Well obviously each ship must continuously cover a large area and be
able to quickly react to problems anywhere in the area while engaging
in several different missions at once. So the speed of the ship isn't
as important as its reach.
This calls for a swarm of unmanned vehicles to watch for enemy
aircraft, ships and subs and clear a mine free area of operations,
along with at least a dozen helicopters to drop boarding parties on
any suspect ship in the area at any time and STOVL manned or unmanned
combat aircraft to engage the enemy over the horizon.
So the ship needs a flight deck, a hanger and a well deck to be able
to operate air, water and underwater manned and unmanned craft along
with internal space for controlling and maintaining the manned and
unmanned craft and bunking the boarding parties and vehicle crews.
The US Navy already has ships, that if properly equipped with a new
generation of unmanned vehicles, could do a much better job at
dominating the littorals than the LCSs ever could, but how could they
ever kick the Marines off?
-HJC
>
> The US Navy already has ships, that if properly equipped with a new
> generation of unmanned vehicles, could do a much better job at
> dominating the littorals than the LCSs ever could, but how could they
> ever kick the Marines off?
IMHO the better LCS are the B*ttl*ships ;)
Joking aside, If you want a Wasp as LCS (If I understand well your specs)
you are firing long ;)
For me a better LCS is a ship around 2000-3000 tons, stealth, equipped much
more with sensors than weapons save some 3" gun and missiles smaller than
Harpoon (Penguin and the Italian Marte came in mind) to defend against
corvettes/FAC of the enemy, and 12.75" TT against coastal submarines An
small helo can be useful, but not necessary.
IIUC the main role of LCS is to render clean the brown water near hostile
coast to permit landing, and as EW against surface or air sorties. So
vbetter something like the European small frigates or large corvettes.
I appreciate much the HI-LO mix advocated in the US during late 70s and
early 80s, so the LCS will fill the LO slot and the DDX-CGX the HI slot.
The said LO slot LCS will be more near the hostile coastline and the HI slot
ships back and further in the rear the CVBG and the Landing Force.
Best regards from Italy.
--
Dott. Piergiorgio d' Errico- Naval and military historian
Niitakayama nobore ichi ni rei ya
Sounds like the specs for an LA or Virginia class SSN, minus the guns.
>
Snippage
OK, why does your mini-LCS need a crew?
Why send a man in harm's way when you can send a robot?
Make the LO really low. For each mission build a thing that has the
sensors, weapons, communications and brains needed to do just that
mission and enough propulsion to go out fifty miles, do that mission
for awhile then come back.
So some of these robots could be sweeping mines while others keep an
eye on commercial traffic and still others are hunting down an enemy
sub.
And what if a careful ambush blows up your minesweeper? Well I guess
you'll just have to get another one out of storage and be more careful
next time, but at least you won't have to write the bereaved family.
-HJC
:OK, why does your mini-LCS need a crew?
Because computers alone ain't that smart.
:Why send a man in harm's way when you can send a robot?
Because the robot can't do the job.
:Make the LO really low. For each mission build a thing that has the
:sensors, weapons, communications and brains needed to do just that
:mission and enough propulsion to go out fifty miles, do that mission
:for awhile then come back.
:
:So some of these robots could be sweeping mines while others keep an
:eye on commercial traffic and still others are hunting down an enemy
:sub.
:
:And what if a careful ambush blows up your minesweeper? Well I guess
:you'll just have to get another one out of storage and be more careful
:next time, but at least you won't have to write the bereaved family.
Why not just use the magical cruise missiles from another thread?
They're cheap and this would only be a small enhancement of the same
technology....
--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney
>"Dott. Piergiorgio" <pg...@libero.it> wrote in message
>news:8G9Ib.220338$e6.86...@twister2.libero.it...
>> For me a better LCS is a ship around 2000-3000 tons, stealth, equipped
>much
>> more with sensors than weapons save some 3" gun and missiles smaller than
>> Harpoon (Penguin and the Italian Marte came in mind) to defend against
>> corvettes/FAC of the enemy, and 12.75" TT against coastal submarines An
>> small helo can be useful, but not necessary.
>
>Sounds like the specs for an LA or Virginia class SSN, minus the guns.
Problem would be, do you really want a nuclear craft that close in?
On the missile side, I'm thinking possibly the Gabriel II missiles
used on Saar 5?
Otherwise, I could see a big gap here that D/E subs would be very,
very useful for.
John
> Why send a man in harm's way when you can send a robot?
Putting aside Asimov's Laws, I point that a Computer, wichever
sophisticated, can make only the things perdicted and programmed in it, and
warfare is ever a matter of ingenuosity, creativity and improvisation.
No robot can replace a true soldier/sailor/pilot.
> Sounds like the specs for an LA or Virginia class SSN, minus the guns.
And 4000 tons less and minus the 21" torpedo ;)
Which is why you have manned terminals controlling the robots from your ship.
Exactly like all of the current LCS designs.
The only difference is that you are paying for far less overhead per unmanned
vehicle by launching and controlling dozens of robots from the same manned
ship.
-HJC
So how do you communicate with all of these dozens of robots
simultaneously to provide man-in-the-loop control? Can you expect one
man to control 1 robot, or all 12? Assume that the ratio is 1:1 for
the sake of argument. You said dozens, so let's use the lowest
possible interpretation of that and say 2 dozen. This means you have
a 24-man watch section just to operate the offboard vehicles, plus
another bunch to operate the ship. How does 12 sound? Too many? OK,
knock it down to 9 for the ship. That adds up to ..... a 33-man watch
section. Which adds up to 99 watchstanders. Add in butchers, bakers,
and candlestick makers for a grand total of roughly 150, and you are
WAY out of the box for LCS. Your big ship needs a big crew. Big crew
means big overhead.
How much deck space do you need for all the antennas it will take to
talk to all these robots simultaneously? You can bet each one's going
to want its own dedicated circuit, if not 2 or three. UHF won't work,
since you want them to go OTH, so it's either HF or satellite. Either
one's a pretty big footprint -- HF for separation to avoid mutual
interference, satellite to get enough gain and the right beam pattern
to talk to the right bird. Round numbers, lets say that you need a
circle with a 2 meter radius for each antenna, with 2 meter separation
between circles. That means you would need a surface area (just for
antennas) of 22m x 34m, or about 750 square meters. For comparison,
the beam of an Arleigh Burke DDG is 18m at the waterline, and about
20m max. Your big ship is going to be bigger than the current billion
dollar destroyer. Lots of steel (or aluminum, or plastic) to put
together and maintain and push through the water means big overhead.
How survivable is this one large robot carrier? I would assume the
worst case -- an ASCM leaker gets past area defenses and point
defenses and you take a hit, or an undetected mine activates under
your keel. How much combat capability do you lose? My bet is 100%
for some period of time -- how long was Princeton unavailable during
Desert Storm after she hit a mine? Whether it's an hour or a day is
immaterial. You may lose that fraction permanently, but you can still
continue the fight. With smaller ships distributed throughout the
littoral, if the worst case scenario occurs you only lose a fraction
of the combat capability. Princeton's temporary loss during DS didn't
really hurt the total effort because area air defense was distributed
among multiple shooters.
In all, the idea of having dozens of unmanned vehicles controlled from
a single platform just doesn't hold water. A bigger ship costs more
to build, it costs more to operate, and it fails to distribute risk.
There's probably a reason that the three current LCS competitors are
in the size/cost range they are in - smaller than/faster than/cheaper
than/not quite as capable as an Aegis CG/DDG meets the mission
requirements.
--
Ken
http://www.geocities.com/kmadams85
I hate you, you hate me, we're a disfunctional family...
:Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message news:<4q93vvk5hjjb44p56...@4ax.com>...
:> hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
:>
:> :OK, why does your mini-LCS need a crew?
:>
:> Because computers alone ain't that smart.
:>
:> :Why send a man in harm's way when you can send a robot?
:>
:> Because the robot can't do the job.
:
:Which is why you have manned terminals controlling the robots from your ship.
Which works great until you have to actually use them, at which point
in time your control gets jammed out, spoofed, etc.
:Exactly like all of the current LCS designs.
Oh, really?
:The only difference is that you are paying for far less overhead per unmanned
:vehicle by launching and controlling dozens of robots from the same manned
:ship.
Which gives you a single point of failure that can fail in multiple
ways. One ship gets hit or jammed off the air and EVERYTHING is
useless.
Bad plan, unless you never intend to actually get into a fight with
this stuff (in which case, why build it at all?).
But remote controled semi-autonomous robots are a vital part of the
LCS mission.
http://www.navysna.org/newsgram/files/Press/firescout_17JAN03.pdf
"We now needed something in the first [LCS] that was a UAV that could
do surveillance for us,"
http://www.navysna.org/newsgram/files/Press/Balisle_22JAN03.pdf
Lockheed Martin's [LMT] remote mine-hunting systems and perhaps other
unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV). These systems could be included in
an LCS "exploratory" mine warfare module.
http://www.naval-industrypartners.com/2003/pdf/NavalSurfaceForceTechnologyNeeds.pdf
Technologies and products that can contribute modular capabilities to
one or more LCS missions
Towed & deployable ASW sonar arrays for USV
Lightweight ASW sensor and weapons payloads
for UAV (e.g. LIDAR, MAD, mini-torpedo)
MIW UUV payloads
ASUW targeting systems and lightweight weapons for UAV and USV
Putting the speed in the robots instead of the main ship and
increasing the size of that main ship so it can take on multiple
missions at the same time isn't just a plan-B for dealing with reality
once the LCS program sinks under the same speed vs payload problems
that have swamped all of the Navy's "smaller, faster, cheaper"
platforms, it's a good idea in its own right.
-HJC
Fred, you simply don't see the possibilities in this thread. I would
have thought you'd visualize a littoral area domination ship as a
sailing yacht with a leather-clad Ann Coulter draped across the bow and
wielding a whip.
Hmmmm, but of course this is nothing new for either SSN's or SS's,
taking station of the coast and simply "listening" for weeks on end.
Mark
:Fred, you simply don't see the possibilities in this thread. I would
:have thought you'd visualize a littoral area domination ship as a
:sailing yacht with a leather-clad Ann Coulter draped across the bow and
:wielding a whip.
I try never to take Ann Coulter littorally....
[What? She can TALK????]
Are current torpedoes smart enough to be considered robots?
Joe
-----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =-----
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>Exactly like all of the current LCS designs.
It's interesting that you suddenly know the details of all the LCS designs,
when recently you have demonstrated ignorance of the basic concepts of LCS.
--
Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
"Haze Gray & Underway" - Naval History, DANFS, World Navies Today,
Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more - http://www.hazegray.org/
>But remote controled semi-autonomous robots are a vital part of the
>LCS mission.
And you have somehow made the jump from this concept to a notion of how many
UxVs LCS can carry/control. In fact you really have no idea what the
capabilities of LCS will be, aside from some vague and general concepts.
>Putting the speed in the robots instead of the main ship and
>increasing the size of that main ship so it can take on multiple
>missions at the same time
Like, perhaps, what CG, DDG, and DDX can do? Revolutionary!
>isn't just a plan-B for dealing with reality
>once the LCS program sinks under the same speed vs payload problems
>that have swamped all of the Navy's "smaller, faster, cheaper"
I'm trying to think of the most recent "smaller, faster, cheaper" program that
"sank" as you describe. Perhaps you're referring to FFG, which must have
"sunk" after producing 51 USN ships and nearly 2 dozen for foreign navies....
There are already the undersea 'gliders' which pretty clearly are at
least in some dim way.
Nope.
Now go read this.
And yes we all know that Joint Venture isn't an LCS. It doesn't
change the final result that small fast ships have been tried over and
over and they've been found wanting in payload, endurance and
seakeeping every time.
"Logistical Analysis of the Littoral Combat Ship"
http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion-image/03Mar_Rudko.pdf
Throughout history, the United States Navy has invested a considerable
amount of time and money in the development of high-speed ships. Since
World War Two, three high-speed ship classes have been commissioned
and tested in hopes of achieving great military usefulness: the
ASHEVILLE class patrol gunboats during the 1960s, the PEGASUS class
missile hydrofoils during the 1980s and the CYCLONE class patrol
coastal ships during the 1990s. However, each class failed to
capitalize on the speed they were designed for and, as a result,
failed to achieve the missions for which they were intended.
-HJC
As Ada Lovelace observed.
>and
>warfare is ever a matter of ingenuosity, creativity and improvisation.
It is controversial whether these can be programmed into a computer.
>No robot can replace a true soldier/sailor/pilot.
Yet.
--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: <zen2...@zen.co.ku>, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).
>World War Two, three high-speed ship classes have been commissioned
>and tested in hopes of achieving great military usefulness: the
>ASHEVILLE class patrol gunboats during the 1960s, the PEGASUS class
>missile hydrofoils during the 1980s and the CYCLONE class patrol
PEGASUS class: 265-ton gunboats
ASHEVILLE class: 265-ton gunboats
CYCLONE class: 328-ton gunboats
LCS: 1000 to 3000 ton fast light frigate/corvette
Any comparison between ships so different in size and concept is irrelevant.
> It is controversial whether these can be programmed into a computer.
IMHO impossible.
So each of the mentioned ship classes were intended for littoral
warfare and as the thesis noted each came up lacking. Conceptually,
the differences between them and the LCS are not as great as you
suggest.
As far as the LCS goes, its conceptual nature is still under debate as
evidenced by this January Proceedings article:
Lethal in the Littoral: A Smaller, Meaner LCS
By Lieutenant (junior grade) Jonathan F. Solomon, USN
The most important question has yet to be debated: What do we want
this combatant to do for us?
Surely Andrew, since your are the "Great Knower Of All Things Knaval",
must agree that the FFGs bear little resemblance to the original PF
concept.
>Surely Andrew, since your are the "Great Knower Of All Things Knaval",
>must agree that the FFGs bear little resemblance to the original PF
>concept.
And the point is?
LCS already bears little resemblance to the original concept (streetfighter),
and surely the final deployed LCS will not be the same as the existing
concepts.
That doesn't mean LCS, or PF/FFG, are failures.
>So each of the mentioned ship classes were intended for littoral
>warfare and as the thesis noted each came up lacking. Conceptually,
>the differences between them and the LCS are not as great as you
>suggest.
By the same rationale, battleships and aircraft carriers are conceptually the
same, since they are both intended for high-seas warfare. But in practical
terms, they're quite different.
The three small classes mentioned earlier are/were essentially fast attack
craft, intended for a single, extremely focused mission, unsuited to
independent deployment, and unable to adapt to new missions. They would have
been good for their intended missions, had those missions actually existed.
But if you build a missile-armed FAC to attack enemy surface combatants, then
place it in south Florida, it just becomes a bloody expensive Coast Guard
boat, and of course is considered a failure.
LCS is fundamentally different, in being a full-sized ship, capable of
deploying on its own, capable of a variety of missions, and specifically
designed to be adaptable for other missions.
In this sense LCS is much more like FFG than any of the small attack craft.
Both LCS and FFG are, and will be, subject to criticism that they are not
equal to larger combatants (DDG, DDX). Some people really despise any
smaller, less-capable, less-expensive ship, and believe everything should be a
top-of-the-line DDG. This argument ignores the fact that one simply cannot
afford to build *every* ship as a billion-dollar top-line vessel, and there
are a great many missions that are best accomplished with the smaller, cheaper
vessel.
There always has been, and always will be, a "high-end" and a "low-end"
ship....even when the concept of "Hi-Low Mix" is out of fashion.
>As far as the LCS goes, its conceptual nature is still under debate as
>evidenced by this January Proceedings article:
Hell, there's still debate about the conceptual nature of carriers and DDGs,
and we've been building them for a long time.
The Navy is evidently sure enough about the "conceptual nature" of the LCS to
issue an RFP for design and construction of 2 of them, arguments in
Proceedings notwithstanding.
Right, the LCS will keep getting bigger and slower and more focused on
mission modularity through UVs and manned air and watercraft until
they become LADS. And then they will be successful.
More or less as predicted by Lieutenant Commander David D. Rudko in
that article I pointed to above.
-HJC
Does the G in FFG stand for Gelded?
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20040102-9999_1m2frigate.html
Without missiles, some sailors wonder if the Navy will also remove the
"G" – for guided missile – from the frigates' designation.
Seahandling seems to be one of the reasons for the gelding.
"The reduced weight also will increase the ship's stability in heavy
seas, he said."
But best of all is this bit.
In essence, by removing the missiles, frigates will become de facto
helicopter carriers, Friedman said. "As a small helicopter carrier, it
may make sense" to continue operating the frigates.
So that's how frigates dominate a large area, through the use of
carried craft rather than firing missiles directly or running around
at 40 knots?
I bet if that Frigate were twice as big it could carry more than twice
the number of helicopters without needing a crew twice as big, eh?
It might even have room for some unmanned surface and subsurface
vehicles.
-HJC
"Henry J. Cobb" wrote:
The italian navy was designing for shallow-water operations post WW2, which let's face it,
theres an awful lot of in the med, and have put more time and effort into helicopter carrying
destroyer and cruiser designs than any navy other than the russians. The Vittorio Veneto
is about 9k tons fully loaded and has deck and hanger space for 9 AB212 helos or 6 SeaKings
(though the latter are too big to fit the elevators to the hanger deck). While an AB212 isn't that large
and doesn't have the endurance of the SeaKing, it can still carry a decent sensor fit and a couple
lightweight torpedoes, or a couple ASMs capable of dealing with small patrol craft, or machine guns or
rocket pods. 9 of them are certainly enough air power to deal with most shallow-water type operations.
Now the ship is overall pretty well armed, with Standard ER missiles, ASROC missiles, 8 76mm guns,
3 twin-40mm guns, and 406mm torpedo launchers, not to mention the Otomat Mk2 SSMs. Cut down on
that heavy hardware a bit and you could shrink the ship's design.
> But best of all is this bit.
>
> In essence, by removing the missiles, frigates will become de facto
> helicopter carriers, Friedman said. "As a small helicopter carrier, it
> may make sense" to continue operating the frigates.
By removing the missles the Frigate can still perform a vital warfare
capability ASW. It's second mission area MIO and drug interdiction
Ops are also unaffected.
> So that's how frigates dominate a large area, through the use of
> carried craft rather than firing missiles directly or running around
> at 40 knots?
That's how they dominate the litorral ASW area, not the theater.
Can you call it dominating though? 6-8 OHP's conducting coordinated
ASW that might qualify as dominating.
sid wrote:
> Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message news:<caq8vv41snv3bl4sv...@4ax.com>...
> > On 31 Dec 2003 17:51:20 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
> >
> > >World War Two, three high-speed ship classes have been commissioned
> > >and tested in hopes of achieving great military usefulness: the
> > >ASHEVILLE class patrol gunboats during the 1960s, the PEGASUS class
> > >missile hydrofoils during the 1980s and the CYCLONE class patrol
> >
> > PEGASUS class: 265-ton gunboats
> > ASHEVILLE class: 265-ton gunboats
> > CYCLONE class: 328-ton gunboats
> >
> > LCS: 1000 to 3000 ton fast light frigate/corvette
> >
> > Any comparison between ships so different in size and concept is irrelevant.
>
> So each of the mentioned ship classes were intended for littoral
> warfare and as the thesis noted each came up lacking. Conceptually,
> the differences between them and the LCS are not as great as you
> suggest.
They came up lacking in that they were designed for duties that they for one reason or another, never
actually got to fulfill. They then got used for other secondary duties which they simply happened to be
better than anything else available was for.
The pegasus class was meant for the shoot first and hope you survive the counter strike philosophy that
comes with engaging the russian black sea fleet as it'd break out into the med. This never happened of
course
and after the breakup of the soviet union/end of the cold war, and after the Iraqi Turkey Shoot by the
British
navy using helicopters, there didn't seem much reason to keep things like the Pegasus class around except
for
border security in the gulf and caribean for chasing down drug smugglers..
The cyclones btw were designed for Navy Seals/special ops, not direct combat with other FACs
and the mighty russian navy. Except they're a bit big for what the seals want to do. The coast guard is
making fun use of them for homeland security work though, basically doing the same stuff they used the
pegasus class for, except the cyclones are better armed for the role since most drug smugglers do not
operate vessels that'd call for a harpoon missile or a 76mm shell to stop.
The Asheville's were originally built during the days of the evil cuban missile crisis as a way to
blockade
cuba if required without tying up larger destroyers and cruisers, but they were usedin the riverine
operations around vietnam quite successfully. But then lacking much in the way of SSMs (aside from a few
conversions for the anti-tattletale role carrying standard anti-radiation SSMs) and not as fast as
russian missile-hydrofoils (which is why the pegasus class came to be), they mostly got relagated to the
reserve fleet pending transfer to foreign countries.
Now canada has some coastal patrol vessels that are amazingly well suited to shallow water operations, and
at about
960 tons are right in the corvette displacement range, but they're a bit under armed as far as modern navy
vessels go, and
slow too (about 16 knts) but they're very maneurable using azipods for the propulsion units (basically
they can do a 360 inside their
own length if they wanted to). But they were designed for patrol work, and mine hunting, and as training
vessels for the naval
reserve, and they do those jobs well.
:By removing the missles the Frigate can still perform a vital warfare
:capability ASW.
You do know what the nickname for the sonar on the Perrys was amongst
the ASW community, don't you?
>So that's how frigates dominate a large area, through the use of
Frigates are not intended as area domination ships. That is a role for
cruisers.
>carried craft rather than firing missiles directly or running around
>at 40 knots?
The missiles that are being removed would not contribute to 'area domination'
anyway...hence their removal.
>I bet if that Frigate were twice as big it could carry more than twice
>the number of helicopters without needing a crew twice as big, eh?
DDs, DDGs, and CGs are twice (or more) the size of FFGs, and carry an equal or
smaller number of helos.
[1969 Vittorio Veneto]
> Now the ship is overall pretty well armed, with Standard ER missiles,
> ASROC missiles, 8 76mm guns, 3 twin-40mm guns, and 406mm torpedo
> launchers, not to mention the Otomat Mk2 SSMs. Cut down on that heavy
> hardware a bit and you could shrink the ship's design.
A magnificent ship indeed... sadly 30/11/2003 was decommissioned :((((((((((
The ex-sailors association of Taranto was attempted to preserve her as
museum ship ( so at least we can have one)
And a side note: the TT was 325 mm. not 406mm...
> On 31 Dec 2003 17:51:20 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
>
> >World War Two, three high-speed ship classes have been commissioned
> >and tested in hopes of achieving great military usefulness: the
> >ASHEVILLE class patrol gunboats during the 1960s, the PEGASUS class
> >missile hydrofoils during the 1980s and the CYCLONE class patrol
>
> PEGASUS class: 265-ton gunboats
> ASHEVILLE class: 265-ton gunboats
> CYCLONE class: 328-ton gunboats
>
> LCS: 1000 to 3000 ton fast light frigate/corvette
>
> Any comparison between ships so different in size and concept is
> irrelevant.
>
Andrew, while I realize it is not current, how would you put the Sa'ar V
with respect to possible LCS relevance?
Yes, but they have different missions.
The DD(X)is the escort leading the way with In-stride Mine Avoidance
and advanced sensors. It also does some land attack with AGS and
Tactical Tomahawk.
The CG(X) handles air and missile defense.
The CVN launches fixed wing aircraft for airspace domination, long
range attack and close air support.
The LADS provides manned and unmanned air and water craft for boarding
operations, minefield clearance and the search for and destruction of
enemy submarines and small watercraft.
So when these classes are combined with the subs, gators and usual
support ships the US Navy can deal with all of its missions without
needing any ocean crosser smaller than a destroyer.
They just need to can the LCS, build more DD(X) and convert a few
gators over to the LADS configuration to test and refine the concept.
It wouldn't hurt to build a modular design that can quickly be shifted
between the LADS and LPD missions.
-HJC
>Andrew, while I realize it is not current, how would you put the Sa'ar V
>with respect to possible LCS relevance?
Well, it's certainly more similar in size and mission than PHM, PGM, and PC
are/were. 1,200 tons clearly puts it outside the realm of "fast attack
craft", and it's multi-mission and air-capable. In a sense, Sa'ar V might be
considered equivalent to one mission load-out for LCS.
The thing it's lacking is the modular, adaptable, mission-changing concept of
LCS. Sa'ar V is conventional, in terms of a fixed set of weapons and
missions. LCS is supposed to be an ASW platform one day, a MCM platform a few
days later, a SOF platform the next week....by changing the equipment, not by
carrying it all at once (which would require a much larger platform). That
sort of flexibility is only seen (on a limited basis) in the Danish Stanflex
ships.
>The DD(X)is the escort leading the way with In-stride Mine Avoidance
>and advanced sensors. It also does some land attack with AGS and
>Tactical Tomahawk.
You've got DD(X) somewhat backwards. At somewhere between 12k and 15k tons,
it's not the "escort", and it's not going to "lead the way" into hostile
waters. That's the purpose of LCS.
When you actually get to hostile waters you'll be using the UUVs of
the LADs to deal with minefields. The DD(X) deals with immediate
action before the UVs are deployed.
Now if the LCS would do the job for a lot less money than the LADS
then I could see some tradeoff of pushing more sailors forwards near
the hostile shore.
But while the LCS will cost $250 million each (
http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/article_217_Washington%2520Post.doc
), LPD 20 will cost less than twice that much
(http://www.ss.northropgrumman.com/pressrelease/news/000530.cfm ).
While the LPD-17 class isn't optimized for the LADS role, each of
these ships has three vehicle decks with a total of 2323 square meters
for vehicle storage which is many times the space available on the
LCS.
Yes the LPD-17 class isn't all that stealthy, but by deploying swarms
of smaller craft it can keep further away from the hostiles than the
LCS using ship mounted sensors and weapons would.
Just remember that distance does stealth a lot better than speed does
armor.
-HJC
Andrew Toppan wrote:
> On 2 Jan 2004 21:47:27 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
>
> >So that's how frigates dominate a large area, through the use of
>
> Frigates are not intended as area domination ships. That is a role for
> cruisers.
>
> >carried craft rather than firing missiles directly or running around
> >at 40 knots?
>
> The missiles that are being removed would not contribute to 'area domination'
> anyway...hence their removal.
>
> >I bet if that Frigate were twice as big it could carry more than twice
> >the number of helicopters without needing a crew twice as big, eh?
>
> DDs, DDGs, and CGs are twice (or more) the size of FFGs, and carry an equal or
> smaller number of helos.
In the USA that's true... in other navies its not. Britain and Canada class ships
on their role, not their
displacement.
>In the USA that's true... in other navies its not. Britain and Canada class ships
>on their role, not their displacement.
Since we're talking about the US Navy, foreign practice is irrelevant.
(and since role and displacement are very closely linked, it's false to say
*any* navy uses one characteristic or the other exclusively. CGs, DDs, and
DDGs in the US Navy have essentially the same displacement, yet 3 different
classifications.)
>But while the LCS will cost $250 million each (
>http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/article_217_Washington%2520Post.doc
>), LPD 20 will cost less than twice that much
>(http://www.ss.northropgrumman.com/pressrelease/news/000530.cfm ).
And LPD 21 will be double that again, $816 million.
>While the LPD-17 class isn't optimized for the LADS role, each of
>these ships has three vehicle decks with a total of 2323 square meters
>for vehicle storage which is many times the space available on the
>LCS.
Which ought to be used for it's intended purpose, carrying Marine Corps
vehicles.
>Yes the LPD-17 class isn't all that stealthy, but by deploying swarms
>of smaller craft it can keep further away from the hostiles than the
>LCS using ship mounted sensors and weapons would.
Again, you fail to comprehend what an LCS is. Offboard vehicles are one of
the major payloads defined for LCS, so "ship mounted sensors and weapons" are
not a limiting factor.
I've "heard" that it can exploit BB propagation (somewhat), which
would be nice in the littoral, lousy capabilities in blue water ops.
Along with the 19 tail, and LAMPS III not too shabby.
:"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
:news:tovdvvoeo7f50pnlh...@4ax.com...
:> "Mark Test" <mgt...@the-i.net> wrote:
:>
:> :By removing the missles the Frigate can still perform a vital warfare
:> :capability ASW.
:>
:> You do know what the nickname for the sonar on the Perrys was amongst
:> the ASW community, don't you?
:
:Nope, never worked with the SQS-56 before (I'm assuming here you are
:talking about the active side).
Both active and passive (but without the tail). It was generally
referred to in the community as 'Helen Keller'.
:I've "heard" that it can exploit BB propagation (somewhat), which
:would be nice in the littoral, lousy capabilities in blue water ops.
Very little of the sea bottom is actually composed of things where
bottom bounce works. Most littoral areas have too much mud and aren't
deep enough. The SQS-26/53 series sonars have a bottom bounce mode
for use in blue water.
:Along with the 19 tail, and LAMPS III not too shabby.
The tail and bouys ARE the Perry's ASW capability. :-)
Mark
There are different issues here -- support required for day-to-day
operations and support required for role change.
The smaller ships were dependant on extensive external support for
day-to-day operations even with their single focused role. The PHMs (for
example) could not self-deploy across an ocean without a tender or maintain
themselves for more than a week or two without their maintenance vans. LCS,
in contrast, can operate in a single role much like any larger ship, staying
at sea for prolonged periods using UNREP. There is more emphasis on fly-in
support, but this is true of DD(X) as well. It's not an LCS issue, it's an
overall Navy mannpower issue.
LCS needs to return to port only if it has to change missions in
mid-deployment. (In contast, the earlier small combatants could not change
missions at all.) The general drift in LCS doctrine appears to be that
payloads will be selected pre-deployment based on the expected threats. If
the threats change in mid-deployment, LCS *can* change payloads, but this
would not be an every day occurrence. For one thing, the crew dynamics make
it a difficult change no matter where the swap is done.
> Missions did in fact exist for those other ships. Each was lacking,
Actually, the missions often did not exist. It was never really clear what
the PGs or PHMs were supposed to do. The PHMs are a particulalry good
example -- their histopry clealry shows that they were technologically
"sweet" platforms in seach of a mission. Once they were built, missions were
found, but not really ones they could do particularly well or that really
required that sort of ship. Only the PCs had a clearly defined mission.
--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)
Gotta call you on your first statement here Tom, the mission has
traditionally existed, its just been fulfilled by FF/DD/CG types since
WWII. There is something wrong with that picture of the big,
expensive, scarce CG sitting DIW interdicting a dhow.
http://www.news.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=11247
We need ships optimized for such missions...and we have been needing
them for decades. The PHMs excelled at this particular job, but they
were orphans.
The PHMs were orphaned because they were too expensive to buy in the
numbers needed, and because of intrapolitical reasons.
(an openly partisan account but he essentially got it right-and it's a
good view into Navy politics)http://www.foils.org/phmhist.pdf
The Ashevilles had a defined mission by the LRO before the first dime
was spent on them.
Rudko makes a compelling argument that the Pegasus's and Ashevilles
utility and subsequent longevity suffered because of the speed
requirement.
Another NPS thesis suggests that the need for speed may not be as big
a necessity as convention wisdom suggests(don't bother to try and open
this with a dial up-its 389 pages):
http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/cgisirsi/Sun+Dec+28+16:27:55+PST+2003/0/520/03sep_Efimba.pdf
"AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS' ABILITY TO PROTECT
EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUPS"
"As modeled in this study, and if not used wisely, tactical speed is a
potential
liability to LCS protection of the ESG.'
"This research provides a quantitative basis for further, higher
resolution studies that should consider the measurable benefits of air
capability and stealth and the relative ineffectiveness of tactical
speed for this new
littoral combatant ship."
> LCS needs to return to port only if it has to change missions in
> mid-deployment. (In contast, the earlier small combatants could not change
> missions at all.) The general drift in LCS doctrine appears to be that
> payloads will be selected pre-deployment based on the expected threats.
All this is hunky-dory in peace time, but when hostilities start and
the LCS force takes its lumps...As a trip wire force its folly to
think it won't...Then rapid mission adjustments will be needed. As a
"system" the LCS is inflexible in this regard;unless many, many are
bought and deployed. That But we all know that's not going to happen.
> There is more emphasis on fly-in support, but this is true of DD(X) as well. > It's not an LCS issue, it's an overall Navy mannpower issue.
Again, great in peace time but this is a built in vulnerability once
bullets start flying, just more potential for mission stopping SAR
efforts...Which brings up a good point, will there be the collective
stomach to take significant losses in the LCS fleet?
The stop everything mentality in the late Vietnam air war to conduct
SAR efforts and the Somalia experience suggest that losses-or
disabling damage-of even one of these ships could well become a huge
operational and tactical liability.
Along with viewing potetial losses through spreadsheets PCO's of the
LCS's would do well to also read this rather more empirical study:
http://www.de413.org/textspirit_of_the_sammy.htm#CHAPTER%206
"About this time one of those disheartening things happened that puts
a lump in your throat. The destroyer HOEL had been hit pretty hard.
Her engine rooms were knocked out. We had to pass her by and leave her
lying there dead in the water with a big list on her. She was on fire.
We could see men scrambling around launching life rafts. We just had
to steam by. In combat you have to leave the wounded behind whether
they are men or ships and go on your way and fight. Nevertheless, it
was something that made every man on our topside feel the same as I
did, and it bothered us to leave those men to the mercy of the Japs,
but there was no other choice."
Gotta call you on your first statement here Tom, the mission has
> LCS needs to return to port only if it has to change missions in
> mid-deployment. (In contast, the earlier small combatants could not change
> missions at all.) The general drift in LCS doctrine appears to be that
> payloads will be selected pre-deployment based on the expected threats.
All this is hunky-dory in peace time, but when hostilities start and
the LCS force takes its lumps...As a trip wire force its folly to
think it won't...Then rapid mission adjustments will be needed. As a
"system" the LCS is inflexible in this regard;unless many, many are
bought and deployed. That But we all know that's not going to happen.
> There is more emphasis on fly-in support, but this is true of DD(X) as well. > It's not an LCS issue, it's an overall Navy mannpower issue.
Again, great in peace time but this is a built in vulnerability once
bullets start flying, just more potential for mission stopping SAR
efforts...Which brings up a good point, will there be the collective
stomach to take significant losses in the LCS fleet?
The stop everything mentality in the late Vietnam air war to conduct
SAR efforts and the Somalia experience suggest that losses of even one
Gotta call you on your first statement here Tom, the mission has
> LCS needs to return to port only if it has to change missions in
> mid-deployment. (In contast, the earlier small combatants could not change
> missions at all.) The general drift in LCS doctrine appears to be that
> payloads will be selected pre-deployment based on the expected threats.
All this is hunky-dory in peace time, but when hostilities start and
the LCS force takes its lumps...As a trip wire force its folly to
think it won't...Then rapid mission adjustments will be needed. As a
"system" the LCS is inflexible in this regard;unless many, many are
bought and deployed. That But we all know that's not going to happen.
> There is more emphasis on fly-in support, but this is true of DD(X) as well. > It's not an LCS issue, it's an overall Navy mannpower issue.
Again, great in peace time but this is a built in vulnerability once
>LCS's overall will require a long, dedicated logistics trail. That
>makes them inherently "un" independent.
The Fleet, as a whole, requires a long, dedicated logistics trail. Fuel,
stores, and munitions don't just appear without a logistics ship to deliver
them. On a day-to-day operational basis, the LCS requires the same logistics
as the rest of the fleet. This is in sharp contrast to the PHMs and the like,
which would require dedicated tender support, and perhaps even heavy lift
support, to conduct an overseas deployment. LCS is to steam with the fleet
like any other ship; the PHMs could never do this.
For mission changes, the PHMs didn't require any logistics because they
*couldn't* change missions at all. LCS is the first USN ship to have the
ability to change missions in this sense (whether at home between deployments,
or during a deployment). The "long, dedicated logistics trail" to accomplish
this would be....a freighter loaded with some containers, and a pier. Really
not the end of the world.
>We need ships optimized for such missions...and we have been needing
>them for decades. The PHMs excelled at this particular job, but they
>were orphans.
First they detected the dhow, probably with the helicopter a PHM would not
have.
Then they put a boarding party onto the dhow, but the PHM hasn't got enough
crew for a boarding party.
Then they took the dhow's crew aboard the USN ship, but the PHM hasn't got
enough space to house them, much less in a secure lockup.
Then they had a prize crew operate the dhow, but the PHM hasn't got enough
crew to form a prize crew.
And they might have needed to tow the dhow, but the PHM can't tow.
So why is the PHM such a great platform for this mission?
A CG is admittedly overkill, but if there's no air threat to defeat, and no
Tomahawks to launch, it is better to use the CG than let it steam in slow
circles doing nothing.
Ideally you would use a small surface combatant for this mission, such as FFG
or LCS.
>> PEGASUS class: 265-ton gunboats
>> ASHEVILLE class: 265-ton gunboats
>> CYCLONE class: 328-ton gunboats
>>
>> LCS: 1000 to 3000 ton fast light frigate/corvette
>>
>> Any comparison between ships so different in size and concept is
>> irrelevant.
>
> So each of the mentioned ship classes were intended for littoral
> warfare and as the thesis noted each came up lacking. Conceptually,
> the differences between them and the LCS are not as great as you
> suggest.
There are some significant differences, especially in how LCS relates to the
rest of the fleet. Unlike all these earlier concepts, LCS is designed to be
self-deployable, able to operate in adverse weather and sea conditions, and
have sufficient endurance to remain on-station with conventional ships.
Previous littoral combatants were short-endurance ships that could not
easily synchonize with fleet operations.
> As far as the LCS goes, its conceptual nature is still under debate as
> evidenced by this January Proceedings article:
> Lethal in the Littoral: A Smaller, Meaner LCS
> By Lieutenant (junior grade) Jonathan F. Solomon, USN
> The most important question has yet to be debated: What do we want
> this combatant to do for us?
I can't say this article impresses me much. He insists that LCS should not
be allowed to become a frigate and then defines the ship's characteristics
and armament almost exactly as a modern frigate (ESSM, Harpoon, etc.). The
rest is not too terribly different from what LCS is already supposed to do.
He's not breaking new ground.
There is something wrong with that picture of the big,
> expensive, scarce CG sitting DIW interdicting a dhow.
> http://www.news.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=11247
> We need ships optimized for such missions...and we have been needing
> them for decades. The PHMs excelled at this particular job, but they
> were orphans.
USN hydrofoils were not designed for maritime interdiction and are certianly
not optimized for it. If you look at their procurement history, there was
much uncertainty aas to what they would actually be used for, but it
certainly wasn't stopping merchant ships. hey got sued for drug
interdiction only because there was no other useful mission they could
accomplish.
My conclusion--based on research I did for NAVSEA a year ot two ago--is that
various people thought hydrofoils were neat ideas (high speed ships often
generate this reaction) and they set out to find a mission for them. The
USN looked at ASW, coastal warfar (PGHs), and even air defense before
settling on the narrow-seas anti-ship role. Oddly, however, the USN had not
seen a need for this mission in the 20-30 years before the PHMs were built,
nor diid is see a need for the mission after they were built. IOW, the
mission was contrived to justify procurement of the technologically "sweet"
hydrofoil concept.
> The PHMs were orphaned because they were too expensive to buy in
> the numbers needed,
In the numbers needed to do what? There was no credible mission put forward
to justify large-scale procurement. That was the whole problem.
and because of intrapolitical reasons.
> (an openly partisan account but he essentially got it right-and it's a
> good view into Navy politics)http://www.foils.org/phmhist.pdf
Its an interesting read, but not the full story by any means. It skips over
how the CINCSOUTH and NATO requirements came to be written in the first
place. Like many such "requirements", these were not exactly written from a
blank page. Rather, hydrofoil advocates created the requirements to justify
the construction of their favored ship.
In many ways, this is how the original LCS requirement came into being --
advocates fo advanced hullforms and distributed sensors created a
"requirement" for a small fast combatant to justify the construction of
their put projects. What the Navy is now doing (sensibly IMO) is stealthily
recasting the project so that LCS actually fills a requirement that the Navy
has had for several years but has been unwilling to articulate for political
reasons -- a frigate replacement project.
It';s been obvious for many years that the Navy was running nto a serious
numbers/mission mismatch, and that the planned all-high force of AEGIs ships
was not going to get the missions done past the mid 2010s. However, itr was
also understood that there was no support (from Congress or from the AEGIS
shipbuilding barons at NAVSEA) for a frigate program in parallel with the
SC-21/DD-21/DD(X). With tight budgets, a frigate might have replaced the
high-mix ships entirely, with equally bad consequences for the fleet.
When the new adminstration demanded that the Navy adopt the Streetfighter
concept (then LCS(X)) as the price for saving DD-21/DD(X), I'm sure the
AEGIS folks thought they woudl experiment for a couple of years and then let
it die on the vine after DD(X) was in construction. But the rest of the
Navy (notably the current CNO) recognized that LCS offers a way out of the
numbers bind the service has been in for so long. So we see LCS evolving
from a 600-ton expendable missile boat to a 2500-ton light frigate.
> The Ashevilles had a defined mission by the LRO before the first dime
> was spent on them.
The LRO requirement again seems to me to have been written to justify a
small combatant, not to fill a clear military need. Certainly, what was
built did not fulfill the fleet's actual operation needs. One way or
another, LRO's requiremetns were wrong.
> Rudko makes a compelling argument that the Pegasus's and Ashevilles
> utility and subsequent longevity suffered because of the speed
> requirement.
>
> Another NPS thesis suggests that the need for speed may not be as big
> a necessity as convention wisdom suggests(don't bother to try and
> open this with a dial up-its 389 pages):
No disagreement on these counts at all. High speed is likely to be the
least useful aspect of LCS or any equivalent ship. High speed was a mandate
from the transformation gurus without any particular operational analyis
behind it. LCS projected speed has slowly declined from 60 knots
(Streetfighter) to 50 knots (objective)/40 knots (threshold). I would not
be surprised to see actual service speed even slower.
>> The general drift in LCS doctrine appears to be that
>> payloads will be selected pre-deployment based on the expected
>> threats.
>
> All this is hunky-dory in peace time, but when hostilities start and
> the LCS force takes its lumps...As a trip wire force its folly to
> think it won't...Then rapid mission adjustments will be needed. As a
> "system" the LCS is inflexible in this regard;unless many, many are
> bought and deployed. That But we all know that's not going to happen.
You miss my point. When operating in a a single role, LCS is not
significantly more difficult to support than a conventional ship. But no
conventional ship can role-change to the same degree at all, so it's unfair
to say LCS requires more logisitcal support due to this feature. To get the
same flexibility from a conventional force, you'd need more ships, with far
more total cost.
> Again, great in peace time but this is a built in vulnerability once
> bullets start flying, just more potential for mission stopping SAR
> efforts...Which brings up a good point, will there be the collective
> stomach to take significant losses in the LCS fleet?
This is really no different than the current situation -- LCS won't be much
more vulnerable than a contemporary frigate. One solid hit on any modern
ship is at least a temporary mission kill and demands lots of extenal
assistance.
In a far away scrap off hostile shores there is no guarantee the LCS
will be able to find a safe place to reconfigure. Along with that
freighter and pier you will likely need substantial force protection.
So its nowhere as simple as you envision except in peacetime.
Such limitations may not be the end of the world , but it could well
facilitate an unfavorable end to a battle...And how many of those can
we afford?
Its a powerful statement for spending the money on multi-mission
capability. It seems like every time the Navy tries to get away from
it they end up coming back. No, I'm not saying build all CG's. I'm
saying that the budget process has not served the small combatant well
since WWII.
>
> Ideally you would use a small surface combatant for this mission, such as FFG
> or LCS.
Thats what I said too.
The hyrofoil concept wasn't sweet a idea, it was a terrific idea.
Since the Russians had already developed it with stealth hydrofoils.
And it only took the US Navy 30 years to catch up this time,
rather than their usual 400 years.
The navy only used the drug interdiction role for the ship,
given that that's the only role the US Navy has ever known
for ships. Since their beer allotment is still only two beers
per month, they have been able to calculate that the
only people their going to get volunteering for any of
their new ships is the US Surgeon General, rather
than people who actually understand how aircraft work.
>
> > The PHMs were orphaned because they were too expensive to buy in
> > the numbers needed,
>
> In the numbers needed to do what? There was no credible mission put forward
> to justify large-scale procurement. That was the whole problem.
>
> and because of intrapolitical reasons.
> > (an openly partisan account but he essentially got it right-and it's a
> > good view into Navy politics)http://www.foils.org/phmhist.pdf
>
> Its an interesting read, but not the full story by any means. It skips over
> how the CINCSOUTH and NATO requirements came to be written in the first
> place. Like many such "requirements", these were not exactly written from a
> blank page. Rather, hydrofoil advocates created the requirements to justify
> the construction of their favored ship.
>
> In many ways, this is how the original LCS requirement came into being --
> advocates fo advanced hullforms and distributed sensors created a
> "requirement" for a small fast combatant to justify the construction of
> their put projects. What the Navy is now doing (sensibly IMO) is stealthily
> recasting the project so that LCS actually fills a requirement that the Navy
> has had for several years but has been unwilling to articulate for political
> reasons -- a frigate replacement project.
But that political reason went away at least 30 years,
since the US navy hasn't had any cruisers in at least
30 years.
OK, so you want something can can quickly go over and drop a boarding
party on such a target before they do anything funny.
My suggestion is to use a ship's boat or a helicopter and just put the
pilots and boarding crew at risk.
> No disagreement on these counts at all. High speed is likely to be the
> least useful aspect of LCS or any equivalent ship. High speed was a mandate
> from the transformation gurus without any particular operational analyis
> behind it. LCS projected speed has slowly declined from 60 knots
> (Streetfighter) to 50 knots (objective)/40 knots (threshold). I would not
> be surprised to see actual service speed even slower.
30 knots is all you need for an escort, 22 knots for a core ESG ship.
So make it big, make it slow and change missions by carrying a
different mix of manned and unmmaned craft.
After all, what happens when an LCS pulls up next to a suicide ship
that then blows itself up? Is that a mission accomplished?
-HJC
>
> It';s been obvious for many years that the Navy was running nto a serious
> numbers/mission mismatch, and that the planned all-high force of AEGIs ships
> was not going to get the missions done past the mid 2010s. However, itr was
> also understood that there was no support (from Congress or from the AEGIS
> shipbuilding barons at NAVSEA) for a frigate program in parallel with the
> SC-21/DD-21/DD(X). With tight budgets, a frigate might have replaced the
> high-mix ships entirely, with equally bad consequences for the fleet.
So its the budget driving mission requirements. Spangenburg's oral
history describes how the post war budget process turned a once
orderly-if not fair-aircraft procurement system driven by mission
requirements into a muddled, expensive mess. Same thing is true for
ships. Bring back the General Board!!
>
> When the new adminstration demanded that the Navy adopt the Streetfighter
> concept (then LCS(X)) as the price for saving DD-21/DD(X), I'm sure the
> AEGIS folks thought they woudl experiment for a couple of years and then let
> it die on the vine after DD(X) was in construction. But the rest of the
> Navy (notably the current CNO) recognized that LCS offers a way out of the
> numbers bind the service has been in for so long. So we see LCS evolving
> from a 600-ton expendable missile boat to a 2500-ton light frigate.
OK fine. So now you have a single mission FFG replacement that will be
regarded as a major warship. That doesn't sound like progress, and it
doesn't sound like the ship needed for the Littoral fight as
envisioned here:
http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Concepts/LCSCONOPS.asp
You have the inside knowledge Tom, is this document an historical
relic?
> The LRO requirement again seems to me to have been written to justify a
> small combatant, not to fill a clear military need. Certainly, what was
> built did not fulfill the fleet's actual operation needs. One way or
> another, LRO's requiremetns were wrong.
I'd say the final product was too flawed to accomplish the mission,
and the navy was preoccupied (albeit with good reason) with the Blue
Water fight. The mission still existed; it just wasn't as important as
others.
>
> No disagreement on these counts at all. High speed is likely to be the
> least useful aspect of LCS or any equivalent ship. High speed was a mandate
> from the transformation gurus without any particular operational analyis
> behind it. LCS projected speed has slowly declined from 60 knots
> (Streetfighter) to 50 knots (objective)/40 knots (threshold). I would not
> be surprised to see actual service speed even slower.
Sounds like speed was considered as part of the survivability by
NAWCD. Making it slower and bigger is means there will be a real
reluctance to put them up near the beach...Unless they morph into
fairly robust multi-mission platforms. But wait, isn't that the same
as DD(X)?
>
> You miss my point. When operating in a a single role, LCS is not
> significantly more difficult to support than a conventional ship. But no
> conventional ship can role-change to the same degree at all, so it's unfair
> to say LCS requires more logisitcal support due to this feature. To get the
> same flexibility from a conventional force, you'd need more ships, with far
> more total cost.
However the Figs can perform multi-missions. Load up the LCS with all
the modules and call a spade a spade...or call it a FFG.
> > Again, great in peace time but this is a built in vulnerability once
> > bullets start flying, just more potential for mission stopping SAR
> > efforts...Which brings up a good point, will there be the collective
> > stomach to take significant losses in the LCS fleet?
>
> This is really no different than the current situation -- LCS won't be much
> more vulnerable than a contemporary frigate. One solid hit on any modern
> ship is at least a temporary mission kill and demands lots of extenal
> assistance.
The NAWCD document, in polite terms, infers the LCS force will
overcome inevitable losses with numbers. It was a long time ago, but
the lessons of Samar should be studied by some Pentagonian
PowerPointers. If what you are saying is correct, yet another class of
ships will be built that will be badly mismatched for the shallow
water role.
>Because they very effectively performed that mission-in a networked
>environment which mitigated their limitiations-for some years. Isn't
They did? When did the PHMs make an operational deployment to anywhere?
Runnig around Key West chasing drug runners doesn't count!
>the whole network thing supposed to be the secret behind the LCS
>Andrew?
No. LCS is supposed to have enough onboard assets (helos, UAVs, UUVs, USVs,
whatever) to do missions *without* depending on someone else to provide all
the goodies. Small craft such as PHM cannot claim this capability.
>Its a powerful statement for spending the money on multi-mission
>capability.
That's why LCS is able to adapt to various missions, so you're not stuck with
a ship capable of the "wrong" mission.
>My suggestion is to use a ship's boat or a helicopter and just put the
>pilots and boarding crew at risk.
Exactly the concept behind one set of LCS missions.
The question is, do you need a billion-dollar CG or DDG to deliver the
helicopter or the small boat to the operating area, or can you use a $220
million LCS?
>Based on your comments, it appears the LCS is headed down the same
>road as Zumwalt's PF.
Which has turned out to be a most useful and flexible warship, such that
decommissioning plans were put on hold for 20 years or more, in favor of
decommissioning larger and "more capable" destroyers.
Hmmmm.
>regarded as a major warship. That doesn't sound like progress, and it
>doesn't sound like the ship needed for the Littoral fight as
>envisioned here:
It's unclear to me what your gripe is....is LCS too big, too small, to fast,
too slow, too focussed, or not focussed enough? You criticize it as being too
dependent on "net" forces (thus implying it should be bigger to be more
independent), then you seem to advocate something more PHM-like in design,
i.e. much smaller and *more* dependent.
I'm reading the latest version of the LCS capabilities development document
tonight (ugh), and to me it certainly seems aimed at something in the
"corvette/small frigate" class, rather than some form of fast attack craft
(PHM, PGM, whatever), or a large frigate/small destroyer.
>rounds start swapping. NAWCD says "that without FORCEnet the LCS will
>be as limited as other previous small combatants". We already see some
LCS is explicitly defined to have certain core capabilities, without mission
modules or any "net", that far exceed those of "small combatants" such as PHM
and PG. With a basic loadout of mission equipment, you get helicopter
capability, plus UUVs or USVs as appropriate. NO other "small combatant"
could provide that capability, "net" or no "net".
>In a far away scrap off hostile shores there is no guarantee the LCS
>will be able to find a safe place to reconfigure. Along with that
So you don't reconfigure, and you're no worse-off than a dedicated-purpose
frigate.
>
> >the whole network thing supposed to be the secret behind the LCS
> >Andrew?
>
> No. LCS is supposed to have enough onboard assets (helos, UAVs, UUVs, USVs,
> whatever) to do missions *without* depending on someone else to provide all
> the goodies. Small craft such as PHM cannot claim this capability.
Wow! Really?! Looks like you will need to straighten out some numbnutz
over at NPS Andrew.
http://www.nps.navy.mil/orfacpag/resumePages/LCS%20CONOPS%20brief%2011-15pt1.ppt
"Without FORCEnet, LCS will be as limited in value as previous small
U.S. Navy ships...Tactical network capabilities are critical to LCS
CONOPS"
>
> >Its a powerful statement for spending the money on multi-mission
> >capability.
>
> That's why LCS is able to adapt to various missions, so you're not stuck with
> a ship capable of the "wrong" mission.
If the LCS turns out to be a 2500 ton major combatant as Tom is
saying, it will be the "wrong" ship for the mission.
What "dedicated purpose" frigates are there Andrew?
>
> >regarded as a major warship. That doesn't sound like progress, and it
> >doesn't sound like the ship needed for the Littoral fight as
> >envisioned here:
>
> It's unclear to me what your gripe is....is LCS too big, too small, to fast,
> too slow, too focussed, or not focussed enough? You criticize it as being too
> dependent on "net" forces (thus implying it should be bigger to be more
> independent), then you seem to advocate something more PHM-like in design,
> i.e. much smaller and *more* dependent.
No "gripes" really, just points of concern. I may no longer go down to
the sea in ships, but its my tax money too.
I think its rapidly evolving into something too big for the job. This
whole idea of support crews flying to and fro smacks of a potential
tactical weakness, but thats a bigger issue than LCS. The modular idea
is an innovative one, but it could cause a Commander some real
problems in a Littoral fight. The potential for losses is fairly great
for this type ship conducting the missions envisioned. Smaller is
better than bigger in this reagrd for a host of reasons. Its been a
long time since the USN has sustained high losses-Liberty, Stark,
Clark, Princeton, Inchon, and Cole notwithstanding...Each of which met
misfortune in the Littorals BTW. I wonder if the collective mindset is
ready. Here is an intersting article that broaches this subject:
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2004/Winter/Pdfs/art4-w04.pdf
Well, maybe I do have one Gripe. It bothers me when I see the
potential for those losses couched in such terms as "Graceful
degradation of the force".
PowerPointers-and LCS PCO's- really need to start at Chapter 6 in this
account of a similar sized-and similarly conceived-ship in a Littoral
fight(for those wanting to cut to the chase, start at ch6):
http://www.de413.org/textspirit_of_the_sammy.htm#CHAPTER%206
"At that time, with the ship lying inert in the water, I was
confronted with one of the most difficult decisions I have ever had to
face: to decide what the hell to do. Should I abandon ship or not? I
looked around my ship, I could see dead and wounded men everywhere.
The ship was hopelessly battered up. From where I stood it was obvious
that she was mortally wounded. The engines were no longer in
operation. I had no communication with the engineering department. She
had what I estimated was about a seven to ten degree list to
starboard. Then Mr. Gurnett arrived on the bridge looking rather
haggard and covered with pulverized asbestos lagging. He told me some
things I already knew and some I didn't know. Among other things he
told me that both engine rooms were definitely knocked out. He also
told me that we were settling by the stern, that he had measured the
list and found it to be eleven degrees. And he recommended that we
abandon ship."
>
> I'm reading the latest version of the LCS capabilities development document
> tonight (ugh), and to me it certainly seems aimed at something in the
> "corvette/small frigate" class, rather than some form of fast attack craft
> (PHM, PGM, whatever), or a large frigate/small destroyer.
So why is it evolving into a ~2500 ton ship?
>So its the budget driving mission requirements. Spangenburg's oral
>history describes how the post war budget process turned a once
>orderly-if not fair-aircraft procurement system driven by mission
>requirements into a muddled, expensive mess. Same thing is true for
>ships. Bring back the General Board!!
Bring back the what?
OK, let's look at the one helicopter mission.
There's a minor choke point in the world's ocean somewhere that sees
very little traffic so you want one helicopter available to help
search ships of interest for terrorists, drugs and WMD.
The current LCS designs do this mission at a minimal requirement in
money and manpower, no?
Well how about the 2 to 5 percent of the time that the one helicopter
on the LCS is out of operation? Do you race the ship around at 40
knots to chase down every boat in the area?
How about instead you just update the FFG design to be modular and
stealthy, but still 4k tons and 29 knots with two helicopters and some
unmanned vehicles to match the different missions. (Underwater
vehicles for mines or subs, airborne or surface vehicles for the
anti-surface mission.)
A FF(X) would have greater endurance and seakeeping than the LCS and
wouldn't cost that much more while carrying at least twice the number
of mission craft.
-HJC
Bring back the board won't do any good as long as all those reformation and
transformation laws remain in effect. If we could free the navy from all the
political inferrence of the last thirty years, then we might have a chance to
fix the problems in weapon buying.
G Lof
Engineer
>sid wrote:
snip:
>> As far as the LCS goes, its conceptual nature is still under debate as
>> evidenced by this January Proceedings article:
>> Lethal in the Littoral: A Smaller, Meaner LCS
>> By Lieutenant (junior grade) Jonathan F. Solomon, USN
>> The most important question has yet to be debated: What do we want
>> this combatant to do for us?
>
>I can't say this article impresses me much. He insists that LCS should not
>be allowed to become a frigate and then defines the ship's characteristics
>and armament almost exactly as a modern frigate (ESSM, Harpoon, etc.). The
>rest is not too terribly different from what LCS is already supposed to do.
>He's not breaking new ground.
>
I don't know about that, while we all basically know this was where the LCS was
going, we really have not heard it spelled out as policy. In fact this was the
first printed material I read advocating such a change from the OSD line. All
the other stories I read about the LCS talk about how great the OSD idea was
over covention ships, or how import the LCS was to the shipbuilding plan, or
how the LSC will revolutions the way wars is waged. I hope the arthor does not
have to pay for his lack of "political correctness" with his career.
G Lof
Engineer
>
>
>Hmmmm, but of course this is nothing new for either SSN's or SS's,
>taking station of the coast and simply "listening" for weeks on end.
>
>Mark
The problem becomes when you need to do stuff like harbor recon, or
generally go closer in than 200 feet depth would allow.
John
>So why is it evolving into a ~2500 ton ship?
Perhaps because you can't do a useful number of missions, in a useful number
of places, on a dramatically smaller ship. Whether it's 2000 tons or 3000 is
somewhat a matter of details, but the differnce between 200 tons, 1000 tons,
and 2500 tons is a difference in basic concept.
>What "dedicated purpose" frigates are there Andrew?
FFG comes to mind. Of the three primary notional LCS mission package roles,
it can only do one (ASW), and no amount of reconfiguring will change that.
>Umm, what was the Port Royal doing the other day? The mission I was
>referring to was interdicting small craft. They did a good job even
The PHMs could not have done the mission PORT ROYAL was doing, because they
could not have
(1) Transited from the US to the theater of operations, and
(2) remained at sea without port support facilities
FACs are great in home waters but useless elsewhere.
>A FF(X) would have greater endurance and seakeeping than the LCS and
>wouldn't cost that much more while carrying at least twice the number
>of mission craft.
It's quite amazing to me that you know *so* much about the endurance,
seakeeping, cost, and mission capabilities of LCS at this early stage. Three
industry teams are off preparing proposals for the competing ideas of LCS,
rigorously keeping the details secret, and you can somehow assess all their
capabilities. Interesting.
Even more amazing is to make a comparison to an entirely notional "FFX"
without any engineering evaluation of that ship whatsoever.
Either you are a genius ship designer, or you are making this up as you go.
>I don't know about that, while we all basically know this was where the LCS was
>going, we really have not heard it spelled out as policy. In fact this was the
So LCS is supposed to be an ESSM- and Harpoon-armed frigate?
This is news.
>On 13 Jan 2004 04:45:21 GMT, glof8...@aol.com (GLof815619) wrote:
>
>>I don't know about that, while we all basically know this was where the LCS
>was
>>going, we really have not heard it spelled out as policy. In fact this was
>the
>
>So LCS is supposed to be an ESSM- and Harpoon-armed frigate?
>
>This is news.
>
I would not go that far Andrew, but the Lieutenant has pointed out the greats
weakness in the LCS project. Currently the LCS is nothing more than a fast
helocopter platform with ideas of being a MGB. They will carry no offensive
weapon larger that a 57mm autocannon. This greatly limits the usefulness of the
LCSs, allowing they to be used in lowest conflict areas. What the LCS need is
the ability to destory thoughs targets found by the remote sensors. This does
not require the use of ESSM and/or Harpoon, but it will require the addition of
far more powerful weapon than are currently required by the Navy.
Now I don't know what BIW, is planning to present to the Navy, but I know that
your people are not stupid, they also know these facts. I would bet that
somewhere in NG there are people working on such changes to their LCSs proposal
already.
G Lof
Engineer
It would give it a fighting chance against these boats.
http://www.amiinter.com/samples/egypt/EG1401.html
Of course when Egypt turns into a radical islamic people's republic in
2006 their support contracts will evaporate and these fancy new boats
will be as useless as Iranian tomcats.
-HJC
Gee, I guess that one armed bandit had nothing at all to do with
AAW...Or its SPS-49 and NTDS/Link 11 did either. The Harpoons? Were
they for ASW Andrew?
It was the need for more multi mission hulls that made the Perry's
what they were...Which was far different from the original PF idea.
And no amount of bombast from you will change that.
Something the size of a Fletcher isn't what this CONOPS is all about:
http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Concepts/LCSCONOPS.asp
If the LCS ends up being 3000 tons then the numbers of hulls that will
get bought will keep the USN in the same dilemma it's in now. Like the
Perry's, its inevitable something that size will gain a multi-mission
capability and its cost will grown exponentially. And then there will
be a real reluctance to put it up next to a dangerous beach.
<sigh> Your assertion Andrew, was that the PHM's were poor at small
craft interdiction, not that they couldn't deploy. Here is your
previous statement:
"First they detected the dhow, probably with the helicopter a PHM
would not
have.'
"Then they put a boarding party onto the dhow, but the PHM hasn't got
enough
crew for a boarding party.'
"Then they took the dhow's crew aboard the USN ship, but the PHM
hasn't got
enough space to house them, much less in a secure lockup.'
'Then they had a prize crew operate the dhow, but the PHM hasn't got
enough
crew to form a prize crew.'
'And they might have needed to tow the dhow, but the PHM can't tow.'
'So why is the PHM such a great platform for this mission?"
Why? When properly integrated (as the LCS's are supposed to be as
well) PHM's did a very good job. Thats documented.
Their inability to deploy was as much a political lack of commitment
as anything.
The "focused" nature of the LCS-or as the LCS is envisioned in this
CONOPs is also recognized as a potential problem:
http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Concepts/LCSCONOPS.asp
"Sea base or shore support for module reconfiguration / resupply will
require Force Protection; the tyranny of distance from the operating
area also is a potential factor."
>Something the size of a Fletcher isn't what this CONOPS is all about:
Do you have any idea of the naval architecture requirements to meet that
CONOPS? Whether it's the size of a FLETCHER, or 1000 tons on either side, it
certainly *isn't* a 200 ton gunboat as you advocate.
Note, really early in the document, the statement "Self-deployability (blue
water endurance) is needed to allow the platforms to get to the contested
area". That rules out small craft.
Also note "Aviation facilities to embark MH-60S helos fitted with AMNS,
RAMICS, ALMDS, AQS-20 and OASIS MCM systems." Again, no small craft are going
to do this.
Also note: "The capacity to transport over 400 tons of equipment, along with
passengers; 750 tons maximum deadweight: 970" That's larger than the small
craft you suggest!
The very CONOPS you quote rules out the craft you suggest. If you don't agree
with the CONOPS, fine, but don't use it to prove your point.
>I would not go that far Andrew, but the Lieutenant has pointed out the greats
>weakness in the LCS project. Currently the LCS is nothing more than a fast
>helocopter platform with ideas of being a MGB. They will carry no offensive
>weapon larger that a 57mm autocannon. This greatly limits the usefulness of the
>LCSs, allowing they to be used in lowest conflict areas.
You fail to understand the concept of LCS as the Navy defines it. In
low-threat areas, LCS operates independently; in a high-threat area, LCS
operates under the area air defense protection of AEGIS ships. It's not
supposed to go alone into high threats.
If you do find that you need a new weapon for some reason, you add it. That's
the entire point of the LCS design - to adapt to new roles and add new
equipment easily.
>Now I don't know what BIW, is planning to present to the Navy, but I know that
>your people are not stupid, they also know these facts. I would bet that
>somewhere in NG there are people working on such changes to their LCSs proposal
>already.
I would suggest nobody in their right mind is changing the LCS design in
response to a Proceedings article. The Navy has been clear in what they want,
in three RFPs and a couple years of design development work. If some feature
isn't in the design now, it's not going to appear just because somebody wrote
a magazine article.
> Gee, I guess that one armed bandit had nothing at all to do with
>AAW...Or its SPS-49 and NTDS/Link 11 did either. The Harpoons? Were
See separate thread on the deletion of the Mk13 launcher from FFGs, since it
is now, apparently, useless.
That deletes the AAW and ASuW role, leaving them as patrol (MIO) and
helo-borne ASW platforms.
>>I would not go that far Andrew, but the Lieutenant has pointed out the
>greats
>>weakness in the LCS project. Currently the LCS is nothing more than a fast
>>helocopter platform with ideas of being a MGB. They will carry no offensive
>>weapon larger that a 57mm autocannon. This greatly limits the usefulness of
>the
>>LCSs, allowing they to be used in lowest conflict areas.
>
>You fail to understand the concept of LCS as the Navy defines it. In
>low-threat areas, LCS operates independently; in a high-threat area, LCS
>operates under the area air defense protection of AEGIS ships. It's not
>supposed to go alone into high threats.
>
>If you do find that you need a new weapon for some reason, you add it.
>That's
>the entire point of the LCS design - to adapt to new roles and add new
>equipment easily.
You of all people know you can not just bolt on a new weapon system to a ship
(especial not a "plastic" one). There will have to be space and support for any
system you add. Right now is the time to make add thoughs provision to the LSC,
when you can engineer them into the design with little cost. And you real don't
have to know what specific weapons system you will be adding. All that needs to
be done are simple thing like designing a space that can be converted into a
missile pit, reenforce some walls of the superstructure, install hard points,
or just plain steel plate on the deck where you can mounts missile racks, even
just making the main guns magazine large enough to handle a Mk75 if required.
These are simple thing to do now, very difficult to add later.
BTW, note that I did not say that the LSC needed any more defence other than
it's RAM, what I said was they needed some heavyer hitting power than the
single 57mm. I may be the groups biggist proponent of survivable design, but I
too expect my warships fo fight back.
>>Now I don't know what BIW, is planning to present to the Navy, but I know
>that
>>your people are not stupid, they also know these facts. I would bet that
>>somewhere in NG there are people working on such changes to their LCSs
>proposal
>>already.
>
>I would suggest nobody in their right mind is changing the LCS design in
>response to a Proceedings article. The Navy has been clear in what they
>want,
>in three RFPs and a couple years of design development work. If some feature
>isn't in the design now, it's not going to appear just because somebody wrote
>a magazine article.
>
It is not the article that will cause these changes, it the the ideas expressed
in it that will fuel the changes. The Lieutenant is not alone in think of the
LCS as a frigate replacement. Tom and many other in the group have claim this
constantly. Now while I see the LSC as more than just a frigate, I do expect it
will be used in frigate type missions that will require frigate type weapon
from time to time. Take a look at the current requirement, submarine hunter and
screening against small craft are already there, how long before mission chreap
steps in and ASW screen and anti ship mission are added to the list.
G Lof
Engineer
Yes thats true, now, but not for the multi decade history of the
class. It will be interesting to see how long this trend will last.
One thing is for sure now though. The modified Perry's cannot be
regarded as an analogue to the LCS.
No sh*t Andrew.
> Whether it's the size of a FLETCHER, or 1000 tons on either side, it
> certainly *isn't* a 200 ton gunboat as you advocate.
You like to make up your facts on the fly don't you. I haven't
advocated a 200 ton hull for the LCS....not even once. I am saying
that 2500 tons is going to end up being too big for the job. And yes
~1000 tons of displacement would be a huge difference in a lot of
ways.
>
> The very CONOPS you quote rules out the craft you suggest. If you don't agree
> with the CONOPS, fine, but don't use it to prove your point.
And don't use specious arguments (that I want to see some PHM redux)
to prove yours. A ship in the 2500 ton range will inevitably evolve as
the Perry's did into a multi mission ship and won't get risked in the
missions the CONOPS outlines.
What seems to be happening here is the never-ending problem of specialized
vs general purpose surface ships. This really breaks down into the other
old division of ship types into "fleet" and "colonial operations/trade."
"Fleet " means part of the battle fleet. There were fleet submarines ,
fleet cruisers, fleet destroyers etc. Let's allow that these can be
specialized, and not be required to perform "colonial/trade" duties off on
their own away from the battle fleet. That work is for the classical
general purpose , jack of all trades, "cruiser" or its modern equivalent.
It would be nice if any ship could be used for both roles like in the
sailing ship days. Once ships got engines, the need to carry enough fuel
for cruising got in the way of carrying enough weapons etc for fighting in
the battle fleet. So we got big trade protection cruisers and small fleet
cruisers (which were destroyer leaders and scouts) The trade protection
cruisers were no good for fleet work, but they were otherwise "general
purpose" for gunboat diplomacy/ WOG- bashing etc in far off "Stations"
Nowadays, that work is done mostly by "frigates" (Persian Gulf patrol, eg)
This is not the same as "high /low" either. (??) You can have "general
purpose frigates" like the 1960 RN Tribal class, which Janes says were
"designed to fill *economically* all the functions of frigates rather than
to have an outstanding performance in any one specialized role, but capable
of meeting the main escort functions of anti-submarine protection,
anti-aircraft defence, and aircraft direction." (IMO this would be a "low"
type general purpose)
Meanwhile the RN was also cranking out their big County class. These had a
"very powerful armament" and "an endurance which will give them a
considerable capacity for operating on their own" (IMO this would be a
"high" type gp almost classic cruiser)
The trouble was the gear needed to be any good at any one of the three
main frigate escort roles took up a lot of ship and any small frigate could
not be made into an adequate ("high") general purpose ship. So what to
do? It seems most navies are going the "low" GP route for lack of money
for big enough ships in adequate numbers. Naval staff keep pushing
reluctant politicians that they need general purpose ships to do the jobs
those politicians keep sending them to do, but the politicians keep trying
to get something for nothing so you get a lot of specialized ships that will
be at least good at some damned thing, while hoping to be under the
"umbrella" of more capable ships in the other specialties if they ever get
caught out. (except they are not supposed to be with a "fleet" --so where
is the "umbrella??")
Where does this leave the USN's FFGs? They started out as "low" general
purpose ships (IMO) but now the USN finds itself short of frigates for
colonial/WOG-bashing duties. To keep them going a few more years without
spending money on them , they are reducing their "general purpose"
capabilities, while at the same time planning to use them in general purpose
roles! Typical!
Also the new LCS is for the same jobs everyone is using frigates for. The
exact same problem is being looked at. They want a small ship, but it can't
be small and be fitted for "high" general purpose. They are looking at
swapping out the specialized gear for "configuring" for each trip, or they
are looking at ways for the ship to remotely operate weapons and sensors
carried by other platforms, all in a desperate attempt to solve the
won't-go-away-problem.
It is not hard to see that the FFG life extension is to give time for the
LCS to arrive in sufficient numbers. It doesn't matter if the LCS is
called a frigate--she will do the same work that frigates have been doing
since the 1950s when the old cruisers died out. And that is the same work
naval ships (mostly the original frigates!) have been doing for hundred of
years, and needs a "general purpose" ship that can handle whatever comes up
whether it is the natives burning the sugar cane again or a pirate ship that
needs catching, or hosting a quarterdeck reception for local dignitaries to
help our ambassador twist some arms.
So how can you have a "high" general purpose ship in adequate numbers to be
deployed all over the world on the usual tasks away from the "fleet" for no
money? Does any smner know?
Regards,
Barry
>So how can you have a "high" general purpose ship in adequate
numbers to be
>deployed all over the world on the usual tasks away from the
"fleet" for no
>money? Does any smner know?
I think you hide it in a nondescript paragraph of "The American
Squirrel Protection Bill"
27653.1.345.09 $1 million for a study on the preservation of
acorns...
.10 $2 million for anti-cat squirrel protection
devices
.11 $20 billion for LCS
.12 $2 million compensation fund for squirrel
depradation of cotton crops
...
Cheers,
dba
>You of all people know you can not just bolt on a new weapon system to a ship
>(especial not a "plastic" one). There will have to be space and support for any
>system you add. Right now is the time to make add thoughs provision to the LSC,
This is exactly the point I made. LCS is designed from the outset to have new
things added, either permanently or as mission modules.
And it's LCS, not LSC. And who says it's plastic?
>It is not the article that will cause these changes, it the the ideas expressed
>in it that will fuel the changes.
The design only changes if the Navy changes their formal requirements.
If you submit a design that responds to magazine articles and "ideas", rather
than the requirements of the RFP, you lose the competition. It's usually a
bad idea to tell your prospective customer "sorry, we didn't give you what you
asked for, because we like some ideas in a magazine article better".
>One thing is for sure now though. The modified Perry's cannot be
>regarded as an analogue to the LCS.
And nobody said they could be, because they lack many features of the LCS
concept.
>You like to make up your facts on the fly don't you. I haven't
>advocated a 200 ton hull for the LCS....not even once. I am saying
When someone started comparisons between LCS and 200-ton-class vessels such as
PHM, PC, and PG, you said LCS would be a failure because those vessels were
failures: "So each of the mentioned ship classes were intended for littoral
warfare and as the thesis noted each came up lacking"
Then you went on contradict yourself by saying how good the PHYs were for
certain missions intended for LCS.
What do you propose as the proper size to meet the CONOPS? 200 tons is too
small; this notional 2500 ton figure (where did it come from?) is too big
according to you. What's right? 1000 tons? 1500 tons? 2000 tons?
SES, hovercraft, catamaran, monohull, trimaran, SWATH, barge?
So far you've been generally critical; do you have any ideas yourself?
The launchers are coming off. No AAW capability at all (except
CIWS).
Al Minyard
The days of leaving shipmates to their fate as RAdm Copeland(and in a
bigger sense Adm Sprague)on the Sammy B had to off Samar may well have
to be revisited.
3) The chances of getting the number of hulls called for is a real
open question. I'm betting it won't happen-especially if the LCS gets
to be a 2500 tonner. That means that the mission redundancies will be
reduced. Since an enemy always messes up a plan, getting the right
ships where they need to be at the right time-epecially during
hostilities- could be a real operational/ tactical Achillies Heel.
Those are some open issues I see. And I'm not the only one apparently
seeing some gaps in the plan:
http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/article_217_Washington%20Post.doc
http://www.navysna.org/newsgram/files/Press/ORourke_16JAN03.pdf
> Then you went on contradict yourself by saying how good the PHYs were for
> certain missions intended for LCS.
The PHMs did a good job at MIO even though they weren't designed for
it. They were never provided the infrastructure to sucessfully deploy.
That was a politcal decision. They were also too expensive and too
complicated which meant that the numbers needed to overcome the short
endurance issue were never bought.
Do we need to buy more today? Hell No.
>
> What do you propose as the proper size to meet the CONOPS? 200 tons is too
> small; this notional 2500 ton figure (where did it come from?) is too big
> according to you. What's right? 1000 tons? 1500 tons? 2000 tons?
> SES, hovercraft, catamaran, monohull, trimaran, SWATH, barge?
It was Thomas Schoene who mentioned the 2500 ton figure:
"So we see LCS evolving from a 600-ton expendable missile boat to a
2500-ton light frigate."
Well now. It sounds as if that is an official question as well.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1295
"Flight 0 may end up including one or two hull forms, said Spicer. "We
may select two different designs, after we review designs in
February."
The long-term acquisition strategy remains in flux. Flight 1 may be a
completely different design from Flight 0, said Malloy. "We don't want
to make that decision yet, so we don't build a dinosaur."'
"Notably, the Navy may decide that none of the three current
competitors meets the Flight 1 requirements and may reopen the
competition to companies that were eliminated earlier this year, when
the Navy narrowed the field from six to three."
The need to launch ROVs and ADS arrays is a big design demand in my
view(this from personal Oil Patch experience). As you mentioned, the
need to support H-60s is a big one as well.
Given those 2 constraints, a multihull with lots of deck space and low
speed stability might have an advantage. In my view, the GD design is
too big. If bought it would get loaded up and you would have a
Frigate, not an LCS. I wonder how the Raytheon SES would do DIW in a
confused shallow water seaway...and if they will engineer out the
Oskoy weaknesses. Its ugly though (for "Presence" aesthetics should be
at least considered). The LM offering has the looks(on paper anyway),
but again I wonder how its motion would be while slow or stopped in a
confused shallow water seaway. Also how would the "plug and play"
notion work with all that superstructure.
All said and done, I'd be partial to the Raytheon at this point.
Whats your's?
>classes came up lacking. I then called into question your claim that
>the LCS will be a ship completely different from those other classes.
>I'll say it again the LCS is getting built to perform the same
>missions (with MIW and ISR thrown in for good measure)and the focused
I don't know how to explain this any more clearly (again). You're wrong. LCS
is absolutely nothing like the PHM, PC, PG, or any other FAC-like classes.
The most commonality I can find is that all of them are/were meant to operate
near the shore...but then again, so was USS MONITOR.
The CONOPS that you have been quoting makes this pretty clear.
>Well now. It sounds as if that is an official question as well.
>http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1295
>"Flight 0 may end up including one or two hull forms, said Spicer. "We
>may select two different designs, after we review designs in
>February."
So? All three teams are working to the same set of requirements, so all three
designs will have at least the same basic capabilities. Buying two different
designs allows the Navy to evaluate the specific differences, but they're not
going to get two ships built to meet totally different requirements....you're
not going to find one team submitting a 200 ton, 60 knot design and another
submitting a 6000 ton, 20 knot ship.
>"Notably, the Navy may decide that none of the three current
>competitors meets the Flight 1 requirements and may reopen the
>competition to companies that were eliminated earlier this year, when
>the Navy narrowed the field from six to three."
Again, we're still talking about six different implementations of the same set
of requirements.
>All said and done, I'd be partial to the Raytheon at this point.
>Whats your's?
I've always thought it was very risky to make such judgements based on vague
artists concepts and incomplete understanding of the requirements, as you are
doing. I also note some inconsistencies in your reasoning - SES is not the
most obvious choice if your priorities are ROVs, ADS and helos as you stated.
>On 15 Jan 2004 06:55:02 GMT, glof8...@aol.com (GLof815619) wrote:
>
>>You of all people know you can not just bolt on a new weapon system to a
>ship
>>(especial not a "plastic" one). There will have to be space and support for
>any
>>system you add. Right now is the time to make add thoughs provision to the
>LSC,
>
>This is exactly the point I made. LCS is designed from the outset to have
>new
>things added, either permanently or as mission modules.
>
>
>And it's LCS, not LSC. And who says it's plastic?
OK technically composite structures are not plastic, but when I talk to the
non-engineer types, they seem to think the any ship not built of wood or metal
must be plastic. And I no longer have the energy to explain the difference to
they. To make it clear that I do know the difference, I added the quote marks
arround the word.,
>
>>It is not the article that will cause these changes, it the the ideas
>expressed
>>in it that will fuel the changes.
>
>The design only changes if the Navy changes their formal requirements.
>
>If you submit a design that responds to magazine articles and "ideas", rather
>than the requirements of the RFP, you lose the competition. It's usually a
>bad idea to tell your prospective customer "sorry, we didn't give you what
>you
>asked for, because we like some ideas in a magazine article better".
>
Well, it is easy to see why GD lost both DD21 and DD(x) competition with a
corporate mind set like this. If all you do is just look at what the some piece
of paper, and say that is all we need to do, you are cooked.
No one said that you should ignore the Request For Proposals, in a age were
lawyers run procurement and not the end user, it an absolute necessity. At the
same time you have to look beyond what written on the paper and find out what
they really want. Such information can be gain directly through meeting with
the cleint or indirectly though other sources, such as comment made to a third
party ( like a magazine article).
For the LCS, the customer ( aka The United State's Navy) are looking for the
most versatility platform. Just designing a ship that can proform the six
mission described in the RPF is really only a starting point. The team which
will win the contest will be the ones that can do as many different missions
while staying within the design limits stated in the RFP.
What that article was is a suggestion of some of the missions. What all the
teams should do is take a good look at their proposal and see if there is any
changes they can make in those design that will allow it to operated it that
mode. Now I know with the limited resources available, you can not go to far in
engineer these feature into your design, But you can do things like planning a
location where you can mount weapons like Harpoon on the ship, or a place for a
Towed Array Sonar can be mounted, or maybe determine site where a VLS can be
installed. Addition features such as these will greatly improve a teams changes
of winning over the competition.
G Lof
Engineer
On the last point you are correct Andrew. The Monitor was much like
the LCS-or the PHM-in the sense that it will be an innovative ship
type designed to support the blue water ships in the coastal environs.
You are full of CRAP otherwise. As a compiler of numbers you do a fair
job. As an historical analyst...Well I guess that part of you must
have run down your momma's ass.
>
> The CONOPS that you have been quoting makes this pretty clear.
Call it Coastl Warfare, call it Littoral Warfare. Essentially the same
thing.
Each ship type you've mentioned-even the Monitor-were conceived to
support the Blue Water fleet in that environment. In that regard they
are the same. Get a clue Andrew.
>
> >Well now. It sounds as if that is an official question as well.
> >http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1295
> >"Flight 0 may end up including one or two hull forms, said Spicer. "We
> >may select two different designs, after we review designs in
> >February."
>
> So? All three teams are working to the same set of requirements, so all three
> designs will have at least the same basic capabilities. Buying two different
> designs allows the Navy to evaluate the specific differences, but they're not
> going to get two ships built to meet totally different requirements....you're
> not going to find one team submitting a 200 ton, 60 knot design and another
> submitting a 6000 ton, 20 knot ship.
There is obvious debate in official circles on which direction this
program will go. Thats whats obvious here.
<snippages of your usual arrogant bombast>
> I've always thought it was very risky to make such judgements based on vague
> artists concepts and incomplete understanding of the requirements, as you are
> doing. I also note some inconsistencies in your reasoning - SES is not the
> most obvious choice if your priorities are ROVs, ADS and helos as you stated.
That was given the 3 so far. Mainly because I suuspect its low speed
characteristics may be the best.
Speaking of vague and incomplete understandings Andrew, when did you
first start going to sea, and how many deployments have you been on
anyway?
>OK technically composite structures are not plastic, but when I talk to the
>non-engineer types, they seem to think the any ship not built of wood or metal
>must be plastic. And I no longer have the energy to explain the difference to
On what do you base the assumption that LCS will be non-metal?
It's clear that Raytheon plans a composite ship. They're working from a
composite SES starting point, and they put out a press release about teaming
with Northrop Grumman's composites facility. But according to all published
accounts, they have the *only* composite entry. The other teams are planning
metal.
>Well, it is easy to see why GD lost both DD21 and DD(x) competition with a
DD21 RFP was cancelled and GD's DDX proposal was scored as technically
superior.....
> What that article was is a suggestion of some of the missions. What all the
[snip a gread deal of gum-flapping]
The article did not just make some suggestions about LCS missions (and we
don't need more suggestions; the RFP lists plenty!) The article proposed that
LCS should be something different from what the Navy has asked for. As I said
before, you don't submit a proposal that says "we're not giving you what you
asked for, we're giving you something we saw in a magazine article instead,
hope you like it!" That's a great way to make sure somebody else wins.