dott.Piergiorgio wrote:
> Il 24/09/2012 10:03, Keith W ha scritto:
>
>> This is exactly the sort of logic that led to the RAF and Armee de
>> L'air flying sorties against the Blitzkrieg using airplanes and
>> tactics designed for bombing Kurdish tribesmen.
>
> Side question, I never get the reasons of the failure of the Fairey
> Battle; in my limited a/c technology knowledge, technically was a
> fair/average late 1930s design, so, I ask if the "failure" lies in a
> wrong CS doctrine, or the wrong doctrine influences the (in se not
> bad) design ?
>
There were prblems with both doctrine and design.
In terms of design it was rather underpowered and slow
with a max loaded weight of 10,000 lbs and a single
1000 hp liquid cooled engine.
In comparison the Blenheim weighed 14,000 lbs
fully laden and had two 920hp air cooled engines
The Battle also lacked self sealing tanks and cockpit
armour which together with its liquid colled enine made
it very vulnerable to light AA on its low level attack
runs against German armour and with only a single
Vickers K gun for defense the German fighters
had a field day when they were sent into the attack
without fighter escorts.
> (aside that the Armee de l' Air has other problems; for example, they
> actually fielded the best 1940 year fighter a/c (the Dewoitine 520)
Well there were actually very few D-520's committed against
the Luftwaffe with only a single fighter group (Groupe de Chasse I)
with 36 aircraft being committed in May 1940 and even these
aircraft were withdrawn by the French Air force and sent to
North Africa while the Battle of France was still being fought !
A further group (GC II) was also equipped with the D-520
but they were committed against the Italian Air Force where
they shot down over 100 aircraft.
The Curtiss H75 was actually the most effecive aircraft involved
in the air battles of 1940 shooting down over 200 German
aircraft for the loss of 33 pilots killed.
> and the avg. French pilot was good and on par to Luftwaffe pilot,
> perhaps with more �lan, or perhaps some "hussard mindset", because
> pre-war the expectactions was basically of charging into the
> (excessively) feared "balbos" somewhere above Nice and the Varo River)
The Arm�e de l'Air had several systemic problems which included
very poor communications, low availability rates and a poor
command and control structure. Most bases effectively operated
on their own with their commanders having no clear idea of
either what the enemy was doing or what their comrades planned
to do.
The air crews were undoubtedly courageous but were very
poorly led and many aircaft were simply destroyed on the
ground due to the lack of an equivalent to the British
observer corps and command centres.
There is an excellent paper on this at
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/sep-oct/kirkland.html
Keith