British BB post WW1

[ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk]

Unlike other navies the RN refitted all the 15 inch ships after 1918
except for Hood. The RS and QE classes got bulges, improved deck armour
and increased AA. Renown and Repulse got increased belt armour and the
other improvements. Some weight compensation was achieved by reducing
secondary armament.

Bulging greatly improved torpedo protection and increased buoyancy
which helped with the other changes. On all ships main deck armour was
increased to 3 inches plus.

While these ships were obviously inferior to the complete rebuilds
done later and those ships rebuilt by other navies I would argue that
they were far less of a death trap than some other WW1 ships that saw
service in WW2


Ken Young

[Eugene Griessel]

On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 09:36:56 -0500, ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:

> Unlike other navies the RN refitted all the 15 inch ships after 1918
>except for Hood. The RS and QE classes got bulges, improved deck armour
>and increased AA. Renown and Repulse got increased belt armour and the
>other improvements. Some weight compensation was achieved by reducing
>secondary armament.

Are you sure the Rs got increased deck armour?

Eugene L Griessel

Eagles may soar, but weasels aren't sucked into jet engines.

[Andy Breen]

On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 16:46:23 +0200, Eugene Griessel wrote:

> On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 09:36:56 -0500, ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
>
>> Unlike other navies the RN refitted all the 15 inch ships after 1918

The QEs were certainly the most useful of the WW1-era ships that any navy
had - not only better armed than most/any but usefully faster. They were
certainly worth investing in (as was shown by the bulk of them getting
two rebuilds between the wars).

The Rs.. a harder case to make, but still well-armed and worth spending a
smaller amount on to keep them useful into the 1930s - which is pretty
much what happened. They were due to go as the KG5s came out.

Refit and Repair.. of marginal use as they stood, but capable of being
turned into useful carrier escorts/raider hunters. Obviously considered
to be of enough potential for Renown to have three significant rebuilds
(the last, in 1944-5, was a thorough waste of money, mind..).

>>except for Hood.

'ood was good enough to 'do' until the 1930s as she was. I believe that
she was next for rebuild after Renown completed..

> The RS and QE classes got bulges, improved deck armour
>>and increased AA. Renown and Repulse got increased belt armour and the
>>other improvements. Some weight compensation was achieved by reducing
>>secondary armament.
>
> Are you sure the Rs got increased deck armour?

I'm sure I've read of some additional plate laid on top of the existing
decks in places - over magazines, I think.

--
Speaking only for myself

[Eugene Griessel]

On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 14:57:08 +0000 (UTC), Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk>

I can only find references to torpedo bulges and AA weapons. Not that
my battleship library is terribly extensive.

Eugene L Griessel

A poet who reads his verse in public may have other nasty habits.

[Eugene Griessel]

Oh, and a catapault on two of them.

Eugene L Griessel

If God wanted us to be brave, why did he give us legs?

[Peter Skelton]

On 26/10/2011 11:05 AM, Eugene Griessel wrote:

>>> Are you sure the Rs got increased deck armour?
>>

>

The deck armour is mentioned in Conway, but there is better information
in Raven and ROberts. From memory, some of the work was done in WWI and
more during various refits

--
Peter

[Andy Breen]

Brown, Nelson to Vanguard, p.151:

"Royal Oak had a two-year refit starting in June 1934 in which she was
given 900 tons of armour, 4in NC over the magazines and 2.5in over the
engine rooms; in both cases over existing 1in plate. She had the usual
package of four twin 4in AA and pompoms with a catapult on X turret. The
other four Royal Sovereigns had enhanced AA armament but no extra armour
before the war"

It sounds like the RO rebuild was not considered worth repeating, and the
plan switched to more radical upgrades for the QEs and scrapping for the
RS class as the KG5s arrived.

[Dennis]

Eugene Griessel wrote:

> On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 17:05:03 +0200, Eugene Griessel

> .co.za> wrote:
>
>>On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 14:57:08 +0000 (UTC), Andy Breen .ac.uk>

>>wrote:
>>
>>>On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 16:46:23 +0200, Eugene Griessel wrote:
>>>
>>>> Are you sure the Rs got increased deck armour?
>>>
>>>I'm sure I've read of some additional plate laid on top of the
>>>existing decks in places - over magazines, I think.
>>
>>I can only find references to torpedo bulges and AA weapons. Not that
>>my battleship library is terribly extensive.
>
> Oh, and a catapault on two of them.

Now, that *is* an antiquated weapon! No wonder they were scraped! ;-)

Dennis

[dott.Piergiorgio]

I would also point that, as seems (because the final mod design was
still not fully defined by sep,39) the Hood modernization will have as
result a ship comparable to HMS Vanguard (or, put in other terms, HMS
Vanguard was the Hood replacement)

and I don't consider "obviously inferior" the QE re. Italian Cs and Ds,
they at worst are on par, range being the same, and superior hitting
power definitively compensating the inferior speed (actually
battle-tested, at Punta Stilo/Off Calabria)

what mod British Battleship was indeed obviously inferior are the Rs,
whose Med performance is rather unsatisfactory, too often ending left
behind during engagements by everyone else, italian and British, but at
least there have done an excellent service with Atlantic Convoys,
covering the central atlantic gap against raiders, until there was
enough radars to give EW to the escorts (many having traded the
torpedoes for more ASW weaponry, or even lacking torps)

Best regards from Italy,
dott. Piergiorgio.

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 26/10/2011 17:20, Andy Breen ha scritto:

> "Royal Oak had a two-year refit starting in June 1934 in which she was
> given 900 tons of armour, 4in NC over the magazines and 2.5in over the
> engine rooms; in both cases over existing 1in plate. She had the usual
> package of four twin 4in AA and pompoms with a catapult on X turret. The
> other four Royal Sovereigns had enhanced AA armament but no extra armour
> before the war"
>
> It sounds like the RO rebuild was not considered worth repeating, and the
> plan switched to more radical upgrades for the QEs and scrapping for the
> RS class as the KG5s arrived.

off my hat, I don't remember if RO's improved deck armour was also at
the cost of a reduction in bulge protection, was so or not ? (a poignant
question, I fear...)

Best regards from Italy

[Andy Breen]

Not mentioned by Brown, and I think that he would have had it had an
impact on her loss.

[Andy Breen]

On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 23:24:32 +0200, dott.Piergiorgio wrote:

> Il 26/10/2011 16:36, ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk ha scritto:
>> Unlike other navies the RN refitted all the 15 inch ships after 1918
>> except for Hood. The RS and QE classes got bulges, improved deck armour
>> and increased AA. Renown and Repulse got increased belt armour and the
>> other improvements. Some weight compensation was achieved by reducing
>> secondary armament.
>>
>> Bulging greatly improved torpedo protection and increased buoyancy
>> which helped with the other changes. On all ships main deck armour was
>> increased to 3 inches plus.
>>
>> While these ships were obviously inferior to the complete rebuilds
>> done later and those ships rebuilt by other navies I would argue that
>> they were far less of a death trap than some other WW1 ships that saw
>> service in WW2
>
> I would also point that, as seems (because the final mod design was
> still not fully defined by sep,39) the Hood modernization will have as
> result a ship comparable to HMS Vanguard (or, put in other terms, HMS
> Vanguard was the Hood replacement)

As the Vanguard design began life as a "battlecruiser"[1] (and was still
occasionally referred to as such as she approached completion), there's a
lot of truth there - though more in role than as a direct replacement.

The Vanguard design was begun in 1937, after studies had shown that a
viable 35000t design could be produced to carry the ex-Wierd Sisters 15"
mountings. She grew a bit after it was decided to use the same machinery
as the Lion class (Brown, N to V, p.37)

> and I don't consider "obviously inferior" the QE re. Italian Cs and Ds,
> they at worst are on par, range being the same, and superior hitting
> power definitively compensating the inferior speed (actually
> battle-tested, at Punta Stilo/Off Calabria)

The Cs and Ds went through a /very/ radical reconstruction, more so than
the most ambitious RN rebuilds (Valiant, QE, Renown). I was thinking of
the ships as they were in the middle 1920s

> what mod British Battleship was indeed obviously inferior are the Rs,
> whose Med performance is rather unsatisfactory, too often ending left
> behind during engagements by everyone else, italian and British, but at
> least there have done an excellent service with Atlantic Convoys,
> covering the central atlantic gap against raiders, until there was
> enough radars to give EW to the escorts (many having traded the
> torpedoes for more ASW weaponry, or even lacking torps)

The Rs were really coming to the end of their useful lives[2] with the
1930s, and another few years of peace would have seen them gone. Like
other obsolete ships in other wars, they saw a lot of useful service in
alternative roles.

[1] Even though the original design had a thicker - though shallower -
belt than the final ship

[2] In particular, they were maxed out on topweight and their machinery
was right at the end of its teather, as witness their woeful sea speeds.

[Andy Breen]

On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 23:24:32 +0200, dott.Piergiorgio wrote:

> what mod British Battleship was indeed obviously inferior are the Rs,
> whose Med performance is rather unsatisfactory,

The RN was not unaware of their deficiences, even pre-war: Brown, N to V,
p.151 gives the footnote:

Goodall, 14 Mar 1939. '1st Sea Lord sent for me re Royal Sovereigns. I
said to send them to fight up to date capital ships would be murder. He
agreed'

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 26/10/2011 23:42, Andy Breen ha scritto:

> [1] Even though the original design had a thicker - though shallower -
> belt than the final ship

Interesting ! sadly the browns are hard to find here....

> [2] In particular, they were maxed out on topweight and their machinery
> was right at the end of its teather, as witness their woeful sea speeds.

toward the end of WW2 I can guess was so, but AFAIK in 1939-40 all Rs
save the Revenge (max speed 19kts) was still capable of doing 20-21 kts
(Revenge never served in Med during 1940-3, AFAICT....)

[Peter Skelton]

Generally speaking, adding bulges increases bouyancy making tonnage
available for deck protection. The bulged R's tended to be too whippy
for good gunnery (bulging was done early), adding top-weight slowed the
roll (later when the deck armour was upgraded the second time). One of
the unlisted good things about the R's was that they were good gunnery
platforms.

--
Peter

[Gernot Hassenpflug]

Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk> writes:

> On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 16:46:23 +0200, Eugene Griessel wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 09:36:56 -0500, ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
>>
>>> Unlike other navies the RN refitted all the 15 inch ships after 1918
>
> The QEs were certainly the most useful of the WW1-era ships that any navy
> had - not only better armed than most/any but usefully faster. They were
> certainly worth investing in (as was shown by the bulk of them getting
> two rebuilds between the wars).
>
> The Rs.. a harder case to make, but still well-armed and worth spending a
> smaller amount on to keep them useful into the 1930s - which is pretty
> much what happened. They were due to go as the KG5s came out.
>
> Refit and Repair.. of marginal use as they stood, but capable of being
> turned into useful carrier escorts/raider hunters. Obviously considered
> to be of enough potential for Renown to have three significant rebuilds
> (the last, in 1944-5, was a thorough waste of money, mind..).

I'll have to look at Roberts or Burt (I forget which it is) when I get
home, but was that last refit for *Renown* mostly AA and radar upgrades
as considered necessary for the Pacific?
--
Gernot Hassenpflug

[Andy Breen]

Pretty much, plus (IIRC) enhanced control spaces and an increase in light
AA - with 12x4.5" DP removed as topweight compensation. Not a /huge/
refit, but still probably more money than was worth spending on an old,
done ship.

[nik Simpson]

Not really fair on the Rs, since what little modernization they recieved
was largely of the form of bolting on a little extra armour and giving
them a new coat of paint. Compared to the three heavily modernized QE
(QE, Valiant & Warspite) they were pretty much in orginal condition, and
weren't a whole lot worse than Barham and Malaya which also saw little
modernization and had similarly undistinguished WW2 careers.


--
Nik Simpson

[nik Simpson]

20+ kts sustained in Rs by the outbreak of WW2 was largely something
that happened in the drunken fever dreams of the chief engineers ;-)
Barham and Malaya were having trouble at those speeds and they started
off a good few knots faster.


--
Nik Simpson

[Andy Breen]

On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 08:26:41 -0500, nik Simpson wrote:

> Not really fair on the Rs, since what little modernization they recieved
> was largely of the form of bolting on a little extra armour and giving
> them a new coat of paint. Compared to the three heavily modernized QE
> (QE, Valiant & Warspite) they were pretty much in orginal condition, and
> weren't a whole lot worse than Barham and Malaya which also saw little
> modernization and had similarly undistinguished WW2 careers.

Perfectly true - but whereas the QEs had the margin of stability to cope
with more agressive upgrades, the Rs didn't. Short of doing an Italian
Job on them, there wasn't really much that could be done to bring them up
to date beyond the first round of early-30s refettling. Thus the QEs (and
Refit and Repair, and 'ood) were considered worth elaborate
reconstruction (the fact that peacetime ran out for four of them doesn't
change this), while the Rs weren't, and would have gone in the late 1930s/
early 1940s if peace had lasted.

When new, the Rs had been not half bad - their lower stability margin
made them good gun platforms, and their only real demerit was a flawed
armour scheme (which would have been just fine if they'd been coal
burners, but was distinctly problematical with oil). They didn't have the
grown margin of the QEs, that's all.

[Andy Breen]

By early 1942 - admittedly in the warmer waters of the Indian Ocean -
Cunningham found that his Rs were 18 knot or less, all out and the ERA's
socks thrown into the furnace too.

[Andy Breen]

On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 08:29:45 -0500, nik Simpson wrote:

By early 1942 - admittedly in the warmer waters of the Indian Ocean -
Cunningham found that his Rs were 18 knot or less, all out and the ERA's
socks thrown into the furnace too.

[Eugene Griessel]

On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 13:34:41 +0000 (UTC), Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk>
wrote:

I believe the expression is: "chief stoker's sitting on the safety
valve".

Eugene L Griessel

Slang is language that has rolled up its sleeves, spat on its hands
and gone to work.

[Andy Breen]

I think that was required for anything over 12-13 knots by then.

[Eugene Griessel]

On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 13:41:09 +0000 (UTC), Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk>

wrote:

>On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 15:39:37 +0200, Eugene Griessel wrote:
>
>> On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 13:34:41 +0000 (UTC), Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>By early 1942 - admittedly in the warmer waters of the Indian Ocean -
>>>Cunningham found that his Rs were 18 knot or less, all out and the ERA's
>>>socks thrown into the furnace too.
>>
>> I believe the expression is: "chief stoker's sitting on the safety
>> valve".
>>
>
>I think that was required for anything over 12-13 knots by then.

I was watching an interview with a lady commander, the interview being
done on a minehunter while she commanded a fast attack craft.
The interviewer asked "is your ship like this one". The look of
horror that crossed the interviewee's face as she explained that this
one could only do 14 knots maximum while her boat did 36 knots was
quite something to see.

I feel for her there - I have butted about on vessels only capable of
speeds FACs could not do without disengaging some engines - and it is
deadly! The 70s minehunters could not hunt mines with the old 193
sonar at more than 2 knots. I recall talking to a chief who was
trying to encourage me to come into the squadron - I had some pithy
things to say about slow boats!

Eugene L Griessel

Some people are likable in spite of their unswerving integrity.

[nik Simpson]

On 10/27/2011 8:32 AM, Andy Breen wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 08:26:41 -0500, nik Simpson wrote:
>
>> Not really fair on the Rs, since what little modernization they recieved
>> was largely of the form of bolting on a little extra armour and giving
>> them a new coat of paint. Compared to the three heavily modernized QE

>> (QE, Valiant& Warspite) they were pretty much in orginal condition, and

>> weren't a whole lot worse than Barham and Malaya which also saw little
>> modernization and had similarly undistinguished WW2 careers.
>
> Perfectly true - but whereas the QEs had the margin of stability to cope
> with more agressive upgrades, the Rs didn't. Short of doing an Italian
> Job on them, there wasn't really much that could be done to bring them up
> to date beyond the first round of early-30s refettling. Thus the QEs (and
> Refit and Repair, and 'ood) were considered worth elaborate
> reconstruction (the fact that peacetime ran out for four of them doesn't
> change this), while the Rs weren't, and would have gone in the late 1930s/
> early 1940s if peace had lasted.
>
> When new, the Rs had been not half bad - their lower stability margin
> made them good gun platforms, and their only real demerit was a flawed
> armour scheme (which would have been just fine if they'd been coal
> burners, but was distinctly problematical with oil). They didn't have the
> grown margin of the QEs, that's all.
>

Very true, the R's were about as good as they were ever going to be the
day they commissioned in WW1, it was downhill all the way after that.

--
Nik Simpson

[Andy Breen]

On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 10:19:14 -0500, nik Simpson wrote:

> On 10/27/2011 8:32 AM, Andy Breen wrote:
>> On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 08:26:41 -0500, nik Simpson wrote:
>>
>>> Not really fair on the Rs, since what little modernization they
>>> recieved was largely of the form of bolting on a little extra armour
>>> and giving them a new coat of paint. Compared to the three heavily
>>> modernized QE (QE, Valiant& Warspite) they were pretty much in
>>> orginal condition, and weren't a whole lot worse than Barham and
>>> Malaya which also saw little modernization and had similarly
>>> undistinguished WW2 careers.

>> When new, the Rs had been not half bad - their lower stability margin
>> made them good gun platforms, and their only real demerit was a flawed
>> armour scheme (which would have been just fine if they'd been coal
>> burners, but was distinctly problematical with oil). They didn't have
>> the grown margin of the QEs, that's all.
>>

> Very true, the R's were about as good as they were ever going to be the
> day they commissioned in WW1, it was downhill all the way after that.

Which poses an interesting question - so far as the Navy (and the
country) doing the buying is concerned, the best option is likely to be
the best ship for the moment (particularly, as when the Rs were ordered,
when tensions are high..). Retrospective comment, all so often, assesses
the ships as they performed much later in their lives. Growth margin is a
good thing, the cost of including it won't be worth it if it buys fewer -
or makes for less effective ships - at the time of build.

I suspect that when the Rs were ordered, the RN was still expecting the
active service life of a capital ship to be 15-20 years, as it had across
the pre-dreadnought era. On that basis the Rs would have been in service
until 1930-34ish, at which time they were still effective ships. The
longer the service life, the harder the optimisation problem gets. This
must be a real headache for designers today.

[Andre Lieven]

Which also brings up the question of, why, when the RN already had
a new class of fast 15 inch gunned battleships (As of 1913), why would
they design an inferior and slower ship instead of building QE #6-10.

Never mind for what that would have meant come the 30s, but consider
it from the view of the Grand Fleet; Two full divisions of 24 knot 15
inch
battleships, with two extras.

The later effect of having ten ships all worth modernising in the 30s
would have been gravy. Though, one could also ask about how many
of those ships the RN could have afforded to rebuild in the late 20s/
early 30s.

When it comes to other navies rebuilding their old battle lines, it
was the two dictatorships that had the most resources for such
rebuilds, Japan and Italy. Ships being so improved that they were
even made longer. Though in the case of the Italian 12 inch ships,
they were so obsolescent that that was the bare minimum needed
for them to continue in service.

And, on the Barham, well, she did OK at Matapan...

Andre

[William Black]

On 27/10/11 17:48, Andy Breen wrote:
> The
> longer the service life, the harder the optimisation problem gets. This
> must be a real headache for designers today.

The reasonably obvious answer is that you design the ships with, more
or less, plug in engines and weapons systems and electronics.

With things like standard engine mounts and weapons 'pods' into which
you swap more modern replacements as time passes.

Alternatively you go for 'bolt on' systems like Exocet that'll 'plug in'
to just about any radar system.

--
William Black

Free men have open minds
If you want loyalty, buy a dog...

[Andy Breen]

On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 18:30:11 +0100, William Black wrote:

> On 27/10/11 17:48, Andy Breen wrote:
>> The
>> longer the service life, the harder the optimisation problem gets. This
>> must be a real headache for designers today.
>
> The reasonably obvious answer is that you design the ships with, more
> or less, plug in engines and weapons systems and electronics.

You still need the space - and the weight margin, and the stability
margin - to do this. This may impact on other desirable things, like
keeping a low RCS.

> With things like standard engine mounts and weapons 'pods' into which
> you swap more modern replacements as time passes.
>
> Alternatively you go for 'bolt on' systems like Exocet that'll 'plug in'
> to just about any radar system.

Doesn't help if you've not got the stability margin to cope with it. Type
21 and lightweight SeaWolf refers.

[Andy Breen]

On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 10:09:36 -0700, Andre Lieven wrote:

>
> Which also brings up the question of, why, when the RN already had a new
> class of fast 15 inch gunned battleships (As of 1913), why would they
> design an inferior and slower ship instead of building QE #6-10.

Desire for a cheaper ship (allowing for more hulls across the fleet),
wish for ships which had similar manoevering characteristics to the 13.5"
gun Dreadnoughts.

Essentially, the QEs were seen as a fast wing to the battle line. The Rs
seem to have been an upgrade to the main battle line, recognising that
the early 12" Dreadnoughts were growing obsolescent for first-line use.

As it turned out, the Rs - new - were not significantly slower than the
QEs, though their conversion to all-oil left them with significant
weaknesses in protection (coal bunkers provide good protection. Oil
tankage doesn't).

It's at least arguable that for 1914 the Rs were better ships for the
Grand Fleet than the QEs.

> Never mind for what that would have meant come the 30s, but consider it
> from the view of the Grand Fleet; Two full divisions of 24 knot 15 inch
> battleships, with two extras.

And a weaker main battle line, containing ships which you knew were badly
out of date.

[William Black]

Because of the horribly long gestation period for British warships I'd
have said that some sort of serious change in policy is needed.

Possibly building a general purpose hull and slotting stuff into it as
necessary and available.

But:

1. Nobody's listening to me.

2. Their Lordships have a problem getting their new ships past the
accountants, and have had since the drawings for the Type 42 were
recalled to have the word 'Cruiser' deleted and the word 'Destroyer '
inserted.

3. An awful lot of people are still thinking in terms of fighting
convoys past a non existent enemy.

[nik Simpson]

Yeah, good point, prior to the Washington Treaty, you didn't modernize
battleships you replaced them, because anything 15 years old was
hopelessly outdated. For example, 15 years is about the time difference
between the Canopus class entering service and the R class entering
service, and even if the Canopus class had plenty growth margin, it's
hard to imagine any refit that could have turned them into something
capable of standing in the 1915 battle line. The problem for the R class
and other ships of similar vintage was that when the building freeze
thawed in the 30s, designers didn't start evolving their 15 year old
designs (apart from Bismark ;-)) they started building new ships that
were 30-40% larger, 50% faster and with heavier guns, and there's not a
lot you can do to match that with a refit.


--
Nik Simpson

[nik Simpson]

Two main reasons:

1. The R class was cheaper to build
2. They built the QEs for a specific role, and now wanted to add 15"
guns to the main battle line which made 20kts on a good day, so no need
for 24-25kt ships for this role.

>
> Never mind for what that would have meant come the 30s, but consider
> it from the view of the Grand Fleet; Two full divisions of 24 knot 15
> inch
> battleships, with two extras.
>
> The later effect of having ten ships all worth modernising in the 30s
> would have been gravy. Though, one could also ask about how many
> of those ships the RN could have afforded to rebuild in the late 20s/
> early 30s.
>

Yeah, given that we only the time and the money to update three of the
QEs it's hard to see much advantage with having 10 of them instead of
five ;-)


--
Nik Simpson

[nik Simpson]

On 10/27/2011 12:30 PM, William Black wrote:
> On 27/10/11 17:48, Andy Breen wrote:
>> The
>> longer the service life, the harder the optimisation problem gets. This
>> must be a real headache for designers today.
>
> The reasonably obvious answer is that you design the ships with, more or
> less, plug in engines and weapons systems and electronics.
>

That's doable to a degree, but consider something like USS Nimitz,
she'll probably have a service life of 50+ years. It's very hard for her
original designers to make a design that's flexible enough to easily
accomodate technological developments over that time period. Nimitz was
designed when a small computer was something that fitted in a large
room, not the palm of your hand ;-)

--
Nik Simpson

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 27/10/2011 15:39, Eugene Griessel ha scritto:

> I believe the expression is: "chief stoker's sitting on the safety
> valve".
>
> Eugene L Griessel
>
> Slang is language that has rolled up its sleeves, spat on its hands
> and gone to work.

world wonders how is that Mr.Griessel's citation program seems eerily
sentient.....

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 27/10/2011 15:34, Andy Breen ha scritto:

>> 20+ kts sustained in Rs by the outbreak of WW2 was largely something
>> that happened in the drunken fever dreams of the chief engineers ;-)
>> Barham and Malaya were having trouble at those speeds and they started
>> off a good few knots faster.
>
> By early 1942 - admittedly in the warmer waters of the Indian Ocean -
> Cunningham found that his Rs were 18 knot or less, all out and the ERA's
> socks thrown into the furnace too.

Well, AFAICT the Italian estimate speed of the trio of HM BB (whose was
rather heterogeneous..) was 26 Warspite, 23 Malaya and 20 Royal
Sovereign, British account gives indeed 18 kts for the Royal Sovereign,
but an Italian plot of the relative positions at the moment of the
Warspite's hit on Cesare shows relative positions compatible with the
26-23-20 proportion above (Regia Marina having what seems to be the best
pre-radar enemy course & speed instrumentation, a byproduct of the
metodical long-range gunfire doctrine of Italian Navy) but OTOH the data
for RS came from Italian Condottieri rushing to join the fray ahead at
flank speed, and this can have influenced the measurement (OTOH I can
admit that opening fire at extreme range to a Rs from a Condottieri 1st
group is borderline between gallantry and foolishness)

sometime I must find the time to a thorough rereading of my texts, I'm
unsure of my memory these days....

[Andy Breen]

On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 23:07:53 +0200, dott.Piergiorgio wrote:

> Il 27/10/2011 15:34, Andy Breen ha scritto:
>
>>> 20+ kts sustained in Rs by the outbreak of WW2 was largely something
>>> that happened in the drunken fever dreams of the chief engineers ;-)
>>> Barham and Malaya were having trouble at those speeds and they started
>>> off a good few knots faster.
>>
>> By early 1942 - admittedly in the warmer waters of the Indian Ocean -
>> Cunningham found that his Rs were 18 knot or less, all out and the
>> ERA's socks thrown into the furnace too.
>
> Well, AFAICT the Italian estimate speed of the trio of HM BB (whose was
> rather heterogeneous..) was 26 Warspite, 23 Malaya and 20 Royal

26 seems decidedly generous[1] for Warspite - Cunningham was most
impressed when (IIRC in the approach to that action) she logged 23.5
knots "when the old lady lifts her skirts she can certainly run". If we
scale the other estimated speeds by that factor then we get 21 knots for
Malaya and 18 for Royal Sovereign, which seems more or less in line with
what the RN reckoned (I'd need to check sources for specifics, but from
memory those numbers seem about right).

[1] As in "you'd need a fair bit of downhill for that"

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 27/10/2011 15:32, Andy Breen ha scritto:
> On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 08:26:41 -0500, nik Simpson wrote:
>
>> Not really fair on the Rs, since what little modernization they recieved
>> was largely of the form of bolting on a little extra armour and giving
>> them a new coat of paint. Compared to the three heavily modernized QE

>> (QE, Valiant& Warspite) they were pretty much in orginal condition, and

>> weren't a whole lot worse than Barham and Malaya which also saw little
>> modernization and had similarly undistinguished WW2 careers.
>
> Perfectly true - but whereas the QEs had the margin of stability to cope
> with more agressive upgrades, the Rs didn't. Short of doing an Italian
> Job on them

*AHEM* when I used the wording "Italian Job" I refer to much more
destructive practices...

[Andy Breen]

In the UK it tends to refer to a certain film. Mind, the C/D
reconstructions might have a parallel there, with "we only asked for a
refit" being paralleled by "I only asked you to blow the bloody doors off"

;-)

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 27/10/2011 23:18, Andy Breen ha scritto:

>> Well, AFAICT the Italian estimate speed of the trio of HM BB (whose was
>> rather heterogeneous..) was 26 Warspite, 23 Malaya and 20 Royal
>
> 26 seems decidedly generous[1] for Warspite - Cunningham was most
> impressed when (IIRC in the approach to that action) she logged 23.5
> knots "when the old lady lifts her skirts she can certainly run". If we
> scale the other estimated speeds by that factor then we get 21 knots for
> Malaya and 18 for Royal Sovereign, which seems more or less in line with
> what the RN reckoned (I'd need to check sources for specifics, but from
> memory those numbers seem about right).
>
> [1] As in "you'd need a fair bit of downhill for that"

mmmm... let's check the sources again; will be rather unique that one or
both of us cites wrong from memory, but keeping the correct speed
proportions, whose has implications on the technical side of the Battle....

[Peter Skelton]

The speed difference between the R's and the QE's in 1917 was about a
knot in practice in the North Sea. The R's were quite capable of acting
as a 'fast wing' if the QE's hadn't been built (so were some of the
13.5's). The advantage both R's and QE's had over the older ships was
that they were oil-fired. They could maintain 23 knots (24 for the QE's)
until the oil ran out, a big advantage over until the stokers got too
tired. They made a lot less smoke, which vastly improved their gunnery.

Rebuilding the QE's etc. was a decision forced by the treaty situation
(or how the government wanted the treaty situation to develop) and the
politics of the day. The reconstruction cost was, IIRC, near what new
battleships of similar capability (S&G or Starbourg) would have cost,
but resulted in slower ships with inferior protection (in the wider sense).

There was not enough dockyard capacity to contemplate rebuilding the R's
starting before 1942, at which time the KGV's would be entering service,
with the Lions well advanced in construction. It made little sense to
upgrade them. From a technical point of view, the 6" guns could have
been removed, the deck armour rationalized, and the engines replaced in
a rebuild resulting in ships much like Warspite without her 6" guns and
a knot slower.

--
Peter

[nik Simpson]

And the remake of the film, like the remake of the Italian dreadnoughts
wasn't that great ;-)

--
Nik Simpson

[Paul J. Adam]

On 27/10/2011 18:56, William Black wrote:
> Because of the horribly long gestation period for British warships I'd
> have said that some sort of serious change in policy is needed.
>
> Possibly building a general purpose hull and slotting stuff into it as
> necessary and available.

Technically feasible, but practically difficult unless you also swap
crews: if you take off the air defence modules and fit MCM gear, your
AAWOs and fighter controllers are going to struggle to hunt mines, and
how did the mine-warfare crew do OST and DCT without a ship? (Synthetic
training helps, but you can't easily go from an ADEX to a damage-control
serial in Cook Building or MCTS)

The examples where it's been tried aren't inspiring.

> But:
>
> 1. Nobody's listening to me.
>
> 2. Their Lordships have a problem getting their new ships past the
> accountants, and have had since the drawings for the Type 42 were
> recalled to have the word 'Cruiser' deleted and the word 'Destroyer '
> inserted.
>
> 3. An awful lot of people are still thinking in terms of fighting
> convoys past a non existent enemy.

Or fending off regimental-strength Backfire raids, which are equally
relevant today. There's much groaning and gnashing of teeth over
FLAADS(M), the Future Local Area Air Defence System(Maritime), because
it lacks the range to wipe out a squadron of enemy missile-firing
aircraft at the horizon - that being the threat we are, allegedly,
imminently menaced by. (The fact that for once FLAADS is an effective
solution with the requirements ground back to quality bronze, with gold
plating kept off, and hence has a decent chance of working on time,
escapes them - as does the remarkable common sense of using the same
basic missile to replace Sea Wolf, Rapier and ASRAAM, so the inevitable
errors in stockpiles and consumption might cancel out)

We haven't done badly with Type 45, either: having left space, margins
and services for various "fit to receive" kit, Daring now has CIWS and
will be getting Harpoon before she deploys to the Gulf. There's a
surprising amount of Military Task Equipment that's fitted to ships
deploying to particular areas, though not much of it is as obvious as a
pair of Phalanx.


The lessons seem to be - as shown by the Type 22B3s and Type 23s - build
a multirole ship that might be specialised in one area but isn't
helpless in others, and try to leave flexibility for the future.
However, while a few people are listening to me, I'm a voice calling
from the edge of the firelight, not part of the intellectual white heat
that is MoD Main.


--
He thinks too much, such men are dangerous.

[William Black]

On 27/10/11 23:25, Paul J. Adam wrote:
> On 27/10/2011 18:56, William Black wrote:
>> Because of the horribly long gestation period for British warships I'd
>> have said that some sort of serious change in policy is needed.
>>
>> Possibly building a general purpose hull and slotting stuff into it as
>> necessary and available.
>
> Technically feasible, but practically difficult unless you also swap
> crews: if you take off the air defence modules and fit MCM gear, your
> AAWOs and fighter controllers are going to struggle to hunt mines, and
> how did the mine-warfare crew do OST and DCT without a ship? (Synthetic
> training helps, but you can't easily go from an ADEX to a damage-control
> serial in Cook Building or MCTS)

Ah, I didn't mean on a day-by-day basis so much as a 'every four or
five years we bung new stuff in'

>> But:
>>
>> 1. Nobody's listening to me.
>>
>> 2. Their Lordships have a problem getting their new ships past the
>> accountants, and have had since the drawings for the Type 42 were
>> recalled to have the word 'Cruiser' deleted and the word 'Destroyer '
>> inserted.
>>
>> 3. An awful lot of people are still thinking in terms of fighting
>> convoys past a non existent enemy.
>
> Or fending off regimental-strength Backfire raids, which are equally
> relevant today.

Yeah, that too.

Everyone's still all tooled up for fending off the Soviet menace...

>
> However, while a few people are listening to me, I'm a voice calling
> from the edge of the firelight, not part of the intellectual white heat
> that is MoD Main.

I haven't been in an MoD building in a decade or so these days and am
well out of any loops I may have once been in, but even then there were
people saying 'Look, there ain't no 'Red Menace' any more, there's no
real credible threat'.

On the other hand chasing drug runners and some blokes in bed sheets
armed with nothing but some man portable Soviet army surplus and an
absolute belief that their view of how to change the world is the right
one is part of the reason I got out.

Spending the sort of cash they're spending on facing down the Red
Menace, blood dripping from its nuclear fangs and with its intelligence
service getting caught up to no good every couple of months is one
thing. Spending it on chasing a bunch of kids who make the IRA look
like the SAS 'gone rogue' is quite another.

[Gernot Hassenpflug]

Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk> writes:

> On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 18:47:27 +0900, Gernot Hassenpflug wrote:
>
>> Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk> writes:
>>
>>> On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 16:46:23 +0200, Eugene Griessel wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 09:36:56 -0500, ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Unlike other navies the RN refitted all the 15 inch ships after 1918
>>>
>>> The QEs were certainly the most useful of the WW1-era ships that any
>>> navy had - not only better armed than most/any but usefully faster.
>>> They were certainly worth investing in (as was shown by the bulk of
>>> them getting two rebuilds between the wars).
>>>
>>> The Rs.. a harder case to make, but still well-armed and worth spending
>>> a smaller amount on to keep them useful into the 1930s - which is
>>> pretty much what happened. They were due to go as the KG5s came out.
>>>
>>> Refit and Repair.. of marginal use as they stood, but capable of being
>>> turned into useful carrier escorts/raider hunters. Obviously considered
>>> to be of enough potential for Renown to have three significant rebuilds
>>> (the last, in 1944-5, was a thorough waste of money, mind..).
>>
>> I'll have to look at Roberts or Burt (I forget which it is) when I get
>> home, but was that last refit for *Renown* mostly AA and radar upgrades
>> as considered necessary for the Pacific?
>
> Pretty much, plus (IIRC) enhanced control spaces and an increase in light
> AA - with 12x4.5" DP removed as topweight compensation. Not a /huge/
> refit, but still probably more money than was worth spending on an old,
> done ship.

Thanks! I had a cursory look at Roberts' late last night, but as it was
after a really nice bottle of ful-bodied Italian red wine shared with a
tall Japanese girl...I digress....I was slightly out of focus and missed
the removal of the 4.5", oops! The book dates from 1976, I was surprised
to note (I had always thought of it as "new" since it is one of my
bibles), and mentions little about the last refits of most of the
capital ships, especially when done in South Africa apparently!
I noticed only searchlight removal and replacement of some AA, but
nothing more. Mea culpa and all that...
--
Gernot Hassenpflug

[Andre Lieven]

On Oct 27, 1:46 pm, Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 10:09:36 -0700, Andre Lieven wrote:
>
> > Which also brings up the question of, why, when the RN already had a new
> > class of fast 15 inch gunned battleships (As of 1913), why would they
> > design an inferior and slower ship instead of building QE #6-10.
>
> Desire for a cheaper ship (allowing for more hulls across the fleet),
> wish for ships which had similar manoevering characteristics to the 13.5"
> gun Dreadnoughts.

That I know, yes. But, there's penny wise and pound foolish...

> Essentially, the QEs were seen as a fast wing to the battle line. The Rs
> seem to have been an upgrade to the main battle line, recognising that
> the early 12" Dreadnoughts were growing obsolescent for first-line use.

Well, relatively. No worse than the German 11 inch gun ships.

> As it turned out, the Rs - new - were not significantly slower than the
> QEs, though their conversion to all-oil left them with significant
> weaknesses in protection (coal bunkers provide good protection. Oil
> tankage doesn't).
>
> It's at least arguable that for 1914 the Rs were better ships for the
> Grand Fleet than the QEs.

There's a point that you are missing. The utility of a fast wing of
battleships
for the bigger navy would be in it being able to force the battle on
the
weaker fleet, which would be the Germans. No British admiral could
look
at the early teen's worth of Janes and consider that the HSF would
stand
for a full fight with the full British battlefleet. Of course, the
weaker fleet
(HSF) would cut and run.

That's why the RN should have wanted the QEs, to have a fast wing
that had the gun power to match or overwhelm anything the German
battleline could offer, *and* to have the speed to force the fight on
the
German line. Four plus one ships aren't really enough to do that when
facing sixteen plus battleships. But, ten might be able to force the
fight, and hold the German line long enough to let the rest of the
British line catch up.

> > Never mind for what that would have meant come the 30s, but consider it
> > from the view of the Grand Fleet; Two full divisions of 24 knot 15 inch
> > battleships, with two extras.
>
> And a weaker main battle line, containing ships which you knew were badly
> out of date.

With the larger batch of QEs leading.

Andre

[Andre Lieven]

Unless you want to double down on the fast wing, so that they can
hold the weaker battleline (German) in a fight brought by their
superior
speed until the rest of the RN 21 knot line can catch up.

> > Never mind for what that would have meant come the 30s, but consider
> > it from the view of the Grand Fleet; Two full divisions of 24 knot 15
> > inch battleships, with two extras.
>
> > The later effect of having ten ships all worth modernising in the 30s
> > would have been gravy. Though, one could also ask about how many
> > of those ships the RN could have afforded to rebuild in the late 20s/
> > early 30s.
>
> Yeah, given that we only the time and the money to update three of the
> QEs it's hard to see much advantage with having 10 of them instead of
> five ;-)

Well, all five QEs did get some kind of refits. The Barham had the
most comprehensive of the 20s refits (Much like the Coral Sea had
the best of the SCB-110A refits, which lasted her for over 25 years.),
which still made her better than an R. Malaya got the kind of refit
that Repulse got, expensive, but without redoing the plant (A
mistake,
IMHO).

I would bet that had there been ten QEs in stock, most of them would
have at least gotten refits no worse than the Malaya's. And, having
ten
in stock would have made pulling more than one at a time out of
service for rebuilding more palatable.

Andre

[Andre Lieven]

Working from The Battle-Cruiser HMS Renown 1916-1948,
Peter C Smith, he relates on page 215 that the (six) forward twin
4.5s were removed, along with the remaining fixed torpedo
tubes, when some prep work was done in June of 1945 for a refit
that was to start in October of 1945.

When the refit was organised, it was expected that it would
be finished by Feb 1946, and that Renown would still be used
against Japan. Once they surrendered, it was still considered
to use the Renown as a training ship, either sea going
or gunnery.

> The book dates from 1976, I was surprised
> to note (I had always thought of it as "new" since it is one of my
> bibles), and mentions little about the last refits of most of the
> capital ships, especially when done in South Africa apparently!
> I noticed only searchlight removal and replacement of some AA, but
> nothing more. Mea culpa and all that...

Andre

[Andy Breen]

On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 21:09:37 -0700, Andre Lieven wrote:

> On Oct 27, 1:46 pm, Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote:
>> On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 10:09:36 -0700, Andre Lieven wrote:
>>
>> > Which also brings up the question of, why, when the RN already had a
>> > new class of fast 15 inch gunned battleships (As of 1913), why would
>> > they design an inferior and slower ship instead of building QE #6-10.
>>
>> Desire for a cheaper ship (allowing for more hulls across the fleet),
>> wish for ships which had similar manoevering characteristics to the
>> 13.5" gun Dreadnoughts.
>
> That I know, yes. But, there's penny wise and pound foolish...

Freeing up some of the estimates for a better destroyer and scout screen
doesn't seem that foolish, really.

>> Essentially, the QEs were seen as a fast wing to the battle line. The
>> Rs seem to have been an upgrade to the main battle line, recognising
>> that the early 12" Dreadnoughts were growing obsolescent for first-line
>> use.
>
> Well, relatively. No worse than the German 11 inch gun ships.

True, and better than the pre-dreadnoughts the Germans were still using
in the line in 1916 by a long way. But "crushingly superior" is always a
better option than "no worse" when the time comes.

>> As it turned out, the Rs - new - were not significantly slower than the
>> QEs, though their conversion to all-oil left them with significant
>> weaknesses in protection (coal bunkers provide good protection. Oil
>> tankage doesn't).
>>
>> It's at least arguable that for 1914 the Rs were better ships for the
>> Grand Fleet than the QEs.
>
> There's a point that you are missing. The utility of a fast wing of
> battleships
> for the bigger navy would be in it being able to force the battle on the
> weaker fleet, which would be the Germans. No British admiral could look
> at the early teen's worth of Janes and consider that the HSF would stand
> for a full fight with the full British battlefleet. Of course, the
> weaker fleet
> (HSF) would cut and run.

With an all-turbine fleet, the GF was always going to have a speed edge
(after an hour or so, anyway) over the HSF, which contained a proportion
of recip-engined ships. And, as Peter pointed out, any of the all-oil RN
ships comprised a de-facto fast wing, able to maintain speed far better
than any coal-burners.

> That's why the RN should have wanted the QEs, to have a fast wing that
> had the gun power to match or overwhelm anything the German battleline
> could offer, *and* to have the speed to force the fight on the
> German line. Four plus one ships aren't really enough to do that when
> facing sixteen plus battleships. But, ten might be able to force the
> fight, and hold the German line long enough to let the rest of the
> British line catch up.
>
>> > Never mind for what that would have meant come the 30s, but consider
>> > it from the view of the Grand Fleet; Two full divisions of 24 knot 15
>> > inch battleships, with two extras.
>>
>> And a weaker main battle line, containing ships which you knew were
>> badly out of date.
>
> With the larger batch of QEs leading.

The experience of the 5th BS at Jutland showed quite clearly the problems
of the "fast wing" losing touch with the main force.

I'd maintain that for 1914 the Rs were a pretty good choice. Usefully
cheaper than the QEs, very little slower, better gun platforms and with a
far better arranged secondary battery, they may even have been the better
ships absolutely when new. They didn't have the growth margin of the QEs,
though, and so became less useful once they were past their expected
lifetime.

[Andy Breen]

Never apologise for these things, Gernot :-)

> I was slightly out of focus and missed
> the removal of the 4.5", oops! The book dates from 1976, I was surprised
> to note (I had always thought of it as "new" since it is one of my
> bibles), and mentions little about the last refits of most of the
> capital ships, especially when done in South Africa apparently! I
> noticed only searchlight removal and replacement of some AA, but nothing
> more. Mea culpa and all that...

I suspect that by 1944 Renown, like many of the old ships, was well
beyond limits in terms of topweight and some of the reduction in armament
was to get her back within those.. even before the new gear went on!

[Andy Breen]

Brown (in N->V) suggests that DNC practically went postal at the idea of
further refitting Renown (and Furious, and some of the other old ships):

P.155: "At the end of the war, a considerable amount of precious dockyard
effort was applied t refitting old battleships etc. Goodall was furious
(6 July 1943): 'Discussed C & D class cruisers - what shuld be done with
the old crocks?' .. (13 March 1945) Doing a lot of work in Royal
Dockyards on old junk eg Renown'"

[U-m757\bud]

On 2011-10-27, Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote:

> On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 10:19:14 -0500, nik Simpson wrote:
>
>> On 10/27/2011 8:32 AM, Andy Breen wrote:
>>> On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 08:26:41 -0500, nik Simpson wrote:
>>>
>>>> Not really fair on the Rs, since what little modernization they
>>>> recieved was largely of the form of bolting on a little extra armour
>>>> and giving them a new coat of paint. Compared to the three heavily
>>>> modernized QE (QE, Valiant& Warspite) they were pretty much in
>>>> orginal condition, and weren't a whole lot worse than Barham and
>>>> Malaya which also saw little modernization and had similarly
>>>> undistinguished WW2 careers.
>

>>> When new, the Rs had been not half bad - their lower stability margin
>>> made them good gun platforms, and their only real demerit was a flawed
>>> armour scheme (which would have been just fine if they'd been coal
>>> burners, but was distinctly problematical with oil). They didn't have
>>> the grown margin of the QEs, that's all.
>>>
>
>> Very true, the R's were about as good as they were ever going to be the
>> day they commissioned in WW1, it was downhill all the way after that.
>

> Which poses an interesting question - so far as the Navy (and the
> country) doing the buying is concerned, the best option is likely to be
> the best ship for the moment (particularly, as when the Rs were ordered,
> when tensions are high..). Retrospective comment, all so often, assesses
> the ships as they performed much later in their lives. Growth margin is a
> good thing, the cost of including it won't be worth it if it buys fewer -
> or makes for less effective ships - at the time of build.
>
> I suspect that when the Rs were ordered, the RN was still expecting the
> active service life of a capital ship to be 15-20 years, as it had across
> the pre-dreadnought era. On that basis the Rs would have been in service

> until 1930-34ish, at which time they were still effective ships. The

> longer the service life, the harder the optimisation problem gets. This
> must be a real headache for designers today.
>
>
>

With the R class, the British navy kept to it's old tradition of
following a ground-breaking class of ships with a smaller, supposedly
cheaper and ultimately less satisfactory class of ships.

Bud

[Andrew Swallow]

On 27/10/2011 18:56, William Black wrote:

{snip}

>
> Because of the horribly long gestation period for British warships I'd
> have said that some sort of serious change in policy is needed.
>
> Possibly building a general purpose hull and slotting stuff into it as
> necessary and available.
>
> But:
>
> 1. Nobody's listening to me.
>

If ships are anything like aircraft the electronics will need replacing
every 10 years. The ship architects need to ensure that the black boxes
have nice simple well defined interfaces. So an electronic engineer,
who has not been born yet, will be able to insert his new device.

> 2. Their Lordships have a problem getting their new ships past the
> accountants, and have had since the drawings for the Type 42 were
> recalled to have the word 'Cruiser' deleted and the word 'Destroyer '
> inserted.
>

The money for upgrading the electronics will come from a different
budget. Think about it.

> 3. An awful lot of people are still thinking in terms of fighting
> convoys past a non existent enemy.
>
>

Old problems have a nasty habit of returning. China is now using oil
from the Middle East and minerals from Africa.

After the Libya campaign does the UK intend to attack any other country
from the sea?

Andrew Swallow

[Alistair Gunn]

Andy Breen twisted the electrons to say:
> The Vanguard design was begun in 1937, after studies had shown that a
> viable 35000t design could be produced to carry the ex-Wierd Sisters 15"
> mountings. She grew a bit after it was decided to use the same machinery
> as the Lion class (Brown, N to V, p.37)

IIRC in one of my father's naval books, there's a comment in the section
on Vanguard that someone had noted during the design & build process that
if Vanguard proved to be an especially good idea then there where all
these "soon to be surplus" Royal Sovereigns with the some more of the
same turrets!
--
These opinions might not even be mine ...
Let alone connected with my employer ...

[Andrew Swallow]

Some things change, some things do not. Water is still wet. Men are
still between 5' and 7' tall.

Machines are still operated by men who prefer being warm and dry. So
the ship needs a place for the operators console, some sort of
processing equipment and a sensor on the outside. They need an energy
source and connecting by control cables.

Only some modern computers are small, code breaking computers can still
fill a room. (The super computer just consists of say 1000 microcomputers.)

Andrew Swallow

[Andy Breen]

On Fri, 28 Oct 2011 15:07:22 +0000, Alistair Gunn wrote:

> Andy Breen twisted the electrons to say:
>> The Vanguard design was begun in 1937, after studies had shown that a
>> viable 35000t design could be produced to carry the ex-Wierd Sisters
>> 15" mountings. She grew a bit after it was decided to use the same
>> machinery as the Lion class (Brown, N to V, p.37)
>
> IIRC in one of my father's naval books, there's a comment in the section
> on Vanguard that someone had noted during the design & build process
> that if Vanguard proved to be an especially good idea then there where
> all these "soon to be surplus" Royal Sovereigns with the some more of
> the same turrets!

I think - from what I've read - that this was definitely in mind at the
time the Vanguard design was taking shape - with an eye to providing a
capable second line (the real heavy lifting would be down to the Lions,
of course..).

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 28/10/2011 13:14, Andy Breen ha scritto:

>> Thanks! I had a cursory look at Roberts' late last night, but as it was
>> after a really nice bottle of ful-bodied Italian red wine shared with a
>> tall Japanese girl...I digress....
>
> Never apologise for these things, Gernot :-)

Well. I fully agree on wine, a bit less on the height of the Japanese
girl... we in Italy say "the best wine is that in small cask" and the
majority of Japanese women are indeed nice petite ladies...

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 28/10/2011 17:07, Alistair Gunn ha scritto:
> Andy Breen twisted the electrons to say:
>> The Vanguard design was begun in 1937, after studies had shown that a
>> viable 35000t design could be produced to carry the ex-Wierd Sisters 15"
>> mountings. She grew a bit after it was decided to use the same machinery
>> as the Lion class (Brown, N to V, p.37)
>
> IIRC in one of my father's naval books, there's a comment in the section

> on Vanguard that someone had noted during the design& build process that

> if Vanguard proved to be an especially good idea then there where all
> these "soon to be surplus" Royal Sovereigns with the some more of the
> same turrets!

whose, in hindsight, led me to suspect that, perhaps, UK at the
Washington Treaty table ought to have pressured for 15" instead 16" as
maximum calibre; because the now-known US eavesdropping was aimed to get
the "red lines" of other Powers at the table (ensuring the success of
the Treaty IMHO), US will have concurred, Italy, and by reflex France,
will be more than happy of 15" (OK, there's a sizeable hindsight...) and
the design of the 15"/42 as "parting gift" of the dissolved
anglo-Japanese alliance (and perhaps together with some financing for
the "downgrading" of the Nagatos) will have ensured the deal....

[Andy Breen]

I'm idly musing on why he was looking at Roberts' afterwards..

.. I mean, that's verging on kinky ;-)

[Andy Breen]

On Fri, 28 Oct 2011 20:46:33 +0200, dott.Piergiorgio wrote:

> whose, in hindsight, led me to suspect that, perhaps, UK at the
> Washington Treaty table ought to have pressured for 15" instead 16" as
> maximum calibre; because the now-known US eavesdropping was aimed to get
> the "red lines" of other Powers at the table (ensuring the success of
> the Treaty IMHO), US will have concurred, Italy, and by reflex France,
> will be more than happy of 15" (OK, there's a sizeable hindsight...) and
> the design of the 15"/42 as "parting gift" of the dissolved
> anglo-Japanese alliance (and perhaps together with some financing for
> the "downgrading" of the Nagatos) will have ensured the deal....

It would have left the USN and IJN with 16" gun ships and the RN with
none. If they couldn't persuade those navies to scrap their 16" ships
then the RN wanted better ships with guns of equal calibre - hence the
push to get permission for Nelsol and Rodnol.

The RN, I suspect, would have preferred to go for 15" at Washington (and
tried very hard to get 12" as a limit at London in 1930), but if there
were going to be 16" gun ships then they wanted to be able to build their
own. Understandable, in 1922.

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 28/10/2011 17:24, Andrew Swallow ha scritto:

> Machines are still operated by men who prefer being warm and dry. So the
> ship needs a place for the operators console, some sort of processing
> equipment and a sensor on the outside. They need an energy source and
> connecting by control cables.
>
> Only some modern computers are small, code breaking computers can still
> fill a room. (The super computer just consists of say 1000 microcomputers.)

if you can explain why a flagship needs an ULTRA department next (green)
WT door....

Granted, there's the definite advantage of really secure and prompt
reporting (dissemination being always a serious issue in intelligence)
but I remain unconvinced of the validity of a Flag codebreaking
department....

[William Black]

On 28/10/11 16:00, Andrew Swallow wrote:
> On 27/10/2011 18:56, William Black wrote:

>> 2. Their Lordships have a problem getting their new ships past the
>> accountants, and have had since the drawings for the Type 42 were
>> recalled to have the word 'Cruiser' deleted and the word 'Destroyer '
>> inserted.
>>
>
> The money for upgrading the electronics will come from a different
> budget. Think about it.

Or possibly not.

In the end it all comes from the 'capital spend' budget.

>> 3. An awful lot of people are still thinking in terms of fighting
>> convoys past a non existent enemy.
>>
>>
>
> Old problems have a nasty habit of returning. China is now using oil
> from the Middle East and minerals from Africa.

Sinking someone else's convoy isn't the same problem as escorting them.

> After the Libya campaign does the UK intend to attack any other country
> from the sea?

With the exception of some light shore bombardment they didn't attack
Libya from the sea...

[William Black]

On 28/10/11 20:00, dott.Piergiorgio wrote:
> Il 28/10/2011 17:24, Andrew Swallow ha scritto:
>
>> Machines are still operated by men who prefer being warm and dry. So the
>> ship needs a place for the operators console, some sort of processing
>> equipment and a sensor on the outside. They need an energy source and
>> connecting by control cables.
>>
>> Only some modern computers are small, code breaking computers can still
>> fill a room. (The super computer just consists of say 1000
>> microcomputers.)
>
> if you can explain why a flagship needs an ULTRA department next (green)
> WT door....

They don't.

But they do need a SIGINT liaison unit with utterly secure communications.

> Granted, there's the definite advantage of really secure and prompt
> reporting (dissemination being always a serious issue in intelligence)
> but I remain unconvinced of the validity of a Flag codebreaking
> department....

I'll bet Admiral Jachino, when just off Cape Matapan in late March
1941, said something like that ...

I'll bet ABC didn't...

[Dean Markley]

Weren't the Nagatos actually 16.1" guns? Was that a technical
violation of treaties?

[Andy Breen]

> Weren't the Nagatos actually 16.1" guns? Was that a technical violation
> of treaties?

I'd suspect that - having gone for "about 16" gun" as the battleship
maximum, then the phasing was chosen to allow the Nagatos to fit - it's
not like 0.1" makes any difference worth a tuppenny dam', after all.

The Japanese delegation would have been happy to go along with that -
their concern was people not spotting the speed of the Nagatos..

[Eugene Griessel]

They were 406mm calibre IIRC. As were most 16in guns. 406 mm only
translates to 16 inch roughly.


Eugene L Griessel

To succeed in the world it is not enough to be stupid,
you must also be well-mannered.

[nik Simpson]

You sure about the "most" part of that? At the time, I would imagine
that the RN and USN built guns using Imperial dimensions, why would they
switch to metric for this? Since they were the only other navies to
field a nominally 16" gun on a BB, I suspect that true imperially
measured 16" would predominate.


--
Nik Simpson

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 28/10/2011 21:32, William Black ha scritto:
> On 28/10/11 20:00, dott.Piergiorgio wrote:
>> Il 28/10/2011 17:24, Andrew Swallow ha scritto:
>>
>>> Machines are still operated by men who prefer being warm and dry. So the
>>> ship needs a place for the operators console, some sort of processing
>>> equipment and a sensor on the outside. They need an energy source and
>>> connecting by control cables.
>>>
>>> Only some modern computers are small, code breaking computers can still
>>> fill a room. (The super computer just consists of say 1000
>>> microcomputers.)
>>
>> if you can explain why a flagship needs an ULTRA department next (green)
>> WT door....
>
> They don't.
>
> But they do need a SIGINT liaison unit with utterly secure communications.

and having the key (because there's their own secure comm), where's the
need of a supercomputer filling an entire compartment aboard the flagship ?

>> Granted, there's the definite advantage of really secure and prompt
>> reporting (dissemination being always a serious issue in intelligence)
>> but I remain unconvinced of the validity of a Flag codebreaking
>> department....
>
> I'll bet Admiral Jachino, when just off Cape Matapan in late March 1941,
> said something like that ...
>
> I'll bet ABC didn't...

well, if you haven't noticed, there's strategic intel, not tactical
ones, whose is what concern a Flag officer aboard.

The tactical intel equipment aboard Vittorio Veneto and Warspite during
Gaudo and Matapan was considered satisfying for both Admirals (Perhaps
Jachino will have wished a Metox, when ABC will have wished better
signal measurements and radar discrimination, but is hindsight), the
difference being in the strategical one, and indeed, even a small delay
in the decoding and the (rather complex) secure comm will have changed
the outcome,

And let's be honest, do you really think that is a sane idea removing at
least one big turret for putting _colossus_ aboard ? aside that the
rather singular mod, the scuttlebutt around, fueled by the rather
abnormal requisitioning of valves (tubes on the other side of the LANT)
will have burned ULTRA in record time.

Considering that every ship has an intelligence of her own, whose
discretion is proverbially weak, is easy to figure that definitively
that a large intel facility afloat on a flagship is a huge no-no.

[Andrew Swallow]

A warship would probably out source code breaking to a shore
establishment. However the ship may wish to process its radar images to
determine which birds in a flock are real birds and which are enemy
stealth bombers camouflaging themselves as birds.

Andrew Swallow

[Andrew Swallow]

On 28/10/2011 20:28, William Black wrote:
> On 28/10/11 16:00, Andrew Swallow wrote:
>> On 27/10/2011 18:56, William Black wrote:
>
>>> 2. Their Lordships have a problem getting their new ships past the
>>> accountants, and have had since the drawings for the Type 42 were
>>> recalled to have the word 'Cruiser' deleted and the word 'Destroyer '
>>> inserted.
>>>
>>
>> The money for upgrading the electronics will come from a different
>> budget. Think about it.
>
> Or possibly not.
>
> In the end it all comes from the 'capital spend' budget.
>

Of different years.

>>> 3. An awful lot of people are still thinking in terms of fighting
>>> convoys past a non existent enemy.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Old problems have a nasty habit of returning. China is now using oil
>> from the Middle East and minerals from Africa.
>
> Sinking someone else's convoy isn't the same problem as escorting them.
>
>> After the Libya campaign does the UK intend to attack any other country
>> from the sea?
>
> With the exception of some light shore bombardment they didn't attack
> Libya from the sea...
>

Did the helicopter carrier get bored them. ;)

Andrew Swallow

[Eugene Griessel]

On Fri, 28 Oct 2011 15:47:22 -0500, nik Simpson <ni...@knology.net>
wrote:

Quote:

Conference on the limitation of armament
Washington,
November 12 1921-February 6, 1922.

Article VI

No capital ship of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun
with a calibre in excess of 16 inches (406 millimetres).

end quote.

As far as I know this was adhered to by all with respect to the
calibre of a 16 inch gun. IIRC the actual bore was about 4
millimetres bigger - around 410 mm. But the shell was 406 mm.
In all the reference books I have seen this is the dimension given
from Nelson and Rodney through to the Iowas.

Eugene L Griessel

It has been said that although God cannot alter the past, historians
can. It is perhaps because they can be useful to him in this respect
that he tolerates their existence.
- Samuel Butler

[U-m757\bud]

The Japanese navy called them 40 cm guns, but they were really 41 cm guns.
It may be that no-one outside of the Japanese navy knew the actual dimension
until after WWII. Oddly, the Japanese did have a 76 mm guns they called 8 cm.
This is per John Campbell's book, Naval Weapons of World War II.

Bud

[Eugene Griessel]

As in a lot of life there is no precise way to measure many things
designated to be a certain size. Try the British 4.5 inch gun for
instance.

[Keith W]

According to the Navweaps site the US 16"/45 and 16"/50 had a
Bourrelet diameter (or projectile diameter ahead of the
driving band) of 15.977 inches (40.06 cm).


Keith

[Eugene Griessel]

They all sort of nominally fell within the range of what one could
consider spitting distance of 16 inches. Navweaps says the guns on
Ngato were 16.1 inch but what actual advantage this may have offered
is unclear.

Eugene L Griessel

What if there were no hypothetical questions?

[Andy Breen]

One eighth of bugger all, I'd reckon. It was common enough to refer to
3.9" or 4.1" guns as "four inch", after all, and 5.9" guns to 6.1" guns
were all "six inch". 0.1" here or there on 1 16" bore was not going to
make a lot of difference to the hitting power of the gun - certainly less
than variations in shell length (and thus weight) between different
weapons did.

As Eugene pointed out, guns of the same quoted bore often have rather
different actual bore sizes (RN 4.7", 4.5"[1], pretty well everybody's
"three finger guns" - nominally 3"..).

[1] to say nothing of the 4.6" Bastard.

[Eugene Griessel]

On Sat, 29 Oct 2011 13:36:48 +0000 (UTC), Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk>

I recall reading an agrieved article by an aviation writer about the
agonies of determining the actual dimensions of military aircraft.
He said something like "if you have to go to this much trouble to find
out if the thing will actually fit in your hangar imagine the problems
determining the price". This seems to be a perennial problem with
military equipment. I can tell of a recent problem in this regard
where one manufacturer took the aircraft builder at his word (instead
of seding out an erk with a tapemeasure) which resulted in rather an
acrimonious exchange between the pair - with the consequence they both
agreed to disagree and the customer is still suffereing today with the
problem of an aircraft that does not quite fit the piece of vendor
test equipment.

Eugene L Griessel

Today's mighty oak is just yesterday's nut that held its ground.

[Andy Breen]

On Sat, 29 Oct 2011 15:46:29 +0200, Eugene Griessel wrote:

> On Sat, 29 Oct 2011 13:36:48 +0000 (UTC), Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk>
> wrote:

>>[1] to say nothing of the 4.6" Bastard.
>
> I recall reading an agrieved article by an aviation writer about the
> agonies of determining the actual dimensions of military aircraft. He
> said something like "if you have to go to this much trouble to find out
> if the thing will actually fit in your hangar imagine the problems
> determining the price". This seems to be a perennial problem with
> military equipment.

Otherwise known as the "well, WE know what we mean by that" problem ;-)

[Paul J. Adam]

On 29/10/2011 14:46, Eugene Griessel wrote:
> I recall reading an agrieved article by an aviation writer about the
> agonies of determining the actual dimensions of military aircraft.
> He said something like "if you have to go to this much trouble to find
> out if the thing will actually fit in your hangar imagine the problems
> determining the price". This seems to be a perennial problem with
> military equipment. I can tell of a recent problem in this regard
> where one manufacturer took the aircraft builder at his word (instead
> of seding out an erk with a tapemeasure) which resulted in rather an
> acrimonious exchange between the pair - with the consequence they both
> agreed to disagree and the customer is still suffereing today with the
> problem of an aircraft that does not quite fit the piece of vendor
> test equipment.

Something similar happened with HMS Norfolk, whose hangar was sized to
accept a Merlin HM.1 helicopter. Unfortunately, the tolerances were
tight: so tight, indeed, that to get said Merlin in and out of the
hangar required that the tyres be deflated enough that the rotor hub
could clear the door.

(Fortunately, an easy fix.)

--
He thinks too much, such men are dangerous.

[Eugene Griessel]

We have a similar problem on the Valor class frigates with an Oryx
helicopter, which they were designed to accept. Apparently only if a
certain piece of equipment in the hangar is removed first (needs to be
unbolted). One does not know if the designer made the hangar big
enough and then some other clown seized on the space to stick his bit
in there or if it was faulty design.

Eugene L Griessel

Three o'clock is always too late or too early for anything you want to do.

[U-m757\bud]

What's five measly hundredths among friends?

Bud

[Tankfixer]

In article <ja3oa7hn0hu7031a2...@4ax.com>, - Eugene
Griessel eug...@dynagen.co.za spouted !

I'd guess #2 as an explanation.
Wandering by he spies all that nice unused hanger ceiling and figures
that his cyclonic-fractal-spice separator would fit up there an be out
of the way.

[Eugene Griessel]

The things were built in Germany but fitted with weapons locally. And
that is probably where the problem arose - there is a gun above the
helicopter hangar and I suspect the problem has to do with that.

[Tankfixer]

In article <qiboa719ktik7vdlq...@4ax.com>, - Eugene

sounds like it..

[nik Simpson]

My mistake is sort of mixed up the 16.1" number in the previous post and
your 406mm. Shortly afterwards, I did the math and realized that 406mm
is about as close as you can get to 16", not 16.1". So we're both right,
the dominant nominal 16" calibre was the one used by the USN and RN ;-)


--
Nik Simpson

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 29/10/2011 02:20, U-m757\bud ha scritto:

> The Japanese navy called them 40 cm guns, but they were really 41 cm guns.
> It may be that no-one outside of the Japanese navy knew the actual dimension
> until after WWII. Oddly, the Japanese did have a 76 mm guns they called 8 cm.
> This is per John Campbell's book, Naval Weapons of World War II.

The point lies that the actual truthworthy measurement was done after
the capture of IJN Nagato in 1945, and is worth of considering the
detail that Japanese guns were of the wire-wound design, and, as seen
with Italian guns of the same generic pattern, isn't that difficult
doing a discreet reboring with mere 4mm more bore....

Another point is that in mid-20s Japanese screws imperially their
designation system, adopting the metric system without grandfathering
the former Imperial measure designation, but "metricating" the
designations, using rounded centimeters (hence the 3" designated 8cm thing)

[Gernot Hassenpflug]

Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk> writes:

> On Fri, 28 Oct 2011 20:26:20 +0200, dott.Piergiorgio wrote:
>
>> Il 28/10/2011 13:14, Andy Breen ha scritto:
>>
>>>> Thanks! I had a cursory look at Roberts' late last night, but as it
>>>> was after a really nice bottle of ful-bodied Italian red wine shared
>>>> with a tall Japanese girl...I digress....
>>>
>>> Never apologise for these things, Gernot :-)
>>
>> Well. I fully agree on wine, a bit less on the height of the Japanese
>> girl... we in Italy say "the best wine is that in small cask" and the
>> majority of Japanese women are indeed nice petite ladies...
>
> I'm idly musing on why he was looking at Roberts' afterwards..
>
> .. I mean, that's verging on kinky ;-)

Hehe. Guys, I love your ribbing... :-) This is definitely one of the nicest groups I have had
the pleasure and honour of participating in!
--
Gernot Hassenpflug

[La N.]

"Gernot Hassenpflug" <ger...@coda.ocn.ne.jp> wrote in message
news:yol8vo3...@asahi-net.or.jp...

I don't know who's "prettier" ... Gernot or some of his lady friends ... I
mean I'm jes' sayin' ... ;)

- nilita (have seen the photos ... heh ...)

[Eugene Griessel]

On Sat, 29 Oct 2011 13:25:51 -0500, nik Simpson <ni...@knology.net>

The Japanese only built two 16 inch battleships - the Nagato and
Mutsu. These were both laid down and completed before the Washington
treaty - in fact they were the first 16 inch battleships. Both being
fairly large vessels as well - exceeding the Washington treaty limits
in size. During the conference, the US representatives wanted, at
least, the Mustsu scrapped of the pair. The Japanese delegates
maintained that the ship had been commissioned on 10 September 1921
and was thus not subject to the treaty limits The Japanese finally
manage to save the Mutsu .

Eugene L Griessel

Advertising (n): the science of arresting the human
intelligence for long enough to get money from it.

[Andre Lieven]

On Oct 28, 7:12 am, Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 21:09:37 -0700, Andre Lieven wrote:
> > On Oct 27, 1:46 pm, Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote:
> >> On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 10:09:36 -0700, Andre Lieven wrote:
>
> >> > Which also brings up the question of, why, when the RN already had a
> >> > new class of fast 15 inch gunned battleships (As of 1913), why would
> >> > they design an inferior and slower ship instead of building QE #6-10.
>
> >> Desire for a cheaper ship (allowing for more hulls across the fleet),
> >> wish for ships which had similar manoevering characteristics to the
> >> 13.5" gun Dreadnoughts.
>
> > That I know, yes. But, there's penny wise and pound foolish...
>
> Freeing up some of the estimates for a better destroyer and scout screen
> doesn't seem that foolish, really.

Budgets don't often work that way...

> >> Essentially, the QEs were seen as a fast wing to the battle line. The
> >> Rs seem to have been an upgrade to the main battle line, recognising
> >> that the early 12" Dreadnoughts were growing obsolescent for first-line
> >> use.
>
> > Well, relatively. No worse than the German 11 inch gun ships.
>
> True, and better than the pre-dreadnoughts the Germans were still using
> in the line in 1916 by a long way. But "crushingly superior" is always a
> better option than "no worse" when the time comes.

That was my point, that the RN 12 inch ships were not aging any faster
than the HSF 11 inch ships.

> >> As it turned out, the Rs - new - were not significantly slower than the
> >> QEs, though their conversion to all-oil left them with significant
> >> weaknesses in protection (coal bunkers provide good protection. Oil
> >> tankage doesn't).
>
> >> It's at least arguable that for 1914 the Rs were better ships for the
> >> Grand Fleet than the QEs.
>
> > There's a point that you are missing. The utility of a fast wing of
> > battleships
> > for the bigger navy would be in it being able to force the battle on the
> > weaker fleet, which would be the Germans. No British admiral could look
> > at the early teen's worth of Janes and consider that the HSF would stand
> > for a full fight with the full British battlefleet. Of course, the
> > weaker fleet (HSF) would cut and run.
>
> With an all-turbine fleet, the GF was always going to have a speed edge
> (after an hour or so, anyway) over the HSF, which contained a proportion
> of recip-engined ships. And, as Peter pointed out, any of the all-oil RN
> ships comprised a de-facto fast wing, able to maintain speed far better
> than any coal-burners.

As both the decision to build the QEs and the results of Jutland
showed, that wasn't going to be enough.

> > That's why the RN should have wanted the QEs, to have a fast wing that
> > had the gun power to match or overwhelm anything the German battleline
> > could offer, *and* to have the speed to force the fight on the
> > German line. Four plus one ships aren't really enough to do that when
> > facing sixteen plus battleships. But, ten might be able to force the
> > fight, and hold the German line long enough to let the rest of the
> > British line catch up.
>
> >> > Never mind for what that would have meant come the 30s, but consider
> >> > it from the view of the Grand Fleet; Two full divisions of 24 knot 15
> >> > inch battleships, with two extras.
>
> >> And a weaker main battle line, containing ships which you knew were
> >> badly out of date.
>
> > With the larger batch of QEs leading.
>
> The experience of the 5th BS at Jutland showed quite clearly the problems
> of the "fast wing" losing touch with the main force.

Especially when said 'main force' is led by Beatty...

My point is that a fast wing works better with 10 than 5 ships.

> I'd maintain that for 1914 the Rs were a pretty good choice. Usefully
> cheaper than the QEs, very little slower, better gun platforms and with a
> far better arranged secondary battery, they may even have been the better
> ships absolutely when new. They didn't have the growth margin of the QEs,
> though, and so became less useful once they were past their expected
> lifetime.

I'll note that Beatty didn't choose one for his flagship... Nor were
the\
pair that were at Jutland even in the same battle division.

Revenge was in 1 BS, 6th Div, with Agincourt, Hercules and
Marlborough. Royal Oak 4 BS, 3 Div, with Iron Duke, Superb,
and Canada.

So, I'm not sure that even contemporary professional opinion
was such.

Andre

[Andre Ilausky]

Paul J. Adam schrieb:

> On 27/10/2011 18:56, William Black wrote:

>> But:
>>
>> 1. Nobody's listening to me.

>>
>> 2. Their Lordships have a problem getting their new ships past the
>> accountants, and have had since the drawings for the Type 42 were
>> recalled to have the word 'Cruiser' deleted and the word 'Destroyer '
>> inserted.
>>

>> 3. An awful lot of people are still thinking in terms of fighting
>> convoys past a non existent enemy.

An awful lot of people thought it was a good idea to not only deliver
Type 42 frigates to Argentina, but to sell HMS Invincible to Australia
in February 1982.

If you are selling Eurofighter Typhoons and Sea Eagle missiles to places
like Saudi Arabia it might be a good idea to be able to defend against
that level of capability with some confidence in the future. Let alone
fifth generation fighters and modern low observable missiles or older
missiles like Kh-15 reaching hypersonic.

> Or fending off regimental-strength Backfire raids, which are equally
> relevant today. There's much groaning and gnashing of teeth over
> FLAADS(M), the Future Local Area Air Defence System(Maritime), because
> it lacks the range to wipe out a squadron of enemy missile-firing
> aircraft at the horizon - that being the threat we are, allegedly,
> imminently menaced by. (The fact that for once FLAADS is an effective
> solution with the requirements ground back to quality bronze, with gold
> plating kept off, and hence has a decent chance of working on time,
> escapes them - as does the remarkable common sense of using the same
> basic missile to replace Sea Wolf, Rapier and ASRAAM, so the inevitable
> errors in stockpiles and consumption might cancel out)
>
> We haven't done badly with Type 45, either: having left space, margins
> and services for various "fit to receive" kit, Daring now has CIWS and
> will be getting Harpoon before she deploys to the Gulf.

So a 7500 t destroyer can accept a couple CIWS and anti-ship missiles!!1 ;)

> There's a
> surprising amount of Military Task Equipment that's fitted to ships
> deploying to particular areas, though not much of it is as obvious as a
> pair of Phalanx.

But the Type 45 is arguably the best AAW ship in the world, if you want
to oppose "regimental-strength Backfire raids". Aster and SAMPSON - an
active radar homing SAM and rotating AESA radar - are high-end solutions
to this problem and that's not including stuff like the S1850M radar and
all-electric propulsion - a radar apparently believed to be an
unnecessary addition by BAE and the first propulsion of that kind on a
warship, IIRC.

So the taxpayer basically saves money by buying a few less Gatling guns,
than would be necessary to equip all ships at the same time, but still
paid for an AESA radar that might have been developed for half a dozen
ships and a SAM for a dozen.

> The lessons seem to be - as shown by the Type 22B3s and Type 23s - build
> a multirole ship that might be specialised in one area but isn't
> helpless in others, and try to leave flexibility for the future.
> However, while a few people are listening to me, I'm a voice calling
> from the edge of the firelight, not part of the intellectual white heat
> that is MoD Main.

"Steel is cheap and air is free." ;) The best bet for this might
actually be an specialized AAW ship, which means at least the ability to
carry a heavy, sophisticated radar as high as possible and a vertical
launching system (maybe a peripheral VLS). That's going to be expensive,
even if everything else is fitted-for-but-not-with (anti-ship missiles,
CIWS, cruise missiles, (towed array) sonar, torpedoes, hangar). Or do
you really want to depend on a Type 23 with Sea Wolf and Type 996 (or
even Artisan) radar to protect your (single) 65,000 t strike carrier?

What might be needed are a somewhat large number of cheap to build and
operate warships that are reasonable upgradeable, in case you have to
fight Evilstan, and can do missions like hunting drug smugglers in the
Caribbean, so you don't have to commit LPH, AAW, ASW or replenishment ships.

[William Black]

On 31/10/11 11:25, Andre Ilausky wrote:
>
> If you are selling Eurofighter Typhoons and Sea Eagle missiles to places
> like Saudi Arabia it might be a good idea to be able to defend against
> that level of capability with some confidence in the future. Let alone
> fifth generation fighters and modern low observable missiles or older
> missiles like Kh-15 reaching hypersonic.

Why bother?

They all use Europeans to maintain them.

Just keep most of the spares in Europe and fly them out when necessary
and their serviceability will be measured in days after their support
operation ceases.

> What might be needed are a somewhat large number of cheap to build and
> operate warships that are reasonable upgradeable, in case you have to
> fight Evilstan, and can do missions like hunting drug smugglers in the
> Caribbean, so you don't have to commit LPH, AAW, ASW or replenishment
> ships.

I think that's what I said.

--
William Black

Free men have open minds
If you want loyalty, buy a dog...

[nik Simpson]

On 10/30/2011 3:18 PM, Andre Lieven wrote:
>
> I'll note that Beatty didn't choose one for his flagship... Nor were
> the\
> pair that were at Jutland even in the same battle division.

Beatty's use of QE as GF flagship had a lot more to do with Beatty's
vanity than any particular advantage of QE vs. Iron Duke as flagship.
Not sure if any of the Rs were fitted for flasgship operations.


--
Nik Simpson

[Andrew Swallow]

The Chinese may take over repairing Arab aircraft. They are after the
same oil.

Andrew Swallow

[William Black]

At which point the flow of spares dries up...

The problem comes when the Indians start doing it because we can't
seriously claim that they're 'on the other side'.

[Peter Skelton]

Iron Duke's crew had idolized Jellicoe who had troubled to do little
things like learning many names, and avoiding messdecks at the wrong
moments (they had to go through a messdeck at times). Beatty could not
compete and found the situation untenable.

Revenge and Resolution at least were fitted out as flagships.

--
Peter

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 31/10/2011 12:25, Andre Ilausky ha scritto:

>>> 3. An awful lot of people are still thinking in terms of fighting
>>> convoys past a non existent enemy.

if someone still hasn't noticed, in the past months was refought the Med
Convoy war of WW2, with the only difference that the former enemies was
allied together, and of course the outcome was inevitable.....

> An awful lot of people thought it was a good idea to not only deliver
> Type 42 frigates to Argentina, but to sell HMS Invincible to Australia
> in February 1982.
>
> If you are selling Eurofighter Typhoons and Sea Eagle missiles to places
> like Saudi Arabia it might be a good idea to be able to defend against
> that level of capability with some confidence in the future. Let alone
> fifth generation fighters and modern low observable missiles or older
> missiles like Kh-15 reaching hypersonic.

Since the days of the Fokker Scourge, a core element of air warfare is
the technological surprise, that at potential enemies is sold the same,
or a more or less downgraded, version of own .mil hardware is actually
an advantage.

I don't think that iranian F-15 is/was an actual menace to USN air
wings, to be outspoken on this point.

[snip]

> "Steel is cheap and air is free." ;) The best bet for this might
> actually be an specialized AAW ship, which means at least the ability to
> carry a heavy, sophisticated radar as high as possible and a vertical
> launching system (maybe a peripheral VLS). That's going to be expensive,
> even if everything else is fitted-for-but-not-with (anti-ship missiles,
> CIWS, cruise missiles, (towed array) sonar, torpedoes, hangar). Or do
> you really want to depend on a Type 23 with Sea Wolf and Type 996 (or
> even Artisan) radar to protect your (single) 65,000 t strike carrier?

Indeed the italian pair of DDG actually has an empty space fore,
officially will be used for expanding the VLS battery or putting a
5"/64, but also has a third, more interesting potential usage, involving
also the deck space fore that empty space...

[nik Simpson]

Doesn't really change the point that selecting QE as Beatty's flagship
was a bad idea from the point of view of the GF, since it weakened the
5th BS by one ship and provided no real advantage as a flaship for
Beatty, who as fleet commander couldn't go wandering off looking for
trouble at high speed and couldn't detach with the 5th BS to leave the
fleet to fend for itself. This was Beatty (who had always coveted the QE
ships) wanting what he perceived was the best ship in the fleet
regardless it's suitability as flagship ;-)


--
Nik Simpson

[Paul J. Adam]

On 31/10/2011 11:25, Andre Ilausky wrote:
> Paul J. Adam schrieb:

>> We haven't done badly with Type 45, either: having left space, margins
>> and services for various "fit to receive" kit, Daring now has CIWS and
>> will be getting Harpoon before she deploys to the Gulf.
>
> So a 7500 t destroyer can accept a couple CIWS and anti-ship missiles!!1 ;)

And a great deal more if the requirement and the funding materialise:
what we haven't done is kit it out like the White Knight at the outset
against a laundry list of potential, imagined and past-but-not-forgotten
threats.

The US did the same, very successfully, with the Spruance-class.

>> There's a surprising amount of Military Task Equipment that's fitted
>> to ships deploying to particular areas, though not much of it is as
>> obvious as a pair of Phalanx.
>
> But the Type 45 is arguably the best AAW ship in the world, if you want
> to oppose "regimental-strength Backfire raids".

Against that particular threat - lots and lots of Backfires with AS-4 -
I'd prefer a couple of Ticonderogas. Type 45 is designed for the future,
not the 1970s.

> Aster and SAMPSON - an
> active radar homing SAM and rotating AESA radar - are high-end solutions
> to this problem

No, they're solutions to threat missiles that are very low RCS, very
fast, and/or capable of serious terminal evasive manoeuvres. Stuff like
Yakhont or BrahMos (the fUSSR SS-N-26, co-developed with India) is an
example of what the Darings are there to deal with.

> and that's not including stuff like the S1850M radar and
> all-electric propulsion - a radar apparently believed to be an
> unnecessary addition by BAE

BAE were and are justly proud of SAMPSON, but the fighter controllers
and AAWOs like to be able to observe and influence the outer air battle:
SAMPSON has excellent range, but even it has a finite energy budget, and
when it's tracking multiple SITs and PITs, uplinking to a number of
in-flight Viper, and still doing horizon search to catch any other
additions to the party... its long-range volume search and track is no
more guaranteed than any other busy phased-array.

> So the taxpayer basically saves money by buying a few less Gatling guns,
> than would be necessary to equip all ships at the same time, but still
> paid for an AESA radar that might have been developed for half a dozen
> ships and a SAM for a dozen.

Fourteen originally with an intent to reuse for other classes, then
modified downwards by multiple budget cuts and planning rounds. Don't
expect logic or sanity from the MoD budgetting process - you'll be
horribly disappointed.

> What might be needed are a somewhat large number of cheap to build and
> operate warships that are reasonable upgradeable, in case you have to
> fight Evilstan, and can do missions like hunting drug smugglers in the
> Caribbean, so you don't have to commit LPH, AAW, ASW or replenishment
> ships.

Sounds like the Type 21s... except they weren't upgradeable, especially
not quickly (even if they'd had more margins, there was no time to add
kit for CORPORATE) and yet because they're big grey canoes they're
"warships" and so get sent to fight wars, where they get smacked hard
for their lack of capability.

If you need Coast Guard cutters, establish a Coast Guard or a Maritime
Constabulary or some other force that's plainly set up for operations
less than outright war: they can get on nicely with some seaworthy,
decent-sized 25kt cutters with good surface-search radar, a helo deck
and hangar (convertable for UAVs, possibly), lots of spare bunks for
embarked troops, excellent boat-handling gear, and a light outfit of
stabilised guns (say, a 5" for disabling fire and a couple of 30mm ASCG
for skiff-busting). No combat system, no countermeasures, no quiet
machinery or shock-hardening, none of the expensive stuff: dead meat in
a shooting war, but very handy for counter-piracy, fishery protection,
counter-narcotics, Falklands guardship and so on.