Were Battleships starting to become obsolete by the time of Dreadnought?
Juleen Jenkins
I know it sounds silly; but here is my reasoning. BB's, it seems, had
been the primary warships in Naval theory for a long time. The entire
goal of going against another fleet was to draw out its BB's, form gun
lines, and hammer at each other till your opponent is gone. This
seemed to work fine, in theory, for centuries. Even the
pre-dreadnoughts had relatively short range and thick vertical armor
belts to protect them in the battle line.
Once Dreadnought hit the fleet, and large caliber main armament became
the norm, it seems things began to change. Because the large guns
were able to fire 20 miles or more, and because at the extended ranges
the BB's became open to plunging fire; the armor belt which had
protected their vitals became less effective. Not many people were
going to be bounding away at such short range that a vertical armor
belt was going to save you from much. The answer was deck armor, but
because of stability issues you can't bout 12" of deck armor on your
ship. Hence, you end up with maybe 6" or slightly more. But None of
the deck armor schemes which I have seen have shown a tremendous
amount of success against large caliber hits. Most of the BB's at
Pearl; Hood, etc. A plunging shell seemed to go right through.
When you add to all this that the Torpedo and the air dropped bomb
were just around the corner, it seems that when you take the whole
history of line of battle ships into account, the dawning of
dreadnought with the all big gun main armament seems to be the
beginning of the end.
Am I crazy?
Jimbo
Peter McLelland
Juleen Jenkins wrote
Snipped
>
>Once Dreadnought hit the fleet, and large caliber main armament became
>the norm, it seems things began to change. Because the large guns
>were able to fire 20 miles or more, and because at the extended ranges
>the BB's became open to plunging fire; the armor belt which had
>protected their vitals became less effective. Not many people were
>going to be bounding away at such short range that a vertical armor
>belt was going to save you from much. The answer was deck armor, but
>because of stability issues you can't bout 12" of deck armor on your
>ship. Hence, you end up with maybe 6" or slightly more. But None of
>the deck armor schemes which I have seen have shown a tremendous
>amount of success against large caliber hits. Most of the BB's at
>Pearl; Hood, etc. A plunging shell seemed to go right through.
>
>When you add to all this that the Torpedo and the air dropped bomb
>were just around the corner, it seems that when you take the whole
>history of line of battle ships into account, the dawning of
>dreadnought with the all big gun main armament seems to be the
>beginning of the end.
>
Well there was a strong movement in the UK after WW1 to stop battleship
building and to move to an all carrier force. The traditionalists won as we
all know, but if the RN had had twice as many carriers with better planes
the war could have been very different in a number of areas. But there I go
with what ifs again.
The simple answer is that as soon as the carrier and naval aircraft came on
the scene there was a movement to get rid of the battleships. In some areas
the pro BB lobby seems to be as strong today as it was in the UK in the 20s.
Peter
B F Lake
//dreadnought with the all big gun main armament seems to be the
beginning of the end.
Am I crazy?//
Yes. (inevitable from following smn). IMO, the beginning of the end was
1867, when Luppis demonstrated his self-propelled bomb for the Austrian
Navy . This was improved by Whitehead to make it a submerged torpedo. The
USN was making these by 1869 and the warship type "torpedo boat" was extant
from 1877. 1878 was the first sinking (Turkish customs boat by Russian
torpedo boats). 1891 Chilean renegade battleship sunk. Russo -Japanese
War 1904-5 Japanese torpedoes sank five battleships and four heavy
cruisers.
The end of the beginning was when armour lost to guns except for a small
"immunity zone" during pre-dreadnought times. The actual end ran from
~1890-1944?
Regards,
Barry
Keith (no, not that Keith)
B F Lake wrote in message <
> The end of the beginning was when armour lost to guns except for a small
>"immunity zone" during pre-dreadnought times. The actual end ran from
>~1890-1944?
IMHO BB still most important ship early in WWII - 1939 to some time in 1941.
For proof see _Glorious_. The turning point is argueably the loss of Force
Z. Even afterwards, however, the carrier was vulnerable at night.
--
K.B.
If they _are_ out to get you, are you still paranoid?
Mike Potter
future as the battle cruiser with accurate long-range gunfire, not armored
dreadnoughts. Recent naval history works, beginning with Professor Sumida's IN
DEFENCE OF NAVAL SUPREMACY, make this point.
Keith WIllshaw
Keith (no, not that Keith) <kbetty@!Nospam!.telusplanet.net> wrote in
message news:xGnh4.92980$n3.16...@news0.telusplanet.net...
>
> B F Lake wrote in message <
>
> > The end of the beginning was when armour lost to guns except for a small
> >"immunity zone" during pre-dreadnought times. The actual end ran from
> >~1890-1944?
>
> IMHO BB still most important ship early in WWII - 1939 to some time in
1941.
> For proof see _Glorious_. The turning point is argueably the loss of Force
> Z. Even afterwards, however, the carrier was vulnerable at night.
I think there were clear signs that the dominance of the BB
was over long before that
The Crippling of the Bismark by a Torpedo from
a Carrier Launched aircraft and the Attack at Taranto
both showed modern Battleships to be vulnerable
even to obsolete Biplanes.
The Japanese are known to have studied the Taranto
attack and the Pearl Harbor plan was doubtless
influenced by it.
Keith
Peter Skelton
>
>Keith (no, not that Keith) <kbetty@!Nospam!.telusplanet.net> wrote in
>message news:xGnh4.92980$n3.16...@news0.telusplanet.net...
>>
>> B F Lake wrote in message <
>>
>> > The end of the beginning was when armour lost to guns except for a small
>> >"immunity zone" during pre-dreadnought times. The actual end ran from
>> >~1890-1944?
>>
>> IMHO BB still most important ship early in WWII - 1939 to some time in
>1941.
>> For proof see _Glorious_. The turning point is argueably the loss of Force
>> Z. Even afterwards, however, the carrier was vulnerable at night.
>
>I think there were clear signs that the dominance of the BB
>was over long before that
>
>The Crippling of the Bismark by a Torpedo from
>a Carrier Launched aircraft and the Attack at Taranto
>both showed modern Battleships to be vulnerable
>even to obsolete Biplanes.
The Bismarck incident was in May 1941. Taranto was on November 11, 1940.
His dates (1939-41) look quite reasonable on your evidenceé
>The Japanese are known to have studied the Taranto
>attack and the Pearl Harbor plan was doubtless
>influenced by it.
>
>Keith
>
>
--
Peter Skelton
Keith WIllshaw
Peter Skelton <skel...@home.com> wrote in message
news:3887197a.4193584@news...
> "Keith WIllshaw" <keith_w...@compuserve.com> wrote:
>
> >
> >Keith (no, not that Keith) <kbetty@!Nospam!.telusplanet.net> wrote in
> >message news:xGnh4.92980$n3.16...@news0.telusplanet.net...
> >>
> >> B F Lake wrote in message <
> >>
> >> > The end of the beginning was when armour lost to guns except for a
small
> >> >"immunity zone" during pre-dreadnought times. The actual end ran
from
> >> >~1890-1944?
> >>
> >> IMHO BB still most important ship early in WWII - 1939 to some time in
> >1941.
> >> For proof see _Glorious_. The turning point is argueably the loss of
Force
> >> Z. Even afterwards, however, the carrier was vulnerable at night.
> >
> >I think there were clear signs that the dominance of the BB
> >was over long before that
> >
> >The Crippling of the Bismark by a Torpedo from
> >a Carrier Launched aircraft and the Attack at Taranto
> >both showed modern Battleships to be vulnerable
> >even to obsolete Biplanes.
>
> The Bismarck incident was in May 1941. Taranto was on November 11, 1940.
> His dates (1939-41) look quite reasonable on your evidenceé
>
The point I was trying to make (and obviously messed up)
was that while his dates are quite good the Turning for
Battleships at sea was the loss of Bismark.
Here was a modern Battleship with good complement of AA
Guns steaming along in open waters crippled by a handfull
of BiPlanes
Similarly Taranto showed the vulnerability of the battlefleet
at anchor.
Thus I would put the date a little earlier
Keith
Keith (no, not that Keith)
Keith WIllshaw wrote in
>The point I was trying to make (and obviously messed up)
>was that while his dates are quite good the Turning for
>Battleships at sea was the loss of Bismark.
>
>Here was a modern Battleship with good complement of AA
>Guns steaming along in open waters crippled by a handfull
>of BiPlanes
>
>Similarly Taranto showed the vulnerability of the battlefleet
>at anchor.
>
>Thus I would put the date a little earlier
>
I see your point on Bismarck. However, she was not sunk by air power; PoW
and Repulse were. I did not include Taranto and Pearl because the BB's were
not at sea.
My point on Force Z was that, afterwards, there was _no_ doubt about BB
vulnerability.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
jul...@mindspring.com (Juleen Jenkins) wrote:
> Because the large guns
> were able to fire 20 miles or more, and because at the extended
> ranges
> the BB's became open to plunging fire;
They may have been able to fire 20 miles (post WW1) getting a hit at
that range is a different matter.
The increases in deck armour post WW1 were considered to be as
important against bombs as shot. American ships had a bomb deck and an
armour deck even though this arrangement was less effective against
shot than combining the weight in a single deck. By the way the BB at
Pearl and the Hood were WW1 designs. If WW2 had not started Hood would
have been rebuilt with additional deck armour.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion
B F Lake
(IMO as soon as anything other than another BB could sink one) and when
they became completely obsolete and the dates this became evident by some
historical event (later). So something can be obsolete for years and
years but not "recognized" as such . This can mean certain theorists see
the obsolescence but the "establishment" won't. Seems like it takes a
wartime disaster to force the recognition sometimes.
In this regard, in 1968, the USN refused to recognize the Charlie class
sub firing SSN 7s from underwater as being a serious threat to their
carriers, while others , not so carrier -oriented , questioned this. It
may be that these subs did make carriers as obsolete as BBs became in their
day, but luckily no war came along to force the issue. So today, they are
happily working on new giant carriers as though nothing has happened-
perhaps just like everyone did in the mid-1930s when they built new BBs!
Regards,
Barry
Paul J. Adam
(no, not that Keith) <kbetty@!Nospam!.telusplanet.net> writes
>I see your point on Bismarck. However, she was not sunk by air power;
Because, instead of shuttle runs of Swordfish or maybe a determined
destroyer attack sinking her, she was pounded into floating scrap by
battleship gunfire and then sunk by torpedoes or her own scuttling
charges (depends who you believe).
But, once she was located and immobilised, she was dead: the only
matter to debate was who signed her death certificate.
>My point on Force Z was that, afterwards, there was _no_ doubt about BB
>vulnerability.
You've never been to the "Should The Battleships Be Back In Service"
board, have you? :) Iowa-class BBs would have laughed off that air
attack, saved Singapore, and gone on to shell all of Japan into a
barren lifeless desert.
--
There are four kinds of homicide: felonious, excusable, justifiable and
praiseworthy...
Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Keith (no, not that Keith)
B F Lake wrote in message <01bf637d$d6d04b20$LocalHost@bflake>...
>IMO there seems to be confusion over when BBs "started to become" obsolete
>(IMO as soon as anything other than another BB could sink one) and when
>they became completely obsolete and the dates this became evident by some
>historical event (later). So something can be obsolete for years and
>years but not "recognized" as such .
In that case, one would say they 'started to become obsolete' when the
torpedo was developed. But the torpedo threat was well known by 1914, and
Jellicoe's turn away at Jutland recognized the risk; the tactics had been
thought out beforehand. Hughes, in "Fleet Tactics: theory and practice"
considers the turn away to be correct based on the WWII Guadalcanal actions.
Vulnerability to a certain weapon source does not make a fighting unit
obsolete, but means it must be used cautiously.
Even in 1945, carriers were vulnerable at night to gunfire or torpedoes -
and to submarine torpedoes at any time.
Submarines are vulnerable to DC's.
ISTM that it is a case of the commander, when possible, using appropriate
forces in combination, recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of each
unit.
The problem is that you don't always have the right units, and must send a
Hood against a Bismarck.
Keith (no, not that Keith)
Paul J. Adam wrote in message ...
>You've never been to the "Should The Battleships Be Back In Service"
>board, have you? :) Iowa-class BBs would have laughed off that air
>attack, saved Singapore, and gone on to shell all of Japan into a
>barren lifeless desert.
>
Seen threads, ignored same....(well, actually, I read them for
entertainment).
I _still_ think a 16" nuclear shell with a Pk of 2 would be interesting.
Once.
Or maybe twice (2 Iowa's).
(remote controlled firing, of course)
Michael P. Reed
> IMO there seems to be confusion over when BBs "started to become" obsolete
> (IMO as soon as anything other than another BB could sink one) and when
> they became completely obsolete and the dates this became evident by some
> historical event (later). So something can be obsolete for years and
> years but not "recognized" as such . This can mean certain theorists see
> the obsolescence but the "establishment" won't. Seems like it takes a
> wartime disaster to force the recognition sometimes.
> In this regard, in 1968, the USN refused to recognize the Charlie class
> sub firing SSN 7s from underwater as being a serious threat to their
> carriers, while others , not so carrier -oriented , questioned this. It
> may be that these subs did make carriers as obsolete as BBs became in their
> day, but luckily no war came along to force the issue. So today, they are
> happily working on new giant carriers as though nothing has happened-
> perhaps just like everyone did in the mid-1930s when they built new BBs!
> Regards,
I think y'all are missing the point (or is that the boat) here. The point
where a weapons platform becomes obsolete is when it can no longer fulfill
its mission. The mission of battleships was not to sink other battleships,
but to gain naval superiority/supremacy. The sailing Ship-of-the-line became
obsolete with the advent of the ironclad warship, because it could no longer
defeat it in battle. This was demonstated at Hampton Roads, when a single
ironclad sank or scattered an entire squadron of sailing warships. As a
result, everyone started building ironclads. As long as the battleship was
the best platform to perform the navy's primary mission of sea control, it
was not obsolete. This held true in the Spanish-American, Russo-Japanese,
and First World Wars. During the inter-bellum period, aircraft took on a
greater roll, but until very late in that era they were not truly capable
platforms against warships, and the battleship still remained the best weapon
for sea control until the late 1930's when fast all metal mono-planes came
along. The event, as others have suggested, that proved the battleships
obsolescence, and their inability to no longer carry out their primary
function, was Force Z. That was the first air vs battleship contest, and the
battleships lost.
As for your second point, about carriers being obsolete. Carriers have
always been vulnerable to submarines. The experience of YORKTOWN, HORNET,
WASP, and SARATOGA show that. However, submarines are not able to perform
the main function of carriers, which is to gain and maintain naval
superiority. Submarines can not do this, as they are sea denial and not sea
control platforms.
--
Regards,
Michael P. Reed
ANDREW BREEN
Michael P. Reed <mpr...@removeme.tdi.net> wrote:
>but to gain naval superiority/supremacy. The sailing Ship-of-the-line became
>obsolete with the advent of the ironclad warship, because it could no longer
>defeat it in battle. This was demonstated at Hampton Roads, when a single
>ironclad sank or scattered an entire squadron of sailing warships. As a
>result, everyone started building ironclads.
Nitpick: Sailing ships of the line were obsolete from 1848, with the advent
of L'Napoleon and Agammemnon - they were made obsolete by the steamship
of the line. Sailing ships of the line were certainly regared as useless
for warlike purposes by France and Britain after 1854, when all the ones
in the Black Sea or Baltic were turned over to support duties.
As to wooden steamships being made obsolete by ironclads - it was
true up to a point, but as late as 1866 wooden steamships of the
line could still maul ironclads, as the Austrian second squadron
showed at Lissa...
Ob. Ironclads: IIRC that one of the French armoure d batteries (Devastation?)
fired on Russian ships during the assault on Sevastopol - the first
steam ironclad to engage another ship?
--
Andy Breen ~ PPARC Advanced Research Fellow, Interplanetary Scintillation
Solar Physics Group, UW Aberystwyth
"When I was young I used to scintillate
now I only sin 'til ten past three" (Ogden Nash)
Lachlan Sturrock
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
> In article <3885b74d....@news.mindspring.com>,
> jul...@mindspring.com (Juleen Jenkins) wrote:
> If WW2 had not started Hood would
> have been rebuilt with additional deck armour.
>
Yes, but its doubtful that it would have made any difference. She was due
to get about 500 tons of armour added over the whole ship.
NE1outheir
>The mission of battleships was not to sink other battleships,
>but to gain naval superiority/supremacy. The sailing Ship-of-the-line became
>obsolete with the advent of the ironclad warship,
nitpick here, minor I know. The wooden ships at Hampton Roads, were steam
powered, and provided with sails too. I also believe that many 1865 to about
1890 ironclads had auxiliary sails to in order to increase unrefueled range and
reduce costs.
Matt
Ken & Laura Chaddock
>
> IMO there seems to be confusion over when BBs "started to become" obsolete
> (IMO as soon as anything other than another BB could sink one) and when
> they became completely obsolete and the dates this became evident by some
> historical event (later). So something can be obsolete for years and
> years but not "recognized" as such . This can mean certain theorists see
> the obsolescence but the "establishment" won't. Seems like it takes a
> wartime disaster to force the recognition sometimes.
> In this regard, in 1968, the USN refused to recognize the Charlie class
> sub firing SSN 7s from underwater as being a serious threat to their
> carriers, while others , not so carrier -oriented , questioned this. It
> may be that these subs did make carriers as obsolete as BBs became in their
> day, but luckily no war came along to force the issue. So today, they are
> happily working on new giant carriers as though nothing has happened-
> perhaps just like everyone did in the mid-1930s when they built new BBs!
Interesting analogy but I don't think altogether convincing. While a
ship can become vunerable to new technology, unless it's role
dissappears
or is taken over by some other vessel, as the BB role was take over by
the
CV and her aircraft, then the ship isn't obsolete, only more vunerable
and
requiring more support and defence.
In that sense, unless it can be demonstrated how submarines can take
over
the role of the carrier, the carrier isn't yet obsolete, only more
vunerable
and in need of better protection and support.
On another tack, if the new trimaran hull form being proposed for the
new
RN frigates were to be adopted for a futur carrier, she would be much
*less*
vunerable to submarine attack. If we had declared carriers "obsolete"
simply
because of vunerability, would a less vunerable hull form make them now
"un-obsolete" ? By that token, if we build 16" gun Battleships again
using
this new, reduced vunerability hull form, does that make them
"un-obsolete" ?
I think not since their role...ie: the "line of battle"...has
disappeared".
...Ken
B F Lake
//snip of logical bumph//
So now we have to have clarity, coherence, and cognizance to post
something? When did that start? :)
Regards,
Barry
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
(Lachlan Sturrock) wrote:
> Yes, but its doubtful that it would have made any difference. She
> was due
> to get about 500 tons of armour added over the whole ship.
British Battleships lists two possible armour schemes. Both included
removing the 5 inch upper belt and improving the two inch splinter
protection on the lower deck.
A: extend the 12 inch belt to the upper deck and increase upper deck
thickness to 2.5 inches over machinery and 4 inches over magazines.
B: leave belts alone and increase thickness of main deck to 4 inches
over machinery and 5 inches over the magazines.
Dave Welsh
"Lachlan Sturrock" <ls...@globalnet.co.uk> wrote in message
news:3888D44B...@globalnet.co.uk...
>
>
> ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
>
> > In article <3885b74d....@news.mindspring.com>,
> > jul...@mindspring.com (Juleen Jenkins) wrote:
> > If WW2 had not started Hood would
> > have been rebuilt with additional deck armour.
> >
>
> to get about 500 tons of armour added over the whole ship.
The rebuild scheme for Hood was not just a matter of adding 500 tons of
armor somewhere, but reconfiguring the armor scheme with a net increase of
500 tons. The protection for the magazines would have been substantially
improved, and since this was exactly the weakness that resulted in Hood's
loss, it might have made all the difference.
BTW the conversion would have made Hood look like a larger version of the
rebuilt Renown, which IMO would have greatly spoiled her appearance.
--
Dave Welsh
dwe...@deltanet.com
Dave Welsh
"Paul J. Adam" <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:o$QuJGANr...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk...
[snip]
> You've never been to the "Should The Battleships Be Back In Service"
> board, have you? :) Iowa-class BBs would have laughed off that air
> attack, saved Singapore, and gone on to shell all of Japan into a
> barren lifeless desert.
Two Iowa class BBs would have had a good chance of surviving that air
attack, but I doubt that they would have "laughed it off."
One of the characteristics of the Iowas that makes me believe this is their
extraordinary maneuverability. They can turn more sharply than a destroyer.
The turning circle of an Iowa is about 1/3 that of Repulse.
Another is their protection scheme which is infinitely superior to that of
Repulse and far better than POW. The latter actually sank because of a
weakness in the antitorpedo protection near the stern.
A third is the devastating efficiency of their AA armament, which (1944
vintage) was many times as effective as that of the British ships in 1941.
Still, there would have been hits and it is likely that the ships would
have had to return to port for repairs after the action.
--
Dave Welsh
dwe...@deltanet.com
B F Lake
//> Yes, but its doubtful that it would have made any difference. She
> to get about 500 tons of armour added over the whole ship.
removing the 5 inch upper belt and improving the two inch splinter
protection on the lower deck.
A: extend the 12 inch belt to the upper deck and increase upper deck
thickness to 2.5 inches over machinery and 4 inches over magazines.
B: leave belts alone and increase thickness of main deck to 4 inches
Don't forget "main deck" = "second deck" in USN. "Lower deck" = fourth
deck in USN, "upper deck"= main deck in USN
What would they do about her freeboard with the extra armour? She was
already low in water. Should be a good candidate for "girdling" with
bulges?
Regards,
Barry
Keith (no, not that Keith)
B F Lake wrote in message
Should be a good candidate for "girdling" with
>bulges?
Did they have enough oak available? ;-)
Keith
Keith Willshaw
Dave Welsh wrote in message <86crlu$2...@journal.concentric.net>...
>
>"Paul J. Adam" <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:o$QuJGANr...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk...
>[snip]
>
>> You've never been to the "Should The Battleships Be Back In Service"
>> board, have you? :) Iowa-class BBs would have laughed off that air
>> attack, saved Singapore, and gone on to shell all of Japan into a
>> barren lifeless desert.
>
>Two Iowa class BBs would have had a good chance of surviving that air
>attack, but I doubt that they would have "laughed it off."
>
Paul was using a literal device called irony by the way
Keith
Ken & Laura Chaddock
Oh Barry, don't be so hard on yourself...your posts are always clear,
coherent and cognizant bumph ! <G>
...Ken
Dave Welsh
"Keith Willshaw" <keith_w...@compuserve.com> wrote in message
news:86d8ra$53i$1...@ssauraaa-i-1.production.compuserve.com...
I did appreciate that. My post was motivated by a belief that the point of
his irony was a little bit off because the superiority of the Iowas _would_
have made a major difference in the outcome.
--
Dave Welsh
dwe...@deltanet.com
Keith Willshaw
Dave Welsh wrote in message <86dgjk$k...@chronicle.concentric.net>...
>
>I did appreciate that. My post was motivated by a belief that the point of
>his irony was a little bit off because the superiority of the Iowas _would_
>have made a major difference in the outcome.
>
I doubt it. Enough Japanese Battlehips with equally impressive
AA hits were sunk late in the war to show the vulnerability
of Battleships. The Japanese also had VERY good torpedoes
which the Iowas were just as vulnerable to as any other
BB
Keith
Peter Skelton
>
>"Keith Willshaw" <keith_w...@compuserve.com> wrote in message
>news:86d8ra$53i$1...@ssauraaa-i-1.production.compuserve.com...
>>
>> Dave Welsh wrote in message <86crlu$2...@journal.concentric.net>...
>> >
>> >"Paul J. Adam" <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>> >news:o$QuJGANr...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk...
>> >[snip]
>> >
>> >> You've never been to the "Should The Battleships Be Back In Service"
>> >> board, have you? :) Iowa-class BBs would have laughed off that air
>> >> attack, saved Singapore, and gone on to shell all of Japan into a
>> >> barren lifeless desert.
>> >
>> >Two Iowa class BBs would have had a good chance of surviving that air
>> >attack, but I doubt that they would have "laughed it off."
>> >
>>
>>
>> Paul was using a literal device called irony by the way
>
>I did appreciate that. My post was motivated by a belief that the point of
>his irony was a little bit off because the superiority of the Iowas _would_
>have made a major difference in the outcome.
Given that the proximate cause of the sinking was stupidity, I don't see
how changing the ships would have made any difference.
An Iowa is not better protected from underwater damage than a KGV; an
Iowa's AA radar in 1944 was not better than a KGV's in 1941 in the respct
that mattered (if it's not turned on, it won't work, if you don't maintain
it, you can't turn it on); if you keep steaming toward the source of the
topedo planes, eventually they'll hit you (Repulse evaded a series of
attacks, until attacked from two directions at right angles simultaneously
- turning circle was not an issue); nothing about a ship's design affects
whether it radios for help, or whether the Air Force will deign to send it.
--
Peter Skelton
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
(B F Lake) wrote:
> What would they do about her freeboard with the extra armour? She
> was
> already low in water. Should be a good candidate for "girdling"
> with
> bulges?
Already had bulges, however the other changes like new machinery and
the modified armament was expected to reduce weight. Also the crushing
tubes in the bulge were to be removed and the free flooding spaces
refitted as fuel tanks.
Paul J. Adam
<dwe...@deltanet.com> writes
>"Paul J. Adam" <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:o$QuJGANr...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk...
>> board, have you? :) Iowa-class BBs would have laughed off that air
>> attack, saved Singapore, and gone on to shell all of Japan into a
>> barren lifeless desert.
>
>Two Iowa class BBs would have had a good chance of surviving that air
>attack, but I doubt that they would have "laughed it off."
They'd have been lost. Simple as that.
>One of the characteristics of the Iowas that makes me believe this is their
>extraordinary maneuverability. They can turn more sharply than a destroyer.
>The turning circle of an Iowa is about 1/3 that of Repulse.
Doesn't help much against the 'anvil' attacks the Japanese were
executing. However tightly you turn, you comb one set of tracks at
the expense of presenting your flank to the other, and the Iowas are
longer and thus likely to take as many or more hits.
>Another is their protection scheme which is infinitely superior to that of
>Repulse and far better than POW.
I'm not convinced about that: caisson testing suggested that the
theory of the underwater protective scheme wasn't reflected by its
performance in reality.
>The latter actually sank because of a
>weakness in the antitorpedo protection near the stern.
Fortunately, no Iowa-class BB had its underwater protective scheme
so thoroughly put to the test. In fact, none of them were ever hit by
significant enemy ordnance...
>A third is the devastating efficiency of their AA armament, which (1944
>vintage) was many times as effective as that of the British ships in 1941.
Radar-controlled, director-aimed guns? PoW had those too.
The Iowas might get the benefit of proximity fuses, but not in 1941.
Like-for-like...
>Still, there would have been hits and it is likely that the ships would
>have had to return to port for repairs after the action.
Provided they were still mobile. Of course, a mobility kill is very
soon "sunk", since you're an immobilised high-value target in range of
enemy land-based air: never a pleasant fate.
Yama
Dave Welsh wrote:
> One of the characteristics of the Iowas that makes me believe this is their
> extraordinary maneuverability. They can turn more sharply than a destroyer.
Yamato could also outturn destroyers. Didn't help.
> Another is their protection scheme which is infinitely superior to that of
> Repulse and far better than POW.
Protection scheme of Yamato was superior to that of Iowa. Didn't help.
Andrew McCruden
Dave Welsh wrote:
>
> One of the characteristics of the Iowas that makes me believe this is
their
> extraordinary maneuverability. They can turn more sharply than a
destroyer.
>
OTOH the destroyers in question were Fletcher's with their origional poor
rudder arangements , this problem was unique to the Fletcher class and later
was fixed. Hardly a representative comparison
oldsalt
shore bombardment role. They can do what is now done by
bomber aircraft, with incredible accuracy, and without
risking airplanes and their crews. I read a newspaper
article by a Marine colonel, written at the time our last
battleships were retired again. He was lamenting our
shortsightedness in not keeping the New Jersey, Iowa, et al
on active duty. There are internal political reasons the
Navy didn't fight harder to keep the battleships. For the
cost of operating one of the big BB's, you can operate
several smaller ships, giving more officers the chance to
command and punch their tickets for promotion. And of
course there are the brown shoe admirals who will fight
against anything that is not centered around an aircraft
carrier.
* Sent from RemarQ http://www.remarq.com The Internet's Discussion Network *
The fastest and easiest way to search and participate in Usenet - Free!
Nick Theodorakis
<tamolina...@juno.com.invalid> wrote:
> Battleships would still be immensely useful today in a
[...]
Here we go again ;-)
Nick
Keith Willshaw
oldsalt wrote in message <04d17460...@usw-ex0107-056.remarq.com>...
>Battleships would still be immensely useful today in a
>bomber aircraft, with incredible accuracy, and without
>risking airplanes and their crews.
Name ONE target in Kosovo or Serbia that could have
been hit by Battleships in the Shore Bombardment
role.
Explain how Battleships could have destroyed
the Iraqi Ministry of Defense in Baghdad
When you can do this we accept that Battleships
can accomplish what bombers do.
Keith
Glenn Dowdy
<176f8e61...@usw-ex0105-037.remarq.com>...
>
>[...]
>
>Here we go again ;-)
>
Paging Mr. Adam, paging Mr. Adam, white clue phone, please.
--
Glenn Dowdy
Larry G. Smith
tamolina...@juno.com.invalid wrote on 1/25/00 10:23 AM:
> Battleships would still be immensely useful today in a
> shore bombardment role.
Oh God, here we go again. Could someone please direct this gent to the
archives? 'Twould save an awful lot of bandwidth.
Michael
Keith (no, not that Keith)
Keith Willshaw wrote in message
>Explain how Battleships could have destroyed
>the Iraqi Ministry of Defense in Baghdad
>
With tomahawks <vbg>
--
K.B.
If they _are_ out to get you, are you still paranoid?
oldsalt
certainly targets a big naval gun can't reach. If we had
battleships we could save our planes for those. I don't
think the Iraqi adventure (no air opposition..in effect
kicking a cripple)is representative of a real war. Let the
planes bomb the aspirin factories and the Chinese Embassy.
As for Kosovo...I don't know what the hell that is are why
we think we should be there. I am more familiar with
Vietnam where I saw dozens of planes lost and aircrews
killed or captured bombing targets that could have been
pulverized in minutes by a few 16-inch salvos from a
battlewagon sitting offshore. I think the Marine colonel I
alluded to probably has a little more expertise than most
on this board, and he agrees with me. By the way, what is
your combat experience, sir?
Samuel Jahaza Howard
> certainly targets a big naval gun can't reach. If we had
> battleships we could save our planes for those. I don't
> think the Iraqi adventure (no air opposition..in effect
> kicking a cripple)is representative of a real war. Let the
> planes bomb the aspirin factories and the Chinese Embassy.
> As for Kosovo...I don't know what the hell that is are why
> we think we should be there. I am more familiar with
> Vietnam where I saw dozens of planes lost and aircrews
> killed or captured bombing targets that could have been
> pulverized in minutes by a few 16-inch salvos from a
> battlewagon sitting offshore.
Lets explain it this way. The military does not pick the missions. The
military goes where they are ordered to go. The issue of whether a war is
right or wrong or a "real war" is irrelevant, becuase either way, we have
to get the job done. If you are proposing limiting the armed forces so
that the pols will limit the missions you're crazy, that's no way to walk
softly and carry a big stick.
> I think the Marine colonel I
> alluded to probably has a little more expertise than most
> on this board, and he agrees with me. By the way, what is
> your combat experience, sir?
There are some people on this board with substantial military experience
as well as very good credentials in many of the other topics that
intersect with this topic. A military officer is called to be an expert
in many fields, and in that vien, we have experts in many fields on this
board. There are people here with sunstantial knowledge of shipbuilding,
science, law, fire management, the ins and outs of naval propulsion and a
plethora of other topics. Furthermore, many of them are dedicated
students of history, either by vocation or avocation.
For the technicalities of why the days of the BB are long gone, look at
the archives.
Sincerely,
Samuel J. Howard
Student
University of Rochester
History/International Relations
oldsalt
Jersey) was not brought out of mothballs until the mid-
seventies, as I recall. We were kicked out of Vietnam
earlier. As far as comparing the cost of shells vs
bombs...those lost airplanes are fairly expensive. And the
widows and orphans left by lost aircrew would probably feel
their lives had high value. They should be put in peril
only when there is no other equally effective way. To
truly appreciate the value of Navy gunfire against shore
targets you probably have to see it. And they are truly
accurate, in all kinds of weather. I served in the Navy's
last six-inch cruiser and took part in shore bombardments.
Our "little" six inchers turned any target we could reach
into rubble. Someone mentioned interdicting the Ho Chi
Minh trail...that was something we never succeeded in doing
from the air. We would spend a hundred thousand dollars
blasting a five hundred dollar bridge to
splinters...Charlie would rebuild it literally overnight. A
game he was quite happy to play, because he could keep it
up longer than we had the will to. Perhaps the ability of
aerial bombing to win a war is illustrated by the fact that
we bombed Vietnam more thoroughly than we bombed Germany in
WW2, but Saigon is now called Ho Chi Minh City. And I bet
Tu Do Street is nowhere near the fun it used to be! Just
an old tar chipping in his two cents worth. Interesting
discussion.
oldsalt
input in picking the missions, at least when the brass have
the moral courage to perform their function of telling the
militarily clueless civilian leadership what is feasible
and what isn't, and what the best way of achieving an
objective is. We have too many generals and admirals,
unfortunately, who don't have the fortitude to risk their
promotion chances by telling the boss something he doesn't
want to hear. There are no technical reasons why the Iowa
class BB's, or better yet, the aborted Montana class, are
not serving very usefully today. They were the victims of
several factors. Not the least of which was the rush to
gut the military following the collapse of the USSR. Those
dollars buy more votes spent on entitlement programs.
Also, the internal politics I mentioned in my first post
are very real indeed.
Keith Willshaw
Keith (no, not that Keith) wrote in message
<7qpj4.94622$n3.18...@news0.telusplanet.net>...
>
>
>Keith Willshaw wrote in message
>
>>Explain how Battleships could have destroyed
>>the Iraqi Ministry of Defense in Baghdad
>>
>
>With tomahawks <vbg>
>
>--
>K.B.
>
Nope - no more ABL's
Keith
Keith Willshaw
oldsalt wrote in message <02562dce...@usw-ex0103-020.remarq.com>...
>I don't think I said air power is unnecessary, there are
>certainly targets a big naval gun can't reach. If we had
>battleships we could save our planes for those. I don't
>think the Iraqi adventure (no air opposition..in effect
>kicking a cripple)is representative of a real war. Let the
>planes bomb the aspirin factories and the Chinese Embassy.
>As for Kosovo...I don't know what the hell that is are why
>we think we should be there. I am more familiar with
>Vietnam where I saw dozens of planes lost and aircrews
>killed or captured bombing targets that could have been
>pulverized in minutes by a few 16-inch salvos from a
>alluded to probably has a little more expertise than most
>on this board, and he agrees with me. By the way, what is
>your combat experience, sir?
>
>
Get real
How could a BB interdict the Ho-Chi-Minh Trail ?
or provide Fire Support to Marines at Khe Sanh ?
99.9% of Vietnam was OUT OF RANGE of those guns
Jeez what a bonehead
Keith
Paul J. Adam
>Battleships would still be immensely useful today in a
>shore bombardment role.
Why? Each shell costs ten times as much as a 2000lb bomb, yet carries
only a sixth of the payload and can be thrown only 23 miles.
> They can do what is now done by
>bomber aircraft, with incredible accuracy, and without
>risking airplanes and their crews.
Instead they throw poorly-designed (for artillery work) shells a short
distance, dragging 1,500 sailors into the teeth of enemy shore
defences.
Battleship shells and guns are designed for a single purpose - attacking
other battleships. They are not particularly effective in other roles,
enthusiastic propaganda to the contrary.
>I read a newspaper
>article by a Marine colonel, written at the time our last
>battleships were retired again. He was lamenting our
>shortsightedness in not keeping the New Jersey, Iowa, et al
>on active duty.
I just read an article in Proceedings by a Marine colonel who said that
the USMC should scrap all its jet aircraft and fly Grumman F7F
Tigercats.
Argentina tried that in the Falklands and her Pucaras got blasted out
of the sky.
Ideas are like a certain anterior orifice: everybody's got one.
>There are internal political reasons the
>Navy didn't fight harder to keep the battleships. For the
>cost of operating one of the big BB's, you can operate
>several smaller ships, giving more officers the chance to
>command and punch their tickets for promotion.
Or, you can have several smaller ships, meaning you can fulfil more
missions.
>And of
>course there are the brown shoe admirals who will fight
>against anything that is not centered around an aircraft
>carrier.
Just like the "Gun Club" used to oppose anything that threatened the
primacy of the battle line.
The sad fact is, the _only_ mission battleships can fulfil now is
bombardment, and they're sorely limited and very expensive for that
role.
If you need 16" guns so badly, then build a dozen monitors using the
turrets from the Iowas.
Paul J. Adam
<glenn...@agilent.com> writes
>Paging Mr. Adam, paging Mr. Adam, white clue phone, please.
"No, the _white_ clue phone."
Paul J. Adam
<tamolina...@juno.com.invalid> writes
>I am more familiar with
>Vietnam where I saw dozens of planes lost and aircrews
>killed or captured bombing targets that could have been
>pulverized in minutes by a few 16-inch salvos from a
>battlewagon sitting offshore.
Then why weren't they pulverised? The BB was there...
The problem with Vietnam is that artificial and restrictive ROE were
imposed on all air and naval-gunfire platforms. Had aircraft been
allowed to hit SAM sites and MiG bases for much of the war then
losses would have been lower, for instance.
>I think the Marine colonel I
>alluded to probably has a little more expertise than most
>on this board, and he agrees with me.
So the US Navy and USMC should scrap all their expensive and
wasteful jets and fly nothing more advanced than Tigercats? A USMC
colonel advocated that, and he's got more experience in the cockpit
than you or I.
>By the way, what is
>your combat experience, sir?
No actual combat (a couple of live-fire exercises, though). Trained by
veterans of the Falklands and of Northern Ireland and of Oman. Work
with many Falklands veterans to this day.
Peter Skelton
>I believe you may be in error. The first battleship (New
>Jersey) was not brought out of mothballs until the mid-
>seventies, as I recall. We were kicked out of Vietnam
>earlier.
Battleship(s?) were brought out of retirement for Viet Nam. They were then
returned to mothballs and reactivated during Reagan's presidency.
As far as comparing the cost of shells vs
>bombs...those lost airplanes are fairly expensive. And the
>widows and orphans left by lost aircrew would probably feel
>their lives had high value. They should be put in peril
>only when there is no other equally effective way.
Sailors are people too. Mines are probably cheaper than SAM defenses.
To
>truly appreciate the value of Navy gunfire against shore
>targets you probably have to see it. And they are truly
>accurate, in all kinds of weather. I served in the Navy's
>last six-inch cruiser and took part in shore bombardments.
>Our "little" six inchers turned any target we could reach
>into rubble.
The RN studies of NGFS in early WWII indicated that 6" cruisers were better
than battleships for this sort of thing. That did not keep them from
building two 15" monitors, but it may have had some effect on the Lion
cancellations.
At Dieppe, the support of a single cruiser made an important difference.
There were destroyers present, but they do not seem to have contributed.
Later experience showed that destroyers were even more useful than cruisers
in this role, and that modified landing craft that could get well inshore
had their place as well. By D-Day the RN had serviceable battleships tied
up so that their crews could man smaller ships.
By 1944, in the Pacific, more battleships were available than anybody knew
what to do with. (The USN had to allow the RN to bring in a few (King
George V actually got to Tokyo Bay first but had to leave for the
signing.)) but, in fact, they seem to have been kept around mostly because
of the fear that American industry might ease up if the workers considered
the war won.
>Someone mentioned interdicting the Ho Chi
>Minh trail...that was something we never succeeded in doing
>from the air. We would spend a hundred thousand dollars
>blasting a five hundred dollar bridge to
>splinters...Charlie would rebuild it literally overnight. A
>game he was quite happy to play, because he could keep it
>up longer than we had the will to. Perhaps the ability of
>aerial bombing to win a war is illustrated by the fact that
>we bombed Vietnam more thoroughly than we bombed Germany in
>WW2, but Saigon is now called Ho Chi Minh City. And I bet
>Tu Do Street is nowhere near the fun it used to be! Just
>an old tar chipping in his two cents worth. Interesting
>discussion.
--
Peter Skelton
Samuel Jahaza Howard
> last six-inch cruiser and took part in shore bombardments.
> Our "little" six inchers turned any target we could reach
> into rubble.
We're not debating the value of NGFS, merely the ablilty of a BB to
adequetly perform in that role. Cruisers and DD's do it better and
cheaper and safer. Like the one that you were on. The arguement for NGFS
is not a sufficient arguement for the BB's
Sincerely,
Samuel J. Howard
Samuel Jahaza Howard
> input in picking the missions, at least when the brass have
> the moral courage to perform their function of telling the
> militarily clueless civilian leadership what is feasible
> and what isn't, and what the best way of achieving an
> objective is.
That's my point. Sometimes the circumstances demand a certain response.
It is the military's duty that all forseeable possibilities are planed and
prepared for so that when there's a meltdown and a mission must be done
the brass can say, "Aye-Aye Sir", not "We can't do that, sir." Obviously
some things are entirely unfeasable, but that is only with current
technology.
We have too many generals and admirals,
> unfortunately, who don't have the fortitude to risk their
> promotion chances by telling the boss something he doesn't
> want to hear. There are no technical reasons why the Iowa
> class BB's, or better yet, the aborted Montana class, are
> not serving very usefully today.
1. They are lousy at NGFS.
2. They are very expensive to maintain.
3. They are falling apart.
4. They don't exist in sufficient numbers. 2 BB's means only one out at
sea at a time, and it sometimes none. This point was comicly made the
following way by someone else on the group: The Marine LT is sitting on a
beach in the Gulf and radios, "Need immediate NGFS" the Navy radios back,
"You can have ship x in two weeks when it gets here from the Pacific, or
you can have ship y in 2 years when it finishes overhaul and workups, how
immediatley do you need that arty?"
5. They are extremly veunerable to modern weapons.
Sincerely,
Samuel J. Howard
Richard Martin
"Keith (no, not that Keith)" wrote:
>
> Keith Willshaw wrote in message
>
> >Explain how Battleships could have destroyed
> >the Iraqi Ministry of Defense in Baghdad
> >
>
> With tomahawks <vbg>
>
> --
> K.B.
>
> If they _are_ out to get you, are you still paranoid?
Execellent point.
--
Richard Martin
I think, therefor I am, therefor I must be... Still here
Keith WIllshaw
Richard Martin <as...@gci.net> wrote in message
news:388EC6E7...@gci.net...
>
>
>
> Execellent point.
>
> --
> Richard Martin
Not really. The BB only makes for a more expensive and
vulnerable launcher
The Tomahawk could have been launched of the deck
of a Destroyer at a fraction of the cost and without needing
Another Destroyer to escort it.
Keith
Keith WIllshaw
oldsalt <tamolina...@juno.com.invalid> wrote in message
news:37fa504d...@usw-ex0107-056.remarq.com...
> In the real world the military certainly does have a large
> input in picking the missions, at least when the brass have
> the moral courage to perform their function of telling the
> militarily clueless civilian leadership what is feasible
> and what isn't, and what the best way of achieving an
> unfortunately, who don't have the fortitude to risk their
> promotion chances by telling the boss something he doesn't
> want to hear. There are no technical reasons why the Iowa
> class BB's, or better yet, the aborted Montana class, are
> not serving very usefully today.
Yes there are
Experience in WW2 showed them to be vulnerable to a
whole range of Air Launched and Submarine Launched
Weapons. Since they lack the abilities for self defense
implemented in todays Cruisers and Destryers they
are by definition OBSOLETE and second rate
weapons systems.
>They were the victims of
> several factors. Not the least of which was the rush to
> gut the military following the collapse of the USSR. Those
> dollars buy more votes spent on entitlement programs.
> Also, the internal politics I mentioned in my first post
> are very real indeed.
The Montanas were never completed - What does that
tell you ?
Keith
Keith (no, not that Keith)
Keith WIllshaw wrote in message
<86mv6f$nlr$1...@ssauraab-i-1.production.compuserve.com>...
Agreed. Without Tomahawks, the 16" guns are insufficient. With Tomahawks,
why put that capability on such a big platform which can't defend itself?
Paul J. Adam
<tamolina...@juno.com.invalid> writes
>I believe you may be in error. The first battleship (New
>Jersey) was not brought out of mothballs until the mid-
>seventies, as I recall.
Nope - she was reactivated in 1968 and deployed to Vietnam for 120
days.
>As far as comparing the cost of shells vs
>bombs...those lost airplanes are fairly expensive. And the
>widows and orphans left by lost aircrew would probably feel
>their lives had high value. They should be put in peril
>only when there is no other equally effective way.
How about dragging 1,500 sailors into the sights of everything from
shore artillery to antiship missiles to minefields? Or don't sailors' lives
count for anything?
>To
>truly appreciate the value of Navy gunfire against shore
>targets you probably have to see it. And they are truly
>accurate, in all kinds of weather.
Yeah, a CEP of about 150 metres and able to get most of the shells
within 250m of the target... this, shooting for score on a range.
>I served in the Navy's
>last six-inch cruiser and took part in shore bombardments.
>Our "little" six inchers turned any target we could reach
>into rubble.
And a light cruiser with a large battery of quick-firing six-inch guns is
a _much_ better NGFS platform than a battleship.
oldsalt
socks than you have ever sailed over, lad. You have read
the books written by the armchair admirals. Perhaps those
of us who have sailed into harm's way and smelled the smoke
of guns fired in battle can add a little to your knowledge
too. Unless it is a case of, "My mind is made up. Don't
confuse me with facts"?
Keith Willshaw
oldsalt wrote in message <07efa1ad...@usw-ex0107-051.remarq.com>...
>Bonehead? I suspect I have wrung more salt water out of my
>socks than you have ever sailed over, lad. You have read
>the books written by the armchair admirals. Perhaps those
>of us who have sailed into harm's way and smelled the smoke
>of guns fired in battle can add a little to your knowledge
>too. Unless it is a case of, "My mind is made up. Don't
>confuse me with facts"?
>
>
Naw he just tests weapons that are VERY good at
sinking Battleships. While knowing that the BB will
never even know they are in his sights
Can you say sitting duck ?
Keith
Greg Yantz
> Bonehead? I suspect I have wrung more salt water out of my
> socks than you have ever sailed over, lad.
Possible, but not relevent. Have you ever been *in* the water,
after being torpedoed? I have one of those in my family, and we
don't automatically take his every word as gospel, because he
was there.
> You have read
> the books written by the armchair admirals. Perhaps those
> of us who have sailed into harm's way and smelled the smoke
> of guns fired in battle can add a little to your knowledge
> too.
If you offer facts, sure. Otherwise it's all just an old
sea story.
> Unless it is a case of, "My mind is made up. Don't
> confuse me with facts"?
That's always good, to listen to the facts. Only problem is, the
facts you've offered have been wrong, innacurate, false. I don't
know how else to say it...
-Greg
Glenn Dowdy
>the books written by the armchair admirals. Perhaps those
>of us who have sailed into harm's way and smelled the smoke
>of guns fired in battle can add a little to your knowledge
>confuse me with facts"?
>
Maybe bonehead is a bit hasty. How about, "We've had this discussion ad
infinitum, ad nauseum about every two months for a long time now". Most of
those who have proposed the recommissioning of the BBs don't possess your
experience; they're mostly young boneheads with no clue, so you'll have to
forgive us if when you show up with the same claims if we tar you with the
same brush.
Do yourself and us a favor. Do a Dejanews search on this group, "battleship"
or "BB" and author Paul J.
Adam. He's not the only person who has presented to un-BB side, but he's
done it so often and captured all of the pertinent details often enough that
it will make your search easier.
Even if you refuse to accept our arguments against the use of BBs in today's
environment, you'll still be a welcome contributor. Hell, we even allow gin
drinkers, so obviously our standards aren't _too_ high.
--
Glenn Dowdy
Nik Simpson
"Joseph Chase" <jch...@neo.rr.com> wrote in message
news:388F8B42...@neo.rr.com...
>
>
> Had aircraft never reached the level of weapon delivery, the
> battleship would still have disppeared once gun battles reached beyond
> the "pointblank" range.
>
Why, the platform for carrying those big guns would have been Battleships,
maybe different from WW1, but still direct evolutionary descendants of those
ships.
--
Nik Simpson
George Herbert
>1. They are lousy at NGFS.
Not proven. They are demonstrably better at NGFS than single-5"-gun
destroyers are on a hull by hull basis, and probably than significant
numbers thereof. Whether they are truly optimal for the NGFS mission
is another issue. No current Navy hull was designed with much thought
or effort into NGFS, so the real analysis would be, if we're serious
about NGFS, comparing BBs versus purpose built multi-tube NGFS ships
tough enough to come inshore and/or versus the BatShell project.
>2. They are very expensive to maintain.
>3. They are falling apart.
>4. They don't exist in sufficient numbers. 2 BB's means only one out at
>sea at a time, and it sometimes none. This point was comicly made the
>following way by someone else on the group: The Marine LT is sitting on a
>beach in the Gulf and radios, "Need immediate NGFS" the Navy radios back,
>"You can have ship x in two weeks when it gets here from the Pacific, or
>you can have ship y in 2 years when it finishes overhaul and workups, how
>immediatley do you need that arty?"
All quite true.
>5. They are extremly veunerable to modern weapons.
Now, wait a minute. You're trying to tell me that a 50 plus thousand
ton many many inch thick armor belt, layered protection system battleship
is more vulnerable to modern weapons than thin skinned modern warships
with a bit of kevlar over a few key spaces?
Look, people. There are plenty of perfectly valid reasons to question
the BBs theoretical return to service. You have just named some of them
above, and there are others. I am certainly not going to sit here and
try and defend the article which started this ruckus... it has some
quite glaring flaws, though I have a fond place in my heart for large
caliber extended range sabot rounds. Battleship worship is another way
to avoid really thinking about NGFS user needs, navy near and far term
capabilities, and how to match the two sensibly and economically.
I do not personally think that the BatShell project is the right solution,
nor that the Battleships are. If we had any 8" cruisers left that might
sort of look like a solution, but I think they've all been turned into
razors and Fords.
But throwing humdingers like "Battleships are extremely vulnerable
to modern weapons" is going overboard. Give the group a break.
Fire a pair of Sunburns into any USN warship and it's going to
hurt, be it Battleship or Carrier or Destroyer. A DD, and we'll
be picking pieces off the bottom. The Carrier and BB will be hurt
and possibly not functional, but they're not going to be on the bottom
unless they're damn unlucky. Fire 20 CS-801 missiles into DD squadron
or a BB, and see what the relative damage absorbtion capabilities are.
Sunburns are high end of the threat envelope: a lot more threats out
there, and most likely typical hits on NGFS platforms, will be a lot
smaller than that. Coastal artillery, light and medium antiship
missiles, which a BB is relatively tolerant of hits from.
-george william herbert
gher...@crl.com
Joseph Chase
BEFORE missiles and aircraft? It seems to me that the improvements in
long-range gunnery between 1900 and WWI already had rendered the
battleship terribly vulnerable, by circumventing its massive armour
belts with "plunging fire". This is a classic piece of the eternal
battle between weapon and armour- the deck can't be made impervious
without colossal weight penalty, therefore the invulnerability of the
battleship was gone.
Perhaps Jackie Fisher was right with his Battlecruisers- as with
most modern ships, their defence was to disable the enemy before being
disabled, or to escape from the range of combat.
Keith (no, not that Keith)
Joseph Chase wrote in message
It seems to me that the improvements in
>long-range gunnery between 1900 and WWI already had rendered the
>battleship terribly vulnerable, by circumventing its massive armour
>belts with "plunging fire". This is a classic piece of the eternal
>battle between weapon and armour- the deck can't be made impervious
>without colossal weight penalty, therefore the invulnerability of the
>battleship was gone.
>
But it was still possible to build treaty BB's in the 1930's that had an
"invulnerable range". This was basically done by adopting "all or nothing"
protection. See Garzke and Dulin.
The difficulty in sinking those BB's _by shellfire_ was amply demonstrated
by Bismarck and Scharnhorst.
The number of torpedo hits the Yamato and Mushashi took was also very high.
Although the armour battle was technologically lost, the ability to take
punishment was still possible to design in the 1930's.
Andrew McCruden
George Herbert wrote in message <86olht$s...@crl3.crl.com>...
>Samuel Jahaza Howard <sh0...@mail.rochester.edu> wrote:
>>1. They are lousy at NGFS.
>
>Not proven. They are demonstrably better at NGFS than single-5"-gun
>destroyers are on a hull by hull basis, and probably than significant
>numbers thereof. Whether they are truly optimal for the NGFS mission
>is another issue. No current Navy hull was designed with much thought
>or effort into NGFS, so the real analysis would be, if we're serious
>about NGFS, comparing BBs versus purpose built multi-tube NGFS ships
>tough enough to come inshore and/or versus the BatShell project.
Actaully it has been proven, in WWII, they are signifiantly better at
materiel destruction with gunfire than a single tube DD, but i chanlenge
anyone to come up with proof that the overpowered,inacurate,slow firing
16"/50's is any real use for the SUPPORT role
>
>>2. They are very expensive to maintain.
>>3. They are falling apart.
>>4. They don't exist in sufficient numbers. 2 BB's means only one out at
>>sea at a time, and it sometimes none. This point was comicly made the
>>following way by someone else on the group: The Marine LT is sitting on a
>>beach in the Gulf and radios, "Need immediate NGFS" the Navy radios back,
>>"You can have ship x in two weeks when it gets here from the Pacific, or
>>you can have ship y in 2 years when it finishes overhaul and workups, how
>>immediatley do you need that arty?"
>
>All quite true.
>
>>5. They are extremly veunerable to modern weapons.
>
>Now, wait a minute. You're trying to tell me that a 50 plus thousand
>ton many many inch thick armor belt, layered protection system battleship
>is more vulnerable to modern weapons than thin skinned modern warships
>with a bit of kevlar over a few key spaces?
The Iowas belt doesn't cover the entire ship, only about a 3rd of the ship,
and is useless agaist torpedo's the only way to defend from ASM's is to
knock em down befor they hit you, and the only way to Defend agaist subs is
ASW, the Iowa's can do neither, your average ASM is very likely to hit the
superstructure, where the armour belt of the Iowa won't help
>
>Look, people. There are plenty of perfectly valid reasons to question
>the BBs theoretical return to service. You have just named some of them
>above, and there are others. I am certainly not going to sit here and
>try and defend the article which started this ruckus... it has some
>quite glaring flaws, though I have a fond place in my heart for large
>caliber extended range sabot rounds.
>Battleship worship is another way
>to avoid really thinking about NGFS user needs, navy near and far term
>capabilities, and how to match the two sensibly and economically.
>I do not personally think that the BatShell project is the right solution,
>nor that the Battleships are. If we had any 8" cruisers left that might
>sort of look like a solution, but I think they've all been turned into
>razors and Fords.
Actaully i think that 6" Cuisers might be better but otherwise all true
>
>But throwing humdingers like "Battleships are extremely vulnerable
>to modern weapons" is going overboard. Give the group a break.
>Fire a pair of Sunburns into any USN warship and it's going to
>hurt, be it Battleship or Carrier or Destroyer. A DD, and we'll
>be picking pieces off the bottom. The Carrier and BB will be hurt
>and possibly not functional, but they're not going to be on the bottom
>unless they're damn unlucky. Fire 20 CS-801 missiles into DD squadron
>or a BB, and see what the relative damage absorbtion capabilities are.
>Sunburns are high end of the threat envelope:
Yes but if you change "Into" to "AT" then you get a MUCH more valid question
and if a BB has by 20 CS-801's shot at it the armour WILL hold, but it'll be
sitting on the bottom after the ships been sunk by the fire started when 17
or 18 of those missiles hits the superstructure and trashes it, on the other
hand Fire 20 CS-801's at 6 Modern DD's (lets assume 3 DDG-51's and 3
DD-963's) and there is a good chance that at least 5 will survive and a
resonable chance that none of them will actually be hit
>a lot more threats out
>there, and most likely typical hits on NGFS platforms, will be a lot
>smaller than that. Coastal artillery, light and medium antiship
>missiles, which a BB is relatively tolerant of hits from.
>
I'll give you the Coastal Arty, but then thats why the long range on ERGM,
as for Missiles i remeber reading that an Excoet WILL go through an Iowas
main belt, although its warhead will be trashed(unfit to detonate),
historically when Excoets have hit theres been a large ammount of Rocket
feul left in e'm which contined to burn, in some cases doing more damage
than the warhead itself and an Exocet is fairly small as ASM's go (not
counting dedicated FAC Plickers like AS15TT and Sea Skua), Fire sinks ships
a rocket exausyting inside you hull is going to start a VERY hot fire. OH
and you forgot Dumb bombs, whcih BB's (including ones better protected than
an Iowa) have historically proven to NOT be "relatively tolerant of hits
from"
Kerryn Offord
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:
>
> In article <026faffc...@usw-ex0105-039.remarq.com>, oldsalt
> <tamolina...@juno.com.invalid> writes
<SNIP>
> >To
> >truly appreciate the value of Navy gunfire against shore
> >targets you probably have to see it. And they are truly
> >accurate, in all kinds of weather.
>
> Yeah, a CEP of about 150 metres and able to get most of the shells
> within 250m of the target... this, shooting for score on a range.
>
This compares with CEP of around 140-150 ft achieved in training by US
Navy aviators using TA-4 and training bombs (25 lbers)
Jason Larke
>>>>> (George Herbert) said:
GH> Now, wait a minute. You're trying to tell me that a 50 plus
GH> thousand ton many many inch thick armor belt, layered
GH> protection system battleship is more vulnerable to modern
GH> weapons than thin skinned modern warships with a bit of
GH> kevlar over a few key spaces?
No viable warship design can absorb a hit from a
Sunburn. Therefore, ships must be built with the ability to stop
the Sunburn before it hits. Most newer ships have some capability
in this range; the BB doesn't.
GH> Sunburns are high end of the threat envelope: a lot more
GH> threats out there, and most likely typical hits on NGFS
GH> platforms, will be a lot smaller than that. Coastal
GH> artillery, light and medium antiship missiles, which a BB is
GH> relatively tolerant of hits from.
Even coastal artillery can wipe out the un-armorable sensors on a
ship, leaving it easy meat for missile fire and whatnot. I think-
as the Navy seems to- that the only viable approach is to stay
way the hell away from the beach.
--
Jason Larke- jla...@uu.net- http://www.nnaf.net/~jlarke Send mail for PGP key
I don't speak for UUNET or MCI Worldcom. I speak for Odin. And he's *pissed*.
"The Rock can't say I quit, because the Rock only talks in the third person."
"People change, and smile: but the agony abides."-T.S. Eliot, The Dry Salvages
Keith WIllshaw
George Herbert <gher...@crl3.crl.com> wrote in message
news:86olht$s...@crl3.crl.com...
> Samuel Jahaza Howard <sh0...@mail.rochester.edu> wrote:
> >1. They are lousy at NGFS.
>
> Not proven. They are demonstrably better at NGFS than single-5"-gun
> destroyers are on a hull by hull basis, and probably than significant
> numbers thereof. Whether they are truly optimal for the NGFS mission
> is another issue. No current Navy hull was designed with much thought
> or effort into NGFS, so the real analysis would be, if we're serious
> about NGFS, comparing BBs versus purpose built multi-tube NGFS ships
> tough enough to come inshore and/or versus the BatShell project.
>
Please note that BB's were not designed for NGFS and that
historically hard pressed troops on Omaha Beach received more
efffective fire support from the 5" Guns on the Destroyers
than the BB big guns
The weapons systems under development for NGFS do
NOT require the platform to come close inshore
>
> Now, wait a minute. You're trying to tell me that a 50 plus thousand
> ton many many inch thick armor belt, layered protection system battleship
> is more vulnerable to modern weapons than thin skinned modern warships
> with a bit of kevlar over a few key spaces?
>
Yes - When a Silkworm was launched at an IOWA Class
BB in the Persian Gulf that Missile was shot down
by the Destroyer escorting it.
Thus the destroyer proved to be more capable
of dealing with modern weapons than the BB
A second example would be the realtive vulnerability of the BB
to submarine attack. With no Sonar Dome or organic ASW
helos the only way a BB has of knowing a Kilo is in
the Area is the bang when the torpedo hits.
>
> But throwing humdingers like "Battleships are extremely vulnerable
> to modern weapons" is going overboard. Give the group a break.
> Fire a pair of Sunburns into any USN warship and it's going to
> hurt, be it Battleship or Carrier or Destroyer.
However the neither the Carrier nor the DD with ERGM need to close
to within range of the Sunburn Launcher to use their weapons
system hence the BB is more at risk
Keith
oldsalt
spotter they are superbly accurate. However, there is more
to it than that. There is a pyschological factor. The
sound of a 16-inch shell passing over your head is
literally terrorizing. A bowel stimulant. Talk about your
big sticks...but they don't have to be that accurate.
Despite propaganda, missile shots are not as accurate as
most people think. The one that missed the enemy bunker
and plowed into the residential neighborhood is never shown
on the evening news, and is vigourously denied if reported.
We had air to air missiles on my cruiser (USS Oklahoma
City) also. I have seen them turn around and pass between
our stacks to hit the water on the wrong side of the ship.
Happens too quickly to hit the self-destruct button. You
cross your fingers and launch another. Your point (2)
Yep. So are carriers and airgroups. Your (3). Not
really. A warship is good for about 30 years. The Iowas
have at most ten years on them. A bigger concern is
obaining spare parts that are no longer made or
stockpiled. That problem can be handled. Your point
(4)...build some more. Point (5), Much less so than a
carrier, cruiser, or DD. Those sitting ducks Mitchell
bombed were not zig zagging at thirty knots, had no crew
aboard to repair damage as it occured, and were not
shooting back. I do not propose BB's to replace carrier
battle groups for EVERY mission, that would be stupid. But
I am convinced that some jobs they can do as well or
better, (supporing amphibious landings, for one). Let's
risk those expensive airplanes and human aircrew lives when
there is no better way. And the big gun platforms have and
still can provide that better way. My opinion.
Keith WIllshaw
oldsalt <tamolina...@juno.com.invalid> wrote in message
> Your point (1): With a trained and practiced crew and
> spotter they are superbly accurate. However, there is more
> to it than that. There is a pyschological factor. The
> sound of a 16-inch shell passing over your head is
> literally terrorizing. A bowel stimulant. Talk about your
> big sticks...but they don't have to be that accurate.
The CEP and danger zone preclude their use for close fire support
The pyschological factor did not stop the Japanese on Tarawa
from massacring the incoming marines
Given a choice between accurate effective fire and inaccurate
fire thats makes a really big bang I,ll take the accurate effective fire
> Despite propaganda, missile shots are not as accurate as
> most people think. The one that missed the enemy bunker
> and plowed into the residential neighborhood is never shown
> on the evening news, and is vigourously denied if reported.
> We had air to air missiles on my cruiser (USS Oklahoma
> City) also. I have seen them turn around and pass between
> our stacks to hit the water on the wrong side of the ship.
> Happens too quickly to hit the self-destruct button. You
> cross your fingers and launch another.
16" Guns miss a lot more however. Look up the CEP
for the weapons systems involved
> Your point (2)
> Yep. So are carriers and airgroups. Your (3). Not
> really. A warship is good for about 30 years. The Iowas
> have at most ten years on them. A bigger concern is
> obaining spare parts that are no longer made or
> stockpiled. That problem can be handled. Your point
> (4)...build some more. Point (5), Much less so than a
> carrier, cruiser, or DD. Those sitting ducks Mitchell
> bombed were not zig zagging at thirty knots, had no crew
> aboard to repair damage as it occured, and were not
> shooting back.
You wont be steaming and zigzagging at 30 knots while
carrying out a shoot
The Yamato, Mushasi,Prince of Wales, Repulse, Barham,
Roma and Warspite were all underway with full crews.
and yet they were hit by planes that are MUCH
less capable than those in service today
Hell Bismark was crippled by Biplanes flying slower
than most of todays Helicopters
> I do not propose BB's to replace carrier
> battle groups for EVERY mission, that would be stupid. But
> I am convinced that some jobs they can do as well or
> better, (supporing amphibious landings, for one). Let's
> risk those expensive airplanes and human aircrew lives when
> there is no better way. And the big gun platforms have and
> still can provide that better way. My opinion.
>
How many targets in Kosovo or Serbia could the BB main
Guns have engaged : Answer NONE
Keith
Peter McLelland
Kerryn Offord wrote
>This compares with CEP of around 140-150 ft achieved in training by US
>Navy aviators using TA-4 and training bombs (25 lbers)
I wonder how good their CEP is when they are flying their F18s against
previously unseen targets, especially when the unsporting target fires back?
Peter
Keith (no, not that Keith)
George Herbert wrote in message
>Now, wait a minute. You're trying to tell me that a 50 plus thousand
>ton many many inch thick armor belt, layered protection system battleship
>is more vulnerable to modern weapons than thin skinned modern warships
>with a bit of kevlar over a few key spaces?
>
The vulnerability of BB's to a) guided weapons (Fritz-X) and b) torpedoes
was amply proven by a) Roma & Warspite and b) Yamato & Mushashi (which had a
good, although it could have been improved, torpedo protection system).
These examples are hardly representative of current weapon systems - but the
ships named (except Warspite, which was reconstructed) are roughly
contemporary with the Iowa's.
feersum_drd_not
Keith WIllshaw wrote in message
>
>oldsalt <tamolina...@juno.com.invalid> wrote in message
>news:1415c574...@usw-ex0107-056.remarq.com...
<snip>
>How many targets in Kosovo or Serbia could the BB main
>Guns have engaged : Answer NONE
>
>Keith
>
Hey Keith, I've got a better question. How many targets in Kosovo or Serbia
should have been engaged by any NATO assets in that illegal, undeclared, wag
the dog "war"? Answer: NONE.
Right argument, wrong example.
- BRT
John Lansford
>I'll give you the Coastal Arty, but then thats why the long range on ERGM,
>as for Missiles i remeber reading that an Excoet WILL go through an Iowas
>main belt, although its warhead will be trashed(unfit to detonate),
I find that hard to believe. An Exocet isn't designed for heavy
penetration of a ship's hull, so trying to smash through 12" of armor
plating sounds like an impossibility for a missile like Exocet.
The Germans have a SSM (Kormoran?) that actually penetrates the outer
hull of a ship before exploding, and the explosion fragments the
casing into large chunks which have more kinetic energy, but I don't
think the Exocet has anything but a warhead.
John Lansford
The unofficial I-26 Construction Webpage:
http://users.vnet.net/lansford/a10/
Olivers
> And the big gun platforms have and
> still can provide that better way. My opinion.
>
Yes, Old Salt, and that's the problem, your opinion having been
desperately flawed by the nature and extent of your former service. The
OKC was a desperate attempt by the Navy to wring a bit more service and
some progress in the art from an existing hull, money for
conversion/operations of ships better replaced by new hulls, but
steaming on for another generation, nearly useless hulks fit only for
carrying a staff.
As for BBs (and this from one with substantial sea and service time,
much of it up on the bridge where such matters are discussed), the Navy
didn't want them in 1955, didn't want them in Viet Nam (but took one
because the money was offered and available), only took them in the 80s
as a quick way to Mr. Reagan's 600 ship navy and a great disinformation
tool in the BBBattle Group scam against the Soviets, utilized one in the
Gulf war because it was crewed and available (with Tomahawk tubes to
impress the media and the possibility of scamming the Iraqis that we
might be stupid enough to land on a beach), and at no level above
Pentagon janitor or Marine COL (equivalent intellectual capacities) want
any now or in the future, 16" NGFS having always been a at best a
snowjob of immortal description, especially in a world in which we're
desperately unequipped to make an opposed "cross- beach" amphibious
landing of greater than battalion strength. Besides, os, all those BFH
("Big Fucking Holes") in the ground vastly impair the potential mobility
of US troops.
Two little bits (non-USN) reading for you to achieve better
appreciation...
The quaint tale of BB-fire support in the Italian campaign in Walter
Cronkhite's memoirs.
The equally informative story of the bombardment of Shure (?) Castle on
Okinawa and the problems which all the BFH created (just as the post
DDay bombardment by gun and air of Caen made a serious obstacle even
more difficult to move through).
I do know an admiral or two, none of whom got there in armchairs. Not a
single one of them ever mentioned wanting a damn BB and none do so now.
Basically, with all good intentions, you're as full of shit as a
Christmas turkey (to borrow a nautical phrase from past sea duty, of
which I've more than a bit). You really don't want to get into a
qualification-comparison game with me or with a couple of others who
post here. Come to think of it, I just noticed that my OOD(UW) letter
dates from 15NOV63 and my DOR as a LCDR was 1JAN70 which makes me senior
to everybody but Sir Francid Fuckin' Drake!
Run that up your halyard and two block it!
--
TMOliver
"Without occasional excess,
Moderation remains impossible."
Glenn Dowdy
>Samuel Jahaza Howard <sh0...@mail.rochester.edu> wrote:
>
>>5. They are extremly veunerable to modern weapons.
>
>Now, wait a minute. You're trying to tell me that a 50 plus thousand
>ton many many inch thick armor belt, layered protection system battleship
>is more vulnerable to modern weapons than thin skinned modern warships
>with a bit of kevlar over a few key spaces?
>
Two words: mission kill. The weight not used for armor is used for systems
to prevent being hit. If either the BB or TSMWWABOK are hit, the mission
fails. The BB will get hit.
--
Glenn Dowdy
"You really need to urgently learn the lesson that
civilised debate demands that you recognise that
others may sincerely hold opinions contrary to your own."
Keith Willshaw
oldsalt
nearly new aircraft carriers, cruisers, DD's, submarines
etc were mothballed at that time too. I don't think they
were all obsolete...
Keith WIllshaw
oldsalt <tamolina...@juno.com.invalid> wrote in message
> It tells me that the war ended. Hundreds of perfectly good
> nearly new aircraft carriers, cruisers, DD's, submarines
> etc were mothballed at that time too. I don't think they
> were all obsolete...
The Navy did - It suspended construction in 1942 and
Cancelled them in 1943. Not exactly the end of the war
now was it
The RN cancelled the LION's for the same reason.
They also laid up many of the current BB's
already in service before War's end
The BB was no longer Queen of the seas
Aircraft could and did kill them
Submarines could and did kill them
The New Guided Missiles of the Time could
and did kill them
The RAF killed Tirpitz with AP bombs weighing
12000 lbs - How do you armour against that ?
Keith
oldsalt
bonehead. I have read/heard the arguments for years but
remained unconvinced. Do you realize that most of the
world's population live within reach of big naval guns?
Most of the world's industry, and ALL of their ports and
naval bases. Aircraft are so vulnerable and so expensive
(if you add in all the infrastructure required to operate
them) and they carry crews. How many lives and planes
would it have cost to destroy Haiphong, for example? As
opposed to a few salvos from a couple of battlewagons? Of
course, Haiphong was never seriously attacked. Perhaps at
least PARTLY because we knew doing so would be so
expensive. The main reason was fear of provoking the
Soviet Union, who, as soon as they realized that, made it a
point to keep at least one ship there at all times. And a
dozen gunship cruisers just don't approach the the sheer
psychological presence of a battleship. Those big guns are
definite attention getters...
Keith WIllshaw
oldsalt <tamolina...@juno.com.invalid> wrote in message
> Gin drinkers? Don't get nasty. Let's stick with
> bonehead. I have read/heard the arguments for years but
> remained unconvinced. Do you realize that most of the
> world's population live within reach of big naval guns?
> Most of the world's industry, and ALL of their ports and
> naval bases
So the RN thought until they tried to take Battleships
into the Bosphorus in WW1
The Germans thought the same until just before the
Torpedoes hit the Blucher and the Karlsruhe
There are good reason why Aircraft were used instead of Battleships
in attacks on defended ports
Those reasons are Aircraft, Submarines and Mines
To that list we must now add guided Missiles
Keith
oldsalt
never understood why any sane man would go to sea in a ship
that sinks on purpose. Come to think of it, I have had a
couple of friends who were submariners, and "sane" would be
the last word I would have used to describe those guys!
That kind of life is not for me, but I am glad our
submarines and the guys who man them are on our side. They
do good work.
Andy McCruden
oldsalt wrote:
> The same could be said, only more so, of a carrier. I
>
Not More so, less so, a Carrier carrys significant numbers of ASW aircraft (at
least 6 Helos) can carry out attacks form a greater distance and hence form a
wider pool of possible locations and does its buisness at inherantly high
speeds, unlike a BB doing NGFS, this makes it more difficult to find, riskier to
approach and even if you try its faster than every non nuke sub in the world
making just GETTING to intercept position diffiuclt, also as the CV will stay
out in the dep water it can be effectively escorted by SSN's, futher increacing
the ASW threat, In close to the shore like a BB needs to get, escort ops by
subs aren't practical
Samuel Jahaza Howard
> would it have cost to destroy Haiphong, for example?
Lets see. One battleship sunk, (assuming that only one would get sunk) is
1,200 lives. For that, I can lose 600 2 seater or 1200 one seater
aircraft and still have lower loss of life.
> Do you realize that most of the
> world's population live within reach of big naval guns?
> Most of the world's industry, and ALL of their ports and
> naval bases.
That doesn't neccesarily mean that it is a good idea to sail the BB into
range. Some of those waters are very tight, and make minefields easy to
accomplish, or counterbattery-fire from the shore.
Sam Howard
Samuel Jahaza Howard
> sound of a 16-inch shell passing over your head is
> literally terrorizing. A bowel stimulant. Talk about your
> big sticks...but they don't have to be that accurate.
The guys in the trenches in the First World War learned very quickly to
tell by the sound of the artillery, what type it was and whether it was
likely to hit them. They knew that the big guns were innacurate, and
probably being used for counterbattery fire rather than general
bombardment, and didn't even bother to duck.
> Despite propaganda, missile shots are not as accurate as
> most people think. The one that missed the enemy bunker
> and plowed into the residential neighborhood is never shown
> on the evening news, and is vigourously denied if reported.
Yes, but they have much longer ranges than naval gunfire.
>Your (3). Not
> really. A warship is good for about 30 years. The Iowas
> have at most ten years on them. A bigger concern is
> obaining spare parts that are no longer made or
> stockpiled. That problem can be handled.
Only at great expense can this problem be handled. Furthermore, a piece
of steel sitting in the water is not exactly immune to the effects of
weather and corrosion.
Your point
> (4)...build some more.
But one of the prime BB-head arguements is that we already have them and
that therefore they are less expensive. This is mainly a refutation of
that idea.
Point (5), Much less so than a
> carrier, cruiser, or DD. Those sitting ducks Mitchell
> bombed were not zig zagging at thirty knots, had no crew
> aboard to repair damage as it occured, and were not
> shooting back. I do not propose BB's to replace carrier
> battle groups for EVERY mission, that would be stupid. But
> I am convinced that some jobs they can do as well or
> better, (supporing amphibious landings, for one). Let's
> risk those expensive airplanes and human aircrew lives when
> there is no better way. And the big gun platforms have and
> still can provide that better way. My opinion.
This has been answered well by others.
Sincerely,
Samuel J. Howard
Paul J. Adam
<tamolina...@juno.com.invalid> writes
>Do you realize that most of the
>world's population live within reach of big naval guns?
How close to shore do you have to get to make them reach?
How do you deal with shore guns, MRLs, mines, submarines, air
attacks, SSMs, et cetera?
>Aircraft are so vulnerable and so expensive
>(if you add in all the infrastructure required to operate
>them) and they carry crews.
A battleship has 1,500 sailors aboard and is effectively irreplaceable.
>Of
>course, Haiphong was never seriously attacked.
It was closed by air-dropped mines - I'd call that "attacked".
>The main reason was fear of provoking the
>Soviet Union, who, as soon as they realized that, made it a
>point to keep at least one ship there at all times.
And why does using battleships rather than aircraft change this?
>And a
>dozen gunship cruisers just don't approach the the sheer
>psychological presence of a battleship. Those big guns are
>definite attention getters...
A popular myth, not supported by reality.
Bombardments by large-calibre guns didn't silence the German
defenders on Omaha Beach, or destroy the Japanese on Tarawa, or
exterminate the Japanese troops on Okinawa...
--
There are four kinds of homicide: felonious, excusable, justifiable and
praiseworthy...
Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Chris Manteuffel
>GH> Sunburns are high end of the threat envelope: a lot more
>GH> threats out there, and most likely typical hits on NGFS
>GH> platforms, will be a lot smaller than that. Coastal
>GH> artillery, light and medium antiship missiles, which a BB is
>GH> relatively tolerant of hits from.
The vital spaces are indeed more survivable to minor hits. However, a
minor hit would just destroy the radars and antenna's that are on the
Iowa. Means that the Marines can't call in and ask for fire support.
So one or two small hits, enough to break the unarmored (and
impossible to armor, BTW) antennas and the BB is just as useful to the
boys on the beach as if it were in San Diego. The only way around this
is to not get hit. The best way to do that is to stay far away- if you
can be seen, you can be hit. Staying far away means very long range
weaponry- the USN doctrine right now calls for the blue water hulls to
stay 25 miles from shore. BB's at their best could probably hit to
about 18 or so (the longest range hit ever recorded by one BB on
another is at 15 miles- note that a BB is a far larger target than any
land target is likely to be). So BB's ain't going to cut it.
Chris Manteuffel
History, n. An account mostly false, of events mostly unimportant,
which are brought about by rulers mostly knaves, and soldiers mostly
fools. - Ambrose Bierce, "The Devil's Dictionary
Nik Simpson
"Keith WIllshaw" <keith_w...@compuserve.com> wrote in message
news:86pflp$puh$1...@ssauraab-i-1.production.compuserve.com...
> The Yamato, Mushasi,Prince of Wales, Repulse, Barham,
> Roma and Warspite were all underway with full crews.
> and yet they were hit by planes that are MUCH
> less capable than those in service today
Minor nitpick (though I'm in total agreement with sentiments of the post)
Roma was on her way to be interened and carrying a skeleton crew which a
decisive factor in her loss. it's extremeley doubtful that the single hit
she recieved would have proved fatal in real comabat conditions.
--
Nik Simpson
Keith Willshaw
Nik Simpson wrote in message ...
I stand corrected.
Keith
Peter H. Granzeau
wrote:
>I find that hard to believe. An Exocet isn't designed for heavy
>penetration of a ship's hull, so trying to smash through 12" of armor
>plating sounds like an impossibility for a missile like Exocet.
Of course, the Exocet is highly unlikely to strike the armor, either.
Only about 10 per cent of a battleship's profile consists of armor.
It may not sink if the radar mast is taken out, the bow is blown off,
or the steering is jammed (as actually happened to another battleship,
once), but it is also no longer likely to complete its mission.
--
Regards, PHG
To reply by mail, send to PGranzeau at the same site)
Nik Simpson
"Keith (no, not that Keith)" <kbetty@!Nospam!.telusplanet.net> wrote in
message news:i25k4.95405$n3.19...@news0.telusplanet.net...
>
>
> Nik Simpson wrote in message ...
>
> >decisive factor in her loss. it's extremeley doubtful that the single hit
> >she recieved would have proved fatal in real comabat conditions.
> >
> >
>
> given:
>
> At about 1548:
>
> "One bomb... starboard side... between frames 100 and 108 ... exploded
under
> the hull....severe damage to the shell and framing of hull girder. The
> after engine room and boiler rooms 7 and 8 flooded, resulting in loss of
> power to the inboard propellors. much [electric] arcing...severe
fires...."
>
> But there was a second hit.
>
> "Around 1602... between frames 123 and 136....bomb continued into the
ship,
> probably exploding in the forward engine room, causing additional fires
and
> flooding the magazines for number 2 main battery turret and the forward
> 152-mm turret on the port side. The explosion of this bomb caused massive
> flooding and excessive strain on an already weakened hull girder. The
> number 2 381-mm turret was blown overboard by the violent explosion of its
> magazines a few seconds later....[pictures of the ship blowing up are
> included in the book. It broke in two and capsized.]
>
> This doesn't appear to suggest that damage control would have saved the
> ship.
>
In which case I stand somewhat corrected, but I don't think she was taking
full evasive action or was properly buttoned up for combat conditions.
--
Nik Simpson
oldsalt
OOD underway until 1978, and I was just a First Class Petty
Officer when I earned it. I wasn't required to do it, did
it on my (very limited) off-watch time. I would defer to
your superior rank and shut up, if I hadn't known some four-
stripers (and two-and-a-half stripers) who had their heads
up their asses, and some CPO's who definitely didn't. Gee,
we Okie-boaters kinda thought our ship was uniquely
configured to do ANTHING, with guns forward and missiles
aft. Perhaps those "E"'s we won misled us.
George Herbert
>The CEP and danger zone preclude their use for close fire support
CEP drops with range to target, same as with any other gun you
get closer to the beach.
Danger zone issues are, however, quite valid. You really don't
want to be dropping 16" shells only 150 meters ahead of your own
forward line.
>The Yamato, Mushasi,Prince of Wales, Repulse, Barham,
>Roma and Warspite were all underway with full crews.
>and yet they were hit by planes that are MUCH
>less capable than those in service today
There are a lot less modern planes, though.
You expect more good hits from modern targeting
systems and guided weapons, but volume of fire
has actually decreased.
-george william herbert
gher...@crl.com
George Herbert
>>ton many many inch thick armor belt, layered protection system battleship
>>is more vulnerable to modern weapons than thin skinned modern warships
>>with a bit of kevlar over a few key spaces?
>
>was amply proven by a) Roma & Warspite and b) Yamato & Mushashi (which had a
>good, although it could have been improved, torpedo protection system).
>These examples are hardly representative of current weapon systems - but the
>ships named (except Warspite, which was reconstructed) are roughly
>contemporary with the Iowa's.
Have you, or anyone else in the thread, sat with the Iowa side
profile and actually checked how much of the ship is vulnerable
to what?
Let's stick to missiles for the time being, there aren't that
many torpedos out there in likely threat nations anymore.
The Sunburn will do a serious number on any unarmored spaces near
where it impacts; as a rough estimate, assume anything within fifty
feet is knocked out, perhaps seventy.
A hit on center-of-profile will blow a bunch of 5" mounts into
the water but shouldn't kill the bridge, CIC, or any radars.
Hits forwards of Turret 1 are just annoying; most annoying would
be far enough forwards to blow the bow proper off, which would
then significantly affect maneuvering, but is probably not in and
of itself a complete mission kill.
Hits in the near vicinity of the forward turrets probably detonate
outboard of the turrets and heavily armored ammo spaces; the Sunburn's
warhead detonator is timed to penetrate then detonate, but probably
not penetrate too far. If it reaches the armored citadel or hits
an external face of the turret, it looks to me like it will not
penetrate the turret but will probably cause enough internal damage
from the detonation to put the turret or its ammo feed out of action.
There may be a small zone between the two turrets on/near deck where
a hit would disable both forward turrets.
Moving aft, a hit low under the bridge encounters the belt and
probably stops there or shortly past it. A hit up the superstructure
a bit does secondary battery damage and may significantly disrupt CIC.
A hit higher up may significantly disrupt the bridge and knock down
the forwards radar masts. Variations on the above for hits aft
in the central hull area, but the vulnerable regions for Bridge
and CIC are relatively small (albeit close to center of profile).
It appears that penetrations into engineering spaces are unlikely.
Aft, near the turret is similar to forward turret.
Past the aft turret, there's a single well hardened
area of concern (the steering gear) which appears to be
hard enough to resist Sunburn penetrations but which might
suffer mechanical failures (repairable or not) if hit square
on by a Sunburn.
It looks to me like a single Sunburn has a low probability of
mission disabling an Iowa, the only likely areas it could do
so would be a hit over CIC, or the Bridge which also knocked
the radar mast down, or on the steering machinery space if
concussion within the armored box there knocked out the gear.
Vulnerable area looks like about 5% of profile area. More like
20% of profile area in the near vicintity of lateral center of
exposed area, so if Sunburns home in on center of profile then
the risk could be closer to that. Two have a moderate chance.
Three probably fifty percent or a bit more, four or more likely
over fifty percent and climbing rapidly.
Same exercise with Exocet class missiles, and the vulnerable
areas shrink considerably and number absorbed prior to the
ship likely being mission killed rises commensurately.
-george william herbert
gher...@crl.com
George Herbert
>George Herbert <gher...@crl3.crl.com> wrote:
>> Samuel Jahaza Howard <sh0...@mail.rochester.edu> wrote:
>>
>> Not proven. They are demonstrably better at NGFS than single-5"-gun
>> destroyers are on a hull by hull basis, and probably than significant
>> numbers thereof. Whether they are truly optimal for the NGFS mission
>> is another issue. No current Navy hull was designed with much thought
>> or effort into NGFS, so the real analysis would be, if we're serious
>> about NGFS, comparing BBs versus purpose built multi-tube NGFS ships
>> tough enough to come inshore and/or versus the BatShell project.
>
>Please note that BB's were not designed for NGFS and that
>historically hard pressed troops on Omaha Beach received more
>efffective fire support from the 5" Guns on the Destroyers
>than the BB big guns
The BB big guns remained far offshore by intentional choice.
They could have come inshore on most of the beaches,
though obviously not as far inshore as the DEs did.
>The weapons systems under development for NGFS do
>NOT require the platform to come close inshore
...and have payloads which approximate the weight of fire
a single Mk-19 GL equipped HMMV can bring to bear on a given
target (though the ERGM equipped destroyer can do so from
about 90 km further away). Perhaps less, and definitely less
for any given 15 second long period of fire.
>> Now, wait a minute. You're trying to tell me that a 50 plus thousand
>> ton many many inch thick armor belt, layered protection system battleship
>> is more vulnerable to modern weapons than thin skinned modern warships
>> with a bit of kevlar over a few key spaces?
>
>Yes - When a Silkworm was launched at an IOWA Class
>BB in the Persian Gulf that Missile was shot down
>by the Destroyer escorting it.
>Thus the destroyer proved to be more capable
>of dealing with modern weapons than the BB
Had that Silkworm hit an Iowa, what percent chance is there
that the Iowa would have been mission killed? Five Silkworms?
I am certainly not advocating sending an Iowa forwards into
SSM fire without air control and interceptors or SAM-equipped
escorts or some RAM launchers bolted on. Avoiding hits is
the name of the game no matter how tough you are. However,
ignoring the ability of a BB to absorb most hits from most
weapons is folly.
>A second example would be the realtive vulnerability of the BB
>to submarine attack. With no Sonar Dome or organic ASW
>helos the only way a BB has of knowing a Kilo is in
>the Area is the bang when the torpedo hits.
Again, I am not advocating sending Iowas forwards into threat
envelopes they're not prepared to deal with.
Out of curiosity, what exactly do you expect a DD sitting
onshore doing NGFS to do when sonar reports high speed
screws in the water forwards range unknown? Ping like
mad and pray that you get a range on something sub-sized
to fire VL ASROC at and get a mutual kill on the enemy
sub not a large rock on the bottom?
>> But throwing humdingers like "Battleships are extremely vulnerable
>> to modern weapons" is going overboard. Give the group a break.
>> Fire a pair of Sunburns into any USN warship and it's going to
>> hurt, be it Battleship or Carrier or Destroyer.
>
>However the neither the Carrier nor the DD with ERGM need to close
>to within range of the Sunburn Launcher to use their weapons
>system hence the BB is more at risk
The Carrier, no. ERGM? Yes.
-george william herbert
gher...@crl.com
George Herbert
>>>>>> On 26 Jan 2000 21:37:01 -0800, gher...@crl3.crl.com
>>>>>> (George Herbert) said:
>GH> thousand ton many many inch thick armor belt, layered
>GH> protection system battleship is more vulnerable to modern
>GH> weapons than thin skinned modern warships with a bit of
>GH> kevlar over a few key spaces?
>
>No viable warship design can absorb a hit from a
>Sunburn. Therefore, ships must be built with the ability to stop
>the Sunburn before it hits. Most newer ships have some capability
>in this range; the BB doesn't.
That is on proper analysis not true. A Sunburn is big but most
of the profile area of a BB is either not critical or well
enough armored to reduce the chance of a Sunburn disabling or
destroying the armored equipment to very low percentage.
One Sunburn appears to me to have a relatively low percent
chance of mission killing a BB.
>GH> Sunburns are high end of the threat envelope: a lot more
>GH> threats out there, and most likely typical hits on NGFS
>GH> platforms, will be a lot smaller than that. Coastal
>GH> artillery, light and medium antiship missiles, which a BB is
>GH> relatively tolerant of hits from.
>
>Even coastal artillery can wipe out the un-armorable sensors on a
>ship, leaving it easy meat for missile fire and whatnot. I think-
>as the Navy seems to- that the only viable approach is to stay
>way the hell away from the beach.
One magic enemy soldier with a Tokarev pistol could fire a round
into the air, breaking through the bridge windows, ricrocheting
through the 2" thick slit in the main armored bridge citadel and
kill the admiral in charge. Doesn't happen very often, though.
Battleships have been hit many hundreds, perhaps thousands of times
in modern history by various large caliber weapons, bombs, etc.
Very few of those hits hit sensors. Very few of them did more than
slightly impair the vessels offensive capability. Modern shore
artillery isn't going to magically be more likely to put magic
shells right into the radar than any previous offensive systems were.
-george william herbert
gher...@crl.com
oldsalt
turkey...I apologize if my post could be interpreted as
implying that your head is up YOUR nether regions. Just as
I am sure that your remarks about USS Oklahoma City were
not intended to impugn a proud and capable ship. If these
discussions get a little heated at times, maybe that is
because we all get passionate about the great Navy we
love. Back to the fray...
Larry G. Smith
Keith) at kbetty@!Nospam!.telusplanet.net wrote on 1/27/00 4:04 PM:
> The explosion of this bomb caused massive
> flooding and excessive strain on an already weakened hull girder. The
> number 2 381-mm turret was blown overboard by the violent explosion of its
> magazines a few seconds later....[pictures of the ship blowing up are
> included in the book. It broke in two and capsized.]
>
> This doesn't appear to suggest that damage control would have saved the
> ship.
Marvelous bit of understatement there, Keith. ;-)
Michael
oldsalt
ponder my position some more. My final thought: the Navy
in it's present configuration evolved to fight a threat
that doesn't exist anymore: a super-power Soviet Union.
Future wars are unlikely to be the kind that we have
configured for. High-tech weapons systems like modern
aircraft are becoming so sophisticated and expensive it can
be foolish to risk them on what are essentially low-tech
missions. Picture the F/A-18 or A-6 bombing a "suspected
fuel dump" and being downed by what is essentially WW2
level AA, (or even a rifleman!) to see what I mean. I
think future military operations are most likely to be
against low-tech third world opponents. Picture Somalia,
the former Yugoslavia, and their equivalents. I think a BB
or it's equivalent, armed with a gun/missile mix, could be
very useful and give us atlernatives. Just one lying
offshore with it's guns trained would give ME pause if I
were a third-world dictator or warlord. Maybe the pendelum
is swinging toward "gunboat diplomacy" again. Something to
think about.
George Herbert
>. A Sunburn is big but most
>>of the profile area of a BB is either not critical or well
>>enough armored to reduce the chance of a Sunburn disabling or
>>destroying the armored equipment to very low percentage.
>>One Sunburn appears to me to have a relatively low percent
>>chance of mission killing a BB.
>>
>high because of the weight. Also, a Sunburn has a _far_ bigger warhead than
>an AP shell. Result: massive fires in the superstructure.
Please re-read: "either not critical or well enough armored to..."
Most spaces on a Battleship are not mission critical.
Compare a Sunburn warhead to a battleship caliber HE shell.
>>Battleships have been hit many hundreds, perhaps thousands of times
>>in modern history by various large caliber weapons, bombs, etc.
>>Very few of those hits hit sensors. Very few of them did more than
>>slightly impair the vessels offensive capability. Modern shore
>>artillery isn't going to magically be more likely to put magic
>>shells right into the radar than any previous offensive systems were.
>
>In "Fleet Tactics: theory and practice", Hughes indicates that BB's were
>expected to be capable of standing up to fire for only about _20 minutes_.
>It is true that some ships took 10-20 heavy calibre hits without sinking -
>Seydlitz and Warspite come to mind; many others took a high number of hits
>at Jutland. But these ships were then mission killed; being towed into port
>backwards is not a good sign.
That indicates that a WW-I Battleship and Battlecruiser
with about half the displacement and half the effective armor
(thinner and lower quality alloy) of a WW-II Iowa class
survived tens of Sunburn-class hits each without sinking.
Both of those ships were 'in action' until near the end
of those series of hits.
Shore batteries today are either light artillery (by BB
terms, 155mm is light and even 203mm only medium) or
are missiles, and few of either are firing even
vaguely AP ammo. My prior comments stand.
>Even if the ship doesn't sink, if it's in the yard for 6 months, it's
>unavailable.
How many forced littoral landings do you expect the US to do per year
in the future? We haven't done one since Korea now, except for sort of
vaguely during the Grenada and Panama operations. I don't think there
has been a situation where we'd have considered several in succession.
>How many BB's could be afforded with today's manpower costs?
This is a valid point. Quite good one. Completely unrelated to
ship vulnerabilities and threat environments.
Please do not take my criticisms here in this thread to be
unmitigated support for returning Battleships to sea for NGFS.
I do not, all things considered, support that. Battleships are
all things considered not a good match for the current NGFS needs
without significant improvements (such as new guided rounds and
extended range saboted rounds, none of which would be cheap to
develop). Though BBs are in my opinion quite tough against the
threat environment, putting them inshore as-is against many possible
opponents without good air cover would be folly. It would be expensive
to add adequate SAM systems for self defense. No matter how you cut
it their systems are not new, manpower efficient. The costs involved
in doing them right would be very significant.
I don't believe that the BatShell is a really good solution, either.
In fact, I don't know for sure what is. I would really like to have
the time to do some detailed design tradeoff analysies of small and
midsized gun platform vessels with various 5", 155mm, and 8" guns
and VLS Standard and NATACMS and Tomhawk, compared to threat envelopes
and see what pops out. I don't have it. I think, but this is a
touchie feelie guess not supported by anything approaching a professional
analysis of the problem, that a 4 to 8 thousand ton platform with
moderate armor (enough to tolerate 155mm hits but not so much that it
can ignore them, enough to ignore them would weigh too much), good self
defense (2 RAM, decoys, stealthy design) and 3-6 gun tubes plus
32 to 64 cells of VLS would do a damn good job at keeping bad guys
away from Marines hitting the beach and be cheap enough to buy 5 to
8 of (say, target price of $250 million for the larger ones)
5 of them would give you 1 in refit or repairs, 2 per coast
homeported, say 1 at sea near troublespots and 2-3 you could
reasonably concentrate given a couple of months warning.
Buy 1 every 2 years for a decade, say. Again, this is not
supported by a detailed analysis.
-george william herbert
gher...@crl.com