Iran will target US bases if attacked
NOMOREWARFORISRAEL
Iran will target US bases if attacked
Sat, 12 Jul 2008 21:18:18
Iran says its Armed Forces would target the heart of Israel and 32 US
bases before the dust settles from an attack on the country.
"If the enemy was confident that it would emerge victorious from an
attack on Iran, they would not put it off for even another day," an
aide to the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Mojtaba Zolnoor said on
Saturday.
Today, through the efforts of Iranian experts, the military
capabilities of the country's Armed Forces have reached an advanced
level, he added.
"If the US or Israel fire one bullet against Iran, the Iranian Armed
Forces will not hesitate to target the heart of Israel and 32 US
military bases in the region before the dust settles," warned
Ayatollah Khamenei's representative in the Islamic Revolution Guards
Corps (IRGC).
Iran has repeatedly warned that its Armed Forces are fully prepared to
immediately deliver a crushing response to any offensive on Iranian
territory.
Iran's words of caution come following escalating speculation that the
Israeli maneuver in early June was held in preparation for a war with
the Islamic Republic.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
New War Brewing: US, Israel Take Dangerous Steps
by Eric Margolis
GENEVA - The U.S., Israel and Iran are playing a very dangerous game
of chicken that soon could result in a new Mideast war.
U.S. intelligence has concluded that Iran is not working on nuclear
weapons. But the Bush administration and Israel, recently joined by
France, are issuing increasingly loud threats of military action to
frighten Iran into halting its nuclear enrichment program.
Iran insists its nuclear program is entirely for civilian use. Tehran
is alternating between conciliatory statements and threats to
retaliate against any attack by inflicting economic chaos on the
global economy. Europe fears the economic damage a war against Iran
would bring far more than Iran¢s nuclear program.
Senior Israeli officials are openly threatening to attack Iran¢s
nuclear installations before President George W. Bush¢s term expires.
Early, this month Israel staged a large, U.S.-approved exercise using
F-15s and F-16s to rehearse an attack over 900 miles - precisely the
distance to Iran¢s nuclear facilities.
The highly regarded American journalist Seymour Hersh just confirmed
that the U.S. Congress authorized a $400-million plan to overthrow Iran
¢s government and incite ethnic unrest. This column reported a year
ago that U.S. and British special forces were operating in Iran,
preparing for a massive air campaign. Israel¢s destruction of an
alleged Syrian reactor last fall was a warning to Iran.
This week a Pentagon official claimed an Israeli attack on Iran was
coming before year end.
Other Pentagon and CIA sources say a U.S. attack on Iran is imminent,
with or without Israel. The Bush administration is even considering
using small tactical nuclear weapons against deeply buried Iranian
targets.
Senior American officers Admiral William Fallon and Air Force Chief
Michael Mosley recently were fired for opposing war against Iran.
According to Israel¢s media, President Bush even told Israel¢s Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert that he could not trust America¢s intelligence
community and preferred to rely on Israeli intelligence.
AIR BLITZ
Intensifying activity is evident at U.S. bases in Europe and the Gulf,
aimed at preparing a massive air blitz that may include repeated
attacks on 3,100 targets in Iran. Other sources say Iranian
Revolutionary Guard installations will be barraged by cruise
missiles.
In Washington, Congress, under intense pressure from the Israel lobby,
is about to adopt a resolution calling for a naval blockade of Iran,
an overt act of war.
Pro-Israel groups have been airing TV commercials claiming Iran is
attacking American troops in Iraq and threatens the U.S.
The Bush administration¢s last desperate act, its Gotterdammerung,
could be war with Iran. UN weapons inspectors concur with U.S.
intelligence that there is no proof Iran is working on nuclear arms,
but the neocon war party in Washington is determined to loosen a final
Parthian shaft by striking Iran.
Israel asserts the right to maintain its Mideast nuclear monopoly by
destroying all fissile-producing reactors in the region. Iran vows to
retaliate against Israel with its inaccurate Shahab missiles, shut the
Strait of Hormuz and mine the Gulf, producing worldwide financial
panic, severe fuel shortages, and $400-$500 per barrel oil. Iran
likely will attack U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kuwait, and
strike Saudi and Kuwaiti oil facilities. Canadians in Afghanistan
could also become targets.
GRAVE DAMAGE
The embattled Bush administration¢s bunker mentality is leading to war
that will gravely damage long-term U.S. Mideast interests. A single
Iranian missile hit on Israel¢s reactor would do more damage to the
Jewish state than all its previous wars. Besides, Israel cannot
destroy Iran¢s nuclear infrastructure. A U.S. or Israeli attack on
Iran will guarantee Tehran decides to build nuclear weapons. Israel
and Iran have turned their regional rivalry into a confrontation that
threatens all.
Iran¢s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, not its bombastic President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, controls that nation¢s military and insists Iran
will not produce nuclear weapons. Israel claims it faces a second
holocaust. Iran says Israel¢s nuclear forces threaten its existence.
The dogs of war are being unleashed.
Eric Margolis is a columnist for The Toronto Sun.
Published on Sunday, July 6, 2008 by The Toronto Sun
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/07/06/10160/
----------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Ron Paul *Iranians Tested Missiles AFTER Israel had WAR
GAMES!
Date: Friday, July 11, 2008, 10:11 AM
Ron Paul *Iranians Tested Missiles AFTER Israel had WAR GAMES!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l1y47K29J1o
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Israel should not be allowed to push US into war with Iran
No More Blank Checks for War
by Patrick J. Buchanan
Friday, July 11, 2008
After the assassination of the archduke in Sarajevo on June 28,
1914, Austria got from Kaiser Wilhelm a "blank cheque" to punish
Serbia. Germany would follow whatever course its ally chose to
take. Austria chose war on Serbia. And World War I resulted.
On March 31, 1939, Britain gave a blank check to Poland in its
dispute with Germany over Danzig, a town of 350,000 Germans. Should
war come, Britain would fight on Poland's side.
Poland refused to negotiate, Adolf Hitler attacked, and Britain
declared war. After six years, the British Empire collapsed.
Germany was burnt to ashes. Poland entered the slave quarters of
Joseph Stalin's empire.
Lesson: No great power should ever give to a small ally or client
state a blank check to drag it into war.
This raises the question: Has President Bush given Israel a blank
check?
A year ago, Israel attacked and smashed an alleged nuclear reactor
site in Syria. In April, Israel held a five-day civil defense
drill. In June, Israel sent 100 F-15s and F-16s, with refueling
tankers, toward Greece in a simulated attack. The planes flew 1,450
kilometers, the distance to Iran's uranium enrichment facility at
Natanz.
On June 6, Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz threatened, "If Iran
continues its nuclear weapons program we will attack it."
Ehud Olmert returned from a June meeting with Bush to tell
Israelis, "George Bush understands the severity of the Iranian
threat and the need to vanquish it, and intends to act on the
matter before the end of his term."
Is Israel bluffing, or in dead earnest?
For while Israel can do damage to Iran, she cannot defeat Iran
without using nuclear weapons. But any attack Israel launched
against Iran would require U.S. complicity, and any Israeli war
with Iran would almost certainly require the United States to do
most of the fighting to win or end it.
Thus, if George Bush does not want war with Iran, with two U.S.
wars already, he must inform the Israelis in unequivocal terms that
the United States opposes any Israeli pre-emptive strike on Iran,
and will not assist but denounce any such attack.
If Bush believes war with Iran is vital to U.S. security, he should
make that case to Congress. To allow Israel to start a war we do
not want would be an abdication of his duty as president.
Clearly, among the reasons Israel conducted its dress rehearsal for
war was to maximize pressure on Iran to halt enriching uranium.
Bush may well have welcomed the added pressure.
But as the Iranians have insisted, they are entitled, under the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty they signed and Israel did not, to
enrich uranium for fuel in power plants. Tehran has declared it
will not be the only nation to surrender its legal rights under the
NPT. And in response to the Israeli military exercises, Tehran
conducted its own missile-firing exercises this week.
If neither side yields, confrontation is inevitable. Perhaps soon.
For we are only four months from the election, and Israel is pawing
the ground to attack Iran's nuclear facilities.
Is this Bush's back door to war with Iran?
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm. Mike Mullen, in Israel a week
ago, returned to say a "third front" in the Middle East, with Iran,
would be "extremely stressful" to U.S. forces.
He is saying that U.S. ground forces probably cannot now cope with
another war, with a nation three times as large as Iraq.
Asked about Israel taking unilateral action, Mullen replied, "This
is a very unstable part of the world, and I don't need it to be
more unstable." But Mullen is not the president. What did Bush tell
Olmert? Does Israel have a green light, a yellow light or a red
light?
Should Israel attack Iran and Bush deny complicity, he would no
more be believed than were Britain and France in 1956. Then, the
Israelis stormed into Sinai, and Britain and France said they were
intervening to separate the warring nations and secure the Suez
Canal. Outraged, Ike ordered the British, French and Israelis alike
to get out of Suez and Sinai. They did.
President Bush must step up to the plate.
If he believes sanctions are not succeeding and Iran's nuclear
program must be halted, he should go to Congress for authority to
neutralize the facilities. If he has not so concluded, he should
tell Israel it is not to start a war that U.S. airmen, sailors,
soldiers and Marines will have to finish.
America needs to restore that absolute freedom of action in matters
of war and peace she once had, before entering the skein of
entangling alliances that now encumber the republic.
No ally, no client state, should ever be allowed to drag America
into a war she has not chosen, constitutionally, to fight.
No more blank checks for any nation.
SOURCE:
http://buchanan.org/blog/2008/07/pjb-no-more-blank-checks-for-war/
---------------------------------------------------------------------
------------
Israel Believes Obama Will 'Deprive' It of Political Support for
Iran Attack
http://www.philipweiss.org/mondoweiss/2008/07/israel-believes-obama-
will-deprive-it-of-support-to-attack-iran.html
Here is a tiny URL for the above one:
---------------------------------------------------------------------
---------
Subject: DE BORCHGRAVE: Attack plans spiked (see the comments posted
at the bottom of the URL for this article as well)
Date: Wednesday, July 9, 2008, 5:40 AM
DE BORCHGRAVE: Attack plans spiked
Wednesday, July 9th, 2008
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jul/09/attack-plans-spiked/
See Video: Neocons Pushed Us into War with Iraq and Now with Iran!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbxD55LnlGg&feature=PlayList&p=71316451BEDD9F8F&index=0&playnext=1
Here is a tiny URL for the above one:
http://neoconzionistthreat.blogspot.com/2008/07/neocons-pushed-us-into-war-with-iraq.html
Here is a tiny URL for the above one:
Scott McClellan Questioned about Neocon Push for Iraq War:
http://neoconzionistthreat.blogspot.com/2008/06/scott-mcclellan-questioned-about-neocon.html
Here is a tiny URL for the above one:
Additional linked via the pics at the following URLs:
http://neoconzionistthreat.com
http://neoconzionistthreat.blogspot.com
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Looking Into the Lobby
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s annual conference is
one of Washington’s most important—and least reported—events.
http://www.amconmag.com/2008/2008_06_30/article3.html
by Philip Weiss
For three days in the capital in early June, suspense built over the
question of how the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
conference would greet Barack Obama. There was a lot of grousing about
Obama in the hallways of the Washington Convention Center, and AIPAC
officials repeatedly warned the faithful to be respectful. “We are not
a debate society or a protest movement. … our goal is to have a friend
in the White House,” executive director Howard Kohr said in a strict
tone. It wasn’t hard to imagine things going poorly: Obama gets booed
on national television. He feels insulted. Conservative Jewish donors
and voters turn off to Obama. He becomes president without their
support. AIPAC has no friend in the Oval Office.
But of course, Obama complied. His speech became the annual example
the conference provides of a powerful man truckling. Two years ago, it
was Vice President Cheney’s red-meat speech attacking the
Palestinians. Last year, it was Pastor John Hagee’s scary speech
saying that giving the Arabs any part of Jerusalem was the same as
giving it to the Taliban. Obama took a similar line. He suggested that
he would use force to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons, made no
mention of Palestinian human rights, and said that Jerusalem “must
remain undivided,” a statement so disastrous to the peace process that
his staff rescinded it the next day. Big deal. The actual meeting had
gone swimmingly.
This was my first AIPAC conference, and the first surprise was how
blatant the business of wielding influence is. The conference makes no
bones about this function, the most savage expression of which is the
Tuesday dinner at which AIPAC performs its “roll call,” where the
names of all the politicians who have come to the conference are read
off from the stage by three barkers in near auctioneer fashion. The
pols try to outdo one another in I-love-Israel encomia. House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi surely won the day when she teared up while dangling the
dogtags of three Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah and Hamas two
years ago.
The second big surprise was that apart from coverage of the headline
speakers, the AIPAC conference is a media no man’s land. It would be
hard to imagine a more naked exhibition of political power: a
convention of 7,000 mostly rich people, with more than half the
Congress in attendance, as well as all the major presidential
candidates, the prime minister of Israel, the minority leader, the
majority leader, and the speaker of the House. Yet there is precious
little journalism about the spectacle in full. The reason seems
obvious: the press would have to write openly about a forbidden
subject, Jewish influence. They would have to take on an unpleasant
informative task that they have instead left to two international
relations scholars in their 50s—Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer,
authors of last year’s book The Israel Lobby.
The press is missing a phantasmagorical event. Imagine a basement
meeting in the Warsaw Ghetto transplanted to the biggest hall in
Vegas, and you have something of the feeling of the thing. The staging
is faultless. Little documentaries called “Zionist Stories” play on
the Jumbotron, complete with footage of Auschwitz, and then the
subject of the documentary comes out on stage to thundering applause.
There is breakout session after breakout session on Middle East policy
and Jewish identity and anti-Semitism, with star turns by Natan
Sharansky, Bill Kristol, and Leon Wieseltier. The press was excluded
from “Advanced Lobbying Techniques,” but still this is a feast of the
political condition. And posh. The roll call is described by AIPAC as
the largest seated dinner in Washington. The wine flows. I went about
in a daze of awe and admiration.
My awe was for men like Haim Saban, a toymaker and giant donor to the
Democratic Party. After his Zionist story, Saban came out on stage
wearing a platinum tie and white shirt and silver gray suit. He has
wonderful presence and something of an Arab look—black-haired, wide
forehead. He was surrounded by 200 college students, veterans of the
Saban Leadership Seminars he sponsors at AIPAC.
On Middle East policy, Saban is barely distinguishable from his
Republican counterparts, who are there in equal force. The main hall
of the conference was filled with lavishly-produced banners featuring
AIPAC donors, not a few with trophy wives, alongside statements of
their mission. There was Donald Diamond, an Arizona real estate
developer whom the New York Times recently profiled on the front page
after he raised $250,000 for John McCain. The Times said nothing in
its piece about Diamond’s Israel work. But that was all the banner was
about. “The U.S.-Israel relationship is the single most important
determinant of democracy in the world, and we must commit to securing
it,” Diamond wrote. “It is so obvious to us that the Jewish community
is a family and that we have to take care of each other.”
I was writing that down when an AIPAC spokesman stopped to check my
credentials. The audience for this stuff isn’t the public, it’s people
in the hall—other rich Jews who might put AIPAC in their wills.
At most conventions, people gather out of self-interest. Therein lies
my admiration: the AIPAC’ers didn’t come for selfish reasons. They are
devoutly concerned with the lives of people they don’t know, very far
away. Yes, people with whom they feel tribal kinship. When Israelis
came out on the dais to speak, they were almost invariably overwhelmed
by the generosity, if not the Vegas schmaltz. “There is a tremendous
amount of love in this place,” Meir Nissensohn, an Israeli executive
of IBM, said in wonder. “If it was a beaker, it would explode.” Even a
sharp critic like myself of what AIPAC is doing to American policy in
the Middle East was frequently moved by the pure loving feeling that
surrounds you at every moment.
Among the devout there is only one real issue: What is the latest
AIPAC line? This is the organization’s function. After consulting
closely with the Israeli political leadership (leaning toward the
right wing), AIPAC regurgitates a simple version of Israeli policy to
its followers, who in turn regurgitate that line to American
politicians. AIPAC’ers do this with the conviction that Israel’s life
is on the line. “It is we that are the guardians of that
relationship,” AIPAC president David Victor said. James Tisch, the
Lowes executive and leader in the Jewish community, warned the
audience that it might be 1939 all over again were it not for them.
AIPAC makes sure the Israeli line is America’s line by cultivating
politicians before they reach the national scene. Victor described
this process when he warned the audience that 10 percent of Congress
will be new next year because so many seats are open: “Do we know
them? Do they know us? Have they
__________________________________________
Philip Weiss is at work on a book about Jewish issues. He blogs at
www.philipweiss.org/mondoweiss/
--------------------------------------------------------
Stop The AIPAC sponsored "Iran War Resolution"
http://www.warwithoutend.co.uk/zone0/viewtopic.php?t=91563
Additional about AIPAC's push for the coming war with Iran via the
following URL (be sure to access the Scott Ritter youtubes linked at
the top of the comments section as well):
AIPAC Pushing US to War with Iran for Israel:
http://neoconzionistthreat.blogspot.com/2007/10/re-aipac-is-pushing-us-to-war-with-iran.html
Hedges: It's Insane to Attack Iran:
http://neoconzionistthreat.blogspot.com/2008/05/hedges-its-insane-to-attack-iran.html
Bob Barr: Attacking Iran Highly Irresponsible and Detrimental:
http://neoconzionistthreat.blogspot.com/2008/05/bob-barr-attacking-iran-highly.html
McCain's loyalty is to Israel first and foremost:
http://neoconzionistthreat.blogspot.com/2008/03/make-people-aware-subscribe.html
Walt & Mearsheimer's Proof That 'Tail Wagged the Dog' Points American
Jews to a Universalist Ethos:
http://www.philipweiss.org/mondoweiss/2007/09/more-on-walt-me.html
eyeball
hcobb
zone.
-HJC
Dan
Not if the target is in the middle of a large body of land like Asia
and a damaged land runway is more readily repaired than a sunk or
listing aircraft carrier.
Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired
Matt Wiser
The OP has this "cry wolf" condition. It can only be cured by repeated smacks on the ass
with a two-by-four, followed by a stint in a padded cell with 24/7 medical supervision.
Don Ocean
You might be surprised at how much fight there is in a carrier crew that
finds walking home from a sunken ship is out of the question.
hcobb
They've got to find the carrier first, while the airbase can be
googled.
-HJC
Dan
No, I wouldn't, witness the Franklin. The problem is where do you
land and take off while it's being repaired? Land bases can fill the
craters and go on. Carriers and land bases each have their strengths and
weaknesses and each is important to the U.S. system of defense.
Dan
There you go again, cobb, how hard do you think it is to find a
carrier? They tend to have significant fleets surrounding them and the
U.S. news system is very good at giving the general location. An enemy
who is capable of attacking a carrier fleet is fully capable of locating it.
Keith Willshaw
"hcobb" <henry...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:33d1b3fd-1953-4466...@t54g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
> This is why a sea base is better than fixed ground bases in a war
> zone.
>
> -HJC
>
Have you ever been to the Persian Gulf Henry ?
I wouldnt want to operate carriers in there until you
have established air superiority and eliminated any
naval threat including mines.
The phrase 'fish in barrel' comes to mind.
Keith
Keith Willshaw
The Persian gulf is only 56km wide at its max and full of civilian
traffic from supertankers to dhows. EVERTBODY will know
where it is, just as in any Souk
Keith
Jack Linthicum
That is why they usually send two or more carriers. What comes out of
Iran must go back to Iran, a strike will find an answer even if it's
one of those heavy things in the silos. BTW what land bases? We fly
B-2 and B-1 missions from Missouri and Diego G.
Dan
There's more to aerial warfare than heavy bombers. Besides, I was
responding to cobb's generalization. He's the same fool that wants to
replace U.S. bombers with SSBN. Apparently he's under the impression the
USAF can do no right and USN can do no wrong.
Jack Linthicum
Okay, what land bases in Central Asia for fighters? Cobb sounds like
he is on board. Last I heard you can fly airplanes from aircraft
carriers and the carriers don't usually stay in one place and offer
themselves as either military or terror targets.
Except for the recent sign that they are malfunctioning you could
replace the Air Force with the airlines. The concept of close air
support is still in the Catch 22 "neat bomb pattern" mode in the
USAF. "We dropped a big bomb and it hit the ground"
hcobb
> There's more to aerial warfare than heavy bombers. Besides, I was
> responding to cobb's generalization. He's the same fool that wants to
> replace U.S. bombers with SSBN. Apparently he's under the impression the
> USAF can do no right and USN can do no wrong.
>
> Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired
And the last time an all-ground base force went up against an all-
carrier force the Argentines were forced to abandon their forward base
while the UK "carriers" kept operating.
... after a feeble attack by semi-heavy bombers.
-HJC
Dan
It was a hypothetical scenario.
Jack Linthicum
They all are.
Dan
Something about being at the limit of Argentine air power played a
factor. Bad planning on the part of Argentina was a major factor. Had
the Falklands been 200 miles closer to Argentina the outcome may well
have been the reverse. Had Argentina properly based aircraft on the
islands the UK would have had a more difficult time.
In any event I never said one way or the other whether land bases or
carriers were superior in all cases. The fact remains there are cases
where one is better for a particular action than the other.
A single example proves only that which worked in that situation. I
could use WW2 in Europe as a counter argument. Land based aircraft from
the U.K. and Soviet Union proved decisive in putting the Nazis back in
their sewers.
Dan
<snip>
>
> ... after a feeble attack by semi-heavy bombers.
>
> -HJC
I am not familiar with the term "semi-heavy bombers," please define.
hcobb
How else would you describe the Vulcan's 10 ton bomb load for a 6
megameter mission?
We can't expect other countries around the world to match the aircraft
the USAF doesn't build anymore.
Suggesting that we have allies who have bombers is like suggesting
they have carriers. It's purely charity.
-HJC
Mark Test
news:7815fc5f-b373-46ca...@x41g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...
http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=63501告onid=351020101
>Iran will target US bases if attacked
>Sat, 12 Jul 2008 21:18:18
>Iran says its Armed Forces would target the heart of Israel and 32 US
>bases before the dust settles from an attack on the country.
Iran has no capability to hit anything......haven't you been reading
the news? Even with a nuke capabilty Iran is looking less and less
scary....
Mark
** Posted from http://www.teranews.com **
Jack Linthicum
> "NOMOREWARFORISRAEL" <NOMOREWAR_FORISR...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>
> news:7815fc5f-b373-46ca...@x41g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=63501§ionid=351020101
>
> >Iran will target US bases if attacked
> >Sat, 12 Jul 2008 21:18:18
> >Iran says its Armed Forces would target the heart of Israel and 32 US
> >bases before the dust settles from an attack on the country.
>
> Iran has no capability to hit anything......haven't you been reading
> the news? Even with a nuke capabilty Iran is looking less and less
> scary....
>
> Mark
>
> ** Posted fromhttp://www.teranews.com**
Which in turn scares the hell out of the people who said they were
scary
Dan
> On Jul 13, 9:06 am, Dan <B24...@aol.com> wrote:
>> hcobb wrote:
>>
>> <snip>
>>
>>
>>
>>> ... after a feeble attack by semi-heavy bombers.
>>> -HJC
>> I am not familiar with the term "semi-heavy bombers," please define.
>>
>> Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired
>
> How else would you describe the Vulcan's 10 ton bomb load for a 6
> megameter mission?
The Argentines had Vulcans?
>
> We can't expect other countries around the world to match the aircraft
> the USAF doesn't build anymore.
Interesting argument, but what does it mean?
>
> Suggesting that we have allies who have bombers is like suggesting
> they have carriers. It's purely charity.
>
> -HJC
Interesting argument, but what does it mean? Remember you are the one
who wants to get rid of U.S. bombers.
Your last two arguments make even less sense on second reading.
Ed Rasimus
>hcobb wrote:
>>
>> And the last time an all-ground base force went up against an all-
>> carrier force the Argentines were forced to abandon their forward base
>> while the UK "carriers" kept operating.
>>
>> ... after a feeble attack by semi-heavy bombers.
>>
>> -HJC
>
> Something about being at the limit of Argentine air power played a
>factor. Bad planning on the part of Argentina was a major factor. Had
>the Falklands been 200 miles closer to Argentina the outcome may well
>have been the reverse. Had Argentina properly based aircraft on the
>islands the UK would have had a more difficult time.
>
> In any event I never said one way or the other whether land bases or
>carriers were superior in all cases. The fact remains there are cases
>where one is better for a particular action than the other.
>
> A single example proves only that which worked in that situation. I
>could use WW2 in Europe as a counter argument. Land based aircraft from
>the U.K. and Soviet Union proved decisive in putting the Nazis back in
>their sewers.
>
>Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired
And, despite the fact that we had carriers in the Med and the Indian
Ocean, when the Iranian students stormed our embassy and took the
staff hostage, we couldn't reach Teheran from the carriers. Nothing
afloat at the legs to reach inland.
I was at USAFE Hq drawing range arcs on the maps and watching
everything short of SAC heavy assets fall short.
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
www.thundertales.blogspot.com
www.thunderchief.org
Dan
I was at Hahn AB at the time feeling rather frustrated. By the time
we could have deployed to Incirlik to support any action the Iranians
would have NRTSed or moved the hostages. The pity is 55th ARRS was in
Incirlik before the hostages were taken and could have taken action if
they had still been there when the embassy was taken. I don't recall if
they were. I was there with the 50th TFW and watched the 55th ARRS
evacuating people from Iran. Two years later I was in the 55th ARRS at
Eglin AFB, but it never occurred to me to ask anyone.
Jack Linthicum
You might have felt even more frustrated if you knew the initial plans
were to hold the embassy for just a few hours. Or, maybe that the
Soviet Embassy was considered and not chosen. The last straw was when
the U.S. gave the Shah permission to enter the U.S. for treatment of
cancer, rather than sending him back to Iran for trial. This was
courtesy of that intellectual giant Henry Kissinger.
In the good old days those carriers would have had a Marine afloat
detachment on board. Wonder when they stopped that practice. It was in
place in 1975 for the Mayaguez.
Andrew Swallow
Time for carrier based tanker aircraft?
Andrew Swallow
Jack Linthicum
KA-3 Skywarrior
Tanker role
During Vietnam, the Skywarrior was modified into a multimission tanker
variant (EKA-3B) that was a real workhorse for the carrier air wing.
Buddy tanking using A-4 Skyhawks and A-7 Corsair IIs, and inflight
refueling using A-3 Skywarriors was utilized by the US Navy in the
Vietnam theater of operations from at least 1966 through 1970.
Eventually, the EKA-3B was replaced by the smaller dedicated KA-6D
Intruder tanker, which had less capacity and endurance, and later by
the S-3 Viking which had even less fuel capacity. With the ongoing
retirement of the S-3B, future tanking will be accomplished by F/A-18E
and F Super Hornet aircraft configured as mission tankers.
Dan
Firstly there were no carriers within range. They were on station in
the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans. Secondly the Marine assault forces
weren't on the carriers, they were on helicopter assault ships and other
vessels. Thirdly the fleet that did the Mayaguez attempt was on station
in the South China Sea and was thus local.
Was Kissinger in the Carter Administration? No, so it was up to
Carter to deny the Shah entry.
Ed Rasimus
>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>>
>> And, despite the fact that we had carriers in the Med and the Indian
>> Ocean, when the Iranian students stormed our embassy and took the
>> staff hostage, we couldn't reach Teheran from the carriers. Nothing
>> afloat at the legs to reach inland.
>>
>> I was at USAFE Hq drawing range arcs on the maps and watching
>> everything short of SAC heavy assets fall short.
>
> I was at Hahn AB at the time feeling rather frustrated. By the time
>we could have deployed to Incirlik to support any action the Iranians
>would have NRTSed or moved the hostages. The pity is 55th ARRS was in
>Incirlik before the hostages were taken and could have taken action if
>they had still been there when the embassy was taken. I don't recall if
>they were. I was there with the 50th TFW and watched the 55th ARRS
>evacuating people from Iran. Two years later I was in the 55th ARRS at
>Eglin AFB, but it never occurred to me to ask anyone.
>
>Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired
As someone with a lot of Incirlik operations experience at that time,
you can believe that we explored the Incirlik option thoroughly. Even
with tankers out of Incirlik supporting F-4s or F-111s out of
Incirlik, if they respected Syrian, Iraqi, and Saudi airspace, the
jets couldn't get to Teheran and back.
Most of those assets were in place or could have been deployed and
ready in less than 48 hours. Even the instant sunshine options were
available, but not seriously under consideration.
Ed Rasimus
<jackli...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>KA-3 Skywarrior
>
>Tanker role
>
>During Vietnam, the Skywarrior was modified into a multimission tanker
>variant (EKA-3B) that was a real workhorse for the carrier air wing.
>Buddy tanking using A-4 Skyhawks and A-7 Corsair IIs, and inflight
>refueling using A-3 Skywarriors was utilized by the US Navy in the
>Vietnam theater of operations from at least 1966 through 1970.
>Eventually, the EKA-3B was replaced by the smaller dedicated KA-6D
>Intruder tanker, which had less capacity and endurance, and later by
>the S-3 Viking which had even less fuel capacity. With the ongoing
>retirement of the S-3B, future tanking will be accomplished by F/A-18E
>and F Super Hornet aircraft configured as mission tankers.
Recognize that carrier-based tanker aircraft are EXTREMELY limited in
off-load capacity. Typically they are used to pass about 1500 pounds
to first launch aircraft on a cycle or as an emergency source at end
of cycle during blue-water ops if the deck is fouled.
They don't have the capacity to pass 15,000 or so pounds to each
aircraft in a flight of four to allow truly meaningful extensions of
range.
I went aboard Forrestal (VF-11 Rippers) about two days after
redeployment from Incirlik to Torrejon. I ragged the Navy jocks about
taking more gas on my down-Med flight in one hook-up than they were
going to take on their entire cruise!
Jack Linthicum
The shah was admitted to the U.S. on October 22, 1979, the embassy was
taken on November 4. Thirteen days, to steam from wherever in the
Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. Carriers are always within range,
the decision to use them is not. How many Marines do you need? Most
carriers have a Marine Detachment on board. Do they just raise the
flag and parade?
Jack Linthicum
900 miles?
Dan
Now you are assuming once the Shah was admitted to the U.S. a carrier
force should have headed for the Straits of Hormuz? For what reason?
Jack Linthicum
Caution, they had been warned, they just didn't listen. There had been
a brief takeover of the Embassy on Valentines Day 1979 and one of the
electronics sites that look into the Soviet Union was taken over on
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_01-03/dauherty_shah/dauherty_shah.html
The author brings unique qualifications to this study. Now a
political science professor, in 1979 he was assigned to the U. S.
embassy in Tehran and was taken captive when Iranian militants,
reacting to the news that the shah had been admitted to the United
States, overran the embassy. He and his colleagues then spent 444 days
as a hostages.—Ed.
Jimmy Carter and the 1979 Decision to Admit the Shah into the United
States
INTRODUCTION
When the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, opened for business the morning
of 22 October 1979, there was a cable waiting in the Central
Intelligence Agency station from CIA headquarters in Langley,
Virginia. The cable advised that President Carter had decided the
previous day to admit the former Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi,
into the United States for life-saving medical treatment. From the
perspective of the embassy staff, it was absolutely the worst thing
that could happen, on two fronts: the decision would undo the
progress, however slight, in improving United States-Iranian
relations; and it would jeopardize the safety and security of all
Americans in Iran. The embassy staff was utterly astonished, for not
only had they warned Washington over the previous summer of the
various dangers associated with such a decision, but some had even
been told that by Washington seniors that the consequences of the
shah’s admission to the United States were so obvious that no one
would be "dumb enough" to allow it. Yet, with U.S.-Iranian relations
still lacking real stability, and with an intense and growing distrust
of the United States permeating the new Iranian "revolutionary"
government, President Carter — unbelievably, from the embassy’s optic—
had decided to allow the shah to enter the United States.
<snip>
Particularly important in this alliance were the TACKSMAN signals
intelligence listening posts in the Elbourz mountains north of Tehran
that provided clear electronic line-of-sight coverage of the Soviet
intercontinental missile test ranges. Intelligence from these sites
not only allowed the United States and its Western allies to followed
critical developments in the Soviet strategic missile forces, they
later provided data essential to verify arms control agreements with
Moscow. The shah also shared the West’s vision of a stable Middle East
in which Iran would play the dominant role.
But serving as the policeman of the Middle East required a huge
investment in modern military equipment and, more significantly, large
numbers of American technicians and trainers to support the highly
sophisticated equipment for a very unsophisticated and under-educated
military. A clash of cultures began appearing and grating on the
general Iranian population, while resentment over the amount of
Iranian oil revenues flowing to the United States and European
countries concurrently generated building resentment against the West.
Simultaneously, the shah’s regime was becoming increasingly and
egregiously corrupt. To counter rising discontent, the shah gave his
security forces carte blanche to ferret out and halt the dissidents;
serious human rights issues ensued, further alienating the Iranian
regime from its own citizens.
<snip>
When the shah left Iran on 16 January 1979, it was expected that he
would quickly seek asylum in America, the nation that had been his
strongest supporter and stalwart friend. Even Khomeini had "expressed
no objections" to the shah’s exile in the United States at this time.
To this end Sunnylands, the sprawling Palms Springs estate of Walter
Annenberg, was offered and readied as a place of haven for his royal
friend. But the shah "proved to be as indecisive in exile as he had
been in power, and this presented a disagreeable problem for the
United States government." Without consulting with the Americans, the
shah first made a quick one-week stopover in Cairo at the invitation
of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, and then flew on to the household
of another monarch, King Hassan II of Morocco, for an indefinite stay.
To Brzezinski, this "pause" in his peregrinations "proved to be
disastrous," and "generated an issue where none should have existed."
As February rolled along the shah’s invitation remained valid, but the
shah preferred to remain as Hassan’s guest.
But just two weeks after his arrival in Rabat, circumstances reversed
for the shah. If he had been loitering in the Near East region hoping
that there would be a reversal of fortunes in Iran which would result
in an opportunity (or call) to return to the Peacock Throne, he was
destined for disappointment. Chances were dimming that the Provisional
Government of Iran (PGOI) would collapse; nor had Khomeini’s support
among the masses of Iranians waned. And, in a case of rather
unfortunate timing, revolutionary militants stormed the United States
embassy in Tehran on 14 February, holding the mission personnel
hostage for several hours and generating fear for the safety of the
remaining Americans in Iran. The final blow for the former monarch
landed when King Hassan decided he had had sufficient time with the
depressed and dispirited shah; he asked his guest to leave. The shah
now sent word to Washington that he was ready to accept the U.S.
government’s invitation.
At a meeting of the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC -- the highest
level policy and crisis management group in the Carter White House) on
23 February the decision was made to inform the shah that, while the
invitation was still officially open, there were now serious
complications. Specifically, the short-lived takeover of the American
embassy the previous St. Valentine’s Day had some senior officials in
Washington reconsidering the wisdom of hosting the shah. The shah’s
entry into the United States was potentially an inflammatory act, and,
with a deteriorating security situation in Tehran, there was still a
very real threat to American interests and the remaining American
officials and citizens. The risk to American lives at that time was
serious, apparent, and exigent: U.S. intelligence personnel at one of
the CIA’s TACKSMAN intelligence collection sites had been taken
captive days before, and American Ambassador William Sullivan was at
that moment in negotiations over their release (the TACKSMAN sites
were a cooperative effort with the shah’s regime for monitoring the
Soviet missile test ranges).
Manifestly, the entry of the shah would no doubt unleash severe and
potentially uncontrollable repercussions against these and other
Americans in Iran. A query from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to
Ambassador Sullivan requesting the latter’s opinion on the shah’s
admission had brought a negative response, with the envoy advising
that it was not a sound idea in terms either of embassy security or
the improving political relationship between the two countries.
Sullivan "supported [the] judgment that the [shah] should not now be
permitted to enter the country." At home, increasingly hostile
demonstrations in U.S. cities staged by pro-Khomeini Iranians resident
in America raised security issues for the shah and his supporters,
should he be admitted. Further, as the shah would now be a private
citizen, there was no way to insulate or immunize him from any
possible legal or congressional action against him or his family.
In the end, whether one was for or against the shah’s admission in
principle, prudence dictated a denial at this time. National Security
Advisor Brzezinski concurred with reluctance while feeling a "personal
repugnance." Vance, despite his own belief that the decision was the
only wise one, described his recommendation to deny entry as "one of
the most distasteful I ever had to make…." The shah, his unhappiness
with the official decision apparent, had little choice but to accept
the news; he traveled to the Bahamas on 30 March.
During the ensuing months, the Carter administration worked to
construct at least a stable, if not immediately productive,
relationship with the new revolutionary regime in Iran. As a practical
matter, for the health of this relationship the greater the American
distance from the shah, the better, and vice versa. The shah’s evident
desire to enter the United States threatened to unravel the little
that had been achieved to date and would render impossible all that
might be accomplished in the future. In April, as he grew increasingly
discontent with life in the islands, the shah’s general state of
unhappiness turned to bitterness as he began telling the world press
that the Carter administration was responsible for his fall. When this
became known in the United States, renewed pressures on President
Carter to admit him were openly and unrelentingly applied by a handful
of powerful people inside and outside of the government.
Particularly intense were National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski, banking magnate David Rockefeller, former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger, and the esteemed elder statesman John J.
McCloy, a coterie which Brzezinski labeled "influential friends of the
shah." In their collective opinion, the admission of the shah,
whenever it was to occur, was "a matter of both principle and
tactics." Brzezinski personally "felt strongly that at stake were
[America’s] traditional commitment to asylum and our loyalty to a
friend. To compromise those principles would be to pay an
extraordinarily high price not only in terms of self-esteem but also
in our standing among our allies…." This was a position in which there
was unquestionably much merit. But it was not the only consideration.
Following on the heels of the shah’s arrival in the Bahamas were phone
calls to the president in early April by David Rockefeller and Henry
Kissinger urging the shah’s admission. Carter was not pleased. While
understanding of and grateful for the past benefits to the United
States which flowed from the shah’s friendship, senior administration
foreign policy officials — the president, Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and
Undersecretary of State David Newsom, among others — balanced the
shah’s wishes against the hope that relations with the new government
of Iran would improve given sufficient time and came down on the side
of the promoting the political ties to the PGOI. They continued to
hold firm against the shah’s admission.
An official statement on 5 May by the Iranian foreign minister,
Ibrahim Yazdi (a medical doctor who had trained in the United States
and held permanent resident alien status), espousing a desire to
better relations with America was seized upon as an important positive
signal by the Carter administration. This added further weight to
denying the shah. And the embassy in Tehran soon after had yet another
opportunity to warn against admission; when queried about the PGOI’s
position on allowing the shah’s children to enter the United States
for schooling, Iran’s secular prime minister, Mehdi Barzargan,
responded that such would not create any difficulties, but he
"reiterated his warning about the dangers of admitting the shah
himself."
<snip>
Specifically, Laingen was to query the PGOI about its willingness to
accept the shah’s admission into the United States if the shah (a)
formally renounced any and all claims to the Peacock Throne, and (b)
agreed to eschew any political activity in the United States.
Laingen’s reply tracked his earlier comments on the same issue, citing
again potential harm to American interests and peril to the embassy
staff. In noting a burgeoning struggle for power between secularist
moderates and religious fundamentalists for control of the Iranian
government, Laingen did hold out the possibility of resolving
favorably the issue of the shah if or when the power contest was
decided. Laingen did suggest that the shah’s abdication — which the
fallen monarch had so far refused to even consider — would "lessen
risks to our own interests." But then everything fell apart in
October.
<more>
Jack Linthicum
wrote:
>
> http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_01-03/dauherty_s...
>
> read more »
Missed a button.
Raymond O'Hara
"Jack Linthicum" <jackli...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:7ea3a20c-2835-4ae8-9fb9-
bombers wouldn't have stopped the take over whether tac ot strategic.
some guy in boston just on a spur of inspiration took the boston globe
sunday sports pages put them in an envelope and addressed them "to the
hostages in iran" tossed them in a mailbox and they actually would get them.
Dan
OK, suppose they had done things your way and had parked a carrier
force just outside the Straits of Hormuz. Would it have prevented the
embassy takeover? If so, how?
One thing to take into consideration is that the protection of
embassies is the duty of the host country. The U.S. gave the Iranian
government every chance to do their job. They did so in the Valentine's
Day takeover when they threw the students out. By the time it became
apparent they weren't going to act the second time nothing had been
decided on by the U.S. so the fleet would have had to return to its
regular station. Bear in mind what was going on in the world at the
time. Carter preferred negotiating with Iran and the Soviet Union was
the bigger threat. At the time no one knew how long the situation in
Tehran would last or how big it would ultimately get.
tankfixer
@x41g2000hsb.googlegroups.com>, NOMOREWAR...@yahoo.com says...
>
>
> Today, through the efforts of Iranian experts, the military
> capabilities of the country's Armed Forces have reached an advanced
> level, he added.
>
Show us that missle launch again there sonny
--
"Oh Norman, listen! The loons are calling!"
- Katherine Hepburn, "On Golden Pond"
tankfixer
@x41g2000hsb.googlegroups.com>, eyeball...@aol.com says...
> Do you have tourettes or are you simply retarded?
The correct answer to that question is,
Yes...
tankfixer
56g2000hsm.googlegroups.com>, henry...@gmail.com says...
> On Jul 13, 4:52 am, Dan <B24...@aol.com> wrote:
> > There's more to aerial warfare than heavy bombers. Besides, I was
> > responding to cobb's generalization. He's the same fool that wants to
> > replace U.S. bombers with SSBN. Apparently he's under the impression the
> > USAF can do no right and USN can do no wrong.
> >
>
> carrier force the Argentines were forced to abandon their forward base
> while the UK "carriers" kept operating.
Actually both sides operated both carrier's and fixed base aircraft.
The RA attempted a carrier strike but found thier ship wanting in the
sped department. After that they operared those aircraft off shore
bases.
They attempted to operate a forward base on the islands but gave up the
idea when some nasty men with knives, rifles and demo snuck ashore and
put holes in some of thier pretty airplanes..
>
> ... after a feeble attack by semi-heavy bombers.
Argentina had no bombers
Raymond O'Hara
"tankfixer" <paul.c...@gmail.comm> wrote in message
news:MPG.22e46c84b...@nntp.earthlink.net...
if the argie navy and even the army had shown the guts and skill of their
air foece they might have won.
as it was it was a "near run thing"
tankfixer
oh...@hotmail.com says...
News flash there ray, lots of those A4 shot down were navy.
Raymond O'Hara
"tankfixer" <paul.c...@gmail.comm> wrote in message
by navy i meant their surface fleet
Kerryn Offord
> "tankfixer" <paul.c...@gmail.comm> wrote in message
> news:MPG.22e482ad2...@nntp.earthlink.net...
>> In article <saednT_WDdfATOfV...@rcn.net>, raymond-
>> oh...@hotmail.com says...
>>> "tankfixer" <paul.c...@gmail.comm> wrote in message
>>> if the argie navy and even the army had shown the guts and skill of
>>> their
>>> air foece they might have won.
>>> as it was it was a "near run thing"
>> News flash there ray, lots of those A4 shot down were navy.
>>
>
> by navy i meant their surface fleet
>
>
The surface fleet knew they were opposed by at least one SSN that they
more or less couldn't detect, nor touch...
If they went close enough to impact the conflict they would have died..
as happened to the General Belgrano
The army had the problem of green conscripts facing professional soldiers...
hcobb
> Time for carrier based tanker aircraft?
>
> Andrew Swallow
It's called the Super Hornet.
-HJC
Jack Linthicum
IIRC the impetus was the move of the Shah into the U.S. The TACKSMAN
sites were very important and losing them was a major blow to the
United States. Someone must have known that. Send the Shah to Tijuana
or some other medical Mecca.
This country may yet try Henry Kissinger as a war criminal, he seems
to have created the idea that the United States was going into a death
spiral and should placate/appease everyone everywhere. He still sticks
his hand in from time to time to the detriment of this country.
You would be surprised what the effects of even six aircraft flying at
low level over a city divided between nutty students and citizens
looking for a nice normal life. This is one of those points where the
threat might be just as effective as the actual implementation of
force. And this thread an example of the hammers of the world thinking
every solution is a nail.
Ed Rasimus
<jackli...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>> >> Ed Rasimus wrote:
>> >>> And, despite the fact that we had carriers in the Med and the Indian
>> >>> Ocean, when the Iranian students stormed our embassy and took the
>> >>> staff hostage, we couldn't reach Teheran from the carriers. Nothing
>> >>> afloat had the legs to reach inland.
>> >>> I was at USAFE Hq drawing range arcs on the maps and watching
>> >>> everything short of SAC heavy assets fall short.
>> >>> Ed Rasimus
>The shah was admitted to the U.S. on October 22, 1979, the embassy was
>taken on November 4. Thirteen days, to steam from wherever in the
>Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. Carriers are always within range,
>the decision to use them is not.
Let me say it again, maybe this time it will sink in. I was in Hq
USAFE in the operational plans division. We convened an emergency
planning cell to explore options. We had people from Operation, Plans,
Logistics, Readiness, Weapons, etc. We were to consider any and all
options.
We had the ranges and capabilities of everything in the inventory. The
carriers could be positioned wherever we needed to have them to reach
Teheran. Nothing aboard had the range to get to the target and back
without using large-body tankers and penetrating Iranian airspace with
them--something that we considered not prudent at that level of
hostility because of risk to the tankers.
The closest we could get with tactical assets was F-111s and that
would have required some cooperation from several nations which we did
not yet have committed.
Over time, the agreements to get some international support were
possible, but at the bottom line there was no tactical air option that
could guarantee safe rescue of the hostages and simultaneously avoid
significant collateral damage to civilian populations.
The point I want to emphasize is that CARRIERS ARE NOT, REPEAT NOT,
ALWAYS IN RANGE.
Ed Rasimus
That's about the range. And that's too long for the stuff we had.
Jack Linthicum
Too long for "the stuff" or the people making the decision? The
Israelis did a mission of about the same length with F-15s a couple
of years later.
Ed Rasimus
>
>Too long for "the stuff" or the people making the decision? The
>Israelis did a mission of about the same length with F-15s a couple
>of years later.
It was out of range of the aircraft. That's the aircraft we had in the
US inventory in 1979.
We were USAFE, the issue was within our theater responsibility. As a
part of the military we provide options and recommendations from the
perspective of what it possible.
The decision for that sort of action would be up to national command
authority, AKA, the President. That was Jimmy Carter.
Attempting to draw a parallel with Israel isn't reasonable. Israel has
been engaged in ongoing hostilities with nations in the region for a
long time. Their options are considerably different than those of the
US in 1979.
And, to keep on the topic of aircraft capability, Israel's conformal
tanked F-15s have longer range than what we had on the table in 1979.
Jack Linthicum
> On Mon, 14 Jul 2008 06:29:45 -0700 (PDT), Jack Linthicum
>
Oh! Then we didn't worry about the Soviet Union across the Black Sea?
Dan
Now you are being silly.
tankfixer
So you would exclude the actions of the Argentine submarine service ?
What would the surface fleet have done besides what they tried ?
Paul J. Adam
<nospamf...@kwillshaw.nospamdemon.co.uk> writes
>The Persian gulf is only 56km wide at its max and full of civilian
>traffic from supertankers to dhows. EVERTBODY will know
>where it is, just as in any Souk
But hitting it is a different problem, and the civilian traffic hurts
you badly there (too many spurious targets)
FWIW it's possible to work a carrier in the Persian Gulf and find water
where there's just the carrier and her escort visible, even scanning the
horizon with good binoculars on a clear day and then asking the
professionals to confirm your estimate (or going down to Ops and
checking the RMP)
There are a lot of ships there... but it's a bigger piece of water than
it looks on the map, and the civilian traffic is not randomly
distributed..
--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides
paul<dot>j<dot>adam[at]googlemail{dot}.com
Jack Linthicum
Well, IIRC they were there and Incirlik was on the other side of the
Black Sea. You see, I find the air people, not just the Air Force but
the others too, so intent on plans and preparations that they forget
what the intent of those plans is or are. I watched the USS Banner do
a patrol in the Sea of Japan and go thru bumps and harrassment, which
somehow made the Pueblo a risk-free mission.
"The US 7th Fleet, US Forces Korea, and the US 5th Air Force, Fuchu,
Japan were informed of PUEBLO’s mission, but because of the minimal
risk assessment, the US Navy made no specific requests for support.
The tasking for similar USS BANNER missions had been rated as
hazardous, and fighter aircraft had been made available on a strip
alert status and 2 US Navy destroyers had maintained station within 50
miles of BANNER. When 5th Air Force personnel questioned the lack of
request for strip alert status for PUEBLO’s mission, they were
verbally informed that they would not be needed."
The Tehran situation could have been planned for in advance, but
wasn't. That's all you need to say. I still wonder why Bahrain wasn't
able to be used, we had filled their defense department with money.
Ed Rasimus
I'm not sure whether that is a non sequitur or a red herring. (Pun
intended.)
We took the nuclear alert down at Incirlik in '76 when the Turks
scared us by going to war with Greece over Cyprus and using Incirlik
as a forward operating location for a couple of their F-100 squadrons
from Konya.
We still supported a wide range of listening posts along the N. coast
of Turkey and our Checkered Flag program routinely exercised TAC (i.e.
US-based) squadrons out of Turkish bases like Diyabirkir, Eskishir,
Batman, and others. My primary job in Operational Plans at that time
was planning and coordinating NATO Southern Region exercises which
inevitably gamed Soviet activities against NATO.
But that has nothing to do with the topic of Iran in 1979 and the
available responses.
The old ADHD acting up this AM?
Jack Linthicum
> On Mon, 14 Jul 2008 07:02:50 -0700 (PDT), Jack Linthicum
>
>
>
What you are saying is that you had a task that was within your
responsibilities and you failed to accomplish it. Try to think of an
exercise as being a substitute for the real thing, rather than the
thing itself.
Raymond O'Hara
"Kerryn Offord" <ka...@ext.canterbury.ac.nz> wrote in message
news:487b...@clear.net.nz...
all they had to do was get there ships to the shallows area aroubd the
islands.
the british would then have had to engage them.
. if all their ships get sunk and they take out a 5 or 6 british ships the
british effort fails.
Ed Rasimus
<jackli...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>What you are saying is that you had a task that was within your
>responsibilities and you failed to accomplish it. Try to think of an
>exercise as being a substitute for the real thing, rather than the
>thing itself.
You do understand that the military is subordinate to the elected
government and that they don't act unilaterally?
You do understand that if you have a mission that involves a range of
responses from finger-waving to unleashing Armageddon that you
maintain a capability to fulfill those options, but you don't get to
say, "I think this needs a nuke on Tiblisi this morning." (Although I
did nurse-maid 345KT of instant sunshine for just that task on several
occasions.)
If anyone thought that the return of the Ayatollah and the ouster of
the Shah would then lead to a group of students under the leadership
of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad storming the US Embassy in violation of
international rules of diplomacy and keeping the occupant hostage for
nearly a year and a half, it would have been the State Department and
the Carter Administration. They dropped the ball, big time.
And by the way, it wasn't Henry Kissinger but Cyrus Vance who was
secretary of state for the two years prior to the fall of the shah and
almost a year after the embassy take-over. The "Rose Garden" strategy
of bunkering-up and doing nothing certainly wasn't a military favor.
Exercises aren't substitutes for real war, but they are as close as
you can get without killing people on the other side. You attempt to
operate as closely as possible to your best estimate of a scenario.
You evaluate your ability to deploy, communicate, operate, respond,
and control your forces. When things are discovered that didn't work
the way you expected, you determine why and try to fix them.
Your assertion regarding failure to stop the embassy attack and the
ineffectiveness of exercising your capabilities makes no sense at all.
Jack Linthicum
> On Mon, 14 Jul 2008 08:28:15 -0700 (PDT), Jack Linthicum
>
Kissinger is given credit for the "blackmail" to get the Shah into the
U.S. You don't have to be the actual Secretary of State to try to use
your influence for your friends.
We, the government and the military, had two clues from the students
and ignored them Takeover of the Embassy for one day on February 14
and the TACKSMAN site a few days later. That nobody seems to have had
the idea there would be more is in keeping with other events in the
past. I cited the Pueblo, I'm sure others could remember other events.
If I tell that the failure to take the Banner was practice for taking
the Pueblo would you believe it? Especially if there were runway
alerts and destroyers in the area for Banner and none of that for the
Pueblo?
Andrew Chaplin
news:bbqm741kfn5gigavp...@4ax.com...
> We took the nuclear alert down at Incirlik in '76 when the Turks
> scared us by going to war with Greece over Cyprus and using Incirlik
> as a forward operating location for a couple of their F-100 squadrons
> from Konya.
Haven't you slipped two years here? Turkey attacked Cyprus in the summer of
'74. (The U.S. public was distracted as the Nixon administration was in its
death throes. I remember it well because I was on my Jr NCO Course, and some
members of the instructional cadre were withdrawn to reinforce the Cdn Abn
Regt then in Nicosia.)
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)
Ed Rasimus
<ab.ch...@yourfinger.rogers.com> wrote:
>"Ed Rasimus" <rasimus...@verizon.net> wrote in message
>news:bbqm741kfn5gigavp...@4ax.com...
>
>> We took the nuclear alert down at Incirlik in '76 when the Turks
>> scared us by going to war with Greece over Cyprus and using Incirlik
>> as a forward operating location for a couple of their F-100 squadrons
>> from Konya.
>
>Haven't you slipped two years here? Turkey attacked Cyprus in the summer of
>'74. (The U.S. public was distracted as the Nixon administration was in its
>death throes. I remember it well because I was on my Jr NCO Course, and some
>members of the instructional cadre were withdrawn to reinforce the Cdn Abn
>Regt then in Nicosia.)
You're right. I got to Torrejon from Thailand in August of '73 and got
certified to pull nuke alert in early '74. When the Turks invaded
Cyprus, the deployed squadron (612th TFS) got ordered to pull the
airplanes out ASAP which meant a no-tankers flight out of Incirlik to
Sigonella Sicily, with emergency authorization to dump the external
tanks if necessary enroute down the Med. (It wasn't needed.)
The fighting seemed to cease and about five weeks later I led the
first flight from Torrejon back to Incirlik (613th TFS). We arrived on
Friday and were going to resume our normal training operations on
Monday morning. I was briefing a flight when we heard the engines
cranking on the TAF F-100s just outside out ops area and they launched
strikes resuming the war.
The Turkish commander told us we were "grounded", so we went into a
watch (and report) mode for the next week. We counted sorties and
tail-numbers and reported them back through intel so we could track
the war.
We never did resume nuke alert after that although we still exercised
all of the procedures and held Operational Readiness Inspections. We
continued to pull alert duty at our other forward operating location.
1974 was the year.
When you get as old as I am the filing cabinet of the mind has so much
cluttering it that it becomes increasingly a good idea to verify
dates.
Andrew Chaplin
No harm, no foul. I was just making sure I hadn't missed something.
That summer, I was obliged to wander the swamps of Petawawa to teach me
tolerance and battle procedure. Major international events attached themselves
to "significant emotional events" in my life and help me to recall the year.
CJ Adams
>
> That summer, I was obliged to wander the swamps of Petawawa to teach me
> tolerance and battle procedure. Major international events attached themselves
> to "significant emotional events" in my life and help me to recall the year.
ARTS 74? I wur thar....
Cheers
CJ Adams
Andrew Chaplin
news:9nusk5-...@news.start.ca...
Reaaallly? In Major O'Brien's "O" Company with all its retreaded Canadian
Guards?
CJ Adams
> "CJ Adams" <blue...@start.ca> wrote in message
> news:9nusk5-...@news.start.ca...
>> Andrew Chaplin wrote:
>>
>>> That summer, I was obliged to wander the swamps of Petawawa to teach me
>>> tolerance and battle procedure. Major international events attached
>>> themselves to "significant emotional events" in my life and help me to
>>> recall the year.
>> ARTS 74? I wur thar....
>
> Reaaallly? In Major O'Brien's "O" Company with all its retreaded Canadian
> Guards?
Sup Tech PL"C", feeding chipmunks in a marquee classroom and
living in a bell tent marked "T. EATON CO. 1917" -- one of
the white ones. Swamps? Gee....
Cheers
Craig
tankfixer
oh...@hotmail.com says...
Even the Japanese recognised when it was prudent to stop trying to use
surface ships to resupply and interdict an island.
Andrew Chaplin
As was I; I shared it with another Gunner (now a Spook major) Tony Marston. A
mosquito coil burning in a helmet outer would nicely force the bugs up the
cone of the bell so that by lights out you could get under your mosquito bar
without them climbing in with you.
> Swamps? Gee....
Yes, part and parcel of every night navigation ex on a Jr NCO. Being up to my
nipples in loon shit is not my idea of fun, but it did get me money to get
drunk with.
Are you in the same cohort as Edmund? It sounds as if you are a year behind
me. I did SSEAP in '73.
La N
"Andrew Chaplin" <ab.ch...@yourfinger.rogers.com> wrote in message
news:H8KdnYjncNc6i-HV...@giganews.com...
> "CJ Adams" <blue...@start.ca> wrote in message
> news:9i0tk5-...@news.start.ca...
>> Andrew Chaplin wrote:
>>> "CJ Adams" <blue...@start.ca> wrote in message
>>> news:9nusk5-...@news.start.ca...
>>>> Andrew Chaplin wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> That summer, I was obliged to wander the swamps of Petawawa to teach
>>>>> me tolerance and battle procedure. Major international events attached
>>>>> themselves to "significant emotional events" in my life and help me to
>>>>> recall the year.
>>>> ARTS 74? I wur thar....
>>>
>>> Reaaallly? In Major O'Brien's "O" Company with all its retreaded
>>> Canadian Guards?
>>
>> Sup Tech PL"C", feeding chipmunks in a marquee classroom and living in a
>> bell tent marked "T. EATON CO. 1917" -- one of the white ones.
>
> As was I; I shared it with another Gunner (now a Spook major) Tony
> Marston. A mosquito coil burning in a helmet outer would nicely force the
> bugs up the cone of the bell so that by lights out you could get under
> your mosquito bar without them climbing in with you.
>
>> Swamps? Gee....
>
> Yes, part and parcel of every night navigation ex on a Jr NCO. Being up to
> my nipples in loon shit is not my idea of fun, but it did get me money to
> get drunk with.
>
Heh. My daughter and I, along with friends, bumped into CF recruiters from
our local regiment-used-to-be-squadron at their booth in the mall last week.
Because my friends knew these fellas, we were bantering with them, joking
around, etc. My daughter was telling them how she almost enlisted a few
years ago. However, the paperwork seemed endlessly arduous, and in the
meantime she got a better (job) offer. They laughed and said, "Oh, well, if
you thought the paperwork was tough, you should have seen what came after
it. You wouldn't have liked it!"
We had a good laugh. One of the former full-timers had been injured in
Kosovo, but here he was back in the reserves. And, I guess, I'm glad my
daughter did the job/Uni route rather than end up in Afghanistan. She would
have loved boot camp, though.
- nilita
Raymond O'Hara
"tankfixer" <paul.c...@gmail.comm> wrote in message
i've read the argies hit a several british ships where the fuses were
defective.
a 500lbs bomb going off on a modern ship can be ugly as the antelope
demonstrated when the defusing failed and the ship sunk/.
tankfixer
They were not defective, just set for release at a higher altitude than
the Argentines dropped them from.
No one faults the bravery of the Argentine pilots.
Antelope sank because most of the crew had been taken off and no damage
control parties could respond in time.
Raymond O'Hara
"tankfixer" <paul.c...@gmail.comm> wrote in message
look at that picture
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:HMS_Antelope_%28F170%29.png
Andre Ilausky
> hcobb wrote:
>> They've got to find the carrier first, while the airbase can be
>> googled.
>>
>> -HJC
>
> There you go again, cobb, how hard do you think it is to find a
> carrier?
In a shooting war? If it doesn't want do be found? Could be very hard.
> They tend to have significant fleets surrounding them
<http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-031.htm>
How to Hide a Task Force
[...] "mirror image strikes" are flown. These are full strike missions
by the airwing flown on a bearing 180 degrees out from the actual
objective. [...] In NORPAC 82 these mirror image strikes within
range of Petroplavask and the SSBN bastion in the Sea of O are conducted
for 4 days without being detected by the opposition [Evil Empire, Cold
War footing]. [...] In a real war our presence would have been deduced
on the first strike as the survivors picked themselves out the rubble of
their airfields. [...]
> and the
> U.S. news system is very good at giving the general location.
Even if true, it's rather insufficient for targeting, unlike for
instance a ballistic missile strike against an airbase using data found
on e.g. globalsecurity.org.
Especially if the carrier is in the Mediterranean like the Truman and
Roosevelt in March 2003, which was pretty much out of reach for a
regional power like Iraq.
> An enemy
> who is capable of attacking a carrier fleet is fully capable of locating
> it.
Well, you could hardly attack something you can't locate ;)
Are the Iranians capable of attacking a CSG with some degree of
confidence? Why did the Soviets deploy stuff like Bear D, RORSAT, EORSAT
etc and what is the Iranian counterpart?
Arved Sandstrom
news:eef3ce57-18fd-4864...@d1g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
[ SNIP ]
> The shah was admitted to the U.S. on October 22, 1979, the embassy was
> taken on November 4. Thirteen days, to steam from wherever in the
> Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. Carriers are always within range,
> the decision to use them is not. How many Marines do you need? Most
> carriers have a Marine Detachment on board.
I could be wrong, but I thought the last Marine detachment went ashore in
1998, off the GEORGE WASHINGTON. Did the USN bring them back?
> Do they just raise the
> flag and parade?
Marines as part of a seagoing detachment don't just raise the flag and
parade, no. They have had (in the 20th century) the duties of internal
security, security for nuclear weapons, manning secondary or AA batteries,
and providing landing parties.
Mind you, we're not talking big landing parties. I believe late 20th century
carrier detachments went up to about two officers and 64 men
(http://www.defensetech.org/archives/003806.html). WW2 Marine seagoing
detachments were in the neighbourhood of 1-2 officers/80 men on a heavy
cruiser or carrier, 2-3 officers/100+ men on a BB, and 1 officer/45 men on a
light cruiser
(http://www.nps.gov/archive/wapa/indepth/extContent/usmc/pcn-190-003125-00/sec1.htm)
With this kind of manpower you could actually do a pretty good job handling
a lot of incidents (what kind of local police force is going to resist a
platoon of heavily armed Marines?), but you sure won't be flying into
Teheran to extricate 50+ hostages either.
AHS
Raymond O'Hara
"Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote in message
news:qj1fk.286$rR2.29@edtnps83...
the hostages probably owe their lives to the fact all the rescue plans
came to naught.
tankfixer
Yes, and how does that negate what I said ?
The 500 pound bomb ended up against a magazine.
So they took most of the crew off before trying to defuse it.
--
War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things.
The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic
feeling which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse.
The person who has nothing for which he is willing to fight,
nothing which is more important than his own personal safety,
is a miserable creature and has no chance of being free unless
made so and kept so by the exertions of much better men than himself.
John Stuart Mill (1806 - 1873) English economist and philosopher.
Raymond O'Hara
"tankfixer" <paul.c...@gmail.comm> wrote in message
because a damge control party wasn't going to save the ship after the bomb
went off.