This post was inspired by my recent reading of Sean McMeekin’s “The
Russian Origins of the First World War”.
The author asserts that Kerensky’s mistake was not in launching an
offensive in 1917, but in launching it against Austria-Hungary, where
already discouraged forces were vulnerable to a powerful German
counterattack, instead of against the Ottomans, with confident, highly
motivated forces taking on an enemy pressed to the limit.
In fact, he asserts that Constantinople and the straits were
increasingly vulnerable as Ottoman defeats in Mesopotamia and eastern
Anatolia had forced them to strip troops from the capital to defend
beleaguered fronts. He also shows that planning for an amphibious
assault on the straits was more advanced than ever under the Black Sea
fleet commander, Admiral Kolchak, and regional commander Grand Duke
Nicholas’s chief of staff, General Yudenich. The ideal time to launch
the operation was the second half of June. He also notes that
Russia’s situation in the black sea was far more advantageous than in
earlier times in the war, because Russia had activated its first
dreadnought, the Empress Catherine, around the end of 1916, and in the
meantime, the two sub-dreadnoughts that had done so much to protect
the straits since 1914, the Goeben and the Breslau, were both down for
serious repairs with their deck guns removed to serve as shore
batteries.
The western allies obviously preferred a 1917 Russian offensive
against Germany and/or Austria-Hungary, but as McMeekin notes,
correctly in my view, nobody *made* Kerensky choose Galicia as the
focal point of his offensive.
I would also add, that the Russians avoiding a summer offensive in
Europe in 1917 would not have been as risky for the overall Entente
cause in 1917, as it would have been in 1916, when the Russians
launched the Brusilov offensive. In 1916, the Brusilov offensive was
needed to put diversionary pressure on the Austrians who were on the
offensive against Italy and the Germans who were on the offensive
against the French at Verdun. In 1917 by contrast, the Germans were
not taking the initiative on any of the land fronts. True, the French
were offensively hors de combat, because of their mutinies, but they
were not under a strategic German attack. If the French could not be
roused to aid the British attacking in Flanders, why should the
Russians? Also, America had entered the war, and although not
immediately effective, all belligerents were looking forward to their
strength gradually being added to the Entente by 1918.
So, in May-June strategy sessions, Kerensky’s provisional government
decides to remain on the defensive in Europe in 1917, but to go on the
offensive against the Ottomans at all possible points of contact,
including the straits. An amphibious attack is launched on the
Bosporus, while forces in northeast Anatolia resume heavy pressure to
tie down Ottoman forces. A secondary thrust in the east is
coordinated with the British in Mesopotamia to converge around Mosul,
placing Kurdistan under Russian protection.
How does this go for the Kerensky government. Will the straits
invasion succeed? Assuming the Petrograd’s optimism about its ability
to put the Ottomans on the run is well-founded, how capable are the
Central Powers of giving the Ottomans effective support? In
particular, how might the Bulgarians factor into the battle for the
Bosporus?
Does a failed offensive mean an automatic revolution? With a
successful anti-Ottoman effort in 1917, would the Russians be capable
of sustaining an offensive in Europe in 1918, or do they risk defeat
and revolution, just later than in OTL?
Assuming the Russian side of anti-Ottoman offensives goes well, are
the British and French going to be in a position to collect any of
their gains from the Sykes-Picot-Sazanov deal?
> This post was inspired by my recent reading of Sean McMeekin’s “The
> Russian Origins of the First World War”.
> The author asserts that Kerensky’s mistake was not in launching an
> offensive in 1917, but in launching it against Austria-Hungary, where
> already discouraged forces were vulnerable to a powerful German
> counterattack, instead of against the Ottomans, with confident, highly
> motivated forces taking on an enemy pressed to the limit.
> In fact, he asserts that Constantinople and the straits were
> increasingly vulnerable as Ottoman defeats in Mesopotamia and eastern
> Anatolia had forced them to strip troops from the capital to defend
> beleaguered fronts. He also shows that planning for an amphibious
> assault on the straits was more advanced than ever under the Black Sea
> fleet commander, Admiral Kolchak, and regional commander Grand Duke
> Nicholas’s chief of staff, General Yudenich. The ideal time to launch
> the operation was the second half of June. He also notes that
> Russia’s situation in the black sea was far more advantageous than in
> earlier times in the war, because Russia had activated its first
> dreadnought, the Empress Catherine, around the end of 1916, and in the
> meantime, the two sub-dreadnoughts that had done so much to protect
> the straits since 1914, the Goeben and the Breslau, were both down for
> serious repairs with their deck guns removed to serve as shore
> batteries.
> The western allies obviously preferred a 1917 Russian offensive
> against Germany and/or Austria-Hungary, but as McMeekin notes,
> correctly in my view, nobody *made* Kerensky choose Galicia as the
> focal point of his offensive.
> I would also add, that the Russians avoiding a summer offensive in
> Europe in 1917 would not have been as risky for the overall Entente
> cause in 1917, as it would have been in 1916, when the Russians
> launched the Brusilov offensive. In 1916, the Brusilov offensive was
> needed to put diversionary pressure on the Austrians who were on the
> offensive against Italy and the Germans who were on the offensive
> against the French at Verdun. In 1917 by contrast, the Germans were
> not taking the initiative on any of the land fronts. True, the French
> were offensively hors de combat, because of their mutinies, but they
> were not under a strategic German attack. If the French could not be
> roused to aid the British attacking in Flanders, why should the
> Russians? Also, America had entered the war, and although not
> immediately effective, all belligerents were looking forward to their
> strength gradually being added to the Entente by 1918.
> So, in May-June strategy sessions, Kerensky’s provisional government
> decides to remain on the defensive in Europe in 1917, but to go on the
> offensive against the Ottomans at all possible points of contact,
> including the straits. An amphibious attack is launched on the
> Bosporus, while forces in northeast Anatolia resume heavy pressure to
> tie down Ottoman forces. A secondary thrust in the east is
> coordinated with the British in Mesopotamia to converge around Mosul,
> placing Kurdistan under Russian protection.
> How does this go for the Kerensky government. Will the straits
> invasion succeed? Assuming the Petrograd’s optimism about its ability
> to put the Ottomans on the run is well-founded, how capable are the
> Central Powers of giving the Ottomans effective support? In
> particular, how might the Bulgarians factor into the battle for the
> Bosporus?
> Does a failed offensive mean an automatic revolution? With a
> successful anti-Ottoman effort in 1917, would the Russians be capable
> of sustaining an offensive in Europe in 1918, or do they risk defeat
> and revolution, just later than in OTL?
> Assuming the Russian side of anti-Ottoman offensives goes well, are
> the British and French going to be in a position to collect any of
> their gains from the Sykes-Picot-Sazanov deal?
It is huge for Russia if they can open up the straits, it allows them
to ship grain exports and recieve supplies, and maybe knock the
Ottomans out of the War which would immensely help the British in the
Mideast as well as the British being able to then redeploy troops to
the West. Meanwhile the Axis needs to rush troops to the Balkans from
Austria-Hungary and Germany, which spreads their forces even more.
Opening that supply route might help Russia economically which was
imperative at that time.
Rob wrote:
> This post was inspired by my recent reading of Sean McMeekin’s “The
> Russian Origins of the First World War”.
> The author asserts that Kerensky’s mistake was not in launching an
> offensive in 1917, but in launching it against Austria-Hungary, where
> already discouraged forces were vulnerable to a powerful German
> counterattack, instead of against the Ottomans, with confident, highly
> motivated forces taking on an enemy pressed to the limit.
> In fact, he asserts that Constantinople and the straits were
> increasingly vulnerable as Ottoman defeats in Mesopotamia and eastern
> Anatolia had forced them to strip troops from the capital to defend
> beleaguered fronts. He also shows that planning for an amphibious
> assault on the straits was more advanced than ever under the Black Sea
> fleet commander, Admiral Kolchak, and regional commander Grand Duke
> Nicholas’s chief of staff, General Yudenich. The ideal time to launch
> the operation was the second half of June. He also notes that
> Russia’s situation in the black sea was far more advantageous than in
> earlier times in the war, because Russia had activated its first
> dreadnought, the Empress Catherine, around the end of 1916, and in the
> meantime, the two sub-dreadnoughts that had done so much to protect
> the straits since 1914, the Goeben and the Breslau, were both down for
> serious repairs with their deck guns removed to serve as shore
> batteries.
The reality ia that Russia lacked the logistical capability to attack
the Bosphorus. The main job of the Black Sea fleet was to guard
the lines of supply to the army on the Caucasian Front and the
sea communications with Romania. It did this quite well but
had little spare capacity.
> The western allies obviously preferred a 1917 Russian offensive
> against Germany and/or Austria-Hungary, but as McMeekin notes,
> correctly in my view, nobody *made* Kerensky choose Galicia as the
> focal point of his offensive.
> I would also add, that the Russians avoiding a summer offensive in
> Europe in 1917 would not have been as risky for the overall Entente
> cause in 1917, as it would have been in 1916, when the Russians
> launched the Brusilov offensive. In 1916, the Brusilov offensive was
> needed to put diversionary pressure on the Austrians who were on the
> offensive against Italy and the Germans who were on the offensive
> against the French at Verdun. In 1917 by contrast, the Germans were
> not taking the initiative on any of the land fronts. True, the French
> were offensively hors de combat, because of their mutinies, but they
> were not under a strategic German attack. If the French could not be
> roused to aid the British attacking in Flanders, why should the
> Russians? Also, America had entered the war, and although not
> immediately effective, all belligerents were looking forward to their
> strength gradually being added to the Entente by 1918.
> So, in May-June strategy sessions, Kerensky’s provisional government
> decides to remain on the defensive in Europe in 1917, but to go on the
> offensive against the Ottomans at all possible points of contact,
> including the straits. An amphibious attack is launched on the
> Bosporus, while forces in northeast Anatolia resume heavy pressure to
> tie down Ottoman forces. A secondary thrust in the east is
> coordinated with the British in Mesopotamia to converge around Mosul,
> placing Kurdistan under Russian protection.
An amphibious attack on the Bosphorus launched by a force far
less capable than that involved in the Dardanelles campaign is
only going to end in disaster. The same combination of
mines, torpedoes and guns is going to be disastrous for the
Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Bosphorus had already been heavily
mined by both sides.
Russia simply lacked both the miltary and logistical capability
to launch an effective offensive on any front and frankly the
war was going to turn on what happened in Europe.
The Turkish campaign was a side show.
