sea
Stallions, or Super Stallions, are carried for mine-sweeping duties. Only
carriers and landing craft can take those beasts.
>Why is this a budget cut. By increasing the power of each carrier, we
>can perhaps make do with fewer.
Adding 16 F-18s isn't much, and you really can't lose ALL the choppers, you
need at least 2 bare minimum. One is always in the air when flight ops are
going, in case some one goes in. More likely you'd end up with 6 or so on
board.
Plus a carrier in a high threat area can out run its escorts (for the most
part) if it needs to retreat. Leaving your ASW helos behind on other ships
would be a bad thing.
BTW, the Navy is already talking of reducing the number of carriers at sea,
as well as keeping 2 of the 4 battleships in mothballs to cut costs.
Neil A Kirby
From Neil A Kirby <n...@cbvox.att.com>
In article <BvnF6...@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> vik...@iastate.edu (Dan Sorenson) writes:
>
>From vik...@iastate.edu (Dan Sorenson)
>
[deleted for brevity]
> To summarize, the former Marines I talked to want F-18's to keep
>the skies clear, and A-10's to give them the ground support they need.
A feeling shared by the Army, I'm sure; give us helos and A10s, and
something to keep other aircraft away from them.
>
> Being former Navy, I have to insert this: *ALL* of them wanted
>an Iowa-class battleship supporting them if they are near a coast. The
>Vietnam veterans even preferred naval artillery to Army artillery due
>to the greater firepower of the naval guns, but every one who had seen
>an Iowa-class fire remembers those incoming rounds fondly.
>
> Perhaps the opinions of the ground-pounders should be taken
>into account? I'd bet the Marine Corps would be willing to operate
>the Iowas if the Navy doesn't want them anymore.
Want an Iowa? ALWAYS. Nothing like sustained 16" fire to make the
other side reconsider holding this beach.
Willing to operate? I doubt it, not their mission. Not their budget,
either.
I bet the navy still wants Iowas, but wants other things even more. The
porper folks to operate the Iowas are the folks who are already trained to
do so. They are the most expensive part of an Iowa anyway.
Neil Kirby
ga...@stsci.edu
From ga...@stsci.edu
Before I load up the napalm, is there anybody out there besides Randy who is in
agreement with his ideas?
If there is interest I'll continue this discussion on the net, if not I'll
limit it to e-mail, with copies to those who have responded to the thread.
-Bill Gawne,
Science Operations Specialist | GySgt USMCR,
Space Telescope Science Institute | Individual Mobilization Augmentee
Operations Division | Operations Research Analyst
Computer Sciences Corporation | Studies and Analysis Division
Associate Technical Staff | Marine Corps Combat Development Cmd
MegaZone23
From mega...@obsidian.WPI.EDU (MegaZone23)
In article <Bvq4q...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>So what? If there were no Marine Air Corps, then the Air Force would
>have had more room and more transport to fly in it's own air planes.
The Marines generally operated from forward bases, so they didn't compete with
the AF. Besides, the was plenty of room.
>I've never suggested that the Marines loose the AV-8B's. Those planes
>are unique, and seem to fit beautifully with Marine doctorine. In
>fact, I always wondered why the Marines didn't have more of them. We
The Harriers may be nice, but they're not suited for everything. As experience
has shown, with the centrally mounted engine a single IR homer can take one
down. The Marines feel they have enough for the moment and the old AV-8A/Cs are
being slowly mothballed.
>However, let's look at the rest of your scenerio. Before the
>beachhead is established, only the navy can provide air support. The
>marine air craft sit on the sidelines and look shiney. When a beach
Wrong. The Marines will fight along side the Navy on the way in. It is mainly
a difference in training, the marines concetrate on CAS, the Navy on fleet air
defense. The pilots make the difference, not the aircraft.
>head is established, then there are bases that the Air force can fly
>into. These bases are the very same bases that you would have the
>Marine air force fly into. So the way I see it, the Marine Air Corps
I'd like to see the AF land at a forward Marine air base. Most of the AF
aircraft could never take the landing forces and sink rates needed to make the
short rough fields. That's an advantage to flying naval aircraft, they are
built to take a beating.
>> c. Every Marine Aviator has had some basic training as an infantry
>>officer. This gives Marine pilots a unique perspective and also focuses
>>Marine aviation toward Close Air Support and support of the grunt in
>>the field.
>But what about the poor Army grunts. They have no Army Air Corps to
>support them. All they have is the Air Force. Are they getting
>sub-standard service?
I would say yes. So does the Army, they want their own CAS aircraft. I'd like
to see them get the planes they want. Let the AF handle penatration and air
cover, and let the Army do the CAS. Let the Army have the A-10, or the ARES.
>air force, if it is broken. I also suggest that once this is done,
>that there remains no reason for the Marines to keep there own air
The problem is getting the aircraft ashore. The Marines fly naval aircraft for
a reason, they can fly from ship to shore and fight their way in. It is much
more complex to arrange for AF tankers etc for the flights, and if you ferry
the aircraft in they won't be carrying weapons, but fuel tanks.
Don Palmrose
From d...@inel.gov (Don Palmrose)
Here's my $0.02 worth. One must remember that the aircraft loading on a
carrier is NOT FIXED! There is a "standard" load out for deployment that is
a compromise between the different warfare areas (AAW, ASW, ASUW, Strike...).
However, if the battle group is going on a particular mission (i.e. Desert
Storm) one of the warfare areas can have its number of planes reduced and
compensated by another. Using the Desert Storm example, there could be less
ASW assests on the carrier in favor of more Strike planes. It also depends
on what other assests are in the area. If a carrier is operating in an area
with many land ASW aircraft nearby, the ASW load **might** be reduced to
increase, say, the AAW area. For example, a carrier task group in the Med
might have 3 to 4 subs and lots of help from other NATO ASW aircraft such that
the number of fighters can now be increased to help provide a tighter CAP and
for all hours of the day.
The important thing to remember is FLEXIBILITY. To maintain that flexibility
one must have adequate numbers of ALL TYPES of aircraft. The Navy will not
cut one area in favor of another (such as ASW vs AAW) because once such a
cut is made, it is EXTREMELY difficult to reverse it later.
Don Palmrose
"I'd rather not serve on a ship designed to sink...."
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Thomas Schoene
From w...@vax5.cit.cornell.edu (Thomas Schoene)
In article <BvnEL...@lawday.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>,
ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
> Here is my latest hair-brained idea. From what I read, a modenr
> carrier has about 16 ASW helocopters aboard. Why cannot we replace
> these with F-18's (there seem to be enough). This woudl trade ASW
> strength for air power.
You read wrong. The current carrier air wing has 6 SH-3G or SH-60F helicopters
which carry out ASW, planeguard, search and rescue, personnel and supplies
transfers, and a variety of sundry other missions. It also has 10 S-3 Viking
fixed wing ASW planes which also carry out surface search, anti-shipping
strike, refuelling and other missions. Both types used extensively in the
Gulf where the submarine threat was nil. In some ways these are the most
flexible assets in the air wing. Getting rid of them makes sense only if you
are sure that your only mission will be land attack.
> I think this is a good trade. The most obvious uses for American
> carriers is off the coast of third world nations. Although many of
> these nations have sub fleets, it is much more common to have an air
> force. Further, most nations (especially third world ones) put much
> more money into their air force than the sub fleet. Finally, much of
> our ASW capacity was built to counter the soviet threat. Now that
> this threat has dissapiated, we have room to cut the ASW capability.
Ask any destroyerman what he thnks about shallow water ASW 9the kind we're
most likely to encounter in a third world setting. It's much harder than deep
water ASW that we built most of the fleet for. Dispensing with the carriers
heavy ASW helos (the only ones with dipping sonar in a US battlegoup) would cut
into ASW forces just when hey are most needed. Just a couple of heavyweight
torpedoes could seriously damage even todays carriers and destroy smaller
ships. Doing without ASW capability is just asd bad as doing without
air defense.
--
Tom Schoene
w...@cornella.cit.cornell.edu -or- w...@vax5.cit.cornell.edu
-------------------------------------------------------------------
"Whenever you're holding all the cards why does everyone else turn
out to be playing chess?"
Chad Barret Wemyss
From chad...@wpi.WPI.EDU (Chad Barret Wemyss)
In article <Bvq4E...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ch...@harvey.gte.com (Curtis Fennell) writes:
>If it were up to me, every service would lose some, but the Air Force
>would lose the most.
Just out of curiosity, why?
Chad Wemyss
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
ga...@stsci.edu writes:
>Before I load up the napalm, is there anybody out there besides Randy who is
>in agreement with his ideas?
Let me help. There seems to be *no one* who thinks that I make any
sense at all. Perhaps there is some sort of "silent majority", but
that didn't work for Nixon so I won't even try it.
However, I did learn a few things, so I guess it was worthwhile. This
is what I think I learned:
- There is little interest in talking about what sort of cuts are
needed in the military. I'm not sure if this is because the people
don't think the cuts are needed (yet they will happen) or if this is
because people think that the politicians will do the cutting with
regards to politics and not military matters (so why worry about it).
- Most everyone likes the approximate status quo. I'm sure that
everyone has their pet change. However, no one likes my proposed
change, and very few wants to propose anything themself.
- There seems to be a strong sense of "I primarily care about my
service". For instance, if the Marine Corps needs air supprt, and the
Air Force is inadiquate, then don't worry too much about the Air Force,
just give me planes. There have been people who complain about the
Air Force, but everyone seems more concerned keeping tha Marine Air
Corps than fixing the Air Force.
- Few people seem to think that the military needs to be cut that
much. Perhaps a program here, or a program there, but not any major
forces. This seems to be a huge mistake to me. IMHO, the total
budget *will* be cut substancially no matter who the next president is.
-Randy
Henry Spencer
From he...@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)
>From ke4zv!ga...@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman)
>Giving up a blue water navy can be costly, as the British found out in
>the Falklands. They were lucky, and they know it, that the Argentines
>weren't as aggressive as they could have been. If the fight had had to
>be carried to the mainland, the British would have been helpless without
>mainforce carriers. Note that the Argentines only made their move *after*
>the Brits retired their last fleet carrier.
There's no evidence that the Argentines were particularly clever about
the timing in this regard. In fact, they were very stupid about the
timing. If they'd waited a little bit longer, plans to sell Hermes to
Australia would probably have gone through, and likewise plans to
mothball -- perhaps even sell -- Invincible as soon as Illustrious was
operational.
Nor would the British have been helpless without "mainforce" carriers
in a mainland war. Note that Harrier performance is closely comparable
to that of the Skyhawk, which formed a large part of the USN's strike
force for a longish time. (Admittedly, the shortest-ranged part.)
And the Argentines took the threat of Ascension-based Vulcan raids on
their mainland airbases very seriously: immediately after the first
Vulcan raid on Port Stanley, the only Argentine squadrons trained and
equipped for air-to-air combat were pulled back to defend the mainland
bases. (Part of the reason why the Harrier air-combat record in the
Falklands looks so good is because serious air-to-air opposition ended
when those squadrons left.) The Argentines were overreacting, but from
their point of view it made some sense: the British were behaving in
unexpected ways already, and who could tell what they might do next?
I do agree with one of Gary's points: the British would have been in
considerable trouble if the Argentines had been more aggressive.
However, one of their two major vulnerabilities is shared by the USN:
not enough carriers. (The other one was lack of radar aircraft, until
their first radar helicopters were deployed, too late for the war.)
They had only two carriers in the task force, and loss of even one would
have been a major disaster. However, a USN task force probably wouldn't
have had more than two or three, and losing one would be almost as bad.
Fact is, in a modern war against a capable opponent, it's insane to
be vitally dependent on assets you can count on your fingers. As the
USN's submariners will gladly tell you :-), the USN carriers are *not*
invulnerable.
--
MS-DOS is the OS/360 of the 1980s. | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
-Hal W. Hardenbergh (1985)| he...@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
Andrew Huie
From and...@panix.com (Andrew Huie)
OK. People have been arguing on whether or not the Marines air force should be
cut. The argument seems convincing to me that the entire air force shouldn't
be cut, but it is not so convincing why the marines need fighters like the
F-18. If their primary use is air cover, why not use AF or Naval assets
instead, since that tends to be their specialty? I have no argument with
the Marines' having ground support aircraft, but air combat fighters does
seem redundant.
ga...@stsci.edu
From ga...@stsci.edu
In article <Bvyt...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>,
(OK Randy, looks like you're not **Quite** all alone.)
The F/A-18 A and C model planes in the VMFA's are used for Close Air Support,
Offensive Air, and Air Defense roles. All of these require close coordination
with the MAGTF commander. Sure, you could bring in Navy pilots to do this.
Put them on the ground for a few months to learn Marine doctrine, run them
through specialized training for USMC air support, and they'd probably be
almost as good as Marine pilots on average and some would be as good as our
best. They would also become rusty in terms of Fleet Air Defense and what-
ever else their regular missions are. This would lead to poor performance
evaluations and lousy promotion opportunities. Now, if you can find any
Navy pilots who want to volunteer for such duty just have 'em ring up old
Admiral Kelso.
You see, to make a Navy pilot effective in supporting the Marines on the
ground you'd just about have to turn him into a Marine pilot. If you do
that then his performance ought to be evaluated by people who understand
his mission.
Frank Crary
From fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary)
In article <Bvyt...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> and...@panix.com (Andrew Huie) writes:
>OK. People have been arguing on whether or not the Marines air force should be
>cut. The argument seems convincing to me that the entire air force shouldn't
>be cut, but it is not so convincing why the marines need fighters like the
>F-18. If their primary use is air cover...
It isn't: The FA-18 was a replacement for the A-7 attack plane. Improved
technology allowed for a combination fighter/attack aircraft that
was both a good fighter and able satisfy the light attack mission. In
practice the Marine FA-18 are attack aircraft, that can also defend
itself and/or be reconfigured into a air superiority fighter in case
of need (assuming the Air Force and Navy can't deliver...) I don't
think the Marines fly any single purpose fighters.
Frank Crary
CU Boulder
Don Palmrose
From d...@inel.gov (Don Palmrose)
From d...@inel.gov (Don Palmrose)
In article <Bvyqq...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>
>
> - Few people seem to think that the military needs to be cut that
> much. Perhaps a program here, or a program there, but not any major
> forces. This seems to be a huge mistake to me. IMHO, the total
> budget *will* be cut substancially no matter who the next president is.
>
> -Randy
>
>
The problem, Randy, is that the force structure HAS TO BE TAILORED TO THE
COMMITMENTS OUR GOVERNMENT MAKES!
I served as an officer in the US Navy in the late 1970's and early 1980's and
saw first hand the problems that were created by cutting the military after
Vietnam (mainly under Carter, but Congress started during Nixon/Ford) and
not reducing our overseas commitments. The stories about ships not being able
to get under way due to not having the money to buy spare parts and ships
going on a nine month deployment, back home for three to five months, and
back to another nine month deployment were true. It was running the US Navy,
at least, into the ground. Regan changed that and it was literally like the
difference between night and day.
If Congress and the next President wants to cut the military drastically like
you think may happen, they better get us out of several international
agreements (NATO, SEATO, UN, Persian Gulf, etc.) or it will be just another
repeat of the 1970's.
Curtis Fennell
From Curtis Fennell <ch...@roger.gte.com>
From Curtis Fennell <ch...@roger.gte.com>
In article <BvxDv...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> chad...@wpi.WPI.EDU (Chad Barret Wemyss) writes:
>
>In article <Bvq4E...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ch...@harvey.gte.com (Curtis Fennell) writes:
>
>>If it were up to me, every service would lose some, but the Air Force
>>would lose the most.
>
>
>Just out of curiosity, why?
I will tell you why, but first let me preface my comments by pointing
out that I served on active duty in the US Marines from 1978 to 1984,
so I am not without bias.
Having said that, let's look at the USAF's missions. They provide
strategic deterrent forces, including bombers, missiles, early warning
systems and command and control functions. They provide most of the
US's air transport capability and they provide tactical air forces for
air superiority, interdiction, deep strike and close air support for
the army.
In the modern world, the most dramatic political change in the past 10
years has been the dissolution of the USSR and the consequent
reduction in the threat of a strategic nuclear war. IMHO, this
actually increases the chance of a limited nuclear exchange,
started by someone like Iraq. However, such an exchange would be
short, as US superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery systems would
end it rather rapidly.
This reduction in the threat of nuclear war should mean a
corresponding reduction in the strategic forces. I believe that the
strategic bomber force is basically an anachronism that can be
scrapped. I also believe that the B-2 is a very expensive luxury that
we can't afford. We should keep some ICBM's for their long range
accuracy, but not too many.
As an aside, it would be nice to keep the B-52s or something like them
for conventional ground support, but their usefulness as strategic
nuclear deterrents is at an end. This does not reflect on the quality
of the aircraft or their crews, but rather on the changing political
realities of our world.
The air force's least glamorous major function is transport and I
think that they should actually spend a little more time and effort on
beefing up the transport forces.
As far as tactical air power is concerned, the need for flexible and
responsive air power is still very great. However, as the likelyhood
of a large conventional war (in central Europe, for example) is
reduced, the need for large fixed-base forces is reduced and the need
for easily transportable, flexible forces increases. And the air
force's tactical air forces are the least flexible arm of our tactical
air power.
For the most part, they require large fixed bases to operate from, as
opposed to the Navy and Marine Corps. With the reduction of US bases
around the world, this becomes less and less possible. It also reduces
the number of places that you can permanently base an air wing.
Because of the fact that air force air wings are less flexible, I
would reduce them more than the Navy or Marine air wings. Modern
armed forces are going to have to be more flexible than they have been
in the past in order to cope with the wide variety of missions that
will be assigned to them, and I just don't see the air force as being
that flexible.
Curt
Gary Coffman
From ke4zv!ga...@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman)
From ke4zv!ga...@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman)
In article <Bvyqq...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>
>Let me help. There seems to be *no one* who thinks that I make any
>sense at all. Perhaps there is some sort of "silent majority", but
>that didn't work for Nixon so I won't even try it.
You are definitely marching to a different drummer. :-)
>However, I did learn a few things, so I guess it was worthwhile. This
>is what I think I learned:
>
>
>- There is little interest in talking about what sort of cuts are
>needed in the military. I'm not sure if this is because the people
>don't think the cuts are needed (yet they will happen) or if this is
>because people think that the politicians will do the cutting with
>regards to politics and not military matters (so why worry about it).
Discussing cuts without discussing missions is useless. First you
define what missions you want the military to carry out, then you
can start structuring and costing the forces necessary to carry
out those missions.
Currently, the US military is tasked with having a two ocean war
fighting capability. Those two are a combination of a European war
and war in Korea or other Asian hotspots. Both very high intensity,
and with significant first world opposition. That mandates a sea lane
control strategy and an expeditionary force capability as well as major
air/land battle elements. Many planners feel that today's military is
only capable of a 1 1/2 ocean war and desparately needs more sealift
and airlift to gain a full two ocean capability.
The world is different today than it was 4 years ago. The threat of
strategic nuclear war is less, and the need for things like Stealth
bombers, Midgetman missiles, Ohio class boomers, and the like has
been significantly lessened. However, in the conventional arena the
world is a more dangerous place today than ever before. There's a
brushfire in the area of Europe that once started a world war. There's
continuing trouble in the Middle East. Fingers are still on triggers
across the DMZ in Korea. Carriers, modern attack aircraft, and capable
conventional submarines are being introduced into SE Asia at an alarming
rate, and Vietnam is a major military power. The CIS is a potential mass
of feuding and fighting countries with the troubles in the SE region only
the beginning of a crumbling of empire. Africa is a mass of low intensity
conflict that could flare up into major fighting at any time. South America
seems relatively calm today, but it did before the Falklands war too.
Even for minor conflicts like Desert Storm, the logistic requirements
are enormous and integrated fighting units are more important today
than ever due to the need to rapidly deploy, and to minimize staff
coordination requirements. Integrated forces can be controlled by a
single staff. Logistics can be handled by a single section. Close air
support can be coordinated with ground forces and with air cover by a
single commander.
Coordinating action between different services requires separate staffs
for each of the services, *and* liason staff at every level to keep
things together. Cost effective military forces have a maximum of
teeth for a minimum of tail. Separate commands trying to work together
have maximum tail, and maximum confusion, for a given amount of teeth.
Splitting command responsibility is a sure recipe for maximum cost
and minimum effectiveness on the battlefield. Looking at weapons
systems instead of looking at integrated fighting doctrine is a
serious mistake that costs war fighting ability, and that costs
extra money. Frontline to staff and support ratios in the Army
and Air Force run as high as 8 support for 1 warrior. In integrated
units like the Marines, the ratio is more like 1 to 1.
The path to cost effectiveness is not to strip the Marines of their
air arm. The path to cost effectiveness is to integrate commands
along the lines of the Marine forces. Thus air/land battle groups
need single service control of their forces. Sea lane control and
logistics forces need single service control of their forces.
Strategic nuclear forces need single service command of their
facilities. Etc. The idea is that forces should be *mission*
oriented rather than weapons systems oriented. That's the road
to a cost effective military force.
>- Few people seem to think that the military needs to be cut that
>much. Perhaps a program here, or a program there, but not any major
>forces. This seems to be a huge mistake to me. IMHO, the total
>budget *will* be cut substancially no matter who the next president is.
Few people who understand the tasks assigned to the military believe
that military forces should be cut. Indeed, many feel that the resources
available to the military are inadequate *today* to meet the missions
that they are responsible for *today*. Any President or Congress who
take a meat axe to the military budget without rescoping the tasks
assigned to the military is a positive danger to the Republic and would
be committing malfeasance in office by doing so. The primary Constitutional
responsiblity of the President and Congress are to provide for the defense
of the nation. All other responsibilities are secondary. They must make
an informed *political* judgement about what threats face the nation and
define military mission requirements accordingly. *Then* the military
must design doctrine and forces to meet those missions. It costs what
it costs. Any other course is nothing short of treason. The military
budget can't be cut without reducing the mission tasking assigned to
the military, else the nation becomes a paper tiger ill served by it's
military and political forces.
Gary
Richard Pierson
From fi...@iscp.Bellcore.COM (Richard Pierson)
From fi...@iscp.Bellcore.COM (Richard Pierson)
In article <Bvyt...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, and...@panix.com (Andrew Huie) writes:
Somewhat (tounge in cheek) the main reason is the Air Force
pilots tend to get lost over any kind of water. :-) Also from
pride, you wont find better pilots than Navy/Marine corps.
(who else in their right mind wants to land on a moving airport)
The AF pilots are too book bound, look down on close air
support (cas) and quite frankly after working with both
would much prefer to call in USMC/USN or A-10 driver
(personally A10 drivers deserve eligibility for a CIB in my book)
than any of the others, the AF accepts "collateral" damage
too easily for me. A couple of "short" 500 lbers can really
make you wish you unpacked the stingers from the track
before you called em, and at least the A10 drivers wave
as they go by as long as the bushes aren't too high. No,
for my taste if I call in AF close air I mark it
with smoke at least 3 k out and mark all FOUR
sides so theres no margin for error. I do have to admit
that the AC130 has gotten much better.
--
##########################################################
There are only two types of ships in the NAVY; SUBMARINES
and TARGETS !!!
#1/XS1100LH #2/10/10/92
Richard Pierson E06584 vnet: [908] 699-6063
Internet: fi...@iscp.belcore.com,|| UUNET:uunet!bcr!fist
#include <std.disclaimer> My opinions are my own!!!
I Don't shop in malls, I by my jeans, jackets and ammo
in the same store.
Nigel Tzeng
From stx...@rs733.gsfc.nasa.gov (Nigel Tzeng)
From stx...@rs733.gsfc.nasa.gov (Nigel Tzeng)
In article <Bvyqq...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> he...@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes:
From he...@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)
[timing deleted]
[Vulcan raid and pulling squadrons back deleted]
when those squadrons left.) The Argentines were overreacting, but from
their point of view it made some sense: the British were behaving in
unexpected ways already, and who could tell what they might do next?
Overreacting in a big way IMHO. I suppose that if the timing issue
regarding the carriers is relevant then if the Argies had waited for
the sales and mothballing they probably would have not had to deal
with the Vulcans either.
As far as I remember anyway the Vulcan raid was as much politically
motivated as anything else...the damage done was very minimal.
I do agree with one of Gary's points: the British would have been in
considerable trouble if the Argentines had been more aggressive.
However, one of their two major vulnerabilities is shared by the USN:
not enough carriers. (The other one was lack of radar aircraft, until
their first radar helicopters were deployed, too late for the war.)
They had only two carriers in the task force, and loss of even one would
have been a major disaster. However, a USN task force probably wouldn't
have had more than two or three, and losing one would be almost as bad.
Yes...but a USN task force would have been far more capable. In fact
one US carrier would have been far more dangerous than the two the
Brits had...just with the AEW capability alone. The Brits certainly
had lots of guts to go into land based air coverage sans early
detection capability...
You can't really compare the Brit force against a real US carrier
group or even a scratch US task force. Minimum you'd have seen is one
carrier group and a MAU (MAB? What is the correct designation
anyway?)...which is arguably an order of magnitude more powerful than
the British force in any arena except ASW. At least I hope so or
we've spent far too much money on them ;-).
Fact is, in a modern war against a capable opponent, it's insane to
be vitally dependent on assets you can count on your fingers. As the
USN's submariners will gladly tell you :-), the USN carriers are *not*
invulnerable.
Yah...but that doesn't mean they aren't worth having around. For that
matter name any weapon system that is invulnerable...or that we have
sufficient number of to suit the military in time of war ;-).
--
MS-DOS is the OS/360 of the 1980s. | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
Nigel Tzeng
--
Nigel Tzeng
.sig under construction
ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
From ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
In article <Bvyqq...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, ra...@ms.uky.edu
(Randy Appleton) writes:
> - There seems to be a strong sense of "I primarily care about my
> service". For instance, if the Marine Corps needs air supprt, and the
> Air Force is inadiquate, then don't worry too much about the Air Force,
> just give me planes. There have been people who complain about the
> Air Force, but everyone seems more concerned keeping tha Marine Air
> Corps than fixing the Air Force.
History has shown that it's generally fultile to attempt to "fix" any
large organisation against it's will. The USAF doesn't like CAS & only
does it to keep high performance a/c away from the army. This is about
as good as a "fix" as there's going to be.
> - Few people seem to think that the military needs to be cut that
> much. Perhaps a program here, or a program there, but not any major
> forces. This seems to be a huge mistake to me. IMHO, the total
> budget *will* be cut substancially no matter who the next president is.
>
The fact that the military budget *will* get cut due to political con-
siderations has nothing to do with whether or not the budget *needs*
to be cut. My opinion is that in these cases it doesn't matter what is
recommended, the politicians will want more. Better just to say "There
isn't anything to cut", & then fight whatever cuts they come up with.
PHIL
Anthony Lee
From Anthony Lee <ant...@cs.uq.oz.au>
From Anthony Lee <ant...@cs.uq.oz.au>
In <Bvyqq...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> he...@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes:
:There's no evidence that the Argentines were particularly clever about
:the timing in this regard. In fact, they were very stupid about the
:timing. If they'd waited a little bit longer, plans to sell Hermes to
:Australia would probably have gone through, and likewise plans to
:mothball -- perhaps even sell -- Invincible as soon as Illustrious was
:operational.
I think one point that people fail to realise is that
Australia (as least back in the earlier 80s) still very
much think of herself as having very closed ties with the U.K.
If the U.K. need the Invincible back from Australia then I am
sure the Australian government would have gladly lent it back to
U.K.
--
Anthony Lee (Time Lord Doctor) (These are my opinions !)
email: ant...@cs.uq.oz.au voice:+(61)-7-3651204 FAX:+(61)-7-3651999
SNAIL: Department Computer Science, The University of Queensland,
St Lucia, Qld 4072, Australia
ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
From ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
The answer to this is simple & has happened hisotrically. The USN & USAF
priorities may NOT be the same as the USMC's in any given situation. The USN
may decide, for instance, that it's time to split (remember Guadalcanal in
WWII?) The USAF may decide that they have more important thigs to do with
their fighter assets. Right now the CAS mission within the USAF is consid-
ered a "lesser" mission, presumably for "lesser" pilots. The only way the
Marines can be sure of getting the support they need, especially in the sort
of precarious amphib landing situations they may ne thrust into, is to have
their own assets. The USN & USAF can & will make alot of promises but those
promises have a way of getting set aside once the shooting starts.
PHIL
Henry Spencer
From Henry Spencer <he...@zoo.toronto.edu>
>From stx...@rs733.gsfc.nasa.gov (Nigel Tzeng)
>As far as I remember anyway the Vulcan raid was as much politically
>motivated as anything else...the damage done was very minimal.
They did put one crater into the Port Stanley runway. The Argentines did
repair it, but evidently not well enough for fast-jet operations, since
they stopped trying that. The practical effects were mostly due to the
scare thrown into Argentine Air Force command, rather than to the actual
bomb damage.
Actually, there were several (six?) Vulcan raids, but the effects from
the later ones were even less significant.
>one US carrier would have been far more dangerous than the two the
>Brits had...just with the AEW capability alone. The Brits certainly
>had lots of guts to go into land based air coverage sans early
>detection capability...
They planned to use ships for radar-picket duty, and did (that's what
the Sheffield was doing when it took its Exocet hit). This didn't work
very well against low-flying aircraft, as they found out. Mind you,
had the war lasted another month, the first radar helicopter would have
been operating with the fleet, and that would have made quite a difference.
--
MS-DOS is the OS/360 of the 1980s. | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
fs...@acad3.alaska.edu
From fs...@acad3.alaska.edu
In article <Bvyqq...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
This has been responded to by quite a few people already, but i want to add a
few points, since i don't entirely agree with what's been said.
>
> - There is little interest in talking about what sort of cuts are
> needed in the military. I'm not sure if this is because the people
> don't think the cuts are needed (yet they will happen) or if this is
> because people think that the politicians will do the cutting with
> regards to politics and not military matters (so why worry about it).
You're kind of right, and kind of wrong. There is a *lot* of interest in
talking about what sort of cuts are needed in the military. You just happened
to propose making a cut that is ``wrong'' for the current strategic situation.
The Marine Corps is set up just for the situation we find ourselves in now.
The time to have cut the Marines would have been during the height of the cold
war-- the Marines were never set up to fight the Soviets, our main adversary.
Now that we find ourselves in a fluid, relatively unpredictable international
situation, the Navy/Marine Corps just happens to be our most valuable asset.
There was a Navy News Service posting that contained the new Navy Department
white paper _...From the Sea_ -- read that, and you'll get a better idea of
where the military wants to go (at least, from the Navy Department's point of
view).
However, if you had proposed getting rid of the B-2, or Seawolf, or other
programs that were designed around a strategic `total war' with another
superpower, i'm sure you would have found a more receptive discussion. i would
have supported reductions in strategic nuclear forces, and heavy mechanized
Army (active duty) units that i think can best be kept in a reserve status.
However, those cuts, in my opinion, better reflect the strategic situation the
US finds itself in, coupled with the financial necessity to make some cuts
somewhere.
>
> - Most everyone likes the approximate status quo. I'm sure that
> everyone has their pet change. However, no one likes my proposed
> change, and very few wants to propose anything themself.
>
The status quo of the military as a whole never really came into question. In
fact, in my original post on this subject, i stated two or three areas that
should be cut. ``However, no one likes my proposed change,'' is accurate, at
least as far as sci.military is concerned. ``and very few wants to propose
anything themself.'' is not. In the past few days, i've seen lots of proposed
cuts, ranging from Air Force to Army to Navy assets that aren't as useful as
they once were. You're just paying too much attention to your pet change, to
the exclusion of others.
However, you did make a big splash, and hopefully will start some meaningful
discussion on where the military as a whole should be cut. We will be forced
to cut something, whether the military establishment wants to or not. The
question is what we want to do, and what we need to do it.
> - There seems to be a strong sense of "I primarily care about my
> service". For instance, if the Marine Corps needs air supprt, and the
> Air Force is inadiquate, then don't worry too much about the Air Force,
> just give me planes. There have been people who complain about the
> Air Force, but everyone seems more concerned keeping tha Marine Air
> Corps than fixing the Air Force.
>
This isn't true. If you pay attention, a lot of the people that responded to
your cut in a negative way were not Marines. Also, `fixing the Air Force' isn't
really an issue. As i said in my first post, if you look closely at the
mission statement of the Air Force, it is meant to fight a protracted air war,
and support the Army in fighting a protracted land war. Naval/Amphibious CAS
missions are *not* the job of the Air Force. The Air Force does a generally
outstanding job of taking and controlling air-space. They also do an exellent
job of bombing things behind the front lines- look at the F-111F, or the B-1B
in a conventional role. Outstanding pilots and aircraft, with very good
results indeed. The Air Force is not `broken'- it does it's stated job very
well. The Army does have a beef though, as the Air Force has neglected it's
role in supporting the Army with CAS. The Navy/Marine team has solved it's CAS
responsibilities rather neatly. The Navy and Marine squadrons work well
together, and are interchangeable to a certain extent while maintaining the
benefits of specialization. Rather than forcing another mission on the Air
Force, perhaps the Air Force should drop the CAS mission entirely, and leave
that to the Army Air Corps and Marine Corps Aviation.
> - Few people seem to think that the military needs to be cut that
> much. Perhaps a program here, or a program there, but not any major
> forces. This seems to be a huge mistake to me. IMHO, the total
> budget *will* be cut substancially no matter who the next president is.
>
Just because the budget will be cut, and we know it, doesn't mean we have to
like it. I don't think you could say it was a mistake to not want a cut. It
would be a mistake to propose cuts in vitally important areas however, such as
Marine Aviation.
There are plenty of proposals to cut major forces. Ask any Army Captain who
happens to have an armor MOS what his chances of making Lt. Colonel are. The
Army was set up for the big fight, and now is being hit hard by the cuts. If
that's not reducing ``major forces'' i don't know what is. Before the cuts are
done with and the military stabilizes at some `optimal' size, i'll bet money
that the Army loses more people than the entire Marine Corps had in 1990- if
they havent already!
> -Randy
James Zuelow
FS...@acad3.alaska.edu
Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
>In article <Bvyqq...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>Discussing cuts without discussing missions is useless. First you
>define what missions you want the military to carry out, then you
>can start structuring and costing the forces necessary to carry
>out those missions.
O.K. Fair criticism. Here is my first attempt. Please feel free to
correct my mistakes. After all, I've never been a mission planner
before.
For the purpose of this, I consider that no NATO nation could likely
become an emeny in the next 10 years. However, I do consider Russia
and China and Iran potential enemies. I do not consider it reasonable
that the CIS will reunite in the next 10 years.
I Think the U.S. military should be able to ...
- Fight a strategic nuclear war at a moments notice. This will help
deter the any first strike against us. I don't expect to win, just
maybe kill the guys who started it.
- Greatly lessen the results of any small nuclear strike by some third
world crackpot with a few balistic missiles and nuclear warheads. I
don't expect to be able to stop every warhead from a force the size of
China's, but stopping 90% (or 50% or so) would be awfully nice. As
far as I know, this capability is many years away, depending on SDI
funding.
- Keep track of all major military units in the world, so that we can
spot in buildups quickly, and hopefully act appropriately.
- Deploy a quick reaction force (maybe division sized) to any spot in
the world in 48 hours. (Do we have the airlift to do this now?)
- Get a carrier battle group within strike range of any piece of coast
within a 'few days'. Since I don't expect to send only one carrier
against an Air Force the size of Lybia's, or the former Iraqi air
force, I also want THREE carrier battle groups to be able to converge to
any one spot in two weeks. I don't mind if this strips the
neighboring seas of carriers.
- Be able to throw a naval blockade around any other nation, and make
it stick. For a nation the size of China, I don't mind if it takes
two weeks to get it set. For a nation the size of Liberia, I'd like
it in a 'few days'.
- Have no other nation, or combination of two of them, be able to
blockade America's ports. This includes the ability to defend against
enemy submarines. I will accept some shipping losses to submarines
against either China or Russia, but not to the extent that the oil
stops flowing to America. Further, I consider China and Russia to
each be two nations for this clause. (Note. I believe that most oil
headed to America comes from either Alaska, Latin America, or Nigeria.
I don't think it comes from the Persian Gulf.)
- Fight a war the size of Desert Storm, even if it is as far away as
the Persian Gulf, assuming that some neighbor provides us with the
necessary bases. I'd like the mobilization to occur no slower than
the last Desert Storm.
- Have the reserves to fight a sustained, large-scale war about the
size of Vietnam or Korea.
So, what do you think? I'm sure I've left some capability out, but
have I included too much? Further, I assume that the current military
can do all of these things. Am I right?
Henry Spencer
From he...@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)
I wrote:
>... If [the Argentines] waited a little bit longer, plans to sell Hermes to
>Australia would probably have gone through, and likewise plans to
>mothball -- perhaps even sell -- Invincible as soon as Illustrious was
>operational.
This seems to have gotten garbled in my memory sometime between then and
now... I believe the correct version was that Hermes was going to be
mothballed, perhaps scrapped -- it was getting pretty old -- and Invincible
was to be sold to Australia.
In the end, after considerable delay, Hermes was sold to India (which has
renamed it Vikrant, I believe), Invincible has remained with the RN, and
Australia's navy is no longer in the carrier business.
As another aspect of bad timing, the RAF Vulcan force was also on the verge
of retirement. I don't think its replacement -- Tornado -- could have
flown the Port Stanley raids from Ascension.
Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
>Because of the fact that air force air wings are less flexible, I
>would reduce them more than the Navy or Marine air wings. Modern
>armed forces are going to have to be more flexible than they have been
>in the past in order to cope with the wide variety of missions that
>will be assigned to them, and I just don't see the air force as being
>that flexible.
Actually, this sounds like an argument to make the air force more
flexible. If the Marines can do it, presumably the Air Force can do
it. If need be, the Marines can teach them how. :-)
Seriously, nothing says that the Air Force CAS pilots cannot go thru
basically the same training as the Marine CAS pilots. There are
reasons why this is not done, however, it could be done. And it would
probably carry the same advantages and disadvantages as the current
Marine Air Corps strategy.
Chad Barret Wemyss
From Chad Barret Wemyss <chad...@wpi.wpi.edu>
>>In article <Bvq4E...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ch...@harvey.gte.com (Curtis Fennell) writes:
>>
>>>If it were up to me, every service would lose some, but the Air Force
>>>would lose the most.
>>
>>Just out of curiosity, why?
Before I attempt to dissect what your response, let me say that I also have
some bias, being an AFROTC cadet who hopes to have an active duty job upon
graduation.
<<STUFF DELETED>>
>years has been the dissolution of the USSR and the consequent
>reduction in the threat of a strategic nuclear war. IMHO, this
>actually increases the chance of a limited nuclear exchange,
>started by someone like Iraq. However, such an exchange would be
>short, as US superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery systems would
>end it rather rapidly.
>
>This reduction in the threat of nuclear war should mean a
>corresponding reduction in the strategic forces. I believe that the
>strategic bomber force is basically an anachronism that can be
>scrapped. I also believe that the B-2 is a very expensive luxury that
>we can't afford. We should keep some ICBM's for their long range
>accuracy, but not too many.
First of all, keeping some ICBM's is a great idea. I couldn't agree more,
because we may need them in the future, and once something is totally deleted,
it is very difficult to bring it back. In this vein, I think we should keep
the comparatively new force of 50 Peacekeepers, while standing down and even
destroying the Minuteman force. (BTW, does anyone know if a converted ICBM
could be used to launch sattelites into space, possibly at a reduced cost
because the rockets already exist?)
The problem with ICBM's is that once they are launched, they cannot be called
back. In the case that the powers that be decide that they no longer want a
city reduced to rubble, a B-1 or B-2 can be turned around. Once a Peacekeeper,
is launched, physics and the guidance system take over, and 10+ warheads at
350kt a piece are going to impact somewhere.
The B-2, while being expensive, has something that other bombers do not, and
that is the ability to survive, even in a high-threat environment. It was
shown in Desert Storm that the F-117A was able to surprise the Iraqi air
defense forces every time. While this was in part due to the fine efforts of
the defense supression flights of F-4G Phantoms, it can also be attributed in
large part to Stealth technology. The B-2 has the added advantage that if it
is produced, it will release the B-1B force completely to conventional duties.
(BTW, I am not on of the many people who believe that Desert Storm can be used
as an object lesson for the employment of military forces. While large, the
Iraqi forces we faced were sub-standard when compared to many possible
adversaries, and so the gulf war can not be used as an example except in the
broadest sense.)
>As an aside, it would be nice to keep the B-52s or something like them
>for conventional ground support, but their usefulness as strategic
>nuclear deterrents is at an end. This does not reflect on the quality
>of the aircraft or their crews, but rather on the changing political
>realities of our world.
On that note, the B-1B force is being converted to have a conventional
capability. While it will retain it's position as the nation's prime manned
nuclear deterrent, a package is under development that will allow the B-1 to
carry a larger number of conventional bombs than the B-52. The B-1 is
already known to be a much more survivable aircraft, due to it's higher speed,
better terrain following systems, and more versatile defensive countermeasures
suite. The B-1 also has much improved weapons-delivery systems allowing night/
all weather operations, wheras the B-52 is for the most part restricted to a
daytime operations in the Close Air Support (CAS) role.
>The air force's least glamorous major function is transport and I
>think that they should actually spend a little more time and effort on
>beefing up the transport forces.
Along this line, McDonnell Douglas is producing the C-17, which will combine
the tremendous payload of a C-5 Galaxy with the short field tactical
performance of the C-130 series. The C-17 is meant to replace the C-141, and
to supplement the C-130's.
>As far as tactical air power is concerned, the need for flexible and
>responsive air power is still very great. However, as the likelyhood
>of a large conventional war (in central Europe, for example) is
>reduced, the need for large fixed-base forces is reduced and the need
>for easily transportable, flexible forces increases. And the air
>force's tactical air forces are the least flexible arm of our tactical
>air power.
>
>For the most part, they require large fixed bases to operate from, as
>opposed to the Navy and Marine Corps. With the reduction of US bases
>around the world, this becomes less and less possible. It also reduces
>the number of places that you can permanently base an air wing.
>
>Because of the fact that air force air wings are less flexible, I
>would reduce them more than the Navy or Marine air wings. Modern
>armed forces are going to have to be more flexible than they have been
>in the past in order to cope with the wide variety of missions that
>will be assigned to them, and I just don't see the air force as being
>that flexible.
Because of the need for increased flexibility, the Air Force has just
undergone a major restructuring. The bombers from Strategic Air Command have
combined with the Tactical Air Command to form the Air Combat Command, or ACC.
The tankers from SAC have combined with Military Airlift Command to form the
Air Mobility Command, or AMC.
Within the ACC, composite wings are being formed to take the place of the old
Tactical Fighter Wings. The first of these to take shape were the 4th Wing, at
Seymour-Johnson AFB, NC, containing F-15E Strike Eagles, and KC-10A tanker/
cargo aircraft. The 4th Wing can deploy anywhere in the world, with the
KC-10's carrying fuel, parts, and ground crew for the F-15E's. The second,
being formed now at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, is the 366th (?) Air Intervention
Wing. This wing will consist of 8 KC-135's (Air Refuelling), 7 B-52's (Heavy
Bombardment), 16 F-15C's (Air Superiority), 16 F-16C's (Attack/CAS), and
several other assorted aircraft including defense supression, ECM, and tactical
recon. It is planned to form another composite wing at Pope AFB, NC to support
the Army's 82nd Airborne Division in it's operation. This wing will probably
consist of an airlift type, either the C-141 or the C-17, depending on the
timing, and an attack type. If the Army had a choice, the attack type would be
the A-10A, andwhile this is a possibility, the F-16C would probably be a better
choice because it could be used to provide air superiority over the battlefield
if neccessary.
While all of these composite wings are still tied to fixed airfields, this may
not be such a tremendous problem as previously suspected. Experiments were
done in the 1970's, involving the temporary deployment of F-4 Phantoms to
operate off strips of highway, and other alternative airstrips. This
indicates to me that while the tankers, cargo aircraft, and heavy bombers
require hard-surface runways, the tactical types can be employed from temporary
expedients close to the battlefield, until the Air Force Civil Engineering
Squadrons can set up an appropriate air base in the operating area. Having the
tankers, etc operate from a distance would not be a major problem, because they
generally have the range to reach their operating areas. B-52's from Barksdale
AFB, Louisiana flew directly into combat, making strikes on Iraqi Guard
positions after 28-hour flights. Admittedly, they could not operate in this
manner for very long befor crew fatigue became a major factor, but they would
undoubtedly be able to find an appropriate bas much closer to the battle area.
Well, that's one man's humble opinion.
Gary Coffman
From Gary Coffman <ke4zv!ga...@gatech.edu>
In article <Bw2JH...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ch...@roger.gte.com (Curtis Fennell) writes:
>
>As an aside, it would be nice to keep the B-52s or something like them
>for conventional ground support, but their usefulness as strategic
>nuclear deterrents is at an end. This does not reflect on the quality
>of the aircraft or their crews, but rather on the changing political
>realities of our world.
Unfortunately, B-52s are older than most of their pilots. To maintain
a large conventional bombardment capability, these aircraft desparately
need to be replaced. The B1A is not a good substitute. The Air Force
thinks the B2 will be able to fill this role, but as you noted, it's
unit cost in the numbers currently authorized is exorbitant. If a large
production run were ordered, it's price would drop by an order of magnitude.
Another aircraft could be designed to fill the role of the B-52, but in
today's short order funding environment, it's costs would also be high.
I think the military is going to lose heavy aerial bombardment capacity
in the next few years as the B-52 airframes have to be retired. More
reliance on MLRS systems will be needed to make up the shortfall.
Gary
Frank Crary
From fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary)
In article <Bw68x...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>>define what missions you want the military to carry out, then you
>>can start structuring and costing the forces necessary to carry
>>out those missions.
>O.K. Fair criticism. Here is my first attempt. Please feel free to
>correct my mistakes. After all, I've never been a mission planner
>before.
>For the purpose of this, I consider that no NATO nation could likely
>become an emeny in the next 10 years. However, I do consider Russia
>and China and Iran potential enemies. I do not consider it reasonable
>that the CIS will reunite in the next 10 years.
>I Think the U.S. military should be able to ...
>- Fight a strategic nuclear war at a moments notice. This will help
>deter the any first strike against us. I don't expect to win, just
>maybe kill the guys who started it.
Against whom? If possible opponents include the Russia, then this
would require maintaining our current stratigic forces, possibly also
improving them, with such programs as the B-2. If Russia is out of the
picture, the _slight_ reductions in stratigic forces might be
possible, but nations like the People's Republic of China would still
require a fairly major arsenal.
>- Greatly lessen the results of any small nuclear strike by some third
>world crackpot with a few balistic missiles and nuclear warheads. I
>don't expect to be able to stop every warhead from a force the size of
>China's, but stopping 90% (or 50% or so) would be awfully nice. As
>far as I know, this capability is many years away, depending on SDI
>funding.
Less than ten years away (political problems asside). A modest
anti-ballistic missile defence isn't too dificult.
> Keep track of all major military units in the world, so that we can
>spot in buildups quickly, and hopefully act appropriately.
That's really the CIA's job, not that of the Department of Defense.
>- Deploy a quick reaction force (maybe division sized) to any spot in
>the world in 48 hours. (Do we have the airlift to do this now?)
That really depends on what kind of division. The Airborne, Air
Assault and Light Infantry divisions could, but at the cost of ariving
with no helocopters, tanks or artillery. If you want to transport heavier
assets, this would require _additional_ defense spending: Further
funding for the RAH-66 Comanche light attack helocopter and funding
for a new generation of tanks, designed to be light and transportable.
>- Get a carrier battle group within strike range of any piece of coast
>within a 'few days'. Since I don't expect to send only one carrier
>against an Air Force the size of Lybia's, or the former Iraqi air
>force, I also want THREE carrier battle groups to be able to converge to
>any one spot in two weeks. I don't mind if this strips the
>neighboring seas of carriers.
A few days isn't much time: The carrier and its nuclear escorts (two
crusiers) could cover a few thoudand miles in that time. This would
require six or seven carrier groups at a time. Since carriers can't be
at see all the time (and even _half_ of the time is unrealistic), you
are talking about a navy about as big as our current one.
>- Be able to throw a naval blockade around any other nation, and make
>it stick. For a nation the size of China, I don't mind if it takes
>two weeks to get it set. For a nation the size of Liberia, I'd like
>it in a 'few days'.
Even with all our current forces, we couldn't blockade a nation the
size of China. I don't think we are every likely to have a navy _that_
big...
>- Have no other nation, or combination of two of them, be able to
>blockade America's ports. This includes the ability to defend against
>enemy submarines. I will accept some shipping losses to submarines
>against either China or Russia, but not to the extent that the oil
>stops flowing to America.
This is one of the navy's major goals: Keeping "Sea Lines Of
Communication" open. Again, no substantial cuts naval ASW and
attack submarines can be made if this is to be assured.
>- Fight a war the size of Desert Storm, even if it is as far away as
>the Persian Gulf, assuming that some neighbor provides us with the
>necessary bases. I'd like the mobilization to occur no slower than
>the last Desert Storm.
In which case, the Army can't be cut back too much either.
>- Have the reserves to fight a sustained, large-scale war about the
>size of Vietnam or Korea.
If the Iraqi War was any evidence, this would require additional
spending on the National Guard. If, however, a lengthy build up is
acceptable (e.g. a year or two) then there is room for budget cuts.
>So, what do you think? I'm sure I've left some capability out, but
>have I included too much? Further, I assume that the current military
>can do all of these things. Am I right?
Not entirely. Certainly the military will not be able to do so
shortly, if the current political pressure to drastically cut military
spending continues.
Frank Crary
CU Boulder
MegaZone23
From MegaZone23 <mega...@obsidian.wpi.edu>
In article <Bw83A...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>Actually, this sounds like an argument to make the air force more
>flexible. If the Marines can do it, presumably the Air Force can do
>it. If need be, the Marines can teach them how. :-)
Don't presume. There are hardware limitations. The AF aircraft cannot operate
from the same bases as the Marine aircraft. The Marines can fly off of carriers
the AF can't. They can use shorter and rougher fields, due to the ruggedness
of their landing gear allowing for high sinkrates and skijumps.
Unless you want to make the AF by naval aircraft. Which increases weight, cost,
and complexity where the AF doesn't need them for most of their missions. And
buying some AF models and some Naval models will increase costs by cutting
back production runs. The AF is also pretty committed to the F-22 at this
point. And aircraft I don't see as that great at CAS. Maybe older F-15s will
be refurbished to the 'E' standard.
Bohdan Tashchuk
From Bohdan Tashchuk <fasttech!fasttech.com!ze...@uu4.psi.com>
In <Bw68r...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Henry Spencer <he...@zoo.toronto.edu> writes:
>They did put one crater into the Port Stanley runway. The Argentines did
>repair it, but evidently not well enough for fast-jet operations, since
>they stopped trying that. The practical effects were mostly due to the
>scare thrown into Argentine Air Force command, rather than to the actual
>bomb damage.
>Actually, there were several (six?) Vulcan raids, but the effects from
>the later ones were even less significant.
I missed the beginning of this thread, so maybe I'm repeating someone, but here
goes.
I haven't seen any discussion of the impact a U.S. battleship would have had
in a similar situation. The RAF had to do something like 11 aerial refuelings
just to get a Vulcan to deliver 1 lousy bomb.
How many 2000 pound shells does a battleship carry? Hundreds? Thousands? It
seems to me that the airport could have been flattened from 20 miles away. I
assume the shells would have cratered the runway, but even if they didn't there
wouldn't be enough infrastructure left to support a paper airplane, let alone a
jet.
I doubt the Argentines had anything on the Falklands that could have engaged
a battleship. In fact, I'd bet that direct Exocet hits would be very survivable.
They don't build them like they used to!
Aaron R Wininger
From ar...@cunixb.cc.columbia.edu (Aaron R Wininger)
I beleive Orbital Sciences Corp is working on converting ICBM's (or some
sort of nuclear missile) into a rapid launch sattelite system. On the order
of say 10 days from notification to launch (probably less once they get the
hang of it).
Aaron
Aaron R. Wininger, Carnivore Columbia Plasma Physics Laboratory
ar...@cunixb.cc.columbia.edu Columbia University
wini...@cuplvx.ap.columbia.edu New York, NY 10027
'That which does not kill us, makes us stronger.' -Nietzche
Joel Upchurch
From upchrch!jo...@peora.sdc.ccur.com (Joel Upchurch )
ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
> For the purpose of this, I consider that no NATO nation could likely
> become an emeny in the next 10 years. However, I do consider Russia
> and China and Iran potential enemies. I do not consider it reasonable
> that the CIS will reunite in the next 10 years.
I wonder if we shouldn't start thinking about what will happen if we
end up fighting a war with Japan say 10 or 15 years down the road. I
suspect that might be a bigger challange than any of the counties you
mentioned. Keep in mind with current projections they would be a bigger
industrial power than the U.S. by then and a lot of our industry would
be dependent on things like electronics and machine tools supplied by
them.
(If your mail bounces use the address below.)
Joel Upchurch/Upchurch Computer Consulting/718 Galsworthy/Orlando, FL 32809
jo...@peora.ccur.com {uiucuxc,hoptoad,petsd,ucf-cs}!peora!joel (407) 859-0982
Gary Coffman
From Gary Coffman <ke4zv!ga...@gatech.edu>
In article <Bw83o...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> chad...@wpi.wpi.edu (Chad Barret Wemyss) writes:
>
[deleted]
>all weather operations, wheras the B-52 is for the most part restricted to a
>daytime operations in the Close Air Support (CAS) role.
[deleted]
>timing, and an attack type. If the Army had a choice, the attack type would be
>the A-10A, andwhile this is a possibility, the F-16C would probably be a better
>choice because it could be used to provide air superiority over the battlefield
>if neccessary.
Not to flame Chad, but this is *exactly* the mindset problem that leads
the Marines to want their own aircraft and the Army to want their own
CAS force.
Calling a B-52 a CAS aircraft is ludicrous. When the threat is 50 meters
away, no sane Army guy is going to call in the B-52s. Nor is he going
to be keen on depending on some fighter jock wanna be in an electric
jet. He wants a hog driver in an armoured A-10 who will come right
down into the weeds and hose the bad guys for him. And he doesn't
want it 12 hours from now after the staffs have "consulted" on the
mission. The Air Force's idea of CAS is 40,000 feet. The grunt's
idea of CAS is the other side of the wire right in front of his
nose. He thinks, correctly from his vantage point, that targets 8 km
away are *strategic* targets that can be left to the Air Force and
the artillery.
Gary
Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
An aside about the B-2: I just really cannot see flying in two billion
dollar aircraft against a third world nation. The cost of one lucky
rifle bullet is just too high. Of all the things that the military is
doing, I *SURE* I can think of many programs that need the money more
than this.
Anyway ...
Chad Barret Wemyss <chad...@wpi.wpi.edu> writes:
>It is planned to form another composite wing at Pope AFB, NC to support
>the Army's 82nd Airborne Division in it's operation. This wing will probably
>consist of an airlift type, either the C-141 or the C-17, depending on the
>timing, and an attack type....
Really. Are they dedicating specific airwings to specific army
divisions now? Do these units train together? Like many people have
said, it would be nice if the pilots had met the soldiers they are
supporting ....
ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
From ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
In article <Bw83A...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>
> From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
>
>>Because of the fact that air force air wings are less flexible, I
>>would reduce them more than the Navy or Marine air wings. Modern
>>armed forces are going to have to be more flexible than they have been
>>in the past in order to cope with the wide variety of missions that
>>will be assigned to them, and I just don't see the air force as being
>>that flexible.
>
> Actually, this sounds like an argument to make the air force more
> flexible. If the Marines can do it, presumably the Air Force can do
> it. If need be, the Marines can teach them how. :-)
Assuming they are willing to learn. Considering the USAF's track record
I would expect alot of lip service & little more.
> Seriously, nothing says that the Air Force CAS pilots cannot go thru
> basically the same training as the Marine CAS pilots. There are
> reasons why this is not done, however, it could be done. And it would
> probably carry the same advantages and disadvantages as the current
> Marine Air Corps strategy.
Inasmuchas the Marines have shown themselves to be very good at it &
the USAF has treated CAS as a sort of 'poor cousin' it seems to me
that it makes the most sense not to give the service with the worst track
record (USAF) more responsibility for CAS but to bet them out of the bus-
iness altogether.
PHIL
Sean J. Roc D'Arcy
From "Sean J. Roc D'Arcy" <bphd...@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu>
In article <Bw68x...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes...
>- Fight a strategic nuclear war at a moments notice. This will help
>deter the any first strike against us. I don't expect to win, just
>maybe kill the guys who started it.
>
>- Greatly lessen the results of any small nuclear strike by some third
>world crackpot with a few balistic missiles and nuclear warheads. I
>don't expect to be able to stop every warhead from a force the size of
>China's, but stopping 90% (or 50% or so) would be awfully nice. As
>far as I know, this capability is many years away, depending on SDI
>funding.
A good question to ask here is; is the SDI worth the funding at all? With
the exception of the FUSSR no one (not even China) has the ability to
launch a major first strike. For all the cost and questionable results,
this would probably be a poor investment.
>
>- Get a carrier battle group within strike range of any piece of coast
>within a 'few days'. Since I don't expect to send only one carrier
>against an Air Force the size of Lybia's, or the former Iraqi air
>force, I also want THREE carrier battle groups to be able to converge to
>any one spot in two weeks. I don't mind if this strips the
>neighboring seas of carriers.
>
>- Be able to throw a naval blockade around any other nation, and make
>it stick. For a nation the size of China, I don't mind if it takes
>two weeks to get it set. For a nation the size of Liberia, I'd like
>it in a 'few days'.
Conversely, this is probably a very good investment. A mobile navy (with
USMC attached) is probably the US main asset in dealing with the initial
stages of aggression.
>
>- Fight a war the size of Desert Storm, even if it is as far away as
>the Persian Gulf, assuming that some neighbor provides us with the
>necessary bases. I'd like the mobilization to occur no slower than
>the last Desert Storm.
Mobilization during Desert Storm was horendous. If Iraq had decided to go
into Saudi Arabia right after the US started its build up the US would
have taken many months to get enough equiptment and supplies to the area to
repel the attack.
Sea lift capability is terrible right now. We do not have the vessels
present to move enough equiptment and supplies to fight a war in a months
notice. During Desert Storm the US had: 1.) Very good ports in Saudi
Arabia, 2.) Got the assistance of many other nations freight carrying
ships for transport. 3.)Had no opposing Navy trying to stop the sea lift.
Still look how long it took to get the materials to their destination.
This is one of the main problems that the military must solve.
>
>So, what do you think? I'm sure I've left some capability out, but
>have I included too much? Further, I assume that the current military
>can do all of these things. Am I right?
The present military can do many things. See above for things they cannot.
I think left out was 1.) Effective force reduction. 2.) Special Forces
Missions 3.) Improvements in procurments. 4.) More effective sharing of
resources between services.
SJRD
Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary) writes:
>>If I remember right, a study during the Kennedy administration said
>>you could destroy 2/3 of all Soviet industry with only 600 Equivelent
>>Megatons.
>I think saw this study, or a very similar one: But the required
>force is (and, I think, was) more accurately stated in _warheads_,
>not megatons: Several hundred (200?) warheads would have to be
>delivered to geographically distant targets. Making assumptions
>about missile and warhead reliability, I think the conclusion was
>that 1000 warheads would have to be launched.
I see our problem further down in your posting. I'm talking about
destroying INDUSTRY, which means cities, not militatry targets. And
yes, I do mean equivlent megatons, which are computed by taking the
sum of all the warheads involved, after raising the power of each on
by (2/3). An equivlent megaton destroys the same surface area wether
it is delivered in a few big bombs or many small bombs.
I agreee that equivelent magetons don't work for hard targets, but I
believe they are a standard unit of measure for soft targets.
>Further,
>several things have changed since that study: Air defense
>has improved dramatically, and military targets are hardened
>against nuclear attack, and Russian missiles have mobile launchers.
I mean 600 E.M.T. delivered. If you choose to send them on something
that might get shot down, then that's your loss. And I don't care
about mobile missile, just immobile cities.
> A
>counter-value strike (e.g. against cities, etc...) is an almost
>impossible plan, politically: People aren't comfortable with the
>idea of threatening millions of innocent civilians to deter the
>actions of a government than may not care about them...
That really suprises me. I think that most people (who really don't
care about this stuff) believe we're still under M.A.D. back when we
were under M.A.D. it was widly accepted as the ONLY realistic choice.
>I don't think you can target MIRVs that way: They have some ability to
>manuver independently not (I think) enough to spread out more than
>a few tens of kilometers. The weapons you describe would be able to
>two dozen holes in each of 3*8=24 major cities.
Are you sure? I never thought that they could be targeted at
different ends of Asia, but I thought you had a hundred miles or more
to play with.
-Randy
Sean J. Roc D'Arcy
From "Sean J. Roc D'Arcy" <bphd...@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu>
In article <BwJM4...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary) writes...
>
>From fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary)
>
>_Which_ present SDI design? Some of the orbital systems might be
>in trouble, if their orbit was tailored to handle launches from high
>inclinations, that proceeded over the pole. The ABM systems are
>focused on the target, not the launch site (which is both easier and
>less effective...) They should work against any balistic missile,
>regardless of who launched it. In detail how effective any would
>be, would depend on specifics of the system. Stopping 75% of a
>few dozen missiles wouldn't be a major challenge, but (at least from
>the six-year old unclassified studies I've seen) stopping 90% of a
>few hundred missiles would be getting difficult.
>
Thanks for the information. I was referring to the latter. I don't know
much on the ABM system.
>>economic effect it would have is a question though.
>
>I think we mean different things by "blockade": I was taking it to
>mean stopping, boarding and turning back merchant vessals. I
>don't think we can do this effectively.
This is what I was meaning. I don't think we would have any problem doing
so. The US submarine force could go after any runners and keep any coastal
patrols at bay (also watch main harbor points), while the frigate and
destoyer forces boarded. I'm sure the CVs could be involved in the
location of potential "runners," but they would probably be more valuable
in other operations.
> All a "sinking ships"
>blockade really has to do is sink ships faster than the opposing
>nation can build new ones...)
I think that the above idea applies more to the type of attrition aimed at
by Germany and the US during the Submarine Campiagns of WW2. In modern
times there is less shipping available and I think all that is needed to
sink enough ships to deter any foriegn trade. I think most trading
companies would honor such a blocade quite quickly if their fleet was at
risk.
SJRD
JHan
From jh...@descartes.uwaterloo.ca (JHan)
Why they don't build any more B-52's?
Simply because, unless the United States has Air Superiority ( or something very close to it) the B-52 is going to get massacred. An elaborate jamming suite, advanced terrain following navagation system, and stand-off weapons help, but unless you are a proponent of the "Megafortress Strategic Escort" as proposed by Dale Brown in his "Old Dog" series, I don't see how a B-52 can survive in an enviroment where control of the air is contested
Ernest Cline
From @usceast.cs.scarolina.edu:cli...@cs.scarolina.edu (Ernest Cline)
ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>cl...@cs.scarolina.edu (Ernest Cline) writes:
>>So how would I do it?
>>After all, it's easier to find fault than propose a solution.
>>Well here it is, a proposed reorganization of the DoD.
>>It probably could be improved, and probably favors the support services more
>>than some people would prefer, but here it is.
>>United States Air Force
>> This would consist of the fighters and bombers plus immediate support
>> forces. However, quite a good bit of what is done by the USAF in other
>> areas would go to other services since the Air Force does not seem to
>> want to do it.
>>United States Army
>> This would be the Mechanized and Airborne forces the U.S. would use in
>> fighting major wars plus specialized units for mountain, arctic, etc.
>> Also included would be immediate support forces and CAS forces (A-10,
>> AH-64, etc.) Thus I would elimiate the ban on the Army flying armed
>> fixed-wing aircraft, although land-based aircraft intended to fight
>> past the FEBA would be solely the USAF's to use.
>The big problem I see with this is that if the Army wants to launch an
>air strike in a hsotile air enviornment then it needs either Air Force
>fighter aircraft or its own. If you give the army its own fighter
>aircraft you've gone back to the days of the army air corps (maybe not
>so bad, from what I hear.)
>If you require them to use Air Force escort, then you have to
>coordinate the two services. How does the Army get escort for the
>helos? Could that method be used?
Exactly. We already have a military that requires coordination between the
services. So let's get a military that has sufficent specialization to do
the task at hand well.
>>United States Navy
>> Much the same as today execpt smaller and some of its duties and ships
>> would be transferred to the:
>>United States Coast Guard
>> Which would gain the sea control mission the USN has neglected to pursue
>> power projection. Essentially the USCG would gain the tasks and abilities
>> that a coastal European navy has today, essentially becoming the coastal
>> American navy.
>I'm not sure what you want the Coast Guard to do. We already control
>our own coast almost be default. The Canadians and the Mexicans are
>hardly a threat, and the Cubans are too scared to do anything really
>threatening. The big threat seems to *be* drug smugglers.
>One of the things I like about the current arangment is the
>concentration by the navy on power projection. It seems to me that we
>are so dominant in our own region that any extra effort in this regard
>is wasted.
Essentially, I want the Coast Guard to acquire the mission of.
"Here's an area of sea. There is no (or very low) probability of air attack.
Your mission is to purge the area of enemy submarines and deny the enemy
the use of that area. You will not engage large enemy naval forces."
I'd also put minesweepers into the CG. If they were needed in high-threat
environments, I'd expect the Navy to provide the approriate defense.
I grant that at present we do not devote many resources to this role.
Nor do I propose shifting additional resources to the task. But by shifting
this task to the CG, I hope to free the Navy to concentrate on power
projection (which it does anyway) without having other tasks being
neglected.
Besides, this task, long term patrol, meshes fairly well IMHO with the other
patrol type tasks that the CG already does.
>>United States Marines Corps
>> Much the same as today.
>>United States Transport Command
>> Combining the Merchant Marine, Sealift, and Airlift Commands into one
>> structure devoted to one purpose: We have forces in an area we've
>> acquired which need supplies from the U.S. via relatively secure supply
>> lines. Besides it gives us an use for the Merchant Marine Academy.
>I like this very much!
>>United States Engineering Corps
>> Combat Engineering dome where and when you need it.
>I like the idea. I'm not sure that it should be on the same level as these
>other services. They are much bigger, after all.
>>United States Guard
>> Much the same as the National Guard but elevated to equal importance.
>> Civil Defense (i.e. FEMA) would come under its jurisdiction.
> I would want ot make sure that the Army and the Guard used the same
>equipment and the same tactics and trained together often. In combat
>they would almost certainly be used together. This makes we wonder if
>they shouldn't be par of the army, and not their own service.
The problem is, as Desert Squall showed, the USA relegated the Guard to an
inferior position. Correct me if I am wrong, but I believe that no Army
National Guard unit saw front line combat duty (with possible execption of
Medivac units). They are not used as they should be.
>>The USAF USA USMC and USN would be the traditional power projection elements
>>of the United States military while the USCG USTC USEC and USG would be the
>>defense and support elements of the military. Of course such a division is
>>somewhat artifical, but is centered on what needs to be done, rather than
>>whether it happens in the air, on land or sea.
>I agree. Center on what needs to be done, not the surface it's done
>on. last comment. Would a unified supply branch be a good idea?
>Should it be combined with the Transport Command?
Yeah, sounds good, to give it a name US Logistics Command. In addition if
there is something that is required by more than one branch to do the same
job, this would be a good place to put the responsibility of deciding
what does the job.
>-Randy
Any other constructive criticism?
--
Ernest Cline cl...@cs.scarolina.edu
m...@mole-end.matawan.nj.us
From m...@mole-end.matawan.nj.us
In article <BwFI1...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, @usceast.cs.scarolina.edu:cli...@cs.scarolina.edu (Ernest Cline) writes:
> Or you could produce more B-1's or B-52's to handle conventional duties.
> ... I'm not calling for a brand new design, just a moderized B-52
> costing around $50 million each and with a payload, speed, and range
> similar to a B-52. I'd much rather have 20 B-72's than 1 B-2 for my
> billion dollars.
You won't get it at that price. By the time you recreate the tooling,
open the production line, build the first few aircraft and recreate
the physical and managerial skills to actually put the parts together,
you've spent most of a billion.
The B2 is so damned expensive because it was engineered for a certain
quantity and it is being built at 15% of that quantity. And we aren't
even buying enough to create a strategic force. (Realistically?
Probably 50 to 60--which will NOT cost three times what the 20 are
costing, if the contracts are written fairly.)
The B1 was built `ahead of schedule and under budget.' The unending
fixes that are being applied now aren't going to go away--the need
was designed in.
--
(This man's opinions are his own.)
From mole-end Mark Terribile
m...@mole-end.matawan.nj.us, Somewhere in Matawan, NJ
ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
From ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
In article <BwFII...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, fen...@prancer.eche.ualberta.ca (Fengxi Zhou) writes:
>
> From Fengxi Zhou <fen...@prancer.eche.ualberta.ca>
>
> ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu writes:
> : From ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
> : From ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
> : In article <Bvyt...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, and...@panix.com (Andrew Huie) writes:
> : > From and...@panix.com (Andrew Huie)
> : > If their primary use is air cover, why not use AF or Naval assets
> : > instead, since that tends to be their specialty? I have no argument with
> : > the Marines' having ground support aircraft, but air combat fighters does
> : > seem redundant.
> :
> : The answer to this is simple & has happened hisotrically. The USN & USAF
> : priorities may NOT be the same as the USMC's in any given situation. The USN
> : may decide, for instance, that it's time to split (remember Guadalcanal in
> : WWII?) The USAF may decide that they have more important thigs to do with
> : their fighter assets. Right now the CAS mission within the USAF is consid-
> : ered a "lesser" mission, presumably for "lesser" pilots. The only way the
> : Marines can be sure of getting the support they need, especially in the sort
> : of precarious amphib landing situations they may ne thrust into, is to have
> : their own assets. The USN & USAF can & will make alot of promises but those
> : promises have a way of getting set aside once the shooting starts.
> :
> : PHIL
> :
> Does that mean US Army should set up its own "fixed wing air force" in case
> USAF decides they have more important thing to do elsewhere? IMHO, the key
> here is a complete military reform. What US really needs is a general chief
> of staff which actually has commanding authority, not JCS which can only
> "advise" different services what to do. Then the military will look at the
> whole picture and interservice rivalries can be more efficiently dealt with.
> As for whether USMC needs its F-18s, they should keep AV-8s and rotary a/c
> but not F-18s and A-6s. If carriers are around, use Navy assets; if a ground
> runway is available, call in AF assets; if none is availabel, AV-8s are sill
> around. AF pilots tend to fly high? This is a matter of training and
> decipline. Did Israeli soldiers complain about their AF pilots as much during
> their various wars? Not as loudly, to say the least. Why, there is a single
> unified command (general chief of staff). Everybody is a brother/sister to
> everybody else, not you navy and me army stuff.
The trouble is that this will be much, much harder than is readily apparent.
I believe that it would take the equivalent of a "cultural revolution" to
eradicate the deeply ingrained attitudes present in the current US armed
forces. Since I also disagree with the argument that a significant saving
in costs will be achieved by transferring assets form the Marines to the
USN or USAF I think it would be more prudent to stick with the service
with the better track record of CAS (the USMC) and take the service that
has shown disregard for it (the USAF) out of the business altogether. Yes,
this would mean that the Army would get their own CAS. The USAF wants to
get rid of their their A-10s to save money for what they consider "more im-
portant" things.(This is a good illustration of the problem, BTW)
Those a/c should be given to the Army which I'm sure will treat them with
a great deal more respect than the USAF ever would.
PHIL
david.r.wells
From "david.r.wells" <d...@cbnewsg.cb.att.com>
In article <BwFIC...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>
>From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
>
>
>We are currently more than able to keep four Tridents at sea at any
>one time. The extra Tridents seem, well, extra. Of course the B-2
>seems *very* extra. And the M-X also seems "extra". However, I bet
>that there relatively cheap to keep operating, now that their already
>built. Besides, they add variety to what would otherwise be a
>complete reliance on balistic missile submarines.
>
>-Randy
I have it on good authority that Trident boomers are going out these
days with FAR LESS than their full load of tridents. We haven't got
enough to go around, and Congress is in no mood to buy more. On the
other hand, if you've got a limited number of tridents, isn't it
best to keep them dispersed on a larger number of subs? Not cheaper
certainly, but safer. (i.e. you haven't got all your eggs in one
basket) I agree that we shouldn't buy more trident missiles, or any
more Ohio class submarines right now, but we should keep what we've
got. If we find ourselves needing more nuclear firepower, we will
be able to just buy more missiles, instead of having to build new
subs.
David R. Wells
DISCLAIMER: The opinions expressed in this article are my own, and
are not necessarily those of AT&T.
Daniel Shoham
From Daniel Shoham <sho...@ll.mit.edu>
In article <BwJMA...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> cr...@jade.cs.orst.edu (Lawrence Crowl) writes:
>
>From Lawrence Crowl <cr...@jade.cs.orst.edu>
>
>I think there is a major flaw in way this newsgroup, the press, and
>congress measure the cost of aircraft. All three measure cost by "how
>much to buy one machine", independent of anything else. I argue that
>only four costs matter:
>
> the cost to buy the first _wing_ of aircraft
> this includes research, manuals, training, simulators, etc.
> the cost to buy each additional _wing_ of aircraft
> the cost to sustain a _wing_ of aircraft in peacetime
> this includes salaries, fuel, parts, practice bombs, etc.
> the cost to sustain a _wing_ of aircraft in combat
How about the cost of airbases/carriers, maintainance centers, etc that are
used by multiple models? that (may) have spare (free??) capacity?
>
>The cost of aircraft is a fraction of cost of air power.
....
>I've oversimplified, I know. But this is the type of analysis that
>makes sense. The cost per aircraft doesn't. Argueing for the A-10
Oversimplifing you are!
Even "new" aircraft models are not built in vacuum.
Should you factor the cost of gaining production/operation/doctorine experience
from one model to the next?
A new run-of-the-house aircraft model can be designed and a wing built for,
say, $10B by a major western airframe maker. However, that cost would be much
higher if the airframe maker did not allready have a ready pool of engineers,
managers, production workers, machinery, computer models, wind-tunnels, etc.
To truely build a new airplane from scratch may well cost $50B. (One of the
reason the B-2 is so expensive is that it is a new class of aircraft where
experience is less usefull).
This argument runs both way. When a taxpayer-financed aircraft creates/improves
experience base (and keep production lines "warm") that reduce the cost of
future models and of civilian models, should one *REDUCE* the program's actual
cost? what about more direct civilian spin-offs?
What about the overall improvement of a national technological base that
such projects generate?
Farthermore, there is no way to evaluate what fraction of the cost eventually
returns to the treasury as taxes paid by the communities that the aviation
industry supports (i.e. the company-towns, or, sometimes, company-states (-: ).
And, if the model has export versions, a whole new arithmatics comes into play.
- and on and on.
--It is entirely possible (but perhaps not likely) that a new aircraft model
(or weapon system, or space-pride project, etc.) will ultimately benefit the
economy more than it's "cost" harmed it. Regardless of the model actual
usewfullness.
Conclusions:
There is really no such thing as the "cost of airpower".
The only meter of what airpower cost is how much those who can (governments,
taxpayers, etc) pay for it and how much those who can (airframe makers, etc.)
sell it for.
Dan Shoham
sho...@ll.mit.edu
Doug Wade
From Doug Wade <wa...@ucs.ubc.ca>
You might find the following message from Aug 1990 relevent to this thread...
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: SPARTAN ABMs- Uses?
Message-ID: <81...@aerospace.AERO.ORG>
Date: 16 Aug 90 22:42:45 GMT
References: <1990Aug14....@world.std.com> <75...@fmeed1.UUCP>
Reply-To: sm...@aero.UUCP (Thomas F. Smith)
Distribution: sci
Organization: The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, CA
Lines: 25
Anyone familiar with the SPARTAN Anti-Ballistic Missile?
I have a chance to pick some up at government surplus and
wonder if I can do anything useful with them.
The first stage is a modified ZEUS booster that burns for
about five seconds, is 43 inches in diameter, 163 inches
long, specific impulse of 198 lb/sec?, total weight 12 thousand
pounds. Sorry for the antique units but too lazy to convert.
The second stage burns for 20 seconds, is the same diameter
and 202 inches long, specific impulse of 219 ??, total weight
of 14 thousand pounds.
The third stage has a spherical motor with 659 pounds of
propellant.
That's all I know about them for now. Let me know if you
want some.
--
This space reserved. Space Not Reserved.
Space Commercialization Office, Space Systems Division, Los Angeles AFB, CA.
Iskandar Taib
From nt...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Iskandar Taib)
>In article <BwFI1...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>
>@usceast.cs.scarolina.edu:cli...@cs.scarolina.edu (Ernest Cline) writes:
||... why doesn't the Air Force build a new version of B-52 (call it the
||B-72 for our purposes)? A special built force of 40-60 planes based
||on the B-52 to do just one thing: convential carpet bombing? I'm not
||calling for a brand new design, just a moderized B-52 costing around
||$50 million each and with a payload, speed, and range similar to a
||B-52. I'd much rather have 20 B-72's than 1 B-2 for my billion
||dollars.
What about using an existing commercial or military transport
airframe as a basis for a new bomber? What about something based
on the 767, or a 747 variant for instance? Would this cost less?
--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iskandar Taib | The only thing worse than Peach ala
Internet: NT...@SILVER.UCS.INDIANA.EDU | Frog is Frog ala Peach
Bitnet: NTAIB@IUBACS !
Fengxi Zhou
From Fengxi Zhou <fen...@prancer.eche.ualberta.ca>
ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu writes:
: From ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
: From ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
: In article <Bvyt...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, and...@panix.com (Andrew Huie) writes:
: > From and...@panix.com (Andrew Huie)
: > OK. People have been arguing on whether or not the Marines air force should be
: > cut. The argument seems convincing to me that the entire air force shouldn't
: > be cut, but it is not so convincing why the marines need fighters like the
: > F-18. If their primary use is air cover, why not use AF or Naval assets
Fengxi Zhou
From Fengxi Zhou <fen...@prancer.eche.ualberta.ca>
ke4zv!ga...@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman) writes:
:
: From Gary Coffman <ke4zv!ga...@gatech.edu>
:
: In article <Bw2JH...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ch...@roger.gte.com (Curtis Fennell) writes:
: >
: >As an aside, it would be nice to keep the B-52s or something like them
: >for conventional ground support, but their usefulness as strategic
:
: Unfortunately, B-52s are older than most of their pilots. To maintain
: a large conventional bombardment capability, these aircraft desparately
(stuff deleted)
: I think the military is going to lose heavy aerial bombardment capacity
: in the next few years as the B-52 airframes have to be retired. More
: reliance on MLRS systems will be needed to make up the shortfall.
:
: Gary
:
:
:
Why do we miss heavy bombers so much? They are on their way out, like it or
not. Remember battleships of yesteryear? Yes, they are still useful. But
modern battle ground/water/space means newer smarter weapon systems are in
and they are out. IMHO, B-2s are a perfect example of wasting precious
resources. They really should have invested that money in A-12 and thought
about replacing the rotten A-6s.
Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
@usceast.cs.scarolina.edu:cli...@cs.scarolina.edu (Ernest Cline) writes:
>United States Navy
> Much the same as today execpt smaller and some of its duties and ships
> would be transferred to the:
>United States Coast Guard
> Which would gain the sea control mission the USN has neglected to pursue
> power projection. Essentially the USCG would gain the tasks and abilities
> that a coastal European navy has today, essentially becoming the coastal
> American navy.
I'm not sure what you want the Coast Guard to do. We already control
our own coast almost be default. The Canadians and the Mexicans are
hardly a threat, and the Cubans are too scared to do anything really
threatening. The big threat seems to *be* drug smugglers.
One of the things I like about the current arangment is the
concentration by the navy on power projection. It seems to me that we
are so dominant in our own region that any extra effort in this regard
is wasted.
>United States Marines Corps
> Much the same as today.
>United States Transport Command
> Combining the Merchant Marine, Sealift, and Airlift Commands into one
> structure devoted to one purpose: We have forces in an area we've
> acquired which need supplies from the U.S. via relatively secure supply
> lines. Besides it gives us an use for the Merchant Marine Academy.
I like this very much!
>United States Engineering Corps
> Combat Engineering dome where and when you need it.
I like the idea. I'm not sure that it should be on the same level as these
other services. They are much bigger, after all.
>United States Guard
> Much the same as the National Guard but elevated to equal importance.
> Civil Defense (i.e. FEMA) would come under its jurisdiction.
I would want ot make sure that the Army and the Guard used the same
equipment and the same tactics and trained together often. In combat
they would almost certainly be used together. This makes we wonder if
they shouldn't be par of the army, and not their own service.
>The USAF USA USMC and USN would be the traditional power projection elements
>of the United States military while the USCG USTC USEC and USG would be the
>defense and support elements of the military. Of course such a division is
>somewhat artifical, but is centered on what needs to be done, rather than
>whether it happens in the air, on land or sea.
I agree. Center on what needs to be done, not the surface it's done
on. last comment. Would a unified supply branch be a good idea?
Should it be combined with the Transport Command?
-Randy
Dave Good
From da...@Cigna.COM (Dave Good)
In article <Bw83o...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Chad Barret Wemyss <chad...@wpi.wpi.edu> writes:
>
>
>First of all, keeping some ICBM's is a great idea. I couldn't agree more,
>because we may need them in the future, and once something is totally deleted,
>it is very difficult to bring it back. In this vein, I think we should keep
>the comparatively new force of 50 Peacekeepers, while standing down and even
>destroying the Minuteman force. (BTW, does anyone know if a converted ICBM
>could be used to launch sattelites into space, possibly at a reduced cost
>because the rockets already exist?)
>
General Dynamics has been doing this with old, 60's vintage Atlas ICBMs for
several years now, with great success.
--
David Good da...@cigna.com
This space intentionally left blank.
Iskandar Taib
From nt...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Iskandar Taib)
In article <BworE...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> he...@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes:
>There are two problems with doing this for something like the Minuteman
>force. One is that those really aren't very large rockets by launcher
>standards. Even the Titan II -- much larger than the Minuteman -- is on
>the small side of medium launchers now.
True, but satellites are getting pretty small, too. Pegasus was
designed to launch fairly small satellites.
As I see it these days you need ultra-heavy launchers for the mongo
payloads like Hubble and small, cheap launchers for the microsatellites
that are starting to appear.
Ernest Cline
From @usceast.cs.scarolina.edu:cli...@cs.scarolina.edu (Ernest Cline)
Chad Barret Wemyss <chad...@wpi.wpi.edu> writes:
>From Chad Barret Wemyss <chad...@wpi.wpi.edu>
>>>ch...@harvey.gte.com (Curtis Fennell) writes:
>>>>If it were up to me, every service would lose some, but the Air Force
>>>>would lose the most.
>>>
>>>Just out of curiosity, why?
>Before I attempt to dissect what your response, let me say that I also have
>some bias, being an AFROTC cadet who hopes to have an active duty job upon
>graduation.
><<STUFF DELETED>>
>>years has been the dissolution of the USSR and the consequent
>>reduction in the threat of a strategic nuclear war. IMHO, this
>>actually increases the chance of a limited nuclear exchange,
>>started by someone like Iraq. However, such an exchange would be
>>short, as US superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery systems would
>>end it rather rapidly.
>>
>>This reduction in the threat of nuclear war should mean a
>>corresponding reduction in the strategic forces. I believe that the
>>strategic bomber force is basically an anachronism that can be
>>scrapped. I also believe that the B-2 is a very expensive luxury that
>>we can't afford. We should keep some ICBM's for their long range
>>accuracy, but not too many.
>First of all, keeping some ICBM's is a great idea. I couldn't agree more,
>because we may need them in the future, and once something is totally deleted,
>it is very difficult to bring it back. In this vein, I think we should keep
>the comparatively new force of 50 Peacekeepers, while standing down and even
>destroying the Minuteman force. (BTW, does anyone know if a converted ICBM
>could be used to launch sattelites into space, possibly at a reduced cost
>because the rockets already exist?)
Early in the space program, variants of the Jupiter, Atlas, Titan, etc. were
used to launch space shots but I believe they were special built, not
decomissioned nuclear missiles.
>The problem with ICBM's is that once they are launched, they cannot be called
>back. In the case that the powers that be decide that they no longer want a
>city reduced to rubble, a B-1 or B-2 can be turned around. Once a Peacekeeper,
>is launched, physics and the guidance system take over, and 10+ warheads at
>350kt a piece are going to impact somewhere.
Given that electronic jamming of the radio is likely to occur, it is highly
probable that both ICBM's and bombers couldn't be recalled during their last
half-hour flight. It just is that for the ICBM's it would also be their
first half-hour.
>The B-2, while being expensive, has something that other bombers do not, and
>that is the ability to survive, even in a high-threat environment. It was
Please tell me where we are likely to need to use strategic bombers
with a sophisticated air defense network in place during the next decade.
(ex-USSR? China? France?) In each of these cases we either have no likeli-
hood of war (France); no strategic interest that is worth fighting a war
over (China); or a country that would be so mired in civil war that its air
defense network would quickly splinter, unless we were to strike first
(ex-USSR). Quite simply, with the breakup of the USSR, there is no mission
that it could do, that can't be done more cheaply by other planes. The B-2's
already produced should be used as R&D types for the B-3, which by the year
2000 we might see a need for in 2010. (Note: B-3 is used only to designate
the next bomber type, not to indicate that I know anything about such a
plane.)
>shown in Desert Storm that the F-117A was able to surprise the Iraqi air
>defense forces every time. While this was in part due to the fine efforts of
The F-117A is an excellent plane which does its limited mission well, and
much better that a generalist type could do. Too bad that the Air Force
seems to be unable to take in the lesson of the F-117A and apply it to the
A-10. You do not need every combat pilot to be a fighter jock. Air
superiority is only one mission, and granted versus a Mig-29, I'd prefer the
fighter. But against a ZU-23 I want that armored bathtub, the A-10. And if I
am an Army grunt I want an A-10 flying CLOSE Air Support, not an F-16
lobbing bombs in the area. (Works great on a static target like airfields
and bridges, but troops move away from where the pre-flight briefing put
them)
>the defense supression flights of F-4G Phantoms, it can also be attributed in
>large part to Stealth technology. The B-2 has the added advantage that if it
>is produced, it will release the B-1B force completely to conventional duties.
Or you could produce more B-1's or B-52's to handle conventional duties.
I am aware of the great age of the B-52 and certainly the plane needs
replacing due to the sheer age of the machines, but why doesn't the Air
Force build a new version of B-52 (call it the B-72 for our purposes)
A special built force of 40-60 planes based on the B-52 to do just one
thing: convential carpet bombing? I'm not calling for a brand new design,
just a moderized B-52 costing around $50 million each and with a payload,
speed, and range similar to a B-52. I'd much rather have 20 B-72's than 1
B-2 for my billion dollars.
>(BTW, I am not on of the many people who believe that Desert Storm can be used
>as an object lesson for the employment of military forces. While large, the
>Iraqi forces we faced were sub-standard when compared to many possible
>adversaries, and so the gulf war can not be used as an example except in the
>broadest sense.)
Agreed.
>>As an aside, it would be nice to keep the B-52s or something like them
>>for conventional ground support, but their usefulness as strategic
>>nuclear deterrents is at an end. This does not reflect on the quality
>>of the aircraft or their crews, but rather on the changing political
>>realities of our world.
>On that note, the B-1B force is being converted to have a conventional
>capability. While it will retain it's position as the nation's prime manned
>nuclear deterrent, a package is under development that will allow the B-1 to
>carry a larger number of conventional bombs than the B-52. The B-1 is
>already known to be a much more survivable aircraft, due to it's higher speed,
>better terrain following systems, and more versatile defensive countermeasures
>suite. The B-1 also has much improved weapons-delivery systems allowing night/
>all weather operations, wheras the B-52 is for the most part restricted to a
>daytime operations in the Close Air Support (CAS) role.
Once again the AF dislike of pure CAS craft comes through, despite the fact
that in general you can buy much more CAS than Air Superiority for the same
buck. I do not deny that plane for plane, that the B-1 is better than my
proposed B-72, but I doubt that dollar for dollar that the B-1 is better.
>>The air force's least glamorous major function is transport and I
>>think that they should actually spend a little more time and effort on
>>beefing up the transport forces.
>Along this line, McDonnell Douglas is producing the C-17, which will combine
>the tremendous payload of a C-5 Galaxy with the short field tactical
>performance of the C-130 series. The C-17 is meant to replace the C-141, and
>to supplement the C-130's.
>>As far as tactical air power is concerned, the need for flexible and
>>responsive air power is still very great. However, as the likelyhood
>>of a large conventional war (in central Europe, for example) is
>>reduced, the need for large fixed-base forces is reduced and the need
>>for easily transportable, flexible forces increases. And the air
>>force's tactical air forces are the least flexible arm of our tactical
>>air power.
>>
>>For the most part, they require large fixed bases to operate from, as
>>opposed to the Navy and Marine Corps. With the reduction of US bases
>>around the world, this becomes less and less possible. It also reduces
>>the number of places that you can permanently base an air wing.
>>
>>Because of the fact that air force air wings are less flexible, I
>>would reduce them more than the Navy or Marine air wings. Modern
>>armed forces are going to have to be more flexible than they have been
>>in the past in order to cope with the wide variety of missions that
>>will be assigned to them, and I just don't see the air force as being
>>that flexible.
>Because of the need for increased flexibility, the Air Force has just
>undergone a major restructuring. The bombers from Strategic Air Command have
>combined with the Tactical Air Command to form the Air Combat Command, or ACC.
>The tankers from SAC have combined with Military Airlift Command to form the
>Air Mobility Command, or AMC.
>Within the ACC, composite wings are being formed to take the place of the old
>Tactical Fighter Wings. The first of these to take shape were the 4th Wing, at
>Seymour-Johnson AFB, NC, containing F-15E Strike Eagles, and KC-10A tanker/
>cargo aircraft. The 4th Wing can deploy anywhere in the world, with the
>KC-10's carrying fuel, parts, and ground crew for the F-15E's. The second,
>being formed now at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, is the 366th (?) Air Intervention
>Wing. This wing will consist of 8 KC-135's (Air Refuelling), 7 B-52's (Heavy
>Bombardment), 16 F-15C's (Air Superiority), 16 F-16C's (Attack/CAS), and
>several other assorted aircraft including defense supression, ECM, and tactical
>recon. It is planned to form another composite wing at Pope AFB, NC to support
>the Army's 82nd Airborne Division in it's operation. This wing will probably
>consist of an airlift type, either the C-141 or the C-17, depending on the
>timing, and an attack type. If the Army had a choice, the attack type would be
>the A-10A, andwhile this is a possibility, the F-16C would probably be a better
>choice because it could be used to provide air superiority over the battlefield
>if neccessary.
Once again the Air Force concentrates on Air Superiority to the exclusion of
all else, Air Superiority is important, it is neccessary, however in the
scheme of things, AS keeps you from losing, CAS allows you to win. We need a
balance between CAS and AS.
>While all of these composite wings are still tied to fixed airfields, this may
>not be such a tremendous problem as previously suspected. Experiments were
>done in the 1970's, involving the temporary deployment of F-4 Phantoms to
>operate off strips of highway, and other alternative airstrips. This
>indicates to me that while the tankers, cargo aircraft, and heavy bombers
>require hard-surface runways, the tactical types can be employed from temporary
>expedients close to the battlefield, until the Air Force Civil Engineering
>Squadrons can set up an appropriate air base in the operating area. Having the
>tankers, etc operate from a distance would not be a major problem, because they
>generally have the range to reach their operating areas. B-52's from Barksdale
>AFB, Louisiana flew directly into combat, making strikes on Iraqi Guard
>positions after 28-hour flights. Admittedly, they could not operate in this
>manner for very long before crew fatigue became a major factor, but they would
>undoubtedly be able to find an appropriate base much closer to the battle area.
>Well, that's one man's humble opinion.
>Chad Wemyss
>Worcester Polytechnic Institute
So how would I do it?
After all, it's easier to find fault than propose a solution.
Well here it is, a proposed reorganization of the DoD.
It probably could be improved, and probably favors the support services more
than some people would prefer, but here it is.
United States Air Force
This would consist of the fighters and bombers plus immediate support
forces. However, quite a good bit of what is done by the USAF in other
areas would go to other services since the Air Force does not seem to
want to do it.
United States Army
This would be the Mechanized and Airborne forces the U.S. would use in
fighting major wars plus specialized units for mountain, arctic, etc.
Also included would be immediate support forces and CAS forces (A-10,
AH-64, etc.) Thus I would elimiate the ban on the Army flying armed
fixed-wing aircraft, although land-based aircraft intended to fight
past the FEBA would be solely the USAF's to use.
United States Navy
Much the same as today execpt smaller and some of its duties and ships
would be transferred to the:
United States Coast Guard
Which would gain the sea control mission the USN has neglected to pursue
power projection. Essentially the USCG would gain the tasks and abilities
that a coastal European navy has today, essentially becoming the coastal
American navy.
United States Marines Corps
Much the same as today.
United States Transport Command
Combining the Merchant Marine, Sealift, and Airlift Commands into one
structure devoted to one purpose: We have forces in an area we've
acquired which need supplies from the U.S. via relatively secure supply
lines. Besides it gives us an use for the Merchant Marine Academy.
United States Engineering Corps
Combat Engineering dome where and when you need it.
United States Guard
Much the same as the National Guard but elevated to equal importance.
Civil Defense (i.e. FEMA) would come under its jurisdiction.
The USAF USA USMC and USN would be the traditional power projection elements
of the United States military while the USCG USTC USEC and USG would be the
defense and support elements of the military. Of course such a division is
somewhat artifical, but is centered on what needs to be done, rather than
whether it happens in the air, on land or sea.
--
Ernest Cline cl...@cs.scarolina.edu
"Joe Friday -- Man of the 90's `Just the fax, ma'am.`"
Craig B. Huffnagle
From yuk...@beta.lanl.gov (Craig B. Huffnagle)
In article <BwDnu...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>
>An aside about the B-2: I just really cannot see flying in two billion
>dollar aircraft against a third world nation. The cost of one lucky
>rifle bullet is just too high. Of all the things that the military is
>doing, I *SURE* I can think of many programs that need the money more
>than this.
>
If you want to stretch this argument a little, why do we use our billion
dollar aircraft carriers everyday? Something might go wrong. Why do we
ever use our expensive military hardware during peacetime. They might
get messed up. Why don't we just save it for the fight? Because we need
the practice, that's why. And what better practice is there than an
actual combat mission. Simulations can't come close to the real thing.
- Craig
--
Craig Huffnagle yuk...@yuck.lanl.gov
"In weightlifting, I don't think sudden, uncontrolled urination
should disqualify you." Jack Handey
------------- Think of a disclaimer, it applies. --------------
MILLER, JIMMY A.
From HADC...@admin.uh.edu (MILLER, JIMMY A.)
In <BwDo0...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> "Sean writes:
>
> From "Sean J. Roc D'Arcy" <bphd...@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu>
>
> In article <Bw68x...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes...
[deletions]
> >- Greatly lessen the results of any small nuclear strike by some third
> >world crackpot with a few balistic missiles and nuclear warheads.
[deletions]
> A good question to ask here is; is the SDI worth the funding at all? With
> the exception of the FUSSR no one (not even China) has the ability to
> launch a major first strike. For all the cost and questionable results,
> this would probably be a poor investment.
I must disagree. An attempt at a full-scale, "stop the Ruskies" style of SDI
may well have been unworkable. But a small-scale, "stop the nut with a dozen
or so ICBM's" system is not only feasible, but (at least) until the remains of
the Soviet Empire settle down, an excellent insurance policy.
Remember, just one nuke can ruin your whole day.
A system need not be 100% perfect to serve as a deterrent. And as they said
in the days of parity bits, "50% error detection is better than none at all."
A small strike may well be completely stopped, and one dead city is better than
two or three or four. Pretty cold-blooded, but I don't subscribe to the idea
of "if we can't stop'em all, let's not stop any."
semper fi,
Jammer Jim Miller
Texas A&M University '89 and '91
********************************************************************************
* Speak for my employers? They don't even know I exist! *
*"Become one with the Student Billing System. *BE* the Student Billing System."*
* "Power finds its way to those who take a stand. Stand up, Ordinary Man." *
* ---Rik Emmet, Gil Moore, Mike Levine: Triumph *
********************************************************************************
Dan Sorenson
From Dan Sorenson <vik...@iastate.edu>
upchrch!jo...@peora.sdc.ccur.com (Joel Upchurch ) writes:
>I wonder if we shouldn't start thinking about what will happen if we
>end up fighting a war with Japan say 10 or 15 years down the road. I
>suspect that might be a bigger challange than any of the counties you
>mentioned. Keep in mind with current projections they would be a bigger
>industrial power than the U.S. by then and a lot of our industry would
>be dependent on things like electronics and machine tools supplied by
>them.
This was the subject of an excellent book called, "The War
In 2020." Sadly, I loaned mine out so I don't know the author's name.
Anyway, his analysis of the forthcoming war is interesting.
Japan is an island. A naval blockade would kill it within weeks.
Thus, Japan didn't directly go to war with the US or the USSR. They
proxied it out to various other countries and just supplied them with
the latest Hitachi gunships carrying high-energy lasers and other bits
of science fiction. Anyway, by doing it this way Japan was able to keep
the fighting away from Japan proper and on other continents. That is
very important in both a historical and tactical sense. With such a
limited resource base, the USA could stifle that country inside of a week
if we were to interdict their shipping.
I don't worry about fighting Japan. I don't think they could
ever be stupid enough to give up their current economic status in exchange
for more territory.
< Dan Sorenson, DoD #1066 z1...@exnet.iastate.edu vik...@iastate.edu >
< ISU only censors what I read, not what I say. Don't blame them. >
<"On a more subtle level, our language assists me by earmarking those>
<who refer to others as "dude" for severe repression." -- Tim Mefford>
Lawrence Crowl
From Lawrence Crowl <cr...@jade.cs.orst.edu>
I think there is a major flaw in way this newsgroup, the press, and
congress measure the cost of aircraft. All three measure cost by "how
much to buy one machine", independent of anything else. I argue that
only four costs matter:
the cost to buy the first _wing_ of aircraft
this includes research, manuals, training, simulators, etc.
the cost to buy each additional _wing_ of aircraft
the cost to sustain a _wing_ of aircraft in peacetime
this includes salaries, fuel, parts, practice bombs, etc.
the cost to sustain a _wing_ of aircraft in combat
The cost of aircraft is a fraction of cost of air power.
For example, consider the F-cheapo and the F-goldplate. The F-cheapo
costs $20 million. The F-goldplate costs $40 million and is only 20%
better than the F-cheapo. Looking at these numbers, the F-cheapo is
the way to go. These numbers are wrong.
The F-cheapo and F-goldplate each have $10 million per year costs in
salaries and maintenance in peacetime. So, over the 20 year service
life, F-cheapo actually costs $220 million and the F-goldplate costs
$240 million. So, for less than 10% additional costs, we get an
aircraft that is 20% better. Clearly F-goldplate is the way to go.
I've oversimplified, I know. But this is the type of analysis that
makes sense. The cost per aircraft doesn't. Argueing for the A-10
over the A-16 on the basis of cost per airframe is misleading. Argue
on the basis of cost per _wing_.
--
Lawrence Crowl 503-737-2554 Computer Science Department
cr...@cs.orst.edu Oregon State University
...!hplabs!hp-pcd!orstcs!crowl Corvallis, Oregon, 97331-3202
Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary) writes:
>Even with all our current forces, we couldn't blockade a nation the
>size of China. I don't think we are every likely to have a navy _that_
>big...
Really? To have an effective naval blockade alls we have to do is
make it too costly for shippers to get to China. If you make the loss
rate high enough, it will no longer be worthwhile, and the shipping
will stop flowing to China.
We don't have to blockade every inch of coast, just the ports. We
have enough satilites to tell us where every ship near China is, so
that part is easy.
I bet we could do it. What do the rest of y'all think?
Dan Sorenson
From Dan Sorenson <vik...@iastate.edu>
Bohdan Tashchuk <fasttech!fasttech.com!ze...@uu4.psi.com> writes:
>I haven't seen any discussion of the impact a U.S. battleship would have had
>in a similar situation. The RAF had to do something like 11 aerial refuelings
>just to get a Vulcan to deliver 1 lousy bomb.
>How many 2000 pound shells does a battleship carry? Hundreds? Thousands? It
>seems to me that the airport could have been flattened from 20 miles away. I
>assume the shells would have cratered the runway, but even if they didn't
>there wouldn't be enough infrastructure left to support a paper airplane,
>let alone a jet.
>I doubt the Argentines had anything on the Falklands that could have engaged
>a battleship. In fact, I'd bet that direct Exocet hits would be very
> survivable.
An Exocet would burn the paint, perhaps even cause a dent, but not
a whole lot more. You just can't sink these things without huge amounts of
explosives. Penetrating 18" of armor isn't easy, and to torpedo it your
best bet is to blow all the water out from underneath her keel and let her
own weight break her back. Again, not easy and not a common weapon.
However, the battleship is only effective if you're within around
20 miles of your target (unless you want to launch cruise missiles and the
like, but I'm talking about shells here). The number of shells that are
carried varies, but I suspect a hundred is about right, possibly a few more.
They are, however, incredibly effective.
>They don't build them like they used to!
Indeed they don't. Best ships I've ever seen are the Iowa class.
Beautiful ships, and capable of spewing forth more ordinance than anything
else on the seas.
<sniff> I guess we always have a special place in our hearts for
our first girlfriend.
Henry Spencer
From he...@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)
>From ar...@cunixb.cc.columbia.edu (Aaron R Wininger)
>I beleive Orbital Sciences Corp is working on converting ICBM's (or some
>sort of nuclear missile) into a rapid launch sattelite system. On the order
>of say 10 days from notification to launch...
OSC is indeed working on a rapid-reaction launch system, under DARPA contract,
but it is not using ICBMs. The Taurus booster -- first launch expected next
year -- is essentially a wingless Pegasus on top of a big new first stage.
The current first stage is the same motor used as the MX first stage, but
that will be replaced with a different design for production -- the ICBM
first stage has problems adapting to a pad launch.
--
MS-DOS is the OS/360 of the 1980s. | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
-Hal W. Hardenbergh (1985)| he...@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
Frank Crary
From fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary)
In article <BwFII...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> bphd...@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu (Sean J. Roc D'Arcy) writes:
>>>China's, but stopping 90% (or 50% or so) would be awfully nice. As
>>>far as I know, this capability is many years away, depending on SDI
>>>funding.
>>Less than ten years away (political problems asside). A modest
>>anti-ballistic missile defence isn't too dificult.
>Not as a point of disagreement, but how did you arrive at the calculation of
>ten years?
Essentially an educated guess: The technology for effective anti-balistic
missiles exists. Hardware design/development/testing (from existing
technology) takes, on average, less than a decade. (I'd put NASA's
space shuttle as an example of a limiting case: The program took ~12 years
until first flight, involved a implimenting new technologies and
wasn't a "crash" or in any rushed program.)
>And how effective would the present SDI design be against any
>other nation besides the FUSSR?
_Which_ present SDI design? Some of the orbital systems might be
in trouble, if their orbit was tailored to handle launches from high
inclinations, that proceeded over the pole. The ABM systems are
focused on the target, not the launch site (which is both easier and
less effective...) They should work against any balistic missile,
regardless of who launched it. In detail how effective any would
be, would depend on specifics of the system. Stopping 75% of a
few dozen missiles wouldn't be a major challenge, but (at least from
the six-year old unclassified studies I've seen) stopping 90% of a
few hundred missiles would be getting difficult.
>>>- Be able to throw a naval blockade around any other nation, and make
>>>it stick. For a nation the size of China, I don't mind if it takes
>>>two weeks to get it set. For a nation the size of Liberia, I'd like
>>>it in a 'few days'.
>>Even with all our current forces, we couldn't blockade a nation the
>>size of China. I don't think we are every likely to have a navy _that_
>>big...
>I would have to disagree here. I think it would be quite easy to blockade
>China. The exposed coastline is big, but just our submarines alone could
>enforce the blockade. We might miss a speed boat or two, but we could
>easily cut off all major sea trade to China via their coast. How much
>economic effect it would have is a question though.
I think we mean different things by "blockade": I was taking it to
mean stopping, boarding and turning back merchant vessals. I
don't think we can do this effectively. If "blockade" means
sinking all ships approaching the nation in question, we
definitely could (even if many ships get past the blockade, they
have to do so repeatedly to be effective. All a "sinking ships"
blockade really has to do is sink ships faster than the opposing
nation can build new ones...)
>>>- Fight a war the size of Desert Storm, even if it is as far away as
>>>the Persian Gulf, assuming that some neighbor provides us with the
>>>necessary bases. I'd like the mobilization to occur no slower than
>>>the last Desert Storm.
>>In which case, the Army can't be cut back too much either.
>We used less than 500,000 of our own troops. We had many more stationed in
>other parts of the world.
Is it acceptable to break our treaty obligations to other nations? (E.g.
could we have pulled troops out of, say, Korea to fight in the Gulf?)
If so, then I agree there is plenty of room for cuts.
Frank Crary
CU Boulder
J.D. Baldwin
From "J.D. Baldwin" <bal...@csservera.usna.navy.mil>
In article <BwBrz...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU
(Frank Crary) writes:
> In article <Bw68x...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu
>(Randy Appleton) writes:
>>>define what missions you want the military to carry out, then you
>>>can start structuring and costing the forces necessary to carry
>>>out those missions.
>> Keep track of all major military units in the world, so that we can
>>spot in buildups quickly, and hopefully act appropriately.
>
>That's really the CIA's job, not that of the Department of Defense.
No, no, no, no! It is a common misconception that the only national
intelligence asset is the CIA. In fact, we have an extensive network
of intelligence assets and agencies, all of which reinforce and
comple- ment each other nicely. In the coming (and current) drawdown,
there will be a tendency to view all such assets as "redundant" (and
I'm sure some of them are) and start cutting with an axe. Nothing
could be more harmful to one of the most critical pieces of our
national security apparatus in this new world. The CIA doesn't
*begin* to encompass the duties and services provided by the National
Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the national
laboratories or the various military intelligence agencies. The
different emphases in analysis alone one gets from this
diversification of resources is worth most of the "redundancy" that
results from it.
>>- Get a carrier battle group within strike range of any piece of coast
>>within a 'few days'. Since I don't expect to send only one carrier
>>against an Air Force the size of Lybia's, or the former Iraqi air
>>force, I also want THREE carrier battle groups to be able to converge to
>>any one spot in two weeks. I don't mind if this strips the
>>neighboring seas of carriers.
>
>A few days isn't much time: The carrier and its nuclear escorts (two
>crusiers) could cover a few thoudand miles in that time. This would
>require six or seven carrier groups at a time. Since carriers can't be
>at see all the time (and even _half_ of the time is unrealistic), you
>are talking about a navy about as big as our current one.
Or bigger. We have *never* had the capability Randy asks for above.
Even in sensitive areas like the post-Desert-Storm Persian Gulf region,
it has been reported (in open sources) that the Carrier Battle Groups
were on a 96-hour "tether" (that is, they could have liberty in
Australia or Kenya while on such an alert status).
And "half of the time [at sea]" is worse than unrealistic, it's
fantasy. Over the life cycle of a nuclear carrier, my offhand guess
would be about 25% *deployment* rate, and that's probably in error on
the high side. Remember, a lot of "at sea" time is taken up in
"workups"--basically training exercises conducted in home waters, not
contributing directly to national military posture abroad.
>>- Have no other nation, or combination of two of them, be able to
>>blockade America's ports. This includes the ability to defend against
>>enemy submarines. I will accept some shipping losses to submarines
>>against either China or Russia, but not to the extent that the oil
>>stops flowing to America.
>
>This is one of the navy's major goals: Keeping "Sea Lines Of
>Communication" open. Again, no substantial cuts naval ASW and
>attack submarines can be made if this is to be assured.
I agree about the ASW (since Third World subs are getting more and
more plentiful and sophisticated), but I'm not so sure about the
SSN's, except insofar as their role is ASW. If we assume that the
enemy ballistic missile submarine threat is dead, the need for
US SSN's is sharply diminished.
Anyway, I worry a lot more about the USN's credibility abroad being
eroded to the point that regional powers attempt hegemony over inter-
national waters in their regions than I do about the direct
interdiction of U.S. shipping. For example, Libya's attempt to "annex"
the Gulf of Sidra. There are scores of choke points worldwide on which
international commerce depend heavily, and frankly I think the only
thing keeping nearby low-rent nations from taking over and charging
"toll" (in the manner of the pirates in the Malacca Strait) is the
forward presence of the U.S. Navy. Erode that substantially, and the
world trade picture is going to change very drastically.
>>- Fight a war the size of Desert Storm, even if it is as far away as
>>the Persian Gulf, assuming that some neighbor provides us with the
>>necessary bases. I'd like the mobilization to occur no slower than
>>the last Desert Storm.
>
>In which case, the Army can't be cut back too much either.
As far as the logistics aspect of such mobilization is concerned,
the Army assets are insignificant when compared to USAF assets, which
are in turn insignificant when compared to Military Sealift assets
(something like 98% of all materiel moves by sea).
Of course, the order of importance is reversed when we're talking
about ground troops and materiel that actually *get* moved (unless we
count U.S. Marines in the equation), but they're a lot easier to stand
up on short notice than logistics assets.
>>So, what do you think? I'm sure I've left some capability out, but
>>have I included too much? Further, I assume that the current military
>>can do all of these things. Am I right?
>
>Not entirely. Certainly the military will not be able to do so
>shortly, if the current political pressure to drastically cut military
>spending continues.
"Continues"? No matter who wins the fall elections, the feeding frenzy
at DoD will begin 4 November. I have this from congressional staffers
(R as well as D) and DoN undersecretaries who shall be nameless.
--
From the catapult of: |+| "If anyone disagrees with anything I
_,_ J. D. Baldwin, Comp Sci Dept|+| say, I am quite prepared not only to
_|70|___:::)=}- U.S. Naval Academy|+| retract it, but also to deny under
\ / bal...@usna.navy.mil |+| oath that I ever said it." --T. Lehrer
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Markus Stumptner
From m...@vexpert.dbai.tuwien.ac.at (Markus Stumptner)
>From Bohdan Tashchuk <fasttech!fasttech.com!ze...@uu4.psi.com>
> In <Bw68r...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Henry Spencer <he...@zoo.toronto.edu> writes:
>>They did put one crater into the Port Stanley runway.
> I haven't seen any discussion of the impact a U.S. battleship would have had
> in a similar situation. The RAF had to do something like 11 aerial refuelings
> just to get a Vulcan to deliver 1 lousy bomb.
There were more bombs, of course, but only one hit the runway itself, which
was the intended effect (they threw the bombs in single file, at an angle to
the runway, from about 5 miles out).
> How many 2000 pound shells does a battleship carry? Hundreds? Thousands? It
> seems to me that the airport could have been flattened from 20 miles away.
Several hundred, easily enough to render the airfield inoperable.
> I doubt the Argentines had anything on the Falklands that could have engaged
> a battleship.
They had nothing - because they removed their jets from Port Stanley
after the Vulcan raids.
As for their capability to damage a battleship at all - remember that
despite their relative invulnerability as compared to modern ships,
WW2 battleships *can* be sunk by planes. Indeed, this was the method
of choice even back then. Basically, if the Argentinians had managed
to get at the British carriers, they would also have managed to get at
an Iowa battleship.
--
Markus Stumptner m...@vexpert.dbai.tuwien.ac.at
University of Technology Vienna vexpert!m...@relay.eu.net
Paniglg. 16, A-1040 Vienna, Austria ...mcsun!vexpert!mst
Henry Spencer
From Henry Spencer <he...@zoo.toronto.edu>
>From da...@Cigna.COM (Dave Good)
>>... while standing down and even
>>destroying the Minuteman force. (BTW, does anyone know if a converted ICBM
>>could be used to launch sattelites into space, possibly at a reduced cost
>>because the rockets already exist?)
>
>General Dynamics has been doing this with old, 60's vintage Atlas ICBMs for
>several years now, with great success.
Not quite right. The USAF did it for a number of years; essentially the
entire old Atlas ICBM force got used up this way. However, current Atlases,
especially the ones GD is now marketing commercially, are new construction.
The USAF is now starting to use the recently-retired Titan IIs for the same
purpose.
There are two problems with doing this for something like the Minuteman
force. One is that those really aren't very large rockets by launcher
standards. Even the Titan II -- much larger than the Minuteman -- is on
the small side of medium launchers now.
The other problem is that if you dump cheap government-surplus missiles
on the launcher market, you wipe out the commercial launch firms. When
you run out of missiles, what replaces them? This is a complicated
political problem. (Giving the missiles to the existing launch firms
is not a very good solution for several reasons.)
Joel Upchurch
From Joel Upchurch <upchrch!jo...@peora.sdc.ccur.com>
I received a nice e-mail message from Ed Rudnicki
(pica.army.mil!erudnick) answering some of the questions being
discussed about the 16 inch guns, so I've posted his message here
Hope you guys don't mind this direct mail; editing news postings is a
pain for me. Feel free to repost.
The acceleration of a 16 inch projo is actually less than a 155mm, because
it's a function of projo base area and tube length and pressure. Believe
it or not the 105mm at high zones that is worst case. 52 cal/1400in3 155m
systems can reach the same range as the 16 inch these days, but the 155s
see much more severe environment. The 155mm will see about 15-16,000 Gs,
while the 16 inch is probably around 11-13,000.
Copperhead uses a nylon slipping ring in place of a rotating band, and
is launched from standard 155mm weapons and exits the muzzle with little
spin. As I stated in another post, the real problem with guiding a 16
inch round is the inertia of the round. Additionally, the buy would be
so small that costs per round would be absolutely outrageous, as the
R&D costs would be amortized over very few projos.
Someday the RPV footage of 16 inch firings will be released, and then
all will see how unbelievably accurate the system is.
(If your mail bounces use the address below.)
Joel Upchurch/Upchurch Computer Consulting/718 Galsworthy/Orlando, FL 32809
jo...@peora.ccur.com {uiucuxc,hoptoad,petsd,ucf-cs}!peora!joel (407) 859-0982
Anthony Lee
From Anthony Lee <ant...@cs.uq.oz.au>
In <BwFI1...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> @usceast.cs.scarolina.edu:cli...@cs.scarolina.edu (Ernest Cline) writes:
[Stuff about building more B52s rather than wasting money on B2s]
Actually that's not such a bad idea. If you consider the civilian
airliner 747. It must be one of the most successful airliner in
history. It is no where near as old as the B52s but it has been
continuously upgraded. Why couldn't they more G version of the
B52s ?
--
Anthony Lee (Time Lord Doctor) (These are my opinions !)
email: ant...@cs.uq.oz.au voice:+(61)-7-3651204 FAX:+(61)-7-3651999
SNAIL: Department Computer Science, The University of Queensland,
St Lucia, Qld 4072, Australia
Randy Appleton
From ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton)
fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary) writes:
>From fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary)
>>Me
>>I Think the U.S. military should be able to ...
>>- Fight a strategic nuclear war at a moments notice. This will help
>>deter the any first strike against us. I don't expect to win, just
>>maybe kill the guys who started it.
>Against whom? If possible opponents include the Russia, then this
>would require maintaining our current stratigic forces, possibly also
>improving them, with such programs as the B-2. If Russia is out of the
>picture, the _slight_ reductions in stratigic forces might be
>possible, but nations like the People's Republic of China would still
>require a fairly major arsenal.
Why do you say this? Like I said, I don't expect to win, just to be
able to kill the other guy (and therefore hopefully deter him).
If I remember right, a study during the Kennedy administration said
you could destroy 2/3 of all Soviet industry with only 600 Equivelent
Megatons. I admit that this was a long time ago, presumably this is
within an order of magnitude. Further, remember that Russia is
smaller than the Soviet Unions was.
Or, to look at it another way, supposed you were able to keep 3
Trident subs ready at all times. That gives you 3 * 8 * 24 warheads.
You can blow a hole in the middle of the 576 biggest cities in Russia
or China. Of course, even if you subtract a small allounce for
missile and warhead failure, that ought to be sufficient deterence.
If I were running things, I'd also keep a fourth Trident sub to hit my
favorite 8*24 military bases of this enemy nation. Of course,
military bases really aren't worth much without a population or
industrial base.
david.r.wells
From "david.r.wells" <d...@cbnewsg.cb.att.com>
In article <BwDn7...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> Bohdan Tashchuk <fasttech!fasttech.com!ze...@uu4.psi.com> writes:
>
>From Bohdan Tashchuk <fasttech!fasttech.com!ze...@uu4.psi.com>
>
>I missed the beginning of this thread, so maybe I'm repeating someone, but here
>goes.
>
>I haven't seen any discussion of the impact a U.S. battleship would have had
>in a similar situation. The RAF had to do something like 11 aerial refuelings
>just to get a Vulcan to deliver 1 lousy bomb.
>
>How many 2000 pound shells does a battleship carry? Hundreds? Thousands? It
>seems to me that the airport could have been flattened from 20 miles away. I
>assume the shells would have cratered the runway, but even if they didn't there
>wouldn't be enough infrastructure left to support a paper airplane, let alone a
>jet.
>
>I doubt the Argentines had anything on the Falklands that could have engaged
>a battleship. In fact, I'd bet that direct Exocet hits would be very survivable.
>They don't build them like they used to!
In many ways, I couldn't agree more. But why use a US battleship for
comparison? If the Brits hadn't scrapped the old Vanguard, they might
have had similar capabilities. In a paper many years ago, I compared
the 1980 lb shells of the Vanguard's 15" shells to the 2000 lb bombs on a
Harrier. The rate of fire is a whole lot better on the Vanguard than on
an Invincible. In retrospect, I suppose that the shells have significantly
smaller explosive charges than the bombs, but they would put one heck of
a hole in a runway, if only from kinetic energy. The trick, of course is
hitting it. If there are any hills between the runway and the coast,
battleships need foreward observers of some variety. I'll have to examine
a map.
Against exocets, the Vanguard would have been even better than an
American Iowa. Consider the Vanguard's superior belt armor.(14" vs
12.1" (356 mm vs 310 mm for you metric folks)) Exocets tend to hit
amidships, low, in the case of battleships, right on the belt armor.
Further, the Iowas armor is internal. An exocet would go right through
the shell plating, and it would look real bad on television. (no
REAL damage, of course, but Dan Blather would make some uninformed
comment about this proving once again that battleships are obsolete)
The Vanguard's armor belt was external. The missile would explode,
and do nothing more than mess up the paint.
Alas, the Vanguard was scrapped, c. 1960. RIP.
I'll miss the Iowas when they're gone. (We'll try to at least
save the New Jersey)
David Wells, Battleship Fanatic
DISCLAIMER: The opinions expressed in this article are my own, and are
almost certainly not those of AT&T. I don't speak for them, they don't
speak for me.
Sean J. Roc D'Arcy
From "Sean J. Roc D'Arcy" <bphd...@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu>
In article <BwBrz...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary) writes...
>
>From fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary)
>>China's, but stopping 90% (or 50% or so) would be awfully nice. As
>>far as I know, this capability is many years away, depending on SDI
>>funding.
>
>Less than ten years away (political problems asside). A modest
>anti-ballistic missile defence isn't too dificult.
Not as a point of disagreement, but how did you arrive at the calculation of
ten years? And how effective would the present SDI design be against any
other nation besides the FUSSR?
>> Keep track of all major military units in the world, so that we can
>>spot in buildups quickly, and hopefully act appropriately.
>
>That's really the CIA's job, not that of the Department of Defense.
If I'm not mistaken doesn't each branch of the service have their own
military inteligence departments. I was under the impression that the CIA
was more generic and had less emphasis on military unit location than the
DOD's version.
>>- Be able to throw a naval blockade around any other nation, and make
>>it stick. For a nation the size of China, I don't mind if it takes
>>two weeks to get it set. For a nation the size of Liberia, I'd like
>>it in a 'few days'.
>
>Even with all our current forces, we couldn't blockade a nation the
>size of China. I don't think we are every likely to have a navy _that_
>big...
I would have to disagree here. I think it would be quite easy to blockade
China. The exposed coastline is big, but just our submarines alone could
enforce the blockade. We might miss a speed boat or two, but we could
easily cut off all major sea trade to China via their coast. How much
economic effect it would have is a question though.
>
>>- Fight a war the size of Desert Storm, even if it is as far away as
>>the Persian Gulf, assuming that some neighbor provides us with the
>>necessary bases. I'd like the mobilization to occur no slower than
>>the last Desert Storm.
>
>In which case, the Army can't be cut back too much either.
We used less than 500,000 of our own troops. We had many more stationed in
other parts of the world. I think the main problem is not size, but
mobility. We can't move as many men and supplies as we need to.
I think downsizing the Army is something that has to be done to meet the
requested military cuts. Moving more people into the reserves would be a
good consideration also.
SJRD
ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
From ppug...@pimacc.pima.edu
In article <BwDnI...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, upchrch!jo...@peora.sdc.ccur.com (Joel Upchurch ) writes:
>
> From upchrch!jo...@peora.sdc.ccur.com (Joel Upchurch )
>
> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>
>> For the purpose of this, I consider that no NATO nation could likely
>> become an emeny in the next 10 years. However, I do consider Russia
>> and China and Iran potential enemies. I do not consider it reasonable
>> that the CIS will reunite in the next 10 years.
>
> I wonder if we shouldn't start thinking about what will happen if we
> end up fighting a war with Japan say 10 or 15 years down the road. I
> suspect that might be a bigger challange than any of the counties you
> mentioned. Keep in mind with current projections they would be a bigger
> industrial power than the U.S. by then and a lot of our industry would
> be dependent on things like electronics and machine tools supplied by
> them.
>
>
Considering the major uproar within Japan over the idea of sending *any*
part of their armed forces overseas (even just for logistic & tech support!)
as part of a UN Peacekeeping Force, I can't imagine that Japan will be a
military threat in the forseeable future. We'll get ample warning anyway.
Their industrial capacity for military production is quite low at pre-
sent. When they start to crank it up (like Germany in the '30s) then we'll
know.
PHIL
MCKEITHAN,CLIFFORD M.
From "MCKEITHAN,CLIFFORD M." <c...@prism.gatech.edu>
>
Seriously, nothing says that the Air Force CAS pilots cannot go thru
basically the same training as the Marine CAS pilots. There are
reasons why this is not done, however, it could be done.
>
>
In my opinion, the reason this is not done is the lack of
true comittment of the USAF to the CAS mission. The
desire to procure "A-16's" is nothing more than an attempt
to get more fighters. Perhaps the A-10 experience in
Iraq will turn more USAF leadership around, but lacking
that, I would prefer the mission AND the funding for CAS
be given to the Army so that control of the assets and
integration into the battle plan can be done effectively.
--
MCKEITHAN,CLIFFORD M.
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta Georgia, 30332
uucp: ...!{allegra,amd,hplabs,ut-ngp}!gatech!prism!cm9
Internet: c...@prism.gatech.edu
Frank Crary
From fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary)
In article <BwHDw...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> bal...@csservera.usna.navy.mil (J.D. Baldwin) writes:
>Or bigger. We have *never* had the capability Randy asks for above.
>Even in sensitive areas like the post-Desert-Storm Persian Gulf region,
>it has been reported (in open sources) that the Carrier Battle Groups
>were on a 96-hour "tether" (that is, they could have liberty in
>Australia or Kenya while on such an alert status).
The Lincon, the carrier stationed there immediately after the war, was
on no such teather. The crew got far less leave than on a typical cruse,
and no farther from the Persian Gulf than the United Arab Emerates.
Frank Crary
CU Boulder
Gary Coffman
From Gary Coffman <ke4zv!ga...@gatech.edu>
In article <BwHE7...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> vik...@iastate.edu (Dan Sorenson) writes:
>
> This was the subject of an excellent book called, "The War
>In 2020." Sadly, I loaned mine out so I don't know the author's name.
The author's name is Ralph Peters, he also wrote _Red Army_. He's no
Clancy, but it's not a bad read.
> Japan is an island. A naval blockade would kill it within weeks.
>Thus, Japan didn't directly go to war with the US or the USSR. They
>proxied it out to various other countries and just supplied them with
>the latest Hitachi gunships carrying high-energy lasers and other bits
>of science fiction. Anyway, by doing it this way Japan was able to keep
>the fighting away from Japan proper and on other continents. That is
>very important in both a historical and tactical sense. With such a
>limited resource base, the USA could stifle that country inside of a week
>if we were to interdict their shipping.
He also postulated a Japanese Star Wars system that prevented direct
strikes on the home islands. A necessary step IMHO. We could badly
hurt Japan by a fleet interdiction effort *today*, but Peters assumes
the US Military is emasculated after the end of the Cold War and is
linited to fighting a military technology 30 years advanced from today
with weapons 30 years out of date. The technical advances are presumed
sufficient that it would be like sending Grant's armies against a modern
Marine Expeditionary Force. There is also an engineered Plague spread
out of Africa that has decimated America, Europe, and parts of the SU.
Asians are immune.
> I don't worry about fighting Japan. I don't think they could
>ever be stupid enough to give up their current economic status in exchange
>for more territory.
Wars aren't always fought over territory. If Japan felt threatened enough
by trade sanctions, or denial of necessary raw materials, it could be
WWII all over again. They aren't militarily capable of such action *today*,
but give them 30 years of Japan bashing and they could very well be a
major threat again. They have the industrial base and the technology
while we are busy throwing ours away.
Gary
Lawrence Crowl
From cr...@jade.cs.orst.edu (Lawrence Crowl)
In article <BwFI1...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>
@usceast.cs.scarolina.edu:cli...@cs.scarolina.edu (Ernest Cline) writes:
>... why doesn't the Air Force build a new version of B-52 (call it the
>B-72 for our purposes)? A special built force of 40-60 planes based
>on the B-52 to do just one thing: convential carpet bombing? I'm not
>calling for a brand new design, just a moderized B-52 costing around
>$50 million each and with a payload, speed, and range similar to a
>B-52. I'd much rather have 20 B-72's than 1 B-2 for my billion
>dollars.
Fifty million is the _best_ you could do for a _marginal_ cost on a
B-72. The _amortized_ cost of a B-2 is a billion dollars. If congress
were to ask for 10 B-72s, the cost would be a billion dollars each. If
congress were to ask for an additional 100 B-2s, the cost would be
_much_ less than a billion dollars.
Incidently, I expect a "modernized B-52" looks a lot like a B-1B, with
conventional capability.
Frank Crary
From fcr...@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary)
In article <BwFIC...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> ra...@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes:
>>Against whom? If possible opponents include the Russia, then this
>>would require maintaining our current stratigic forces, possibly also
>>improving them, with such programs as the B-2. If Russia is out of the
>>picture, the _slight_ reductions in stratigic forces might be
>>possible, but nations like the People's Republic of China would still
>>require a fairly major arsenal.
>Why do you say this? Like I said, I don't expect to win, just to be
>able to kill the other guy (and therefore hopefully deter him).
>If I remember right, a study during the Kennedy administration said
>you could destroy 2/3 of all Soviet industry with only 600 Equivelent
>Megatons.
I think saw this study, or a very similar one: But the required
force is (and, I think, was) more accurately stated in _warheads_,
not megatons: Several hundred (200?) warheads would have to be
delivered to geographically distant targets. Making assumptions
about missile and warhead reliability, I think the conclusion was
that 1000 warheads would have to be launched.
>I admit that this was a long time ago, presumably this is
>within an order of magnitude. Further, remember that Russia is
>smaller than the Soviet Unions was.
Actually, not by much (In about the same was the United States
would be smaller without the original 13 states.) Further,
several things have changed since that study: Air defense
has improved dramatically, and military targets are hardened
against nuclear attack, and Russian missiles have mobile launchers.
That means modern bombers (like the B-2) would be required, and
B-2) and individually and precisely targeted warheads (you can't
target one warhead/city and expect to destroy military sites
within that city.)
I'm assuming you are talking about a counter-force or a pre-emptive
first strike (e.g. going after military not civilian targets). A
counter-value strike (e.g. against cities, etc...) is an almost
impossible plan, politically: People aren't comfortable with the
idea of threatening millions of innocent civilians to deter the
actions of a government than may not care about them... However,
counter-value strikes are quite easy: One MIRVed missile per
major city would work (although five or six might be better,
in case missiles fail, airplanes shot down or submarines sunk...)
>Or, to look at it another way, supposed you were able to keep 3
>Trident subs ready at all times. That gives you 3 * 8 * 24 warheads.
>You can blow a hole in the middle of the 576 biggest cities in Russia
>or China.
I don't think you can target MIRVs that way: They have some ability to
manuver independently not (I think) enough to spread out more than
a few tens of kilometers. The weapons you describe would be able to
two dozen holes in each of 3*8=24 major cities.
Frank Crary
CU Boulder
Doug Mohney
From sys...@king.eng.umd.edu (Doug Mohney)
The Air Force would like to keep around approximately 180 bombers by the turn
of the century, which breaks down to:
97 B-1Bs
15 B-2s
75-80 B-52s
In article <Bw845...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>, ke4zv!ga...@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman) writes:
>
>Unfortunately, B-52s are older than most of their pilots. To maintain
>a large conventional bombardment capability, these aircraft desparately
>need to be replaced.
>I think the military is going to lose heavy aerial bombardment capacity
>in the next few years as the B-52 airframes have to be retired.
Like it or not, the B-52 will be flying at the end of the century, because
there's nothing else available to haul a lot of bombs. I think the magic number
projected is somewhere around 75-80 planes, all of the latest model (G?). It
will use stand-off weapons in high-threat AD environments.
> The B1A is not a good substitute.
Substitute? There are 97 B-1Bs (B-1A being the plane canceled by the Carter
administration) which are (slowly) being qualified in the conventional role. It
is expected the B-1B will overfly and drop bombs in all but the most
high-threat AD environments.
More money needs to be put into the B-1B to make it an effective conventional
stand-off weapons platform; I think the total number is about $5 billion for
the current fleet, which would include common-sense upgrades like GPS, a secure
radio for the tactical environment, and certification of smart-weapons.
>The Air Force
>thinks the B2 will be able to fill this role, but as you noted, it's
>unit cost in the numbers currently authorized is exorbitant. If a large
>production run were ordered, it's price would drop by an order of magnitude.
I suspect they'll be some leaning towards buying a B-2 here and there to keep
the production lines going, since all the tooling is paid for, and as
replacements for B-52s/B-1Bs which fall out of the skies.
Play in the intelluctual sandbox of Usenet
-- > SYS...@CADLAB.ENG.UMD.EDU < --
merlin
From merlin <mer...@neuro.usc.edu>
>>From ar...@cunixb.cc.columbia.edu (Aaron R Wininger)
>>I beleive Orbital Sciences Corp is working on converting ICBM's (or some
>>sort of nuclear missile) into a rapid launch sattelite system. On the order
>>of say 10 days from notification to launch...
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
REALITY:
I had drinks with a nice lady air force officer a few weeks ago. Her new
assignment in the Los Angeles area is as onsite contract officer for some
project designed to convert existing icbm's into launchers for some small
non nuclear scientific (and maybe surveillance) orbital reentry vehicles.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPECULATION:
Also ... as a curiosity ... and not to sound like a crackpot ... what does
the military currently know or speculate about the existance of UFO's with
extraterresterial origin and/or the recent spat of reports of abductions
or medical experiments performed on noncooperative terresterial subjects?
Is this mass hysteria - or is there some real evidence underlaying reports.
Daniel F Boyd
From Daniel F Boyd <bo...@acsu.buffalo.edu>
In article <Bx97o...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>
nt...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Iskandar Taib) writes:
> What about using an existing commercial or military transport
> airframe as a basis for a new bomber? What about something based on
> the 767, or a 747 variant for instance?
The wing spar is in the way. There is no place to put the bomb bay
because both these aircraft are low-winged, with the wing going
underneath the fuselage. This puts the wing spar right where you want
to put the bomb bay.
Also, 747s and 767s are designed to carry the weight of people
distributed throughout the cabin, and they're not designed for the
stresses you would get when you let go of the bombs -- the plane loses
a lot of weight in a hurry, and 7X7s don't do that.
> Would this cost less?
Probably not enough less to make it worth it. If the Air Force needs
a carpet-bombing plane then they'll ask for one -- and it will
probably have efficient turbofan engines and so on that Boeing learned
how to build/use when making the 767, a more efficient wing, all sorts
of things. But it won't be the same plane, because the basic airframe
of a bomber and a transport have different needs.
Also, remember that, for the foreseeable future at least, the B-52 and
the B-1 fill the Air Force's needs. Conventional area bombing can be
done with the B-52s until they wear out; then the B-1 can take over
the whole mission. A B-1 can carry a larger conventional bombload
than a B-52, and they can go faster, so you could probably fly two or
three missions in a day with B-1s versus one mission for the B-52s.
Conventional area bombing is of questionable military value at best;
even in WWII when the Allies were pounding Germany day and night,
German war production increased every month right up to the end of the
war. The B-52s from Guam trucking huge bombloads over North Viet Nam
didn't help us win Vietnam. True, they demoralized the Iraqi army,
but Iraq doesn't count because they were poorly organized in the first
place. (Suppose we had to fight well-trained committed Syrians
instead of poorly-trained 'I'd-rather-be-in-Philadelphia' Iraqis?)
It's better to send F-111s over with LGBs to take out every power
plant and TV station in the country than it is to send a flight of
B-52s over with MK84s to flatten five square miles of random
territory.
We could always buy some Bears -- but given the known shoddy state of
Soviet military production, would YOU want to fly in one?
--
Daniel F. Boyd -- bo...@cs.buffalo.edu -a +X -x -e -m -S -F"> "
----------------------------------------------------------------------
((lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x)))
(quote (lambda (x) (list x (list (quote quote) x)))))
Ethan L Mckinney
From mcki...@athena.mit.edu (Ethan L Mckinney)
Don't forget, though, Boeing proposed a 747 variant as a cruise-missile carrier
to replace the B-52. Would have given us a lot more value than the B-1 ever
will...
Thomas Schoene
From w...@vax5.cit.cornell.edu (Thomas Schoene)
In article <BxEvt...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>,
Daniel F Boyd <bo...@acsu.buffalo.edu> writes:
>
> From Daniel F Boyd <bo...@acsu.buffalo.edu>
>
> In article <Bx97o...@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>
> nt...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Iskandar Taib) writes:
>> What about using an existing commercial or military transport
>> airframe as a basis for a new bomber? What about something based on
>> the 767, or a 747 variant for instance?
>
> The wing spar is in the way. There is no place to put the bomb bay
> because both these aircraft are low-winged, with the wing going
> underneath the fuselage. This puts the wing spar right where you want
> to put the bomb bay.
>
> Also, 747s and 767s are designed to carry the weight of people
> distributed throughout the cabin, and they're not designed for the
> stresses you would get when you let go of the bombs -- the plane loses
> a lot of weight in a hurry, and 7X7s don't do that.
Even more problematic: 7X7's (and their MD and Airbus counterparts) aren't
designed with low altitude, high speed flight in mind. The airframe isn't
designed for it, nor is the airframe designed with any radar minimizing
features, etc, et multiple cetera.
>
>> Would this cost less?
>
> Probably not enough less to make it worth it. If the Air Force needs
> a carpet-bombing plane then they'll ask for one -- and it will
> probably have efficient turbofan engines and so on that Boeing learned
> how to build/use when making the 767, a more efficient wing, all sorts
> of things. But it won't be the same plane, because the basic airframe
> of a bomber and a transport have different needs.
>
Of course the 747 was seriously proposed as a cruise missile carrier sometime
in the '70s I think. The proposal had 100+ ALCMs launched through a hatch at
the rear of the airframe. In the event, old B-52s were already on hand so they
were used instead (with fewer ALCMs but 100+ per aicraft would have been a
little like putting all of one's eggs in one basket anyway.)
>[commets on the relative utility of various bombers deleted]
--
Tom Schoene
w...@cornella.cit.cornell.edu -or- w...@vax5.cit.cornell.edu
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Back off man. I'm a political scientist!
Gary Coffman
From Gary Coffman <ke4zv!ga...@gatech.edu>
I'd suggest that neither option is very cost effective. Any aircraft that
can't penetrate and drop iron bombs probably isn't very useful in today's
threat environment. Firing multi-million dollar cruise missiles only
makes sense if they're nuclear tipped, or after an extremely high value
target. Most of the warfare we're likely to face in the near future
will be better served by lots of iron bombs on the heavies, and guided
bombs on strike aircraft.
The B1 was designed to penetrate extremely strong air defenses, such as
were claimed for the XUSSR. However, a Cessna penetrated those vaunted
defenses, while the XUSSR *did* manage to down a 747 after a lot of
fumbling around, so perhaps the B1 is more than slightly a case of
overkill for that mission and perhaps the 747 isn't really up to the job.
About the only places where we're likely to encounter very strong air
defenses today are over former North Vietnam or North Korea.
For most scenarios, the B52 fills the bill for a heavy. What we need is
a cost effective replacement for those antiques that can carry lots of
iron bombs for softening up ground troops.
Gary