Iran's Naval Strategy Today

[Dennis]

Interesting!

Dennis

[pic - Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard practice attacking a naval vessel
during military exercises in the Persian Gulf.]

October 25th, 2011
10:30 AM ET

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/25/tehrans-new-plan-to-
dominate-the-region-and-beyond/

Tehran's new plan to dominate the region - and beyond

Editor's Note: W. Jonathan Rue is a Senior Research Analyst at the
Institute for the Study of War. A former active duty Marine officer, he
served in Iraq from 2009–2010.

By W. Jonathan Rue, Foreign Affairs

While much of the world's attention focuses on Iran's nuclear program,
Tehran has made considerable progress on another security front in recent
years - steadily increasing the reach and lethality of its naval forces.
The goal by 2025, if all goes as the country has planned, is to have a
navy that can deploy anywhere within a strategic triangle from the Strait
of Hormuz to the Red Sea to the Strait of Malacca.

Should such plans materialize - and Iran is making steady progress -
Tehran would redraw the strategic calculus of an already volatile region.
The Persian Gulf is home to some of the world's most valuable supply
lines, routes that are vital to the global energy supply. In the last few
years, Iran has invested heavily in a domestic defense industry that now
has the ability to produce large-scale warships, submarines, and
missiles.

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Iran has largely pursued a
strategy of deterrence. Its ground forces, which number roughly 450,000,
are trained and equipped to fight a prolonged, asymmetric defensive
battle on its own territory. Likewise, Iran's air force can protect high
value domestic targets such as the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and
numerous military and political headquarters inside Tehran; it is
incapable of long-range strike missions abroad. Iran simply does not
possess the capability to project hard power into neighboring states.

But Iran's navy is different. It is the best organized, best trained, and
best equipped service of the country's conventional military
establishment. More than a nuclear weapons program, which would likely
function as a passive deterrent, Iran's navy is an active component of
Iran's activist foreign policy. The country's leadership, including
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has repeatedly said that Iran's
navy is the critical foundation on which its long-term development and
prosperity rests.

Iran actually has two navies - the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN)
and the vaunted Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN). The
responsibilities of both have been expanding since 2007. The IRIN
operates conventional surface and subsurface platforms and fulfills a
more traditional naval role. It is now responsible for the Caspian Sea,
the Gulf of Oman, and the blue waters outside the Persian Gulf. The
IRGCN, which executes asymmetric operations with swarms of small boats
that overwhelm the defenses of larger ships, has been tasked with
defending the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. This reorganization
reflects Tehran's desire to be a naval power that can deploy and operate
well outside Persian Gulf waters (via the IRIN) while still retaining
formidable coastal defenses in the Persian Gulf (via the IRGCN).

Evidence of Iran's growing naval assertiveness is already on display. In
December 2010, Iran participated in a training exercise with Djibouti
during a port call there. Tehran sailed away from that engagement with a
partnership agreement that could allow Iran to use Djibouti as a
logistical base supporting a larger and persistent Iranian presence in
the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Two months later, for the first time
since 1979, Iran sent two ships through the Suez Canal to the Eastern
Mediterranean, inducing the ire of both Israel and the United States.
Neither country retaliated, but Israel closely tracked the ships as they
sailed along the Israeli coast. This summer, Iran sent one of its Kilo
class submarines to the Red Sea on a counter-piracy operation. Finally,
Iran recently asserted plans to send naval patrols to the Western
Atlantic. Although Iran probably doesn't have the capacity for such a
mission, this kind of rhetoric speaks to Tehran's grand ambitions and is
a way of emphasizing what it sees as the illegitimacy of the U.S. naval
presence in the Persian Gulf.

On numerous occasions in recent years, IRGCN small boats have come
dangerously close to U.S. and Western naval ships operating in the
Persian Gulf. By all accounts, this is not an abnormal occurrence and
usually ends with the small boat being turned away. But a recent change
has increased the danger of escalation. Since 2005, Iran has been
decentralizing command and control, not requiring subordinate commanders
to get approval for all actions from senior leaders in Tehran. Thus, an
IRGCN boat commander was able to take the initiative and capture a small
crew of British sailors in 2007, a tactical action with strategic
consequences. Should the IRGCN become more assertive, such engagements
could spiral out of control.

Iran's emboldened navy is also increasing the country's influence
throughout the region. The navy is the only service with the operational
reach to visit countries that do not share a border with Iran. These
visits help foster good political relations, but, more important, they
provide a foundation for military-to-military ties that can also yield
operational benefits. For example, using ports in places such as Djibouti
as resupply points allows Iran to increase the length and duration of
deployments to waters outside its navy's traditional areas of operation.
More worryingly, such an extended reach could also allow the IRIN to
deliver weapons to various Iranian proxy groups abroad.

Moreover, the United States must now contend with the presence of IRIN
ships well outside the Persian Gulf. This has enormous implications for
U.S. military planners and commanders - for example, it could force the
U.S. Navy to implement increased force protection measures in waters,
such as the Red Sea, that were once considered less volatile. Iran could
soon have the ability to deny the U.S. entry through the Strait of Hormuz
and into the Persian Gulf.

In many ways, the origins of Iran's naval buildup stem from embargoes
that the U.S. slapped on Tehran during its war with Iraq, more than two
decades ago. Since then, Tehran has sought what it calls "self-
sufficiency." It has invested heavily in a domestic defense industrial
base. Employing Chinese, Russian, and North Korean technology, Iran has
begun building its own ships, submarines, and missiles.

That industry is now producing. In 2010, the IRIN put its first
domestically manufactured traditional surface combatant, the Mowj class
destroyer, to sea. Tehran has also built four Combattante II class guided
missile patrol boats. In August 2010, it expanded the Peykaap/Tir class
line, a fast-attack craft capable of carrying anti-ship cruise missiles
and hitting a cruising speed of 55 knots. The U.S. Office of Naval
Intelligence says that these programs "demonstrate Iran's ability to
produce mid- to large-size ships" and "will likely be followed by
others."

Iran is also producing its own submarines and missiles. It has added
multiple Ghadir class mini-subs to its order of battle since the
reorganization. In 2007, Iran had only three in service. Now it has
eleven, with another nine expected in the next three years. In 2008
Tehran announced the opening of a production line for a larger, more
potent submarine platform, the 1,000 ton Qa'em class. It is working on
its own missile designs, too, by reverse-engineering older Chinese
models. The IRGCN test fired one such missile last spring, claiming an
effective range of 186 miles. Last month, Tehran announced that it had
begun full production of one based on those tests.

Reaction to the buildup in the Gulf has been mixed. For most of the six
states that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran's nuclear program
remains the dominant regional security concern. With the United States'
Fifth Fleet stationed in Bahrain and serving as the prime guarantor of
maritime security across the region, the GCC has displayed little angst
over Iran's growing naval power. Saudi Arabia, however, has been taking
Tehran's growing assertiveness seriously. According to news reports,
Riyadh is looking to spend another $30 billion to upgrade the Royal Saudi
Navy (on top of the $60 billion arms deal that Washington and Riyadh
signed in 2010). Final word on the new agreement could be announced by
the end of the year.

Washington, meanwhile, has responded in a few different ways. Then
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen suggested last
month that Tehran and Washington link up a hotline to avoid
miscommunication and prevent accidental tactical naval engagements from
spiraling out of control. Tehran rejected the idea, presumably because it
would give legitimacy to an ongoing U.S. naval presence in the Persian
Gulf. Asked about Iran's September announcement that it would deploy
naval vessels to the U.S. Atlantic coast, White House spokesman Jay
Carney dismissed the possibility, saying that the White House did not
take such pronouncements seriously.

Iran will obviously never reach naval parity with the United States, but
the GCC countries, even with their newer, Western-supplied ships, would
likely find themselves on the losing end of a naval engagement with Iran,
mainly because of their minimal force numbers and their inability to
coordinate any naval campaign. As long as the United States continues to
provide maritime security in the Middle East, the GCC will be able to
rest easy. But Iran has a head start and the GCC should start thinking
about implementing a naval modernization and development plan of its own.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of W. Jonathan Rue
Post by: W. Jonathan Rue

[Andrew Swallow]

On 25/10/2011 22:31, Dennis wrote:
{snip}

> {snip} The

> IRGCN, which executes asymmetric operations with swarms of small boats
> that overwhelm the defenses of larger ships, has been tasked with

> defending the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.{snip}

That sounds like infantry tactics/tank applied to the sea. These small
boats have thin hulls so mortar fire, shrapnel or RPG rounds may sink
them. For a swarm the RPG equivalent of a machine gun will be useful.
Since the boats move the mark 2 could be fitted with a laser designator.

For a fast deployment supply every ship in the Persian Gulf and Strait
of Hormuz with several RPG-7 launches. Train the sailors in using them
from moving ships.

Andrew Swallow

[William Black]

On 25/10/11 22:31, Dennis wrote:
> Interesting!
>
> Dennis
>
> [pic - Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard practice attacking a naval vessel
> during military exercises in the Persian Gulf.]
>
> October 25th, 2011
> 10:30 AM ET
>
> http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/25/tehrans-new-plan-to-
> dominate-the-region-and-beyond/
>
> Tehran's new plan to dominate the region - and beyond
>
> Editor's Note: W. Jonathan Rue is a Senior Research Analyst at the
> Institute for the Study of War. A former active duty Marine officer, he
> served in Iraq from 2009–2010.
>
> By W. Jonathan Rue, Foreign Affairs
>
> While much of the world's attention focuses on Iran's nuclear program,
> Tehran has made considerable progress on another security front in recent
> years - steadily increasing the reach and lethality of its naval forces.
> The goal by 2025, if all goes as the country has planned, is to have a
> navy that can deploy anywhere within a strategic triangle from the Strait
> of Hormuz to the Red Sea to the Strait of Malacca.
>

Is it budget time for the US Navy again?

--
William Black

Free men have open minds
If you want loyalty, buy a dog...

[Jonathan]

"Dennis" <tsalagi...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:Xns9F89A81445046ts...@130.133.4.11...

>
> Interesting!
>
> Dennis
>
> [pic - Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard practice attacking a naval vessel
> during military exercises in the Persian Gulf.]
>
> October 25th, 2011
> 10:30 AM ET
>
> http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/25/tehrans-new-plan-to-

> dominate-the-region-and-beyond/
>

> Tehran's new plan to dominate the region - and beyond

New plan? Or are we reading that article now because
Iran is the new target? I think we shouldn't push Iran
too hard and let nature take it course.

Dictatorships seem to have a way of flying apart
just about the same time their political or military
strength peaks. Accelerating viscous cycles of
resistance and repression, wars or corruption, with
an ending as certain as a glass hitting the floor.
Such an event can't be mistaken for anything else.

So, like with Libya, the west should wait with Iran until 'it'
happens, until it's obvious, And not force the issue
as in Iraq. The difference is night-and-day, as with
Libya and Iraq.

Have faith in the system dynamics of a very rigid system
under great stress. 'It' always finds a way of happening.

It's like in the Austin Powers movie, the henchmen should just
accept the inevitable, and all fall down. The reason why
is easy to see. Nature takes over much like a fluid moving
down a hill, without constant effort the dam eventually bursts.

Even the Dictators should know all this by now.


Jonathan


"You cannot put a fire out;
A thing that can ignite
Can go, itself, without a fan
Upon the slowest night.

You cannot fold a flood
And put it in a drawer,-
Because the winds would find it out,
And tell your cedar floor."



By E Dickinson (1830-1886)



s

[vaughn]

"Jonathan" <wr...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:R4idnQCg9vFvvjXT...@giganews.com...

>
> Dictatorships seem to have a way of flying apart
> just about the same time their political or military
> strength peaks.

Then how do we explain Cuba and N. Korea? Both of these, (particularly Cuba)
peaked decades ago.

Vaughn

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 26/10/2011 19:15, vaughn ha scritto:

>> Dictatorships seem to have a way of flying apart
>> just about the same time their political or military
>> strength peaks.
>
> Then how do we explain Cuba and N. Korea? Both of these, (particularly Cuba)
> peaked decades ago.

Because Fidel has the cunning of leaving freedom of choicing the free
side, whose happens to be just offshore, and the avg. Cuban in Cuba is
more or less sympathetic with the Cuban regime.

NK, OTOH, remained so backward that the appalling cost of bringing it on
at least free countries's basic standards keep it into the juche regime.

Best regards from Italy,
dott. Piergiorgio

[Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.]

You don't. It was nonsense. Obvious. ("Jonathan" makes up crap to fit his politics.)
;-)

[vaughn]

"dott.Piergiorgio" <chied...@ask.me> wrote in message
news:3gYpq.90168$GZ3....@tornado.fastwebnet.it...

> and the avg. Cuban in Cuba is more or less sympathetic with the Cuban regime.

I'll admit that I've never had the chance to meet a Cuban "in Cuba". That said,
I've known many Cubans here in the USA, known them good enough for them to speak
freely to me. None was even a tiny bit sympathetic with the Cuban regime.

I think the average Cuban "in Cuba" is not political. They just want a better
life and are very busy trying to make a living under nearly impossible
circumstances. Also, remember that over the last several decades, the
smartest, the hardest working, and the most resourceful of the Cuban population
have left. What does that say for those that remain?.

Vaughn

[Ray O'Hara]

"William Black" <black...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:j88j0o$hpb$3...@dont-email.me...

Well they can't use the "Sverdlovsk cruiser threat" anymore.
one wonders how these "swarms" of boats do in the face of straffing runs by
fighters.

[William Black]

I imagine they'd use helicopters.

It's cheaper and probably faster if you want to make sure you hit
everything.

What does the US Navy use instead of Sea Skua?

They used to have some Penguins but I think they'll be over by now.

[William Black]

On 26/10/11 20:58, vaughn wrote:

> Also, remember that over the last several decades, the
> smartest, the hardest working, and the most resourceful of the Cuban population
> have left.

Along with most of the criminals...

[Dennis]

Jonathan wrote:

>> Tehran's new plan to dominate the region - and beyond
>
> New plan? Or are we reading that article now because
> Iran is the new target? I think we shouldn't push Iran
> too hard and let nature take it course.
>
> Dictatorships seem to have a way of flying apart
> just about the same time their political or military
> strength peaks. Accelerating viscous cycles of
> resistance and repression, wars or corruption, with
> an ending as certain as a glass hitting the floor.
> Such an event can't be mistaken for anything else.
>
> So, like with Libya, the west should wait with Iran until 'it'
> happens, until it's obvious, And not force the issue
> as in Iraq. The difference is night-and-day, as with
> Libya and Iraq.
>
> Have faith in the system dynamics of a very rigid system
> under great stress. 'It' always finds a way of happening.
>
> It's like in the Austin Powers movie, the henchmen should just
> accept the inevitable, and all fall down. The reason why
> is easy to see. Nature takes over much like a fluid moving
> down a hill, without constant effort the dam eventually bursts.

Mostly agree. Of course, their knowing that our naval resources can mop
the deck with theirs helps stress their system further. So some counter
to this would be wise - and as other posters say, should hardly be
expensive.

It'd be good if we could help the rebels in Syria, because that'd remove
Iran's last significant ally. I tried to restart the discussion of this
but no one bit. (Unfortunately, I don't see how we could do it; Syria
isn't Libya.)

> Even the Dictators should know all this by now.

Dictators are dickheads!

Or, perhaps, how do you get off a tiger without getting eaten?

> "You cannot put a fire out;
> A thing that can ignite
> Can go, itself, without a fan
> Upon the slowest night.
>
> You cannot fold a flood
> And put it in a drawer,-
> Because the winds would find it out,
> And tell your cedar floor."
>
>
>
> By E Dickinson (1830-1886)

"We didn't start the fire
It's been always burning
Since the world's been turning...

by Billy Joel

[vaughn]

"William Black" <black...@gmail.com> wrote in message

news:j89pdg$i7$1...@dont-email.me...

>> Well they can't use the "Sverdlovsk cruiser threat" anymore.
>> one wonders how these "swarms" of boats do in the face of straffing runs by
>> fighters.
>>
>>
> I imagine they'd use helicopters.
>
> It's cheaper and probably faster if you want to make sure you hit everything.
>
> What does the US Navy use instead of Sea Skua?
>
> They used to have some Penguins but I think they'll be over by now.

Phalanx?

[William Black]

Not enough range.

Even those old Chinese 'Osa' class boats carry something that'll carry
about fifty miles.

You need to reach out and touch them...

[Paul J. Adam]

On 26/10/2011 21:09, William Black wrote:
> I imagine they'd use helicopters.
>
> It's cheaper and probably faster if you want to make sure you hit
> everything.
>
> What does the US Navy use instead of Sea Skua?
>
> They used to have some Penguins but I think they'll be over by now.

Hellfire quad-packs seem to be quite popular on USN Seahawks in surface
mode.

A bit small for something like a Nanuchka (the original design driver
for Skua, setting warhead size and standoff range) but practically ideal
for Boghammars and the like.


--
He thinks too much, such men are dangerous.

[dott.Piergiorgio]

It's more or less the same issue Italy has; in the last 30 or so years
here in Italy happens a large emigration of brains, whose have led
ultimately to the current sore state and extremely serious issues here,
and not only here.....

the Italian variant is more serious because even after the inevitable
bringing down of the dwarf, said best and brightest people hardly will
return back, when I'm confident that Cuban emigres will have all
motivations, not only ideological, to return to sort out the issues in
their home country.

Best regards from Italy,
dott. Piergiorgio.

[Chris]

On Oct 26, 6:36 pm, "dott.Piergiorgio" <chiedet...@ask.me> wrote:

> the Italian variant is more serious because even after the inevitable
> bringing down of the dwarf, said best and brightest people hardly will
> return back, when I'm confident that Cuban emigres will have all
> motivations, not only ideological, to return to sort out the issues in
> their home country.

Unfortunately, that is not necessarily a good thing for Cuba: a major
problem observed both in Iraq and Afghanistan was that the when the
emigres returned they had difficulty relating to the people who had
stayed behind- the vast majority of people involved. It turned out
that the culture had moved on on the many years since they left, and
someone like Hamid Karzai (who except for a few years in the middle
'90's had been living outside of Afghanistan since 1979- either in
India or in Pakistan, when he became Chairman of the Transitional
Administration in Bonn) had trouble understanding the mindset of
someone who had survived the Soviets, Najibullah, and the Taliban.
There was a lot of resentment by those who stayed, and a lot of
frustration of those who returned. The book _Assassins Gate_ by George
Packer takes as one of its subjects Kanan Makyia, who became a British
citizen in 1982 and was a major proponent of the invasion of Iraq in
2003, and his growing frustration in dealing with those who stayed
behind (among the first of the exiles to return in 2003, he ended up
leaving in 2006). His decades of living in the west left him
unprepared for the mindset that allowed people to survive in Iraq, and
the fact that those he did talk to in Iraq were the few dedicated
enough to risk their lives left him with a skewed view of the average
man on the street's opinions.

As for Italy, I tend to think that a bigger problem for Italy is
cultural[1]: it seems plausible to me that the 1980's excellent
Italian GDP growth (il sorpasso) squeezed all that could be out of the
male workforce, and in order to continue the economic growth Italy
needs to do a better job on bringing women into the workforce. The
difference between male and female employment rates in Italy is
particularly enormous, over 20%, and represents the most obvious low-
hanging fruit to increasing Italian economic growth. This is obviously
a very difficult question, one that everyone is struggling with, but I
do observe that there seems to be a relationship between economic
growth since 1990 and female workforce participation (or more
precisely, the difference between male and female workforce
participation)

[1]: http://www.economist.com/node/15174418

Chris Manteuffel

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 27/10/2011 19:53, Chris ha scritto:

> As for Italy, I tend to think that a bigger problem for Italy is
> cultural[1]: it seems plausible to me that the 1980's excellent
> Italian GDP growth (il sorpasso) squeezed all that could be out of the
> male workforce, and in order to continue the economic growth Italy
> needs to do a better job on bringing women into the workforce. The
> difference between male and female employment rates in Italy is
> particularly enormous, over 20%, and represents the most obvious low-
> hanging fruit to increasing Italian economic growth. This is obviously
> a very difficult question, one that everyone is struggling with, but I
> do observe that there seems to be a relationship between economic
> growth since 1990 and female workforce participation (or more
> precisely, the difference between male and female workforce
> participation)

mmmm.... Aside that what was squeezed out during is from a (not only
male) workforce of ever-shrinking quality (for the reasons cited above)
and agreeing that issues in workplaces can be rather serious, not only
because of the now-too-well-known defects of Italian male behaviour, but
also of the lingering Marxism of workers and union (the
FIAT-Marchionne-union conflict being a case in point, and if you follow
the Economist, surely you known on this)

aside the dwarf's mis-behaviour, womens in politics, esp. pretty, are
systematically rumoured to having built their career around their body
(to put it in gentlemen's term of sort....)

but generally I don't think that the issue can have a large impact on
the recovery of the "escaped brains"; Italians in general are apt to
adapt, and people of high intelligence (whose is the main trait of
Italian emigres of the last 30 or so years) ought to known that patience
and time is the best way to influence a mindset.

[David E. Powell]

Convoy your ships, provide escort, and when lightly armed, light
hulled craft swarm, activate the OTO/Melara 76s or similar weapons and
win a nice rubber ducky.

The big worry, I'd think, would be Iran's ability to use small boats
for infiltration, or outright invasion. I am guessing they have worked
up their small boat and special ops stuff quite a lot, and have quite
a few people who wouldn't mind a one way trip.

[Tankfixer]

In article <j89pdg$i7$1...@dont-email.me>, - William Black
black...@gmail.com spouted !

>
> On 26/10/11 21:01, Ray O'Hara wrote:
> > "William Black"<black...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> > news:j88j0o$hpb$3...@dont-email.me...
> >> On 25/10/11 22:31, Dennis wrote:
> >>> Interesting!
> >>>
> >>> Dennis
> >>>
> >>> [pic - Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard practice attacking a naval vessel
> >>> during military exercises in the Persian Gulf.]
> >>>
> >>> October 25th, 2011
> >>> 10:30 AM ET
> >>>
> >>> http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/25/tehrans-new-plan-to-
> >>> dominate-the-region-and-beyond/
> >>>
> >>> Tehran's new plan to dominate the region - and beyond
> >>>
> >>> Editor's Note: W. Jonathan Rue is a Senior Research Analyst at the
> >>> Institute for the Study of War. A former active duty Marine officer, he

> >>> served in Iraq from 2009?2010.

> >>>
> >>> By W. Jonathan Rue, Foreign Affairs
> >>>
> >>> While much of the world's attention focuses on Iran's nuclear program,
> >>> Tehran has made considerable progress on another security front in recent
> >>> years - steadily increasing the reach and lethality of its naval forces.
> >>> The goal by 2025, if all goes as the country has planned, is to have a
> >>> navy that can deploy anywhere within a strategic triangle from the Strait
> >>> of Hormuz to the Red Sea to the Strait of Malacca.
> >>>
> >>
> >> Is it budget time for the US Navy again?
> >>
> >
> >
> > Well they can't use the "Sverdlovsk cruiser threat" anymore.
> > one wonders how these "swarms" of boats do in the face of straffing runs by
> > fighters.
> >
> >
> I imagine they'd use helicopters.
>
> It's cheaper and probably faster if you want to make sure you hit
> everything.
>
> What does the US Navy use instead of Sea Skua?

AGM-114 Hellfire