True enough Doc for the civies. But there are very good statistics
for GI resisters. In 1971, seven of every 100 soldiers in the U.S.
Army deserted, while another seventeen of every 100 went AWOL
(desertion is being defined as AWOL for thirty days or more). In real
numbers this translated into 98,059 deserters in the Army in 1971,
most of whom (around 67 percent), came from the lowest ranks, E-1s and
E-2s. Further, most desertions and AWOLs took place not in Vietnam (an
estimated 3 percent) but stateside (around 88 percent), for the simple
reason that there were very few places for GIs to hide in Vietnam
(see: Bell, D. Bruce and Bell, Beverly W., "Desertion and Antiwar
Protest: Findings from the Ford Clemency Program," 'Armed Forces and
Society,' May 1977 pg.435; Gabriel, Richard A. and Savage, Paul L.,
"Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army" p. 181, table 1 - New
York: Hill and Wang, 1978)
GIs in the Vietnam War deserted for very different reasons. For some
it was a political stand against the war and the U.S., and these
soldiers deserted to take part in the antiwar movement in the U.S. and
Europe. For others it was simply a desire not to get killed in
Vietnam; this was an especially prevalent sentiment after major troop
reductions began in 1970. Probably the bulk of the deserters could at
least agree on the FTA/FTW orientation - Fuck the Army/Fuck the War.
The military eventually had to establish no less than nine "personnel
control facilities" on bases from New Jersey to California solely to
house deserters and AWOLs.
But to understand the full import of this phenomenon, other figures
must be added. In 1944, during World War 2, the U.S. Army's desertion
rate was nearly as high as in 1971: 6.3 percent. (Further, the highest
desertion rate to date in the Marine Corps occurred in 1975 - 10.5
percent, and that in the Navy in 1976 - 2.4 percent, both after U.S.
forces were out of Vietnam). While the real figures in Vietnam would
undoubtedly have been higher if the army had not instituted the
practice of charging many deserters with only being AWOL, it is very
misleading to look only at figures from various and times when
analyzing a military's morale and support for a war. More important is
to examine the quality of the desertions by asking the question: what
would it have taken to get the soldiers "back into the fold". In World
War 2 the desertion rate mainly reflected war weariness in general,
while in Vietnam it reflected much more profound opposition to the war
itself, and simple soldiers looking to save their own hides. This is
revealed in the fact that desertion was often the strategy of choice
among the most politically advanced GIs and sailors and in the fact
that many of the troops deserted after returning from Vietnam, not
before going there.
- redvet