WWII era Japan I-400 submarines

[a425couple]

Jack Linthicum wishes to post:
Dust cover note for Operation Storm

In 1941, the architects of Japan's sneak attack on Pearl Harbor
planned a bold follow-up: a potentially devastating air raid--
this time again at New York City and Washington, DC. The classified
Japanese program required developing a squadron of top secret
submarines--the Sen Toku, or I-400 class--which were, by far,
the largest and among the most deadly subs of World War II.
Incredibly, the subs were designed as underwater aircraft carriers,
each equipped with three Aichi M6AI attack bombers painted to look like
U.S. aircraft. The bombers, called Seiran (which translates as
'storm from a clear sky"), were tucked in a huge watertight hanger
on the subs' deck. The subs' mission was to travel more than halfway
around the world, surface on the east coast of the United States,
and launch a deadly attack. Although U.S. forces had broken the
Japanese naval code, American intelligence knew nothing of the
operation. And the amazing thing is how close the Japanese came to
pulling off their mission.

Jack Linthicum adds:
478 pages of the near miss. Even at the end of the war the I-400
subs were considered top secret and used Americans ordering former
Japanese crewmen on a trip to Hawaii. The I-400s are considered
the concept boats for the Regulus program.

[a425couple]

"a425couple" <a425c...@hotmail.com> wrote in message ...

> Jack Linthicum wishes to post:
> Dust cover note for Operation Storm

> ---- top secret

> submarines--the Sen Toku, or I-400 class--which were, by far,
> the largest and among the most deadly subs of World War II.

Well, certainly "the largest"!

> Incredibly, the subs were designed as underwater aircraft carriers,

> each equipped with three Aichi M6AI attack bombers ---

> The subs' mission was to travel more than halfway
> around the world, surface on the east coast of the United States,

> and launch a deadly attack. ----

I've been reading about them for decades,, but generally
the most believable plan for them was to attack the
Panama Canal. (Damage one sides locks & an interior dam,
if you can drain the Gatun Lake and Madden lake reservoirs,
even after everything is repaired It takes long time to
refill water to use canal)

> Even at the end of the war the I-400
> subs were considered top secret and used Americans ordering former
> Japanese crewmen on a trip to Hawaii. The I-400s are considered
> the concept boats for the Regulus program.

Yes, after Japan surrendered, the US siezed & studied.
The USSR really wanted one, or to at least examine one,,,
somehow,,, it just did not happen (!!! shocked & amazed!!)
and they were scuttled in very deep water!!

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 12/06/2013 19:26, a425couple ha scritto:
> Jack Linthicum wishes to post:
> Dust cover note for Operation Storm
>
> In 1941, the architects of Japan's sneak attack on Pearl Harbor
> planned a bold follow-up: a potentially devastating air raid--
> this time again at New York City and Washington, DC. The classified
> Japanese program required developing a squadron of top secret
> submarines--the Sen Toku, or I-400 class--which were, by far,
> the largest and among the most deadly subs of World War II.
> Incredibly, the subs were designed as underwater aircraft carriers, each
> equipped with three Aichi M6AI attack bombers painted to look like U.S.
> aircraft. The bombers, called Seiran (which translates as 'storm from a
> clear sky"), were tucked in a huge watertight hanger on the subs' deck.
> The subs' mission was to travel more than halfway around the world,
> surface on the east coast of the United States, and launch a deadly
> attack. Although U.S. forces had broken the Japanese naval code,
> American intelligence knew nothing of the operation. And the amazing
> thing is how close the Japanese came to pulling off their mission.

Seems to me that the author has badly mixed-up between axis planned
special ops... Japanese a/c for the I-400s hasn't enough range to hit
NY, albeit the impact of the *true* Divine Wind on NY, as we know today,
will be rather interesting... so I suspect was *much* better for Japan
to not have ever thinked on it...

OTOH, who was seriously (and actually set in motion...) thinking on
hitting US shores was Italian Navy, whose aimed to do a large "Italian
job" against NY docks, and the plan was basically of using a large boat
(RN Leonardo da Vinci, the ace submarine boat) to carry a smaller boat
(CA type midget submarine) whose in turn release the frogmen whose
instead of riding "Maiali" (chariots) will have carried limpet charges,
large enough to flood the engineroom of a commerce ship (enough to leave
it in a near-sinking condition), realistically the aim was of disrupting
convoy organization, "throwing sand in the clockwork", and having to
raise ASAP the crippled Liberties and Victories (to free the piers) and
reorganizing the convoy flow will have haved an impact on Allied logistics.

Best regards from Italy,
dott. Piergiorgio.

[Keith W]

I dont think they were even close to being a near miss.

The reality is that the 3 aircraft each I-400 could carry could only carry
a single type 91 17.7" torpedo. This carried a warhead of up to 650 lbs

The lock gates were NOT flimsy, they had to withstand enormous
loads and were around 7ft thick hollow sections. At best the torpedo
could punch a large hole in the outer skin and a smaller hole in the inner
skin.

If you look at the attack carried out on the dry dock at St Nazaire
by the RN they considered it necessary to pack the bows of
an old destroyer with 4.5 tons of HE and ram it into the dock gates.

Then there is the little matter of the attack itself, the plan required them
to make a night attack having launched over 100 miles away and then
hit a relatively small target in narrow concrete channel.

Even had the Canal Defence force decided to sit the action out
the chances of getting a hit were not high.

The IJN would have had far better to take a leaf out of the Kriegsmarine
book and use smaller submarines to hit ships entering and leaving
the canal.

Keith

[Malcom "Mal" Reynolds]

In article <kpab1...@news7.newsguy.com>,

"a425couple" <a425c...@hotmail.com> wrote:

> Jack Linthicum wishes to post:
> Dust cover note for Operation Storm
>
> In 1941, the architects of Japan's sneak attack on Pearl Harbor
> planned a bold follow-up: a potentially devastating air raid--
> this time again at New York City and Washington, DC. The classified
> Japanese program required developing a squadron of top secret
> submarines--the Sen Toku, or I-400 class--which were, by far,
> the largest and among the most deadly subs of World War II.

I was under the impression that those subs never fired a shot in anger,
interesting definition of "deadly"

[Vaughn]

On 6/12/2013 3:38 PM, Malcom "Mal" Reynolds wrote:
> I was under the impression that those subs never fired a shot in anger,
> interesting definition of "deadly"

Given the huge investment to build them vs the tiny payload of those few
planes, I don't see them ever being any kind of game changer, even if
they had managed to fire angry shots.

For the time though, they were certainly impressive.

[willshak]

Maybe they could have sunk a Staten Island Ferry or two?

>
> The lock gates were NOT flimsy, they had to withstand enormous
> loads and were around 7ft thick hollow sections. At best the torpedo
> could punch a large hole in the outer skin and a smaller hole in the inner
> skin.
>
> If you look at the attack carried out on the dry dock at St Nazaire
> by the RN they considered it necessary to pack the bows of
> an old destroyer with 4.5 tons of HE and ram it into the dock gates.
>
> Then there is the little matter of the attack itself, the plan required them
> to make a night attack having launched over 100 miles away and then
> hit a relatively small target in narrow concrete channel.
>
> Even had the Canal Defence force decided to sit the action out
> the chances of getting a hit were not high.
>
> The IJN would have had far better to take a leaf out of the Kriegsmarine
> book and use smaller submarines to hit ships entering and leaving
> the canal.
>
> Keith
>
>

--
Bill
In Hamptonburgh, NY
In the original Orange County. Est. 1683
To email, remove the double zeros after @

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Wed, 12 Jun 2013 21:13:22 -0400, Vaughn <vaugh...@gmail.com>
wrote:

http://s1139.photobucket.com/user/eugenegriessel/media/seiran003_zps106b1238.jpg.html

Eugene L Griessel

[a425couple]

Jack Linthicum wants to add:
Read the Book!
One of the reasons I posted this was because the Panama Canal
mission has been given as the only one for the I-400s. Adm Yamamoto
drew up the whole thing in late 1941, as a second blow to
add to the Pearl Harbor one. The I-400s were to gross 6,500 tons,
with fuel (stored in what would later become ballast tanks)
for the 40,000 mile round trip. Eighteen I-400s were the initial concept,
carrying 36 attack planes each with 600 mile range. As the war dwindled on,
the shortage of steel for such monsters led to a trimming of the mission
to fewer and fewer subs, eventually making 3 plus two other
((I-13 and I-14) carrying a plane apiece. The mission got trimmed too,
eventually being cut to the Panama Canal idea.

The book has some errors, but tells the tale from interviews with the
survivors
and Japanese publications. Worthwhile if you are an I-400 buff as I am.

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Wed, 12 Jun 2013 19:14:02 -0700, "a425couple"

Air International of October 1989 had a rather thorough article on the
whole scheme.

Eugene L Griessel

[ohar...@mindspring.com]

Somewhere I read an account of the trip from Japan to Hawaii on one of these things by some US submariners after the war. They were appalled at the living conditions aboard and doubted they could have made seriously long voyages due to the poor conditions.

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Thu, 13 Jun 2013 04:23:15 +0200, Eugene Griessel

<eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:

>Air International of October 1989 had a rather thorough article on the
>whole scheme.

Here is the first part of that article. Scanning errors are mine.

The concept of an aircraft capable of being stored aboard, launched
from and retrieved by a submersible host is almost as old as naval
aviation itself. It could perhaps be asserted that its origins date
back to 6 January 1915, on which day a modified Friedrichshafen FF
29a seaplane was first floated from the foredeck of the small coastal
patrol submarine U-12 off`the German Imperial Navy's base within the
Mole at Zeebrugge. To be strictly accurate, however, the story of
the submarine-borne aircraft really began in the late
autumn of 1917, when Lake Plauen, in Germany, witnessed the first
tests of the Brandenburg W 20, a small, single-seat flying-boat
conceived from the outset for assembly and disassembly
aboard a surfaced submarine.

Between that fourth October of World War I and the end of World War
II, every major maritime power was to consider the potential of
the submarine-borne aircraft, primarily as a means of extending
the horizons of the submarine commander. This interest waxed and
waned. Only in Imperial Japan was the concept consistently developed,
and it was here that the notion was to be radically transformed; the
aircraft assumed the primary offensive role previously the prerogative
of the vessel by which it was carried. The principal task of the
submarine-borne aircraft changed from target search on
behalf of its mother ship to offensive missions against targets
accessible only by means of submarine transportation.

It was this innovative approach to the operational utilisation of
submarine-bonie aircraft that was to result in the Seiran*; an
ingenious aircraft conceptually unique in warplane annals. The Sieran
was conceived as an integral element of an imaginative and audacious
strategic weapon: the submersible aicraft carrier. This bid fair to
provide means of attacking cities and other US targets far beyond the
range of orthodox bombing aircraft; a weapon conferring the
incalculable advantage of maximum surprise.

* Seiran - An idiomatic translation is Mountain Haze; a more literal
translation wouldbe descriptive of adverse weather at a mountain
summit beneath a clear sky.

The idea of the submersible aircraft carrier was born within the
Imperial Navy Headquarters as a means of conducting transoceanic
attack several months before the commencement of hostilities in the
Pacific. The scheme envisaged construction of submarines far larger
than any previously laid down, these being specifically designed for
transportation and launching of attack aircraft. The proposed modus
operandi of this new weapon called for a flotilla of long-range,
aircraft-carrying super-submarines to traverse the Pacific. Once
within air strike range of the pre-determined target, the flotilla
would catapult launch its complement of aircraft and then submerge.

After mounting their attack, the aircraft would rendezvous with the
flotilla, and, subject to sea conditions, alight alongside the
submarines where they would be scuttled, their crews being retrieved
and the flotilla submerging once more. Thus, to the confusion of the
enemy, no trace would be left of the source of the assault which would
result in psychological damage to the American populace of far greater
importance than any material damage inflicted.

It was even to be suggested that the flotilla could make its way to a
remote location, after the air strike, to take on replacement
aircraft, bombs and fuel from tenders pre-positioned in readiness.
Alternatively, the submarines, which it was proposed be fitted with
torpedo tubes permitting a more conventional secondary role, could
continue to operate among coastal shipping while sufficient fuel
remained.

The project, which was to be pursued in conditions of the utmost
secrecy*, was assigned considerable priority by the

* Allied intelligence was not to become aware of the existence of this
project until after the cessation of hostilities.

High Command, and, early in 1942, naval architects were assigned the
formidable task of planning what were, in the event, to be the largest
submarines to be built by any nation prior to the advent of nuclear
propulsion. The programme was to be referred to succinctly as the sen
toku, or "special submarine", the basic design of the submersible
aircraft carrier being finalised in the early spring of 1942. At this
time it was envisaged that 18 of these immense vessels would be
constructed under the Fourth Naval Replenishment Programme. The
original sen toku design provided for a displacement of 4,060 tons (4
125 tonnes) surfaced with accommodation for two float seaplanes.
Before the first keel was to be laid at the Kure Navy Yard on 18
January 1943, however, the design was to undergo substantial
enlargement, the surfaced displacement rising to 4,663 tons (4 738
tonnes) and accommodation being increased to three seaplanes plus
parts for a fourth. With the basic design of the sen toku defined, it
was possible to formulate a specification for the aircraft that was
the primary raison d'etre of the submarine.

Discussions were held at the Kaigun Koku Hombu, the Naval Aviation
Headquarters, with senior representatives of the Aichi concern, which,
since the early twenties, had designed and built aircraft virtually
exclusively for the Imperial Navy. Taking place in the early spring of
1942, these discussions were intended to finalise, in the light of the
Navy's performance demands and the constraints imposed by the
dimensions of the proposed submarine hangar, the basic design
parameters of what was effectively an entirely new category
ofwarplane.

The Navy was adamant that the success of the submersible carrier
concept would be dependent on the performance of its aircraft. This
aircraft had to possess a reasonable chance of eluding interception
and a maximum speed of 300 knots (556 km/h) without external ordnance
at 13,125 ft (4000 m) was called for. Furthermore, it might have to be
launched some way from the US Pacific seaboard and then penetrate some
distance inland to reach its target. A range of 800 naut mls (1482 km)
was therefore considered necessary, but as the service foresaw use of
the aircraft for one mission only, it concluded that any form of
undercarriage would be an unnecessary encumbrance. The diameter of the
tubular, watertight hangar into which the aircraft had to be inserted
had been defined as 11 ft 51 in (3,50m), but the Navy was anxious that
the aircraft would not have to be disassembled in order to occupy this
accommodation, provision being made to fold any surfaces projecting
beyond the diameter of the tube.

The Aichi team, led by Takuichiro Gornei, Director of Experimental
Programmes, saw the requirement as an intriguing challenge to its
ingenuity, and envisaged no insurmountable obstacles in complying with
this decidedly imaginative request. Accordingly, on 15 May, the Navy
specification was formalised as the 17-Shi (1942) Experimental Special
Attack Bomber, the task of fulfilling the requirement being assigned
to Norio Ozaki as Chief Designer, his principal assistants being
Yasushiro Ozawa and Morishige MorL

Birth of the Seiran

Assigned the Aichi designation AM-24 and the official short
designation of M6AI � to which was to be appended, some 14 months
after the launching of the programme, the popular name Seiran � the
design of the submarine-borne attack aircraft progressed comparatively
smoothly in view of its innovative nature. In consultation with the
Navy, the Aichi team elected to adopt the Aichi Atsuta*
twelve-cylinder inverted-vee liquid-cooled engine derived from the
Daimler-Benz DB 601, and at an early design phase it was decided to
make provision for a detachable float undercarriage � the only
detachable element of the Seiran � to enhance the potential utility of
the aircraft. It was accepted that this appendage would inevitably
result in considerable performance degradation and it was agreed that
provision should be made for jettisoning the floats in flight should
such action be dictated by the combat situation. Accordingly, the
design of the sen toku was modified, small, tubular storage bays being
added on each side of the hangar to accommodate the floats on dollies.

A full-scale wooden mock-up of the aircraft was built during the
summer of 1942, this being intended primarily to perfect the method of
folding the wings and tail surfaces. A rotary joint was inserted at
the main spar centre section root, the intention being to rotate the
wing hydraulically through 90 deg to the vertical plane, the leading
edge swivelling downwards and the surface turning to lie flat along
the fuselage. This operation was preceded by the manual folding of the
outer portions of the horizontal tail, the upper portion of the
vertical tail folding to starboard. The result was a reduction in
overall width to 8 ft (2,46 m), while the overall height of the
aircraft resting on its catapult launching cradle was reduced to 6ft
10 in (2,10m). The intention was to pre-warm the aircraft in its
hangar through a system circulating heated lubricating oil while the
submarine was still submerged, and it was calculated that, once the
vessel surfaced, the undercarriageless aircraft could be readied for
catapult launch within four and a half minutes, attachment of the
floats involving a further two and a half minutes.

The M6AI was of conventional metal construction, apart from the wing
tips which were of wood with plywood skinning and an outer covering of
doped fabric. The ailerons, elevators and rudder were fabric covered,
and the metal-skinned flaps employed a double-slotted arrangement with
tandem aerofoils, the rearmost being capable of turning through 90 deg
to serve as a dive brake. The two crew members were accom- modated in
tandem cockpits under a continuous canopy with sliding sections for
access and egress. Initially, defensive armament was to have included
a fixed forward-firing 7,7-mm machine gun, but, in January 1943, the
decision was taken to delete this weapon and confine the gun armament
to a single 13-mm Type 2 machine gun on a flexible mounting in the
rear cockpit. Planned offensive loads included a single 1,874-lb
(850-kg) torpedo, a single 1,764-lb (800-kg) bomb or two 551-lb
(250-kg) bombs.

Six prototype airframes were laid down at Aichi's Eitoku facility in
Nagoya early in 1943, a decision having meanwhile been taken to
complete the last two of these for pilot conversion as the M6AI-K. To
be named Nanzan (Southern Mountain), although initially referred to as
Seiran-Kai, the M6AI-K dispensed with the folding-surface facility and
was to introduce an inward-retracting wheel undercarriage. Apart from
deletion of the rudder tip as this was considered likely to produce an
over-sufficiency of directional stability without the floats, the
M6AI-K was otherwise identical to the standard model, even to the
extent of retaining the catapult launch cradle attachment points.
Retention of these allowed for the possibility of shore-based
catapult-launch training.In the meantime, the sen toku carrier
construction programme was gathering momentum, the first keel having,
as previously related, been laid at the Kure Navy Yard on 18 January
1943. This vessel was assigned the number 1-400, two similar
submersible carriers, the 1-401 and 1-402, being laid down in the
Sasebo Navy Yard, and preparations being made to initiate the
construction of two more, the 1-404 and 1-405, at the Kure yard and at
Kawasaki's Kobe yard respectively. A further 12 sen toku carriers were
planned, and, at the same time, the decision was taken to lay down 10
AM- type submarines to supplement the sen toku carriers, each of these
carrying two Seiran attack aircraft. The AM-type had a displacement of
3,217 tones (3 269 tonnes) surfaced, the lead ship, the 1-13 laid down
in February 1943, having originally been intended as an A2 type with
provision for a single reconnaissance seaplane. This was redesigned
during construction in Kawasaki's Kobe yard, and work initiated on two
more. Like the sen toku, the AM-type submarine had an endurance of 90
days, but only 60 per cent of the range of the larger vessel.

The largest submersible in the world, the sen toku had an overall
length of 400 ft 3 in (122,00 m), a beam of 39 ft 4 in (12,00 m) and
a draft of 22 ft 11 in (7,00 m). Propelled by four 7,700 hp diesels on
the surface and two 2,400 hp electric motors submerged, it could
attain a speed of 18.75 knots (34,75 km/h) surfaced and 6.5 knots (12
km/h) under water. The surface range was 37,500 naut mis (69 490 km)
at 14 knots (26 km/h), its armament comprised one 5.5-in (140-mm) gun,
three triple 25-mm cannon and a single cannon of similar calibre, plus
20 torpedoes for its eight 21-in (53-cm) bow tubes, and it had a
complement of 144 officers and men. Ordnance for its Seiran attack
aircraft consisted of four torpedoes, three 1,764-lb (800-kg) bombs
and 12 550 lb (250-kg) bombs. Its aircraft hangar was slightly offset
to starboard, as was also its 85 ft 3 in (26,00 m) length catapult
forward of the hangar, and its conning tower was offset to port.


Eugene L Griessel

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Thu, 13 Jun 2013 09:34:05 +0200, Eugene Griessel

<eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:

>Op Thu, 13 Jun 2013 04:23:15 +0200, Eugene Griessel
><eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:
>
>>Air International of October 1989 had a rather thorough article on the
>>whole scheme.
>

Here is the second part of that article. Scanning errors are mine.

Disruption of planning

The first prototype of the Seiran was completed at Aichi's Eitoku
plant in late October 1943, flight testing commencing in the following
month, with the second joining the development programme in February
1944. The Seiran was a supremely elegant float seaplane,
aerodynamically clean and aesthetically pleasing. It was subsequently
to be alleged erroneously that Norio Ozaki and his team had based
their design on that of the D4Y Suisei shipboard dive bomber created
at the 1st Naval Air Technical Arsenal at Yokosuka and assigned to
Aichi for series production. It is true that initial consideration
had been given to adaptation of the D4Y I to meet the submarine-borne
attack aircraft requirement, but, at an early stage, this proposal had
been found impracticable. It is equally true that the design of the
Seiran benefited from some input of experience gained with the
Yokosuka-designed aircraft and that there was a superficial
resemblance between the two aircraft. But there is no evidence of the
adoption or adaptation of any design features of the Suisei for the
Seiran. The non-availability of the specified AEIP Atsuta 32 engine
dictated installation of a lower-powered AEIA Atsuta 21 in the first
two prototype aircraft. This power plant afforded 1,400 hp at 2,800
rpm for take-off, 1,250 hp at 5,575 ft (1 700 m) at 2,600 rpm, and, at
the same revs, 1,290 hp at 16,405 ft (5 000 m). Although no flight
test results appear to have survived, these must have proved
acceptable as the Eitoku facility began preparation of jigs and tools
for series manufacture during the early spring of 1944, even though
the third and fourth prototypes, which, like the two land-based
M6AI-Ks completed almost simultaneously, were powered by the
definitive Atsuta 32, were not rolled out until May and June
respectively.

The first series M6AI Seiran was completed in October 1944, and four
had been delivered by 7 December when production at Eitoku was brought
to a standstill by a severe earthquake in the Nagoya area which
twisted the jigs and caused other damage. This disruption had only
just been overcome and the production programme was just regaining
tempo when, on 12 March, the Eitoku facility suffered fire damage
during an air attack on the Nagoya urban area, renewed disruption of
the assembly plant itself being exacerbated by damage to the factories
of various local sub-contractors. At the time of the attack, the
Eitoku plant was being dispersed, a process begun late in the previous
month and accelerated as a result of the air attack, but although
dispersal facilities were at an advanced stage of readiness by the
time that the Nagoya area was again attacked on 17 May, changes in
Imperial Navy priorities had already dictated termination of Seiran
manufacture.

The decision to terminate production of the submarine-borne attack
aircraft had resulted from a more realistic appraisal of the likely
availability of submersible carriers. The I-400 had been completed on
30 December 1944, with the I-401 following barely a week later, on 8
January, but the decision had been taken to modify the I-402 while
still under construction to serve as a submarine tanker to transport
oil from the East Indies through the US blockade to the home islands.
The I-404's construction was to be terminated in March 1945 when 90
per cent complete, construction of the I-405 was halted simultaneously
and plans for the I-406 to I-417 were cancelled.

The March 1945 decision to discontinue the sen toku construction
programme also affected the supporting AM-type submarine programme,
which, in any case, had already been scaled down to four boats. The
I-1 had been launched at Kobe on 10 June 1944, and, although 70 per
cent complete, was now cancelled. The I-13, the first of the AM class,
had been completed on 16 December 1944, with the second, the I-14,
following on 14 March, but the I-15 was now terminated when 90 per
cent complete. With few submersible aircraft carriers likely to be
available to the Imperial Navy, there was no longer any point ifi
building substantial numbers of submarine-borne attack aircraft. It
was decided, therefore, to halt the Seiran production programme at the
same time as the construction programme of the aircraft's intended
carrier. It was foreseen that 44 series aircraft would be available
with the programme's termination, but, owing to successive disruptions
of the assembly line, only 14 Seirans had been delivered by the end of
March, and the programme was to be continued as components had already
been manufactured, it being proposed that the aircraft be used for
conventional attack missions. In the event, only a further six Seirans
were to be completed at Eitoku, although a number of others were to be
in various stages of assembly when the conflict ended.

The last throw

In the late autumn of 1944, the Imperial Navy made a start on the
creation of a specialised Air Corps intended specifically to operate
the Seiran from the submersible carriers. Both maintenance personnel
and aircrews were carefully selected for their previous experience. On
15 December, the new unit was assigned the designation of 631st Air
Corps, command being awarded to Capt Tatsunoke Ariizumi. The Corps was
an integral component of the 1st Submarine Flotilla of the 6th Fleet,
Ariizumi being appointed Flag Officer. The Flotilla was to consist of
the two sen toku vessels, the I-400 and I-401, the AM-type support
submarine I-13 and the similar I-14 which was still undergoing sea
trials.

These were to have a complement of 10 Seiran attack aircraft. Most of
the training was conducted at the 1st Naval Air Technical Arsenal at
Yokosuka, the first shakedown cruises to include catapult launching
trials of the Seiran being performed during the course of January
1945. Most sea training was undertaken in the lyo-Nada area of the
Inland Sea, south of Kure, and Seiran flight training was conducted at
the Fukuyama Naval Air Base where six aircraft were available, the
principal problems encountered being associated with the Atsuta
engine. A programme of combined training between the submarines and
their aircraft ostensibly began on 2 April, but this was so severely
inhibited by shortages of diesel fuel, all priority in the supply of
which having been assigned to operational needs, that the I-401 was
hurriedly despatched to Dairen, Manchuria, where diesel was available.
For the passage, the giant submarine was fitted with a superstructure
to disguise it as a frigate, but as the vessel passed Ube it suffered
damage from a magnetic mine, necessitating return to Kube for repairs.
The false superstructure was then transferred to the I-400 which
completed the voyage to and from Dairen successfully, temporarily
alleviating the fuel problem. On 11 May, the two sen toku carriers, by
now joined by the I-13 and I-14, left Kure for Maizuru, Kyoto,
designated as the main support base for the 1st Submarine Flotilla,
and from there sailed to Nanao Bay where they were joined by the
Seirans for operational training exercises. Exercises were to continue
for six weeks, the time taken to launch the Seiran floatplanes being
progressively reduced, although it was ascertained that to attach the
floats and launch all three of the complement of aircraft of the sen
toku carriers occupied 30 minutes, half of this time being required
for the third aircraft which took longer to withdraw from the hangar.
However, it was calculated that, in an operational situation and
launching the Seirans without floats, the elapsed time from surfacing
to submerging once more could be reduced to 14.5 minutes.

The primary target for the first operational mission of the 1st
Submarine Flotilla was the Gatun Lock Gates of the Panama Canal. Such
an attack, if successful, would bring to a halt the relentless flow
through the canal of men and equipment destined to participate in the
war against Japan. Ten Seirans were to participate in the assault,
these being led by Lt Atsushi Asamura, and six were to carry torpedoes
and four were to tote HE bombs, two aircraft being assigned to each of
the targeted lock systems. The Seirans were continuously flown in
practice attacks on a large scale model of the Gaton Locks, their
crews memorising every land checkpoint.

The Flotilla was to follow the same course as the Pearl Harbor attack
force three-and-a-half years earlier, then heading southwards down
towards the Colombian coast from Oahu and finally altering course to
sail along the coastline in a northerly direction. The two smaller
AM-type submarines, lacking the fuel capacity for the round trip, were
to be refuelled by the larger submarines.

This dramatic attack, more a gesture of defiance than a realistic
attempt to change the outcome of the conflict, was never to be
realised in the event, as the desperate situation in which Japan now
found itself, with invasion of the home islands believed imminent,
prompted Imperial Navy Order No 95. It was considered that a major
blow against Allied forces within striking distance of Japan must take
precedence over a strategic attack with results that might well come
too late to relieve the beleaguered Japanese forces. The Order, issued
on 25 June 1945, therefore ordered the 1st Submarine Flotilla to
expend its complement of attack aircraft in a single Kamikazi-type
assault on US Navy carriers at Ulithi Atoll.

The new plan, designated Operation Hikari (Splendour), called for the
two sen toku vessels to sail with their Seirans to Ominato Naval Base,
at the northern tip of Honshu, where they were to rendezvous with the
two AM-type submarines which would have disassembled Nakajima C6NI
Saiun land-based reconnaissance aircraft in their hangars. It was
proposed that the C6Nls be ferried to Truk, which was still in
Japanese hands, and, after assembly, scout the Ulithi Atoll to provide
target information for the Seiran force from the I-400 and I-401. The
I-13 and I-14 were to precede the sen toku vessels, but the former was
damaged on 16 July, 480 naut mls (890 km) east of Yokosuka, by
aircraft from the USS Anzio and subsequently sunk by the destroyer USS
Lawrence C Taylor. The I-14 succeeded in reaching Truk, its C6NI being
offloaded, assembled and readied for its reconnaissance mission.

The I-400 and I-401 meanwhile left Ominato, but, on 6 August, the
latter, which was the flagship with Capt Ariizumi aboard, suffered a
serious electrical fire which rendered it unable to submerge until
repairs had been carried out. Presumably, as a result of the damage,
Capt Ariizumi signalled a change in rendezvous point further from the
target to a position 100 naut mis (185 km) short of Ponape Island, in
the eastern Carolines. Operation Hikari called for the attack on
Ulithi to be mounted on 17 August, but, unbeknown to Capt Ariizumi,
the commander of the I-400, Toshiwo Kusaka, had not received the
signal changing the rendezvous and as ordered was awaiting the arrival
of the I-401 just east of the target atoll.

Two days before the planned launching of Operation Hikari, Japanese
forces throughout Asia and the islands of the Western Pacific laid
down their arms, but the Imperial Navy Headquarters merely postponed
the date of the attack which was now specified as 25 August! On the
morning of 16 August, however, the submarines were informed of the
surrender and ordered to return to Japan. Four days later, Capt
Ariizumi received orders to destroy all offensive weapons and the
three Seirans of I-401 were catapulted from the submarine pilotless
and without their engines being started. Insofar as the Seirans aboard
the I-400 were concerned, these were dragged from their hangar, holed
and pushed overboard, the submarines themselves surrendering at sea on
27 and 29 August. Thus came to an ignominious conclusion one of the
most imaginative schemes for strategic aerial attack conceived during
World War II by any of its participants. With it terminated the story
of submarine-borne aircraft, at least, until now. There have, since
World War II, been feasibility studies for aircraft accommodated by
and launched from submarines, but as yet such have remained on the
drawing boards. Today, the subject of submarine aviation is confined
to the pages of history, but tomorrow . . . ?

Eugene Griessel




Eugene L Griessel

[Bill]

On Thu, 13 Jun 2013 09:06:59 +0100, Jeff <je...@assystems.com> wrote:



>Many navies including the USN and the RN toyed with the concept, most
>gave up. The RN after the loss of the M2 whic had been successful until
>the accident.
>

Oh come on.

It was a converted 'K class'.

At some point it was going to sink in an accident, they all did...

<well, not quite all, but you know what I mean>

[Dean Markley]

M-2 was not a converted K class.

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Thu, 13 Jun 2013 03:54:40 -0700 (PDT), Dean Markley

<dama...@gmail.com> wrote:

>M-2 was not a converted K class.

Indeed not - it was a converted M class. Powered by two Vickers 12
cylinder diesels of 1200 hp. Four M class boats were laid down in
1916, three commissioned. M-2 was converted to a seaplane carrier in
1928 and M-3 to a minelayer. M-1 having been lost after being rammed
by a freighter in 1925. The K class were longer and heavier boats.

Eugene L Griessel

[Bill]

On Thu, 13 Jun 2013 03:54:40 -0700 (PDT), Dean Markley
<dama...@gmail.com> wrote:

>M-2 was not a converted K class.

I thought they were K17 to K21.

They were certainly about as lucky...

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Thu, 13 Jun 2013 12:46:53 +0100, Bill <black...@gmail.com>
wrote:

Submarines were not particularly lucky in the early days.

Eugene L Griessel

[tutall]

On Jun 13, 2:24 am, Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:

<SNIP>

Thank you Gene.

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Thu, 13 Jun 2013 11:24:36 +0200, Eugene Griessel
<eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:

Let us not forget, while on the subject, the German submarine-towed
autogyro project as an aerial observation post. Here is one in
action: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gP6VnbeWXSY


Eugene L Griessel

[Keith W]

Thats not how I read it, the worst problem seems to have been
that the IJN crews were very casual about hygiene with left over
food and grease on every surface and rats running around the place.

Once the boat had been cleaned and fumigated it was apparently
very stable , habitability was OK although it had a much smaller
crew than her wartime complement and had some very nice features
that no US fleet submarine had at the time. These included a recording
fathometer
that facilitated navigation using soundings, and a shallow depth gauge
with a cross section of the ship's hull painted on the scale from the
waterline
to the tip of the periscopes to tell the Diving Officer at a glance how much
of his superstructure was still exposed while submerging.

This being a US Boat however it did one new piece of equipment
in the form of an ice cream maker.

Keith

[a425couple]

"Eugene Griessel" <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote in message...

> Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:
>>, Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:
>>>Air International of October 1989 had a rather thorough article on the
>>>whole scheme.
>
> Here is the second part of that article. Scanning errors are mine.
> Disruption of planning

> The first prototype of the Seiran ---------snip

> Today, the subject of submarine aviation is confined
> to the pages of history, but tomorrow . . . ?
> Eugene Griessel

Jack Linthicum wishes to post:

Eugene has filled in the blanks which I don't have the ability to make.
Some differences from the book but enough to create the whole
shrinking story down to the end. The weight of the devices carried
by the Seirans is given as 1760 pounds in the book. I would imagine
Adm. Yamamoto's scheme would have featured attacks on the
Empire State Building and Chrysler Building would have had a
similar effect to the 9/11 hits. The death of Adm Yamamoto in
April 1973 started the shrinking of the Sen-toku from 18 to 10
boats. The Naval General Staff had enough nay-sayers to further
shrink the plan.

As for the confusion between some Italian plan and Yamamoto's
grand plan I have only given what was in the book.
If you want to read about the game after the game try "Trans-Pacific
Voyage of the H.I.J.M.S. I-400" in the internet.

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Thu, 13 Jun 2013 16:13:02 -0700, "a425couple"

<a425c...@hotmail.com> wrote:

>The weight of the devices carried
>by the Seirans is given as 1760 pounds in the book.

Probably a slight conversion error. The actual weights were specified
in kilogrammes. Even then they were probably nominal weights - 850 kg
torpedo, 800 kg bomb or two 250 kg bombs. Such exact weights are
seldom reflected in the actual weight of the ordnance. The standard
aerial torpedo at the time was available in three sizes: mod 3: 849
kg, mod 4: 921 kg and mod 7: 1,052 kg. Those weights more or less
reflect the actual weight of the torpedoes rather than the nominal
weights. The mod 3 torpedo would have weighed in at 1871.72 pounds
whereas the article states 1874 pounds which would be a ballpark
conversion of 850 kg. According to my rather fundamental list of
Japanese naval bombs - the No 80 (800 kg nominal weight) bomb actually
weighed 799.5 kgs - which would give the ballpark conversion of 1760
pounds. Depending on how many coats of paint and other small factors!

Eugene L Griessel

[Jeffrey Hamilton]

I'll add my thanks here too, Eugene, that was a very interesting read.

cheers....Jeff

[Keith W]

a425couple wrote:
> "Eugene Griessel" <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote in message...
>> Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:
>>> , Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:
>>>> Air International of October 1989 had a rather thorough article on
>>>> the whole scheme.
>>
>> Here is the second part of that article. Scanning errors are mine.
>> Disruption of planning
>> The first prototype of the Seiran ---------snip
>> Today, the subject of submarine aviation is confined
>> to the pages of history, but tomorrow . . . ?
>> Eugene Griessel
>
> Jack Linthicum wishes to post:
> Eugene has filled in the blanks which I don't have the ability to
> make. Some differences from the book but enough to create the whole
> shrinking story down to the end. The weight of the devices carried
> by the Seirans is given as 1760 pounds in the book. I would imagine
> Adm. Yamamoto's scheme would have featured attacks on the
> Empire State Building and Chrysler Building would have had a
> similar effect to the 9/11 hits.

Assuming they had succeeded. By 1943 its much more likely the
submarine would have been detected and sunk. The Atlantic at that
period was a dammed dangerous place for a submarine, especially
one as large as the I-400 on the surface launching aircraft.

As for the impact of the attack I suspect the physical damage would
be far less that occurred on 9/11. The energy release from the
impact of fully loaded jets at 500 mph and the quantity of unburned
fuel spewed into the buildings dwarfs the payload of a Seiran.
I would expect to see damage of the scale inflicted when a
B-25 hit the Empire State building in July 1945.

At best it has the effect of making the Americans even more
determined to make Japan surrender unconditionally at worst
such an attack has the result of Japan being treated more
harshly after the surrender.

Keith

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Fri, 14 Jun 2013 09:49:24 +0100, "Keith W"

<keithnosp...@demon.co.uk> wrote:

>> Jack Linthicum wishes to post:
>> Eugene has filled in the blanks which I don't have the ability to
>> make. Some differences from the book but enough to create the whole
>> shrinking story down to the end. The weight of the devices carried
>> by the Seirans is given as 1760 pounds in the book. I would imagine
>> Adm. Yamamoto's scheme would have featured attacks on the
>> Empire State Building and Chrysler Building would have had a
>> similar effect to the 9/11 hits.
>
>Assuming they had succeeded. By 1943 its much more likely the
>submarine would have been detected and sunk. The Atlantic at that
>period was a dammed dangerous place for a submarine, especially
>one as large as the I-400 on the surface launching aircraft.
>
>As for the impact of the attack I suspect the physical damage would
>be far less that occurred on 9/11. The energy release from the
>impact of fully loaded jets at 500 mph and the quantity of unburned
>fuel spewed into the buildings dwarfs the payload of a Seiran.
>I would expect to see damage of the scale inflicted when a
>B-25 hit the Empire State building in July 1945.
>
>At best it has the effect of making the Americans even more
>determined to make Japan surrender unconditionally at worst
>such an attack has the result of Japan being treated more
>harshly after the surrender.

If I was them - and wishing to make some sort of effective attack on
New York - I'd try and sink a few ships in strategic places making
harbour traffic difficult for a while. However I doubt it would have
had the slightest effect on the flow of war materials to the Pacific.

Eugene L Griessel

[Keith W]

Laying a few mines off San Diego and in the approaches to
San Francisco would have been far more disruptive and eminently
doable. Of course the only minelaying submarines they had where
the old I-121 class boats which were copies of a German WW1
design. They seem mainly to have been used as supply boats
for isolated bases. The USN in contrast disrupted Japanese
shipping wit submarine and air dropped mines frequently
forcing the closure of Japanese ports for days at a time.

The use of mines was rare by the IJN in WW2, presumably it
want sufficiently in keeping with Bushido. Its off though
as they had some success with them in the Russo Japanese
war of 1905.

Keith

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Fri, 14 Jun 2013 12:59:27 +0100, "Keith W"

They used the 4 minelayers offensively in the early part of the war
but two were sunk pretty early (May and August 1942) - leaving only
two which were used for training. The IJN failed to grasp, in many
ways, the most useful way to employ submarines and their sub force was
often squandered on futile pursuits like running supplies to
beleagured outposts.

Eugene L Griessel

[John Szalay]

Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote in

news:hs3jr85882omscj9u...@4ax.com:

> Op Thu, 13 Jun 2013 09:34:05 +0200, Eugene Griessel
> <e
>

> Eugene Griessel
>
> SNIP
>
>
> Eugene L Griessel
>


Just to add to the noise level.

http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/HURL/gallery/archaeology/I-401.html

[David E. Powell]

Eugene - Thank you for the sub info, it is much appreciated.

I sometimes wonder why they didn't go more into "Drumbeat" mode. Not sure if the West Coast had a better system than the East Coast early on, they did make raids like the well known shore bombardments in California. However going for U.S. Coastal shipping, or supply routes, would be something dangerous they could use subs for. Also during battles like the Solomon Islands campaigns, though U.S. Convoys involved in that campaign were very well escorted. I know they sent submarines, but I don't believe they ever tried anything like the German Wolf Packs.

[Derek Lyons]

"a425couple" <a425c...@hotmail.com> wrote:

>Jack Linthicum wishes to post:

>Dust cover note for Operation Storm
>
>In 1941, the architects of Japan's sneak attack on Pearl Harbor
>planned a bold follow-up: a potentially devastating air raid--
>this time again at New York City and Washington, DC.

Potentially devastating? To believe so requires ingesting dosages of
hallucenogenic compounds at or beyond the LD50 level.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

[Derek Lyons]

True... but the British K and M classes still managed to collectively
set the right hand edge of the curve.

I mean, what other class had two sunk and four damaged in the span of
a little more than an hour *in a peacetime exercise*?

[Keith W]

Their attitude to submarine warfare was mind blowing. I recall
listening with amazement to an interview with an IJN submarine
skipper who was talking about a war time patrol during the
Marianas campaign. He returned without firing a shot because
in his words 'We had 3 sightings but they were not warships
and so didnt merit a torpedo'

Keith

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Fri, 14 Jun 2013 18:24:32 GMT, fair...@gmail.com (Derek Lyons)
wrote:

>Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:
>
>>Op Thu, 13 Jun 2013 12:46:53 +0100, Bill <black...@gmail.com>
>>wrote:
>>
>>>On Thu, 13 Jun 2013 03:54:40 -0700 (PDT), Dean Markley
>>><dama...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>M-2 was not a converted K class.
>>>
>>>I thought they were K17 to K21.
>>>
>>>They were certainly about as lucky...
>>
>>Submarines were not particularly lucky in the early days.
>
>True... but the British K and M classes still managed to collectively
>set the right hand edge of the curve.
>
>I mean, what other class had two sunk and four damaged in the span of
>a little more than an hour *in a peacetime exercise*?

Despite their design problems the battle of May Island can hardly be
blamed on it. It was a tactical blunder - compounded by a faulty
doctrine of having submarines working with the fleet that was largely
to blame. Only the loss of the M-2 could be attributed to
crew/equipment failure. Being rammed by a merchant ship happens with
monotonous regularity today even!

Eugene L Griessel

[Keith W]

Derek Lyons wrote:
> Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:
>
>> Op Thu, 13 Jun 2013 12:46:53 +0100, Bill <black...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, 13 Jun 2013 03:54:40 -0700 (PDT), Dean Markley
>>> <dama...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> M-2 was not a converted K class.
>>>
>>> I thought they were K17 to K21.
>>>
>>> They were certainly about as lucky...
>>
>> Submarines were not particularly lucky in the early days.
>
> True... but the British K and M classes still managed to collectively
> set the right hand edge of the curve.
>
> I mean, what other class had two sunk and four damaged in the span of
> a little more than an hour *in a peacetime exercise*?
>
> D.

Well there was a clas of US destroyer that did better
when in 1924 9 of 14 Destroyers of the Clemson class
ran onto the rocks at Honda Point with the loss of 7 ships
and 23 sailors.

Keith
Keith

[cman...@gmail.com]

On Friday, June 14, 2013 2:24:32 PM UTC-4, Derek Lyons wrote:
> I mean, what other class had two sunk and four damaged in the span of
> a little more than an hour *in a peacetime exercise*?

While there were no Germans present, the Battle of May Island took place during World War One.

Chris Manteuffel

[tutall]

On Jun 14, 8:17 am, "David E. Powell" <David_Powell3...@msn.com>
wrote:

> On Friday, June 14, 2013 9:31:31 AM UTC-4, Eugene Griessel wrote:
> > Op Fri, 14 Jun 2013 12:59:27 +0100, "Keith W"
>

> > <keithnospoofsple...@demon.co.uk>  wrote:

>
> > >Laying a few mines off San Diego and in the approaches to
>
> > >San Francisco would have been far more disruptive and eminently
>
> > >doable. Of course the only minelaying submarines they had where
>
> > >the old I-121 class boats which were copies of a German WW1
>
> > >design. They seem mainly to have been used as supply boats
>
> > >for isolated bases. The USN in contrast disrupted Japanese
>
> > >shipping wit submarine and air dropped mines frequently
>
> > >forcing the closure of Japanese ports for days at a time.
>
> > >The use of mines was rare by the IJN in WW2, presumably it
>
> > >want sufficiently in keeping with Bushido. Its off though
>
> > >as they had some success with them in the Russo Japanese
>
> > >war of 1905.
>
> > They used the 4 minelayers offensively in the early part of the war
>
> > but two were sunk pretty early (May and August 1942) - leaving only
>
> > two which were used for training.  The IJN failed to grasp, in many
>
> > ways, the most useful way to employ submarines and their sub force was
>
> > often squandered on futile pursuits like running supplies to
>
> > beleagured outposts.
>
> > Eugene L Griessel
>
> Eugene - Thank you for the sub info, it is much appreciated.
>
> I sometimes wonder why they didn't go more into "Drumbeat" mode.

Come on David, how many times have you read about the shortfalls of
Japanese submarine doctrine now?

[David E. Powell]

Several, but that doesn't mean I'm still not surprised they didn't do more like the Germans did, or any number of others that sent subs out against commerce in a more aggressive fashion.

[Andrew Swallow]

Sun Tzu did not recommend attacks on supply lines in 'The Art of War'.
Also such attacks do not work in the game 'GO'. They were trying to
fight infantry land battles on the sea.

Andrew Swallow

[Eugene Griessel]

And what better formula for disaster could there be than a bunch of
battlecruisers, destroyers and submarines on the surface at night, in
formation, doing 20 knots?

Eugene L Griessel

[Kerryn Offord]

But he does suggest attacking baggage trains...
http://suntzusaid.com/book/12

Which is the closest they had to lines of supply in his day....

[Keith W]

Amateurs talk tactics but professionals talk logistics.

The requirements of armies have changed since the days
of Sun Tzu. Napoleon led huge armies to Russia and
Spain where they starved. Wellington and Marlborough
before him made sure their armies had supplies from food
and ammunition to boots and spare uniforms available.

Rommel was beaten in North Africa because his logistics
were inadequate. While the DAK was better equipped
and lead than the 8th Army it was permanently short of
supplies, fuel and ammunition. Montgomery made sure
his army was always amply supplied with the requirement
of war making.

Keith

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 15/06/2013 01:24, Keith W ha scritto:

> Amateurs talk tactics but professionals talk logistics.
>
> The requirements of armies have changed since the days
> of Sun Tzu. Napoleon led huge armies to Russia and
> Spain where they starved. Wellington and Marlborough
> before him made sure their armies had supplies from food
> and ammunition to boots and spare uniforms available.
>
> Rommel was beaten in North Africa because his logistics
> were inadequate. While the DAK was better equipped
> and lead than the 8th Army it was permanently short of
> supplies, fuel and ammunition. Montgomery made sure
> his army was always amply supplied with the requirement
> of war making.

I can point, of all campaigns, that North Africa was, in the end, won
because of attacks on supply lines ?

Best regards from Italy,
dott. Piergiorgio.

[Keith W]

Absolutely and the reason this was possible was Rommel
overuled Kesselring who wanted to invade Malta. The air assets
necessary for the invasion were transferred to the Afrika Corps
as a result of Hitler being promised Egypt if he got them.

Keith

[dott.Piergiorgio]

In the end the assets you cite (Folgore para div) in the end allow the
final bloodletting of the British Empire (where lies the actual Italian
"victory"); historical estimates here put the point of no return on the
"open jugular" around spring 1943; a quick victory at El Alamein will
have sutured the Jugular no late than the winter 1942-3, even at the
price of temporarily losing Malta (pls. notice the shorter endurance of
axis air assets)

The stubborn southern resistance of the Paras (Folgore & Ramcke KG)
allow the opening of the Tunisian redoubt, and the resulting Imperial
bloodletting was the turning point in the allied balance of power.

This aside the unhappy choice of ABC as leader of the Med Naval war
(IMHO was the least Nelsonian of WWII british Admiral)

Best regards from Italy,
dott Piergiorgio.

[Keith W]

It think you are overstating the importance of Italian military efforts.

The reality is that while the North African campaign cost the
Commonwealth forces 200,000 casualties including around
40,000 killed the axis losses were far greater at over 950,000
over half of which were Italian.

> The stubborn southern resistance of the Paras (Folgore & Ramcke KG)
> allow the opening of the Tunisian redoubt, and the resulting Imperial
> bloodletting was the turning point in the allied balance of power.
>

Its worth recalling that the battles of the Mareth line started with
an Axis offensive called Operation Capri which was decisively
beaten off with great loss. The initial offensive by 50th
Northumbrian smashed through the Italian lines and only
a counterattack by 15th Panzer Division saved them.
The British then attacked on the left flank and the Axis
srmy had to hurriedly withdraw to avoid encirclement
at the end of March. Axis resitance had lasted little more
than a week.

It was too little avail as by 7th May British forces had taken
Tunis and by 13th May the entire Axis force of over 230,000
men had surrendered.

So 'weakened' were the allied forces that they invaded Italy and
forced the capitulation of Italy before invading France and advancing to
the Oder.

> This aside the unhappy choice of ABC as leader of the Med Naval war
> (IMHO was the least Nelsonian of WWII british Admiral)
>

Given the fact that the bulk of the Italian Fleet ended up surrendering to
the RN and being interned in Malta that seems an odd conclusion.

Keith

[george152]

History is a bitch for those who don't know or ignore it when posting :)

[Bill]

Well the K Class were developed because the tactical doctrine of the
day said that an ideal combination would be fast submarines scouting
ahead of a battlefleet.

That idea may well have been sound.

Indeed there was a lot of talk in the Cold War about Soviet submarines
scouting ahead of their surface units (or just below a spy trawler)
and launching cruise missiles as they came...

Of course what they didn't have in WWI was radar...

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Sun, 16 Jun 2013 16:28:40 +0100, Bill <black...@gmail.com>
wrote:

>Well the K Class were developed because the tactical doctrine of the
>day said that an ideal combination would be fast submarines scouting
>ahead of a battlefleet.
>
>That idea may well have been sound.

The doctrine was unsound until the advent of the nuclear submarine -
and was at the time vehemently opposed by a number of RN officers who
knew just a little more about submarines than Jacky Fisher did. They
based their opposition on sound experience of trying to work surface
ships and submarines together. That was reinforced by what happened
at the Battle of the Heligoland Bight.


Eugene L Griessel

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 15/06/2013 21:21, Keith W ha scritto:

> It think you are overstating the importance of Italian military efforts.

you seems to not 100% understanding it, perhaps you're hypnotized by the
too effective british propaganda....

> The reality is that while the North African campaign cost the
> Commonwealth forces 200,000 casualties including around
> 40,000 killed the axis losses were far greater at over 950,000
> over half of which were Italian.

usual british propaganda.... the great bulk of Italian surrenders, so
aren't to be counted to casualties... and also Germans surrenders,
notably in Tunisia.

>> The stubborn southern resistance of the Paras (Folgore & Ramcke KG)
>> allow the opening of the Tunisian redoubt, and the resulting Imperial
>> bloodletting was the turning point in the allied balance of power.
>>
>
> Its worth recalling that the battles of the Mareth line started with
> an Axis offensive called Operation Capri which was decisively
> beaten off with great loss. The initial offensive by 50th
> Northumbrian smashed through the Italian lines and only
> a counterattack by 15th Panzer Division saved them.
> The British then attacked on the left flank and the Axis
> srmy had to hurriedly withdraw to avoid encirclement
> at the end of March. Axis resitance had lasted little more
> than a week.

"smashed through"... typical british propaganda wording...

> It was too little avail as by 7th May British forces had taken
> Tunis and by 13th May the entire Axis force of over 230,000
> men had surrendered.

you care to look upon who surrendered first ? (hint: wasn't the usual
suspect...)

> So 'weakened' were the allied forces that they invaded Italy and
> forced the capitulation of Italy before invading France and advancing to
> the Oder.

... and only the foul mouth of an US general (Patton, of course) saves
the day at Gela, then the blunders of the Hermann Goering division
sealed the fate of the lone effective Italian division in theatre
(Livorno division) and of Sicily... whose was the first allied operation
led mainly by US.

>> This aside the unhappy choice of ABC as leader of the Med Naval war
>> (IMHO was the least Nelsonian of WWII british Admiral)

well, I have counted at least three good occasion to really put out
Italian navy out of the picture (after Taranto, between Matapan and the
hunt for the Bismarck, and after Italian Navy was worn out after the
contrast of Vigorous and Pedestal, when OTOH of Howe and Anson was
available but was never exploited (the basic requirement is true
Nelsonian spirit and capital ships capable of negating the speed
difference, that was, the KGVs the BCs and the carriers); and the basic
concept was available, because Operation Grog shows that forcing Italian
Navy to leave port IS possible) and after the removal of the
heavyweights the Italian lightweight (nasty ships, indeed, but
manageable because Malta became safe to cruisers (side note, RN don't
deploy much CAs in Med, and this even prior of Matapan...) and his war
of attrition led straight to the demise of the British Empire because of
the cut of the direct communication to the Eastern parts of the Empire....

so, my opinion is that ABC, instead of being created Peer, ought to be
hanged as already done to Adm. Byng (his lack of will to effectively
engage cost Britannia much more than Minorca: the entire British Empire)

>
> Given the fact that the bulk of the Italian Fleet ended up surrendering to
> the RN and being interned in Malta that seems an odd conclusion.

and you never asked yourself what will be happened if Salerno was
contrasted by that trio of Mediterrannean Behemoths and Italian/german
airforce ? (hint: the distance between Salerno and Spezia is much
smaller than Hashirajima and Okinawa, and that between Sardinia and
Salerno even much smaller than Formosa and Okinawa... and Japan don't
have ASuW missiles as we learnedin the hard way that Germans have) and
by the way, the british surge was after US concedes to replace the KGVs
with a pair of their fast BB, and the entire affair was led by US
(knowing that UK manages to land their own boots in the most wrong place
to put boots in Italy (Calabria.... the least non-alpine place in
Europe for mobile warfare, without Salerno & the armistice will end in a
bogging worster than Anzio & Cassino combined) US leadership after
mid-1943 was a good thing for everyone involved)

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 15/06/2013 22:22, george152 ha scritto:

> History is a bitch for those who don't know or ignore it when posting :)

well, for obvious reasons I have access to untranslated primary &
secondary sources.... ;)

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Tue, 18 Jun 2013 04:06:12 +0200, "dott.Piergiorgio"

<chied...@ask.me> wrote:

>Il 15/06/2013 22:22, george152 ha scritto:
>
>> History is a bitch for those who don't know or ignore it when posting :)
>
>well, for obvious reasons I have access to untranslated primary &
>secondary sources.... ;)

I had a relative who commanded an Italian brigade in North Africa. He
thought they were absolutely useless. But then he was German....

Eugene L Griessel

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Tue, 18 Jun 2013 04:04:30 +0200, "dott.Piergiorgio"
<chied...@ask.me> wrote:

>usual british propaganda....

Seems you fall far too easily for the usual Italian propaganda.

Eugene L Griessel

[george152]

On 18/06/13 14:06, dott.Piergiorgio wrote:
> Il 15/06/2013 22:22, george152 ha scritto:
>
>> History is a bitch for those who don't know or ignore it when posting :)
>
> well, for obvious reasons I have access to untranslated primary &
> secondary sources.... ;)
>

Italian WW2 propaganda as served up to the Italian populace has a slight
credibility gap

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Tue, 18 Jun 2013 16:38:32 +1200, george152 <gbl...@hnpl.net>
wrote:

>Italian WW2 propaganda as served up to the Italian populace has a slight
>credibility gap

I had a bunch of uncles who fought their way through East Africa,
North Africa, Sicily and Italy. I have no need of "British
propaganda" as the apologist, revisionist dott.Piergiorgio so quaintly
calls it. One of my favourite signals was one from a unit complaining
that the Italian army in Ethiopia was retreating far faster than the
South African unit could possibly advance....

Eugene L Griessel

[Keith W]

dott.Piergiorgio wrote:
> Il 15/06/2013 21:21, Keith W ha scritto:
>
>> It think you are overstating the importance of Italian military
>> efforts.
>
> you seems to not 100% understanding it, perhaps you're hypnotized by
> the too effective british propaganda....
>

Actually I understand it very well

>> The reality is that while the North African campaign cost the
>> Commonwealth forces 200,000 casualties including around
>> 40,000 killed the axis losses were far greater at over 950,000
>> over half of which were Italian.
>
> usual british propaganda.... the great bulk of Italian surrenders, so
> aren't to be counted to casualties... and also Germans surrenders,
> notably in Tunisia.
>

Given that prisoners were a nett loss to the combatant is not unusual
to include them which I did for both sides.

>>> The stubborn southern resistance of the Paras (Folgore & Ramcke KG)
>>> allow the opening of the Tunisian redoubt, and the resulting
>>> Imperial bloodletting was the turning point in the allied balance
>>> of power.
>>
>> Its worth recalling that the battles of the Mareth line started with
>> an Axis offensive called Operation Capri which was decisively
>> beaten off with great loss. The initial offensive by 50th
>> Northumbrian smashed through the Italian lines and only
>> a counterattack by 15th Panzer Division saved them.
>> The British then attacked on the left flank and the Axis
>> srmy had to hurriedly withdraw to avoid encirclement
>> at the end of March. Axis resitance had lasted little more
>> than a week.
>
> "smashed through"... typical british propaganda wording...
>

They took the position in a single night attack by 3 infantry battalions

>> It was too little avail as by 7th May British forces had taken
>> Tunis and by 13th May the entire Axis force of over 230,000
>> men had surrendered.
>
> you care to look upon who surrendered first ? (hint: wasn't the usual
> suspect...)
>
>> So 'weakened' were the allied forces that they invaded Italy and
>> forced the capitulation of Italy before invading France and
>> advancing to the Oder.
>
> ... and only the foul mouth of an US general (Patton, of course) saves
> the day at Gela, then the blunders of the Hermann Goering division
> sealed the fate of the lone effective Italian division in theatre
> (Livorno division) and of Sicily... whose was the first allied
> operation led mainly by US.
>

Ah excuses

>>> This aside the unhappy choice of ABC as leader of the Med Naval war
>>> (IMHO was the least Nelsonian of WWII british Admiral)
>
> well, I have counted at least three good occasion to really put out
> Italian navy out of the picture (after Taranto, between Matapan and
> the hunt for the Bismarck, and after Italian Navy was worn out after
> the contrast of Vigorous and Pedestal, when OTOH of Howe and Anson was
> available but was never exploited (the basic requirement is true
> Nelsonian spirit and capital ships capable of negating the speed
> difference, that was, the KGVs the BCs and the carriers); and the
> basic concept was available, because Operation Grog shows that
> forcing Italian Navy to leave port IS possible) and after the removal
> of the

HMS Anson was rather busy covering the Murmansk run until mid 1944
while the Howe was not transferred to the Med until the Allied invasion
of Scicily so neither was in fact available.

Germany was simply considered more dangerous and the resources
you mention were not made available to Cunningham. Fact is
the Americans rightly regarded the MTO as something of a
sideshow with the invasion of France being the main event.

Keith

[Keith W]

My father had a photo of a single British infantry squad escorting
an entire Italian batallion back to the rail head to be sent to a POW camp
after Ritchies first campaign. The Italian soldiers were ill trained.
ill equipped and incredibly badly led.

In Operation Compass a commonwealth force 36,000 strong attacked
the 150,000 strong Italian defenders. In 10 weeks the Commonwealth
army advanced 800 km, captured 400 tanks,1290 artillery pieces
and 130,000 Italians including 22 generals for a total of 2,000
allied casualties.

This must be some new definition of being bled white.

Keith

[dott.Piergiorgio]

for "primary sources" I mean all those reports, memos & military
paperwork output whose generally ends forming large appendix of
monographic texts, whose as qualitative standards are on par with the US
Army green books.... I have little use of pre-1950s italian books, if
not for the sake of historiography (esp. on Naval matters, there's hints
that actually was some serious post-war suspects and doubts on actual HM
SIGINT prior of the disclosure of ULTRA, but I'm still looking upon
those hints)

On the challenge from Gene (naming his relative's mixed kampfgruppe (I'm
positively sure that WWI Italian army don't have brigades per se, and
the diminutive italian divisions are larger than actual brigades, I
infer that his relative speaks about his KG) I will later check the
four-volume Montanari on that unit... In the meantime I will remember
him about his questionable comparing apples with oranges (Von Letttow's
context with that of the Duke of Aosta....)

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Again with that Ethopian Campaign ?? your uncle surely don't tell you
the actual tactical situation.... so pls tell more details... (and
remember, I know and have applied on the field the "square/cube root
rule" of parsing reports & remembrances....)

and, c'mon, is normally usual for every wictor to talk magnificently
about the vanquished armies, for better shining their triumph, and UK
exception of this rule is more than suspect, do you have an explanation
on this ?

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 18/06/2013 09:43, Keith W ha scritto:

> My father had a photo of a single British infantry squad escorting
> an entire Italian batallion back to the rail head to be sent to a POW camp
> after Ritchies first campaign. The Italian soldiers were ill trained.
> ill equipped and incredibly badly led.
>
> In Operation Compass a commonwealth force 36,000 strong attacked
> the 150,000 strong Italian defenders. In 10 weeks the Commonwealth
> army advanced 800 km, captured 400 tanks,1290 artillery pieces
> and 130,000 Italians including 22 generals for a total of 2,000
> allied casualties.
>
> This must be some new definition of being bled white.

first thing first, giving Caesar's what's of Caesar: Compass's merit are
much more of O'connor (the first to fully understand tank manoeuvre in
tank's lands) than Ritchie...

then, one-third of POW was Italian as baby Gaddafi was (meaning, the men
of the three Libyan divisions formed from former colonial units when
Libya was given metropolitan status in late 1930s) and formed the bulk
of the frontline, and the divisions from Italy suffered from the inrush
of war complements

on the ill-equipment I fully concur; there was a lack of critical
supplies (AP shots is the main shortfall) and in the end there was
improvisations as the motor cannon (think oversize technical with a 3"
or 4" *naval* gun)

On the ill-led, Italian army was always on the philosophy "young rider,
old horse", and generally the actual handling of the platoons, and even
companies was in the hands of senior career NCO, but with units swamped
with just-recalled complement sub Lt.s and Lt.s and troops there was an
umbalance in small unit leadership (aside the lack of proper orientation
on the desert theatre...) and too many senior officiers was actually
*too* capable in leadership, and when fell KIA or POW the unit morale
collapses; and the top leadership (graziani) was simply the worst an
italian army has, on par with cadorna, and this says all.

So, the O'connor (NOT Ritchie) offensive was destined to win, but fails
to fully win: taking Tripoli prior of the arrival of the Afrikakorps is
suturing half of the jugular, and surging in the Med Hood, Renown and
Repulse with Ark Royal and another carrier (either Eagle or Hermes) with
five CAs (best if at least three Londons or Norfolks) and not few CLs of
the Town class should have closed the Med War and sutured the jugular by
spring 1941)

[dott.Piergiorgio]

I have already explained what I mean for primary sources...

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 18/06/2013 09:35, Keith W ha scritto:

> Germany was simply considered more dangerous and the resources
> you mention were not made available to Cunningham. Fact is
> the Americans rightly regarded the MTO as something of a
> sideshow with the invasion of France being the main event.

Agree that France is a best road toward Germany than Italy, but in the
end, today US VIth Fleet far surpass in size and capability the entire
RN... and this because of the "sideshow", as you like to call....

... still you eluded the main argument: what actually happened in NA and
Med during 1940-3, when the fate of the British Empire was sealed ?

[Bill]

On Tue, 18 Jun 2013 04:04:30 +0200, "dott.Piergiorgio"
<chied...@ask.me> wrote:


>>> This aside the unhappy choice of ABC as leader of the Med Naval war
>>> (IMHO was the least Nelsonian of WWII british Admiral)
>
>well, I have counted at least three good occasion to really put out
>Italian navy out of the picture (after Taranto, between Matapan and the
>hunt for the Bismarck, and after Italian Navy was worn out after the
>contrast of Vigorous and Pedestal, when OTOH of Howe and Anson was
>available but was never exploited (the basic requirement is true
>Nelsonian spirit and capital ships capable of negating the speed
>difference, that was, the KGVs the BCs and the carriers); and the basic
>concept was available, because Operation Grog shows that forcing Italian
>Navy to leave port IS possible) and after the removal of the
>heavyweights the Italian lightweight (nasty ships, indeed, but
>manageable because Malta became safe to cruisers (side note, RN don't
>deploy much CAs in Med, and this even prior of Matapan...) and his war
>of attrition led straight to the demise of the British Empire because of
>the cut of the direct communication to the Eastern parts of the Empire....
>
>so, my opinion is that ABC, instead of being created Peer, ought to be
>hanged as already done to Adm. Byng (his lack of will to effectively
>engage cost Britannia much more than Minorca: the entire British Empire)

You can almost taste the bitterness...

"Please to inform your Lordships that the Italian battle fleet now
lies at anchor under the guns of the fortress of Malta."

[Bill]

On Tue, 18 Jun 2013 12:36:07 +0200, "dott.Piergiorgio"
<chied...@ask.me> wrote:

>Il 18/06/2013 05:33, Eugene Griessel ha scritto:
>> Op Tue, 18 Jun 2013 04:04:30 +0200, "dott.Piergiorgio"
>> <chied...@ask.me> wrote:
>>
>>> usual british propaganda....
>>
>> Seems you fall far too easily for the usual Italian propaganda.
>
>I have already explained what I mean for primary sources...

The British primary sources have lots of stuff as well, including a
signal that reads:

"Please to inform your Lordships that the Italian battle fleet now

lies at anchor under the guns of the fortress of Malta."[

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 18/06/2013 12:56, Bill ha scritto:

> You can almost taste the bitterness...
>
> "Please to inform your Lordships that the Italian battle fleet now
> lies at anchor under the guns of the fortress of Malta."

well, the bitterness is understandable, because by Summer 1943 was clear
that Britannia has lost his rule of waves and now US is the top-dog...

.. on top of it UK bitterness towards Italy gives US an easy playing of
"good cop" role towards defeated Italy, reaping large profits, esp. in
strenghtening their control of Med sea...

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Tue, 18 Jun 2013 11:51:12 +0200, "dott.Piergiorgio"

<chied...@ask.me> wrote:

>Again with that Ethopian Campaign ?? your uncle surely don't tell you
>the actual tactical situation.... so pls tell more details... (and

Yes, that glorious Italian action against underwhelming odd. a mighty
defeat snatched from the jaws of victory.

EAST AFRICA CAMPAIGN - PART 1
(dismissed by the good dottore as South African Propaganda I suppose).

Strategic position in May 1940

In May 1940 Italian military superiority was such that it seemed
likely that the British Commonwealth would lose the Sudan and Kenya
and that Egypt, with the vital Suez Canal, would fall as well. Such a
disaster would have left the Axis powers supreme in the Mediterranean
and in a position to drive further south.

By the time Italy declared war on the British Commonwealth on 10 June
1940 the Italian viceroy of Ethiopia, the Duke of Aosta, had at his
disposal air, ground and naval forces which numbered 291 000. This
strength was to increase as reservists were recalled and new troops
were recruited. The Italian ground forces were organised into two
divisions: the Savoy Grenadier and Africa Divisions. These divisions
were supplemented by sixteen Italian battalions, 28 independent
colonial brigades, seventeen independent colonial battalions, two
medium tank companies, one light tank squadron, eight colonial cavalry
groups, twelve artillery groups, twenty-two Banda (irregular) groups
and fifteen Banda detachments. These troops were supported by 325
aircraft, and the Italian Navy had eight submarines and ten destroyers
based at Massawa.

The Italian forces had access to large reserves of fuel, lubricants,
food and ammunition. The Italian artillery was numerous, if somewhat
outdated. Some of the guns were of Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) vintage
but in the right hands were still lethal weapons of war. The
obsolescence of the Italian artillery was not the sole source of
Italian weakness. Once war was declared and the Suez Canal closed to
Italian ships, only aircraft could be replaced and these would be
without spares. The army's motor transport, vital if the Italians were
to make use of their interior lines, was worn out and short of tyres.
So while the Italians could increase their numerical strength, their
overall combat effectiveness weakened daily and Italian morale was
already low.

By contrast, the British Commonwealth had deployed, in Kenya, two East
African brigades and two light artillery batteries. The garrison in
British Somaliland consisted of one King's African Rifles battalion
and five companies of the Somaliland Camel Corps. The Sudan frontier
was covered by three British battalions, the Sudan Defence Force, the
Sudan Police and some irregulars. All these forces totalled just under
19 000 men.

To support them, the British Commonwealth could muster 133 aircraft.
The Royal Navy could provide convoy escorts in the Red Sea, but this
essentially defensive measure meant that the naval initiative remained
with the Italians.

Arrival of the South African forces

The British Commonwealth situation was aggravated by the fact that the
Italians had large forces in Libya, and British resources would have
to be divided between Egypt, the Sudan and Kenya, with Egypt enjoying
top priority. The situation worsened with the French collapse in June
1940, leaving the British Commonwealth on its own. This meant that any
help that could come from South Africa was vital, and South African
air and ground forces began arriving in Kenya in May 1940.

The position in Kenya during May 1940 was in fact worse than the
statistics would indicate. The East African brigades were without
logistical support and their motor transport companies were without
vehicles. The air arm consisted of three flights of the Kenya
Auxiliary Air Force and a Rhodesian squadron equipped with various
types of Hart light bombers. In late May 1940 the situation in Kenya
improved dramatically when Nos 11 and 12 Squadrons and No 1 Squadron
SAAF arrived in Kenya with thirteen Junkers JU 86 medium bombers, 24
Hartbeest close support bombers, six Hurricane fighters, six Fury
fighters and one Fairey Battle light bomber. These squadrons
represented one-third of the British Commonwealth's air strength when
Italy declared war on 10 June 1940.

South African ground forces in Kenya consisted of the 1st
Anti-Aircraft Brigade, South African Artillery and No 1 Light Tank
Company, South African Tank Corps. The Anti-Aircraft Brigade was the
only anti-aircraft unit available to defend the vital port of Mombasa,
through which all the British Commonwealth's reinforcements would have
to come. Vital though these troops were to the defence of Kenya, it
was the preliminary arrangements made in May and early June that
changed the military situation in East Africa. On 7 June 1940 the
first convoy of motor vehicles left Broken Hill, Northern Rhodesia
(the present Zambia). It was the forerunner of convoys which brought
13 000 vehicles to Kenya by May 1941. South Africa equipped 33 of its
own motor transport companies as well as 25 East African motor
transport companies. This achievement motorised the East Africa Force,
which still thought in terms of man-carried rather than
vehicle-transported loads. Equally important were the South African
Engineering Corps (SAEC) field companies which started arriving in
Kenya within a week of Italy's declaration of war. By the end of the
campaign there would be 29 SAEC companies in Kenya, Somaliland and
Abyssinia. Aside from the normal military engineering tasks, the SAEC
undertook the essential tasks of road-building and the provision of
water supplies. The success of the South African engineers meant that
a mechanised infantry offensive could be made into southern Abyssinia
and Italian Somaliland,
as the roads broke the desert barrier which the Italians were
expecting to protect them from an attack from the south.
Road-building and water supplies were not the only essential services
provided by the SAEC. They also built the airfields which made the air
offensive from Kenya possible and forced the Regia Aeronautica (the
Royal Italian Air Force) to fight a twofront war. In addition, the
South African engineers compiled the maps which were vital to the
planning and execution of the offensive against Italian Somaliland and
southern Abyssinia. Without these maps, military operations would have
been difficult, if not impossible, as existing maps were inaccurate,
and those of enemy territory
were unobtainable.

The mass of mechanical equipment and motor transport delivered from
South Africa would have to be repaired and maintained on an ongoing
basis. This task was undertaken by the workshops of the South African
Technical Service Corps. They provided the necessary technical
expertise which a modern mechanised war demanded.

The South African Air Force goes to war

While South African ground troops were arriving and being trained, and
the technical arms were preparing the infrastructure necessary for a
modern war, the South African Air Force (SAAF) had not been idle.
Unlike the Italian Supreme Command, the senior British Commonwealth
air force commanders were not content to wait to be attacked.

At 16:45 on 10 June 1940 the British ambassador in Rome was informed
that at one minute past midnight on 11 June, Italy would be at war
with the British Commonwealth. At midnight on 10 June the telephones
rang at Eastleigh airfield, Kenya, and the order came through for the
SAAF's JU 86 bombers to be bombed up for a raid on the Italian
garrison at Moyale, Abyssinia. At 8:00 on II June, the bombers took
off and arrived over their target at 10:00. They dropped their bombs.
It was a more practical reply to the Italian declaration of war than
South Africa's formal one four hours later. The following day No 11
Squadron's Hartbeests began the series of photographic and offensive
patrols that were to strip the protective desert barrier from the
Italians.

On 16 June 1940, the Italian air bases at Yavello and Neghelli and the
army base at Mega were attacked. Vital aircraft were damaged or
destroyed on the ground. The Italians failed to strike back in the
south and by the end of June had lost their best chance for air
superiority. In late June and early July more Hartbeest and Fairey
Battle light bombers were sent from South Africa. The Fairey Battle,
which was massacred over the Meuse bridges in Belgium in May 1940, was
to prove an effective light bomber in East Africa.

Throughout August and September 1940 SAAF squadrons continued to
attack Italian airfields and bases, extending their attentions as far
as Mogadishu. These attacks destroyed fuel tanks and caught Italian
bombers on the ground. Aggressive pilots were to be found in all SAAF
squadrons. Lt C. Kearey flying a Valentia transport aircraft and aided
and abetted by Lt J. Lentzer of the SAEC, constructed a home-made bomb
and dropped it on an Italian fort. Kearey received his rewards: a
severe reprimand and a transfer to a bomber squadron. The Italians
abandoned the fort. By October the SAAF air offensive was achieving
air superiority over southern Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. In
addition, an impressive photo mosaic had been compiled from which the
maps for the ground offensive would be made.

The SAAF's successes had cost it thirteen aircraft. Even those pilots
and aircrew who walked away from their crashed aircraft faced a long
walk home. Some never made it. They died, often alone, without food or
water, either in the dense and trackless bush or the heat-seared
deserts which separated South African bases from their aircrafts'
targets.

By December, a second SAAF Army Cooperation Squadron had arrived and
Glenn-Martin Marylands had been adapted for photo reconnaissance. The
stage was now set for the SAAF to put its improvised techniques of
ground support in order to supplement the meagre artillery resources
of the East Africa Force during the forthcoming offensive from the
south.

El Wak

While the SAAF was achieving air superiority over southern Abyssinia
and Italian Somaliland, South African and West African ground troops
were arriving and training for the forthcoming battles. The West
African regiments, organised into two brigades, arrived at the end of
June 1940. This allowed the 11th and 12th African Divisions to be
formed, although at this stage they were little more than paper
divisions.

The 1st South African Brigade Group arrived in Kenya on 24 July 1940
and immediately began bush warfare training. The men of the East
Africa Force were to be the last British Commonwealth troops to be
properly trained in an operational theatre until Lt Gen B.L.
Montgomery took over the 8th Army in Egypt and Lt Gen W.J. Slim the
14th Army in Burma. The 1st South African Brigade Group's arrival more
than doubled the artillery available to the East Africa Force and
provided the Force's first motorised brigade. Yet its arrival was to
precipitate a command crisis in the East Africa Force.

The South African government, unlike those of New Zealand and
Australia, had placed no restrictions on the employment of South
African troops in Africa. Unfortunately, this was interpreted as a
licence to break up South African higher formations without regard to
operational efficiency or the political consequences. The problem was
aggravated by the fact that until October 1940 the South African
brigades were commanded by colonels instead of brigadiers, and the I
st South African Division was commanded by a brigadier general (George
Brink). This failure to match rank to responsibilities was the last
legacy of the Union Defence Force's penny-pinching policies.

The clash between the South African commanders and Lt Gen D.P.
Dickinson (GOC East Africa Force) had lasting consequences. The
methods that he used in an attempt to force through his reorganisation
plans cost him the trust of the South African government and his South
African subordinates. This distrust was eventually extended to other
British senior officers. In the end Dickinson's reorganisation plans
did not come about, as he was replaced by Lt Gen Sir Alan Cunningham.

The weakness of the 11th and 12th African Divisions in supporting arms
and artillery led to the 1 st South African Brigade Group being sent
to the 12th African Division, and the 1 st South African Division
taking over the newly formed 25th East African Brigade. In addition,
the 1st South African Division had to give up two-thirds of its
artillery component to provide divisional artillery for the 11th and
12th African Divisions.

Fortunately, the disputes within the high command did not interrupt
the 1st South African Brigade Group's training programme. By the end
of October it and the 24th Gold Coast Brigade Group had completed
their training and were ready for action. It had been decided that an
attack on an Italian outpost would round off the training programme.

The Italian positions at El Wak were selected as the target. The South
Africans and Gold Coasters struck on 16 December 1940. The garrison,
estimated by the Italians to be three battalions strong, was attacked
by three South African and two Gold Coast battalions well supported by
artillery, aircraft, armoured cars and tanks. The garrison commander
fled on a bicycle. The British Commonwealth force withdrew
after having killed 208 Italian troops for the loss of two South
Africans killed. The psychological impact of this raid was out of all
proportion to the size of the forces involved or the casualties
sustained. It destroyed the morale of the defenders of Italian
Somaliland and southern Abyssinia, placing them on the defensive and
beginning the disintegration of the Italian colonial troops. It showed
that the fighting skills of the British Commonwealth forces were
greatly superior to those of the Italians and, thanks to South Africa,
they had the means to wage a modern mechanised war. The Italians were
unready for modern war and awaited the end of the rainy season with
considerable anxiety.

The fight for Mega

As the 1st South African Brigade Group was completing its training,
two more South African brigade groups were arriving in Kenya. On 21
October 1940 the 2nd South African Brigade Group landed in Mombasa,
followed by the headquarters of the 1st South African Division on II
November and the 5th South African Brigade Group on 27 November.

At the beginning of December the 1st South African Division took over
responsibility for the Marsabit area. The 2nd South African Brigade
then began patrolling towards the Abyssinian frontier, making
infrequent contact with Italian Banda groups. While the 1st South
African Brigade Group was attacking El Wak, the 1st South African
Division was taking over operational control of the 5th South African
Brigade Group and, by Christmas, had taken over the raw 25th East
African Brigade.

El Wak had changed the British Commonwealth perspective of the
strategic position in East Africa. It was now considered possible to
take the port of Kismayu, thereby removing the threat to Mombasa.
Southern Abyssinia could also be invaded to stimulate an Abyssinian
revolt against the Italians. The responsibility for this invasion was
given to the 1st South African Division. The division's initial task
was to secure the area Dukana-Hobok-Gebel Affur preparatory to
invading southern Abyssinia. The Italians had developed strong
defensive positions at Mega and Moyale which dominated the southern
routes into Abyssinia. Small garrisons were based at Hobok, Gorai,
Buluk, El Yibo and El Sardu. The first targets of the 2nd South
African Brigade Group were the Banda garrisons at El Yibo and El
Sardu.

It took two days to take El Yibo, mainly due to the South African
preference for manoeuvring rather than suffering casualties. The
result was that the Italians abandoned both positions after resisting
strongly on the first day. The terrain, consisting of hot lava beds,
proved more dangerous than the enemy. Having eliminated the El Yibo
and El Sardu garrisons, the 1st South African Division then prepared
to enter Abyssinia and attack the Italians at Gorai, El Gumu and
Hobok.

On 31 January 1941, the mechanised columns of the 1st South African
Division entered Abyssinia en route to Gorai and El Gumu. The fort at
Gorai was stormed by the 1st Field Force Battalion on the afternoon of
1 February, inflicting 77 casualties for the loss of two men. The rest
of the Italian garrison fled before the trap could be closed. El Gumu
was overrun the same day and on the following day Hobok was stormed
with South African-made and -manned armoured cars, allowing the South
Africans to take the positions while suffering few casualties. The
South Africans then paused to bring up supplies and support the
Abyssinian rebellion. The next move was to eliminate the Italian
garrisons at Mega and Moyale.

The South African attack on Mega surprised the Italians, who thought
themselves protected by the Moyale defences and an impregnable
southern escarpment. The South Africans circled the escarpment and cut
Mega's communications with the rest of Abyssinia. Gen Brink's plan was
to attack with the 5th South African Brigade Group from the north and
the 2nd South African Brigade Group from the south. The latter was to
move through El Sod and then go south to cut the Mega-Moyale road.
After this, the brigade was to turn north and attack Mega's southern
defences. The 5th South African Brigade Group was to attack from the
north and capture, in succession, the positions designated Clare
Hill, Kirby Ridge, Dobbs' Ridge and Hill "A".

The 5th SA Brigade Group reached its jumping-off point during the
night of 14/15 February. Unfortunately the 2nd SA Brigade Group's
rearguard was attacked by Italian light tanks, and this caused the
brigade to halt at El Sod for twelve hours. The next day, the 5th SA
Brigade Group secured Clare Hill and spent the night there. On 16
February the 5th SA Brigade Group took Kirby Ridge and Dobbs' Ridge
under heavy shell fire and in pouring rain, while the 2nd SA Brigade
Group moved south and cut the Mega-Moyale road. The 5th SA Brigade
Group seized Hill "A" and the hills to the west of Mega Hill on 17
February The next day, the inner Mega defences were attacked. The
South African Irish captured Fort Hill and then moved in on Mega Fort
itself. Meanwhile, the 3rd Transvaal Scottish took Mega and Big Tree
Hills and
reached Mega Fort from the west. The 2nd SA Brigade Group's 2nd Field
Force Battalion took Consulate Hill. Mega surrendered at 17:00. Moyale
was occupied, unopposed, a few days later.



















Eugene L Griessel

[Bill]

On Tue, 18 Jun 2013 14:40:24 +0200, "dott.Piergiorgio"
<chied...@ask.me> wrote:

>Il 18/06/2013 12:56, Bill ha scritto:
>
>> You can almost taste the bitterness...
>>
>> "Please to inform your Lordships that the Italian battle fleet now
>> lies at anchor under the guns of the fortress of Malta."
>
>well, the bitterness is understandable, because by Summer 1943 was clear
>that Britannia has lost his rule of waves and now US is the top-dog...
>

Well Italy certainly wasn't ruling the waves...

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Tue, 18 Jun 2013 11:51:12 +0200, "dott.Piergiorgio"
<chied...@ask.me> wrote:

EAST AFRICA CAMPAIGN - PART 2

The 4th Australian Division

The attack on Mega and the Juba line had been aided by a deception.
The East Africa Force created the "4th Australian Division" out of
some wireless sets and 60 dummy tanks. By simulating wireless traffic
and "carelessly" allowing Somalis to see the tanks, this division
caused the Italian abandonment of Moyale. It also made the Italians
overextend themselves in attempting to defend the Juba line against
the attacks of the 11th and 12th African Divisions.

Keren and the SAAF

While the main South African contribution to the Abyssinian campaign
was to provide the East Africa Force with the necessary technical and
logistical support, its artillery and air power, and over a third of
its infantry battalions. South Africa made a critical contribution to
the British Commonwealth attack from the north on Abyssinia. The
ground attack was the responsibility of the 4th and 5th Indian
Divisions, but the vital air cover was provided by No 1 Fighter
Squadron SAAF. The squadron arrived at a fighterless Khartourn on 8
August 1940. On 1 September SAAF Gladiators caught two Italian CR 42s
over Kassala and shot them down. The SAAF was not challenged again
over Kassala. On 22 September a flight was sent to Port Sudan to
assist with its air defence during the landing of the 5th Indian
Division there, and the landings took place without interference. The
stormers of the heights of Keren had arrived. Through October and into
November No 1 Fighter Squadron SAAF was engaged in inconclusive
battles with CR 42s. The fight became critical .towards the middle of
November. The 5th Indian Division failed in its attack on Gallabat. K
Flight RAF was wiped out and No 1 Fighter Squadron lost two aircraft
covering the attack. No 1 Fighter Squadron was withdrawn to Khartoum
to reorganise and receive new aircraft. At the beginning of December
the squadron began to receive Hurricane fighters. On 13 December two
were flown to Port Sudan to cover the arrival of the 4th Indian
Division. While the division was being landed, the Italians launched a
series of bombing raids and they lost three bombers to the Hurricanes.
Raids then ceased as Port Sudan was too well defended. The northern
offensive could then take place in February 1941 due to the air cover
provided by No 1 Fighter Squadron.

The Italians were aware that an offensive was imminent and began to
make preparations to withdraw. This, in turn, sped up the British
Commonwealth offensive. The result was that Kassala was entered
unopposed on 19 January 1941. The Italians were pursued, with No 1
Fighter Squadron covering the advance. By 23 January the squadron was
flying from the Eritrean airfield at Tessenei. From there, the
squadron covered the battle for Agordat which ended on 1 February. By
now. No 1 Fighter Squadron had fourteen Hurricanes and seven
Gladiators which enabled it to stop all air attacks on the 4th Indian
Division.

Keren

Gazelle Force, which was leading the advance of the 4th Indian
Division, arrived at the roadblock in front of the Keren position on 2
February 1941. Eight weeks were to follow before the position fell.
The northern offensive had forced the Italians to commit the Savoy
Grenadier Division. While the ground forces were held up at Keren, No
1 Fighter Squadron achieved air superiority over Eritrea. Between 7
and 21 February the squadron destroyed the Italian fighter force in
Eritrea in air and ground attacks and forced the abandonment of the
Italian air bases behind the Keren position. This allowed operations
around Keren to proceed without interference from the Regia
Aeronautica. British Commonwealth air superiority made up for the
numerical inferiority of its ground troops. By 15 March the Royal Air
Force was able to bomb the Keren defences unhindered.

This air support destroyed the Italians' counterattacks and their
morale. The result was that they abandoned the Keren position on 26
March. The retreat was harried by the RAF covered by No 1 Fighter
Squadron. The Italians had nowhere to run. Five days after the
northern offensive had reached Massawa, 700 km from Khartourn, the
southern thrust had reached Addis Ababa, 3 200 km from Nairobi.

From the Juba to the Awash

Whilst the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions were engaged in their gallant
but costly struggle for Keren, the East Africa Force was sweating
rather than bleeding, being engaged in a rapid advance from the Kenyan
border to the heart of Abyssinia. This advance en sured that the
sacrifices made at Keren would not be wasted. Although El Wak had
shown the weakness of the Italian Army in Italian Somaliland, Gen A.
Cunningham, commander of the East Africa Force, was only too aware of
his own logistical problems. On a short logistical leash, he had to
limit his planning to the capture of the port Kismayu only, which had
to fall by nine days after D-day, i.e. the beginning of the operation
or the operation would have to be called off. However, he did make
provision for the exploitation of any success.

On 11 February 1941 the 12th African Division, with the 1 st South
African Brigade under command, began its advance on Kismayu. That
afternoon the Italians were ordered to abandon the port and Kismayu
was captured on 14 February, six days ahead of the critical logistical
deadline. It also meant that the Kismayu garrison escaped behind the
Juba line, leaving the 1st South African Brigade with the prospect of
a
frontal assault across the Juba River at Gobwen.

Brig D.H. "Dan" Pienaar, commander of the 1st South African Brigade,
undertook an air reconnaissance of the Juba River and found an
undefended crossing upriver at Yonte. On the night of 17/18 February
the brigade seized a bridgehead at Yonte, and held it throughout the
night against fierce Italian counterattacks.

On 18 February a pontoon bridge was brought to the Juba and completed
on 19 February. This allowed armoured cars to cross the river and
break up the most dangerous Italian counterattack. On 20 February
Jumbo surrendered, and the 1st South African Brigade moved northwards
to attack Italian positions atJelib. On the same day the 24th Gold
Coast Brigade seized a bridgehead at Mabungo and began to move south
on Jelib. The 1st South African Brigade captured Jelib at 13:00 on 22
February and thereby completed the destruction of the Juba Line. Later
that afternoon the brigade cut the Mogadishu road. The 11th African
Division passed through the 12th African Division and took up the
pursuit. The 1st South African Brigade went into East Africa Force
reserve. Mogadishu fell on 25 February after being declared an open
town. The Italians left behind 350 000 gallons of petrol and 80 000
gallons of aviation fuel, which would enable the East Africa Force to
reach Harar and then Addis Ababa. Thus the fuel for the Blitzkrieg
which would ultimately destroy Italy's East African empire was
provided by the Italians themselves. The success of the 11th and 12th
African Divisions in Italian Somaliland meant that the advance into
southern Abyssinia was no longer necessary, and the 1st South African
Division was withdrawn so that it could be sent to Egypt.

The 11th African Division paused for African air and artillery
support, had forced the Italians out of three strong positions. Keren
was finally captured on the same day. The 1st South African Brigade
took up the pursuit until Miesso, where it ran out of petrol. Then the
22nd East African Brigade took over the pursuit and drove for the
Awash River, where the Italians blew the bridges in their faces on 2
April. Covered by its South African gunners, the brigade crossed
the river on 3 April. On the afternoon of 3- April South African
engineers built a box girder bridge across it. The road to Addis Ababa
was open. From the Awash to Amba Alagi As the Awash crossings were
being secured, six waves-of SAAF bombers pounded the airfield at Addis
Ababa. By the afternoon of 5 April the 22nd East African Brigade was
16 km short of Addis Ababa. The next day the brigade entered the
Abyssinian capital, transported by the 10th Reserve Motor Transport
Company of the South African Indian and Malay Corps. The 1st South
African Brigade also arrived on that day, having travelled 2 400 km in
25 days.

The East Africa Force now paused to regroup and the 1st South African
Brigade was sent to the Omo River only to be redirected towards the
north. On 13 April the brigade started on its journey north and
covered 170 km, capturing the remnants of the 631st Blackshirt
Battalion on the way. By 15 April the 1st South African Brigade was in
the Great Rift Valley and on the next day it entered Debra Sina. The
pace was slowing due to Italian demolitions. The advance continued on
17 April when the 1st Brigade reached the Karramarra Gorge, the
approach to Combolcia Pass.

Here the Cape Town Rifles (Dukes) leading the brigade came under fire
from the Italians entrenched in the pass. The South African gunners
deployed and returned the fire. However, accurate Italian gunnery
forced the South Africans to retire to less exposed positions. While
this duel was going on, the Transvaal Scottish moved to the village of
Ricchia and contacted a group of Abyssinian patriots. The patriots'
commander reported to Brig Pienaar that evening. Apart from the
patriots, the 1st South African Brigade had to rely on its own
resources. That night more artillery arrived and the Dukes began to
struggle uphill to occupy the high ground above the road. The
deployment of the guns and the advance of the infantry was prolonged
due to sleet, slush and mud. The next day, as the Dukes pushed forward
towards the hill designated "Dukes" Hill, the artillery began to
bombard the Italian positions. The Italian return fire once more
forced the South African guns to move. The Dukes captured a number of
Italian patrols and, during the night, the Abyssinian patriots
captured the Italian observation posts, thereby blinding the
Italian guns. On 19 April the Dukes occupied Dukes Hill undetected.
However, the Abyssinian patriots revealed that the position was-
occupied and then the Italians launched a massive but ill-prepared
counterattack which the Dukes repulsed, taking 400 prisoners. This
failure caused several companies of Italian colonial infantry to
desert.

On 20 April the Natal Carbineers were sent forward to replace the
Dukes and to probe for the Italian flank. The following day the
Transvaal Scottish took over the Dukes Hill position to prepare for an
attack on 22 April. At 02:00 on 22 April the Carbineers began their
approach march and were only detected ten metres from the Italian
positions. A fierce battle followed, but by midday, Hills 3 and 4 had
been taken and the crest of Hill 2 stormed, but ammunition was running
low. This forced the Transvaal Scottish to make a bayonet charge on
Hill 1, which caused the Italians to flee.

It took five days to clear the road to Dessie, which surrendered on 27
April. ' In two weeks the South Africans had killed or captured over 8
000 Italians and opened the road to Amba Alagi. The result of their
efforts was that the Italian Africa Division could not reinforce the
Amba Alagi garrison. It had been destroyed at Combolcia. The 1st South
African Brigade advanced 227 km from Dessie to Amba Alagi in ten days.
On 10 May 1941 they joined a battle which had been raging since 20
April. The 5th Indian Division had been alternately attacking the
Italian positions east and west of Amba Alagi and had taken the outer
defences. On 11 May an air reconnaissance was undertaken, and it was
decided to attack two days later. On 12 May the Abyssinian Patriots
stormed the Twin Pyramids. The next day the 1st South African and 9th
Indian Brigades stormed Mount Corsari and then followed up by
attacking toward Fort Toselli. During these attacks a South African
shell hit an Italian fuel dump, detonating its contents and
contaminating the Italian reserve water supply. The Italians then
entered into negotiations and an armistice was arranged.

At noon on 19 May, one year after the 1st South African Brigade had
been mobilised, the Italian viceroy surrendered. The main act of the
East African Campaign was over.

The Lakes and Gondar

The elimination of the Amba Alagi position and the capture of the
Italian viceroy were essential factors leading to the destruction of
Italian prestige and enabled troops to be moved to Egypt. However, two
major concentrations of Italian troops in Abyssinia remained virtually
untouched. These were Gen Gazzera's command in the GallaSidamo and Gen
Nasi's forces at Gondar near Lake Tana. In the Galla-Sidamo, an area
of some 311 000 km2, there were 40 000 Italian troops and 200 guns. To
deal with them, Gen Cunningham (GOC East Africa Force)
could muster the 21st East African Brigade at Yavello and the 24th
Gold Coast Brigade in Neghelli in the south. To the north, he only had
the 22nd East African Brigade at Addis Ababa. The Natal Mounted Rifles
(NMR) and the 1st Field Force Battalion were loaned to 11th African
Division to strengthen the thrust from the north. All the air,
artillery and engineering support was provided by South Africa.

The first operation was an anticlimax. The garrison at Minne
surrendered the moment the NMR Company arrived. Meanwhile, the
Italians were being forced back to the Dadaba River, and when the NMR
began raiding across the Gidu River, the Italians abandoned their
positions in front of the Dadaba River. The NMR advanced to the river
and crossed it on 13 May without opposition and stormed the Italian
positions. The Italian counterattack with light tanks was destroyed by
the NMR in a fierce hand-to-hand struggle. The action ended with the
NMR charging and overwhelming the Italian artillery.

As these operations were taking place, South African guns were
supporting the drive from the south which was struggling through mud
and rain. The delay caused by the mud meant that the NMR had to
continue its advance towards Soddu and Jimma. The result was that the
remnants of the Italian 21st, 25th and 101st Colonial Divisions
surrendered at Soddu on 23 May. To the south, four South African
armoured cars, supported by a Gold Coast company, took 4 000 prisoners
and opened the road between Nairobi and Addis Ababa. The NMR and the
1st Field Force Battalion were withdrawn, leaving South African
gunners and engineers to support operations which ended with the
surrender of the Italians in the Galla-Sidamo on 10 July. Only Gen
Nasi's forces at Gondar remained to be dealt with, but they could not
be attacked by ground troops until the end of the rainy season.
However, as they could be attacked by air, the South African Air Force
began attacks in mid-July 1941. By ' August, Gondar was being attacked
every day by South African aircraft. The attacks were made in the face
of intense anti-aircraft fire and ten aircraft were lost. By the end
of September the attacks achieved their first success when the
garrison of the otherwise impregnable Wolchefit Pass surrendered.

The road to Gondar from the north was now open and the SAAF moved to
Dabat to intense their attacks. Forty-three tons of bombs and 75 000
rounds were used between 4 August and 10 October. As the air attacks
intensified, the ground troops, supported by South African engineers,
moved on Gondar from the south and east. By the first week in November
they were ready to strike. The first attack on the Kulkaber position
on 13 November failed. The SAAF continued its attacks and for a week
pounded this position. On 21 November 1941 another attack was made,
with the SAAF dropping nine tons of bombs. On the ground, the attack,
led by South African engineers, took the position by late afternoon.
The ground forces could then attack Gondar from all sides while the
SAAF, assisted by six RAF bombers, attacked from above. It was too
much for Nasi and his men, who surrendered on 27 November.

South Africa had made possible the Allies' first lasting victory of
World War II.

Eugene L Griessel

[Keith W]

dott.Piergiorgio wrote:
> Il 18/06/2013 09:43, Keith W ha scritto:
>
>> My father had a photo of a single British infantry squad escorting
>> an entire Italian batallion back to the rail head to be sent to a
>> POW camp after Ritchies first campaign. The Italian soldiers were
>> ill trained. ill equipped and incredibly badly led.
>>
>> In Operation Compass a commonwealth force 36,000 strong attacked
>> the 150,000 strong Italian defenders. In 10 weeks the Commonwealth
>> army advanced 800 km, captured 400 tanks,1290 artillery pieces
>> and 130,000 Italians including 22 generals for a total of 2,000
>> allied casualties.
>>
>> This must be some new definition of being bled white.
>
> first thing first, giving Caesar's what's of Caesar: Compass's merit
> are much more of O'connor (the first to fully understand tank
> manoeuvre in tank's lands) than Ritchie...
>

Quite correct Ritchie came later and was in command during
the Gazala battles - my mistake.

> then, one-third of POW was Italian as baby Gaddafi was (meaning, the
> men of the three Libyan divisions formed from former colonial units
> when Libya was given metropolitan status in late 1930s) and formed
> the bulk of the frontline, and the divisions from Italy suffered from
> the inrush of war complements
>

And more than third of the Commonwealth forces were not
British including major constributions from India and Africa.

> on the ill-equipment I fully concur; there was a lack of critical
> supplies (AP shots is the main shortfall) and in the end there was
> improvisations as the motor cannon (think oversize technical with a 3"
> or 4" *naval* gun)
>
> On the ill-led, Italian army was always on the philosophy "young
> rider, old horse", and generally the actual handling of the platoons,
> and even companies was in the hands of senior career NCO, but with
> units swamped with just-recalled complement sub Lt.s and Lt.s and
> troops there was an umbalance in small unit leadership (aside the
> lack of proper orientation on the desert theatre...) and too many
> senior officiers was actually *too* capable in leadership, and when
> fell KIA or POW the unit morale collapses; and the top leadership
> (graziani) was simply the worst an italian army has, on par with
> cadorna, and this says all.

Hence my comment - very badly lead.

> So, the O'connor (NOT Ritchie) offensive was destined to win, but
> fails to fully win: taking Tripoli prior of the arrival of the
> Afrikakorps is suturing half of the jugular, and surging in the Med
> Hood, Renown and Repulse with Ark Royal and another carrier (either
> Eagle or Hermes) with five CAs (best if at least three Londons or
> Norfolks) and not few CLs of the Town class should have closed the
> Med War and sutured the jugular by spring 1941)
>
> Best regards from Italy,
> dott. Piergiorgio.

The reason Tripoli was not taken was political not military. Churchill
halted the offensive and diverted the troops and much of the naval
strength available to Greece and Crete.

Ark Royal was based in Gibraltar as part of force H and as such
was not part of Cunninghams command, Eagle and Hermes were
in the Indian Ocean hunting commerce raiders and so he didnt
have access to them either.

Keith

[Keith W]

dott.Piergiorgio wrote:
> Il 18/06/2013 09:35, Keith W ha scritto:
>
>> Germany was simply considered more dangerous and the resources
>> you mention were not made available to Cunningham. Fact is
>> the Americans rightly regarded the MTO as something of a
>> sideshow with the invasion of France being the main event.
>
> Agree that France is a best road toward Germany than Italy, but in the
> end, today US VIth Fleet far surpass in size and capability the entire
> RN... and this because of the "sideshow", as you like to call....
>

The balance of naval forces in the MTO was heavily weighted
in favour of British forces. During Operation Husky the USN provided
a minority of the naval forces present,

> ... still you eluded the main argument: what actually happened in NA
> and Med during 1940-3, when the fate of the British Empire was sealed
> ?
> Best regards from Italy,
> dott. Piergiorgio.

Nothing that had any real influence on the fate of the British Empire.
The policy of granting self determination was enshrined in a series
of Imperial conferences that started in the 1930's

The bulk of the non British commonwealth forces came from

Australia - Self Governing
New Zealand - Self Governing
South Africa - Self Governing

All 3 countries independently declared was on Germany in 1939


and India

Contrary to popular belief India was already on track to become
self governing when WW2 started. The Indian provinces were already
run by elected assemblies and the main thing holding up full independence
was the inability of the Hindu and Muslim parties to agree on the
form of the new independent nation.

In 1942 the British had offered India full self governing status immediately
the war was over. This was REJECTED by the Indian Congress party
unless they and they alone could dictate the terms and form of self
government.

See
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/topics/cripps-nehru-gandhi.htm

Keith

[george152]

Same here.
My father in law was a Swordfish pilot who was in the raid on the
Italian Fleet and three uncles chased Rommel out of North Africa and
spent the rest of the war walking through Sicily and Italy chasing the
Germans

[george152]

They were to busy waving anything white

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Wed, 19 Jun 2013 08:34:18 +1200, george152 <gbl...@hnpl.net>
wrote:

http://i1139.photobucket.com/albums/n559/eugenegriessel/addisabiba_zps6f2244ed.jpg

Eugene L Griessel

[Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.]

dott.Piergiorgio wrote:
>
> well, I have counted at least three good occasion to really put out
> Italian navy out of the picture

Dear Italian Old Fool (tm),

Want to buy an Italian army rifle? ...only dropped once

(old American joke)
;-)

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Tue, 18 Jun 2013 14:57:09 +0200, Eugene Griessel

<eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:

>Op Tue, 18 Jun 2013 11:51:12 +0200, "dott.Piergiorgio"
><chied...@ask.me> wrote:
>
>>Again with that Ethopian Campaign ?? your uncle surely don't tell you
>>the actual tactical situation.... so pls tell more details... (and
>
>Yes, that glorious Italian action against underwhelming odd. a mighty
>defeat snatched from the jaws of victory.

Some maps for the armchair soldiers:

http://s1139.photobucket.com/user/eugenegriessel/library/East%20Africa%20Campaign


Eugene L Griessel

[Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.]

Eugene Griessel wrote:
>
> Some maps for

Son, give us maps showing your campaigns killing innocent
Black people in the South Africa civil war.
;-)

[Malcom "Mal" Reynolds]

In article <8u-dneFVf8-HWFzM...@supernews.com>,
"Dr. Vincent Quin, PhrauD." on Wednesday, June 19, 2013 11:28:14 AM
spewed

child, please show us all of your successes in stopping/preventing wars?

[dott.Piergiorgio]

well, an Italian army rifle is all one needs to decapitate US of A....

[Gernot Hassenpflug]

"Malcom \"Mal\" Reynolds" <atlas-...@invalid.invalid> writes:

> In article <8u-dneFVf8-HWFzM...@supernews.com>,
> "Dr. Vincent Quin, PhrauD." on Wednesday, June 19, 2013 11:28:14 AM
> spewed
>> Eugene Griessel wrote:
>> >
>> > Some maps for
>>
>> Son, give us maps showing your campaigns killing innocent
>> Black people in the South Africa civil war.
>> ;-)

"South Africa" civil war? Is that an incorrect reference to the
geographic region of Southern Africa, or the country
South Africa? Because if the latter, then I'm proud to say RSA is a
country in the minority (of 1?) in coming out of a colonial era without
a civil war.
--
Gernot Hassenpflug

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Thu, 20 Jun 2013 14:36:04 +0900, Gernot Hassenpflug

Why attempt a rational discourse with bigotted racist? A pug ignorant
one at that.

Eugene L Griessel

[Eugene Griessel]

Here's some real British propaganda for dottore to savour:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SsIWUiWSvIY

Eugene L Griessel

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 20/06/2013 07:43, Eugene Griessel ha scritto:
> Here's some real British propaganda for dottore to savour:
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SsIWUiWSvIY

well, I'm now officially convinced that you mistook *naval history*
revisionism for rightist revisionism....

On the battlefield the perspective changes not only by side, but also by
the scope of the picture; prolly the Italian unit has actually run away,
but IIUC was a company commander; so I can't exclude that the opposite
side has retreated either because of losses (as already pointed, many
Italian units's morale is too dependant on leadership) or because of
orders or their picture of the battlefield (wasn't infrequent, in all
armies in all wars, imagining encircling or side attacks...)

Cunningham itself, until the searchlight was turned on, was sure of
being on tail and having caught the crippled Italian BB, for a known
example...

Hope this help to clarify the disagreement....

[Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.]

What do you call the war with the ANC and other Black rebels fighting
for their freedom against the White government? If it walks like
a duck...etc. Civil war, I say.
;-)

[Jeffrey Hamilton]

Eugene Griessel wrote:
> Op Tue, 18 Jun 2013 11:51:12 +0200, "dott.Piergiorgio"
> <chied...@ask.me> wrote:
>
>> Again with that Ethopian Campaign ?? your uncle surely don't tell you
>> the actual tactical situation.... so pls tell more details... (and
>
> Yes, that glorious Italian action against underwhelming odd. a mighty
> defeat snatched from the jaws of victory.
>
> EAST AFRICA CAMPAIGN - PART 1
> (dismissed by the good dottore as South African Propaganda I suppose).
>
> Strategic position in May 1940

<snipped for space>

> Eugene L Griessel

An excellent read that, Eugene, I got a chuckle out of the South African
Irish and the Transvaal Scottish regiment names.

cheers....Jeff

[David E. Powell]

Not exactly that cut and dried in all cases. Those forces and their Cuban allies did a lot of damage to black people too, especially in Angola.

The South African forces that fought against them were not 100 percent monochrome, either.

The war between Cubans and South Africans was very real and fought with combined arms. There were also a few elements besides race involved. It was not confined to a single country, either. The internal challenge in South Africa was to do with color lines, but those who got involved in the armed conflict areas of the equation had various reasons for doing so.

The residual effects of these events are still there in modern South Africa, but the great hope is they will pull through those issues. Neighboring nations like Angola have had a hard journey too, but again the hope is there that the future will be better than the past.

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Thu, 20 Jun 2013 22:08:21 -0400, "Jeffrey Hamilton"

<bbere...@cogeco.ca> wrote:

>An excellent read that, Eugene, I got a chuckle out of the South African
>Irish and the Transvaal Scottish regiment names.

Well - at least one person read it! It does make it look a bit like
"we did it all ourselves" but it is from a South African perspective.
Glad you enjoyed it - as for the Scottish and Irish - one of the very
first regiments ever established here was founded by a Scottish
colonel - who was a third generation Dutchman! This was in the 1700s.
The regiment eventually became the Cape Town Highlanders. As for the
Irish - an Irish battalion fought with the Boers in the 1899 -1902 war
against the British. What else?

Was going to post a companion piece about the North African campaign
but after the deafening silence decided not to bother.


Eugene L Griessel

[george152]

On 21/06/13 14:46, Eugene Griessel wrote:

> Was going to post a companion piece about the North African campaign
> but after the deafening silence decided not to bother.
>

Yup I noticed that silence :)

[Gernot Hassenpflug]

The pieces were incredibly interesting and fun to read (sobering too, of
course, given the sacrifices). I did not have time to read in full, but
made sure to read the aerial-related parts. Homemade bomb dropped from
a transport... yup, that's us :-)
--
Gernot Hassenpflug

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Fri, 21 Jun 2013 12:19:18 +0900, Gernot Hassenpflug

<gernot.ha...@asahinet.com> wrote:

>The pieces were incredibly interesting and fun to read (sobering too, of
>course, given the sacrifices). I did not have time to read in full, but
>made sure to read the aerial-related parts. Homemade bomb dropped from
>a transport... yup, that's us :-)

I grew up at Langebaanweg - and across from us lived the man who had
lit the fuse and kicked the bomb out (it got stuck in the door of the
Vickers Valentia for a few heart-stopping moments). It was a 44
gallon drum filled with dynamite and assorted metallic odds and sods -
including parts of an old sewing machine. He used to regale us with
stories of the Vickers Valentia - top speed was something like 86 mph.
Actually the place was full of SAAF veterans of both WW2 and Korea and
there were some very interesting tales to be told.

Getting back to East Africa there is of course the story of the naked
pilot ..... took off in his Gladiator wearing only boots and helmet
(it was bloody hot) and shot down a couple of Italians. The one, a
Count of some sort or the other, actually managed to bail out on the
SAAF airfield and asked to meet the man who had shot him down. Our
hero had just landed and the Italian count was horrified when the
nudist alighted from his aircraft and was introduced as his adversary.

Eugene L Griessel

[Eugene Griessel]

Op Fri, 21 Jun 2013 12:19:18 +0900, Gernot Hassenpflug
<gernot.ha...@asahinet.com> wrote:

>The pieces were incredibly interesting and fun to read (sobering too, of
>course, given the sacrifices). I did not have time to read in full, but
>made sure to read the aerial-related parts. Homemade bomb dropped from
>a transport... yup, that's us :-)

Just for you Gernot:

The SAAF goes to war.

The danger signals of a forthcoming war had been sounded loud and
clear during the Munich Crisis in 1938, yet when the war that everyone
knew was coming did eventually break out in September 1939 the South
African Air Force was not completely prepared. Considering the
magnitude of the events that were to overwhelm the world in the next
five years and the immensity of the task ahead, the puny size of the
S.A.A.F. and the condition of its aircraft is best not dwelt on too
long. But, while it may have been a matter of immediate despair, that
unhappy situation was really of little account in the long run. The
S.A.A.F. may have 'lacked aircraft and immediate organisation.
But it possessed something infinitely more valuable耀pirit. A spirit
of resolution, adventure and enthusiasm that was to carry it through
that early period of difficulties, writing a remarkable page in the
history of aerial warfare in the process, and to continue like an
ever-growing stream until it became a powerful catalyst binding a huge
force.

It was the pilots, aircrews and service crews of the first squadrons
to go into action in Kenya, the Sudan, Eritrea and Abyssinia who set
the pattern of what was to follow. They conducted a campaign of such
audacity and determination against the Italian Air Force that within a
short time they had mastery of the air in East Africa. Outnumbered,
operating obsolete, cumbersome aircraft against the more modern
machines of their adversaries they set about putting the Italian Air
Force out of business, knowing that if they failed then the Italians
had the ability to blow them out of the skies in East Africa. In the
process the South Africans displayed a spirit of adventure and daring
that was to act as a gallant example to those who were to follow.

When the South African Parliament voted to join the Allies and to
declare war on Germany, the S.A.A.F. comprised 160 permanent force
officers, 35 cadets and 1,400 men. There were three service squadrons,
two of them training units, and five shadow squadrons that
existed only on paper. The S.A.A.F. possessed about 100 aircraft of
which 63 were obsolete general purpose Hartbees, the majority of them
unserviceable for lack of spares.

The only modern machines were six Hurricane fighters, a Fairey Battle
bomber and a Blenheim bomber. In addition, the Junkers airliners of
South African Airways, with their crews, were available, after
conversion, for wartime use - eighteen JU 86's as bombers or coastal
patrol machines and eleven JU 52's as transport planes. Not a very
imposing array.

Among the senior officers of the force were men who had come through
from the days of the Royal Flying Corps. Sir Pierre van Ryneveld was
the Chief of General Staff for the Union Defence Force. Col. J.
Holthouse was Director General of Air Services, Lt. Col. H. C. Daniel
was in command of the S.A.A.F. headquarters at Zwartkop and Lt. Col.
J. A. T. Louw became commanding officer of the Airways Wing. It was
this Airways Wing that was the first to go into operation. No time was
wasted in converting a dozen of the twin-engined, low-wing, all-metal
JU 86 monoplanes for bomber-reconnaissance work. Within two weeks of
the declaration of war four flights, each comprising three JU 86's,
six officers and twelve men, had been formed and posted to Cape Town,
Durban, Port Elizabeth and Walvis Bay to assist in the work of
protecting the vital Cape sea route. They started patrolling at once,
operating in conjunction with the Royal Navy.

A Junkers patrol from Wingfield while over the sea about 90 miles from
Cape Point, intercepted the German ship Watussi, which had broken out
from Lourenco Marques in an attempt to return to Europe, early in
December. The JU ordered the Watussi to stop and alter course for Cape
Town. When the ship refused, the aircraft fired machinegun bullets
across her bows and then dropped bombs ahead of her and on her port
bow until she turned course toward Cape Town.

Another Junker then took over, shadowing the Watussi, until a third
machine and two planes from the aircraft carrier Ark Royal arrived. By
this time the Watussi had swung out her boats and stopped. Smoke was
seen pouring from the after-hold as the crew abandoned ship. Within a
short time fire spread throughout the whole vessel and the upper works
were enveloped in flames, with great columns of smoke coming from the
holds. The Watussi was obviously doomed, and after H.M.S. Sussex had
picked up the survivors from their nine lifeboats H.M.S. Renown sank
her with gunfire. The S.A.A.F. patrols had done a good job of
interception. But the incident proved that aircraft were not able to
prevent a ship from being scuttled by a determined captain and crew.

Other S.A.A.F. units gradually came into being, during the latter part
of 1939 and early 1940 although there was a grave shortage of
aircraft, equipment and clothing. Squadrons were formed for a variety
of purposes, ranging from home defence, army-co-operation, bombing,
fighting, photo-reconnaissance and training.

By early 1940 the pattern of the forthcoming struggle had become
clear. The Middle East and East Africa were to become major theatres
of war, emphasising that the Cape sea route would need extra
protection to allow the safe passage of essential convoys of troops
and supplies to those areas, thus placing a greater burden on the
S.A.A.F., while the Italian Empire of Somaliland, Abyssinia and
Eritrea would need to be contained and then dealt with before the
forces established there could break out to threaten East and Central
Africa.

South Africa's immediate contribution to the forces needed to meet the
situation in East Africa comprised as many troops as she could spare
and three of the S.A.A.F. squadrons that had been formed. In May,
1940, Number 1 fighter squadron, equipped with four Hurricanes and six
Furies; Number 11 bomber squadron, with Hawker Hartbees; and Number
12 bomber squadron, equipped with JU 86's left for Kenya. Most of the
pilots of Number 1 went on to Egypt, where they collected a number of
Gloster Gladiators and later ferried some of them to Khartourn in the
Sudan, where they established a flight, while the other flight of the
squadron remained in Kenya, to become Number 2 squadron at a later
date. Later in the year Number 3 fighter squadron was formed and sent
to Kenya with Hurricanes, as were two army co-operation squadrons,
Number-40 and 41, both equipped with Hartbees.

On June 10, 1940, Italy entered the war thus pulling the pin in the
time bomb that had existed in East Africa. The S.A.A.F. wasted no time
in starting aggresive action. At dawn on June 11 four Junkers 86
ofNumberl2 squadron, led by Major Danie du Toit, took off from
Eastleigh aerodrome, near Nairobi, with the object of attacking
transport and enemy tanks at Moyale, on the escarpment just inside
Abyssinia. They touched down on an airstrip near Bura to refuel and
were soon over their target, dropping 250 Ib. bombs and then
machine-gunning the area, much to the surprise of the Italian
garrison, who retaliated with strong anti-aircraft fire.

Having taken the initiative, the S.A.A.F. had no intention of letting
it go. The next day three Hartbees, of Number 11 squadron, under Major
R. H. Preller, set off on an offensive reconnaissance over Italian
Somaliland for the purpose of locating enemy aerodromes near the Kenya
border. They flew from Nairobi to Garissa where they refuelled before
traversing the waterless bush and semi-desert of the Northern Frontier
District that separated the cultivated areas of the highlands of Kenya
from the Italian sector of East Africa. Their mission was a success,
as was a raid by JU bombers of Number 12 squadron the next day over
the Italian aerodromes at Kismayu, Jelib and Afmadu in Somaliland.

These excursions were something of an impertinence considering the
relative sizes of the forces involved. In all, there were only about
40 South African planes in Kenya, lined up against an estimated 300
Italian Air Force machines, though these planes were spread over the
large area of the Italian Empire, embracing Somaliland, Abyssinia
and Eritrea.

An official appraisal of the situation in the air, based on the
slender resources of the S.A.A.F. was that air attacks by day should
be avoided and all possible steps should be taken to conserve and
protect aircraft until a considerable improvement in numbers had been
achieved. But to the airmen of the S.A.A.F. in Kenya and the Sudan no
such word as "conservative" existed. The planners in Nairobi saw no
merit in sitting waiting for the blow to come庸or them there could
only be one line of action, to attack the enemy air force wherever it
could be found and destroy it before its apparent numerical
superiority could be exploited.

The Italian land forces were the first to make a move. In July they
attacked eastwards from Abyssinia to overrun British Somaliland and
westward to invade the Sudan, with the apparent intention of taking
Khartourn and Port Sudan. In the south of their empire they sat tight
behind natural barriers, making no attempt to come down from the
mountains of Abyssinia or to cross the wastelands of the Northern
Frontier Districts to invade Kenya. But after these moves, they
remained static, there being very little military activity from then
until the end of 1940.

But in the air it was a period of intense activity on the part of the
S.A.A.F., who were softening up the opponents in preparation for an
all-out attack. Eighteen Gladiators made serviceable by S.A.A.F.
mechanics at Abu Suier, on the Suez Canal in Egypt, were supposed to
be ferried down to Nairobi, via the Sudan, by pilots of Number 1
squadron to provide the squadron there with a complete establishment
of planes. But when the first flight of eight Gladiators arrived at
Khartourn, soon after the Italians had moved into the Sudan, the
R.A.F. officer commanding the aerodrome there said that, at last, he
had some planes to defend the city and he was not allowing them to
continue on their flight to Nairobi.

So it happened that a group of ten South African pilots and six ground
crew became detached from their comrades and remained in the Sudan.
Under the command of Major S. van Schalkwyk, they had originally been
a Flight of Number 1 squadron. The group then became
known as Number 1 Squadron and the original Number 1, based on
Nairobi, was renumbered Number 2 Squadron.

The ten pilots and their service crews were destined to play a role
that had incalculable consequences on the campaign in Eritrea and
northern Abyssinia.

The Italians were established in strength inside the Sudan border,
with their permanent airfields in nearby Eritrea. Although the South
Africans were supposed to be involved in defensive activities, they
preferred to go out on the offensive. Patrols went up regularly,
looking for Italian planes and scouting out the area for information
of troop movements. The first clash to take place in the Sudan
occurred on September I, when three Gladiators, flown by Major van
Schalkwyk, Lt. L. Theron and Lt. J. L. Hewitson were patrolling
over Italian-held Kassala. Two CR 42's came up to meet them but the
South Africans got in first and one CR spun in and crashed while the
other made off for its aerodrome at Tessenei where it crash-landed.

After a period defending Port Sudan while vital convoys of troops
arrived in the build up for the attack on Eritrea. a group of six
Gladiators, under Capt. B. J. L. Boyle, with six mechanics, set up an
advanced aerodrome in the desert at Azaza, near Gedaref, from which
they went out on offensive patrols over enemy-held territory.
Conditions at the airfield were primitive in the blistering heat and
because there was no armourer the pilots belted all their own
ammunition by hand and overhauled their guns themselves, working late
into the night to be ready for the next morning's dawn patrol. The
Italians seldom challenged them, though early in October they
encountered three CR 42's which turned on them in the favourite
Italian form of attack, head-on with guns blazing, followed by a quick
dive. Boyle's machine was hit, but he managed to
get in an effective squirt at his adversary and saw him go down,
trailing a plume of smoke. Lt. S. Viljoen also got a CR 42 but the
third escaped.

Then the Italians made a devastating bombing raid on Gedaref, wiping
out eight Wellesley bombers of the R.A.F. that were preparing to
attack Italian troop concentrations near the Lake Tana area in
Abyssinia. The South Africans could not understand why they had not
been asked to drive off the raiders, but an after-raid investigation
showed that the telephone line to Azaza had been cut. Determined that
the Italians should not think they could have everything their own
way, Boyle and two of his pilots, Lts. R. Pare and A. Duncan, staged a
reprisal operation two days later, raiding the Barentu aerodrome, well
inside Eritrea.

Flying almost at ground level, to escape detection, they arrived over
Barentu in formation to find a large number of Italian planes on the
ground. They shot up a group of Fiats while in formation and then
broke up to make individual attacks on a number of bombers. The Fiats
burst into flames and a Savoia and some Capronis looked very sad after
the attack. Subsequent army-air liaison reported the destruction of
three fighters, one Savoia 79 and five Caproni 133's. General Heath,
commanding the Indian Division, sent a note: "My dear Boyle, the news
of your exploit, so well conceived and magnificently executed has
thrilled us all . . . its effects are far beyond those of the material
damage inflicted".

With the note the General sent a case of champagne, the only one in
the area, which was duly drunk, warm, by Number 1 out of tin mugs.

The raid on Barentu stimulated the appetite of the South Africans. It
also proved to them that the Italians could be caught napping and that
destroying aircraft on the ground was likely to be far more effective
than taking on the Italians, with their swifter machines, in aerial
combat. With their tails up they joined in the preparations being made
for the recapture of Gallabat and the occupation of Kassala, the
Italian frontier town. Attempts were being made by the . Italians to
reinforce these centres with troops from further inside Abyssinia. The
full strength of Number I, a total of eight pilots and six ground
crew, was gathered at Azaza and a constant search made for Italian
aircraft and for troops moving through the mountains. Together with a
group of R.A.F. Wellesleys they caught one of these troop convoys,
made up of 90 vehicles, in a narrow defile some 30 miles north-west of
Gondar. When the Wellesleys had finished dropping their bombs, the
South Africans attacked to add to the destruction. The following day
the South Africans were over the scene again, escorting two Gauntlets
armed with bombs. Once more the convoy took a terrific beating and
only a small remnant struggled through into the hills. Four CR 42's
appeared but they were chased by the South Africans who shot one down
and damaged another.

The battle for Gallabat followed early in November, with Major van
Schalkwyk, as officer commanding Number I, responsible for the general
co-ordination of fighter activities. As Azaza was some 100 miles from
the battleground, an advance airstrip was prepared for the use of a
flight of Number 1 only 25 miles from Gallabat. As the battle
developed three Gladiators of R.A.F. Flight K giving fighter cover to
the troops were attacked by a group ofCR 42's. Two were shot down and
the third forced down some distance away. Major van Schalkwyk took off
from Azaza for the advance strip but ran into eight Fiats on the way.
He immediately engaged, and news of the uneven scrap was phoned
through to the advance field. Concerned for the safety of his skipper,
Capt. Boyle took off, but with great difficulty as rain the previous
night had turned the advance strip into a quagmire of thick black mud.
He arrived just in time to see Van Schalkwyk's Gladiator go down in
flames, with the pilot, his body alight, floating down on a parachute.
Then he was fighting for his life. A stream of explosive bullets from
a CR 42 smashed his cockpit and he crash-landed between the lines.

The loss of five fighters in one morning reduced the ability of the
air forces to give protection to the attacking troops. As a
consequence the Italians, who had reacted strongly to the attack,
bringing up aircraft reinforcements from all over Abyssinia and
Eritrea, were able to get through with bombers and carry out a
systematic low-level bombardment of the area and so hold up the attack
of the Allied forces. In answer to a call for fighters that afternoon
the four remaining Gladiators of Number 1 and the one survivor of
Flight K went out on patrol. They sighted six CA 133's at 7,000 feet
heading for the battle zone and immediately attacked. Six CR 42's,
unseen at 10,000 feet, came hurtling down on the Gladiators and in the
ensuing melee the last pilot of K flight went down to his death.

The South Africans split up into pairs. Lts. Duncan and Hewitson
continued to attack the bombers, while Lts. Pare and Coetzer took on
the six Fiats. It was a terrific scrap, with the air full of milling
wings and chattering machine guns. The South Africans outfought the
Italians, with both Duncan and Hewitson sending a bomber crashing
down, while the other two finished off two Fiats, as the remainder
turned tail.

Next day the four remaining Gladiators of Number 1 were engaged in
another furious battle. After escorting a group of five Wellesleys on
a raid they sighted four CR 42's and gave chase. Lt. Pare shot down
one, but they were then attacked by another formation of four Fiats
and broke off engagement with Pare's machine damaged.

While this battle was going on ten Italian bombers got through and
were able to inflict severe damage on the ground troops. Because it
was apparent that the Italians had mastery of the air over the
battlefield the attack was called off, leaving the Allies in
occupation of the remains of Gallabat, but the Italians still in
possession of their frontier positions.

The badly mauled Number 1 was withdrawn to Khartourn, its pilots and
ground crews exhausted, for a spell of rest and for re-organisation.
With only four machines left to patrol the entire frontier of
Abyssinia and Eritrea the squadron needed reinforcements. There was
only one way of strengthening the area and that was by drawing
machines from Number 2 squadron. First its Gladiators were taken and
then its Hurricanes, leaving the squadron with only Furies and
Gauntlets.

Major L. A. Wilmot was appointed as the new commanding officer of
Number 1 and he flew from Nairobi to Khartourn and then Azaza with
five Hurricanes, to add to the five replacement Gladiators that had
already reached the squadron. The arrival of these Hurricanes was to
change the entire pattern of the aerial war in the Sudan and Eritrea.
In strike after strike and in daring raids they were to smash the
Italian air force just as similar machines were to do in Abyssinia in
the hands of Number 3 Squadron. Patrols were immediately started over
Port Sudan, which needed protection as convoys of troops destined to
take over Eritrea and Abyssinia arrived at the port. The Italians made
a number of air raids in attempts to delay these landings but were
soon discouraged by the Hurricanes, which shot three Savoias down
during ineffective attacks on the port over a period .of a week in
December.

The Italians then gave up, presuming that the port was too well
defended and the landings proceeded unopposed. While Number 1 had been
active on the western side of Abyssinia the other S.A.A.F. squadrons
had established themselves at strategic places in Kenya, carrying out
a similar softening up programme preparatory to the invasion of
Italian-held territory. Number 11 Bomber Squadron, under Major Bob
Preller, which had started off with Hartbees, was using Fairey Battles
operating from Archers Post, while the flights of the Junkers
squadron, Number 12, (Major Charles Martin), were at Nanyuki and also
helping in the defence of Mombasa. Number 2 Fighter Squadron was
scattered between Nanyuki, Archers Post, Ndege's Nest and Marsabit,
while the army co-op squadrons. Numbers 40 (Major J. T. Durrant) and
41 (Major E. Pope) with Hartbees, arrived later to take up positions
at Marsabit, Garissa, Lokitaung, Bura and Ndege's Nest, while Number 3
Fighter Squadron was at Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa, Bura and Luma. All
of them had their share of adventure during the period up to the end
of 1940, with the pilots inaulging in individual actions that typified
air force operations during those times. The Italians certainly
enjoyed numerical advantage, and their aircraft may have been
superior, but the young South Africans, many of them only just out of
school, imbued with a sense of adventure and high-spirited in their
approach to the campaign, soon had their measure. The squadrons
proceeded to embark on a series of exploits that may have appeared
over-zealous, yet as their pilots patrolled and fought over the
deserts and mountain ranges of the area in those early days, dropping
their bomb loads among the parked Capronis and Savoias, or chasing any
Italian planes wanting a fight, they whittled away the enemy's
striking power and reduced his will to attack.

Their contribution was of inestimable value, for the story of the
conquest of East Africa is, to a great extent, the story of the defeat
of the Italian Air Force. The smashing of this aerial power made it
possible for the South African and British forces to cross vast areas
of territory, free from attack from the air and able to move at any
time that was convenient. Because there were many more pilots in these
Kenya-based squadrons than the handful of men operating in the Sudan,
their activities may not have been chronicled with such detail.

Conditions in the dry season at places like Garissa and Wajir and all
other sections of the Northern Frontier District were appalling. The
heat was so severe that work on aircraft stopped between 10 o'clock in
the morning and 4.00 in the afternoon. Sand was another problem.
Planes and trucks constantly had to be dug out, while it was
impossible to rev engines before taking-off because sand picked up and
stripped fabric from the propellers. The average life of a wooden
propeller with fabric covering was twelve take-offs. Living conditions
were equally trying, with the pilots and aircrews sleeping out under
tarpaulins hung between trees and bushes, with meals consisting of
bully beef, black coffee and biscuits. Water was stringently rationed,
only a gallon a day per person being allowed for all purposes. In
typical undergraduate fashion the pilots adopted various outlandish
nicknames. There was the Buna Kid, the Sultan of Osamandela, the
Sheikh of El Wak, the D.C. of Dalaki and there were the Ginsbergs. On
one occasion the Sultan of Osmandela was sitting in & tree, clad only
in a birthday suit, when a scramble came for an air raid. He rushed
through the bush to his plane and was soon mixed up in a scrap with a
group of Italian planes. A Caproni bomber was shot down. It crashed
and burst into flames, four of the crew being killed. One of the
survivors, burned and sorely wounded, hobbled to a field dressing
station. Even after the crash he still looked smart in his Italian Air
Force uniform. Asking to meet the pilot who had shot him down he was
presented to the Sultan. He took one look, shook his head sadly and
remarked: "To think that an ace of the Spanish War should be shot down
by boys who fly naked!"

When Sir Arthur Longmore, Air Officer in Command of East Africa, paid
a visit to pilots of the S.A.A.F. to congratulate them on their good
work. Brigadier Hector Daniel, head of the S.A.A.F. in East Africa,
had to send a message ahead of the visit to ensure that the pilots
were properly dressed for the inspection. He knew from experience what
the situation was likely to be, because, on a previous occasion, when
he had visited one of the squadrons in the bush, he found most of the
pilots so informally dressed that they were only wearing bath towels
marked "Stanley Hotel". In the case of the Junkers pilots, most of
them were Airways pilots transferred to the S.A.A.F. by the stroke of
a pen. Overnight they found themselves posted as officers in the
S.A.A.F. While they may have been first-rate pilots, their knowledge
of military discipline and procedure was nil, producing near-comical
situations as they flew off with their crews on the dangerous
operations of wartime flying.

Places like Moyale, Yavello and Neghelli were bombed regularly and
other targets where there might be planes of the Italian force. To
reach these targets the pilots of 11 and 12 Squadrons would leave
their bases in the Kenya highlands and refuel at advance fields in the
bush, often sleeping out for the night under the wings of their
machines before taking off at first light. This sustained programme of
air attacks was continued ruthlessly, smashing planes on the ground,
and damaging aerodromes, railways, transport and fuel stocks, while
the photo-recce planes took mosaics of the areas that were to be
attacked when the ground forces moved against the Italians.

The port of Mogadishu, in Somaliland, became a favourite target of
Number 11 Squadron with the Battles paying it regular visits with
devastating effects. Kismayu also received its share of attention and
it was on a recce flying to this area that Major Bob Preller, the
squadron commander, and his crew were involved in a near-disastrous
incident that won the D.F.C. for Preller葉he first S.A.A.F. decoration
of the War.

After photographing Kismayu, Preller had turned inland to have a look
at Afmadu aerodrome. There his crew took more photos and after that he
shot up an Italian plane on the ground in a series of low-level
passes. A bullet from groundfire hit the radiator of the Battle and
out poured the glycol. Within a few miles the engine seized. Preller
made a hazardous landing among trees well inside enemy territory. The
three airmen set fire to the plane after removing the compass and
films and set off with only one water bottle between them. While an
intensive air search was made for them the three made their way
through the bush suffering dreadful privations. Tormented by thirst
and starving they staggered on for days. After a week, when they had
been posted as "missing", Preller told Air Corporals E. Petterson and
B. Ackerman to remain at a waterhole, in an endeavour to recover some
of their strength, while he continued alone.

Twelve days after the crash Preller was spotted by a plane of the
Rhodesian Air Force jogging slowly along on a camel on the road
between Garissa and Liboi. A truck and an ambulance were ordered out
and they picked up Preller, weak, suffering from severe sunburn and
blistered feet.

He was able to direct the rescue party to the waterhole where the two
corporals lay exhausted. Preller was awarded the D.F.C., with a
citation for "embuing his squadron with his own offensive spirit to a
remarkable degree" and for bringing back "very valuable exposed film
of enemy military objectives".

Early in 1941, South African and other Allied forces started their
two-pronged thrust out of Kenya into Italian territory. Within a short
time the river Juba line had been forced and what had started as a
limited offensive became an ambitious campaign to drive the Italians
back into their mountain stronghold in Abyssinia before the rains
came. Afmadu was taken, Kismayu fell, shortly followed by Mogadish and
the Italians were in full flight as the Allied armies raced across
Somaliland.

It was in the move towards Afmadu, in a Hurricane of Number 3
Squadron, that Capt. J. Frost shot down four planes in one action. The
Transvaal Scottish were being bombed by a flight of threeCapronis near
Dif when Frost went up to intercept. As he attacked the first of the
bombers a couple of Fiats, CR 42 fighters, came down at him. He
managed to elude them and climbed to intercept the two leading
bombers. The Fiats came in at Frost again, head on and guns blazing.
He got in a prolonged burst at one just before pulling into a steep
climb. The fighter went into the bush and burst into flames. Frost
returned to the Capronis, which broke formation. The pilot of the
first bailed out, leaving the plane to crash; the second bomber was
shattered by a burst of Frost's eight machine-guns; and the third
crash-landed after Frost had made two passes at it. Frost was given
the immediate award of the D.F.C. for "skill, resource, determination
and courage of the highest order".

Six weeks later, when the Italians had been driven out of Somaliland
into the mountains of Abyssinia, Frost was involved in a remarkable
incident as Number 3 Squadron made a devastating attack on Diredawa
aerodrome. Three Fiats that came up to defend were dealt with in short
time and sent crashing to the ground. Then six Hurricanes set about
shooting up the Italian planes on the drome. Three Savoias went up in
flames as did three Fiat CR 32's, while another Caproni and three
fighters were damaged. Returning to Diredawa after refuelling and
rearming at the captured aerodrome at Daghadur, the Hurricanes were
intent on finishing off what was left of the aerodrome and any planes
on it when Frost's plane was hit. Glycol streamed out of the cooling
system as the engine seized and he was forced to land on a satellite
airfield a few miles away from the main Diredawa drome that was under
attack. Frost jumped out of the plane and attempted to set it alight
while guns in the surrounding hills started to fire at him.

Lt. R. Kershaw, who had seen Frost go down circled the field to keep
off any Italian ground forces that might try to capture his flight
commander and then landed, taxiing his Hurricane up to Frost, shouting
to him to jump in. With artillery fire landing all around the plane.
Frost climbed into the cramped cockpit behind Kershaw. Kershaw taxied
rapidly to the end of the runway when Frost moved over into Kershaw's
lap, took over the controls and set the plane dashing across the field
to take off amid a hail of bullets and shells. The act was a typical
example of the comradeship that existed in the S.A.A.F. Such was the
bond of friendship that if a mate was in trouble you went to his
assistance, come what may. For his bravery Lt. Kershaw was given the
immediate award of the D.S.O.

As the Allied forces smashed their way into the mountain strongholds
of the Italians the S.A.A.F. pounded airfields, railways, mountain
passes and forts with bombs and shot up artillery posts or any
defences that resisted to ease the way of the troops. Addis Ababa was
given a terrific work out, with five waves of bombers plastering the
aerodrome and defences, after which the Hurricanes took over to reduce
what was left of the Italian Air Force to a mass of wreckage. When the
town was taken the remains of some 30 battered planes were evidence of
the S.A.A.F/s onslaught. The same thing occurred at Komollchia, the
aerodrome for Dessie, where the Italians were staging a stand. A
concentrated attack by the South African bomber, army co-op and
fighter squadrons put paid to 24 Italian planes in a morning in a
series of raids that practically finished off the remaining aircraft
of the Italian Air Force.

There was continued resistance for some months in the areas of the
Abyssinian lakes, but the S.A.A.F. had practically finished its work.
The battered, but faithful, elderly Hartbees had seen their last ops,
as had the reliable Junkers. The Hurricanes of Number 3 Squadron had
run up the amazing tally of more than 100 Italian aircraft destroyed,
with Capt. Jack Frost emerging as the S.A.A.F.'s ace of the campaign.

To the north of where Numbers 2,3,11,12,40,41 and 60 (photographic)
Squadrons had been operating, the twelve individualists of Number 1
had pushed with their Gladiators and Hurricanes into Eritrea as the
Allied ground forces fought through from Kassala and Gallabat in the
west and Port Sudan in the north to take Gondar, Asmara, Massawa and
the mountain fortress of Keren. They completely dominated the skies of
that part of the country, knocking down the CR 42's and other Italian
planes that came up in last-minute attempts to stem the tide of
defeat. In addition, they provided cover for the bombers and army
co-op planes that played such an important part in the defeat of the
Italian forces, shot up aerodromes, smashed railway and road transport
convoys and gave the maximum assistance to the ground troops in their
difficult task of assaulting mountain redoubts. In the final tally
this handful of pilots had accounted for the remarkable total of 48
enemy aircraft destroyed, 57 damaged in aerial combat and 53 destroyed
on the ground. The South African losses in the northern sector were
six pilots killed.

Throughout the East African campaign the S.A.A.F. squadrons flew more
than 5,000 sorties, destroyed 71 enemy aircraft in combat and at least
another 70 on the ground. The force's casualties amounted to 79 pilots
and aircrew killed and 5 missing.


Eugene L Griessel

[Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.]

Gee, son...if you could only say something substantive besides your
unreasoned *opinions*. It was a civil war...citizen rebels fighting to
overthrow rule of established government. You appear to be a peabrain
with an overblown sense of the importance of your nutty *opinions*.

And I sense racism in your eagerness to *completely* discount the racist
aspect of this civil war...an aspect well known, at the time, world over.

therefore peabrain you waste our time so please stfu thank you
;-)

[Dean Markley]

Haha! Vinnie the PhrauD got pissed off!

[David E. Powell]

Looks like.

I didn't discount racism, or how powerful the internal problems were then in South Africa or that there are still worries now.

What I pointed out was that there were plenty of issues that were also involved in the armed conflict that was going on in the Southern tip of Africa.

The Cubans were heavily involved in Angola, which led to an all out war. Angolans suffered heavily, as well as South Africans and some others. Angolans suffered from the Communist side too, as they were dragged into it.

I would urge the fake Prof. to look up the "Green Boots" who were (somewhat controversial) counterinsurgency types for South Africa, whose ranks included black soldiers as well as white ones. Some of their troops were former SWAPO troops who turned against the Communists.

This doesn't disguise racism as an issue or try to brush over the repercussions that are still causing problems, but it does add some of the other dimensions to what was going on in that part of the world at the time that are rarely if ever discussed in the US.

For what it's worth it has been said that President Eisenhower in the US did what he did to combat racism here in part because he Soviet Union pointed to it as a flaw with the USA, and when challenging them on human rights abroad he was sensitive to the racial problems in the USA.

Also, as I pointed out, the larger war that broke out in the region was not only fought with insurgent and counterinsurgency methods. There were some serious combined arms battles as well. A huge chunk of the Cuban military was deployed to Angola and fought on one side, while the South African conventional military led the forces on the other side.

[Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D.]

No, son, you jumped in disputing the civil war statement...you were
claiming it was not a civil war. It was. The fact that there
was also civil war in other parts of south Africa (e.g. Rhodesia)
is irrelevant to the truth of it being a civil war.

And indeed your racism is further shown with your "monochrome"
comment, inferring that since South Africa had token Blacks in
it's military that South Africa was not really racist.

IMHO, your effort to downplay the racism, THE primary cause of the
war, shows you a racist. Walks like a duck...etc...a racist.

[Malcom "Mal" Reynolds]

In article <eKadnXKcZsUaCl7M...@supernews.com>,
"Dr. Vincent Quin, PhrauD." on Friday, June 21, 2013 16:43:32 PM spewed

a failure on your part to stop another war. why do you insist on
promoting your failures?

[David E. Powell]

On Friday, June 21, 2013 4:59:40 PM UTC-4, Dr. Vincent Quin, Ph.D. wrote:

I pointed out that the coalition fighting the Communist forces was not limited to people from one race. That was not a rebuttal to the very existence of racism, it was a rebuttal to your argument that the whole war was black vs. white. You also use words like "Token" which is a racially nasty way of ignoring the point.

Also you called it a Civil War. I pointed out that there were not only several different local countries dragged in, and whose people suffered, including at the hands of Communist forces, but Cubans were involved as well. Hence it was not just a civil war within South Africa as a nation state, but involved actor and groups from other nations. Hence, not all about a civil war.

You will notice that South Africa's moment of reconciliation happened at the end of the Cold War when they solved their problems domestically. A person noticing the involvement of foreign forces in the fighting and that the end of the Cold War was around the same time that South Africa made a very big change might see a bit of a connection. In short, when the foreign military pressure eased, as opposed to economic and political pressure that was a more non-bellicose way of making the point, DeKlerk did the right thing.

The fact that South Africa had a nuclear program might also be explained by the foreign conflicts of the 1970s and early 1980s. You don't build nukes as counterinsurgent weapons. After South Africa entered their period of transition, their nuclear program went away too. Of course, so had the Cold War. This does not excuse racism, far from it, in fact racism provided a spark that other people in the region and internationally got involved with, some in peaceful ways (Paul Simon, etc.) and some with violent means. (Angolans, Cubans, etc.) They had their own motives and goals in mind when they did. Simon's were about his vision of equality and peace, the Angolans and Cubans, well, they had their own too.

Don't get upset just because facts don't agree with your opening positions. Race was huge, and it was the big internal issue in South Africa that caused conflict. I was just pointing out that there were other actors involved in the region, combined arms battles going on, and differing motivations. Not to mention that for various reasons you found people of different races fighting on both sides, whether Cubans allies with SWAPO and Angolans, or other Angolans and Black South Africans in the South African-led forces. This is not a denial of racial strife existing in South Africa, but pointing out other elements going on at the time as well.

As for South Africa today, I hope they can get through the period they are in now and build a strong, united nation for the future together. Even if it means we have to hear those damn vuvezela horns at more soccer matches.