Nuclear-Powered DDG?
dump...@hotmail.com
a nuclear-powered version of the Burke class DDG's:
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3410184&c=AME&s=SEA
Is this a good idea?
Odd to see a Democrat pushing for a nuclear-powered ship, I always
thought the Dems were averse to all things fission-powered.
g lof2
You know, I always thought that no one could screw up your naval
shipbulding program worse than Rumsfeld and his new Light Weight
Mafia, but I was wrong, This guy really does not have a clue about
shipbuilding economics, technology, and engineering. I bet he will
want to reintroduce sails and wooden hulls next.
When you build a nuclear power ship, you start with the power plan and
build the ship around it, ( against modern conventional warships
design were you start with the weapon system). While I see nothing
wrong with build nuclear power missile cruisers, of the appropreate
size, the idea that using the hull design of a small ship because you
think everybody like it (which they did not by the way as it was too
short) is stupid.
Sure the DDG1000 hull is controversial, but this is not the first time
this hull form been use on warships, and the all electric drive power
train has been used before. And the fact remains that the navy has
intended to use the DD(x) hull foir the CG(x) from day one, that what
Rumsfeld and party ment by 'spiral development' (alond with the dual
radars and larger missile cells).
Now if they were really interest is the high cost of the DDG, the
congressman would ask about the marginal cost of increasing the number
of DDG 1000 order per year, I suspect they be surprise at how cheap
the second and third hulls will be if we return to the same product
rates of the Burke class which they are so impressed
Derek Lyons
>Some lawmakers want to scrap the DDG 1000 in favor of
>a nuclear-powered version of the Burke class DDG's:
>
>http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3410184&c=AME&s=SEA
>
>Is this a good idea?
No.
>Odd to see a Democrat pushing for a nuclear-powered ship, I always
>thought the Dems were averse to all things fission-powered.
They aren't pushing for it to be nuclear powered - they are pushing to
delay it so long and raise the price so much they are then justified
in cancelling it... after blaming the Navy for trying to build such a
gold plated ship in the first place.
D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.
http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/
-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL
Tiger
> Some lawmakers want to scrap the DDG 1000 in favor of
> a nuclear-powered version of the Burke class DDG's:
>
> http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3410184&c=AME&s=SEA
>
> Is this a good idea?
Hmmmmm....... Long term perhaps. Fuel costs are starting to bite. Plus
you don't need to build any more oilers. Down side? Cost upfront & Some
ports will be off limits to Nuke ships.
>
> Odd to see a Democrat pushing for a nuclear-powered ship, I always
> thought the Dems were averse to all things fission-powered.
Even a stopped watch is right once in a while. Of course we alreAady had
a nuke surface force till the penny pinchers killed them. Same thing
with the Battleships. The Uss New Jersey should be at sea, not sitting
in Camden.
Derek Lyons
>dump...@hotmail.com wrote:
>> Some lawmakers want to scrap the DDG 1000 in favor of
>> a nuclear-powered version of the Burke class DDG's:
>>
>> http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3410184&c=AME&s=SEA
>>
>> Is this a good idea?
>
>Hmmmmm....... Long term perhaps. Fuel costs are starting to bite. Plus
>you don't need to build any more oilers. Down side? Cost upfront & Some
>ports will be off limits to Nuke ships.
The don't just increase upfront - they stay increased across the
entire life cycle of the ship.
>> Odd to see a Democrat pushing for a nuclear-powered ship, I always
>> thought the Dems were averse to all things fission-powered.
>
>Even a stopped watch is right once in a while.
In this case, the Congressman proposing the change reads more like
some of the tamer loons we have here - he advocates some stuff and
dislikes other stuff, and utterly lacks any understanding.
TMOliver
"Tiger" <Lana_...@hotmail.com> wrote ...
>
> Even a stopped watch is right once in a while. Of course we alreAady had a
> nuke surface force till the penny pinchers killed them. Same thing with
> the Battleships. The Uss New Jersey should be at sea, not sitting in
> Camden.
>
Somehow, I knew we would once again have a chance to see a statement like
that in bold vivid print demonstrating the pre-pubescent - no barely post
infantile - mindset of the poster......
You do understand that in 1917, had USS MONITOR not sunk off Hatteras and
been preserved, and some great thinker had proposed deploying her to Scapa,
Rosyth or Derry with units of the US Atlantic Fleet off to aid in ther fight
against the dastardly Huns, MONITOR would be almost a decade "younger" than
NEW JERSEY is today. It would have made just about as good sense to sail
CONSTITUTION down to Hampton Roads to engage CSS VIRGINIA. After all, she
would have been no more an antique than is NEW JERSEY today. Come to think
of it, I guess OLYMPIA could have played a key role battling kamikazes off
Okinawa, a great deal younger in a sense of actual age or relatively modern
systems than is NJ.
....And then there's all those BTs you'll need.
It's one thing to be out of touch with reality, another indeed to be so
shockingly uninformed as to be an embarrassment to yourself and rest of us
who to date have failed to publicly brand you as a blithering idiot.
Compared to you, ray o'hara is a veritable Mahan, and ja a theologian of
impeccable credentials.
TMO
Andre Lieven
> "Tiger" <Lana_sa...@hotmail.com> wrote silly nonsense...
You know, I was going to address this latest outbreak of BB Insanity,
but you did the job spot on.
In the late stage of the first decade of the 21st Century, anyone so
addled as to demand to refight the latter half of the first half of
the
naval wars of the 20th, well, they need to look at a current calendar.
What the USN needs to get done is to be allowed to build enough
new ships in several categories. As the Tarawas wear out, more
Wasp type LHDs are needed. Ditto more San Antonio LPDs to
replace their 60s vintage ancestors. The LCS program needs to get
sorted out, and ditto with the future DDG and CG programs.
AS with any other military need, the US Navy needs *modern*
gun systems, not antique and obsolete pre mid 20th Century
museum pieces. Al Qaeda isn't threatening the West with a
fleet of Yamatos...
Andre
Dean A. Markley
warships in general)they have ALWAYS been a complete waste of resources
better directed elsewhere. The only thing battleships have ever
accomplished was to cause immense naval arms races. I challenge anyone
to name a war where battleships proved their worth.
Dean
David E. Powell
Spanish-American....
> Dean
Andrew Robert Breen
Dean A. Markley <deanm...@comcast.net> wrote:
>Andre Lieven wrote:
>> On Mar 8, 12:37 pm, "TMOliver" <tmoliverjr...@hot.rr.comFIX> wrote:
>>> "Tiger" <Lana_sa...@hotmail.com> wrote silly nonsense...
>>>
>>>> Even a stopped watch is right once in a while. Of course we alreAady had a
>>>> nuke surface force till the penny pinchers killed them. Same thing with
>>>> the Battleships. The Uss New Jersey should be at sea, not sitting in
>>>> Camden.
>>> Somehow, I knew we would once again have a chance to see a statement like
>>> that in bold vivid print demonstrating the pre-pubescent - no barely post
>>> infantile - mindset of the poster......
{Marvellous stuff, TMO, and thanks for saving me from the temptation to
rant..}
>> You know, I was going to address this latest outbreak of BB Insanity,
>> but you did the job spot on.
>I'd add to this that as much as I am fascinated with battleships (and
>warships in general)they have ALWAYS been a complete waste of resources
>better directed elsewhere. The only thing battleships have ever
>accomplished was to cause immense naval arms races. I challenge anyone
>to name a war where battleships proved their worth.
Russia-Japan, 1904-05. The battleships were pretty decisive there.
--
Andy Breen ~ Not speaking on behalf of the University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Feng Shui: an ancient oriental art for extracting
money from the gullible (Martin Sinclair)
Peter Skelton
In WWI they were certainly worth it to the allied side. If the RN
had not had enough of them, British support to the continental
effort would not have been possible, and the blockade would not
have worked. That that war was settled because the German attempt
to blockade Britain failed and their attempt to blockade Germany
worked.
Peter Skelton
Fred J. McCall
:Tiger <Lana_...@hotmail.com> wrote:
:
:>dump...@hotmail.com wrote:
:>> Some lawmakers want to scrap the DDG 1000 in favor of
:>> a nuclear-powered version of the Burke class DDG's:
:>>
:>> http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3410184&c=AME&s=SEA
:>>
:>> Is this a good idea?
:>
:>Hmmmmm....... Long term perhaps. Fuel costs are starting to bite. Plus
:>you don't need to build any more oilers. Down side? Cost upfront & Some
:>ports will be off limits to Nuke ships.
:
:The don't just increase upfront - they stay increased across the
:entire life cycle of the ship.
:
Not as much as it used to, given that we build reactors that don't
require refueling for the life of the ship.
Then you need to look at $100 oil prices, capital costs and operating
costs of oilers to fuel carrier escorts, etc. If the escorts don't
need fuel oilers can deliver more aviation fuel to carriers (which can
carry more because they're nuclear powered).
There are good arguments for nuclear carriers having all-nuclear
escort forces. I've only touched on a few of them.
--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney
BF Lake
"Dean A. Markley" <deanm...@comcast.net> wrote
>. I challenge anyone
> to name a war where battleships proved their worth.
Guadalcanal 14/15Nov 1942 went a lot better than it did on 13 Nov. (if you
ignore SD being so pathetic)
Regards,
Barry
Derek Lyons
>What the USN needs to get done is to be allowed to build enough
>new ships in several categories. As the Tarawas wear out, more
>Wasp type LHDs are needed. Ditto more San Antonio LPDs to
>replace their 60s vintage ancestors. The LCS program needs to get
>sorted out, and ditto with the future DDG and CG programs.
I think that could be said of virtually every major class other than
CVN's Andre.
zzbu...@netscape.net
> Some lawmakers want to scrap the DDG 1000 in favor of
> a nuclear-powered version of the Burke class DDG's:
>
> http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3410184&c=AME&s=SEA
>
> Is this a good idea?
Nobody knows, since the way the navy designs
DDG's is to always put a former aircraft carrier commander
in charge of the design. Which is also why people
with realistic forms of intellilects always put people with
real engineering skills in charge of AAW.
And let the navy do what they're best at:
Painting Signs they say:
"We're doing ASW here".
Andre Lieven
> better directed elsewhere.
Sure. They're fun as historical objects and as historical directions
of
massive technology, but the history of the Two Big Mistake Wars has
shown that their active role was overcome by their passive costs ( I
don't only mean in cash, but in trained personnel, support resources -
from fuel, to defended ports, and escorts ), which did not later
paralyse
carrier forces.
> The only thing battleships have ever
> accomplished was to cause immense naval arms races. I challenge anyone
> to name a war where battleships proved their worth.
Russo Japanese War of 1904-05.
Andre
Andre Lieven
> Andre Lieven <andrelie...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> >What the USN needs to get done is to be allowed to build enough
> >new ships in several categories. As the Tarawas wear out, more
> >Wasp type LHDs are needed. Ditto more San Antonio LPDs to
> >replace their 60s vintage ancestors. The LCS program needs to get
> >sorted out, and ditto with the future DDG and CG programs.
>
> I think that could be said of virtually every major class other than
> CVN's Andre.
Well, yes. Even though many navies are getting more life time out
of their ships, the design to build cycle has gotten even longer.
So, the timely replacement of ship types is now a worldside naval
problem, and, since most of the world's present blue water navies
are owned by democratic nations, the admirals have the task of
convincing politicians who don't know lots about naval power why
they need a fair number of fairlyexpensive blue water ships, when
the imminent appearance of a blue water enemy doesn't show much
of any such.
There might well be a case for a modern nuclear powered ocean
escort for USN task forces, but trying to shoehorn a nuke plant
into a designed for a gas turbine plant hull is not one of them.
IMHO. :-)
Andre
Dean A. Markley
>> I'd add to this that as much as I am fascinated with battleships (and
>> warships in general)they have ALWAYS been a complete waste of resources
>> better directed elsewhere. The only thing battleships have ever
>> accomplished was to cause immense naval arms races. I challenge anyone
>> to name a war where battleships proved their worth.
>
> Spanish-American....
>
>> Dean
Even here it is doubtful. There were no battleships at Manila Bay. At
Santiago Bay, the devastation was caused by small guns (8in, 6 in, etc)
rather than the 12in or 13 in guns. Santiago Bay was more of an armored
cruiser battle than anything else. With a better stroke of luck, the
Spanish cruisers could have outrun the American BBs.
Dean A. Markley
> In article <lJudnSQUxPkodE_a...@comcast.com>,
> Dean A. Markley <deanm...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> Andre Lieven wrote:
>>> On Mar 8, 12:37 pm, "TMOliver" <tmoliverjr...@hot.rr.comFIX> wrote:
>>>> "Tiger" <Lana_sa...@hotmail.com> wrote silly nonsense...
>>>>
>>>>> Even a stopped watch is right once in a while. Of course we alreAady had a
>>>>> nuke surface force till the penny pinchers killed them. Same thing with
>>>>> the Battleships. The Uss New Jersey should be at sea, not sitting in
>>>>> Camden.
>>>> Somehow, I knew we would once again have a chance to see a statement like
>>>> that in bold vivid print demonstrating the pre-pubescent - no barely post
>>>> infantile - mindset of the poster......
>
> {Marvellous stuff, TMO, and thanks for saving me from the temptation to
> rant..}
>
>>> You know, I was going to address this latest outbreak of BB Insanity,
>>> but you did the job spot on.
>
>> I'd add to this that as much as I am fascinated with battleships (and
>> warships in general)they have ALWAYS been a complete waste of resources
>> better directed elsewhere. The only thing battleships have ever
>> accomplished was to cause immense naval arms races. I challenge anyone
>> to name a war where battleships proved their worth.
>
> Russia-Japan, 1904-05. The battleships were pretty decisive there.
>
the actual war campaign was minor. Had the Russians not possessed or
sent those poor ships around the world, the war would have ended the
same way. Up to that point, battleships had proven themselves extremely
vulnerable to mines. And the Russian battleships were completely
ineffective at preventing the Japanese from moving troops to Korea.
Dean
Dean A. Markley
battleships suffered extremely heavily. And not mostly at the hands of
Central powers battleships either. You are entirely correct in the
blockade statements. Except that the Allied blockade was not done with
battleships, that was done with mines and smaller ships. The Allied
battleships only purpose was to contain the High Seas Fleet (and to a
lesser extent, the A-H fleet). My point is that all powers wasted far
too much money on battleships when it could have been spent more wisely
on other forces.
Dean
deem...@aol.com
But if the Russians had defeated the Japanese at Tsushima, the war
would've gone differently.
Dean A. Markley
rendered hors de combat by a weaker force of cruisers and destroyers.
So, was the Japanese battleship Hiei worth having there? In a way, the
fight on the 14th/15th was similar. Poor South Dakota was forced out of
the battle rather quickly after being smothered with 5in and 8in
gunfire. Was Washington superb in its pounding of Kirishima? Of
course! But, had Washington been replaced with say a few light
cruisers/heavy cruisers, it is entirely possible Kirishima would have
suffered the same fate. Surigao Strait proved that.
Dean
Gernot Hassenpflug
I think that given the balance of costs and benefits, at some point
the penny (literally and figuratively) had to drop as to what more
profitable means of waging war were.
The problem though, at that point, is that different people measure
"profit" rather differently, nor necessarily as calculate profit for
the same group, let alone the entire country in question. In other
words, vested interests and economic interests, contract issues,
conservatism, and the lack of education of the general public, helped
to keep the battleships being built and in service decades after their
in hind-sight finished peak.
Before the peak, there was I believe no better way to bring steel and
powder to bear on a naval adversary than by building big-gun
battleships.
--
Gernot Hassenpflug
BF Lake
"Dean A. Markley" <deanm...@comcast.net> wrote in message > Exactly. But
on the 13th, the Imperial Japanese Navy had a battleship
> rendered hors de combat by a weaker force of cruisers and destroyers.
Who paid a terrible price for that
> But, had Washington been replaced with say a few light
> cruisers/heavy cruisers, it is entirely possible Kirishima would have
> suffered the same fate.
If you don't mind your losses for not having the right ships for the job and
having to fight with what you have
> Surigao Strait proved that.
The USN in 1942 did not have the swarms of radar equipped DDs they did two
years later. In 1942 they (the admirals etc) didn't even know how to use
the radar they had.
Regards,
Barry
Gernot Hassenpflug
Or not. Both Hiei and Kirishima's fates were sealed not by the damage
to upperworks, but by the destruction, in both cases, of their rudders
(Hiei's I think by an 8 in shell and Kirishima's by a 16 in one). I
forget where I got the details from, but that was the reason no
attempt was made to try and save Kirishima, while Hiei had proved
unable to steer to safety either.
> would have suffered the same fate. Surigao Strait proved that.
Yup. My feeling is that the Kongo's were unlucky those nights and
although they were obviously going to be badly damaged, as would any
other vessel in the same circumstances, they would have had a good
chance at survival had the steering not been wrecked in both cases. I
would say that the newer heavy cruisers would have done as well or as
badly, as the case may be, but that probably the 14 in guns of the
Kongos would be an asset in many cases---one would have to look at the
respective fire control and rate of fire to determine which ships were
better. Also, the Kongo's did have a secondary battery that was not to
be sniffed at, even if they were in casemates.
--
Gernot Hassenpflug
BF Lake
"Dean A. Markley" <deanm...@comcast.net> wrote in message
>The Allied
> battleships only purpose was to contain the High Seas Fleet (and to a
> lesser extent, the A-H fleet). My point is that all powers wasted far
> too much money on battleships when it could have been spent more wisely
> on other forces.
That's the trouble isn't it? As soon as one navy has one, every navy has to
have one. That's why they are called "capital" ships, because they are at
the top of the food chain , not at the bottom or in the middle.
If everyone only has knives, the first guy to bring a gun wins.
The British long distance blockade using cruisers etc only worked because
the German BBs couldn't just go out and clear them away. Because of RN BBs.
Regards,
Barry
dott.Piergiorgio
Russo-Japanese war....
And also WWI, and, in waters like Med or SW Pacific, WWII....
Best regards from Italy,
Dott. Piergiorgio.
dott.Piergiorgio
>snip<
*Sigh* another B* thread....
But let's take the bull by the horns, as we say in Italy.
Let's begin with some general fact:
1) now only USN owns large flat-top capable of manage CTOL a/c.
2) the replacement for the V/STOL a/c currently in use, the Harrier, is
proceeding with various difficulties, and isnìt certain that the F-35B
will see the light; also I feel that the major CVL navies are very
suspicious of the actual intentions of the US in the programme (to put
it mildly, suspicions of a planned scuttling of the F-35B by US are
rising here and in spain, the more interested countries in the F-35
programme)
3) the monopoly of the USN in the CTOL field and advanced CTOL a/c will
invariably led everyone else to put R&D efforts in things capable of
negating this strategic& tactical advantage (the old lance vs. shield thing)
4) the DDX-DD-1000 & CGX is already in the predreadnought range of
tonnage, and the peculiar bow of them will reinforce the impression (I
actually was half-serious in my joke of reclassify them BBX)
5) after ~50 years of stability of naval gun calibre in the 5" area, now
are reapparing the 6" range of calibre; this, coupled with the
development of more or less intelligent shells with extended range, now
nearing the 100km will surely led to the already seen macho escalation
of bigger and larger penis... ehm, guns, and I guess also in their
number aboard ships.
6) the development of side launcher cells free the centreline for other
purposes, and the natural thing whose an Naval engineer will place on
the centreline are presumably turrets.
7) since 1950s enormous efforts are gone in the development of
insensitive explosives, firing charges & propellants; from what I can
understand, already now a direct hit in the magazines is much less
fearsome than in past.
8) the development of UAV will led to easily recoverable reconnaissance
drones with an relative easiness of recovering on non-flattop ships, a
situation not much different to the days of catapults & floatplanes in
the interwar & WWII period.
Having put this eight facts on current Naval situation and development,
is rather easy see what will happens: on the ships now called destroyers
and cruisers is beginning to appear the 6" guns, and in the evolution of
Naval gunfire support this will led to consider & develop advanced gun
in the other calibres up, 7", 7.5" 8", 9,2" and so, and perhaps in
increasing number aboard ships, and with ever increasing range & better
CEP. When ranges start to reach the ~200-250 km (i guess around 8"-10"
calibre, extrapolating from the ~100km range of the current 5"/62)
range, in the mind of some Admirals dawn the factoid that the range is
starting to approach the tactical radius of CTOL a/c with much less time
on target and pratically no time between "sorties" and that nice &
stealth (floatplane ?) UAV gives an good chance of detecting the
position of targets at very long distance.... and put the R6D effort in
developing advanced guns capable of the same range of tactical radius of
CTOL A/C, guns whose will be in the well-known 12"-16" range... and how
many are needed ? There's no much effort of imagination to visualize the
general appareance of this type of ships, whose surely led to an natural
& obvious classification.....
(surely everyone has noticed that I have refrained to discuss the other
component of the B* nature, that is, the armour, but I know so little of
what is happening in the field of advanced materials, and I don't know
much about that rumour of the development of carbon-based nanomaterial
armour, so I wisely avoid talking of things I don't know....)
dott.Piergiorgio
> The problem though, at that point, is that different people measure
> "profit" rather differently, nor necessarily as calculate profit for
> the same group, let alone the entire country in question. In other
> words, vested interests and economic interests, contract issues,
> conservatism, and the lack of education of the general public, helped
> to keep the battleships being built and in service decades after their
> in hind-sight finished peak.
>
> Before the peak, there was I believe no better way to bring steel and
> powder to bear on a naval adversary than by building big-gun
> battleships.
and now, a very interesting question, whose seems to me that wasn't ever
talked here: when was this peak ?
In my opinion was during the late inter-war period, let's say ~1933/8,
when the state of antitorpedo system, deck armour and AA armament was
much more effective than the contemporary biplane torpedo bomber and
horizontal/shallow dive bombers. Aside Taranto, the contemporary
(mid-30s) swordfish never sunk an Italian BB (at Matapan there was the
1938 vintage Albacore) with a lesser peak in ~1942 (I think that if at
PH was present the North Carolinas & Alabamas instad of the old
battlewagon the outcome will be much less in favor of the Japanese).
What put the CV above BB was the development of the monoplane torpedo
and especially the dive bomber, whose IMHO reach the full maturity ~1944.
BF Lake
"dott.Piergiorgio" <dott.Pierg...@KAIGUN.fastwebnet.it> wrote in
message news:VZTAj.12239
> What put the CV above BB was the development of the monoplane torpedo
> and especially the dive bomber, whose IMHO reach the full maturity ~1944.
It was the plunging shell or bomb on the deck that did them in. (or a
cunning, shell -made- into -a- bomb, dirty trick even!) It was not possible
to armour the deck sufficiently. True even if no aircraft ever built.
IAW it was long- range shooting post-WW1 which meant plunging fire. For
bombs, it did occur after the aircraft developed power/strength enough to
carry a heavy bomb just pre-WW2 say.
Regards,
Barry
deem...@aol.com
> "dott.Piergiorgio" <dott.PiergiorgioNI...@KAIGUN.fastwebnet.it> wrote in
I disagree. The torpedo has always been the worst aerial enemy of
even the biggest ships.
BF Lake
<deem...@aol.com> wrote in message news:4ad00bef-3d64-496d-96ea-
> I disagree. The torpedo has always been the worst aerial enemy of
even the biggest ships.
But that didn't stop the carrier from continuing to exist, and it has the
same problem as a BB hull for that. Didn't Andy just post that test
bombing of NELSON's deck got the LION's cancelled?
Regards,
Barry
Peter Skelton
<deanm...@comcast.net> wrote:
HMS Audacious was the only modern battleship the RN lost in WWI.
The allied blockade was enforced by battleships, if the RN had
not had enough of them, the German battleships would have ended
it quickly. Saying that the only purpose was to contain the HSF
is saying the only pupose was to end the war without a huge death
toll. In other words, the RN's battleships were the best money
the allies spent.
(Of course if the RN hadn't battleships, getting the army over
the channel in the first few weeks of the war might have been
problematic.)
One could argue with some success that the German battleships
were a waste of resource that could have been used more wisely,
but, if the Germans had them, the British had no choice.
Peter Skelton
Andrew Robert Breen
According to Brown (who, as the historian of the RN Corps of Naval
Constructors - and a former senior constructor himself, should be in a
position to know) it was the impossibility of developing deck protection
against heavy air-launched weapons which killed the RN battleship
projects: 12" armour would have been needed, and as deck armour has many
times (3-4x, from memory) the impact on ship size that the same belt
thickness does this simply wasn't going to happen. Note that by 1945 or so
naval thinking had moved away from the torpedo bomber (at least, outside
thhe USSR) as the new weapons developed (or in development) to counter
kamikaze were thought to make it unlikely that a torpedo bomber could
make a stable launch run (hence the demise of the Fairey Spearfish - for
example - and the interest in rocket-carried torpedoes: torpedo-carrying
fighters were thought to still be of use against poorly-defended targets).
In the end, it was probably the Fritz-X hits on _Warspite_ and _Roma_
which served notice that the day of the battleship was ending.
As to the 'carrier: it has poorer ability to soak up damage than an
equaivalently sized battleship, but a much better chance of detecting,
evading or diisrupting the strikes launched against it, and an infinitely
greater capacity to reach outt to long ranges to attack the enemy. Brown
comments meorably on this, but not quite so memorably that I'm able to
quote him here... sorry.
--
Andy Breen Not speaking on behalf of the University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Post-September, somebody figured out that the Internet was
cheaper than babysitters (Dick Gaughan)
Vince
Great to hear from you
Vince Brannigan
William Hamblen
<dott.Pierg...@KAIGUN.fastwebnet.it> wrote:
>and now, a very interesting question, whose seems to me that wasn't ever
>talked here: when was this peak ?
The adoption of fire control radar probably marks the peak of
development of the battleship.
Battleships became obsolete as the "command of the sea" ship simply
because naval aviation outranged naval artillery.
Bud
William Hamblen
wrote:
>HMS Audacious was the only modern battleship the RN lost in WWI
... to enemy action.
HMS Vanguard did self-destruct.
Bud
Andrew Robert Breen
{stuff...}
>Great to hear from you
Thanks Vince. It's appreciated. Feeling a lot better the least few days,
so //hopefully// (and hopefully not trailing temptation for the infernal
Gods here!!) I'm on the upwards ppart of the curve now.
--
Andy Breen ~ Speaking for myself, not the University of Wales
"your suggestion rates at four monkeys for six weeks"
(Peter D. Rieden)
BF Lake
"Andrew Robert Breen" <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote in message
news:a4rda5x...@news.aber.ac.uk...
> In the end, it was probably the Fritz-X hits on _Warspite_ and _Roma_
> which served notice that the day of the battleship was ending.
>
> As to the 'carrier: it has poorer ability to soak up damage than an
> equaivalently sized battleship, but a much better chance of detecting,
> evading or diisrupting the strikes launched against it, and an infinitely
> greater capacity to reach outt to long ranges to attack the enemy. Brown
> comments meorably on this, but not quite so memorably that I'm able to
> quote him here... sorry.
Looking in "Nelson to Vanguard", can't find ref to test bombing of NELSON.
They did modify MONARCH as a mock NELSON for bombing trails in 1923 he
mentions.
At the end of the BB section he says," It is often said that the battleship
died because it was vulnerable. This is incorrect; it was replaced by the
fleet carrier which was much more vulnerable. The battleship died because
it was far less capable than the carrier of inflicting damage on the enemy."
(supporting William H in his post)
Regards,
Barry
>
deem...@aol.com
> <deemsb...@aol.com> wrote in message news:4ad00bef-3d64-496d-96ea-
Carriers had greater strike capabilities than battleships. That's
why they replaced them. Put 4 bombs on the deck of my battleship and
I'll put 4 torps into the hull of your battleship. I'd be willing to
bet the odds that my battleship would still be underway and at least
partially mission capable are greater than yours.
BF Lake
<deem...@aol.com> wrote
Carriers had greater strike capabilities than battleships. That's
why they replaced them. Put 4 bombs on the deck of my battleship and
I'll put 4 torps into the hull of your battleship. I'd be willing to
bet the odds that my battleship would still be underway and at least
partially mission capable are greater than yours.
-----------------------
Nope, my battleship is bigger than your battleship :)
Regards,
Barry
deem...@aol.com
> <deemsb...@aol.com> wrote
Well, nevermind then :(
Andre Lieven
If your wager is limited to all sorts of WW2 ordinance, then the fate
of
Roma and Warspite in 1943 puts paid to your side of the bet.
Neither was hit by as many as four bombs, yet one sank, and the
other one wa 100% mission klled, and damned near sank, too.
Oh, and Arizona took not too many bomb hits, too...
Andre
deem...@aol.com
And I could bring up Barham, Royal Oak, Fuso, and Kongo that were
all sunk by 4 or less torpedoes. The Italian BBs at Taranto come to
mind. Also, Oklahoma which was sinking from 3 torps when 2 more
capsized her.
My point is that torpedoes were more dangerous, on average, to
battleships than bombs. Battleships could shrug off many bomb hits,
but rarely did so to torpedo hits. Punching holes below the waterline
was usually more serious than explosions on the deck.
Andre Lieven
Regardless, this doesn't change the fact that my examples belied
your claim.
> The Italian BBs at Taranto come to
> mind. Also, Oklahoma which was sinking from 3 torps when 2 more
> capsized her.
> My point is that torpedoes were more dangerous, on average, to
> battleships than bombs.
Then, you fail to grasp the lesson that having bombs that kill
battleships, were the last major nail in their coffin.
Battleships were big gun ships, intended to fire relatively flat
trajectory shell fire against enemy ships and battleships. As
long as that was also their primary danger that their defensive
systems had to protect against, they ruled.
Once torpedoes came in, destroyer escort forces allowed the
battleships some cover from both of the original torpedo delivery
systems, subs and enemy destroyers.
Now, bring in long range plunging heavy shellfire, AND airborne
torpedo delivery craft, AND finally, airborne heavy bomb delivery
craft. Against ALL THOSE, the battleship could not stand, and
it could not strike back to ranges from which the aiborne delivery
craft come from.
> Battleships could shrug off many bomb hits,
> but rarely did so to torpedo hits. Punching holes below the waterline
> was usually more serious than explosions on the deck.
You utterly missed the whole point. No soup for you.
Andre
Andrew Robert Breen
>
>"Andrew Robert Breen" <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote in message
>news:a4rda5x...@news.aber.ac.uk...
>
>> In the end, it was probably the Fritz-X hits on _Warspite_ and _Roma_
>> which served notice that the day of the battleship was ending.
>>
>> As to the 'carrier: it has poorer ability to soak up damage than an
>> equaivalently sized battleship, but a much better chance of detecting,
>> evading or diisrupting the strikes launched against it, and an infinitely
>> greater capacity to reach outt to long ranges to attack the enemy. Brown
>> comments meorably on this, but not quite so memorably that I'm able to
>> quote him here... sorry.
>
>Looking in "Nelson to Vanguard", can't find ref to test bombing of NELSON.
>They did modify MONARCH as a mock NELSON for bombing trails in 1923 he
>mentions.
Mutter.. It /may/ be in "Rebuilding the Royal Navy". He certainly
discusses the trials in one of that series, but I'm currently some hundred
miles from my references and working from memory.
>At the end of the BB section he says," It is often said that the battleship
>died because it was vulnerable. This is incorrect; it was replaced by the
>fleet carrier which was much more vulnerable. The battleship died because
>it was far less capable than the carrier of inflicting damage on the enemy."
>(supporting William H in his post)
That's the line I was failing to remember.
--
Andy Breen ~ Not speaking on behalf of the University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Feng Shui: an ancient oriental art for extracting
money from the gullible (Martin Sinclair)
deem...@aol.com
Since I never claimed bombs couldn't kill a battleship, your
examples don't really show anything.
>
> > The Italian BBs at Taranto come to
> > mind. Also, Oklahoma which was sinking from 3 torps when 2 more
> > capsized her.
> > My point is that torpedoes were more dangerous, on average, to
> > battleships than bombs.
>
> Then, you fail to grasp the lesson that having bombs that kill
> battleships, were the last major nail in their coffin.
Bombs were one of several factors. The real reason was that
carriers were more effective at more things....especially increased
range to reach out and touch someone.
>
> Battleships were big gun ships, intended to fire relatively flat
> trajectory shell fire against enemy ships and battleships. As
> long as that was also their primary danger that their defensive
> systems had to protect against, they ruled.
>
> Once torpedoes came in, destroyer escort forces allowed the
> battleships some cover from both of the original torpedo delivery
> systems, subs and enemy destroyers.
>
> Now, bring in long range plunging heavy shellfire, AND airborne
> torpedo delivery craft, AND finally, airborne heavy bomb delivery
> craft. Against ALL THOSE, the battleship could not stand, and
> it could not strike back to ranges from which the aiborne delivery
> craft come from.
Which doesn't change my point.
>
> > Battleships could shrug off many bomb hits,
> > but rarely did so to torpedo hits. Punching holes below the waterline
> > was usually more serious than explosions on the deck.
>
> You utterly missed the whole point. No soup for you.
You still haven't changed my point.
>
> Andre
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
> Yes Peter and the big question here is what is "worth it"? The Allied
> battleships suffered extremely heavily. And not mostly at the hands
> of Central powers battleships either.
Only one Allied battleship was sunk. (Audacious) Several battle
cruisers were by Central Powers BB. RN capital ship losses were mainly
at Jutland.
> that was done with mines and smaller ships. The Allied
> battleships only purpose was to contain the High Seas Fleet
And unless the High Seas Fleet was contained it could smash the
blockading ships. And why Allied BB anyway. The French fleet was
operating in the Med and the USN had no part in the war until 1917 after
Jutland. By the way the mine barrage was intended to block German
submarines the blockade was largely carried out by AMC.
Ken Young
Peter Skelton
Thanks, I'd forgotten that one. I shall drink a small scotch this
evening in penance.
Peter Skelton
Peter Skelton
wrote:
I've always had a little trouble with that one, although it's
clearly true, it is only part of the truth. ISTM that the fact
that the carrier affected a much larger area had at least as much
to with it and that they could be built more quickly had a little
to do with it too.
(I would not care to defend the idea that carriers were more
vulnerable than battleships once the threat moved upstairs.)
Peter Skelton
dott.Piergiorgio
> And I could bring up Barham, Royal Oak, Fuso, and Kongo that were
> all sunk by 4 or less torpedoes. The Italian BBs at Taranto come to
> mind. Also, Oklahoma which was sinking from 3 torps when 2 more
> capsized her.
> My point is that torpedoes were more dangerous, on average, to
> battleships than bombs. Battleships could shrug off many bomb hits,
> but rarely did so to torpedo hits. Punching holes below the waterline
> was usually more serious than explosions on the deck.
On the carrier side, I can point about the possibility of "combined
attack" by carrier a/c; seems to me that the sinking of the Yamato was a
manual case; If i have understand well, the first wakes of dive bomber
and perhaps also strafing fighters has wrecked many of the massive AA
assets of the Yamato and killed many of the crew manning them, allowing
relatively safe runs to the successive torpedo bombers whose put the ten
or so torpedoes whose sunk the Yamato.
IIRC there's somewhere on YouTube an excerpt of an recent movie about
the last mission of the Yamato whose illustrate (and dramatize in a
peculiar Japanese style..) this point.
R.C. Payne
I'm going to take a slightly different slant on this one to most of the
rest of you. While as a means of fighting other ships, the Battleship
remained king until replaced by the aircraft carrier, it is true. But
that is not what battleships are for, and never has been. From the time
of Napoleon and throughout the nineteenth century, the battleship (or
battle fleet) was a means to control the seas, and to ensure that you
could never be denied access to them by your enemies, but deny them
access as you saw fit.
I would say that the peak of the battleship as the means for strategic
dominance of the oceans was 1906 - 1916 (Dreadnought - Jutland).
Jutland was supposed to be a rerun of Trafalgar, where our victory over
them ensured that there was no way they could put to sea again in a way
that would threaten us. In a sense, Britain achieved that at Jutland,
because the Germans never did come out again. But it did not stop
Germany from seriously threatening Britain as a nation, using the tool
of unrestricted submarine warfare. As was demonstrated in the battle of
the atlantic, having a big ship (be it destroyer, cruiser or battleship)
sailing in company with you was no assurance that you, as a merchantman,
were safe from enemy action, as it was in previous times.
Robin
Andrew Robert Breen
Peter Skelton <skel...@cogeco.ca> wrote:
>On Sun, 09 Mar 2008 23:03:46 GMT, "BF Lake" <non...@nospam.com>
>wrote:
>
>>
>>"Andrew Robert Breen" <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote in message
>>news:a4rda5x...@news.aber.ac.uk...
>>> As to the 'carrier: it has poorer ability to soak up damage than an
>>> equaivalently sized battleship, but a much better chance of detecting,
>>> evading or diisrupting the strikes launched against it, and an infinitely
>>> greater capacity to reach outt to long ranges to attack the enemy. Brown
>>> comments meorably on this, but not quite so memorably that I'm able to
>>> quote him here... sorry.
>>At the end of the BB section he says," It is often said that the battleship
>>died because it was vulnerable. This is incorrect; it was replaced by the
>>fleet carrier which was much more vulnerable. The battleship died because
>>it was far less capable than the carrier of inflicting damage on the enemy."
>>(supporting William H in his post)
>>
>I've always had a little trouble with that one, although it's
>clearly true, it is only part of the truth. ISTM that the fact
>that the carrier affected a much larger area had at least as much
>to with it and that they could be built more quickly had a little
>to do with it too.
>
>(I would not care to defend the idea that carriers were more
>vulnerable than battleships once the threat moved upstairs.)
The battlewagon was less vunerable to hits than the 'carrier, which is the
point I've always taken to tbe one Brown was making. The 'carrier, of
course, has many more ways to /avoid/ being hit (recon patrols, CAP..).
The battlewagon has just got to sit and soak it up..
Andrew Robert Breen
dott.Piergiorgio <dott.Pierg...@KAIGUN.fastwebnet.it> wrote:
>
>On the carrier side, I can point about the possibility of "combined
>attack" by carrier a/c; seems to me that the sinking of the Yamato was a
>manual case; If i have understand well, the first wakes of dive bomber
>and perhaps also strafing fighters has wrecked many of the massive AA
>assets of the Yamato and killed many of the crew manning them, allowing
>relatively safe runs to the successive torpedo bombers whose put the ten
>or so torpedoes whose sunk the Yamato.
Standard inter-war tactics, of course (at least in the RN, can't speak for
elsewhere) - using fighters and bombers to supress AA fire and interfere
with control so that the torpedo bombers could close-to-cripple. And
tactics which had beeen proven in 1918, too - as witness the loss of
_Breslau_ and the crippling of _Goeben_ (100% mission-kill) after air
attacks by fighters with MGs and light bombs swept their bridges, forced
them out of control and drove them into minefields..
Vince
> In article <1w9Bj.13437$q53....@tornado.fastwebnet.it>,
> dott.Piergiorgio <dott.Pierg...@KAIGUN.fastwebnet.it> wrote:
>> On the carrier side, I can point about the possibility of "combined
>> attack" by carrier a/c; seems to me that the sinking of the Yamato was a
>> manual case; If i have understand well, the first wakes of dive bomber
>> and perhaps also strafing fighters has wrecked many of the massive AA
>> assets of the Yamato and killed many of the crew manning them, allowing
>> relatively safe runs to the successive torpedo bombers whose put the ten
>> or so torpedoes whose sunk the Yamato.
>
> Standard inter-war tactics, of course (at least in the RN, can't speak for
> elsewhere) - using fighters and bombers to supress AA fire and interfere
> with control so that the torpedo bombers could close-to-cripple. And
> tactics which had beeen proven in 1918, too - as witness the loss of
> _Breslau_ and the crippling of _Goeben_ (100% mission-kill) after air
> attacks by fighters with MGs and light bombs swept their bridges, forced
> them out of control and drove them into minefields..
>
Torpedo bombing, as with many other technologies, could take advantage
of a "window" In the late 1930s 1800-2000 horsepower engines were being
created by both Wright and P&W That allowed a single engine "fast"
carrier borne torpedo bomber
such a bomber could close on a ship at 200+ knots (even if it has to
slow to launch
maximum practical launch distance on a 200 m ship is 2000m
at this range you might get 10% hits in a mass attack (15 + aircraft)
hit rates go up as you get closer
in 1941-43 there was no practical ship borne defense against such an
aircraft Eventually computed flak control of the 40mm gun would be
effective
You need fighters to protect the torpedo bombers
Vince
Weatherlawyer
> On Mar 9, 8:47 pm, "BF Lake" <non...@nospam.com> wrote:
>
> > Carriers had greater strike capabilities than battleships. That's
> > why they replaced them. Put 4 bombs on the deck of my battleship and
> > I'll put 4 torps into the hull of your battleship. I'd be willing to
> > bet the odds that my battleship would still be underway and at least
> > partially mission capable are greater than yours.
>
>
The point being that for convoy escort a carrier could soon be knocked
up. And for shadowing an enemy squadron a carrier is ideal.
If the squad was under constant surveillance it could perform no
mission other than demand surveillance. There isn't all that much need
for any exchange of fire in those circumstances.
See March and April 1941. Getting a battleship close to a convoy
protected by Merchant carriers:
"APRIL 1941
Battle of the Atlantic - Over the next few months a number of long
awaited ship types and weapons started to be introduced. These would
contribute significantly to the eventual defeat of the U-boat.
(1) The first Auxiliary Fighter Catapult Ships flying the White Ensign
and equipped with a single 'one-way' Hurricane were ready in April
1941. They shot down their first Kondor in August. In May a Hurricane
was successfully launched from a Red Ensign Catapult Armed Merchantman
(CAM), but they did not claim their first victim until November. CAM-
ships were eventually superseded in 1943 by Merchant Aircraft Carriers
(MACs) - merchantmen with full flightdecks, but sailing under the Red
Ensign and also carrying oil or grain.
(2) The final step in the introduction of ship-borne aircraft into the
Battle of the Atlantic came in June when the first escort carrier was
ready for service. HMS Audacity, converted from a German prize, had a
short life, but proved the great value of these vessels.
(3) New scientific developments also started to play their part. In
May the first high definition, 10cm radar (Type 271) was installed in
a corvette. Later still, high frequency, direction finding (HF/DF or
'Huff-Duff') was introduced to supplement the work of the shore
stations. It was many months before either system was widely in
service, and not until 1942 did they claim their first U-boats.
(4) Inter-service co-ordination was further improved when RAF Coastal
Command was placed under operational control of the Admiralty."
http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsAtlanticDev.htm
The greatest need as shown by the charts at the end of this page was
for carriers: http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsAtlanticDev2.htm
Paul J. Adam
<a...@aber.ac.uk> writes
>As to the 'carrier: it has poorer ability to soak up damage than an
>equaivalently sized battleship, but a much better chance of detecting,
>evading or diisrupting the strikes launched against it, and an infinitely
>greater capacity to reach outt to long ranges to attack the enemy. Brown
>comments meorably on this, but not quite so memorably that I'm able to
>quote him here... sorry.
End of Chapter 1 of "Nelson to Vanguard" what you were thinking of,
Andy?
"It is often said that the battleship died because it was vulnerable.
This is incorrect: it was replaced by the fleet carrier which was much
more vulnerable. The battleship died because it was far less capable
than the carrier of inflicting damage on the enemy."
--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides
paul<dot>j<dot>adam[at]googlemail{dot}.com
TMOliver
engagement".
For a BB to engage another BB or CV, it must close to within what was even
with the best of radar and eadar FCS essentially visual range.
Theoretically, a well-handled carrier task group was always immune as long
as it possessed speed and range equal to that of a BB attempting to close,
while the BB could be enagaged at close to the limit of the CV's aircraft
and almost continuously while closing.
The capacity of manuever for protection and the range of available weapons
systems didn't creep into the "balance of power" equation with the
development of BBs and CVs.
No matter how much armor one might don, your pilum and your gladius were
simply not very effective when engaging Hunnish mounted archers.
Nor was forming a square an adequate defense for infantry against horse
artillery.
Were we into "What Ifs" and "War Gaming" at the grand strategy level, one
could make a good case for Japan to have abandoned building or rebuilding
BBs in 1920, building new CVs in place of new BBs and even converting every
suitable existing huu'powerplant by adding a flight deck (and similarly
greatly ramping up the IJN's pilot training program).
Subtracting one engagement off Guadalcanal and the "accomplishments" of
Japanese BBs aren't very impressive compared to their cost in money,
personnel and logistics support required.
The night battle in the Straights? Those old US BBs would have been in far
greater danger from a few (effective) squadrons of a/c embarked on CVs
decks. In all likelihood, the old BBs would have never been "forward
deployed" had the threat of a/c attack not been minimal.
One can't assign the moment upon which the sun set upon BBs to a single
moment in history. Twilight takes a while, but certainly after the IJN had
been repulsed from the Slot, the IJN's BB become little more than pawns. The
real threat from TIRPITZ was probably over-rated (evidenced by the
relatively modest expendure of Allied resources allocated to her
destruction), and had the Allies been willing to apply the original thinking
and modest R&D costs of the German's "guided" bombs, TIRPITZ could have been
reduced to a tomb for its crew far sooner.
The best path to a more effetive USN would have been to sail every BB on
hand into a selected US port in September, 1945, and leaves the keys with
the local City Halls.
Fire support off Korea? Gimme a break! A couple of more deckloads of
elderly Corsairs with bomb and rocket racks and the crazed young men who
drove them would have accomplished more (and further inland without ever
hazarding a flight deck within range of coast artillery).
TMO
TMOliver
lollygagging down in Sick Bay or being in Hack in your stateroom has reduced
the level of learning which cluesticks may hammer into the thick skulls of
the latest draft of recruits and pressed men arriving aboard.
We have not seen dolts and dullards such as these since Yoshida departed and
zzbunker's keepers began to increase the period during which he was
restrained every day.
The prospects for your recovery lift a veritable "Stone Frigate" from the
collective breast of smn!
TMO
BF Lake
"TMOliver" <tmoliv...@hot.rr.comFIX> wrote in message
news:47d56ecf$0$22808$4c36...@roadrunner.com...
> We have not seen dolts and dullards such as these since Yoshida departed
....
You mean
http://www.adamyoshida.com/newadam.jpg
(doesn't he need a top hat for that pose?)
He is not among the departed, though it seems many wish he were.
Regards,
Barry
Andrew Robert Breen
TMOliver <tmoliv...@hot.rr.comFIX> wrote:
>
>Fire support off Korea? Gimme a break! A couple of more deckloads of
>elderly Corsairs with bomb and rocket racks and the crazed young men who
>drove them would have accomplished more (and further inland without ever
>hazarding a flight deck within range of coast artillery).
Brown (again, and again in "Nelson to Vanguard" if my memory's working)
refers to an Admiralty study in 1945 or so which suggested that had the
aircraft used to provide air cover for _Howe_ and _Anson_ in their
bombardment of {somewhere, during their Pacific Fleet deployment} had
been used in a strike role or as cover for the strike, they'd have done
considerably more damage to the enemy.
Probably not as photogenic, though..}
Andrew Robert Breen
Paul J. Adam <paul.j.adam...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>In message <a4rda5x...@news.aber.ac.uk>, Andrew Robert Breen
><a...@aber.ac.uk> writes
>>As to the 'carrier: it has poorer ability to soak up damage than an
>>equaivalently sized battleship, but a much better chance of detecting,
>>evading or diisrupting the strikes launched against it, and an infinitely
>>greater capacity to reach outt to long ranges to attack the enemy. Brown
>>comments meorably on this, but not quite so memorably that I'm able to
>>quote him here... sorry.
>
>End of Chapter 1 of "Nelson to Vanguard" what you were thinking of,
>Andy?
>
>"It is often said that the battleship died because it was vulnerable.
>This is incorrect: it was replaced by the fleet carrier which was much
>more vulnerable. The battleship died because it was far less capable
>than the carrier of inflicting damage on the enemy."
Bingo. Thanks, Paul, and everyone else who looked it up. Like I said, I'm
away from my reference shelves and working from Mk.1 Grey Matter only..
Eugene Griessel
As mad a Hatter as ever graced these hallowed electronic halls.
Still thinks he's a US citizen, one notes.
Eugene L Griessel
How can I take an interest in my work when I don't like it?
- I usually post only from Sci.Military.Naval -
BF Lake
"Eugene Griessel" <eugene@dynagen..co..za> wrote in message
news:47d57a0d...@news.uunet.co.za...
> As mad a Hatter as ever graced these hallowed electronic halls.
> Still thinks he's a US citizen, one notes.
I thought he was doing "Uncle Sam Wants You" but no hat. I see be the many
Google hits they all love him as much as we did.
Regards,
Barry
Keith Willshaw
> In article <47d56b95$0$22815$4c36...@roadrunner.com>,
> TMOliver <tmoliv...@hot.rr.comFIX> wrote:
>>
>>Fire support off Korea? Gimme a break! A couple of more deckloads of
>>elderly Corsairs with bomb and rocket racks and the crazed young men who
>>drove them would have accomplished more (and further inland without ever
>>hazarding a flight deck within range of coast artillery).
>
> Brown (again, and again in "Nelson to Vanguard" if my memory's working)
> refers to an Admiralty study in 1945 or so which suggested that had the
> aircraft used to provide air cover for _Howe_ and _Anson_ in their
> bombardment of {somewhere, during their Pacific Fleet deployment} had
> been used in a strike role or as cover for the strike, they'd have done
> considerably more damage to the enemy.
>
Worse than that, John Winton points out in his book 'The Forgotten Fleet'
that the diversion of the BB's and attendant AA cruisers and destroyers
stripped
away AA ships and fighter cover just when they were most needed. As a
result HMS Formidable was hit by a Kamikaze and suffered considerable
damage.
Keith
Andrew Robert Breen
>
>"Eugene Griessel" <eugene@dynagen..co..za> wrote in message
>news:47d57a0d...@news.uunet.co.za...
>
>
>> As mad a Hatter as ever graced these hallowed electronic halls.
>> Still thinks he's a US citizen, one notes.
>
>I thought he was doing "Uncle Sam Wants You" but no hat.
Perhaps he's "A hat short of a recruiting poster"?
Andrew Robert Breen
TMO - I'm honoured. I'm not sure I deserve such praise, but thank you :)
--
Andy Breen, not speaking on behalf of the University of Wales
"The internet, that wonderful tool for bringing us into contact
with things that make us wish we could scrub our brains out with
dental floss.." (Charlie Stross)
Andrew Robert Breen
He's departed from here, which is dam' fine by me...
Andre Lieven
Utterly wrong, as my examples showed several BBs destroyed by
less than your " four bombs ".
> > > The Italian BBs at Taranto come to
> > > mind. Also, Oklahoma which was sinking from 3 torps when 2 more
> > > capsized her.
> > > My point is that torpedoes were more dangerous, on average, to
> > > battleships than bombs.
>
> > Then, you fail to grasp the lesson that having bombs that kill
> > battleships, were the last major nail in their coffin.
>
> Bombs were one of several factors. The real reason was that
> carriers were more effective at more things....especially increased
> range to reach out and touch someone.
Thank you, Captain Obvious.
Nonetheless, YOUR claim of " four bombs " leaving a bb in better
shape than four torps, was... *wrong*.
Deal with it.
> > Battleships were big gun ships, intended to fire relatively flat
> > trajectory shell fire against enemy ships and battleships. As
> > long as that was also their primary danger that their defensive
> > systems had to protect against, they ruled.
>
> > Once torpedoes came in, destroyer escort forces allowed the
> > battleships some cover from both of the original torpedo delivery
> > systems, subs and enemy destroyers.
>
> > Now, bring in long range plunging heavy shellfire, AND airborne
> > torpedo delivery craft, AND finally, airborne heavy bomb delivery
> > craft. Against ALL THOSE, the battleship could not stand, and
> > it could not strike back to ranges from which the aiborne delivery
> > craft come from.
>
> Which doesn't change my point.
No, it demolishes your " point ".
> > > Battleships could shrug off many bomb hits,
> > > but rarely did so to torpedo hits. Punching holes below the waterline
> > > was usually more serious than explosions on the deck.
>
> > You utterly missed the whole point. No soup for you.
>
> You still haven't changed my point.
<Projection>
Andre
Andre Lieven
On Mar 10, 1:14 pm, "TMOliver" <tmoliverjr...@hot.rr.comFIX> wrote:
> I'll subscribe to a slightly different interpretation, "parameters of
> engagement".
>
> For a BB to engage another BB or CV, it must close to within what was even
> with the best of radar and eadar FCS essentially visual range.
> Theoretically, a well-handled carrier task group was always immune as long
> as it possessed speed and range equal to that of a BB attempting to close,
> while the BB could be enagaged at close to the limit of the CV's aircraft
> and almost continuously while closing.
>
> The capacity of manuever for protection and the range of available weapons
> systems didn't creep into the "balance of power" equation with the
> development of BBs and CVs.
>
> No matter how much armor one might don, your pilum and your gladius were
> simply not very effective when engaging Hunnish mounted archers.
>
> Nor was forming a square an adequate defense for infantry against horse
> artillery.
>
> Were we into "What Ifs" and "War Gaming" at the grand strategy level, one
> could make a good case for Japan to have abandoned building or rebuilding
> BBs in 1920, building new CVs in place of new BBs and even converting every
> suitable existing huu'powerplant by adding a flight deck (and similarly
> greatly ramping up the IJN's pilot training program).
The thing here is that this ramping up of a putative IJN all-carrier
program,
would not have passed unnoticed. Its true that the exact parameters of
the ships and their aircraft would likely have only partially been
known,
but such an IJN program, no matter how hard they might have tried to
keep it secret, would not have stayed such, and would have triggered
at leasta response from the USN ( Assuming that minding new European
battlefleets keeps the RN too busy to respond in such kind. ), with
more
carriers and planes/ilots from them.
As actual history showed, thats a sure path to the IJN losing.
> Subtracting one engagement off Guadalcanal and the "accomplishments" of
> Japanese BBs aren't very impressive compared to their cost in money,
> personnel and logistics support required.
It'd be interesting if the IJN hadd thrown in Yamato and Musashi as
cover
for their Guadalcanal bombardment forces.
Imagine Ching Lee's surprise when he expects to find only Kirishima,
and two Yamatos shows up, too...
> The night battle in the Straights? Those old US BBs would have been in far
> greater danger from a few (effective) squadrons of a/c embarked on CVs
> decks. In all likelihood, the old BBs would have never been "forward
> deployed" had the threat of a/c attack not been minimal.
Well, 18 CVEs makes for pretty good organic air cover afloat.
> One can't assign the moment upon which the sun set upon BBs to a single
> moment in history. Twilight takes a while, but certainly after the IJN had
> been repulsed from the Slot, the IJN's BB become little more than pawns.
> The real threat from TIRPITZ was probably over-rated (evidenced by the
> relatively modest expendure of Allied resources allocated to her
> destruction), and had the Allies been willing to apply the original thinking and
> modest R&D costs of the German's "guided" bombs, TIRPITZ could have been
> reduced to a tomb for its crew far sooner.
Nonetheless, the lighting and weather conditions in the Barents Sea,
coupled with a RN carrier arm that was not yet able to destroy
batteships
at sea in all weather and at night, made for a specific situation
where
the German ship could still cause losses and casualties a plenty.
And, I doubt that contemporary USN carriers could have done anything
on the night that Fraser eliminated the Scharnhorst.
> The best path to a more effetive USN would have been to sail every BB on
> hand into a selected US port in September, 1945, and leaves the keys with
> the local City Halls.
Well, thats almost what happened with every USN BB older than the
Iowa.
> Fire support off Korea? Gimme a break! A couple of more deckloads of
> elderly Corsairs with bomb and rocket racks and the crazed young men who
> drove them would have accomplished more (and further inland without ever
> hazarding a flight deck within range of coast artillery).
Andre
Dan
I guess we can always apply the same argument used by those who favor
big-gun ships: Which form of aerial warfare endured, bombs or torpedoes?
Dan
Rich Johnson
>
> As to the 'carrier: it has poorer ability to soak up damage than an
> equaivalently sized battleship, but a much better chance of detecting,
> evading or diisrupting the strikes launched against it, and an
> infinitely greater capacity to reach outt to long ranges to attack the
> enemy. Brown comments meorably on this, but not quite so memorably that
> I'm able to quote him here... sorry.
Welcome back.
Pleading gross ignorance here, but when did armour decking fall out of
favour for carriers? ISTR the Brits had armoured flight deck carriers
while the Yanks didn't. Were there practical reasons for the difference
in philosophies?
--
Rich
Enfield NS
Canada
deem...@aol.com
You're arguing something different than me.
>
> > > > The Italian BBs at Taranto come to
> > > > mind. Also, Oklahoma which was sinking from 3 torps when 2 more
> > > > capsized her.
> > > > My point is that torpedoes were more dangerous, on average, to
> > > > battleships than bombs.
>
> > > Then, you fail to grasp the lesson that having bombs that kill
> > > battleships, were the last major nail in their coffin.
>
> > Bombs were one of several factors. The real reason was that
> > carriers were more effective at more things....especially increased
> > range to reach out and touch someone.
>
> Thank you, Captain Obvious.
>
> Nonetheless, YOUR claim of " four bombs " leaving a bb in better
> shape than four torps, was... *wrong*.
>
> Deal with it.
I said I'd bet the BB would be in better shape. I never said it
was absolute.
>
>
>
>
>
> > > Battleships were big gun ships, intended to fire relatively flat
> > > trajectory shell fire against enemy ships and battleships. As
> > > long as that was also their primary danger that their defensive
> > > systems had to protect against, they ruled.
>
> > > Once torpedoes came in, destroyer escort forces allowed the
> > > battleships some cover from both of the original torpedo delivery
> > > systems, subs and enemy destroyers.
>
> > > Now, bring in long range plunging heavy shellfire, AND airborne
> > > torpedo delivery craft, AND finally, airborne heavy bomb delivery
> > > craft. Against ALL THOSE, the battleship could not stand, and
> > > it could not strike back to ranges from which the aiborne delivery
> > > craft come from.
>
> > Which doesn't change my point.
>
> No, it demolishes your " point ".
No, your logic is really weak.
>
> > > > Battleships could shrug off many bomb hits,
> > > > but rarely did so to torpedo hits. Punching holes below the waterline
> > > > was usually more serious than explosions on the deck.
>
> > > You utterly missed the whole point. No soup for you.
>
> > You still haven't changed my point.
>
> <Projection>
>
> Andre
Whatever you say. Maybe you should read a post before replying to
it.
deem...@aol.com
How many first-rate navies and air forces plan on using bombs
against ships?
Dean A. Markley
> "Dean A. Markley" <deanm...@comcast.net> wrote in message
>
> >The Allied
>> battleships only purpose was to contain the High Seas Fleet (and to a
>> lesser extent, the A-H fleet). My point is that all powers wasted far
>> too much money on battleships when it could have been spent more wisely
>> on other forces.
>
> That's the trouble isn't it? As soon as one navy has one, every navy has to
> have one. That's why they are called "capital" ships, because they are at
> the top of the food chain , not at the bottom or in the middle.
>
> If everyone only has knives, the first guy to bring a gun wins.
>
> The British long distance blockade using cruisers etc only worked because
> the German BBs couldn't just go out and clear them away. Because of RN BBs.
>
> Regards,
> Barry
>
>
But after the sinking of those three British armored cruisers, both
sides were more afraid of submarines than each others battleships.
Dean A. Markley
> On Sun, 09 Mar 2008 17:10:22 -0500, William Hamblen
> <wrha...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>> On Sun, 09 Mar 2008 14:38:46 -0400, Peter Skelton <skel...@cogeco.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> HMS Audacious was the only modern battleship the RN lost in WWI
>> ... to enemy action.
>>
>> HMS Vanguard did self-destruct.
>>
> Thanks, I'd forgotten that one. I shall drink a small scotch this
> evening in penance.
>
>
>
> Peter Skelton
And for the purposes of this discussion, we shall also lump in
battlecruisers. Have three more small scotches.
Dean
Keith Willshaw
"Rich Johnson" <rwh.j...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:tmjBj.75382$w57.1369@edtnps90...
Compare the typical air groups of an Essex class carrier compared
with that of an Illustrious Class carrier and you will see the difference
in capability
As to philosophy the RN carriers were designed to work in constricted
waters like the North Sea and Med where the enemy was likely to
have air superiority. Moreover the likely enemies had no viable
carrier arm. As a result survivability was considered more important
than size of air group.
The situation in the PTO was quite different.
Keith
Dean A. Markley
> In article <98ydnQcOUs38RE7a...@comcast.com>,
> deanm...@comcast.net (Dean A. Markley) wrote:
>
>> Yes Peter and the big question here is what is "worth it"? The Allied
>> battleships suffered extremely heavily. And not mostly at the hands
>> of Central powers battleships either.
>
> Only one Allied battleship was sunk. (Audacious) Several battle
> cruisers were by Central Powers BB. RN capital ship losses were mainly
> at Jutland.
>
>> that was done with mines and smaller ships. The Allied
>
> blockading ships. And why Allied BB anyway. The French fleet was
> operating in the Med and the USN had no part in the war until 1917 after
> Jutland. By the way the mine barrage was intended to block German
> submarines the blockade was largely carried out by AMC.
>
>
> Ken Young
Audacious and Vanguard were the only British Dreadnoughts to be lost.
If you sum up the total allied battleships lost in WWI, the list is
mindboggling.
Peter Skelton
Not on a weeknight, I'll save them for the weekend.
(Just to be honest, I've substituted Irish tonight.)
Peter Skelton
Andre Lieven
Your statement/question makes little, if any sense.
The point remains: aircraft, such as those coming from carriers, can
control a far, far larger area of ocean space than can a battleship.
As well as delivering capital ship-killing ordinances at such can't-be
matched-by-battleships ranges.
The reason why battlships died of is not *just* that hey can be
killed from hundreds of miles away from an airbase, fixed or
mobile; Its also that the airbases, fixed or mobile, can *control*
far, far more ocean space than can a battleship.
Once those facts are in place, it matters not whether the ordinance
is a ship killing bomb, a ship killing torpedo, or a ship killing anti
ship missile.
Andre
Andre Lieven
clue:
Wrong. I'm showing that you were arguing a load.
> > > > > The Italian BBs at Taranto come to
> > > > > mind. Also, Oklahoma which was sinking from 3 torps when 2 more
> > > > > capsized her.
> > > > > My point is that torpedoes were more dangerous, on average, to
> > > > > battleships than bombs.
>
> > > > Then, you fail to grasp the lesson that having bombs that kill
> > > > battleships, were the last major nail in their coffin.
>
> > > Bombs were one of several factors. The real reason was that
> > > carriers were more effective at more things....especially increased
> > > range to reach out and touch someone.
>
> > Thank you, Captain Obvious.
>
> > Nonetheless, YOUR claim of " four bombs " leaving a bb in better
> > shape than four torps, was... *wrong*.
>
> > Deal with it.
>
> I said I'd bet the BB would be in better shape. I never said it
> was absolute.
YOU wrote: " I'd be willing to
bet the odds that my battleship would still be underway and at least
partially mission capable are greater than yours. "
I showed two examples where your battleships would be at least
100% mission killed, and on the verge of sinking, or where it blew
up and sank, from less than four hits.
> > > > Battleships were big gun ships, intended to fire relatively flat
> > > > trajectory shell fire against enemy ships and battleships. As
> > > > long as that was also their primary danger that their defensive
> > > > systems had to protect against, they ruled.
>
> > > > Once torpedoes came in, destroyer escort forces allowed the
> > > > battleships some cover from both of the original torpedo delivery
> > > > systems, subs and enemy destroyers.
>
> > > > Now, bring in long range plunging heavy shellfire, AND airborne
> > > > torpedo delivery craft, AND finally, airborne heavy bomb delivery
> > > > craft. Against ALL THOSE, the battleship could not stand, and
> > > > it could not strike back to ranges from which the aiborne delivery
> > > > craft come from.
>
> > > Which doesn't change my point.
>
> > No, it demolishes your " point ".
>
> No, your logic is really weak.
<Projection>
" What is asserted without proof is properly dismissed without proof.
"
> > > > > Battleships could shrug off many bomb hits,
> > > > > but rarely did so to torpedo hits. Punching holes below the waterline
> > > > > was usually more serious than explosions on the deck.
>
> > > > You utterly missed the whole point. No soup for you.
>
> > > You still haven't changed my point.
>
> > <Projection>
>
> > Andre
>
> Whatever you say. Maybe you should read a post before replying to
> it
<Massive Loon Projection>
Thnak you for your latest concession on the topic, hop head.
Andre
Andre Lieven
Thats why the blockade was a *distant* blockade.
Andre
Andre Lieven
> ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
> > In article <98ydnQcOUs38RE7anZ2dnUVZ_gidn...@comcast.com>,
Counting pre dreadnoughts over inflates the list, as the RN was not
really concerned about how many were lost in the pursuit of worthwhile
objective. At the Dardanelles, the commanding admiral was told that
if he lost most of his pre dreadnoughts, but got through, that would
be
a solid win for the RN, and the Allies.
In terms of dreadnought battleships lost in the European region of
WW1, the only other ship lost was the Da Vinci, which was lost to
the same cause as the HMS Vanguard.
For the purposes of anti German and Austrian Navy operations,
Russian losses were irrelevent.
Andre
deem...@aol.com
And I showed several more where torpedoes did the same thing. I'd
say the odds are still in my favor. You'll note I never said bombs
couldn't sink battleships.
Are you always an ass or do you just play one on Usenet? Once again,
read what is written before jumping in. You'll look like less of a
fool.
Andre Lieven
flailed:
Which would make the issues equal, NOT *your claimed* " better for
BBs if the ordinance were bombs " now well discredited claim.
> I'd say the odds are still in my favor.
And, you'd still be... wrong.
> You'll note I never said bombs couldn't sink battleships.
Straw Whore. Fuck her on your own time.
<Massive Loon Projection>
> Once again, read what is written before jumping in.
Ad Hominem Alone, the last refuge of the *whipped* scoundrel.
> You'll look like less of a fool.
<Massive Loon Projection>
Thank you for your latest concession on the topic.
Andre
BF Lake
"Paul J. Adam" <ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:bh58SPTm...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk...
> "It is often said that the battleship died because it was vulnerable.
> This is incorrect: it was replaced by the fleet carrier which was much
> more vulnerable. The battleship died because it was far less capable
> than the carrier of inflicting damage on the enemy."
The BB was not limited in its effect to the range of her guns of course.
The BB had mobility too. If you don't know where all the enemy BBs are,
you have to protect everything everywhere. So another cause of the BB
losing its place as a menace is the ability to keep tabs on all the enemy
BBs that came with WW2 and post war surveillance. A carrier has the same
problem but even if you know where the enemy carrier is, you don't know
where its planes are, so that keeps it viable.
Regards,
Barry
Andre Lieven
> "Paul J. Adam" <n...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote in messagenews:bh58SPTm...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk...
>
> > "It is often said that the battleship died because it was vulnerable.
> > This is incorrect: it was replaced by the fleet carrier which was much
> > more vulnerable. The battleship died because it was far less capable
> > than the carrier of inflicting damage on the enemy."
>
> The BB was not limited in its effect to the range of her guns of course.
She was more limited in this area than an effective fast carrier.
My above definition of a fleet carrier is of a ship with at least 50
aircraft,
and radar so as to be able to direct her fighter cover, plus it has to
be a ship
with a speed of at least that of contemporary battleships, if not a
couple of
knots more.
> The BB had mobility too. If you don't know where all the enemy BBs are,
> you have to protect everything everywhere.
Well, this never happened in WW1, and in WW2, it happened pretty
rarely.
Pretty much never post the sinking of the Bismarck...
> So another cause of the BB
> losing its place as a menace is the ability to keep tabs on all the enemy
> BBs that came with WW2 and post war surveillance.
Whenever dd battleships ( Dreadnought or otherwise ) ever have that
capability ? Thats one of the jobs that light ( scout ) cruisers tried
to
do for battlefleets.
If you had left the IJN of 1905 with only their pre dreadnoughts and
armoured cruisers, their engagement with the 2nd Pacific Squadron
might never have happened...
> A carrier has the same
> problem but even if you know where the enemy carrier is, you don't know
> where its planes are, so that keeps it viable.
Rather, the carrier's search aircraft ( And, on USN CVs, Hawkeyes do
mst of this with their radar. ) give the carrie hundreds of miles of
battlespace surveillance and control. A capability quite lacking in
even a modernised Iowa.
Andre
Fred J. McCall
:
: How many first-rate navies and air forces plan on using bombs
:against ships?
:
You're aware of recent USAF experiments using JDAM (a bomb) dropped by
B-52s as an anti-ship weapon, right?
--
"The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable
man persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore,
all progress depends on the unreasonable man."
--George Bernard Shaw
Fred J. McCall
:
:My above definition of a fleet carrier is of a ship with at least 50 aircraft,
:and radar so as to be able to direct her fighter cover, plus it has to be a ship
:with a speed of at least that of contemporary battleships, if not a couple of
:knots more.
So by your definition the brand new UK 'super carriers' would not
qualify as 'fleet carriers', despite being larger than anything the
Royal Navy has ever had?
The projected HMS Queen Elizabeth will be slow (around 25 knots) and
will carry fewer than 50 aircraft (maximum air group of around 48,
including helicopters). With a displacement of around 65,000 tons,
these will be the largest vessels the RN has ever had - but not good
enough to cross your line for 'fleet carrier' status.
By your definition, most of Britain's WWII fleet carriers don't
qualify as 'fleet carriers', either, as they didn't carry enough
aircraft.
--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney
Andre Lieven
> Andre Lieven <andrelie...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
> :My above definition of a fleet carrier is of a ship with at least 50 aircraft,
> :and radar so as to be able to direct her fighter cover, plus it has to be a ship
> :with a speed of at least that of contemporary battleships, if not a couple of
> :knots more.
>
> So by your definition the brand new UK 'super carriers' would not
> qualify as 'fleet carriers', despite being larger than anything the
> Royal Navy has ever had?
Hardly, as my inclusion of radar clearly speaks to 1939-1945 period
ships and airwings.
If you had a question about this point, you could have... ASKED,
rather
than blindly charging ahead into ASSumption Land...
> The projected HMS Queen Elizabeth will be slow (around 25 knots)
So, what are the " contemporary *battleships* " to them ?
Oh wait, THERE AREN'T ANY. Thats MORE of a Clue that I was
speaking in *historical terms*... Duh.
> and
> will carry fewer than 50 aircraft (maximum air group of around 48,
> including helicopters). With a displacement of around 65,000 tons,
> these will be the largest vessels the RN has ever had - but not good
> enough to cross your line for 'fleet carrier' status.
Straw Whore. Fuck her on your own time.
> By your definition, most of Britain's WWII fleet carriers don't
> qualify as 'fleet carriers', either, as they didn't carry enough
> aircraft.
By 1945, most of the Illustrious type did operate about 50-60
planes.
Further, as the early Illustrious', when carrying under 50 planes, and
biplane strike aircraft at that, were no threat to single handedly
sink
an enemy battleship... Even an over 50 plane ship, Ark Royal, never
managed to do such a thing.
For that matter, I don't recall any Axis cruisers sunk by RN
embarked carrier airpower *alone*. Yes, Konigsberg was sunk by
land based Skuas. OTOH, not a few RN cruisers were also sunk
by Axis land based strike aircraft.
The war began a bit eary for the RN carrier fleet, and their aircraft,
to have advanced eough to become serious ship killers in their
own rights. That achievement had to wait for more powerful aircraft,
and more experience in working such planes well out at sea.
Andre
Gernot Hassenpflug
Exactly (I think).
Function drives features (=appearance). At least, in a rational world,
and despite the horror, winning wars is nothing if not a raitonal
business. Hence, technology determines, at any particular point in
time, what delivery mechanisms can in a general optimzed sense (with
parameters set hopefully by logistics, manpower, industry and military
planners) most effectively and efficiently bring damage to bear on the
enemy. Often there is not one overriding objective; for example, the
requirement may be that a platform is multi-purpose, thereby making it
impossible to optimize any one aspect to the utmost degree. The
constraints (technical, industrial, fiscal, political, manpower,
military) too may be quite restrictive, and interplay between these
and the necessity to achieve results can get extremely
complicated. Trade-off and sensitivity studies are very important to
try and assess these complex interplays.
Things were a lot simpler in WW2 than today :-)
--
BOFH excuse #336:
the xy axis in the trackball is coordinated with the summer solstice
Gernot Hassenpflug
> A couple of further points...
>
> On Mar 10, 1:14 pm, "TMOliver" <tmoliverjr...@hot.rr.comFIX> wrote:
>> I'll subscribe to a slightly different interpretation, "parameters of
>> engagement".
/../
> It'd be interesting if the IJN hadd thrown in Yamato and Musashi as
> cover
> for their Guadalcanal bombardment forces.
>
> Imagine Ching Lee's surprise when he expects to find only Kirishima,
> and two Yamatos shows up, too...
I doubt he would not have known. The various intelligence agencies,
and coast watchers, would definitely have picked up the news that the
Y&M were heading South. Even a lack of the usual daily signals from
Y&M would have been enough warning.
/../
--
BOFH excuse #9:
doppler effect
Gernot Hassenpflug
There are plenty of engineering reasons too. Just as with
blade-making, you need toughness and hardness to do different
things. Sure, a British armored carrier could take a hit and continue
operating aircraft, but all the impact was most surely going into the
structure and deforming it. A US carrier would absorb the impact by
means of a destroyed deck, leaving the hull structure largely
unaffected---if you don't count the possibility of disastrous hangar
fires. Thus, no matter which way you cut it, there is a necessary
trade-off, and you cannot escape the costs one way or the other.
--
BOFH excuse #203:
Write-only-memory subsystem too slow for this machine. Contact your local dealer.
Fred J. McCall
:On Mar 11, 1:38 am, Fred J. McCall <fmcc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
:> Andre Lieven <andrelie...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
:>
:> :My above definition of a fleet carrier is of a ship with at least 50 aircraft,
:> :and radar so as to be able to direct her fighter cover, plus it has to be a ship
:> :with a speed of at least that of contemporary battleships, if not a couple of
:> :knots more.
:>
:> So by your definition the brand new UK 'super carriers' would not
:> qualify as 'fleet carriers', despite being larger than anything the
:> Royal Navy has ever had?
:
:Hardly, as my inclusion of radar clearly speaks to 1939-1945 period
:ships and airwings.
:
:If you had a question about this point, you could have... ASKED, rather
:than blindly charging ahead into ASSumption Land...
:
Pleased to see you're your usual charming self, Mr Lieven...
:> The projected HMS Queen Elizabeth will be slow (around 25 knots)
:
:So, what are the " contemporary *battleships* " to them ?
:
:Oh wait, THERE AREN'T ANY. Thats MORE of a Clue that I was
:speaking in *historical terms*... Duh.
:
Then you just have to use the last ones built, don't you?
:
:>
:> and
:> will carry fewer than 50 aircraft (maximum air group of around 48,
:> including helicopters). With a displacement of around 65,000 tons,
:> these will be the largest vessels the RN has ever had - but not good
:> enough to cross your line for 'fleet carrier' status.
:>
:
:Straw Whore. Fuck her on your own time.
:
Pleased to see you're your usual charming self, Mr Lieven...
:
:>
:> By your definition, most of Britain's WWII fleet carriers don't
:> qualify as 'fleet carriers', either, as they didn't carry enough
:> aircraft.
:>
:
:By 1945, most of the Illustrious type did operate about 50-60
:planes.
:
Cite? Everything I see says numbers of 40 or less, with the official
number being 33. Even the Indomitable (which was a modified
Illustrious class with an extra hangar level added by removing armor)
only carried around 45 aircraft.
:
:Further, as the early Illustrious', when carrying under 50 planes, and
:biplane strike aircraft at that, were no threat to single handedly sink
:an enemy battleship... Even an over 50 plane ship, Ark Royal, never
:managed to do such a thing.
:
To quote that paragon of charm and wit - Straw Whore. Fuck her on your
own time.
:
:For that matter, I don't recall any Axis cruisers sunk by RN
:embarked carrier airpower *alone*. Yes, Konigsberg was sunk by
:land based Skuas. OTOH, not a few RN cruisers were also sunk
:by Axis land based strike aircraft.
:
Again - Straw Whore. Fuck her on your own time.
:
:The war began a bit eary for the RN carrier fleet, and their aircraft,
:to have advanced eough to become serious ship killers in their
:own rights. That achievement had to wait for more powerful aircraft,
:and more experience in working such planes well out at sea.
:
Again - Straw Whore. Fuck her on your own time.
The point remains - the majority of UK WWII fleet carriers don't
qualify as fleet carriers under *your* definition of same.
--
"So many women. So little charm."
-- Donna, to Josh; The West Wing
Gernot Hassenpflug
> On Mar 11, 1:38 am, Fred J. McCall <fmcc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>> Andre Lieven <andrelie...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
/../
> The war began a bit eary for the RN carrier fleet, and their aircraft,
> to have advanced eough to become serious ship killers in their
> own rights. That achievement had to wait for more powerful aircraft,
> and more experience in working such planes well out at sea.
Heh, I suspect the establishment would not have changed its course had
war not broken out. Budget fights, turf wars and the like being the
main attraction of the inter-war period. It was a period of
experimentation for all concerned, to be sure, but I doubt very much
that an entire policy was about to be changed merely because other
countries had different ones (and which proved better in wartime
practice, such as single-seat fighters).
--
BOFH excuse #321:
Scheduled global CPU outage
deem...@aol.com
> "deemsb...@aol.com" <deemsb...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> :
> : How many first-rate navies and air forces plan on using bombs
> :against ships?
> :
>
> You're aware of recent USAF experiments using JDAM (a bomb) dropped by
> B-52s as an anti-ship weapon, right?
>
> --
Yes, but those were experiments. Missiles are the weapon of choice
these days. Bombs tend to expose the expensive aircraft and crews too
much.
Eugene Griessel
>On Mar 11, 12:45=A0am, Fred J. McCall <fmcc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>> "deemsb...@aol.com" <deemsb...@aol.com> wrote:
>>
>> :
>> : =A0 =A0How many first-rate navies and air forces plan on using bombs
>> :against ships?
>> :
>>
>> You're aware of recent USAF experiments using JDAM (a bomb) dropped by
>> B-52s as an anti-ship weapon, right?
>>
>> --
>
> Yes, but those were experiments. Missiles are the weapon of choice
>these days. Bombs tend to expose the expensive aircraft and crews too
>much.
Bombs can be made to glide long ways these days.
Eugene L Griessel
My life has a superb cast, but I can't figure out the plot.
- I usually post only from Sci.Military.Naval -
zzbu...@netscape.net
The military idiots always say that until they look at what
Missile Launchers cost. And then it's always a quick
back-peddle to:
Let's put some sattelites, robots, drones, AAV, A.I.
and laser-guided bombs, in their too.
Andrew Robert Breen
Rich Johnson <rwh.j...@gmail.com> wrote:
>On Sun, 09 Mar 2008 19:41:30 +0000, Andrew Robert Breen wrote:
>
>>
>> As to the 'carrier: it has poorer ability to soak up damage than an
>> equaivalently sized battleship, but a much better chance of detecting,
>> evading or diisrupting the strikes launched against it, and an
>> infinitely greater capacity to reach outt to long ranges to attack the
>> enemy. Brown comments meorably on this, but not quite so memorably that
>> I'm able to quote him here... sorry.
>
>Welcome back.
>
>Pleading gross ignorance here, but when did armour decking fall out of
>favour for carriers? ISTR the Brits had armoured flight deck carriers
>while the Yanks didn't. Were there practical reasons for the difference
>in philosophies?
The armoured 'carriers of the RN - it wasn't jusk the deck which was
armoured, it was the whole hanger structure - were a product of a very
particular time (pre-radar), set of operationaal requirements (to bee able
to operate in range of enemy land-based air) and preconceptions about what
was desirable.
Without radar, a 'carrier operating with the battle fleet - or in advance
of it, scouting or manoevering to launch a strike on a foorce in chase -
would be vunserable to night attack by the enemy cruiser force.
Chatfield, the then 3rd Sea Lord (in charge of construction) had commanded
a battlecruiser at Jutland and as a result had developed strong views on
the importance of armour. In his view the main armament of a ship - and
the weapons supplies to it - had to be protected against the weapons of
its likely opponents. The main armament of a 'carrier was its air group,
its weapons ssupplies were its bomb and torpedo rooms and aviation fuel
storage - so these all had to be protected against cruiser gunfire or
aerial bomb attack. The result was a very well-protected ship, but with a
restricted air group (_Illustrious_ class).
It rapidly became clear that more aeroplanes wouldd be a good thing, so
the follow-on group got more hanger space, withthe weight margin achieved
by thinning the armour on the hanger sides. The next group got more
aeroplanes still (though restricted in type) by double-stacking hangers
behind thinner-again protection and thinning the armoured flight deck. All
of this was acceptable beecause (a) radar meant that unscheduled meetiings
with enemy cruisers became much less likely (b) radar meant that
controlled CAP patrols were viable, giving beetter active defence against
air attack and (c) it wasn't possible to fit a thick eenough deck to
protect against heavy bomb attack (_Illustrious_ off Malta refers...).
Having somee flight deck protection to prevvent operations beeing
disrupted in the event of lighter hits remained desirable, but the problem
with armoured flight decks is that it's an awful lot of weight an awful
long way up in the ship, and generally that weight's better used
elsewwhere.
--
Andy Breen ~ Not speaking on behalf of the University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Feng Shui: an ancient oriental art for extracting
money from the gullible (Martin Sinclair)