JFH, JTIDS, E3s & RN Fleet Air Power
Charlie Whitaker
favour of RAF and RN operated GR7s. Some concern also about the lack of
fleet air power which might result.
Perhaps the group could apply its formidable powers of strategic
thinking to finding a way for the UK's armed forces - as they are
currently evolving, or with minimal modification, but without FA2s or
JSFs - to assert air supremacy over any particular stretch of the
world's coastline.
This as opposed to what seems to be the planned national strategy of
providing off-shore airstrips for pounding the locals, with the
assumption that either the enemy has no airforce worth the name, or else
a suitably-equipped ally will always be available and on hand to counter
an air-borne threat.
I'd see this as a somewhat separate exercise from fleet air defence -
and the whole Type 45 PAAMS issue - which I'm going to assume is and
will be effective enough for protecting ships. The speculation here is
how to make things safer for the deployed elements of Joint Force
Harrier as they deliver ordnance on target, over land.
Since we are creative strategists - and we are working in the spirit of
jointery - we're going to assume that all UK types are available for
this exercise. Including, obviously, the RAF's E3s and tankers.
Will it be possible, for example, to fit JTIDS to the GR7s, put E3s on
station and use them to stealthily vector some Harriers onto enemy
aggressors? Is it technically feasible to modify the Harriers for this?
Do the E3s have the range (helped by tankers)? Does the UK have enough
strategic bases worldwide for global deployment along these lines?
Are E3s even necessary? Is Sea King ASAC (now also with JTIDS)
sufficient for directing a littoral attack? MR4s, even?
And should GR7s be equipped with AMRAAM?
There is a US angle to this as well - since it looks as though UK/US
naval strategy is converging. Is it really the case that no one outside
NATO is going to have an effective defensive air force in the future?
Will there always be friendly air bases near enough to the enemy to
allow the 'air force' to forward deploy its best front-line fighters? Or
will JSF be that good ...
OK, have at it ...
Regards,
Charlie
--
Charlie Whitaker
London, UK
Brad Meyer
<cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
> Or
>will JSF be that good ...
IMO, JSF has about the same chance of being operationally deployed
aboard CV's as the F-111 did. Whether one looks at the JSF as an "all
in one" effort or a "navalizing a lnd based design" effort, if they
succeed it will be the first time in many attempts.
Brooks
Brad Meyer <brad...@attbi.com> wrote:
>On Fri, 30 Aug 2002 19:09:37 +0100, Charlie Whitaker
><cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>
>> Or
>>will JSF be that good ...
>
>IMO, JSF has about the same chance of being operationally deployed
>aboard CV's as the F-111 did.
Well, if the USN plans to replace its F-18C's, it better be. There is nothing
else on the horizon, and the odds that the F-18E/F would become the only
deployed strike/fighter design are rather slim.
Whether one looks at the JSF as an "all
>in one" effort or a "navalizing a lnd based design" effort, if they
>succeed it will be the first time in many attempts.
But unlike the F-111, the Navy has been more intimately involved in the design
and development of the F-35, leading to the CTOL version that will differ
from the conventional and STOVL versions to better accomodate shipboard needs
(i.e., the larger wing). And the JSF will not experience the weight gain
that the F-111 did (the lines parameters were frozen in June, with the biggest
changes being adding an inch or two to the diameter of the fuselage behind
the cockpit, and lengthening the nose to better accomodate avionics repairs).
Lastly, if the USN wants to have any kind of stealth capability, it has exactly
two options as of now--the F-35 and the UCAV. Do you think the UCAV is going
to completely displace manned strike platforms that quickly?
Brooks
>
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Keith Willshaw
"Brad Meyer" <brad...@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:5fpvmugeddnpeqqkj...@4ax.com...
Oh I dont know the AV8/Harrier seems to have
fared pretty well for an aircraft that started out
as a land based design.
Come to think of it the F-4 Phantom was rather
succesful both on land and at sea.
Keith
Brooks
Going from naval to land based, you also have the A-3/B-66, A-1 Skyraider,
A-7 Corsair, and A-4 Skyhawk. And the T-45 Goshawk started out as the land
based Hawk.
Brad Meyer
Phantom was a naval design from the ground up, adopted for land use.
There are any number of examples of that sort of conversion. One's
going the other direction are scarece to non-existant.
In take off and landing terms, harrier is much more like a copter then
a fixed wing. I should have qualified by saying "top end warplane" or
some such.
Charlie Whitaker
Brad Meyer <brad...@attbi.com> wrote:
I wouldn't know much about the navalised CTOL version planned - except
to comment that the geometry of the X-35C is notably different from the
other two versions - it has a larger wing area for example. Perhaps this
means it's the odd one out - and will fail to make service - although LM
claims it has met the relevant test paramaters. Presumably, the JSF
program managers are aware of earlier failed attempts to 'navalise'
aircraft and are trying to learn from those errors ...
However, the experience of the Harrier (ta-da) shows that a V/STOL type
translates fairly well to a naval application. As long as it can land
vertically - and the X-35B can - it doesn't care what the airstrip is. I
guess the main potential problem is rust. The RN/RAF are completely
serious about JFH (Joint Force Harrier) and I believe them when they
claim that the combined force is more flexible and potent than its
predecessors.
Maybe it's the non-conformist in me, but I'm always ready to tip my hat
to an unconventional structure of some sort or another. If you're
Israel, you have no independent air force or navy. Good for them. It
clearly works.
I suppose my concern, now I think about it, is with the concept of naval
force projection: i.e. using a navy to influence events on land. It
looks to me as though it hasn't been thought through by military
strategists and purchasers. Here's my brief (and very rough) history of
how things came to be as they are:
* 1500-1939: Navies are used to protect merchant shipping and ferry
troops - all other functions are derivative (i.e. battleship squadrons
hunting each other out). Navies generally don't take on land forces - if
they do, they lose.
* 1939-1945: Out of expediency, the US Navy evolves a doctrine of
carrier air power to support the invasion of multiple Pacific islands,
allowing the USAF to forward deploy to within range of Tokyo. These
naval air assets are short ranged but competitive in their theatre.
In-flight refuelling doesn't exist. As a side issue, it is discovered
that carriers + air wings supersede battleships.
* 1945-1982: The USN continues to adapt successive aviation technologies
for carrier deployment, because they feel they have to keep up and
because no one tells them not to. They sometimes fail (F-111). There is
no clear strategic purpose: consequently, a 'doctrine' of 'flexibility'
emerges. The RN emulates the USN on a smaller scale until around 1980.
* 1982: A small force of V/STOL carrier aircraft proves effective in
enabling the recapture of the Falkland Islands. But the Argentine
invasion is a fluke, with no profound strategic implications.
* 1982-present: The USN and USMC progressively emulates the RN's
(expedient) technical solution (and this will culminate in JSF, which is
clearly a conceptual evolution of the Harrier), while the RN plans to
match the USN's *strategy* (with somewhat increased assets). Namely, the
limited projection of force, over land and onto land, from ships.
Conclusions? While all of this was going on, we had the Cold War,
Vietnam, the Gulf etc. All of which involved equipment and tactics of
greater scope and effectiveness those deployed by carriers. What were
the justifications for carriers during the Cold War? Submarine hunting?
The major land actions envisaged involved vastly greater strategic depth
than any naval assets could effectively project into. The converse was
not true, in that both the USAF and the RAF (and other NATO air forces)
could cover the whole of the Atlantic, North Sea, etc. to interdict
shipping and hunt submarines (leaving out submarines hunting submarines
themselves: surely the real naval action was (and is?) submarine
warfare; the Russian surface fleet didn't exist until 1980 or so, and
seems to have been a vanity exercise to superficially match the USN).
I'd suggest that the mission of the USN carrier fleet today is *still*
to assist with the invasion of small islands (garrisoned by infantry
with limited air cover). And the RN is being reconstituted to emulate
this role. The focus on strike fighter procurement supports this
conclusion.
I'm not deliberately provoking US patriots here: it's not my business to
care how the tax dollars of US citizens are spent, since the results
don't threaten me. What I do care about is a half-baked attempt to
emulate a less-than-effective strategy (i.e. by procuring CVF with JSF).
If the real task is to take on a tough enemy air force over their own
territory, in 2050, with no friendly land bases in sight, and win, then
is this the tool for the job?
Came out a bit longer than planned: sorry.
Regards,
Brooks
Brad Meyer <brad...@attbi.com> wrote:
>On Sat, 31 Aug 2002 00:12:56 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
><keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>
>>"Brad Meyer" <brad...@attbi.com> wrote in message
>>news:5fpvmugeddnpeqqkj...@4ax.com...
>>> On Fri, 30 Aug 2002 19:09:37 +0100, Charlie Whitaker
>>> <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>>>
>>> > Or
>>> >will JSF be that good ...
>>>
>>> IMO, JSF has about the same chance of being operationally deployed
>>> aboard CV's as the F-111 did. Whether one looks at the JSF as an "all
>>> in one" effort or a "navalizing a lnd based design" effort, if they
>>> succeed it will be the first time in many attempts.
>>>
>>
>>Oh I dont know the AV8/Harrier seems to have
>>fared pretty well for an aircraft that started out
>>as a land based design.
>>
>>Come to think of it the F-4 Phantom was rather
>>succesful both on land and at sea.
>
>Phantom was a naval design from the ground up, adopted for land use.
>There are any number of examples of that sort of conversion. One's
>going the other direction are scarece to non-existant.
Hawk to Goshawk, for one. And while stretching things a little bit (but not
excessively), the YF-17 Cobra was the basis for the F/A-18...
Brooks
>
>In take off and landing terms, harrier is much more like a copter then
>a fixed wing. I should have qualified by saying "top end warplane" or
>some such.
>
>
>
-----------== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Uncensored Usenet News ==----------
Fred J. McCall
:
:"Brad Meyer" <brad...@attbi.com> wrote in message
:news:5fpvmugeddnpeqqkj...@4ax.com...
:> On Fri, 30 Aug 2002 19:09:37 +0100, Charlie Whitaker
:> <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
:>
:> > Or
:> >will JSF be that good ...
:>
:> IMO, JSF has about the same chance of being operationally deployed
:> aboard CV's as the F-111 did. Whether one looks at the JSF as an "all
:> in one" effort or a "navalizing a lnd based design" effort, if they
:> succeed it will be the first time in many attempts.
:
:Oh I dont know the AV8/Harrier seems to have
:fared pretty well for an aircraft that started out
:as a land based design.
Comparing load and combat capability, it doesn't fare so well at all.
:Come to think of it the F-4 Phantom was rather
:succesful both on land and at sea.
A Navy design that the Air Force was told to use. Things generally
work better when driven from that direction.
--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney
Brooks
Charlie Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
<snip>
>I suppose my concern, now I think about it, is with the concept of naval
>force projection: i.e. using a navy to influence events on land. It
>looks to me as though it hasn't been thought through by military
>strategists and purchasers. Here's my brief (and very rough) history of
>how things came to be as they are:
>
>* 1500-1939: Navies are used to protect merchant shipping and ferry
>troops - all other functions are derivative (i.e. battleship squadrons
>hunting each other out). Navies generally don't take on land forces - if
>they do, they lose.
ISTR a British experience involving the world's shortest war, in northern
Africa, where a few minutes of naval bombardment brought about a change of
mind on the part of the otherwise belligerent land party; late 1800's?
>
>* 1939-1945: Out of expediency, the US Navy evolves a doctrine of
>carrier air power to support the invasion of multiple Pacific islands,
>allowing the USAF to forward deploy to within range of Tokyo.
I believe that is simplfying things to the point that it is no longer accurate.
Naval aviation had been undergoing doctrinal development long before the
war began, and the carriers were not developed to merely support island assaults;
in fact, I believe a significant portion of the CAS supporting those assaults
came from smaller light carriers. The fleet carriers were primarily oriented
towards destroying the enemy fleet, as at Pearl Harbor, Taranto, and any
number of later Pacific battles. The only real wartime development in terms
of new missions for the carrier was that of the escort carriers in terms
of the ASW fight. Carriers also conducted important strikes against the Japanese
home islands early in 45 (i.e., TF 58), another nail in the "just island
hopping" assertion.
>These
>naval air assets are short ranged but competitive in their theatre.
>In-flight refuelling doesn't exist. As a side issue, it is discovered
>that carriers + air wings supersede battleships.
>
>* 1945-1982: The USN continues to adapt successive aviation technologies
>for carrier deployment, because they feel they have to keep up and
>because no one tells them not to.
I believe there was more to it than that. In fact, it was a good enough idea
that many other nations tried to saty in the game for quite a while (Australia,
Canada, Spain, The Netherlands, etc.), and a few decided to stick it out
in varying degrees to the present (France, UK, Brazil, Italy, Spain, India,
and Thailand). As far as doctrine goes, the naval aviation contribution to
the Korean conflict, especially in the early days and later in the interdiction
fight, were rather valuable.
>They sometimes fail (F-111).
I am not sure that is completely accurate either; I was under the impression
that the USN was forced into the F-111 program by McNamara and played second
fiddle throughout the development program.
>There is
>no clear strategic purpose: consequently, a 'doctrine' of 'flexibility'
>emerges.
Did you miss the old "From the Sea" bit? Flexibility is inherent to US military
doctrine; though we only belatedly recognized it, we have been rather flexible
for many decades. Hence the use of F-105's and B-52's as conventional bomb
trucks and reuse of piston engined aircraft like the A-1 (by the USAF; the
Navy was using them all along) and B-26 Invader in Vietnam.
>The RN emulates the USN on a smaller scale until around 1980.
>
>* 1982: A small force of V/STOL carrier aircraft proves effective in
>enabling the recapture of the Falkland Islands. But the Argentine
>invasion is a fluke, with no profound strategic implications.
But it was power projection, and it would probably not have been possible
(at least without much heavier casualties) without those Harriers.
>
>* 1982-present: The USN and USMC progressively emulates the RN's
>(expedient) technical solution (and this will culminate in JSF, which is
>clearly a conceptual evolution of the Harrier),
No. The USMC jumped on the VSTOL bandwagon rather early (pre-1982, that is
for sure). The Navy has not yet otherwise really embraced the "expedient"
solution you mention, which is why the F-35C is being developed--the USN
remains a CV-based force (rightly or wrongly, depending upon your opinion).
>while the RN plans to
>match the USN's *strategy* (with somewhat increased assets). Namely, the
>limited projection of force, over land and onto land, from ships.
>
>Conclusions? While all of this was going on, we had the Cold War,
>Vietnam, the Gulf etc. All of which involved equipment and tactics of
>greater scope and effectiveness those deployed by carriers. What were
>the justifications for carriers during the Cold War? Submarine hunting?
ASW was one contribution, especially early on when we still had the ASW carriers.
But you are ignoring what the Cold War really was; it was not solely based
upon what was happening in Europe. CV's provided power projection to any
potential hotspot, sometimes those where land bases were not available or
would have been difficult to use; Taiwan was the subject of such deployments
on a couple of occasions, along with the Middle East. Take your Gulf War
scenario; how many land bases would we have had to use if Saddam had his
crap together and had attacked immediately into Saudi Arabia? In such a scenario,
the CV's offer the only real option in terms of continuous operations.
>The major land actions envisaged involved vastly greater strategic depth
>than any naval assets could effectively project into.
CV's projected rather well into Afghanistan (though the additional tanking
provided by RAF and IIRC RAAF assets was valuable). And the carrier based
interdiction campaign was rather successful in Korea.
>The converse was
>not true, in that both the USAF and the RAF (and other NATO air forces)
>could cover the whole of the Atlantic, North Sea, etc. to interdict
>shipping and hunt submarines
Uhmmm...I do believe that an awful lot of those land based assets would have
been tied up with supporting the ground conflict in Europe (or trying to
find alternate bases when they got slimed with persistant chemicals...).
>(leaving out submarines hunting submarines
>themselves: surely the real naval action was (and is?) submarine
>warfare; the Russian surface fleet didn't exist until 1980 or so, and
>seems to have been a vanity exercise to superficially match the USN).
Actually, I believe the USN was going to try going offensive, in part to
support the ASW fight, and to support the inevitable convoys from the US
(which is why so many authors talk about going after the Soviet northeastern
airfields with CV air assets). If you look at the weapons used by the CV
airwings through a large part of the Cold War era, you will note that they
were most decidedly oriented more towards land strikes; Harpoon gave them
their first decent anti-surface capability (used to good effect IIRC against
both Iranian and Iraqi surface vessels when land based air was not available...).
>
>I'd suggest that the mission of the USN carrier fleet today is *still*
>to assist with the invasion of small islands (garrisoned by infantry
>with limited air cover).
Well, I think you would not only be wrong, but you would be ignoring both
the past history and the developments which have enabled the CV to effecively
take down pinpoint targets well inland (i.e., SLAM, JSOW, JDAM, the Paveway
LGB's, etc.).
>And the RN is being reconstituted to emulate
>this role. The focus on strike fighter procurement supports this
>conclusion.
In view of the lesser surface threat present in today's world, the decreased
submarine threat (at least versus what was faced when the USSR was around),
and the likelihood that the RN will have to travel some distance and be asked
to influence events on terra firma, that seems to be rather smart. I note
that the RN was also the first and only export customer of the Tomahawk,
used for similar or supporting roles.
>
>I'm not deliberately provoking US patriots here: it's not my business to
>care how the tax dollars of US citizens are spent, since the results
>don't threaten me. What I do care about is a half-baked attempt to
>emulate a less-than-effective strategy (i.e. by procuring CVF with JSF).
As opposed to what? Using the RAF's long range bomber force...oops, that
went away in the 80's.
>If the real task is to take on a tough enemy air force over their own
>territory, in 2050, with no friendly land bases in sight, and win, then
>is this the tool for the job?
The only way that is going to happen is in conjunction with the USN; I believe
the threat is most likely going to be of lesser capability in many cases.
The only real scenario I can think of where your poited situation would e
viable would be in the event of armed conflict with the PRC...unless you
are worried about fighting some of your EUCOM partners?
Brooks
>
>Came out a bit longer than planned: sorry.
>
>Regards,
>
>--
>Charlie Whitaker
>London, UK
-----------== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Uncensored Usenet News ==----------
Brad Meyer
>Hawk to Goshawk, for one. And while stretching things a little bit (but not
>excessively), the YF-17 Cobra was the basis for the F/A-18...
True, but only as a point of departure for an entirely new design that
became the F-18.
Keith Willshaw
"Brooks" <broo...@127.0.0.1> wrote in message
news:3d6f...@news.newsgroups.com...
>
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> >
> >"Brad Meyer" <brad...@attbi.com> wrote in message
> >news:5fpvmugeddnpeqqkj...@4ax.com...
> >> On Fri, 30 Aug 2002 19:09:37 +0100, Charlie Whitaker
> >> <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
> >>
> >> > Or
> >> >will JSF be that good ...
> >>
> >> IMO, JSF has about the same chance of being operationally deployed
> >> aboard CV's as the F-111 did. Whether one looks at the JSF as an "all
> >> in one" effort or a "navalizing a lnd based design" effort, if they
> >> succeed it will be the first time in many attempts.
> >>
> >
> >Oh I dont know the AV8/Harrier seems to have
> >fared pretty well for an aircraft that started out
> >as a land based design.
> >
> >Come to think of it the F-4 Phantom was rather
> >succesful both on land and at sea.
> >
> >Keith
>
> Going from naval to land based, you also have the A-3/B-66, A-1 Skyraider,
> A-7 Corsair, and A-4 Skyhawk. And the T-45 Goshawk started out as the
land
> based Hawk.
>
The Harrier wasnt designed as a naval aircraft, at the time
the RN was flying F-4's and Buccaneers and wanted
nothing to do with it. The USMC arrived on the scene
long after its first flight
Keith
Keith Willshaw
"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:gv80nu0vpmtqmcck5...@4ax.com...
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> :
> :"Brad Meyer" <brad...@attbi.com> wrote in message
> :news:5fpvmugeddnpeqqkj...@4ax.com...
> :> On Fri, 30 Aug 2002 19:09:37 +0100, Charlie Whitaker
> :> <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
> :>
> :> > Or
> :> >will JSF be that good ...
> :>
> :> IMO, JSF has about the same chance of being operationally deployed
> :> aboard CV's as the F-111 did. Whether one looks at the JSF as an "all
> :> in one" effort or a "navalizing a lnd based design" effort, if they
> :> succeed it will be the first time in many attempts.
> :
> :Oh I dont know the AV8/Harrier seems to have
> :fared pretty well for an aircraft that started out
> :as a land based design.
>
> Comparing load and combat capability, it doesn't fare so well at all.
>
Tell it to the Marines
Keith
Brooks
No, but your other example, the Phantom, was...
Brooks
>
>Keith
Brooks
Goshawk would seem to place your claim that using a land based design on
a CV is never successful in the "incorrect" category; the YF-17/F-18 development
is an admittedly less-complete case of "icing on the cake". I guess the moral
of the story would be that stating an absolute is risky...
Brooks
Charlie Whitaker
"Brooks" <broo...@127.0.0.1> wrote:
> >* 1500-1939: Navies are used to protect merchant shipping and ferry
> >troops - all other functions are derivative (i.e. battleship squadrons
> >hunting each other out). Navies generally don't take on land forces - if
>
> >they do, they lose.
>
> ISTR a British experience involving the world's shortest war, in northern
> Africa, where a few minutes of naval bombardment brought about a change of
> mind on the part of the otherwise belligerent land party; late 1800's?
An exception that proves the rule? Ships can't sink rocks.
> >* 1939-1945: Out of expediency, the US Navy evolves a doctrine of
> >carrier air power to support the invasion of multiple Pacific islands,
> >allowing the USAF to forward deploy to within range of Tokyo.
>
> I believe that is simplfying things to the point that it is no longer
> accurate.
> Naval aviation had been undergoing doctrinal development long before the
> war began, and the carriers were not developed to merely support island
> assaults;
> in fact, I believe a significant portion of the CAS supporting those assaults
> came from smaller light carriers. The fleet carriers were primarily oriented
> towards destroying the enemy fleet, as at Pearl Harbor, Taranto, and any
> number of later Pacific battles. The only real wartime development in terms
> of new missions for the carrier was that of the escort carriers in terms
> of the ASW fight. Carriers also conducted important strikes against the
> Japanese
> home islands early in 45 (i.e., TF 58), another nail in the "just island
> hopping" assertion.
Perhaps I could rephrase: the Pacific War provided the first (and only?)
key task for carrier air power: CAS and top cover for littoral assaults.
The littoral assaults were needed because Japan's mainland was out of
bombing range. Navies don't exist in order to destroy other navies: that
role is secondary (not undemanding, perhaps, but still secondary). It's
not the equivalent of armies taking on armies: there is no fundamental
need to control and occupy ocean *area* as it is uninhabitable. I'm not
going to argue that the CV wasn't a potent weapon in WWII: The CV made
the BB go away, for sure. But if you wanted to defeat a CV today, would
you invest in CVs?
> >These
> >naval air assets are short ranged but competitive in their theatre.
> >In-flight refuelling doesn't exist. As a side issue, it is discovered
> >that carriers + air wings supersede battleships.
> >
> >* 1945-1982: The USN continues to adapt successive aviation technologies
>
> >for carrier deployment, because they feel they have to keep up and
> >because no one tells them not to.
>
> I believe there was more to it than that. In fact, it was a good enough idea
> that many other nations tried to saty in the game for quite a while
> (Australia,
> Canada, Spain, The Netherlands, etc.), and a few decided to stick it out
> in varying degrees to the present (France, UK, Brazil, Italy, Spain, India,
> and Thailand). As far as doctrine goes, the naval aviation contribution to
> the Korean conflict, especially in the early days and later in the
> interdiction
> fight, were rather valuable.
Well, Korea is close enough to WWII to be seen as an extension of it, in
technical and tactical terms if not strategic. And Korea happens to have
plenty of coast. And yes, many navies have had a go at carriers. But
majorities aren't always right.
> >They sometimes fail (F-111).
>
> I am not sure that is completely accurate either; I was under the impression
> that the USN was forced into the F-111 program by McNamara and played second
> fiddle throughout the development program.
I didn't mean to disparage the USN: my point was to note the failure of
that project. It was conceptually flawed. There have been other attempts
to put bombers on carriers since WWII; the A-3/A-5 Vigilante, for
example (and a beautiful plane, IMO). While the Vigilante was a
technical success - i.e. it worked as intended - the role was clearly
redundant and quickly deleted.
> >There is
> >no clear strategic purpose: consequently, a 'doctrine' of 'flexibility'
>
> >emerges.
>
> Did you miss the old "From the Sea" bit? Flexibility is inherent to US
> military
> doctrine; though we only belatedly recognized it, we have been rather
> flexible
> for many decades. Hence the use of F-105's and B-52's as conventional bomb
> trucks and reuse of piston engined aircraft like the A-1 (by the USAF; the
> Navy was using them all along) and B-26 Invader in Vietnam.
At what point does tactical flexibility turn into strategic redundancy?
It's true that the USN pioneered some useful 'swing-role' tactics:
equipping fighters with bombs, for example, which is a tactic still used
by the IAF, since it suits their strategic requirement very well. But is
it always smart to persist with a good idea past its sell-by date?
> >* 1982-present: The USN and USMC progressively emulates the RN's
> >(expedient) technical solution (and this will culminate in JSF, which is
>
> >clearly a conceptual evolution of the Harrier),
>
> No. The USMC jumped on the VSTOL bandwagon rather early (pre-1982, that is
> for sure). The Navy has not yet otherwise really embraced the "expedient"
> solution you mention, which is why the F-35C is being developed--the USN
> remains a CV-based force (rightly or wrongly, depending upon your opinion).
But I think the trend is detectable. The issue of who is copying who is
secondary. You're right about the USMC: they jumped first and gave
credibility to the Harrier as an amphibious platform: the RN followed
them when no carriers at all was the alternative: the Falklands proved
the concept had a certain utility after all, which in turn reaffirmed
the USMC's leap of faith. And the USN, like it or not, is going that
way. From the F-35C to the F-35B is a small step, and it'll only take an
episode of bad weather during hostilities to encourage a switch. There's
no conspiracy here: this is just how cultural trends work.
> But you are ignoring what the Cold War really was; it was not solely based
> upon what was happening in Europe. CV's provided power projection to any
> potential hotspot, sometimes those where land bases were not available or
> would have been difficult to use; Taiwan was the subject of such deployments
> on a couple of occasions, along with the Middle East. Take your Gulf War
> scenario; how many land bases would we have had to use if Saddam had his
> crap together and had attacked immediately into Saudi Arabia? In such a
> scenario,
> the CV's offer the only real option in terms of continuous operations.
Turkey is a NATO ally bordering Iraq. There is a US base there
(Incirlik) unlike SA. How much more friendly or convenient can things
get? And if not Saudi (which would have put up a fight, surely) then
Qatar, Oman etc.? If you are defending a friend, the friend will usually
be able to offer you a land base to operate from, unless completely
over-run. And a land base is *always* more potent than a carrier base:
bigger, tougher, more flexible. Add tankers and the strike range becomes
huge, largely vitiating the carrier's mobility advantage. Add air
redeployment, and you can have very potent forces moving around the
globe very quickly in response to threats. Add SATINT, GPS (Gallileo
:-)) JDAMs etc.
> >The major land actions envisaged involved vastly greater strategic depth
>
> >than any naval assets could effectively project into.
>
> CV's projected rather well into Afghanistan (though the additional tanking
> provided by RAF and IIRC RAAF assets was valuable)
The key asset here is the tanker, no? And the power was most definitely
projected by B-52s (and Afghanistan is not a tough target).
> >The converse was
> >not true, in that both the USAF and the RAF (and other NATO air forces)
>
> >could cover the whole of the Atlantic, North Sea, etc. to interdict
> >shipping and hunt submarines
>
> Uhmmm...I do believe that an awful lot of those land based assets would have
> been tied up with supporting the ground conflict in Europe (or trying to
> find alternate bases when they got slimed with persistant chemicals...).
Assets are always finite. The issue is how you divide things up. If no
carrier fleet, then those resources can be used elsewhere. The MR2 is a
better sub hunter than the ASW Sea King. As is the Type 23 frigate, I
suspect.
> (which is why so many authors talk about going after the Soviet northeastern
> airfields with CV air assets). If you look at the weapons used by the CV
> airwings through a large part of the Cold War era, you will note that they
> were most decidedly oriented more towards land strikes
Of course: this is my point. Naval land strike is a cultural inheritance
and no longer an essential mission.
> In view of the lesser surface threat present in today's world, the decreased
> submarine threat (at least versus what was faced when the USSR was around),
> and the likelihood that the RN will have to travel some distance and be asked
> to influence events on terra firma, that seems to be rather smart. I note
> that the RN was also the first and only export customer of the Tomahawk,
> used for similar or supporting roles.
There's no such thing as a decreased submarine threat. Submarines are
always very dangerous. If you want to make your coastline utterly
inhospitable to the enemy's navy - buy submarines. One type 209 sub
nearly wrecked the Falklands campaign for the RN - they couldn't find
it, and but for luck, it would have done major damage. And that's just
one cheap SSK.
What is the quality of influence that the RN is being asked to project
using carriers? It seems to be the ability to pound soft targets close
to the shore in concert with the USN. The RN SSN Tomahawk is a hard
target weapon, but limited in number and difficult to replenish. GR7s
with Storm Shadow will also have good strategic stand-off offensive
capability. But for putting bombs over targets repeatedly, you need more
than light fighter/bombers to make a difference, which is why the USAF
B-52s get used at *every* opportunity, it seems. And are there better
ways of launching cruise missiles or JDAMs at a distant target than via
a large slow-moving boat?
> >I'm not deliberately provoking US patriots here: it's not my business to
>
> >care how the tax dollars of US citizens are spent, since the results
> >don't threaten me. What I do care about is a half-baked attempt to
> >emulate a less-than-effective strategy (i.e. by procuring CVF with JSF).
>
> As opposed to what? Using the RAF's long range bomber force...oops, that
> went away in the 80's.
Well, we're talking about making a new force from an almost standing
start in a 10 year time span. Why not invest in SATINT, long range
heavyweight UCAVs, tankers, SCALPs and JDAMs instead? We currently have
an over-supply of orbital launchers for the satellites. Or we could at
least look long and hard at how carrier air power is best used. 'The
marines' have not gone in for a while now - like a paradrop, it's one of
the toughest ways to fight - but in the unlikely event that they will
need to in the future, they need three things: a platform to launch the
assault from, secure air space and (perhaps) supporting air strikes
(this didn't happen much in the Falklands, probably because the air
space wasn't secure). I can agree that a carrier is a good way to
provide some of these things in truly remote places. But is amphibious
assault still a key mission in itself? The Serbs were driven out of
Kosovo because NATO began to selectively bomb Belgrade, not because we
mounted a counter-invasion or blew up their tanks. There's a case for
arguing that this tactic would have worked on the Argentines also, had
the capability existed. No electricity for three months in Buenos Aires:
down with Galtieri. I guarantee it.
> >If the real task is to take on a tough enemy air force over their own
> >territory, in 2050, with no friendly land bases in sight, and win, then
>
> >is this the tool for the job?
>
> The only way that is going to happen is in conjunction with the USN; I
> believe
> the threat is most likely going to be of lesser capability in many cases.
> The only real scenario I can think of where your poited situation would e
> viable would be in the event of armed conflict with the PRC...unless you
> are worried about fighting some of your EUCOM partners?
Times change. Hard to believe with half the British Army still based in
Germany, I know. But relying on a ally to assist in *power projection*
is perverse, because they can leave you high and dry in the blink of an
eye, and without diplomatic penalty. SEAC = Save England's Asiatic
Colonies. Why not trust allies for mutual *defence* and procure the
hardest hitting weapons for power projection, if you're serious about
it? There's a lot of talk about emerging threats: the CVF/JSF force is
meant to be good for 40 years of effective capability. Once the carriers
are built, is it likely that we (in Britain) are going to spend a good
chunk of that time scratching around for cut-down versions of new
weapons to equip those platforms, simply because they're there? Or do we
really believe that the JSF with limited organic AEW will reign supreme
in 2040-50?
Or assuming that those in charge know exactly what they're doing, on the
other hand, seems to mean cynically accepting that all future 'enemies'
will be soft: softer than the Serbs, at any rate. this casts the RN, at
least, in the role of a bully. Doesn't it?
Or maybe carriers are actually totems of national pride. I agree that
they're impressive. But I'm not sure that anyone is intimidated.
Dangerous enemies will just buy more SSKs.
Alan Minyard
>Hawk to Goshawk, for one. And while stretching things a little bit (but not
>excessively), the YF-17 Cobra was the basis for the F/A-18...
>
>Brooks
Of course you realize that the Goshawk is a terrible a/c, has
virtually no commonality with the Hawk, and cost about four times what
a new design would have cost.
Al Minyard
Fred J. McCall
:"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
:news:gv80nu0vpmtqmcck5...@4ax.com...
:> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
:>
:> :Oh I dont know the AV8/Harrier seems to have
:> :fared pretty well for an aircraft that started out
:> :as a land based design.
:>
:> Comparing load and combat capability, it doesn't fare so well at all.
:
:Tell it to the Marines
Rather an interesting double use of an old phrase, but I'll take it in
its direct meaning rather than the old colloquial one.
Believe me, they know. They want it for different reasons than its
massive bomb load, great speed, or ACM capabilities. The V-22 doesn't
compare real favourably to other light transport aircraft, either,
but, like the Harrier, it brings that something 'extra' to the table
(i.e., operating from non-airfields) that endears it to my Green
Brethren.
I've always liked the AV-8, but I'm under no misapprehensions about
its strengths and weaknesses.
[Besides, they're the only ones who brought one of their test pilots
to my CDR.]
--
"Death is my gift." -- Buffy, the Vampire Slayer
Fred J. McCall
:The Harrier wasnt designed as a naval aircraft, at the time
:the RN was flying F-4's and Buccaneers and wanted
:nothing to do with it. The USMC arrived on the scene
:long after its first flight
Not all that long, though. The Marines were interested in it before
it was ready and showed up unannounced at Farnborough in 1968 during
the finished aircraft's first public outing for test flights. In
point of fact, they'd been interested for some time prior to that, as
evidenced by testing with the Kestrel (which was adjudged interesting
but too small and underpowered).
There were many improvements driven by USMC requirements, resulting in
the AV-8A. Oddly, the RAF demanded that wiring for Sidewinders be
REMOVED from their AV-8A aircraft! And of course, the AV-8B is pretty
much an American aircraft, since HM Government withdrew in 1975. USN
also terminated its participation (which is a shame - the AV-16 would
have been a truly neat aircraft), which left USMC driving the
requirements.
The Marine requirement was really for more payload (the original
requirement they bought the Harrier for was first slated to be filled
by an attack helicopter), which led to the AV-8B. BAe finally came
back on board in 1981, after having the British government decline to
get involved in their 'big wing' Harrier program, which actually kept
open an upgrade path for existing aircraft in RAF service and produced
something closer to the original RAF requirements for a Harrier
follow-on. But all the hesitation and wrangling led to BAe being a
subcontractor for all but the relative handfuls of aircraft to be
procured by HM government.
Fred J. McCall
:Goshawk would seem to place your claim that using a land based design on
:a CV is never successful in the "incorrect" category; the YF-17/F-18 development
:is an admittedly less-complete case of "icing on the cake". I guess the moral
:of the story would be that stating an absolute is risky...
When this came up a while back, I recall someone commenting on a
number of 'less than desirable' behaviours by the Goshawk (although I
don't recall exactly what they were) that were due to trying to
'navalize' what was essentially a land-based design. It may not be
the greatest example, either.
Alan Minyard
>
>Goshawk would seem to place your claim that using a land based design on
>a CV is never successful in the "incorrect" category; the YF-17/F-18 development
>is an admittedly less-complete case of "icing on the cake". I guess the moral
>of the story would be that stating an absolute is risky...
>
>Brooks
Not at all. The Goshawk is a politically driven disaster. It ended up
costing a fortune, and is basically a totally different a/c that sort
of looks like a Hawk. A clean sheet design would have been cheaper
and far better.
Al Minyard
Jack Love
And a control system which didn't require incredibly high skill levels
to fly IIRC.
Brad Meyer
<cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>I didn't mean to disparage the USN: my point was to note the failure of
>that project. It was conceptually flawed. There have been other attempts
>to put bombers on carriers since WWII; the A-3/A-5 Vigilante, for
>example (and a beautiful plane, IMO). While the Vigilante was a
>technical success - i.e. it worked as intended . . .
It did nothing of the sort. It was, in fact, almost totally unsuitable
for the mission for which it was designed. OTOH, it was very good as
an attack recon a/c and opeerated in that role for several years
>At what point does tactical flexibility turn into strategic redundancy?
That point is located in the eye of the beholder.
>It's true that the USN pioneered some useful 'swing-role' tactics:
>equipping fighters with bombs, for example, which is a tactic still used
>by the IAF, since it suits their strategic requirement very well. But is
>it always smart to persist with a good idea past its sell-by date?
Where is that date stamped? Given the amout of weapons delivered by
fighters and light attack craft vs bombers in any of the wars of the
last few decades. I'd say the concept is alive and well. Indeed, if
anything, it is bombers that are becomming redundant.
>But I think the trend is detectable. The issue of who is copying who is
>secondary. You're right about the USMC: they jumped first and gave
>credibility to the Harrier as an amphibious platform: the RN followed
>them when no carriers at all was the alternative: the Falklands proved
>the concept had a certain utility after all, which in turn reaffirmed
>the USMC's leap of faith. And the USN, like it or not, is going that
>way.
I doubt it. In all the cases cited (including Falklands) it was
understood that the Harriers were no match for their opponents and no
attempt was made to use them as air superiority a/c. I do not think
the Navy will ever send carriers out to sea without an air superiority
a/c aboard.
>Turkey is a NATO ally bordering Iraq. There is a US base there
>(Incirlik) unlike SA. How much more friendly or convenient can things
>get?
Turkey is on the verge of a radical Islamic erruption if the BBC is
correct. It could be successful and deny that base to the US. The
Turkish govt could deny the base in a bid to appease the
fundamentalists. What could be more friendly is an airstrip one owns
outright rather then one that one rents from a dubious landlord.
>Or maybe carriers are actually totems of national pride. I agree that
>they're impressive. But I'm not sure that anyone is intimidated.
>Dangerous enemies will just buy more SSKs.
Assuming they have the means to acquire and man them. The USSR more or
less went bankrupt trying to persue that sort of policy.
elstunto
"Charlie Whitaker" <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote in message
news:charlie-A01FBC...@dyke.uk.clara.net...sni[p
> Perhaps I could rephrase: the Pacific War provided the first (and only?)
> key task for carrier air power: CAS and top cover for littoral assaults.
> The littoral assaults were needed because Japan's mainland was out of
> bombing range.
Not entirely correct B-24's of the the26th Bomb Group based in the Aleutian
Islands regularly bombed Japan from July 1943 onwards
--
regards
Calum
Pilots without maintainers are just pedestrians with sunglasses and a cool
jacket.
Charlie Whitaker
Brad Meyer <brad...@attbi.com> wrote:
> On Sat, 31 Aug 2002 13:19:30 +0100, Charlie Whitaker
> <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>
>
> >I didn't mean to disparage the USN: my point was to note the failure of
> >that project. It was conceptually flawed. There have been other attempts
> >to put bombers on carriers since WWII; the A-3/A-5 Vigilante, for
> >example (and a beautiful plane, IMO). While the Vigilante was a
> >technical success - i.e. it worked as intended . . .
>
> It did nothing of the sort. It was, in fact, almost totally unsuitable
> for the mission for which it was designed. OTOH, it was very good as
> an attack recon a/c and opeerated in that role for several years
But it did (literally) work as intended - it could take off, deploy a
weapon (nuclear) and return to the carrier: i.e. it could meet the
specs. Some issues with reliable weapon deployment, but these probably
could have been overcome with persistence. Whether such a large and
complex aircraft was a good match for a carrier is another matter:
clearly it was somewhat difficult to land and had maintenance issues.
The real problem was that, compared to - say - Polaris, it had very
limited capability even when working perfectly. But that's what can
happen when you try to fit new weapons and tactics to an old
(conceptually old) platform (CV in this case). The USN thought it needed
a carrier-based strategic bomber. It got as far as taking delivery
before it realised it was wrong.
> >At what point does tactical flexibility turn into strategic redundancy?
>
> That point is located in the eye of the beholder.
I think we could reach a consensus that the A-3/A-5 together with
Polaris constituted redundancy. The USN also recognised this, it seems.
Re-purposing the B-52 for conventional land target bombing: clearly not
redundant - one of the unpleasant surprises of history ...
> >It's true that the USN pioneered some useful 'swing-role' tactics:
> >equipping fighters with bombs, for example, which is a tactic still used
> >by the IAF, since it suits their strategic requirement very well. But is
> >it always smart to persist with a good idea past its sell-by date?
>
> Where is that date stamped? Given the amout of weapons delivered by
> fighters and light attack craft vs bombers in any of the wars of the
> last few decades. I'd say the concept is alive and well. Indeed, if
> anything, it is bombers that are becomming redundant.
USAF/USAAF tonnage dropped:
WW II 2,150,000 45 months
Korea 454,000 37 months
Vietnam/SEA 6,162,000 140 months
Gulf War 60,624 1.5 months
USN/USMC tonnage dropped:
WW II 103,000 45 months
Korea 177,000 37 months
Vietnam/SEA ? 140 months
Gulf War 23,576 1.5 months
(Compiled quickly from various sources, and not authoritative: someone
who knows might like to comment on how many USN sorties were generated
from land bases during Desert Storm.)
The huge decrease from Vietnam to Desert Storm reflects not only the
shorter duration of the conflict but also the coming-of-age of PGMs.
However, the percentage dropped by heavy bombers (B-52s) is now *rising*
(from 30% in Vietnam to around 60% in Desert Storm, and 80-90% in
Enduring Freedom).
I don't know if JDAMs (and JSOWs) are suitable for the B-52 (or for grim
amusement, let's say its sub-orbital un-manned successor) but it isn't
hard to see how devastating they could be in that context - every single
2000 lb 'dumb' bomb knows where it's supposed to go. If the target is a
city, that's a saturation air strike which targets only military,
government and civilian infrastructure assets (in theory), avoiding
nuclear escalation (in theory). JDAMs haven't yet arrived in the popular
consciousness. But I believe they will.
While researching the figures, I found these two gems:
"The Navy and Marine Corps has [sic] served as the backbone of Operation
Enduring Freedom. ... I want to note the contribution of the sister
services, especially the Air Force's heavy bombers [sic], that dropped
most of the strategic ordnance. ... They made a vital contribution to
this effort. But the key support was provided by tactical aircraft,
close air support for our troops, provided overwhelmingly by the Navy."
-Rep. Mark S. Kirk (R?Ill.), a lieutenant commander in the US Naval
Reserve, in Dec. 20 (2001?) floor speech.
"What the Navy is flying is more Desert Drizzle than Desert Storm, in
terms of tonnage being dropped, the amount of firepower being provided.
But it's interesting to see them putting their best foot forward."
-Defense analyst Andrew Krepinevich, quoted in Defense Week.
Make of those what you will - I include them for light relief only. Some
day I hope to out-patronise Mr Krepinevich, but it seems he is the
master yet.
Now, before you all take me for some latter-day Bomber Harris (or Dr.
Strangelove) my only point is that whether they are PGMs or not (and
with JDAM, they may as well *all* be PGMs) the bomb is the weapon, not
the vehicle that delivers it. And bombs scale: the more bombs you can
deliver, the more potent your force. It's a sad fact of our world, but
experience shows that bombs do work: it's a given. For the attacker, the
trade-offs are in survivability of the delivery vehicle, its payload,
its range, its cost. If the vehicle is launched from another vehicle -
i.e. a carrier - then that needs to be factored in as well. Obviously,
vehicle survivability is affected by the mission: stand-off weapons can
make a big difference on day one of the war, making things safe for the
same vehicle to sortie closer.
> >the concept had a certain utility after all, which in turn reaffirmed
> >the USMC's leap of faith. And the USN, like it or not, is going that
> >way.
>
> I doubt it. In all the cases cited (including Falklands) it was
> understood that the Harriers were no match for their opponents and no
> attempt was made to use them as air superiority a/c. I do not think
> the Navy will ever send carriers out to sea without an air superiority
> a/c aboard.
By some measures, they already do. Depends on whether you listen to the
USAF or the USN. Either the F-22 is the only realistic 'air dominance'
option for the future, or it isn't.
Look at the UK perspective: I see 200+ Typhoons arriving on these shores
over the next 10 years, supported by 7 or more E3s and tankers. This is
a credible air superiority force - AEW, JTIDS, IRST etc. - and the best
my nation can muster. Is it just going to sit here awaiting an aggressor
while the navy goes out to fight with a less capable force? The answer
seems to be yes. Like the F-22/F-18: something doesn't compute.
> Turkey is on the verge of a radical Islamic erruption if the BBC is
> correct. It could be successful and deny that base to the US. The
> Turkish govt could deny the base in a bid to appease the
> fundamentalists. What could be more friendly is an airstrip one owns
> outright rather then one that one rents from a dubious landlord.
Yes, you can lose basing opportunities. You can gain others. There's a
wealth to choose from presently, and only major diplomatic bungling is
going to blow them all. Why not see if you can lose Diego Garcia :-).
> >Or maybe carriers are actually totems of national pride. I agree that
> >they're impressive. But I'm not sure that anyone is intimidated.
> >Dangerous enemies will just buy more SSKs.
>
> Assuming they have the means to acquire and man them. The USSR more or
> less went bankrupt trying to persue that sort of policy.
Well, the USSR tried to do it all, including rockets to the moon. With
an economy the size of Portugal's. If they had concentrated their
resources into a few areas, including a potent submarine fleet (perhaps
with a mix of SSN and SSK) they could have sustained a credible
defensive navy at much less cost.
Charlie Whitaker
"elstunto" <elstunto...@tpg.com.au> wrote:
> "Charlie Whitaker" <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote in message
> news:charlie-A01FBC...@dyke.uk.clara.net...
> > In article <3d70...@news.newsgroups.com>,
> > "Brooks" <broo...@127.0.0.1> wrote:
> >
> sni[p
>
> > Perhaps I could rephrase: the Pacific War provided the first (and only?)
> > key task for carrier air power: CAS and top cover for littoral assaults.
> > The littoral assaults were needed because Japan's mainland was out of
> > bombing range.
>
> Not entirely correct B-24's of the the26th Bomb Group based in the Aleutian
> Islands regularly bombed Japan from July 1943 onwards
>
Good point - only they were surely a bit too far away to bomb Hokkaido
or Honshu. Kuril islands, perhaps?
Fred J. McCall
:The real problem was that, compared to - say - Polaris, it had very
:limited capability even when working perfectly.
The same might be said for the comparison between any manned AF
strategic bomber and the ICBM force. The idea, as always, is to make
life as difficult for the other guy as possible. That means being
able to hit him as many different ways as possible.
:But that's what can
:happen when you try to fit new weapons and tactics to an old
:(conceptually old) platform (CV in this case). The USN thought it needed
:a carrier-based strategic bomber. It got as far as taking delivery
:before it realised it was wrong.
There were an awful lot of weapons carried on an awful lot of flattops
for me to buy your interpretation of what the Navy was thinking.
:I think we could reach a consensus that the A-3/A-5 together with
:Polaris constituted redundancy. The USN also recognised this, it seems.
And redundancy is a GOOD thing.
:Re-purposing the B-52 for conventional land target bombing: clearly not
:redundant - one of the unpleasant surprises of history ...
Redundant with cruise missiles, by the sort of reasoning you use
above.
:I don't know if JDAMs (and JSOWs) are suitable for the B-52
They are.
:(or for grim
:amusement, let's say its sub-orbital un-manned successor) but it isn't
:hard to see how devastating they could be in that context - every single
:2000 lb 'dumb' bomb knows where it's supposed to go.
For this capability to be useful, you need target 'clusters'. The
number of those existing outside the 1st world are small.
:While researching the figures, I found these two gems:
:
:"The Navy and Marine Corps has [sic] served as the backbone of Operation
:Enduring Freedom. ... I want to note the contribution of the sister
:services, especially the Air Force's heavy bombers [sic], that dropped
:most of the strategic ordnance. ... They made a vital contribution to
:this effort. But the key support was provided by tactical aircraft,
:close air support for our troops, provided overwhelmingly by the Navy."
:
:-Rep. Mark S. Kirk (R?Ill.), a lieutenant commander in the US Naval
:Reserve, in Dec. 20 (2001?) floor speech.
Sorry, but generally true. While USAF strategic platforms dropped
some 75% of the ordnance by weight (while flying only 15% of the
sorties), the turn-around time when flying from Diego Garcia was
excessive and very limiting. Virtually all tactical air was Navy
tactical air, supported by USAF tankers to let them loiter over the
potential target zones. The vast majority of combat sorties were by
Navy aircraft.
:Now, before you all take me for some latter-day Bomber Harris (or Dr.
:Strangelove) my only point is that whether they are PGMs or not (and
:with JDAM, they may as well *all* be PGMs) the bomb is the weapon, not
:the vehicle that delivers it. And bombs scale: the more bombs you can
:deliver, the more potent your force. It's a sad fact of our world, but
:experience shows that bombs do work: it's a given. For the attacker, the
:trade-offs are in survivability of the delivery vehicle, its payload,
:its range, its cost. If the vehicle is launched from another vehicle -
:i.e. a carrier - then that needs to be factored in as well. Obviously,
:vehicle survivability is affected by the mission: stand-off weapons can
:make a big difference on day one of the war, making things safe for the
:same vehicle to sortie closer.
Response time matters.
:By some measures, they already do. Depends on whether you listen to the
:USAF or the USN. Either the F-22 is the only realistic 'air dominance'
:option for the future, or it isn't.
I'd say it isn't, given the relative handfuls that the Air Force is
going to get.
--
"You keep talking about slaying like it's a job. It's not.
It's who you are."
-- Kendra, the Vampire Slayer
elstunto
"Charlie Whitaker" <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote in message
They bombed the home islands, to what extent I'm not sure. Paramushio naval
base was common target, although they never really knocked it out.
--
regards
Calum
Pilots without maintainers are just pedestrians with sunglasses and a cool
jacket.
>
Brooks
By that line of thinking, the F-16C Block 60 is not an F-16, as it differs
quite a great deal from the F-16A? And the C-130J is no longer a C-130? Fact
is that the Hawk was developed for land based use; the Navy selected the
T-45 as a navalized version and old McD-D undertook the necessary work, and
the T-45 is being used successfully by the USN to train CV pilots, to include
operating them from the training rotation CV's.
Brooks
Al, it is not my intent to defend the T-45. But the fact is that it did indeed
start out as a landbased design, and it is being successfully used to perform
its mission, to include CV operations. The Navy has not been an unwilling
participant in that program,and I believe the aircraft are still being delivered?
Brooks
Braybrook
| On Fri, 30 Aug 2002 19:09:37 +0100, Charlie Whitaker
| <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
|
| > Or
| >will JSF be that good ...
|
| IMO, JSF has about the same chance of being operationally deployed
| aboard CV's as the F-111 did. Whether one looks at the JSF as an "all
| in one" effort or a "navalizing a lnd based design" effort, if they
| succeed it will be the first time in many attempts.
North American F-86 Sabre to FJ-4 Fury
Brooks
Charlie Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>In article <3d70...@news.newsgroups.com>,
> "Brooks" <broo...@127.0.0.1> wrote:
>
>> >* 1500-1939: Navies are used to protect merchant shipping and ferry
>> >troops - all other functions are derivative (i.e. battleship squadrons
>> >hunting each other out). Navies generally don't take on land forces -
if
>>
>> >they do, they lose.
>>
>> ISTR a British experience involving the world's shortest war, in northern
>> Africa, where a few minutes of naval bombardment brought about a change
of
>> mind on the part of the otherwise belligerent land party; late 1800's?
>
>An exception that proves the rule?
No, but an exception that tends to disprove the idea that they "lose" by
definition when they try to engage land forces. The Taliban/AQ folks who
were on the receiving end of the CAS provided by the CV's (before the land
based tactical fighters could get into the fight in a big way) would likely
also disagree (though unwillingly) to that statement, as would our NA allies
and their SF advisors.
Ships can't sink rocks.
But as shown over the past year, they can make rocky places rather inhospitable
to the bad guys, especially when they have decent targeting info...
>
>> >* 1939-1945: Out of expediency, the US Navy evolves a doctrine of
>> >carrier air power to support the invasion of multiple Pacific islands,
>> >allowing the USAF to forward deploy to within range of Tokyo.
>>
>> I believe that is simplfying things to the point that it is no longer
>> accurate.
>> Naval aviation had been undergoing doctrinal development long before the
>> war began, and the carriers were not developed to merely support island
>> assaults;
>> in fact, I believe a significant portion of the CAS supporting those assaults
>> came from smaller light carriers. The fleet carriers were primarily oriented
>> towards destroying the enemy fleet, as at Pearl Harbor, Taranto, and any
>> number of later Pacific battles. The only real wartime development in
terms
>> of new missions for the carrier was that of the escort carriers in terms
>> of the ASW fight. Carriers also conducted important strikes against the
>> Japanese
>> home islands early in 45 (i.e., TF 58), another nail in the "just island
>> hopping" assertion.
>
>Perhaps I could rephrase: the Pacific War provided the first (and only?)
>key task for carrier air power: CAS and top cover for littoral assaults.
So you would classify Taranto as...?
>The littoral assaults were needed because Japan's mainland was out of
>bombing range.
No, the littoral assaults were not conducted merely to provide bombing bases,
as a rule. The initial plan was to base the bomber force out of China; XX
Bomber Command experience quickly demonstrated thsi was a no-go. Kenneth
Werrell ("Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers Over japan During World War II",
Smithsonian Press, 1996) indicates that the identification of the Marianas
as a basing option was made in Sep 43, when the Air Staff urged that the
scheduled assaults of those islands (originally planned for 46) be brought
forward to allow the basing of B-29's. This makes it patently clear that
the bombers and their bases were NOT the deciding factor forcing the strategy
of island hopping.
>Navies don't exist in order to destroy other navies: that
>role is secondary (not undemanding, perhaps, but still secondary).
That would be entirely dependent upon the situation and the mission assigned.
One could easily argue that the Japanese Navy was placing its strongest emphasis
upon the destruction of the USN as a viable offensive force until at least
the Midway battle. And during how many assaults conducted by the USN was
the concept of drawing the remaining Japanese naval forces into a decisive
battle mentioned? Why did the Leyte operation unfold as it did? Why was Halsey
out chasing the elusive Japanese "main force"?
>It's
>not the equivalent of armies taking on armies: there is no fundamental
>need to control and occupy ocean *area* as it is uninhabitable.
Firstly, the idea would be in most cases to orient on destruction of the
enemy force's naval capabilities; this can indeed be a necessary ingredient
to acheiving later success by other means (i.e., the Japanese failure at
PH to remove the Pacific Fleet's strike capability, in the form of its carriers,
meant that in the end the attack was only of marginal success). Secondly,
sometimes that uninhabitable open ocean can be vital, as it sometimes is
the site of vital SLOC's or chokepoints (you would be hardpressed to define
the GIUK gap as anything but open ocean).
>I'm not
>going to argue that the CV wasn't a potent weapon in WWII: The CV made
>the BB go away, for sure. But if you wanted to defeat a CV today, would
>you invest in CVs?
That is immaterial to the argument; we are not in the business of wanting
to kill CV's, nor is the RN. The flip side to your question is--if you want
to project power from the sea into littoral areas, would your sole selected
resource be DDG's?
>
>> >These
>> >naval air assets are short ranged but competitive in their theatre.
>> >In-flight refuelling doesn't exist. As a side issue, it is discovered
>> >that carriers + air wings supersede battleships.
>> >
>> >* 1945-1982: The USN continues to adapt successive aviation technologies
>>
>> >for carrier deployment, because they feel they have to keep up and
>> >because no one tells them not to.
>>
>> I believe there was more to it than that. In fact, it was a good enough
idea
>> that many other nations tried to saty in the game for quite a while
>> (Australia,
>> Canada, Spain, The Netherlands, etc.), and a few decided to stick it out
>> in varying degrees to the present (France, UK, Brazil, Italy, Spain, India,
>> and Thailand). As far as doctrine goes, the naval aviation contribution
to
>> the Korean conflict, especially in the early days and later in the
>> interdiction
>> fight, were rather valuable.
>
>Well, Korea is close enough to WWII to be seen as an extension of it, in
>technical and tactical terms if not strategic. And Korea happens to have
>plenty of coast. And yes, many navies have had a go at carriers. But
>majorities aren't always right.
So are you now going to say that the CV might be a valuable power projection
platform only if the targeted nation has "plenty of coast"? So the impact
of naval based CAS in Afghanistan was...? The movement of the 24th MEU into
the AO from its platforms in the IO to Camp Rhino was...?
>
>> >They sometimes fail (F-111).
>>
>> I am not sure that is completely accurate either; I was under the impression
>> that the USN was forced into the F-111 program by McNamara and played
second
>> fiddle throughout the development program.
>
>I didn't mean to disparage the USN: my point was to note the failure of
>that project. It was conceptually flawed. There have been other attempts
>to put bombers on carriers since WWII; the A-3/A-5 Vigilante, for
>example (and a beautiful plane, IMO). While the Vigilante was a
>technical success - i.e. it worked as intended - the role was clearly
>redundant and quickly deleted.
No...the strategic nuclear strike role was deleted, but the need to field
capable carrier based conventional strike platforms (and indeed tactical
nuclear strike platforms, as evidenced by the long period that the USN deployed
such weapons on the CV's, even after the demise of the heavy strikers like
the A-3 and A-5) remained unabated, and has been used to good effect quite
a few times (Libya, the PG during the 80's, Afghanistan, Falklands...).
>
>> >There is
>> >no clear strategic purpose: consequently, a 'doctrine' of 'flexibility'
>>
>> >emerges.
>>
>> Did you miss the old "From the Sea" bit? Flexibility is inherent to US
>> military
>> doctrine; though we only belatedly recognized it, we have been rather
>> flexible
>> for many decades. Hence the use of F-105's and B-52's as conventional
bomb
>> trucks and reuse of piston engined aircraft like the A-1 (by the USAF;
the
>> Navy was using them all along) and B-26 Invader in Vietnam.
>
>At what point does tactical flexibility turn into strategic redundancy?
When you reach the point that you can ensure that all other nations will
cooperate in *every* future military confrontation by allowing the regional
basing of tactical combat aircraft (we are not there yet, nor will we ever
be), or when you can assure me that the USAF can provide timely, continuous,
and effective strike and CAS support on a worldwide basis irregardless of
those base locations (we are not there yet, either). Until then, they are
not "redundant". (And FWIW, I am one of those (gasp!) guys who thinks that
the USN could indeed operate effectively with fewer CV's than the current
force provides...so the fact that you have me strongly defending them points
to the degree that I find your arguments unsupported).
>It's true that the USN pioneered some useful 'swing-role' tactics:
>equipping fighters with bombs, for example,
I don't believe that was a USN feat; the USAAF, and I believe the RAF, had
long seen a role for fighters in the ground attack arena.
which is a tactic still used
>by the IAF, since it suits their strategic requirement very well.
I am not as enamored of the IAF as you apparently are; and USAF fighters
were playing in both the air-to-air and air-to-ground environments before
the IAF did so, and they continued to do so throughout the period since WWII--
F-4's serving as bomb carriers in SEA, the F-16, etc.
>But is
>it always smart to persist with a good idea past its sell-by date?
Until you can meet the citeria I gave you earlier regarding either ensuring
friendly bases being made available, or the ability of the USAF to conduct
continuous, effective CAS and strike operations from extremely long range,
you have not established the "sell by" date for the CV.
>
>> >* 1982-present: The USN and USMC progressively emulates the RN's
>> >(expedient) technical solution (and this will culminate in JSF, which
is
>>
>> >clearly a conceptual evolution of the Harrier),
>>
>> No. The USMC jumped on the VSTOL bandwagon rather early (pre-1982, that
is
>> for sure). The Navy has not yet otherwise really embraced the "expedient"
>> solution you mention, which is why the F-35C is being developed--the USN
>> remains a CV-based force (rightly or wrongly, depending upon your opinion).
>
>But I think the trend is detectable. The issue of who is copying who is
>secondary. You're right about the USMC: they jumped first and gave
>credibility to the Harrier as an amphibious platform: the RN followed
>them when no carriers at all was the alternative: the Falklands proved
>the concept had a certain utility after all, which in turn reaffirmed
>the USMC's leap of faith. And the USN, like it or not, is going that
>way. From the F-35C to the F-35B is a small step, and it'll only take an
>episode of bad weather during hostilities to encourage a switch. There's
>no conspiracy here: this is just how cultural trends work.
I don't see it; the USN has never bought into the STOVL system, especially
as a stand alone. And I see no evidence yet that they are about to do so
in the future (through the 2020 period, at least).
>
>> But you are ignoring what the Cold War really was; it was not solely based
>> upon what was happening in Europe. CV's provided power projection to any
>> potential hotspot, sometimes those where land bases were not available
or
>> would have been difficult to use; Taiwan was the subject of such deployments
>> on a couple of occasions, along with the Middle East. Take your Gulf War
>> scenario; how many land bases would we have had to use if Saddam had his
>> crap together and had attacked immediately into Saudi Arabia? In such
a
>> scenario,
>> the CV's offer the only real option in terms of continuous operations.
>
>Turkey is a NATO ally bordering Iraq. There is a US base there
>(Incirlik) unlike SA. How much more friendly or convenient can things
>get? And if not Saudi (which would have put up a fight, surely) then
>Qatar, Oman etc.? If you are defending a friend, the friend will usually
>be able to offer you a land base to operate from, unless completely
>over-run.
H'mmm...the "friends" are sure ducking their heads left and right these days...just
whisper "Iraq" and see the reponse regarding land basing (though I will give
you that Turkey is not apparently in that cabal...but can you assure that
will remain the case indefinitely?).
And a land base is *always* more potent than a carrier base:
>bigger, tougher, more flexible.
And suceptable to its own threats...what is the terrain like, and the local
threat? Are you going to have to run a gauntlet of SA-16's every time you
approach or take off? What are you going to do when you get slimed with persitant
chems? How good are your supporting port facilities, and the land LOC's tying
the bases to those ports? (You are likely not going to be able to bring in
the required weapons volumes using air alone, unless it is a VERY small conflict)
>Add tankers and the strike range becomes
>huge, largely vitiating the carrier's mobility advantage.
ONLY if you have the bases available in the area, when you need them, and
in the condition you need (remember, it took some time to get those bases
in the various -stans ready to operate the land based tactical aircraft...and
during that timeframe, the CV's shouldered the brunt of the CAS mission).
>Add air
>redeployment, and you can have very potent forces moving around the
>globe very quickly in response to threats. Add SATINT, GPS (Gallileo
>:-)) JDAMs etc.
Add the fact that base availability in other nations are not assured, and
is subject to host nation restrictions. CV's can be available when and where
you need them, and nobody can dictate what you do with them or their air
assets.
>
>> >The major land actions envisaged involved vastly greater strategic depth
>>
>> >than any naval assets could effectively project into.
>>
>> CV's projected rather well into Afghanistan (though the additional tanking
>> provided by RAF and IIRC RAAF assets was valuable)
>
>The key asset here is the tanker, no?
No. It was definitely nice, but the CV's could have still conducted effective
(albeit less than what you would get with) missions without the use of external
tanking. Add in the fact that you can base tankers withing a MUCH larger
radius (compared to land based tactical air) from the targeted AO (meaning
a better chance that you will find somebody willing to host such "benign"
assets as KC-135's) and still support the CV effectively.
> And the power was most definitely
>projected by B-52s (and Afghanistan is not a tough target).
OK, so you are saying we should always be able to depend upon having B-52's
rotating overhead the battlefield? Not likely, IMO. And the B-52's were not
able to maintain a presence over the entire combat zone, 24-hours a day,
even in this relatively benign environment; that is why the USN was flying
CAS. And where did those B-52's (and B-1's, for that matter) get their ECM
and HARM support from during those initial strikes? From the CV's.
>
>> >The converse was
>> >not true, in that both the USAF and the RAF (and other NATO air forces)
>>
>> >could cover the whole of the Atlantic, North Sea, etc. to interdict
>> >shipping and hunt submarines
>>
>> Uhmmm...I do believe that an awful lot of those land based assets would
have
>> been tied up with supporting the ground conflict in Europe (or trying
to
>> find alternate bases when they got slimed with persistant chemicals...).
>
>Assets are always finite. The issue is how you divide things up. If no
>carrier fleet, then those resources can be used elsewhere.
So placing all of your pennies in one jar is the way to go?
The MR2 is a
>better sub hunter than the ASW Sea King.
Really? When it comes to final prosecution, that dipping sonar and over-target
loiter capability does not give the helo any advantage?
As is the Type 23 frigate, I
>suspect.
Without the accompanying helos, your DDG's and FFG's are back to the days
of WWII pre-escort carrier operations--they have to wait until the sub enters
their detection range. Not a good thing.
>
>> (which is why so many authors talk about going after the Soviet northeastern
>> airfields with CV air assets). If you look at the weapons used by the
CV
>> airwings through a large part of the Cold War era, you will note that
they
>> were most decidedly oriented more towards land strikes
>
>Of course: this is my point. Naval land strike is a cultural inheritance
>and no longer an essential mission.
Really? So you think we can handle all scenarios using our handy long range
land based air assets, without regard to basing requirements in-theater (because
all of those "friendly" nations will by definition just fall all over themselves
to support the US (or UK's) war aims)? "The bomber will always get through"?
(Where have we heard that one before?) I would disagree. You are betting
a lot (i.e., the ability to execute the full range of operations) on some
mighty big "ifs" (IF we can get the local bases, or IF we can use our land
based heavies without regard to enemy defenses, or IF all possible future
engagements occur within range of existing, nonrestrictive bases). I don't
think that a wise stance.
>
>> In view of the lesser surface threat present in today's world, the decreased
>> submarine threat (at least versus what was faced when the USSR was around),
>> and the likelihood that the RN will have to travel some distance and be
asked
>> to influence events on terra firma, that seems to be rather smart. I note
>> that the RN was also the first and only export customer of the Tomahawk,
>> used for similar or supporting roles.
>
>There's no such thing as a decreased submarine threat.
Well, pardon me but I find the idea of having to address the small handfull
of potential threat subs out there today as being a whale of a lot less threatening
than the idea of having to address the full Soviet sub threat at its height.
>Submarines are
>always very dangerous. If you want to make your coastline utterly
>inhospitable to the enemy's navy - buy submarines. One type 209 sub
>nearly wrecked the Falklands campaign for the RN - they couldn't find
>it, and but for luck, it would have done major damage. And that's just
>one cheap SSK.
And the old saw, "If 'ifs and buts' were candy and nuts..." applies here
as well. So, you are saying that the mere presence of subs makes the AO "utterly
inhospitable" to friendly naval action? Nope. It may increase the risk, but
you counter that with a credible ASW capability on your side (we, and the
RN, have managed to maintain both ASW and CV capabilites at the same time;
the two are not mutually exclusive).
>
>What is the quality of influence that the RN is being asked to project
>using carriers? It seems to be the ability to pound soft targets close
>to the shore in concert with the USN.
Or you could use the F-35's stealthy characteristics to sneak in and hit
a hard target in an otherwise difficult IADS environment...
> The RN SSN Tomahawk is a hard
>target weapon, but limited in number and difficult to replenish. GR7s
>with Storm Shadow will also have good strategic stand-off offensive
>capability. But for putting bombs over targets repeatedly, you need more
>than light fighter/bombers to make a difference, which is why the USAF
>B-52s get used at *every* opportunity, it seems. And are there better
>ways of launching cruise missiles or JDAMs at a distant target than via
>a large slow-moving boat?
I believe you are missing the point of the whole idea of maintaining disparate
systems with different capabilities; doing so allows you to be flexible when
the time comes, and engage the enemy with a combined quiver of arrows that
through synergy yields more power than any one system in isolation. The CV
means you have the ability to strike irrespective of basing concerns, or
in support of operations to *seize* those bases for later operations; it
means you have the ability of providing dedicated tactical ECM and SEAD support
to ensure that you can use those B-52's most effectively, or being able to
put up a credible CAP to support the arrival of transports performing a NEO
or an airborne/airmobile assault. Take out any of these capabilities and
you just weaken the overall operational flexibility (again, not a good thing).
>
>> >I'm not deliberately provoking US patriots here: it's not my business
to
>>
>> >care how the tax dollars of US citizens are spent, since the results
>> >don't threaten me. What I do care about is a half-baked attempt to
>> >emulate a less-than-effective strategy (i.e. by procuring CVF with JSF).
>>
>> As opposed to what? Using the RAF's long range bomber force...oops, that
>> went away in the 80's.
>
>Well, we're talking about making a new force from an almost standing
>start in a 10 year time span. Why not invest in SATINT, long range
>heavyweight UCAVs, tankers, SCALPs and JDAMs instead?
Because like it or not, we are not yet at the point where we can depend upon
long range strikes exclusively. And the cost of building a long range land
based strike capability, plus the required C4I support system, would likely
rival if not surpass the cost of those two CV's.
We currently have
>an over-supply of orbital launchers for the satellites. Or we could at
>least look long and hard at how carrier air power is best used. 'The
>marines' have not gone in for a while now - like a paradrop, it's one of
>the toughest ways to fight - but in the unlikely event that they will
>need to in the future, they need three things: a platform to launch the
>assault from, secure air space and (perhaps) supporting air strikes
>(this didn't happen much in the Falklands, probably because the air
>space wasn't secure). I can agree that a carrier is a good way to
>provide some of these things in truly remote places. But is amphibious
>assault still a key mission in itself? The Serbs were driven out of
>Kosovo because NATO began to selectively bomb Belgrade, not because we
>mounted a counter-invasion or blew up their tanks. There's a case for
>arguing that this tactic would have worked on the Argentines also, had
>the capability existed. No electricity for three months in Buenos Aires:
>down with Galtieri. I guarantee it.
I would have no problem with reassessing the *levels* of current USN CV resourcing
and operational use (i.e., where we focus them), nor with the idea of streamlining
the USMC somewhat, or reevaluating some of its missions; but that is a far
cry from claiming that the CV is dead, or that the CV cannot influence operations
on land.
>
>> >If the real task is to take on a tough enemy air force over their own
>> >territory, in 2050, with no friendly land bases in sight, and win, then
>>
>> >is this the tool for the job?
>>
>> The only way that is going to happen is in conjunction with the USN; I
>> believe
>> the threat is most likely going to be of lesser capability in many cases.
>> The only real scenario I can think of where your poited situation would
e
>> viable would be in the event of armed conflict with the PRC...unless you
>> are worried about fighting some of your EUCOM partners?
>
>Times change. Hard to believe with half the British Army still based in
>Germany, I know. But relying on a ally to assist in *power projection*
>is perverse,
Whoah there! You have been saying all along that we should just PLAN on having
those needed bases available whenever and wherever needed...and now you think
that depending on an ally for projection is "perverse""?
because they can leave you high and dry in the blink of an
>eye, and without diplomatic penalty. SEAC = Save England's Asiatic
>Colonies. Why not trust allies for mutual *defence* and procure the
>hardest hitting weapons for power projection, if you're serious about
>it? There's a lot of talk about emerging threats: the CVF/JSF force is
>meant to be good for 40 years of effective capability. Once the carriers
>are built, is it likely that we (in Britain) are going to spend a good
>chunk of that time scratching around for cut-down versions of new
>weapons to equip those platforms, simply because they're there? Or do we
>really believe that the JSF with limited organic AEW will reign supreme
>in 2040-50?
Uhmmm..when the alternative would be no capability to *ensure* (what with
all of those undependable allies and all) having tacair bases available,
then that purchase starts to look a bit more wise.
>
>Or assuming that those in charge know exactly what they're doing, on the
>other hand, seems to mean cynically accepting that all future 'enemies'
>will be soft: softer than the Serbs, at any rate. this casts the RN, at
>least, in the role of a bully. Doesn't it?
You think your F-35B, or F-35C, could not hit a hard target? Maybe better
than that B-52 trying to operate in a hostile environment?
>
>Or maybe carriers are actually totems of national pride. I agree that
>they're impressive. But I'm not sure that anyone is intimidated.
>Dangerous enemies will just buy more SSKs.
And hopefully all potential enemies will follow that approach and limit themselves
to one platform;that would make our job a bit easier. God forbid they have
the ability to conduct attacks from multiple axis and environments...
Brooks
>
>Regards,
>
>--
>Charlie Whitaker
>London, UK
-----------== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Uncensored Usenet News ==----------
Brooks
Oooh, good one!
Brooks
martin.sinclair
"Charlie Whitaker" <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote in message
>
> Will it be possible, for example, to fit JTIDS to the GR7s, put E3s on
> station and use them to stealthily vector some Harriers onto enemy
> aggressors? Is it technically feasible to modify the Harriers for this?
When flying in a VC10 into Belize City, about ten years ago, it was
interesting to see one of the last operational GR3s turn up on our
wingtip somewhat before landing, to escort us in. Kept the fighter
controllers in practice, apparently.
TINS quote from two american tourists, on seeing a GR3 fly past
a beach somewhere in Belize,
"Gee, honey, I didn't know the Marines were here".....
Martin
First of Foot, Right of the Line
Brad Meyer
<elstunto...@tpg.com.au> wrote:
>They bombed the home islands, to what extent I'm not sure. Paramushio naval
>base was common target, although they never really knocked it out.
Located in the Kurils.
Matt Clonfero
Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>Some discussion recently about the withdrawal of Sea Harriers (FA2) in
>favour of RAF and RN operated GR7s. Some concern also about the lack of
>fleet air power which might result.
>
>Perhaps the group could apply its formidable powers of strategic
>thinking to finding a way for the UK's armed forces - as they are
>currently evolving, or with minimal modification, but without FA2s or
>JSFs - to assert air supremacy over any particular stretch of the
>world's coastline.
Easy. Volunteer every member of the Treasury as auxiliary crew on STUFT
for every war, pointing out that (a) transports are high priority
targets; and (b) No fleet air defence makes them much more vulnerable.
Suddenly, the money to keep SHAR in service will appear. You can then
use them for Fleet Air Defence or air superiority as required.
>I'd see this as a somewhat separate exercise from fleet air defence -
>and the whole Type 45 PAAMS issue - which I'm going to assume is and
>will be effective enough for protecting ships. The speculation here is
>how to make things safer for the deployed elements of Joint Force
>Harrier as they deliver ordnance on target, over land.
Air defence is like cold weather survival - you can never have too many
layers.
>Will it be possible, for example, to fit JTIDS to the GR7s, put E3s on
>station and use them to stealthily vector some Harriers onto enemy
>aggressors? Is it technically feasible to modify the Harriers for this?
>Do the E3s have the range (helped by tankers)? Does the UK have enough
>strategic bases worldwide for global deployment along these lines?
In a word, no.
>Are E3s even necessary? Is Sea King ASAC (now also with JTIDS)
>sufficient for directing a littoral attack? MR4s, even?
If Sea King was good enough, we wouldn't buy Sentry. The Sentry flies
higher and spends more time on station.
>And should GR7s be equipped with AMRAAM?
No air-to-air radar make it a bit on the pointless side. They aren't
even getting ASRAAM (which would make them a bit more potent in the air-
to-air role)
Aetherem Vincere
Matt
--
To err is human
To forgive is not
Air Force Policy
Guy Alcala
Of course, the Sabre was developed from the straight wing FJ-1 Fury, with
the F-86E (prototype; the production versions were based on the F-86F)
being turned into the minimum change FJ-2 (20mm guns, folding wings, hook,
lengthened nosewheel leg, catapult attachment points, wider track), and
then developed further to better meet navy requirements as the FJ-3 and
FJ-4. The latter, in particular, was a very different animal from the
Sabre.
Guy
Charlie Whitaker
"Brooks" <broo...@127.0.0.1> wrote:
> No, but an exception that tends to disprove the idea that they "lose" by
> definition when they try to engage land forces. The Taliban/AQ folks who
> were on the receiving end of the CAS provided by the CV's (before the land
> based tactical fighters could get into the fight in a big way) would likely
> also disagree (though unwillingly) to that statement, as would our NA allies
> and their SF advisors.
I've never argued that carriers can't provide CAS, if in range. My
problem is with this being a limited mission of limited relevance to the
UK's interests.
And there was no particular requirement to move that quickly in
Afghanistan, Kosovo, and other recent engagements. The attacker (us) can
usually take his time (a few weeks at least) Of course, this speedy
supply of CAS was nice, but available only because the USN had a carrier
(or two) in the region. The RN, on the other hand, will only have two
CVFs. It's almost certain that they won't be conveniently placed for
every eventuality.
> No, the littoral assaults were not conducted merely to provide bombing bases,
> as a rule. The initial plan was to base the bomber force out of China; XX
> Bomber Command experience quickly demonstrated thsi was a no-go. Kenneth
> Werrell ("Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers Over japan During World War II",
> Smithsonian Press, 1996) indicates that the identification of the Marianas
> as a basing option was made in Sep 43, when the Air Staff urged that the
> scheduled assaults of those islands (originally planned for 46) be brought
> forward to allow the basing of B-29's. This makes it patently clear that
> the bombers and their bases were NOT the deciding factor forcing the strategy
> of island hopping.
I don't understand what you're saying here. You seem to be saying that
taking islands *was* critical for bomber basing. The Pacific island
assaults of WWII were very expensive in terms of marine casualties, yet
an isolated enemy garrison with no means of resupply is effectively
prisoner: the islands could have been ignored, if there wasn't an
over-riding need to acquire secure land bases closer to the enemy.
Of course, I've never said that carriers weren't useful in WWII - that
conflict was the carrier's moment in history.
> One could easily argue that the Japanese Navy was placing its strongest
> emphasis
> upon the destruction of the USN as a viable offensive force until at least
> the Midway battle.
In essence, this is why they lost. They built a navy with the intention
of sinking another navy. It's seems likely that the Japanese could have
achieved many of their objectives in WWII (China, Singapore etc.)
without drawing the US into a fight. I'd suggest that their particular
selection and deployment of naval assets (driven by their national
cultural character) led them inexorably to a Godzilla v. King Ghidorah
show-down. A smart aggressor doesn't play to the enemy's strengths.
> That is immaterial to the argument; we are not in the business of wanting
> to kill CV's, nor is the RN. The flip side to your question is--if you want
> to project power from the sea into littoral areas, would your sole selected
> resource be DDG's?
The profligacy of attempting to deny the enemy's CVs by using CVs of
your own isn't immaterial to the argument that navies don't exist to
take on other navies: it supports that conclusion. If you want to deny
CVs, use submarines.
But if you want to support a coastal land battle, yes - CVs are the
answer. This is my point. The question I'm asking is: is the need to
support coastal land battles enough of a reason for the UK to build new
CVs?
> So are you now going to say that the CV might be a valuable power projection
> platform only if the targeted nation has "plenty of coast"? So the impact
> of naval based CAS in Afghanistan was...? The movement of the 24th MEU into
> the AO from its platforms in the IO to Camp Rhino was...?
The impact of naval CAS in Afghanistan was limited. And even so, it was
enhanced by tankers flying out of land bases. Obviously, coastal
proximity is very relevant to carrier power projection: this is ususally
used as an argument in favour of carriers - most of the world's
population lives by the sea.
> No...the strategic nuclear strike role was deleted, but the need to field
> capable carrier based conventional strike platforms (and indeed tactical
> nuclear strike platforms, as evidenced by the long period that the USN
> deployed
> such weapons on the CV's, even after the demise of the heavy strikers like
> the A-3 and A-5) remained unabated, and has been used to good effect quite
> a few times (Libya, the PG during the 80's, Afghanistan, Falklands...).
I don't deny that a tactical strike role is retained by the USN (used in
the Falklands?). But those are soft targets you're describing, with the
exception of Desert Storm, perhaps, in which the air offensive was
overwhelmingly land-based and commenced after a long and careful
build-up.
> When you reach the point that you can ensure that all other nations will
> cooperate in *every* future military confrontation by allowing the regional
> basing of tactical combat aircraft (we are not there yet, nor will we ever
> be), or when you can assure me that the USAF can provide timely, continuous,
> and effective strike and CAS support on a worldwide basis irregardless of
> those base locations (we are not there yet, either). Until then, they are
> not "redundant". (And FWIW, I am one of those (gasp!) guys who thinks that
> the USN could indeed operate effectively with fewer CV's than the current
> force provides...so the fact that you have me strongly defending them points
> to the degree that I find your arguments unsupported).
Kosovo shows the very limited utility of tactical strike in forcing a
potent defender to budge - especially if you are unwilling to commit
ground forces. And are you really saying that the USAF cannot provide
timely, continuous and effective strategic strike using conventional
weapons?
> Until you can meet the citeria I gave you earlier regarding either ensuring
> friendly bases being made available, or the ability of the USAF to conduct
> continuous, effective CAS and strike operations from extremely long range,
> you have not established the "sell by" date for the CV.
The bases are available, and the USAF can do strategic strike. I'm not
arguing that CVs don't give the US additional resources to 'finesse' her
operations, but they are an expensive way of meeting a limited mission.
My issue is with how smart it is for Britain to invest in CVs -
specifically to rely *mainly* on two CVs - for 'broad brush' global
power projection, which is the stated goal. The RAF doesn't have
anything like the global reach of the USAF and talk of enhancing it is
little heard of late.
Let me put it this way: if you had to direct US operations in Iraq,
Kosovo, Afghanistan, etc. without either the US Navy or the USAF, which
would you choose? That's the character of Britain's choice. And that's
before we get to the issue of 'difficult' potential enemies.
> I don't see it; the USN has never bought into the STOVL system, especially
> as a stand alone. And I see no evidence yet that they are about to do so
> in the future (through the 2020 period, at least).
JSF V/STOL CTOL commonality is compelling evidence of convergence. I
agree it may not happen before 2020.
> H'mmm...the "friends" are sure ducking their heads left and right these
> days...just
> whisper "Iraq" and see the reponse regarding land basing (though I will give
> you that Turkey is not apparently in that cabal...but can you assure that
> will remain the case indefinitely?).
No.
> And a land base is *always* more potent than a carrier base:
> >bigger, tougher, more flexible.
>
> Add the fact that base availability in other nations are not assured, and
> is subject to host nation restrictions. CV's can be available when and where
> you need them, and nobody can dictate what you do with them or their air
> assets.
CVs have limited availability problems all of their own. They aren't
always where you want them, and they take time to move. They have
limited capacity of materiel and they are not always easy to resupply.
And they can be sunk. Wherever you sail it, and especially if you sail
it close to land, the position of a CV (floating on the ocean) is
intrinsically vulnerable.
> OK, so you are saying we should always be able to depend upon having B-52's
> rotating overhead the battlefield? Not likely, IMO. And the B-52's were not
> able to maintain a presence over the entire combat zone, 24-hours a day,
> even in this relatively benign environment; that is why the USN was flying
> CAS. And where did those B-52's (and B-1's, for that matter) get their ECM
> and HARM support from during those initial strikes? From the CV's.
If CVs are available, you will find a way to use them. That is not in
doubt. The issue is bang-for-buck.
> Without the accompanying helos, your DDG's and FFG's are back to the days
> of WWII pre-escort carrier operations--they have to wait until the sub enters
> their detection range. Not a good thing.
But many destroyers/frigates can (and do) have helicopters attached.
Isn't this why the USN no longer has carriers which 'specialise' in sub
hunting? My point about MR2/MR4 and Sea King ASW was that coverage by
the Nimrod is massively greater - and there is a lot of ocean. The
'equivalent' carrier-based capability is much more limited, as is often
the case with carriers. To get synergy between the two platforms - if
you have them - is good, obviously. But maybe the UK could actually
enhance this capability beyond what a carrier can offer by basing Merlin
ASW on all new 'escort' assets projected for the near future. Which is
better - 20 sub-hunting helos on 20 frigates or 20 sub-hunting helos on
1 carrier?
> to support the US (or UK's) war aims)? "The bomber will always get through"?
> (Where have we heard that one before?) I would disagree. You are betting
> a lot (i.e., the ability to execute the full range of operations) on some
> mighty big "ifs" (IF we can get the local bases, or IF we can use our land
> based heavies without regard to enemy defenses, or IF all possible future
> engagements occur within range of existing, nonrestrictive bases). I don't
> think that a wise stance.
CALCMs, JSOWs, JDAMs have transformed the situation. The required bases
can be a long way from the target. The threat to the initial strike
force is greatly reduced. For follow-up attacks, if Vulcans can deploy
with Shrike, then I don't see why a successor platform couldn't carry
ALARM (the most effective anti-radiation missile used in Kosovo) or
something better for SEAD.
Again, from the UK perspective, we are in a good position with the
number, type and locations of land bases available to us. As ranges
continue to improve, the pressure on basing lessens further.
> Well, pardon me but I find the idea of having to address the small handfull
> of potential threat subs out there today as being a whale of a lot less
> threatening
> than the idea of having to address the full Soviet sub threat at its height.
> And the old saw, "If 'ifs and buts' were candy and nuts..." applies here
> as well. So, you are saying that the mere presence of subs makes the AO
> "utterly
> inhospitable" to friendly naval action? Nope. It may increase the risk, but
> you counter that with a credible ASW capability on your side (we, and the
> RN, have managed to maintain both ASW and CV capabilites at the same time;
> the two are not mutually exclusive).
They are not: ASW capability is essential for any surface fleet. If you
have carriers, the risk of a major loss is high. The activities of the
Argentine Type 209 (San Luis) in the Falklands are under-reported, in my
opinion. If she had managed to bag a CVS, we wouldn't feel nearly so
optimistic about carriers today, I guarantee it. And what if the AA had
put 10 properly prepared 209s in the theatre? I believe they would have
delivered much better value than the Super Etendards, the 25 de Mayo,
etc. We were lucky that the Argentine military planners were susceptible
to vanity and believed that they needed a carrier to demonstrate
strength: consequently their force was dissipated and relatively weak in
all areas.
> Or you could use the F-35's stealthy characteristics to sneak in and hit
> a hard target in an otherwise difficult IADS environment...
In 2040, the F-35 will not be considered stealthy by virtue of RCS
alone. Considering the loss of an F-117 in Kosovo, it could be argued
that this type of stealth is already of limited value. For tactical
strike, this may not be such an issue if the enemy's SAM defences and
air force have already been neutralised (as they surely will be in any
sane and methodical attack). But for this air supremacy pre-requisite,
the F-35 with no passive detection systems and supported only by
low-altitude low-capacity helicopter AEW is not going to be a credible
attacker against the best opposition out there in the medium to long
term.
> I believe you are missing the point of the whole idea of maintaining
> disparate
> systems with different capabilities; doing so allows you to be flexible when
> the time comes, and engage the enemy with a combined quiver of arrows that
> through synergy yields more power than any one system in isolation.
My point is that a balanced small force (UK) is not the same as a
balanced big force (US). Balanced capability doesn't necessarily scale:
we might find we end up with a disproportionately impotent force. I'd
ask that the UK requirement be assessed honestly: are we really in the
business of delivering modest (balanced) punches to weak enemies? Would
a CVF in the Adriatic really have been the best instrument for deterring
the Serbian genocide? Considering that it would probably have had to
relocate from the Persian Gulf first, wouldn't a potent air force,
operating from domestic bases, have been more able to deliver a timely
punch?
> >Well, we're talking about making a new force from an almost standing
> >start in a 10 year time span. Why not invest in SATINT, long range
> >heavyweight UCAVs, tankers, SCALPs and JDAMs instead?
>
> Because like it or not, we are not yet at the point where we can depend upon
> long range strikes exclusively. And the cost of building a long range land
> based strike capability, plus the required C4I support system, would likely
> rival if not surpass the cost of those two CV's.
But we seem to be approaching that point. Kosovo was surely a watershed.
The toughest enemies will also be the most highly developed, and
therefore very vulnerable to infrastructure attack. A force of the type
I have outlined may cost at least as much as the two CVs plus air wings,
if not more. But I'd speculate that it would also be much more potent,
and hence better value.
I would note that a European GPS program is in hand. This makes the use
of JDAMs (which are very cheap) possible with two 'competing' suppliers
of guidance (is it likely that the UK would fall out with both the US
and the EU simultaneously?). A new delivery vehicle for multiple
CALCMs/JDAMs is unlikely to be expensive if specified with moderation
(i.e. no crew, no RCS, no rough/short field landing ability). Tankers
(drogue & probe type) are minimally modified commercial aircraft which
do double duty as military passenger or civilian cargo transport. I
don't know how you do UCAV in-flight refuelling but I'm sure it's
solvable. A stock of JDAMs and CALCMs does cost, but would also be
required by the carrier force, and can be built up or drawn down as
threats emerge and recede. C4I is the expensive part, but surveillance
satellites aside, the UK is not hopelessly out of its depth here either.
And satellites are becoming much cheaper.
> Whoah there! You have been saying all along that we should just PLAN on
> having
> those needed bases available whenever and wherever needed...and now you think
> that depending on an ally for projection is "perverse""?
Yes. There's no contradiction if you own the bases and have a long
reach. The main problem is one of airspace denial requiring you to fly
further than you thought. But Diego Garcia is almost ideally placed for
Asian and African operations. Ascension is also valuable.
My point was that asking an ally to *join offensive operations* is a lot
to ask if your national survival is not directly threatened. The US may
have an interest in the survival of the UK - but I'm not so sure that
they care so much about our prosperity and future growth. They probably
don't care if we lose a dependent territory or two (we were lucky that
the Thatcher/Reagan relationship was as good as it was) or end up on the
raw end of a nasty trade dispute/naval blockade. If hostilities have a
moral basis - as in Kosovo - then who knows how things will go.
Political hues in the US change constantly: the mission of NATO has
become very poorly defined (for example, Article 5 was invoked by the US
after 9-11, yet the recent actions in Afghanistan were directed outside
of NATO command).
I completely support a holistic foreign policy that leverages good
relationships with allies to enhance mutual national interests but I
think it should be recognised that this does contradict the notion of an
independent power projection force. Particularly if that force depends
on the ally *operationally* - i.e. to plug a key capability gap.
> >Or maybe carriers are actually totems of national pride. I agree that
> >they're impressive. But I'm not sure that anyone is intimidated.
> >Dangerous enemies will just buy more SSKs.
>
> And hopefully all potential enemies will follow that approach and limit
> themselves
> to one platform;that would make our job a bit easier. God forbid they have
> the ability to conduct attacks from multiple axis and environments...
Or perhaps God forbid that they develop sufficient strength in one axis
to hurt you while retaining a sufficiently barbed defensive posture to
dissuade all-out counter attack. What are you going to do - go nuclear?
And as I said, the UK is not developing *offensive* strength in depth.
We are choosing to go the naval aviation route to enhanced power
projection. Is this so smart?
Charlie Whitaker
Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> Charlie Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>
> :The real problem was that, compared to - say - Polaris, it had very
> :limited capability even when working perfectly.
>
> The same might be said for the comparison between any manned AF
> strategic bomber and the ICBM force. The idea, as always, is to make
> life as difficult for the other guy as possible. That means being
> able to hit him as many different ways as possible.
For the US, perhaps. Although I note that the nuclear bomber role has
all but gone now. The RN has only one nuclear strike force - a credible
one. Different ways to me means a choice of weapon type, not a choice of
ways to deliver one weapon type. Either your delivery method works, or
it doesn't. If it's specified, designed, procured and operated correctly
- it'll work.
> And redundancy is a GOOD thing.
Not when it dissipates effectiveness - then it's a bad thing.
> For this capability to be useful, you need target 'clusters'. The
> number of those existing outside the 1st world are small.
They existed in Serbia. As the world develops, these vulnerabilities
will increase. This is a good thing, because it's better by far to
dissuade an opponent by reducing his or her standard of living than by
unleashing an indiscriminate firestorm.
I find the idea of building a force specifically to hammer poorly
defended third world countries distasteful. They have no assets, so you
have to kill the people. This approach says: we are going to confine our
influence to the easily influenced. It puts us outside of the mainstream
of global development (i.e. Asia, from the Black Sea to the
Phillipines), has the potential to store up big trouble and sets a bad
example for other would-be imperial powers. It's happened before - I got
the impression that the US disapproved of it last time around.
History has happened. I don't seek to unravel it - Britain currently has
a disproportionate status in the world - but neither should the best of
Western enlightenment culture be lost because we're unwilling to stand
by the relatively strong position we've achieved and attempt to
influence things for the better. This might mean - I hope it won't -
squaring up to the toughest opponents at some future date.
I don't dispute that humanitarian military missions also exist - Sierra
Leone, for example. However, a third world conflict shouldn't call for a
first world naval air force: if it does, you were stupid to sell (or
allow the sale of) the equipment which has made the scenario critically
dangerous for your peacekeeping force.
> Sorry, but generally true. While USAF strategic platforms dropped
> some 75% of the ordnance by weight (while flying only 15% of the
> sorties), the turn-around time when flying from Diego Garcia was
> excessive and very limiting. Virtually all tactical air was Navy
> tactical air, supported by USAF tankers to let them loiter over the
> potential target zones. The vast majority of combat sorties were by
> Navy aircraft.
But it was the carpet bombing that actually shifted them (the Taliban).
Ugly, but true.
> I'd say it isn't, given the relative handfuls that the Air Force is
> going to get.
Then hypocrisy is involved, surely?
Braybrook
| Braybrook wrote:
|
| > "Brad Meyer" <brad...@attbi.com> wrote:
| > | On Fri, 30 Aug 2002 19:09:37 +0100, Charlie Whitaker
| > | <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
| > |
| > | > Or
| > | >will JSF be that good ...
| > |
| > | IMO, JSF has about the same chance of being operationally deployed
| > | aboard CV's as the F-111 did. Whether one looks at the JSF as an "all
| > | in one" effort or a "navalizing a lnd based design" effort, if they
| > | succeed it will be the first time in many attempts.
| >
| > North American F-86 Sabre to FJ-4 Fury
|
| Of course, the Sabre was developed from the straight wing FJ-1 Fury,
No, the Navy's XFJ-1 was being developed concurrently with the Army's XP-86
(the Navy contract was awarded less than 6 months before the Army contract).
| with
| the F-86E (prototype; the production versions were based on the F-86F)
| being turned into the minimum change FJ-2 (20mm guns, folding wings, hook,
| lengthened nosewheel leg, catapult attachment points, wider track), and
| then developed further to better meet navy requirements as the FJ-3 and
| FJ-4. The latter, in particular, was a very different animal from the
| Sabre.
The issue was "navalizing a land based design", which is what occurred with
the FJ-2/3/4.
Fred J. McCall
:In article <charlie-38D8F7...@iris.uk.clara.net>, Charlie
:Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
:
:>And should GR7s be equipped with AMRAAM?
:
:No air-to-air radar make it a bit on the pointless side. They aren't
:even getting ASRAAM (which would make them a bit more potent in the air-
:to-air role)
Wait a minute. I thought the GR.7 was the same aircraft as the
Harrier II. Am I confused about that? OURS have a radar; the same
one that's in the F/A-18 Hornet, in fact. And they are cleared for
AMRAAM carriage.
Tom Schoene
"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:0484nugjpn84r562c...@4ax.com...
> Matt Clonfero <Matt@[127.0.0.1]> wrote:
>
> :In article <charlie-38D8F7...@iris.uk.clara.net>, Charlie
> :Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
> :
> :>And should GR7s be equipped with AMRAAM?
> :
> :No air-to-air radar make it a bit on the pointless side. They aren't
> :even getting ASRAAM (which would make them a bit more potent in the air-
> :to-air role)
>
> Wait a minute. I thought the GR.7 was the same aircraft as the
> Harrier II. Am I confused about that? OURS have a radar; the same
> one that's in the F/A-18 Hornet, in fact. And they are cleared for
> AMRAAM carriage.
A bit confused, yes. The GR.7s are very similar to the USMC AV-8B Harrier
II, but not identical. However, neither of these aircraft have radar or
AMRAAM. The APG-73 radar was added in the Harrier II-Plus modification,
which the RAF did not adopt. It's limited to the USMC and the Spanish and
Italian navies.
Also, the USMC's Harrier II-Pluses have not been equipped with AMRAAM. The
Italians and Spaniards are actually leading the AMRAAM integration effort.
Marine Harriers won't be AMRAAM capable until at least 2003, and they may
still not be issued AMRAAM (a budgetary issue, I expect).
http://www.weaponeeronline.com/archives/2001/2001_03_12/news/N21AMlahi18799.
html
--
Tom Schoene (replace "invalid" with "net" to email)
"It is not knowledge, but the act of learning, not possession but
the act of getting there, which grants the greatest enjoyment."
Karl Friedrich Gauss
Keith Willshaw
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> :The Harrier wasnt designed as a naval aircraft, at the time
> :the RN was flying F-4's and Buccaneers and wanted
> :nothing to do with it. The USMC arrived on the scene
> :long after its first flight
>
> Not all that long, though. The Marines were interested in it before
> it was ready and showed up unannounced at Farnborough in 1968 during
> the finished aircraft's first public outing for test flights. In
> point of fact, they'd been interested for some time prior to that, as
> evidenced by testing with the Kestrel (which was adjudged interesting
> but too small and underpowered).
>
> There were many improvements driven by USMC requirements, resulting in
> the AV-8A. Oddly, the RAF demanded that wiring for Sidewinders be
> REMOVED from their AV-8A aircraft!
The RAF designation for the first aircraft they received
was GR1 and it was fitted for the AIM-9L
> And of course, the AV-8B is pretty
> much an American aircraft, since HM Government withdrew in 1975. USN
> also terminated its participation (which is a shame - the AV-16 would
> have been a truly neat aircraft), which left USMC driving the
> requirements.
>
BA will be surprised to hear that HM Government
withdrew from the Harrier program in 1975 having
been involved in building Sea Harriers and GR3,
GR5 and GR7 and delivering them to the RAF since
that date.
> The Marine requirement was really for more payload (the original
> requirement they bought the Harrier for was first slated to be filled
> by an attack helicopter), which led to the AV-8B. BAe finally came
> back on board in 1981, after having the British government decline to
> get involved in their 'big wing' Harrier program, which actually kept
> open an upgrade path for existing aircraft in RAF service and produced
> something closer to the original RAF requirements for a Harrier
> follow-on. But all the hesitation and wrangling led to BAe being a
> subcontractor for all but the relative handfuls of aircraft to be
> procured by HM government.
>
Actually HMG quite correctly IMHO made the point that
2 separate developments of the same airframe with the
same service requirement was simply a waste of money.
Instead there was a joint production deal for AV8B/GR5
and AV8C/GR7 between BaE and Mcdonnel Douglas/Boeing.
Keith
Charlie Whitaker
Matt Clonfero <Matt@[127.0.0.1]> wrote:
> >Perhaps the group could apply its formidable powers of strategic
> >thinking to finding a way for the UK's armed forces - as they are
> >currently evolving, or with minimal modification, but without FA2s or
> >JSFs - to assert air supremacy over any particular stretch of the
> >world's coastline.
>
> Easy. Volunteer every member of the Treasury as auxiliary crew on STUFT
> for every war, pointing out that (a) transports are high priority
> targets; and (b) No fleet air defence makes them much more vulnerable.
>
> Suddenly, the money to keep SHAR in service will appear. You can then
> use them for Fleet Air Defence or air superiority as required.
Glad to see the group's powers of lateral thinking undiminished.
> >I'd see this as a somewhat separate exercise from fleet air defence -
> >and the whole Type 45 PAAMS issue - which I'm going to assume is and
> >will be effective enough for protecting ships. The speculation here is
> >how to make things safer for the deployed elements of Joint Force
> >Harrier as they deliver ordnance on target, over land.
>
> Air defence is like cold weather survival - you can never have too many
> layers.
True, but I was still asking the question assuming the worst case for an
attack scenario - no top cover for JFH - where the enemy does have a
defending air force but doesn't have a specialist anti-shipping strike
force and taking it for granted that the fleet can take care of itself
with PAAMS (which is very capable on paper). I wouldn't disagree that
carriers without air defence fighters are more vulnerable in principle.
> >Will it be possible, for example, to fit JTIDS to the GR7s, put E3s on
> >station and use them to stealthily vector some Harriers onto enemy
> >aggressors? Is it technically feasible to modify the Harriers for this?
> >Do the E3s have the range (helped by tankers)? Does the UK have enough
> >strategic bases worldwide for global deployment along these lines?
>
> In a word, no.
No to GR7 JTIDS vectoring, or no to E3 global deployment?
> >Are E3s even necessary? Is Sea King ASAC (now also with JTIDS)
> >sufficient for directing a littoral attack? MR4s, even?
>
> If Sea King was good enough, we wouldn't buy Sentry. The Sentry flies
> higher and spends more time on station.
That seems to be unarguable. But does this mean you think the E3 should
be deployed to assist naval air ops?
> >And should GR7s be equipped with AMRAAM?
>
> No air-to-air radar make it a bit on the pointless side. They aren't
> even getting ASRAAM (which would make them a bit more potent in the air-
> to-air role)
True about AMRAAM. I thought they were getting ASRAAM.
Tom Schoene
news:aktb5h$p23$1$830f...@news.demon.co.uk...
> > There were many improvements driven by USMC requirements, resulting in
> > the AV-8A. Oddly, the RAF demanded that wiring for Sidewinders be
> > REMOVED from their AV-8A aircraft!
>
> The RAF designation for the first aircraft they received
> was GR1 and it was fitted for the AIM-9L
Are you sure about that? I distinctly remember that the GR.3s that went
down south for the Falklands needed a very quick rewiring and clearance
program to accept AIM-9. Was this capability lost between GR.1 and GR.3?
Ogden Johnson III
>TINS quote from two american tourists, on seeing a GR3 fly past
>a beach somewhere in Belize,
>"Gee, honey, I didn't know the Marines were here".....
I am surprised as [expletive] that a random pair of American tourists
would be able to identify, with this specificity, a warplane in the
first place, much less know which US service flies it. Expecting them
to know, or even notice, markings is *way* beyond reasonable.
OJ III
Fred J. McCall
:
:"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
:news:14k1nu87tumdd9qkr...@4ax.com...
:>
:> Not all that long, though. The Marines were interested in it before
:> it was ready and showed up unannounced at Farnborough in 1968 during
:> the finished aircraft's first public outing for test flights. In
:> point of fact, they'd been interested for some time prior to that, as
:> evidenced by testing with the Kestrel (which was adjudged interesting
:> but too small and underpowered).
:>
:> There were many improvements driven by USMC requirements, resulting in
:> the AV-8A. Oddly, the RAF demanded that wiring for Sidewinders be
:> REMOVED from their AV-8A aircraft!
:
:The RAF designation for the first aircraft they received
:was GR1 and it was fitted for the AIM-9L
Given a choice between believing you and believing the book, I'm going
to believe the book. Britain specifically requested that the wiring
for AIM-9 be REMOVED from AV-8As delivered to them. They were added
back as a crash program in April of 1982 for the Falklands.
:> And of course, the AV-8B is pretty
:> much an American aircraft, since HM Government withdrew in 1975. USN
:> also terminated its participation (which is a shame - the AV-16 would
:> have been a truly neat aircraft), which left USMC driving the
:> requirements.
:
:BA will be surprised to hear that HM Government
:withdrew from the Harrier program in 1975 having
:been involved in building Sea Harriers and GR3,
:GR5 and GR7 and delivering them to the RAF since
:that date.
Try reading what I wrote again. Withdrew FROM THE FOLLOW ON
DEVELOPMENT, which resulted in the AV-8B. The statement from HM
Government was that there was "There is not enough common ground on
the Advanced Harrier for us to join in the programme with the US."
That was on 19 March, 1975. The issue was that UK requirements called
for the follow-on aircraft to be an upgrade path from existing
aircraft (the US design called for new engines, with the major
fuselage alterations that would require (although the larger engine
was eventually dropped and an internally modified Rolls-Royce engine
was used, instead) , and a new wing - essentially an entirely
different airframe), no slower than existing GR.3 aircraft (the US
design was slower), and a sustained turn rate of at least 20
degrees/second (the US design maxes out under 14 degrees/second). The
real reason, of course, is that the government at the time was looking
for reasons to kill it for budgetary reasons, having committed to the
Sea Harrier, instead.
BAe shouldn't be too surprised. Just ask them who the prime is on
every Harrier built for delivery anywhere except the UK. There'a a
reason that happened. BAe didn't come back on board, recommending the
AV-8B configuration until after HM Government chopped their legs out
from under them on their 'Big-Wing' Harrier upgrade proposal in 1980,
when the Minister of Defense announced, "the Big Wing is unlikely to
be any part of an improvement programme for the GR.3". That's rather
a shame, since the Big Wing looked like a good design.
So in 1981, BAe basically backed the US program, seeing that being
part of a large program was better than being all of a non-existent
one.
:> The Marine requirement was really for more payload (the original
:> requirement they bought the Harrier for was first slated to be filled
:> by an attack helicopter), which led to the AV-8B. BAe finally came
:> back on board in 1981, after having the British government decline to
:> get involved in their 'big wing' Harrier program, which actually kept
:> open an upgrade path for existing aircraft in RAF service and produced
:> something closer to the original RAF requirements for a Harrier
:> follow-on. But all the hesitation and wrangling led to BAe being a
:> subcontractor for all but the relative handfuls of aircraft to be
:> procured by HM government.
:
:Actually HMG quite correctly IMHO made the point that
:2 separate developments of the same airframe with the
:same service requirement was simply a waste of money.
:Instead there was a joint production deal for AV8B/GR5
:and AV8C/GR7 between BaE and Mcdonnel Douglas/Boeing.
Odd how things look different from over there, isn't it? First HMG
government said the requirements were too different and thus REQUIRED
2 separate developments (1975), and then reversed themselves after
they withdrew from the joint program to essentially buy what was now
an American aircraft.
BAe is only prime for aircraft delivered to the UK and a small piece
of international sales (25%). Boeing owns the program. Actual work
split on the aircraft is 60/40 Boeing for airframe and 80/20 Boeing
for everything else except engines. Engine work is 100% Rolls-Royce
for non-US aircraft and 75/25 Rolls-Royce for US aircraft (with Pratt
& Whitney doing the other 25%).
Actually, HMG had a good programme and essentially pissed a large part
of it away to us Yanks.
Keith Willshaw
"Tom Schoene" <tasc...@starpower.invalid> wrote in message
news:aktbc6$9qd$1...@bob.news.rcn.net...
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
> news:aktb5h$p23$1$830f...@news.demon.co.uk...
> >
> > "Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
> > news:14k1nu87tumdd9qkr...@4ax.com...
>
> > > There were many improvements driven by USMC requirements, resulting in
> > > the AV-8A. Oddly, the RAF demanded that wiring for Sidewinders be
> > > REMOVED from their AV-8A aircraft!
> >
> > The RAF designation for the first aircraft they received
> > was GR1 and it was fitted for the AIM-9L
>
> Are you sure about that? I distinctly remember that the GR.3s that went
> down south for the Falklands needed a very quick rewiring and clearance
> program to accept AIM-9. Was this capability lost between GR.1 and GR.3?
I've certainly seen photos of a GR1 what looks like
to be sidewinder, I know most of them were refitted
to GR3 standard and assumed they lost the fit at
that time but its possible that the aircraft I saw
was part of the sales pitch to the USMC.
Keith
Keith Willshaw
Which is not what you wrote nor is it accurate.
What HMG backed out from in 1975 wasnt the AV-8B
program but a proposed AV-16A" or "AV-8X", based on
a bigger and more powerful Pegasus 15 engine, with
plenum-chamber burning. The informal "AV-16A" designation
reflected the goal of an aircraft with twice the range and twice
the warload of the existing AV-8A. There was also some
interest in supersonic performance. The government withdrew
because of the projected cost of the Pegasus 15 development.
The USMC pursued a more modest proposal involving a larger
composite wing when it was clear that the Pegasus 15 wouldnt
be available.
At the same time BAE proposed a development that involved a new
and bigger wing made which would have have been retrofitted to
existing Harrier GR.3s and Sea Harriers. However, in 1980 the RAF
evaluated the AV-8B design to see if it would meet their requirements
instead.
The RAF's biggest criticism of the AV-8B was that it could not turn
quickly enough to defend itself in air combat. In response, McDonnell
Douglas added "leading-edge (wing) root extensions (LERX)", short wing
extensions along the air intakes that created vortexes over the wing surface
to enhance maneuverability. LERX was fitted to the second development
aircraft. The idea was borrowed from the Big Wing Harrier design.
At this point (1981) the British joined the AV8-B development with an offer
to
contribute $80 million USD for general development and $200 million
USD for development of features related to their own needs, and agreed
to buy at least 60 of the new aircraft. Construction of airframe elements
was divided between MDD and BAE, with no overlapping sourcing of
components.
> The statement from HM
> Government was that there was "There is not enough common ground on
> the Advanced Harrier for us to join in the programme with the US."
> That was on 19 March, 1975. The issue was that UK requirements called
> for the follow-on aircraft to be an upgrade path from existing
> aircraft (the US design called for new engines, with the major
> fuselage alterations that would require (although the larger engine
> was eventually dropped and an internally modified Rolls-Royce engine
> was used, instead) , and a new wing - essentially an entirely
> different airframe), no slower than existing GR.3 aircraft (the US
> design was slower), and a sustained turn rate of at least 20
> degrees/second (the US design maxes out under 14 degrees/second). The
> real reason, of course, is that the government at the time was looking
> for reasons to kill it for budgetary reasons, having committed to the
> Sea Harrier, instead.
>
> BAe shouldn't be too surprised. Just ask them who the prime is on
> every Harrier built for delivery anywhere except the UK.
Which of course isnt correct either. Those Sea Harriers the
Indians bought came from BAE as I recall
> There'a a
> reason that happened. BAe didn't come back on board, recommending the
> AV-8B configuration until after HM Government chopped their legs out
> from under them on their 'Big-Wing' Harrier upgrade proposal in 1980,
> when the Minister of Defense announced, "the Big Wing is unlikely to
> be any part of an improvement programme for the GR.3". That's rather
> a shame, since the Big Wing looked like a good design.
>
> So in 1981, BAe basically backed the US program, seeing that being
> part of a large program was better than being all of a non-existent
> one.
>
Which rather contradicts your earlier statement that they didnt back it.
Which means rather a lot of the content of all the Harriers
come to Britain
> Actually, HMG had a good programme and essentially pissed a large part
> of it away to us Yanks.
>
Erm no in fact HMG withdrew from an expensive development
program that would paralleled an existing US effort and
joined the US development instead. I'll leave the last word to
Boeing.
<Quote>
The Boeing Company, British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce teamed to produce the
AV-8B, as an upgrade to the AV-8A. The first production AV-8B aircraft was
delivered in November 1983. Deliveries of night-attack Harrier IIs began in
September 1989. The U.S. Marine Corps received its first Harrier II Plus
aircraft in July 1993, and its first remanufactured Harrier II Plus in
January 1996.
</Quote>
Keith
Alan Minyard
>
>Alan Minyard <aminya...@netdoor.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>Goshawk would seem to place your claim that using a land based design on
>>>a CV is never successful in the "incorrect" category; the YF-17/F-18 development
>>>is an admittedly less-complete case of "icing on the cake". I guess the
>moral
>>>of the story would be that stating an absolute is risky...
>>>
>>>Brooks
>>
>>Not at all. The Goshawk is a politically driven disaster. It ended up
>>costing a fortune, and is basically a totally different a/c that sort
>>of looks like a Hawk. A clean sheet design would have been cheaper
>>and far better.
>>
>>Al Minyard
>
>By that line of thinking, the F-16C Block 60 is not an F-16, as it differs
>quite a great deal from the F-16A? And the C-130J is no longer a C-130? Fact
>is that the Hawk was developed for land based use; the Navy selected the
>T-45 as a navalized version and old McD-D undertook the necessary work, and
>the T-45 is being used successfully by the USN to train CV pilots, to include
>operating them from the training rotation CV's.
>
>Brooks
>
The Navy had the Hawk rammed down its throat by the politicians. The
program manager for the beast had one of the worst jobs that I have
seen! The T-45 is marginal, at best. It is being used because it is
the only game in town.
Al Minyard
Alan Minyard
>
>Alan Minyard <aminya...@netdoor.com> wrote:
>>
>>>Hawk to Goshawk, for one. And while stretching things a little bit (but
>not
>>>excessively), the YF-17 Cobra was the basis for the F/A-18...
>>>
>>>Brooks
>>
>>Of course you realize that the Goshawk is a terrible a/c, has
>>virtually no commonality with the Hawk, and cost about four times what
>>a new design would have cost.
>>
>>Al Minyard
>
>Al, it is not my intent to defend the T-45. But the fact is that it did indeed
>start out as a landbased design, and it is being successfully used to perform
>its mission, to include CV operations. The Navy has not been an unwilling
>participant in that program,and I believe the aircraft are still being delivered?
>
>Brooks
>
Willing participant only in the sense of "if you are going to be raped
anyway, lie back and enjoy it". It is being used, and procured,
martin.sinclair
news:3d725...@news2.vip.uk.com...
>
> Errr.....no, the Harrier II+ has the APG-65, the Harrier II doesn't.
I should clarify - Harrier II+ is AV-8B+, as I understand it. The APG-65
installation method was copied from the Blue Vixen installation method.
Brad Meyer
<aminya...@netdoor.com> wrote:
>The Navy had the Hawk rammed down its throat by the politicians. The
>program manager for the beast had one of the worst jobs that I have
>seen! The T-45 is marginal, at best. It is being used because it is
>the only game in town.
I should think the "T" designation might be some measure of its
utility as a warbird. Is anyone flying them in operational squadrons
at sea?
Brad Meyer
<cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>In article <6qr2nug4rv0a0tr23...@4ax.com>,
> Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
>> Charlie Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>>
>> :The real problem was that, compared to - say - Polaris, it had very
>> :limited capability even when working perfectly.
>>
>> The same might be said for the comparison between any manned AF
>> strategic bomber and the ICBM force. The idea, as always, is to make
>> life as difficult for the other guy as possible. That means being
>> able to hit him as many different ways as possible.
>
>For the US, perhaps. Although I note that the nuclear bomber role has
>all but gone now. The RN has only one nuclear strike force - a credible
>one.
Only in the sense that the German High Seas Fleet of WW I was
credible. While it was credible, it was only going to operate with
British acquiesence.
Charlie Whitaker
Brad Meyer <brad...@attbi.com> wrote:
That's no way for a vendor to talk. Do you want to sell us more D5s, or
what?
C.
Brooks
Charlie Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>In article <3d71...@news.newsgroups.com>,
> "Brooks" <broo...@127.0.0.1> wrote:
>
>> No, but an exception that tends to disprove the idea that they "lose"
by
>> definition when they try to engage land forces. The Taliban/AQ folks who
>> were on the receiving end of the CAS provided by the CV's (before the
land
>> based tactical fighters could get into the fight in a big way) would likely
>> also disagree (though unwillingly) to that statement, as would our NA
allies
>> and their SF advisors.
>
>I've never argued that carriers can't provide CAS, if in range. My
>problem is with this being a limited mission of limited relevance to the
>UK's interests.
I seem to recall that your statements regarding the viability and value of
carriers was a blanket one, including those we have here in the US.
>
>And there was no particular requirement to move that quickly in
>Afghanistan, Kosovo, and other recent engagements. The attacker (us) can
>usually take his time (a few weeks at least) Of course, this speedy
>supply of CAS was nice, but available only because the USN had a carrier
>(or two) in the region.
Well, ISTR that one carrier was quickly deployed from Japan; it served as
an SOF platform, according to reports (another plus for CV flexibility; though
not the first time that quality was exhibited, as a BCT with attached helos
was, IIRC, deployed by CV during the Haiti operation in the 90's).
The RN, on the other hand, will only have two
>CVFs. It's almost certain that they won't be conveniently placed for
>every eventuality.
Maybe not. But can you assure that you can secure and activate land bases
in the AO before they could arrive, in every eventuality?
>
>> No, the littoral assaults were not conducted merely to provide bombing
bases,
>> as a rule. The initial plan was to base the bomber force out of China;
XX
>> Bomber Command experience quickly demonstrated thsi was a no-go. Kenneth
>> Werrell ("Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers Over japan During World War II",
>> Smithsonian Press, 1996) indicates that the identification of the Marianas
>> as a basing option was made in Sep 43, when the Air Staff urged that the
>> scheduled assaults of those islands (originally planned for 46) be brought
>> forward to allow the basing of B-29's. This makes it patently clear that
>> the bombers and their bases were NOT the deciding factor forcing the strategy
>> of island hopping.
>
>I don't understand what you're saying here. You seem to be saying that
>taking islands *was* critical for bomber basing.
Well, I believe you snipped your earlier statement providing context. You
said that island hopping, and the need for those islands, was dictated by
the bomber plans; but the USN already had planned to secure the Marianas.
The bomber issue just resulted in a depressed timeline. And a fair number
of islands were secured that never played any role in the bombing effort.
>The Pacific island
>assaults of WWII were very expensive in terms of marine casualties, yet
>an isolated enemy garrison with no means of resupply is effectively
>prisoner: the islands could have been ignored, if there wasn't an
>over-riding need to acquire secure land bases closer to the enemy.
We did ignore quite a few; and we secured some that never hosted bomber bases.
The fact is that we had to get to Japan in order to win, and we had to take
quite a few islands in order to do that. The B-29's were not the reason d'etre
for island hopping, and CV's were not developed to facilitate island hopping.
>
>Of course, I've never said that carriers weren't useful in WWII - that
>conflict was the carrier's moment in history.
>
>> One could easily argue that the Japanese Navy was placing its strongest
>> emphasis
>> upon the destruction of the USN as a viable offensive force until at least
>> the Midway battle.
>
>In essence, this is why they lost. They built a navy with the intention
>of sinking another navy. It's seems likely that the Japanese could have
>achieved many of their objectives in WWII (China, Singapore etc.)
>without drawing the US into a fight. I'd suggest that their particular
>selection and deployment of naval assets (driven by their national
>cultural character) led them inexorably to a Godzilla v. King Ghidorah
>show-down. A smart aggressor doesn't play to the enemy's strengths.
And in order for that smart party to be able to maneuver around or negate
the enemy's strengths, he generally has to have a wide range tools available
to allow him to tailor his response; the CV is just one of those many tools.
>
>> That is immaterial to the argument; we are not in the business of wanting
>> to kill CV's, nor is the RN. The flip side to your question is--if you
want
>> to project power from the sea into littoral areas, would your sole selected
>> resource be DDG's?
>
>The profligacy of attempting to deny the enemy's CVs by using CVs of
>your own isn't immaterial to the argument that navies don't exist to
>take on other navies: it supports that conclusion. If you want to deny
>CVs, use submarines.
Whose CV's are you wanting to combat? ISTR that the RN already has a rather
capable sub force; where would you put the rest of their "eggs", all in that
same basket? Or might you want to deploy other systems that offer disparate
capabilities, like CV's?
>
>But if you want to support a coastal land battle, yes - CVs are the
>answer.
You appear to be hung up on "coastal", but the plain fact is that if you
want to be able to project power inland any significant distance, you need
airpower. And if you do not have readily available land bases in the vicinity,
you may well need the CV's capabilities. We tried the "cruise missiles only"
bit in Afghanistan once before; it did not work.
>This is my point. The question I'm asking is: is the need to
>support coastal land battles enough of a reason for the UK to build new
>CVs?
If your desire is only to be able to influence actions on the beach, maybe
not. But that approach would not get you very far in many scenarios (like
Afghanistan).
>
>> So are you now going to say that the CV might be a valuable power projection
>> platform only if the targeted nation has "plenty of coast"? So the impact
>> of naval based CAS in Afghanistan was...? The movement of the 24th MEU
into
>> the AO from its platforms in the IO to Camp Rhino was...?
>
>The impact of naval CAS in Afghanistan was limited.
That would be arguable at best. Many of the early USAF bomber missions were
directed at preselected targets; when it came to providing CAS to ground
elements, the CV's contributed their part, as they also did in providing
the early ECM and SEAD support to the heavies.
>And even so, it was
>enhanced by tankers flying out of land bases.
Question: which can you base further from the AO (thus increasing the number
of potential base sites) and still find them viable, tankers or tactical
fighters?
>Obviously, coastal
>proximity is very relevant to carrier power projection: this is ususally
>used as an argument in favour of carriers - most of the world's
>population lives by the sea.
While relevant, not completely limiting. The CV airwing has a rather decent
capability to extend its reach well beyond the beach.
>
>> No...the strategic nuclear strike role was deleted, but the need to field
>> capable carrier based conventional strike platforms (and indeed tactical
>> nuclear strike platforms, as evidenced by the long period that the USN
>> deployed
>> such weapons on the CV's, even after the demise of the heavy strikers
like
>> the A-3 and A-5) remained unabated, and has been used to good effect quite
>> a few times (Libya, the PG during the 80's, Afghanistan, Falklands...).
>
>I don't deny that a tactical strike role is retained by the USN (used in
>the Falklands?).
Uhmm...the Falklands bit was to illustrate that CV based strike assets are
valuable even to the UK.
>But those are soft targets you're describing, with the
>exception of Desert Storm, perhaps, in which the air offensive was
>overwhelmingly land-based and commenced after a long and careful
>build-up.
Libya (Eldorado Canyon) was "soft"? I wonder why the CV based aircraft launched
all of those HARM's, and why EA-6's were used...and what killed that one
F-111. What would you have classified the NV air defenses that the CV's penetrated
repeatedly during the late 60's/early 70's? And as I already noted elsewhere,
the advent of a stealthy platform like the F-35 will only enhance the ability
of the CV to go after "hard" targets.
>
>> When you reach the point that you can ensure that all other nations will
>> cooperate in *every* future military confrontation by allowing the regional
>> basing of tactical combat aircraft (we are not there yet, nor will we
ever
>> be), or when you can assure me that the USAF can provide timely, continuous,
>> and effective strike and CAS support on a worldwide basis irregardless
of
>> those base locations (we are not there yet, either). Until then, they
are
>> not "redundant". (And FWIW, I am one of those (gasp!) guys who thinks
that
>> the USN could indeed operate effectively with fewer CV's than the current
>> force provides...so the fact that you have me strongly defending them
points
>> to the degree that I find your arguments unsupported).
>
>Kosovo shows the very limited utility of tactical strike in forcing a
>potent defender to budge - especially if you are unwilling to commit
>ground forces.
I would differ somewhat. I believe what Kosovo taught us was (a) that at
that time, sensor/targeting capabilities lagged significantly behind weapons
delivery capabilities, and (b) trying to conduct any major combat operation
without the will to use all of your systems to acheive the required synergy
is stupid.
>And are you really saying that the USAF cannot provide
>timely, continuous and effective strategic strike using conventional
>weapons?
Not on a "anywhere, anytime, and for any duration" basis they can't. In some
cases they can extend their coverage by working with CV's (i.e., the CV's
providing SEAD and ECM support, or even air escort, to USAF long range strikers
like the B-1).
>
>> Until you can meet the citeria I gave you earlier regarding either ensuring
>> friendly bases being made available, or the ability of the USAF to conduct
>> continuous, effective CAS and strike operations from extremely long range,
>> you have not established the "sell by" date for the CV.
>
>The bases are available,
Really? OK, if we have to TACAIR to say, the South China Sea region, where
are our *existing* bases that we can use without being subject to possible
host nation restrictions? Or in Africa?
>and the USAF can do strategic strike.
Strategic strike and CAS are not the same thing. And where will those startegic
assets get their SEAD and ECM support, if they need it?
> I'm not
>arguing that CVs don't give the US additional resources to 'finesse' her
>operations, but they are an expensive way of meeting a limited mission.
Expensive, yes. But with global responsibilities, some expenses can't be
easily avoided. That said, I would agree that the DoD, and the USN, have
to look seriously at missions and roles, and we are going to have to consider
what CV assets we have to have, and where we need to focus them. Recent discussions
have seemed to revolve around justifying nearly the same CV force levels
we had during the latter part of the Cold War, and I am not sure that is
the right way to go about things today or for the next decade or so.
>My issue is with how smart it is for Britain to invest in CVs -
>specifically to rely *mainly* on two CVs - for 'broad brush' global
>power projection, which is the stated goal. The RAF doesn't have
>anything like the global reach of the USAF and talk of enhancing it is
>little heard of late.
Granted the UK has different security concerns. The RN/CV issue is not an
easy one to decypher; as you note, there is no real push for strategic strike
capabilites for the RAF. Which would leave you with Tomahawk, and my position
is that a "single resource" approach is unwise; alternative, or complementing,
systems need to be fielded if you are to ensure the continued viability of
your power projection and strike capabilities.
>
>Let me put it this way: if you had to direct US operations in Iraq,
>Kosovo, Afghanistan, etc. without either the US Navy or the USAF, which
>would you choose? That's the character of Britain's choice. And that's
>before we get to the issue of 'difficult' potential enemies.
I am not sure the UK's choices are that limited. Yes, your budget is less
than ours and you could never realistically acheive the level of force projection
capability that we have; this actually makes "flexibility" even more important
to you than it is to us, as you cannot afford every niche capability/system.
So look at a hypothetical--you are given the choice of procuring the CV's,
or picking up say sixteen of our recently stored excess B-1's and operating
them along with your (soon to be, we hope) commercial tankers. Which offers
more versatility? Can the B-1's support a NEO in Africa, or take on an alternate
load of troops and helos from 5 Airmobile Bde and transport them in an assault-ready
mode to the coast off of Lower Slobovia?
>
>> I don't see it; the USN has never bought into the STOVL system, especially
>> as a stand alone. And I see no evidence yet that they are about to do
so
>> in the future (through the 2020 period, at least).
>
>JSF V/STOL CTOL commonality is compelling evidence of convergence. I
>agree it may not happen before 2020.
>
>> H'mmm...the "friends" are sure ducking their heads left and right these
>> days...just
>> whisper "Iraq" and see the reponse regarding land basing (though I will
give
>> you that Turkey is not apparently in that cabal...but can you assure that
>> will remain the case indefinitely?).
>
>No.
Which is why you cannot *depend* upon landbase availability.
>
>> And a land base is *always* more potent than a carrier base:
>> >bigger, tougher, more flexible.
I thought I already mentioned the various manners in which land bases can
be vulnerable? A land base is much easier to target with persistant chems
on SRBM's than the CV would be...
>>
>> Add the fact that base availability in other nations are not assured,
and
>> is subject to host nation restrictions. CV's can be available when and
where
>> you need them, and nobody can dictate what you do with them or their air
>> assets.
>
>CVs have limited availability problems all of their own. They aren't
>always where you want them, and they take time to move. They have
>limited capacity of materiel and they are not always easy to resupply.
>And they can be sunk. Wherever you sail it, and especially if you sail
>it close to land, the position of a CV (floating on the ocean) is
>intrinsically vulnerable.
>
As can be land bases. They are utterly dependent upon the viability and capacity
of their associated LOC's, and since they don't move they are arguably more
vulnerable to interdiction. A well equipped and trained, albeit "low tech"
guerrella team can make things very interesting for a land base; it would
not be able to do much in regards to the CV. We had to insert a sizeable
ground security element into the -stan that provided us a land base near
Afghanistan, and then had to perform engineer operations to get the base
fully operational to boot; that is a lot of resources that have to be moved
and supported and which offer no direct contribution to the strike efforts.
>> OK, so you are saying we should always be able to depend upon having B-52's
>> rotating overhead the battlefield? Not likely, IMO. And the B-52's were
not
>> able to maintain a presence over the entire combat zone, 24-hours a day,
>> even in this relatively benign environment; that is why the USN was flying
>> CAS. And where did those B-52's (and B-1's, for that matter) get their
ECM
>> and HARM support from during those initial strikes? From the CV's.
>
>If CVs are available, you will find a way to use them. That is not in
>doubt. The issue is bang-for-buck.
I had hopes for your rationality in this discussion, as evidenced by your
earlier agreement that the CV's do indeed provide services that may be needed
and not available from other players...and then you resort back to the "you
will find a way to use them" junk. FACT: current strategic assets do not
have companion ECM and SEAD support, much less fighter escort, unless they
are provided by either the CV or other land based assets nearer the AO. FACT:
you already agreed that finding the land bases for those support systems
is not assured. So the CV does indeed remain capable of providing services
that would otherwise be completely unavailable.
>
>> Without the accompanying helos, your DDG's and FFG's are back to the days
>> of WWII pre-escort carrier operations--they have to wait until the sub
enters
>> their detection range. Not a good thing.
>
>But many destroyers/frigates can (and do) have helicopters attached.
Yep, and they use them to good effect in countering the sub threat; but they
are of much less value in terms of influencing the battle on the other side
of the beach.
>Isn't this why the USN no longer has carriers which 'specialise' in sub
>hunting? My point about MR2/MR4 and Sea King ASW was that coverage by
>the Nimrod is massively greater - and there is a lot of ocean. The
>'equivalent' carrier-based capability is much more limited, as is often
>the case with carriers. To get synergy between the two platforms - if
>you have them - is good, obviously. But maybe the UK could actually
>enhance this capability beyond what a carrier can offer by basing Merlin
>ASW on all new 'escort' assets projected for the near future. Which is
>better - 20 sub-hunting helos on 20 frigates or 20 sub-hunting helos on
>1 carrier?
I think we will continue to disagree in this vein; I doubt the reasons behind
the RN CV effort are based upon primarily using them as ASW platforms.
>
>> to support the US (or UK's) war aims)? "The bomber will always get through"?
>> (Where have we heard that one before?) I would disagree. You are betting
>> a lot (i.e., the ability to execute the full range of operations) on some
>> mighty big "ifs" (IF we can get the local bases, or IF we can use our
land
>> based heavies without regard to enemy defenses, or IF all possible future
>> engagements occur within range of existing, nonrestrictive bases). I don't
>> think that a wise stance.
>
>CALCMs, JSOWs, JDAMs have transformed the situation.
But they have not made it possible to provide long term, rapidly responsive
strike/CAS capabilities to any point on the globe regardless of threat conditions.
Remember that JDAM requires you to fly very near the target, and JSOW is
unlikely to ever be a great CAS asset, nor is CALCM. The plain fact is, we
are not at the point of being able to deliver the full range of required
capabilities under all conditions without having TACAIR available.
>The required bases
>can be a long way from the target.
Not for the SEAD and ECM support, and most definitely not for the fighter
escort, if one is required.
>The threat to the initial strike
>force is greatly reduced.
Courtesy of SEAD and ECM, in many cases. How successful would Kosovo have
been if you only had the CALCMs, B-1's, B-52's, and even (our paltry number)
of B-2's? Take that scenario and place it outside the realistic operating
radius of land based TACAIR, and that is what you face (plus reduced situational
awareness, since you also just elimianted the shorter legged UAV's like Predator).
>For follow-up attacks, if Vulcans can deploy
>with Shrike, then I don't see why a successor platform couldn't carry
>ALARM (the most effective anti-radiation missile used in Kosovo) or
>something better for SEAD.
Are you willing to risk your long range shooters in the cat-and-mouse game
of SEAD on a routine basis? And what kind of stealthy long range platform
are you going to buy to do so? The B-2? Heck, that would be more expensive
than the CV option.
>
>Again, from the UK perspective, we are in a good position with the
>number, type and locations of land bases available to us.
You don't KNOW that; you can't, because the question of whether or not you
can actually USE those bases can't be answered until the time of need actually
arises. Care to imagine what your PM would say if we jumped up tomorrow and
said we want to use the Strike Eagles out of Lakenheath in a repeat of the
86 Libya strike? Hell, our "allies" the French even refused us *overflight*
rights the last time we had to do so...
>As ranges
>continue to improve, the pressure on basing lessens further.
So, we can rest easy because ranges are going to continue to improve? What
RAF system do you have in mind in terms of that capability?
>
>> Well, pardon me but I find the idea of having to address the small handfull
>> of potential threat subs out there today as being a whale of a lot less
>> threatening
>> than the idea of having to address the full Soviet sub threat at its height.
>
>> And the old saw, "If 'ifs and buts' were candy and nuts..." applies here
>> as well. So, you are saying that the mere presence of subs makes the AO
>> "utterly
>> inhospitable" to friendly naval action? Nope. It may increase the risk,
but
>> you counter that with a credible ASW capability on your side (we, and
the
>> RN, have managed to maintain both ASW and CV capabilites at the same time;
>> the two are not mutually exclusive).
>
>They are not: ASW capability is essential for any surface fleet. If you
>have carriers, the risk of a major loss is high. The activities of the
>Argentine Type 209 (San Luis) in the Falklands are under-reported, in my
>opinion. If she had managed to bag a CVS, we wouldn't feel nearly so
>optimistic about carriers today, I guarantee it. And what if the AA had
>put 10 properly prepared 209s in the theatre? I believe they would have
>delivered much better value than the Super Etendards, the 25 de Mayo,
>etc. We were lucky that the Argentine military planners were susceptible
>to vanity and believed that they needed a carrier to demonstrate
>strength: consequently their force was dissipated and relatively weak in
>all areas.
I would imagine that the RN's CV effort would be a world-class model, not
anywhere near the vein of the Argie carrier.
>
>> Or you could use the F-35's stealthy characteristics to sneak in and hit
>> a hard target in an otherwise difficult IADS environment...
>
>In 2040, the F-35 will not be considered stealthy by virtue of RCS
>alone.
Well, if you are speaking solely in terms of 2040, by that time we may very
well find that *all* strike missions are flown by UCAV's. But there are a
LOT of years between now and then to deal with, and the F-35 should be viable
for the majority of them.
>Considering the loss of an F-117 in Kosovo, it could be argued
>that this type of stealth is already of limited value.
Not intelligently. Stealth is a relative term; it does not imply complete
invisibility. I understand faulty tactics probably had as much to do with
the F-117 loss as anything else (use of the same corridor)...though there
is a Yugo over in the r.a.m. group who claims that all passive stealth is
useless due to plasma-whatever and UFO's...
>For tactical
>strike, this may not be such an issue if the enemy's SAM defences and
>air force have already been neutralised (as they surely will be in any
>sane and methodical attack).
Horse first, then cart. Long range strikers cannot be relied upon to completely
dismantle the IADS; remember that during ODS the AH-64 was used to good effect.
>But for this air supremacy pre-requisite,
>the F-35 with no passive detection systems
Why would you think that an F-35 could not handle a passive detection system
if you want it to?
>and supported only by
>low-altitude low-capacity helicopter AEW is not going to be a credible
>attacker against the best opposition out there in the medium to long
>term.
Compared to what? Your (as yet fictional) longer range and maybe even less
stealthy land based system?
>
>> I believe you are missing the point of the whole idea of maintaining
>> disparate
>> systems with different capabilities; doing so allows you to be flexible
when
>> the time comes, and engage the enemy with a combined quiver of arrows
that
>> through synergy yields more power than any one system in isolation.
>
>My point is that a balanced small force (UK) is not the same as a
>balanced big force (US).
Agreed, but many of your comments were offered in generic terms regarding
CV's as a whole, not just potential RN CV's.
Balanced capability doesn't necessarily scale:
>we might find we end up with a disproportionately impotent force. I'd
>ask that the UK requirement be assessed honestly: are we really in the
>business of delivering modest (balanced) punches to weak enemies? Would
>a CVF in the Adriatic really have been the best instrument for deterring
>the Serbian genocide? Considering that it would probably have had to
>relocate from the Persian Gulf first, wouldn't a potent air force,
>operating from domestic bases, have been more able to deliver a timely
>punch?
Maybe, maybe not. And all of your potential future conflicts will not necessarilly
happen next to the warm bosom of greater Europa, as you folks found out in
1982. So maybe the question is whether you are better off with a CV force
offering a significant degree of operational flexibility, or a long range
shooter force that can only perform one task (strike).
>
>> >Well, we're talking about making a new force from an almost standing
>> >start in a 10 year time span. Why not invest in SATINT, long range
>> >heavyweight UCAVs, tankers, SCALPs and JDAMs instead?
>>
>> Because like it or not, we are not yet at the point where we can depend
upon
>> long range strikes exclusively. And the cost of building a long range
land
>> based strike capability, plus the required C4I support system, would likely
>> rival if not surpass the cost of those two CV's.
>
>But we seem to be approaching that point. Kosovo was surely a watershed.
While we lucked out in Kosovo, it showed us some real weaknesses, and all
of them have not yet been overcome to the complete satisfaction of all involved.
>The toughest enemies will also be the most highly developed, and
>therefore very vulnerable to infrastructure attack.
Uh-oh. Beware of the unerrring belief in the ability of "infrastructure attack".
Your own nation survived quite well under significant hardship in late 1940.
If your goal is to impose your will on the enemy (and that is really what
war is all about), you have to be prepared to go into the sandbox and get
dirty; doing it all from long range is not going to work *most* of the time,
much less all of the time.
>A force of the type
>I have outlined may cost at least as much as the two CVs plus air wings,
>if not more. But I'd speculate that it would also be much more potent,
>and hence better value.
Value? You are positing a single purpose force; if the bad guy poses an asymmetric
threat to you, you may very well be left with no viable alternatives courtesy
of the "eggs in one basket" (long range strike) approach. Again, how are
your long range strikers going to support that NEO effort, or an urban fight
in the littoral area? How are they going to provide a CAP for minesweepers
trying to open a chokepoint? Or provide reliable, *continuous* on-call CAS
to an assault force trying to secure an airfield for future use?
>
>I would note that a European GPS program is in hand.
As was the Meteor, and the A-400...but we have seen no real movement on either
yet, IIRC largely due to your partner's inactivity regarding budgeting.
>This makes the use
>of JDAMs (which are very cheap) possible with two 'competing' suppliers
>of guidance (is it likely that the UK would fall out with both the US
>and the EU simultaneously?).
JDAM makes you fly more or less right over the target; unless your posited
long range paltform is pretty stealthy, this could get expensive.
>A new delivery vehicle for multiple
>CALCMs/JDAMs is unlikely to be expensive if specified with moderation
>(i.e. no crew, no RCS, no rough/short field landing ability). Tankers
>(drogue & probe type) are minimally modified commercial aircraft which
>do double duty as military passenger or civilian cargo transport. I
>don't know how you do UCAV in-flight refuelling but I'm sure it's
>solvable. A stock of JDAMs and CALCMs does cost, but would also be
>required by the carrier force, and can be built up or drawn down as
>threats emerge and recede. C4I is the expensive part, but surveillance
>satellites aside, the UK is not hopelessly out of its depth here either.
>And satellites are becoming much cheaper.
Well, with all of our assets, we still have not managed to make long range
strike the "end all, do all". Good luck to you if you think you can surpass
us over the next ten to twenty years in this regard.
>
>> Whoah there! You have been saying all along that we should just PLAN on
>> having
>> those needed bases available whenever and wherever needed...and now you
think
>> that depending on an ally for projection is "perverse""?
>
>Yes. There's no contradiction if you own the bases and have a long
>reach. The main problem is one of airspace denial requiring you to fly
>further than you thought. But Diego Garcia is almost ideally placed for
>Asian and African operations. Ascension is also valuable.
But only if you take the view that the long range strikers can do it all;
that was tried by both the RAF and USAAF in Europe about sixty years ago,
and the results did not support that contention. While capabilities have
improved, so have countermeasures.
We maximize out balance and flexibility to prevent such a situation from
arising. As you note, the UK can't match the US in that manner; but it CAN
try to balance the assets it does procure, and maximize their flexibility
(again, probably even MORE important to the UK). I don't think creation of
a long range air strike capability does much to serve either of those needs
if it is pursued at the cost of other major systems, especially when the
fact that the CV is infinitely more flexible than long range bombers is considered.
>
>And as I said, the UK is not developing *offensive* strength in depth.
>We are choosing to go the naval aviation route to enhanced power
>projection. Is this so smart?
Given the lack of real alternatives that could offer equal flexibility, I
think it may indeed be smart to pursue a modernized CV capability, though
it might be arguably better for the UK to build maybe four smaller F-35B
capable vessels than it would be to build only two larger F-35C capable ships.
Brooks
>
>Regards,
>
>--
>Charlie Whitaker
>London, UK
-----------== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Uncensored Usenet News ==----------
Charlie Whitaker
I'm going to attempt a summary, rather than chase a million fragments -
we'll end up arguing about who said what, when. I've been snipping
quoted text to try to keep my posts focussed - it's not some kind of
underhand tactic.
The crux of the discussion seems to be whether or not new CVs represent
good value for the UK, given the capability they will provide, and the
type of influence they will encourage us to exert.
Obviously, this issue involves a sideways look at the US CV fleet, and
examining its cultural ancestry and questioning its continued relevance.
I think at the least we can agree that the CV had its moment in the
Pacific War - during which it was a 'decisive weapon' so to speak. There
haven't been any major wars involving the US since, so the modern CV has
yet to be tested to the full, in my view. The issue of whether the
American strategy in the Pacific war - taking every single island - was
the right one is an interesting discussion, but tangential.
*** Strengths & Weaknesses of CVF ***
What I take from the discussion is a sense that air supremacy and SEAD
are hard to generate locally unless you have a local base. I agree that
CVs give a capability here if diplomacy can't secure a handy land base.
Air supremacy (and SEAD) is a pre-requisite for intensive strike
operations involving weapons such as JDAMS, whether the strike is
launched locally or remotely. This suggests that a CV, if doing any
mission in support of offensive actions, should focus on controlling
airspace.
How well will JSF and FOAEW meet this mission for the UK? The current
focus seems to be on using JSF for the attack role - it's not being
specified for air superiority. FOAEW may well end up as a helicopter:
that's a problem in my view. Are two carriers enough - probably not, I
agree.
I also think it's valid to question the survivability of CVs in the
context of littoral waters defended by a competent submarine force. My
questions about sub capability were not directed at UK or US forces -
they were aimed at exploring how hard it would be for an enemy to
acquire or enhance such a defensive capability. Not hard, I think,
assuming they're not stupid - and I think we have to assume they're not
stupid. If an evolved air defence threat makes it harder for UCAV long
range strike in the future, then an evolved sub threat makes it harder
for CVs - there is no such thing as invulnerability for the attacker.
And yes, in the global context both then and now, Libya is a soft target.
*** Basing ***
The basing issue favours the UK - we have the bases and they are
politically and geographically secure. In my view they are an overlooked
(except by the USAF) key advantage which history has bequeathed to us.
Yes, it's an unfair advantage.
I will never agree that diplomacy is *not* an aspect of planning for
hostilities - surely to go for material and technological 'omnipotence'
for all your war-fighting plans is wasteful. You end up fighting wars
you don't have to, or spending money where you don't need to. Again, I
think the Pacific war has left this approach as one of its legacies -
there wasn't much neutral territory to be negotiated over in the
Pacific. Self-sufficiency is admirable, but perhaps sometimes foolhardy.
Pride is dangerous.
*** UK Strategic Strike Capability ***
I think it's a little harsh to judge that the UK couldn't field a new
capability in this area, or would resort to buying US cast-offs. And
yes, a capability that exceeds what the US currently fields in
penetrative ability, if not mass. The USAF, although capable, is running
a odd mix of legacy hardware. Even the B-2 is legacy because its
original mission has gone. The EU partner nations *will* field Galileo,
if only because it's also a civil program with clear economic benefits.
The Eurofighter program *is* working - collaborative development can
happen to good effect. If emphasis is placed on acquiring potent CALCMs,
the delivery vehicles themselves need not be expensive like the B-2. And
they don't have to be built by EADS - they could go to Boeing!
The new carriers will end up costing a lot - both in themselves, the
maintenance and supply of them, the crews, the protection of them, the
way they will concentrate the surface fleet escorts around them (eroding
capability elsewhere) and in the continual effort to keep the embarked
air assets at the leading edge. As you said yourself - by 2040 we may
all be looking at UCAV air combat. If the carriers exist at that time,
there will be significant gravitation towards finding ways to fit them
with new capabilities. As the example of the A-3 shows, this can be a
procurement trap.
If the *strike* capability was largely transferred to the RAF, then many
of these procurement pressures would be eased. The CV mission can be
more clearly defined, and the CVs more effectively designed to meet it.
For example, the CVs would not need to go to sea with the largest
possible bomb stock - and re-supply will be easier.
If money is the issue, I think it also has to be asked why there is an
armoured division in Germany, with no one to fight, and no means of
moving themselves somewhere useful. The war in Europe ended over 50
years ago ...
And since our defence budget is around 60% of the US budget on a
pro-rata basis (i.e. around 12% in absolute terms?) there is, in theory,
room for manouevre in the budget. It's more a matter of willingness to
pay than ability to pay.
*** Modern War Fighting ***
After Vietnam, I don't see any Western nations mounting large-scale land
offensives unless all the cards are in their favour - i.e. Desert Storm.
Even then, the allied force stopped short of an occupation. Total war
short of a nuclear exchange doesn't seem likely in the future. Which is
a good thing. And it's a simple fact that the Serbs left Kosovo because
their infrastructure was being bombed to bits - it was the one thing
that made the difference - you often don't have to crush and occupy an
aggressor nation to resolve matters satisfactorily. I think this
validates strategic conventional bombing. It won't do everything all the
time, but it will do a lot. It *is* power projection.
*** Conclusion ***
It's been nice to have some naval discussion in SMN, don't you think?
Regards,
Charlie
Brooks
Charlie Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>Brooks,
>
<snip interesting summary>
>
>*** Conclusion ***
>
>It's been nice to have some naval discussion in SMN, don't you think?
>
>Regards,
>
>Charlie
Enjoyed the exchange; we'll undoubtedly differ on some points, but in the
end probably agree on more than we disagree. I look forward to the next time...
Brooks
>
>--
>Charlie Whitaker
>London, UK
-----------== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Uncensored Usenet News ==----------
Fred J. McCall
:
:"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
:news:bnf4nu8o3uc95ug2s...@4ax.com...
It is what I wrote (since the follow on work generally IS the program)
and it is accurate.
:What HMG backed out from in 1975 wasnt the AV-8B
:program
Which didn't exist at the time. You see, I have this silly idea that
when one discusses a sequence of events, one should stick to the
actual temporal sequence. You apparently disagree.
:but a proposed AV-16A" or "AV-8X", based on
:a bigger and more powerful Pegasus 15 engine, with
:plenum-chamber burning. The informal "AV-16A" designation
:reflected the goal of an aircraft with twice the range and twice
:the warload of the existing AV-8A. There was also some
:interest in supersonic performance. The government withdrew
:because of the projected cost of the Pegasus 15 development.
No, the government withdrew because there was no decent upgrade path
for existing airframes under that plan and because they'd already
decided to sink money into Sea Harrier.
:The USMC pursued a more modest proposal involving a larger
:composite wing when it was clear that the Pegasus 15 wouldnt
:be available.
The *US* gave up on Pegasus 15 because of costs and because it became
obvious to USN that what they wanted and what the USMC wanted were two
different aircraft, so THEY withdrew from the development.
:At the same time BAE proposed a development that involved a new
:and bigger wing made which would have have been retrofitted to
:existing Harrier GR.3s and Sea Harriers.
Not quite the temporal sequence that occurred. I talked about it
below.
:However, in 1980 the RAF
:evaluated the AV-8B design to see if it would meet their requirements
:instead.
No, BAE switched camps after the Minister of Defense essentially said
that the Big Wing Harrier was a dead issue. I already mentioned that.
:The RAF's biggest criticism of the AV-8B was that it could not turn
:quickly enough to defend itself in air combat. In response, McDonnell
:Douglas added "leading-edge (wing) root extensions (LERX)", short wing
:extensions along the air intakes that created vortexes over the wing surface
:to enhance maneuverability. LERX was fitted to the second development
:aircraft. The idea was borrowed from the Big Wing Harrier design.
No, the idea was 'borrowed' from the F/A-18, which was also built by
MACAIR and had them first.
:At this point (1981) the British joined the AV8-B development with an offer
:to
:contribute $80 million USD for general development and $200 million
:USD for development of features related to their own needs, and agreed
:to buy at least 60 of the new aircraft. Construction of airframe elements
:was divided between MDD and BAE, with no overlapping sourcing of
:components.
Already said that, too. You sure do seem to do a lot of 'disagreeing'
with me by noting things I've already noted. Funny how that works.
: > The statement from HM
:> Government was that there was "There is not enough common ground on
:> the Advanced Harrier for us to join in the programme with the US."
:> That was on 19 March, 1975. The issue was that UK requirements called
:> for the follow-on aircraft to be an upgrade path from existing
:> aircraft (the US design called for new engines, with the major
:> fuselage alterations that would require (although the larger engine
:> was eventually dropped and an internally modified Rolls-Royce engine
:> was used, instead) , and a new wing - essentially an entirely
:> different airframe), no slower than existing GR.3 aircraft (the US
:> design was slower), and a sustained turn rate of at least 20
:> degrees/second (the US design maxes out under 14 degrees/second). The
:> real reason, of course, is that the government at the time was looking
:> for reasons to kill it for budgetary reasons, having committed to the
:> Sea Harrier, instead.
:>
:> BAe shouldn't be too surprised. Just ask them who the prime is on
:> every Harrier built for delivery anywhere except the UK.
:
:Which of course isnt correct either. Those Sea Harriers the
:Indians bought came from BAE as I recall
There's that temporal sequence thing again. Sea Harrier is a dead
issue. Anyone beside India planning on operating them in the long
term? Any bets what winds up happening in India?
:> There'a a
:> reason that happened. BAe didn't come back on board, recommending the
:> AV-8B configuration until after HM Government chopped their legs out
:> from under them on their 'Big-Wing' Harrier upgrade proposal in 1980,
:> when the Minister of Defense announced, "the Big Wing is unlikely to
:> be any part of an improvement programme for the GR.3". That's rather
:> a shame, since the Big Wing looked like a good design.
:>
:> So in 1981, BAe basically backed the US program, seeing that being
:> part of a large program was better than being all of a non-existent
:> one.
:
:Which rather contradicts your earlier statement that they didnt back it.
There's that problem you seem to have with temporal sequencing again.
In case you didn't notice, there's half a dozen years in between those
two positions.
:> :> The Marine requirement was really for more payload (the original
But probably not nearly as much as would have done had Britain not
bounced out of the program and then back in again. BAe was out and
in, as was HMG. Rolls-Royce was always in. Look at the numbers
again, with that in mind, and postulate what they might have been if
BAe and HMG had stayed in all along.
:> Actually, HMG had a good programme and essentially pissed a large part
:> of it away to us Yanks.
:
:Erm no in fact HMG withdrew from an expensive development
:program that would paralleled an existing US effort and
:joined the US development instead.
Erm, yes. There's that temporal sequencing problem of yours again.
You're talking about Big Wing, which is the very tail end of the
story. I'm talking about the overall program and the 1975 withdrawal.
:I'll leave the last word to Boeing.
:
:<Quote>
:The Boeing Company, British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce teamed to produce the
:AV-8B, as an upgrade to the AV-8A. The first production AV-8B aircraft was
:delivered in November 1983. Deliveries of night-attack Harrier IIs began in
:September 1989. The U.S. Marine Corps received its first Harrier II Plus
:aircraft in July 1993, and its first remanufactured Harrier II Plus in
:January 1996.
:</Quote>
And you expect complete stories from corporate web pages? That's
really quite amusing. If you take that as gospel, that means that the
AV-8B was totally designed and bringing aircraft off the line in less
than 3 years. You and I both know that simply doesn't happen.
Keith Willshaw
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>
> :but a proposed AV-16A" or "AV-8X", based on
> :a bigger and more powerful Pegasus 15 engine, with
> :plenum-chamber burning. The informal "AV-16A" designation
> :reflected the goal of an aircraft with twice the range and twice
> :the warload of the existing AV-8A. There was also some
> :interest in supersonic performance. The government withdrew
> :because of the projected cost of the Pegasus 15 development.
>
> No, the government withdrew because there was no decent upgrade path
> for existing airframes under that plan and because they'd already
> decided to sink money into Sea Harrier.
>
Erm no
The Sea Harrier project didnt get approval until 1975
and was always going to a different aircraft than the
RAF Harriers
> :The USMC pursued a more modest proposal involving a larger
> :composite wing when it was clear that the Pegasus 15 wouldnt
> :be available.
>
> The *US* gave up on Pegasus 15 because of costs and because it became
> obvious to USN that what they wanted and what the USMC wanted were two
> different aircraft, so THEY withdrew from the development.
>
In fact neither country was prepared to fund it
http://www.history.navy.mil/planes/av8.htm
<Quote>
Both Hawker-Siddley in the United Kingdom and McDonnell Douglas Aircraft in
the United States who had become the American associate contractor, could
see ways to improve the Harrier. In 1973, a joint advanced Harrier program
was undertaken but the costs of both airplane and Rolls-Royce engine
development led to abandonment of the proposed AV-16A advanced Harrier.
</Quote>
> :At the same time BAE proposed a development that involved a new
> :and bigger wing made which would have have been retrofitted to
> :existing Harrier GR.3s and Sea Harriers.
>
> Not quite the temporal sequence that occurred. I talked about it
> below.
>
Yes but you forgot to mention that BOTH governments
backed out of AV-16 and that BOTH governments
opted in to AV-8B
> :However, in 1980 the RAF
> :evaluated the AV-8B design to see if it would meet their requirements
> :instead.
>
> No, BAE switched camps after the Minister of Defense essentially said
> that the Big Wing Harrier was a dead issue. I already mentioned that.
>
Not quite, MOD said 'Show me why AV-8B wont work'
> :The RAF's biggest criticism of the AV-8B was that it could not turn
> :quickly enough to defend itself in air combat. In response, McDonnell
> :Douglas added "leading-edge (wing) root extensions (LERX)", short wing
> :extensions along the air intakes that created vortexes over the wing
surface
> :to enhance maneuverability. LERX was fitted to the second development
> :aircraft. The idea was borrowed from the Big Wing Harrier design.
>
> No, the idea was 'borrowed' from the F/A-18, which was also built by
> MACAIR and had them first.
>
In fact LERX have been fitted to many aircraft including the F-5E,
Mig-29 and SU-27, in the case of the F-18 they were a
feature inherited from the Northrop YF-17
Translation
"I propose to ignore or rule as irelevant awkward facts"
> :> There'a a
> :> reason that happened. BAe didn't come back on board, recommending the
> :> AV-8B configuration until after HM Government chopped their legs out
> :> from under them on their 'Big-Wing' Harrier upgrade proposal in 1980,
> :> when the Minister of Defense announced, "the Big Wing is unlikely to
> :> be any part of an improvement programme for the GR.3". That's rather
> :> a shame, since the Big Wing looked like a good design.
> :>
> :> So in 1981, BAe basically backed the US program, seeing that being
> :> part of a large program was better than being all of a non-existent
> :> one.
> :
> :Which rather contradicts your earlier statement that they didnt back it.
>
> There's that problem you seem to have with temporal sequencing again.
> In case you didn't notice, there's half a dozen years in between those
> two positions.
>
In which time both McDonnel Douglas and BaE did
design work which came to be part of the AV-8B
except for the disagreeable facts that
1) BOTH governments bounced out of AV-16A
2) HMG never bounced out of AV-8B but in fact
abandoned its own separate program to join it.
> :> Actually, HMG had a good programme and essentially pissed a large part
> :> of it away to us Yanks.
> :
> :Erm no in fact HMG withdrew from an expensive development
> :program that would paralleled an existing US effort and
> :joined the US development instead.
>
> Erm, yes. There's that temporal sequencing problem of yours again.
> You're talking about Big Wing, which is the very tail end of the
> story. I'm talking about the overall program and the 1975 withdrawal.
>
Which was AV-16A not AV-8B and wasn't funded by
the US Government either
Its really rather simple
1) The Joint MDD/BaE offering of AV-16 was unacceptable
to both governments.
2) The RAF and USMC both still wanted upgraded Harriers
so both BAE and MDD came up with designs for bigger
winged Harriers
3) Neither country wanted to fund separate developments
of the same airframe with the same capabilities and
for once sense prevailed and HMG opted IN to the AV-8B
program after MDD demonstrated that it could utilise
LERX to provide acceptable handling
> :I'll leave the last word to Boeing.
> :
> :<Quote>
> :The Boeing Company, British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce teamed to produce
the
> :AV-8B, as an upgrade to the AV-8A. The first production AV-8B aircraft
was
> :delivered in November 1983. Deliveries of night-attack Harrier IIs began
in
> :September 1989. The U.S. Marine Corps received its first Harrier II Plus
> :aircraft in July 1993, and its first remanufactured Harrier II Plus in
> :January 1996.
> :</Quote>
>
> And you expect complete stories from corporate web pages? That's
> really quite amusing. If you take that as gospel, that means that the
> AV-8B was totally designed and bringing aircraft off the line in less
> than 3 years. You and I both know that simply doesn't happen.
>
Translation
"I know better that the people who merely build and operate
the aircraft"
There's no arguing with that.
Keith
Braybrook
[ . ]
| Which was AV-16A not AV-8B and wasn't funded by
| the US Government either
|
| Its really rather simple
|
| 1) The Joint MDD/BaE offering of AV-16 was unacceptable
| to both governments.
|
| 2) The RAF and USMC both still wanted upgraded Harriers
| so both BAE and MDD came up with designs for bigger
| winged Harriers
|
| 3) Neither country wanted to fund separate developments
| of the same airframe with the same capabilities and
| for once sense prevailed and HMG opted IN to the AV-8B
| program after MDD demonstrated that it could utilise
| LERX to provide acceptable handling
Didn't Jimmy Carter's Administration require that an export customer for the
AV-8B program be onboard or the program would be axed.
The UK joined the program with the 1982 MoU - shortly after a significant
change of administration in both countries - but well after construction of
the pre-series AV-8B had started (the first was flying in Novemeber 1981, an
order for them was placed in April 1979).
Fred J. McCall
:
:"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
:news:aaq6nust8p953fcps...@4ax.com...
:> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
:>
:
:>
:> :but a proposed AV-16A" or "AV-8X", based on
:> :a bigger and more powerful Pegasus 15 engine, with
:> :plenum-chamber burning. The informal "AV-16A" designation
:> :reflected the goal of an aircraft with twice the range and twice
:> :the warload of the existing AV-8A. There was also some
:> :interest in supersonic performance. The government withdrew
:> :because of the projected cost of the Pegasus 15 development.
:>
:> No, the government withdrew because there was no decent upgrade path
:> for existing airframes under that plan and because they'd already
:> decided to sink money into Sea Harrier.
:>
:
:Erm no
Erm yes.
:The Sea Harrier project didnt get approval until 1975
:and was always going to a different aircraft than the
:RAF Harriers
HMG was going to expend funds on ONE new Harrier. They'd already
committed to the Sea Harrier (1975 is when they withdrew from Harrier
II, remember?) for the RN, and so grabbed the excuse of incompatible
desires (which was true) to withdraw from Harrier II for the RAF.
:> :The USMC pursued a more modest proposal involving a larger
:> :composite wing when it was clear that the Pegasus 15 wouldnt
:> :be available.
:>
:> The *US* gave up on Pegasus 15 because of costs and because it became
:> obvious to USN that what they wanted and what the USMC wanted were two
:> different aircraft, so THEY withdrew from the development.
:
:In fact neither country was prepared to fund it
For it to be funded, USN would have had to give up some conventional
aircraft. They weren't willing to do that, and so withdrew. That
left the Marines, who had simply wanted a better subsonic bomb truck
all along.
:> :At the same time BAE proposed a development that involved a new
:> :and bigger wing made which would have have been retrofitted to
:> :existing Harrier GR.3s and Sea Harriers.
:>
:> Not quite the temporal sequence that occurred. I talked about it
:> below.
:
:Yes but you forgot to mention that BOTH governments
:backed out of AV-16 and that BOTH governments
:opted in to AV-8B
No, I mentioned EXACTLY what happened. Remember me talking about the
USN withdrawal, leaving the USMC driving the requirements? No, of
course you don't. But it was there quite plainly.
:> :However, in 1980 the RAF
:> :evaluated the AV-8B design to see if it would meet their requirements
:> :instead.
:>
:> No, BAE switched camps after the Minister of Defense essentially said
:> that the Big Wing Harrier was a dead issue. I already mentioned that.
:
:Not quite, MOD said 'Show me why AV-8B wont work'
No, the quote from the Minister of Defense in 1980 was precisely as I
originally rendered it, essentially declaring the Big Wing dead BEFORE
BAe switched to backing the AV-8B.
:> :The RAF's biggest criticism of the AV-8B was that it could not turn
:> :quickly enough to defend itself in air combat. In response, McDonnell
:> :Douglas added "leading-edge (wing) root extensions (LERX)", short wing
:> :extensions along the air intakes that created vortexes over the wing
:surface
:> :to enhance maneuverability. LERX was fitted to the second development
:> :aircraft. The idea was borrowed from the Big Wing Harrier design.
:>
:> No, the idea was 'borrowed' from the F/A-18, which was also built by
:> MACAIR and had them first.
:
:In fact LERX have been fitted to many aircraft including the F-5E,
:Mig-29 and SU-27, in the case of the F-18 they were a
:feature inherited from the Northrop YF-17
Which predated all your examples. And it wasn't the 'Northrop' YF-17.
It was a joint development between Northrop and MCAIR. That's why
MCAIR got the Navy contract to 'Navalize' it; that was the original
agreement between the two companies.
:> :At this point (1981) the British joined the AV8-B development with an
:
:Translation
:
:"I propose to ignore or rule as irelevant awkward facts"
Translation
"I have no substantive disagreement, so I shall, in the finest British
fashion, descend to personal insult and derision instead."
:> :> There'a a
:> :> reason that happened. BAe didn't come back on board, recommending the
:> :> AV-8B configuration until after HM Government chopped their legs out
:> :> from under them on their 'Big-Wing' Harrier upgrade proposal in 1980,
:> :> when the Minister of Defense announced, "the Big Wing is unlikely to
:> :> be any part of an improvement programme for the GR.3". That's rather
:> :> a shame, since the Big Wing looked like a good design.
:> :>
:> :> So in 1981, BAe basically backed the US program, seeing that being
:> :> part of a large program was better than being all of a non-existent
:> :> one.
:> :
:> :Which rather contradicts your earlier statement that they didnt back it.
:>
:> There's that problem you seem to have with temporal sequencing again.
:> In case you didn't notice, there's half a dozen years in between those
:> two positions.
:
:In which time both McDonnel Douglas and BaE did
:design work which came to be part of the AV-8B
BAe was not part of the AV-8B effort during those years. The design
was practically a done deal by the time they came back.
:> :> :> The Marine requirement was really for more payload (the original
Except for the disagreeable facts that
:1) BOTH governments bounced out of AV-16A
1) I explicated the entire sequence in great detail. I'm sure you
must have noticed it.
:2) HMG never bounced out of AV-8B but in fact
:abandoned its own separate program to join it.
2) There wasn't an AV-8B program to 'bounce out of' until HMG withdrew
from Harrier II development and the USN withdrew from AV-16, leaving
the USMC driving the requirements. As a result of that, USMC got what
it wanted - a more efficient bomb truck, the AV-8B. THEN BAe, after
remarks from HMG about how the Big Wing was dead, jumped on board.
Any of that sound familiar to you?
:> :> Actually, HMG had a good programme and essentially pissed a large part
:> :> of it away to us Yanks.
:> :
:> :Erm no in fact HMG withdrew from an expensive development
:> :program that would paralleled an existing US effort and
:> :joined the US development instead.
:>
:> Erm, yes. There's that temporal sequencing problem of yours again.
:> You're talking about Big Wing, which is the very tail end of the
:> story. I'm talking about the overall program and the 1975 withdrawal.
:
:Which was AV-16A not AV-8B and wasn't funded by
:the US Government either
Same program. It underwent redirection when the USN (not the US
government) withdrew and USMC got to drive their requirements.
:Its really rather simple
Yes, it is, but you'll persist in misstating it just to argue.
:1) The Joint MDD/BaE offering of AV-16 was unacceptable
:to both governments.
:
:2) The RAF and USMC both still wanted upgraded Harriers
:so both BAE and MDD came up with designs for bigger
:winged Harriers
:
:3) Neither country wanted to fund separate developments
:of the same airframe with the same capabilities and
:for once sense prevailed and HMG opted IN to the AV-8B
:program after MDD demonstrated that it could utilise
:LERX to provide acceptable handling
All lovely, except it is not quite in exact 1:1 accord with our
present reality. A nice fairy tale, though.
:> :I'll leave the last word to Boeing.
:> :
:> :<Quote>
:> :The Boeing Company, British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce teamed to produce
:the
:> :AV-8B, as an upgrade to the AV-8A. The first production AV-8B aircraft
:was
:> :delivered in November 1983. Deliveries of night-attack Harrier IIs began
:in
:> :September 1989. The U.S. Marine Corps received its first Harrier II Plus
:> :aircraft in July 1993, and its first remanufactured Harrier II Plus in
:> :January 1996.
:> :</Quote>
:>
:> And you expect complete stories from corporate web pages? That's
:> really quite amusing. If you take that as gospel, that means that the
:> AV-8B was totally designed and bringing aircraft off the line in less
:> than 3 years. You and I both know that simply doesn't happen.
:>
:
:Translation
:
:"I know better that the people who merely build and operate
:the aircraft"
:
:There's no arguing with that.
Translation
"I AM stupid enough to expect the complete story to be posted as a
single paragraph on a public web site."
You're right. There is no arguing with that.
And we'll continue to ignore the little detail that your fairy tale
timeline requires the complete design of a joint aircraft and rolling
the first production articles off the new assembly line in less than 3
years. If you knew anything about the design and construction of
modern military aircraft, you would know how ludicrous that sounds to
me.
Brooks
Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>"Keith Willshaw" <keith_w...@no-spam.compuserve.com> wrote:
>
>:
>:"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
>:news:aaq6nust8p953fcps...@4ax.com...
>:> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
<snip>
And it wasn't the 'Northrop' YF-17.
>It was a joint development between Northrop and MCAIR. That's why
>MCAIR got the Navy contract to 'Navalize' it; that was the original
>agreement between the two companies.
>
No, Fred, you are fantasizing again. *Northrup* began development of the
YF-17 as an in-house program in the mid-60's as amore capable export fighter
to complement its successful F-5. By 1971, when the USAF LWF RFP was issued,
they were on their fourth generation of design and evaluation work. *Northrup*
was selected, along with GD, in 1972 to build flying prototypes. *Northrup*
decided to incorporate the LEX, and Northrup designed and built the prototypes;
McDonnell Douglas was not a player on the *Northrup* team at this point.
The Navy had tried to implement its own VFAX in early 1974, but was told
to shelve it and instead choose one of the two LWF competitors; it was at
that point that the McD-D folks linked up with Northrup in an agreement to
develop the YF-17 for shipboard use. In Jan 75 the YF-16 was declared the
winner of the LWF contract, and some four months later the Navy selected
the Northrup/McD-D team to develop its fighter. The *Northrup* YF-17 had
first flown in Jun 74; the first F-18 would not leave the ground until 1978.
In short, McD-D did not become involved in the YF-17 program until about
the same time as the first flight was in the air, and your idea that McD-D
was somehow intimately involved in the YF-17 development is patently false,
along with the inferrence that the LEX on the F-18 got its start from the
McD-D side of the house.
Brooks
Fred J. McCall
:
:Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
:>"Keith Willshaw" <keith_w...@no-spam.compuserve.com> wrote:
:>
:>:
:>:"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
:>:news:aaq6nust8p953fcps...@4ax.com...
:
:>And it wasn't the 'Northrop' YF-17.
:>It was a joint development between Northrop and MCAIR. That's why
:>MCAIR got the Navy contract to 'Navalize' it; that was the original
:>agreement between the two companies.
:
:No, Fred, you are fantasizing again.
Brooks, you ignorant slut. Some of us call them 'mistakes' when we
make them. Others of you simply pretend you never make one,
obfuscating and insulting to try to paper over them.
:*Northrup* began development of the
:YF-17 as an in-house program in the mid-60's as amore capable export fighter
:to complement its successful F-5.
Jack's last name was NORTHROP, not "*Northrup*". No such company as
"*Northrup*". Brooks, you must be fantasizing again.
You're semi-correct (but mostly wrong), by the way. It was late
1960's, not "mid-60's" (paper airplane in 1966, no decision to proceed
with anything until 1967, and the design not stabilized until 1970).
The purpose of the P-530/P-600 ( Cobra was not to COMPLEMENT the F-5.
It was expected to REPLACE the F-5, along with the F-104 and the
Mirage III.
:By 1971, when the USAF LWF RFP was issued,
It wasn't issued until January of 1972. You must be fantasizing
again, Brooks.
:they were on their fourth generation of design and evaluation work.
Misleading, at least. They had three PARALLEL designs going; the
P-530 Cobra, the P-600 (the LWF proposal from NORTHROP (note the 'O')
was based on the P-600 design study, although the P-530 was what the
actual YF-17 hardware was based on) from an independent team that
wound up looking virtually the same as the P-530, and the P-610, which
was a single engine variant.
:*Northrup*
No such company. You must be fantasizing again, Brooks.
:was selected, along with GD, in 1972 to build flying prototypes. *Northrup*
:decided to incorporate the LEX, and Northrup designed and built the prototypes;
:McDonnell Douglas was not a player on the *Northrup* team at this point.
Or ever, since there was never a company named Northrup.
:The Navy had tried to implement its own VFAX in early 1974, but was told
:to shelve it and instead choose one of the two LWF competitors;
Misleading to the point of being false. You must be fantasizing
again, Brooks.
Fighter Study IV, trying to address the inability of the Navy to
procure sufficient F-14 aircraft to meet its needs and the need to
replace Phantoms and Corsairs in the near future, looked at various
alternatives to all the Navy to procure sufficient airframes, among
which were a cheaper variant of the F-14, a navalized, F-15, and a
product improvement of the F-4. All were rejected as inadequate and a
set of design requirements embodied as VFAX were put together by the
group. Fighter Study iV anticipated that the VFAX requirements would
lead to a new aircraft start, but it was at this point they were
directed to STUDY (not choose) DERIVATIVES (not the two planes that
competed) of the USAF ACF contenders.
:it was at
:that point that the McD-D folks linked up with Northrup in an agreement to
:develop the YF-17 for shipboard use.
Well, no. You see, MCAIR linked up with a company named Northrop.
Together they produced a design originally known as Northrop P-630 or,
slightly later, as McDonnell Douglas Model 267. This design was the
progenitor of the F/A-18 and it was at this point that the agreement I
had misremembered as being earlier occurred. At the same point,
General Dynamics teamed with LTV (Vought Aircraft) to produce a design
for a navalized F-16.
However, despite all your bluster, this is all a side show to the
original statement on my part, since by this time MCAIR most certainly
had an aircraft in the pipeline using LEXs which handily predates the
AV-8B.
:In Jan 75 the YF-16 was declared the
:winner of the LWF contract,
January 13, 1975, to be precise.
:and some four months later the Navy selected
:the Northrup/McD-D team to develop its fighter.
No, the navy selected the Northrop/McD-D team. No such company as
Northrup. And the date was May 2, 1975, again in the interests of
precision.
:The *Northrup* YF-17 had
No such aircraft.
:first flown in Jun 74;
The NORTHROP YF-17 was first flown on June 9, 1974.
:the first F-18 would not leave the ground until 1978.
November 18, 1978, to be precise. You are comparing apples and
oranges, though, since that aircraft was part of an FSD batch of 11
aircraft and not merely a flyoff model.
:In short, McD-D did not become involved in the YF-17 program until about
:the same time as the first flight was in the air, and your idea that McD-D
:was somehow intimately involved in the YF-17 development is patently false,
True. Nobody's memory is 100%, Brooks, not even such pompous asses as
yourself. I would have thought, though, that if you were going to
post such an incredible piece of personal sniping as the effort of
yours which I am responding to, you would at least have gone to the
trouble to get the NAME OF THE AIRPLANE COMPANY (NORTHROP) CORRECT.
:along with the inferrence that the LEX on the F-18 got its start from the
:McD-D side of the house.
I'm not responsible for your incorrect inferences. That's one claim I
never made. The INFERENCE is that, having already had much experience
with an aircraft design incorporating the LEX, MCAIR would hardly need
to borrow the concept from BAe many years later for incorporation on
the AV-8B. THAT inference seems to stand.
--
"But if this ever changing world in which we live in
Makes you give in and cry...
Say live and let die."
-- Paul McCartney & Wings
Keith Willshaw
"Braybrook" <Br...@127.0.0.230> wrote in message
news:6sMc9.32622$FJ1.5...@e3500-atl1.usenetserver.com...
I've heard rumors to that effect but I dont know if
they are true.
Keith
Keith Willshaw
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith_w...@no-spam.compuserve.com> wrote:
> :Translation
> :
> :"I know better that the people who merely build and operate
> :the aircraft"
> :
> :There's no arguing with that.
>
> Translation
>
> "I AM stupid enough to expect the complete story to be posted as a
> single paragraph on a public web site."
>
Actually I dont believe that , but I dont believe
they were lying when they referred to it as a
partnership either.
You presumably believe 40% of the airframe content
comes from BaE because Boeing are a really generous
company right ?
> You're right. There is no arguing with that.
>
Thats for sure
> And we'll continue to ignore the little detail that your fairy tale
> timeline requires the complete design of a joint aircraft and rolling
> the first production articles off the new assembly line in less than 3
> years. If you knew anything about the design and construction of
> modern military aircraft, you would know how ludicrous that sounds to
> me.
>
Except I have never made such a claim and have
clearly stated several times that BOTH BaE and
McDonnel Douglas were working on their
respective designs pretty much from the abandonment
of AV-16 up to BaE joining the MDD development.
Both companies supplid know how to the finished
design but McDonnel Douglas had clearly gone
further down the line as is evidenced by the 60/40
content split in their favor.
Keith
Paul J. Adam
Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> writes
>In article <ib82nu4n9q8ohe2qm...@4ax.com>,
> Brad Meyer <brad...@attbi.com> wrote:
>> I doubt it. In all the cases cited (including Falklands) it was
>> understood that the Harriers were no match for their opponents and no
>> attempt was made to use them as air superiority a/c. I do not think
>> the Navy will ever send carriers out to sea without an air superiority
>> a/c aboard.
>
>By some measures, they already do. Depends on whether you listen to the
>USAF or the USN. Either the F-22 is the only realistic 'air dominance'
>option for the future, or it isn't.
>
>Look at the UK perspective: I see 200+ Typhoons arriving on these shores
>over the next 10 years, supported by 7 or more E3s and tankers. This is
>a credible air superiority force - AEW, JTIDS, IRST etc. - and the best
>my nation can muster. Is it just going to sit here awaiting an aggressor
>while the navy goes out to fight with a less capable force? The answer
>seems to be yes. Like the F-22/F-18: something doesn't compute.
Part of it is politics and basing rights. Getting a base depends what
you want to do from it.
Fly tankers and transports and AWACS? Those are just big airliners,
perhaps painted a fetching shade of air superiority grey and with a few
factory-fitted extras..
Fly air-defence fighters? That's a _defensive_ measure, no problem!
Fly attack aircraft on strike missions? That's a nasty warmongering
crime against humanity...
The great advantage of an aircraft carrier is that it gives you a strike
base, which is at least somewhat decoupled from your allies' decision to
let you fly defensive and logistic sorties from their bases.
>> Turkey is on the verge of a radical Islamic erruption if the BBC is
>> correct. It could be successful and deny that base to the US. The
>> Turkish govt could deny the base in a bid to appease the
>> fundamentalists. What could be more friendly is an airstrip one owns
>> outright rather then one that one rents from a dubious landlord.
>
>Yes, you can lose basing opportunities. You can gain others. There's a
>wealth to choose from presently, and only major diplomatic bungling is
>going to blow them all. Why not see if you can lose Diego Garcia :-).
However, the less pressure you put on your allies, and the easier you
make their decision, the more likely you are to get what you want. It's
fundamentally easier to allow tankers, AWACS and defensive air patrols,
than it is to allow strike sorties.
The limiting factor is finding someone willing to let you launch
offensive air missions from their turf. See ELDORADO CANYON in 1986 for
an example: the majority of the sorties, including all the SEAD and
MiGCAP and a lot of the strike, were carrier-based, the land-based F-111
raid being a well-publicised sideshow. Carrier air was just the USN and
Libya facing off as they had done previously and did again later with
little reportage: the USAF flying strikes from Europe made worldwide
news.
--
Paul J. Adam
Matt Clonfero
Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>How well will JSF and FOAEW meet this mission for the UK? The current
FOAEW has been renamed MASC (Maritime Airborne Surveillance and
Control). Whether this is a good or bad thing remains to be seen.
Aetherem Vincere
Matt
--
To err is human
To forgive is not
Air Force Policy
Matt Clonfero
>:Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>:
>:>And should GR7s be equipped with AMRAAM?
>:
>:No air-to-air radar make it a bit on the pointless side. They aren't
>:even getting ASRAAM (which would make them a bit more potent in the air-
>:to-air role)
>
>Harrier II. Am I confused about that? OURS have a radar; the same
>one that's in the F/A-18 Hornet, in fact. And they are cleared for
>AMRAAM carriage.
Same airframe, yes. But the AV-8B Harrier II+ has a different avionics
suite to the Harrier GR.7
Matt Clonfero
Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>Glad to see the group's powers of lateral thinking undiminished.
All Civil Servants despise Treasury staff...
>> Air defence is like cold weather survival - you can never have too many
>> layers.
>
>True, but I was still asking the question assuming the worst case for an
>attack scenario - no top cover for JFH - where the enemy does have a
>defending air force but doesn't have a specialist anti-shipping strike
>force and taking it for granted that the fleet can take care of itself
>with PAAMS (which is very capable on paper). I wouldn't disagree that
>carriers without air defence fighters are more vulnerable in principle.
In 1982, a NATO navy almost got handed its head by a third-world air
force, using 5 ASMs (of which 1 hit its intended target) and a lot of
unguided bombs, delivered by 1960s strike aircraft with no fighter cover
in the face of a CAP, Naval and Army SAMs and lots and lots of gunfire.
With only PAAMS as an outer layer, the furthest you can engage the enemy
is the radar horizon - so you are not going to prevent a strike arriving
over the task force with missiles alone. Couple that to the concept that
many air forces have a range of weapons - from glide bombs, guided bombs
and short-range air to surface missiles which, while not specifically
designed for anti-ship work, will make a real mess out of a warship -
especially a carrier covered in aircraft with fuel, ordnance etc. In
this situation, you want to be killing archers - and preferably from out
of arrow range. Waiting and hoping to kill them as they fire is not good
ju-ju.
>> >Will it be possible, for example, to fit JTIDS to the GR7s, put E3s on
>> >station and use them to stealthily vector some Harriers onto enemy
>> >aggressors? Is it technically feasible to modify the Harriers for this?
>> >Do the E3s have the range (helped by tankers)? Does the UK have enough
>> >strategic bases worldwide for global deployment along these lines?
>>
>> In a word, no.
>
>No to GR7 JTIDS vectoring, or no to E3 global deployment?
IDK about JTIDS on GR.7s; but we don't have a wide enough network of
global bases without host nation support. After all, in 1982 Port
Stanley Airfield was one of our strategic bases.
>> If Sea King was good enough, we wouldn't buy Sentry. The Sentry flies
>> higher and spends more time on station.
>
>That seems to be unarguable. But does this mean you think the E3 should
>be deployed to assist naval air ops?
Where possible; in the same way that Nimrods operate in support of task
forces when they can. But if (for the sake of a poor argument) we had to
win the freedom of the indigenous people of Diego Garcia from the Mongol
Hordes, the E-3s might not be coming to the party
>> >And should GR7s be equipped with AMRAAM?
>>
>> No air-to-air radar make it a bit on the pointless side. They aren't
>> even getting ASRAAM (which would make them a bit more potent in the air-
>> to-air role)
>
>True about AMRAAM. I thought they were getting ASRAAM.
Cancelled, as a cost cutting measure. Did I say cost cutting? I meant
due to changed operations circumstances no longer warranting the
integration of ASRAAM. Yes, that's what I meant.
Brooks
>
>:
>:Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>:>"Keith Willshaw" <keith_w...@no-spam.compuserve.com> wrote:
>:>
>:>:
>:>:"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
>:>:news:aaq6nust8p953fcps...@4ax.com...
>:
>:>And it wasn't the 'Northrop' YF-17.
>:>It was a joint development between Northrop and MCAIR. That's why
>:>MCAIR got the Navy contract to 'Navalize' it; that was the original
>:>agreement between the two companies.
>:
>:No, Fred, you are fantasizing again.
>
>Brooks, you ignorant slut.
Ignorant? Who was the guy who thought that McD-D was a partner in the YF-17
program? Ooops..that's right, that was YOU. As to "slut", you have your genders
confused again, Fred...do you often have problems with gender confusion?
Is that why you so quickly resort to personal attack, because of your own...uhmm...*inadequacy*?
Sad, very sad...
>Some of us call them 'mistakes' when we
>make them.
So, when you screw up, it's merely a mistake...but when others disagree with
your often-warped sense of reality, it's a basis for specious personal attacks?
Interesting dichotomy there...
>Others of you simply pretend you never make one,
>obfuscating and insulting to try to paper over them.
So "slut" is not an (albeit incorrect) insult, right?
>
>:*Northrup* began development of the
>:YF-17 as an in-house program in the mid-60's as amore capable export fighter
>:to complement its successful F-5.
>
>Jack's last name was NORTHROP, not "*Northrup*". No such company as
>"*Northrup*". Brooks, you must be fantasizing again.
Awww...resorting to spelling critique now, are you? My, now that *is* going
to convince a lot of folks that you have a clue regarding your rants...
<snip>
Here comes the part we all like...
>it was at this point that the >agreement I had misremembered as being >earlier
occurred.
Stop the presses! That is as close as we will see Fred come to admitting
he was wrauggg...wroooo...(that's OK, just spit it out, Fred-o...)...WRONG!
There, you did it!
<snip>
>:In short, McD-D did not become involved in the YF-17 program until about
>:the same time as the first flight was in the air, and your idea that McD-D
>:was somehow intimately involved in the YF-17 development is patently false,
>
>True. Nobody's memory is 100%,
Translation: I can be expected to make the occasional mistake, which everyone
should ignore...
>Brooks, not even such pompous asses as
>yourself.
Translation (continued): "...but by God I reserve the right to pummel anyone
else who *I think* is incorrect!"
>I would have thought, though, that if you were going to
>post such an incredible piece of personal sniping as the effort of
>yours which I am responding to, you would at least have gone to the
>trouble to get the NAME OF THE AIRPLANE COMPANY (NORTHROP) CORRECT.
Not a personal sniping exercise; just a correction of your false assertion.
And if my misspelling of Northrop upsets you so much...get away from UseNet
now! There are even worse spellers out there lurking, waiting to assault
your apparently delicate sensibilities. And BTW, you are again wrong regarding
the P-530 being an F-5 replacement; the proper order of the F-5 and related
later projects by Northrop is F-5A (under MAP), F-5E (as a result of the
IFA; note that the P-530 does not fit in there), and then the bad-luck F-20;
the P-530 was intended to result in a more capable (and more expensive) fighter
for those nations who wanted and could afford more than the F-5 offered.
I got that from "the book" (knowing how you like to depend upon such things,
based on your earlier comment to Keith).
Brooks
<snip>
Paul J. Adam
<Matt@[127.0.0.1]> writes
>In article <charlie-49B07B...@dyke.uk.clara.net>, Charlie
>Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>
>>Glad to see the group's powers of lateral thinking undiminished.
>
>All Civil Servants despise Treasury staff...
One of the areas where they share common ground with defence
contractors.
>>True, but I was still asking the question assuming the worst case for an
>>attack scenario
>In 1982, a NATO navy almost got handed its head by a third-world air
>force, using 5 ASMs (of which 1 hit its intended target) and a lot of
>unguided bombs, delivered by 1960s strike aircraft with no fighter cover
>in the face of a CAP, Naval and Army SAMs and lots and lots of gunfire.
In part because that NATO navy had been promised and assured that it
would never have to fight a war out of range of a friendly airbase.
Well, a few Nimrod MR.2s got hasty Sidewinder fits, but it didn't make
them fighters. But other than some Harrier GR.3s and a couple of
Vulcans, they were the limit of direct RAF contribution to that war.
We needed embarked AEW, we needed fighters with significant BVR
capability and a lot more combat persistence, we needed much more
maritime strike, we needed much better shipborne defences.
Admittedly, we provided lessons for our allies (and to a lesser extent
our foes). But we had a _lot_ to learn.
>>True about AMRAAM. I thought they were getting ASRAAM.
>
>Cancelled, as a cost cutting measure. Did I say cost cutting? I meant
>due to changed operations circumstances no longer warranting the
>integration of ASRAAM. Yes, that's what I meant.
Same reason they don't have guns. I don't even believe in the cult of
the gun, but the arguments raised look too much like "save money" than
they do "maximise the effectiveness and safety of HM Forces" for
comfort.
But hey, all I've got for that fight is one vote.
--
Paul J. Adam
Brad Meyer
<pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>We needed embarked AEW, we needed fighters with significant BVR
>capability and a lot more combat persistence, we needed much more
>maritime strike . . .
In fact, you needed either more a/c capacity on your carriers or more
carriers.
>Admittedly, we provided lessons for our allies (and to a lesser extent
>our foes). But we had a _lot_ to learn.
From what I have heard of CVF, the lesson hasn't really sunk in yet.
John 14 15-21
>The limiting factor is finding someone willing to let you launch
>offensive air missions from their turf. See ELDORADO CANYON in 1986 for
>an example: the majority of the sorties, including all the SEAD and
>MiGCAP and a lot of the strike, were carrier-based, the land-based F-111
>raid being a well-publicised sideshow. Carrier air was just the USN and
>Libya facing off as they had done previously and did again later with
>little reportage: the USAF flying strikes from Europe made worldwide
>news.
So your trying to say that a completely USN show on Libya would not have made
the news. I completely disagree. That the USAF can strike from so far is
impressive.
What you say about carriers is true, but their planes often need USAF Tanker
support. Also the USAF can strike anywhere in the world within 24 hours. It can
take weeks to put a carrier(s) in place.
>Paul J. Adam
Remember: Romans 10:9-10, John 14:15-21, Acts 2:38, Eph 2:7-10, Matthew 5:3-16,
I Cor 15, John Chapter Three, Romans Chapter Eight, The Book of First John. :)
http://www.unshackled.org/ Old Time Radio Drama / Lives Changed by Christ
______________________________________________________________________
"Most High, glorious God, enlighten the darkness of my heart, and give me a
right faith, a sure hope, a perfect charity." ---St Francis of Assisi
-
"Reasons last step is the recognition that there is an infinite number of
things that go beyond it"---Blaise Pascal.
Jack Love
wrote:
>Paul J. Adam" pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk wrote:
>
>>The limiting factor is finding someone willing to let you launch
>>offensive air missions from their turf. See ELDORADO CANYON in 1986 for
>>an example: the majority of the sorties, including all the SEAD and
>>MiGCAP and a lot of the strike, were carrier-based, the land-based F-111
>>raid being a well-publicised sideshow. Carrier air was just the USN and
>>Libya facing off as they had done previously and did again later with
>>little reportage: the USAF flying strikes from Europe made worldwide
>>news.
>
>So your trying to say that a completely USN show on Libya would not have made
>the news. I completely disagree. That the USAF can strike from so far is
>impressive.
>
>What you say about carriers is true, but their planes often need USAF Tanker
>support. Also the USAF can strike anywhere in the world within 24 hours. It can
>take weeks to put a carrier(s) in place.
>
And on the second day? And on the 3rd day? And on the 4th day? etc. I
think you'll find USAF is not real thrilled about 26hour missions day
after day after day.
Fred J. McCall
:
:Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
:>"Brooks" <broo...@127.0.0.1> wrote:
:>
:>:
:>:Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
:>:>"Keith Willshaw" <keith_w...@no-spam.compuserve.com> wrote:
:>:>
:>:>:
:>:>:"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
:>:>:news:aaq6nust8p953fcps...@4ax.com...
:>:
:>:>And it wasn't the 'Northrop' YF-17.
:>:>It was a joint development between Northrop and MCAIR. That's why
:>:>MCAIR got the Navy contract to 'Navalize' it; that was the original
:>:>agreement between the two companies.
:>:
:>:No, Fred, you are fantasizing again.
:>
:>Brooks, you ignorant slut.
:
:Ignorant? Who was the guy who thought that McD-D was a partner in the YF-17
:program? Ooops..that's right, that was YOU. As to "slut", you have your genders
:confused again, Fred...do you often have problems with gender confusion?
:Is that why you so quickly resort to personal attack, because of your own...uhmm...*inadequacy*?
:Sad, very sad...
I see. You insult me and when you get slapped back, it's deplorable
that *I* "so quickly resort to personal attack". How conVEEEENient.
Oh, and for cultural literacy, give yourself an F. That wasn't an
insult so much as a joke. See early Saturday Night Live shows, with
Chevy Chase and Jane Curtin. "Jane, you ignorant slut...."
[And words like 'slut' and 'bitch' are often used as gender neutral
these days, despite dictionary definitions. Sorry you're so
confused.]
:>Some of us call them 'mistakes' when we
:>make them.
:
:So, when you screw up, it's merely a mistake...but when others disagree with
:your often-warped sense of reality, it's a basis for specious personal attacks?
:Interesting dichotomy there...
Yes, it is. What's most interesting about it, of course, is that it's
just another obvious product of your high fever.
:>Others of you simply pretend you never make one,
:>obfuscating and insulting to try to paper over them.
:
:So "slut" is not an (albeit incorrect) insult, right?
See above.
:>:*Northrup* began development of the
:>:YF-17 as an in-house program in the mid-60's as amore capable export fighter
:>:to complement its successful F-5.
:>
:>Jack's last name was NORTHROP, not "*Northrup*". No such company as
:>"*Northrup*". Brooks, you must be fantasizing again.
:
:Awww...resorting to spelling critique now, are you? My, now that *is* going
:to convince a lot of folks that you have a clue regarding your rants...
It's certainly an indicator of YOUR merit. Hard to believe that
you're carrying a grudge that leads to you having to leap into this
particular 'fray' and you can't even get the name of the aircraft
company right.
Lesson for you, Brooksie. If you're going to be a prig over other
folk's errors, try MUCH harder not to make simple ones yourself in the
process of your personal attacks.
:Here comes the part we all like...
You got a turd in your pocket?
:>it was at this point that the >agreement I had misremembered as being >earlier
:occurred.
:
:Stop the presses! That is as close as we will see Fred come to admitting
:he was wrauggg...wroooo...(that's OK, just spit it out, Fred-o...)...WRONG!
:There, you did it!
I do it a lot, Brooksie. Your problem with me is that I don't do it
when I'm not wrong, which is pretty much any time I disagree with one
of your more silly statements.
And the last time YOU admitted error was when, again? You seem to be
suffering from a serious problem with role reversal here....
:>:In short, McD-D did not become involved in the YF-17 program until about
:>:the same time as the first flight was in the air, and your idea that McD-D
:>:was somehow intimately involved in the YF-17 development is patently false,
:>
:>True. Nobody's memory is 100%,
:
:Translation: I can be expected to make the occasional mistake, which everyone
:should ignore...
:
:>Brooks, not even such pompous asses as
:>yourself.
:
:Translation (continued): "...but by God I reserve the right to pummel anyone
:else who *I think* is incorrect!"
I think Brooksie's 'translations' stand by themselves, without
comment. They say more about his grudge than they do about anything
having to do with me.
:>I would have thought, though, that if you were going to
:>post such an incredible piece of personal sniping as the effort of
:>yours which I am responding to, you would at least have gone to the
:>trouble to get the NAME OF THE AIRPLANE COMPANY (NORTHROP) CORRECT.
:
:Not a personal sniping exercise; just a correction of your false assertion.
And that, of course, is why you immediately started with phrases like
"you are fantasizing again". Sorry, Brooksie, but the innocent act
just doesn't quite wash.
:And if my misspelling of Northrop upsets you so much...get away from UseNet
:now! There are even worse spellers out there lurking, waiting to assault
:your apparently delicate sensibilities. And BTW, you are again wrong regarding
:the P-530 being an F-5 replacement; the proper order of the F-5 and related
:later projects by Northrop is F-5A (under MAP), F-5E (as a result of the
:IFA; note that the P-530 does not fit in there), and then the bad-luck F-20;
:the P-530 was intended to result in a more capable (and more expensive) fighter
:for those nations who wanted and could afford more than the F-5 offered.
:I got that from "the book" (knowing how you like to depend upon such things,
:based on your earlier comment to Keith).
Then our books would appear to disagree. I suggest you take it up
with Lee Begin.
"By 1967 the decision had been taken to design a Mach 2 air
superiority fighter with secondary capability in other roles. The
potential market was assessed at about 3,000 aircraft, of which the
Northrop share could be about one-third, and the main types the new
fighter could be expected to replace were the F-5, the Lockheed F-104
Starfighter and the Dassault Mirage III."
That seems a pretty clear statement of what they thought they were
doing when they started working toward what became the P-530 Cobra
design.
A few additional corrections for you. The F-5A wasn't developed under
MAP, as you imply. It was developed on Northrop money and only later
selected for sale under MAP.
Yes, the F-5E was selected as the winner of the IFA. That was at the
end of 1970, with first flight in mid-1972, which was several years
before any flyable hardware from the P-530 program existed to be
evaluated. The P-530 doesn't "fit in there" (between the -A and -E
models) because it was still undergoing wind tunnel testing when the
first F-5Es were flying. In other words, it doesn't fit in there
because it came AFTER the F-5E. It was common for Northrop to run
several generations of designs overlapped and several different
designs of the same generation in parallel.
As for the F-5G (aka F-20), it came AFTER the P-530 design had grown
into the YF-18 Cobra (subsequent to the Navy evaluation and the
involvement of MCAIR) and was indeed an effort to come up with
something cheaper than the YF-18 aircraft for current F-5E users.
Plans change, you see, and the YF-18 had become a much more expensive
aircraft than the original YF-17 and P-530 designs originally called
for. Given no assembly line for the YF-17, Northrop had the choice of
trying to market a cheaper version of the YF-18 (probably not
practical, as the airframe and avionics by this time had become
overkill for the mission of replacing the Tiger II) or designing a new
F-5 variant. They elected to undertake the latter course in 1975 with
the original F-5/404 design studies, although it was a pretty
low-level 'Mafia' effort until three years later and wasn't a real
airplane until the 1980 time frame.
If you want to snipe, at least try to get it right, Brooksie....
--
"If you grab them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow."
-- Chuck Colson
Andrew McCruden
"John 14 15-21" <thena...@aol.comsec> wrote in message
news:20020902224128...@mb-ca.aol.com...
> What you say about carriers is true, but their planes often need USAF
Tanker
> support. Also the USAF can strike anywhere in the world within 24 hours.
It can
> take weeks to put a carrier(s) in place.
its true the USAF can _strike_ within 24 hours, but thats _just_ strike. a
CVBG group can perform a wider range of missions, CAP, Recon, CAS, Maritime
interdiction, SOF support, and can do so in a mnore sustained manner, much
ealier than the USAF can get equivalents in place by shiping AIrcraft to a
local base and getting them supplied and set up for operations (assuming
local bases are availble).
Iain Rae
> In message <Mhy2MRBm...@ntlworld.com>, Matt Clonfero
> <Matt@[127.0.0.1]> writes
>
>> In article <charlie-49B07B...@dyke.uk.clara.net>, Charlie
>> Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
>>
>>> Glad to see the group's powers of lateral thinking undiminished.
>>
>>
>> All Civil Servants despise Treasury staff...
>
>
> One of the areas where they share common ground with defence contractors.
>
>>> True, but I was still asking the question assuming the worst case for an
>>> attack scenario
>>
>
>> In 1982, a NATO navy almost got handed its head by a third-world air
>> force, using 5 ASMs (of which 1 hit its intended target)
Umm that depends what you mean by intended target, the Carriers (which
was supposed to be their intended target) no. One of the blobs on the
Radar screens yes.
>>and a lot of
>> unguided bombs, delivered by 1960s strike aircraft with no fighter cover
>> in the face of a CAP, Naval and Army SAMs and lots and lots of gunfire.
>
>
> In part because that NATO navy had been promised and assured that it
> would never have to fight a war out of range of a friendly airbase.
>
> Well, a few Nimrod MR.2s got hasty Sidewinder fits, but it didn't make
> them fighters. But other than some Harrier GR.3s and a couple of
> Vulcans,
Don't forget the entire tanker fleet.
> they were the limit of direct RAF contribution to that war.
>
Actually probably the biggest contribution to the Falklands war effort
by the RAF is the two that are always missed out, the additional
helicopter airlift, particularly the chinook and the Herky bird support.
Arguably the GR 3's could have been left at home yes they were better
suited to the ground attack role but the Shars could have done this at a
pinch. They were originally sent down to replace all those Sea Harriers
which were going to get shot out of the sky.
> We needed embarked AEW,
yes and I'm betting someone had the AEW Sea Kings in mind but was
looking for a nice quiet budget they could sneak the development money
out of.
> we needed fighters with significant BVR
> capability and a lot more combat persistence, we needed much more
> maritime strike, we needed much better shipborne defences.
>
yes, we did, it could have been a lot worse since there was a lot of
sneaking around involved in getting the Invincibles and a few months on
and we wouldn't have had half the task force.
> Admittedly, we provided lessons for our allies (and to a lesser extent
> our foes). But we had a _lot_ to learn.
>
Sadly we seem not to have learned some of the most important things.
Opps sorry I mean sadly the Politicians seem to know better the armed
forces requirements that those that serve in them.
Andrew McCruden
"Iain Rae" <ia...@inf.ed.ac.uk> wrote in message
news:3D746A4F...@inf.ed.ac.uk...
> Paul J. Adam wrote:
> > In message <Mhy2MRBm...@ntlworld.com>, Matt Clonfero
> > <Matt@[127.0.0.1]> writes
> >
> >> In article <charlie-49B07B...@dyke.uk.clara.net>, Charlie
> >> Whitaker <cha...@plan-consult.com.null> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Glad to see the group's powers of lateral thinking undiminished.
> >>
> >>
> >> All Civil Servants despise Treasury staff...
> >
> >
> > One of the areas where they share common ground with defence
contractors.
> >
> >>> True, but I was still asking the question assuming the worst case for
an
> >>> attack scenario
> >>
> >
> >> In 1982, a NATO navy almost got handed its head by a third-world air
> >> force, using 5 ASMs (of which 1 hit its intended target)
>
> Umm that depends what you mean by intended target, the Carriers (which
> was supposed to be their intended target) no. One of the blobs on the
> Radar screens yes.
Arguably the objective of the first raid was just to hit warships, and only
the subsequent raid specifically targeted the Carriers rather than just
identify the Carriers as the most desirable possilbe targets.
> > Well, a few Nimrod MR.2s got hasty Sidewinder fits, but it didn't make
> > them fighters. But other than some Harrier GR.3s and a couple of
> > Vulcans,
>
> Don't forget the entire tanker fleet.
Who's main contribution (appart from supporting the Ferry of GR.3's ) was to
support the Nimrods and Vulcans
> > they were the limit of direct RAF contribution to that war.
> >
>
> Actually probably the biggest contribution to the Falklands war effort
> by the RAF is the two that are always missed out, the additional
> helicopter airlift, particularly the chinook and the Herky bird support.
Indeed, but much of it went away because of delays unloading Atlantic
conveyor (however if she HAD been unloaded of the Helos, descanliation plant
and PSP strip she might well have had harriers on board when she was hit, as
she spent much time operating as a spare deck)
> Arguably the GR 3's could have been left at home yes they were better
> suited to the ground attack role but the Shars could have done this at a
> pinch. They were originally sent down to replace all those Sea Harriers
> which were going to get shot out of the sky.
I would dissagree,. the GR.3's added a level of reserve to the fast mover
assests, however it proved that keeping the Surface combatant numbers up and
the supply of Beans and Bullets was more proablematic than SHAR's but it
might have been different if the land based FAA had tried harder to contest
the air from the Sea Based one. (for instance what if initally half the
A-4's flew with 3 drop tanks and 2 sidewinders to CAP over west Falkland
with the Daggters and Mirgaes in support, OK time on station wouldn't have
been high, but they could havew increaced harrier Losses considerably)
Odd question I know the Argentines sidewinders were tail chase models but
were they late USN models Like the AIM-9G's the Fleet Air Arm/RAF had prior
to the AIM-9L or were they earlier AIM-9B's, or even USAF type AIM-9E's or
J's?
> Sadly we seem not to have learned some of the most important things.
>
> Opps sorry I mean sadly the Politicians seem to know better the armed
> forces requirements that those that serve in them.
That seems to have always been the case.
Andrew McCruden
"Brad Meyer" <brad...@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:ad78nu4fcgbap6nbp...@4ax.com...
> On Tue, 3 Sep 2002 00:38:58 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
> <pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>
> >We needed embarked AEW, we needed fighters with significant BVR
> >capability and a lot more combat persistence, we needed much more
> >maritime strike . . .
>
> In fact, you needed either more a/c capacity on your carriers or more
> carriers.
The proablems were MUCH more fundamental than that, ships like the Type 21
and Type 42 had been commisioning for years without modern close in AAW
defenses, (the Sea Cat was there but Sea Cat hadn't been modern since the
60's and was too optimised for low mass and easy retrofitablity) even the
two classes of ships without the first weakness (the Batch 3A lenader refits
and the Type 22)lacked the most Versatile weapon Naval system available (the
DP gun, what other Weapon system can contribute to both AAW and ASuW, even
if its main use is really fire support for troops ashore) on to of all that
the electrics and electronics weren't being designed with sufficent eye to
damage worthiness.
Even the Weaknesses in the Fleet Air Arm cannot really be simplified down to
"needed more Carrier capacity"
> >Admittedly, we provided lessons for our allies (and to a lesser extent
> >our foes). But we had a _lot_ to learn.
>
> From what I have heard of CVF, the lesson hasn't really sunk in yet.
Really? CV(F) is intended to carry significantly more aircraft (although
admitedly the focus of the Project is more on sortie rates than actaul
aircraft numbers per se) I don't see how this misses your lesson, Even if it
won't bring the ships up to CVN levels, (although if Thales are to be
belived a 70,000 ton CV(F) is actaully quite likely)
More CV's even samller ones, would not be affordable*1, or without a
parralell increace the size of our surface combatant fleet, justifiable.
*1 On our current budget, IMO we should bite the bullet and admit that both
local sea control AND power projection are requiremnets on the RN, and
always will be in the real world*2, double the number of MCMV's and surface
combantants and add a lower tier 2-Carrier class (not far off the
Invincibles for size) to command the Atlantic group and complement the CV(F)
if nessesacy in the power projection group, but the resulting Tax increace
would be to say the least unpopular
*2 IE: with polticians (of one kind or another) in charge, Politicains want
to intervene in any crisis that presents itself, but do also implicitly
expect the RN to sumultainiously exersize Sea Control wherever it might be
needed.
Brooks
Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>"Brooks" <broo...@127.0.0.1> wrote:
>
>:
>:Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
<snip>
>:
>:Stop the presses! That is as close as we will see Fred come to admitting
>:he was wrauggg...wroooo...(that's OK, just spit it out, Fred-o...)...WRONG!
>:There, you did it!
>
>I do it a lot, Brooksie.
H'mmm...such as?
<snip>
>And the last time YOU admitted error was when, again? You seem to be
>suffering from a serious problem with role reversal here....
Not at all. Actually, the last time was just this past week, when Keith questioned
my statement regarding whether or not the Lt. Taylor's famous missing Avengers
had been found. I even offered to dine on a nice meal of crow. And your last
time (other than when forced to here) was...?
>
>:>:In short, McD-D did not become involved in the YF-17 program until about
>:>:the same time as the first flight was in the air, and your idea that
McD-D
>:>:was somehow intimately involved in the YF-17 development is patently
false,
>:>
>:>True. Nobody's memory is 100%,
>:
>:Translation: I can be expected to make the occasional mistake, which everyone
>:should ignore...
>:
>:>Brooks, not even such pompous asses as
>:>yourself.
>:
>:Translation (continued): "...but by God I reserve the right to pummel anyone
>:else who *I think* is incorrect!"
>
>I think Brooksie's 'translations' stand by themselves, without
>comment. They say more about his grudge than they do about anything
>having to do with me.
No grudge. Just an observation that you went rather out of the way to "correct"
Keith, in this case, and rather snidely (as you are so accustomed to doing),
and were in the end quite wrong yourself.
>
>:>I would have thought, though, that if you were going to
>:>post such an incredible piece of personal sniping as the effort of
>:>yours which I am responding to, you would at least have gone to the
>:>trouble to get the NAME OF THE AIRPLANE COMPANY (NORTHROP) CORRECT.
>:
>:Not a personal sniping exercise; just a correction of your false assertion.
>
>And that, of course, is why you immediately started with phrases like
>"you are fantasizing again". Sorry, Brooksie, but the innocent act
>just doesn't quite wash.
Awww...well, having seen some of your recent insults directed at various
posters, I assumed you might have a thicker skin. I am so sorry for using
such a "personally abusive" phrase such as "fantasizing"...
>
>:And if my misspelling of Northrop upsets you so much...get away from UseNet
>:now! There are even worse spellers out there lurking, waiting to assault
>:your apparently delicate sensibilities. And BTW, you are again wrong regarding
>:the P-530 being an F-5 replacement; the proper order of the F-5 and related
>:later projects by Northrop is F-5A (under MAP), F-5E (as a result of the
>:IFA; note that the P-530 does not fit in there), and then the bad-luck
F-20;
>:the P-530 was intended to result in a more capable (and more expensive)
fighter
>:for those nations who wanted and could afford more than the F-5 offered.
>:I got that from "the book" (knowing how you like to depend upon such things,
>:based on your earlier comment to Keith).
>
>Then our books would appear to disagree. I suggest you take it up
>with Lee Begin.
>
>"By 1967 the decision had been taken to design a Mach 2 air
>superiority fighter with secondary capability in other roles. The
>potential market was assessed at about 3,000 aircraft, of which the
>Northrop share could be about one-third, and the main types the new
>fighter could be expected to replace were the F-5, the Lockheed F-104
>Starfighter and the Dassault Mirage III."
>
>That seems a pretty clear statement of what they thought they were
>doing when they started working toward what became the P-530 Cobra
>design.
You are drawing an expanded conclusion; Begin is correct in his assertion
that the P-530 would have been attractive to *some* F-5 customers, but nowhere
does he say that the P-530 was to replace the F-5 in Northrop's offering
of aircraft. As Angelucci and Bowers noted, the market for the P-530 was
intended to be those nations who wanted more performance than the F-5 and
were willing to pay for it; many nations could not, and Northrop had no plans
to drop the F-5 line in favor of the P-530. If you try to make Begin's statement
meet your requirements (that it was intended to replace the F-5 in the Northrop
stable), then one wonders why they were doing the F-5E at the same time as
the P-530, and why the F-20 followed the F-5E. And it is interesting that
Begin used the same identification of platforms that the P-530 was to replace
(F-5A, Mirage, and F-104) that are mentioned by others as being the goal
of the IFA...which as you know was won by the F-5E. Just more evidence that
Northrop realized that the market would continue to support the need for
true low cost (and lower capability) fighters, and that the P-530 would not
be able to fill that need.
>
>A few additional corrections for you. The F-5A wasn't developed under
>MAP, as you imply. It was developed on Northrop money and only later
>selected for sale under MAP.
Not a correction in this case. I did not say, or intend to imply, that it
was developed under MAP; but it was selected to be the low-cost fighter that
the US would market under MAP. MAP is what made it successful.
>
>Yes, the F-5E was selected as the winner of the IFA. That was at the
>end of 1970, with first flight in mid-1972, which was several years
>before any flyable hardware from the P-530 program existed to be
>evaluated. The P-530 doesn't "fit in there" (between the -A and -E
>models) because it was still undergoing wind tunnel testing when the
>first F-5Es were flying. In other words, it doesn't fit in there
>because it came AFTER the F-5E. It was common for Northrop to run
>several generations of designs overlapped and several different
>designs of the same generation in parallel.
I note no correction there, just your "clarification" of your position. So
apparently you are agreeing that the F-5A was intended to be followed by/replaced
by within the Northrop stable by the F-5E, not the P-530.
>
>As for the F-5G (aka F-20), it came AFTER the P-530 design had grown
>into the YF-18 Cobra (subsequent to the Navy evaluation and the
>involvement of MCAIR) and was indeed an effort to come up with
>something cheaper than the YF-18 aircraft for current F-5E users.
>Plans change, you see, and the YF-18 had become a much more expensive
>aircraft than the original YF-17 and P-530 designs originally called
>for. Given no assembly line for the YF-17, Northrop had the choice of
>trying to market a cheaper version of the YF-18 (probably not
>practical, as the airframe and avionics by this time had become
>overkill for the mission of replacing the Tiger II) or designing a new
>F-5 variant. They elected to undertake the latter course in 1975 with
>the original F-5/404 design studies, although it was a pretty
>low-level 'Mafia' effort until three years later and wasn't a real
>airplane until the 1980 time frame.
Again, I see no correction there. The fact is that the Northrop continued
with development of the F-5 line (though the F-20 was a "radical" form of
continuation; the nose was different, the aft fuselage was redesigned, the
LEX/wing combo did not match the F-5E's, and the avionics were almost entirely
new) rather than pursue any P-600/YF-17/F-18 developments (and the issue
you raise of not having a F-17 assembly line would not matter; the F-20 would
have required new tooling and jigs as well, so they offered similar challenges
in that regard).
>
>If you want to snipe, at least try to get it right, Brooksie....
Sorry, but I am not seeing all of these "corrections" you keep mumbling about.
Brooks
Guy Alcala
> "Iain Rae" <ia...@inf.ed.ac.uk> wrote in message
> news:3D746A4F...@inf.ed.ac.uk...
> > Paul J. Adam wrote:> > Well, a few Nimrod MR.2s got hasty Sidewinder fits,
> but it didn't make
> > > them fighters. But other than some Harrier GR.3s and a couple of
> > > Vulcans,
> >
> > Don't forget the entire tanker fleet.
>
> Who's main contribution (appart from supporting the Ferry of GR.3's ) was to
> support the Nimrods and Vulcans.
And those rather important Hercules supply/personnel dropping flights. Early
on, while the task groups were still relatively far north, it was possible to
just use the Hercs that had hastily been modded with internal auxiliary tanks,
but as the ships got further south it became necessary to air-refuel the Hercs
(some of which had been equally hastily modded with probes).
> > > they were the limit of direct RAF contribution to that war.
Plus the numerous VC-10 supply flights to Ascension, as well as other places.
> > Actually probably the biggest contribution to the Falklands war effort
> > by the RAF is the two that are always missed out, the additional
> > helicopter airlift, particularly the chinook and the Herky bird support.
>
> Indeed, but much of it went away because of delays unloading Atlantic
> conveyor (however if she HAD been unloaded of the Helos, descanliation plant
> and PSP strip she might well have had harriers on board when she was hit, as
> she spent much time operating as a spare deck)
Once unloaded, Atlantic Conveyor wouldn't have been used as a spare deck for
Harriers, except for emergency recoveries. Keeping helos on her, OTOH, probably
would have been done, just as it was with her more elaborately converted sister
Atlantic Causeway, which IIRR spent a lot of time in San Carlos Water
maintaining helos and acting as a flotating base for them.
> > Arguably the GR 3's could have been left at home yes they were better
> > suited to the ground attack role but the Shars could have done this at a
> > pinch. They were originally sent down to replace all those Sea Harriers
> > which were going to get shot out of the sky.
>
> I would dissagree,. the GR.3's added a level of reserve to the fast mover
> assests, however it proved that keeping the Surface combatant numbers up and
> the supply of Beans and Bullets was more proablematic than SHAR's but it
> might have been different if the land based FAA had tried harder to contest
> the air from the Sea Based one. (for instance what if initally half the
> A-4's flew with 3 drop tanks and 2 sidewinders to CAP over west Falkland
> with the Daggters and Mirgaes in support, OK time on station wouldn't have
> been high, but they could havew increaced harrier Losses considerably).
West Falkland was essentially irrelevant, and CAPs (I presume you mean at
altitude) would have been sitting ducks for either SHAR/AIM9Ls or Sea Dart.
> Odd question I know the Argentines sidewinders were tail chase models but
> were they late USN models Like the AIM-9G's the Fleet Air Arm/RAF had prior
> to the AIM-9L or were they earlier AIM-9B's, or even USAF type AIM-9E's or
> J's?
AIM-9Bs, and they had little or no training with them (IIRC, it was only CANA
Skyhawks that had ever seen them), nor did they have any ACM training. Using a
higher percentage of Daggers/Mirages as CAP/escort with Shafrirs/Magics (the
R.530 is pretty hopeless) might have paid off, although given the large
percentage of the strike force the Daggers made up such use would have severely
limited the number of strikers. In the event Grupo 6's Daggers proved fairly
ineffective in the strike role (Grupo 5's A-4Bs did the majority of the damage),
but they did occasionally draw the SHARs attention away when A-4s were inbound.
The Daggers had a decent chance of doing so safely because they could outrun the
SHARs (if they spotted them early enough), something the A-4s were incapable
of. The FueAA (to distinguish them from the British FAA) might have benefited
from employing more Mirages/Daggers as escorts, but after the losses on 1 May
they seem to have been completely intimidated by the AIM-9L, and by the
knowledge that they were tactically outclassed.
Guy
Paul J. Adam
<thena...@aol.comsec> writes
>Paul J. Adam" pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk wrote:
>>The limiting factor is finding someone willing to let you launch
>>offensive air missions from their turf. See ELDORADO CANYON in 1986 for
>>an example: the majority of the sorties, including all the SEAD and
>>MiGCAP and a lot of the strike, were carrier-based, the land-based F-111
>>raid being a well-publicised sideshow. Carrier air was just the USN and
>>Libya facing off as they had done previously and did again later with
>>little reportage: the USAF flying strikes from Europe made worldwide
>>news.
>
>So your trying to say that a completely USN show on Libya would not have made
>the news.
The previous incidents (patrol boats crippled, aircraft shot down, SAM
sites suppressed) didn't make much noise, and the naval part of the
operation was almost unreported: what made the event newsworthy was that
the USAF had hit Libya from Upper Heyford.
>What you say about carriers is true, but their planes often need USAF Tanker
>support. Also the USAF can strike anywhere in the world within 24 hours.
Sustainability? Force delivered? Need for tanking & SEAD?
--
Paul J. Adam
Paul J. Adam
<brad...@attbi.com> writes
In what way?
--
Paul J. Adam
Brooks
"Paul J. Adam" <pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In message <20020902224128...@mb-ca.aol.com>, John 14 15-21
><thena...@aol.comsec> writes
>>Paul J. Adam" pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk wrote:
>>>The limiting factor is finding someone willing to let you launch
>>>offensive air missions from their turf. See ELDORADO CANYON in 1986 for
>>>an example: the majority of the sorties, including all the SEAD and
>>>MiGCAP and a lot of the strike, were carrier-based, the land-based F-111
>>>raid being a well-publicised sideshow. Carrier air was just the USN and
>>>Libya facing off as they had done previously and did again later with
>>>little reportage: the USAF flying strikes from Europe made worldwide
>>>news.
>>
>>So your trying to say that a completely USN show on Libya would not have
made
>>the news.
>
>The previous incidents (patrol boats crippled, aircraft shot down, SAM
>sites suppressed) didn't make much noise, and the naval part of the
>operation was almost unreported: what made the event newsworthy was that
>the USAF had hit Libya from Upper Heyford.
Paul, in this case I think you are taking what was "newsworthy" in the UK
and trying to apply the same criteria here in the US. I can assure you that
when the F-14's engaged the Libyan Su's and (IIRC) faced off with the Mig-23's,
it received prominent coverage in the US market. Eldorado Canyon was also
covered as a joint operation over here; video of both USAF and USN strikes
were shown on the news, and there was significant coverage regarding the
use of USN SEAD (especially targeting the SA-5 sites, again IIRC). After
all, USN CV operational capabilities are only exceeded by USN PAO capabilities.<g>
>
>>What you say about carriers is true, but their planes often need USAF Tanker
>>support. Also the USAF can strike anywhere in the world within 24 hours.
>
>Sustainability? Force delivered? Need for tanking & SEAD?
Agree with you there. Too many folks who think that the USAF long range bombers
can "do it all" forget that there are frequently other supporting requirements
(i.e., as you mention, SEAD), and that efficient use of long range air requires
good targeting (if the bad guy is elusive, or the threat is not fully known,
it is hard to tell the B-1's/B-2's where to go) and do not have unlimited
time-on-station capabilities.
Brooks
>
>--
>Paul J. Adam
Brad Meyer
<use...@beyond-comprehension.fsnet.co.uk> wrote:
>Even the Weaknesses in the Fleet Air Arm cannot really be simplified down to
>"needed more Carrier capacity"
Perhaps, but had they been flying a first class air superiority a/c
(like the F-14) and had on-board air tankers, most of the other lacks
would have been well hidden and not led to the damage the fleet
suffered.
>> >Admittedly, we provided lessons for our allies (and to a lesser extent
>> >our foes). But we had a _lot_ to learn.
>>
>> From what I have heard of CVF, the lesson hasn't really sunk in yet.
>
>Really? CV(F) is intended to carry significantly more aircraft (although
>admitedly the focus of the Project is more on sortie rates than actaul
>aircraft numbers per se) I don't see how this misses your lesson, Even if it
>won't bring the ships up to CVN levels, (although if Thales are to be
>belived a 70,000 ton CV(F) is actaully quite likely)
When I see it . . .
>More CV's even samller ones, would not be affordable*1 . . .
This is the real issue. They are cutting their pattern to fit their
cloth, rather then passing altogether. They are a second rank military
power wanting a first class Navy.
Brad Meyer
<pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In message <ad78nu4fcgbap6nbp...@4ax.com>, Brad Meyer
><brad...@attbi.com> writes
>>On Tue, 3 Sep 2002 00:38:58 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
>><pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>Admittedly, we provided lessons for our allies (and to a lesser extent
>>>our foes). But we had a _lot_ to learn.
>>
>>From what I have heard of CVF, the lesson hasn't really sunk in yet.
>
>In what way?
The ideas I have seen are still about a smaller air-group of VSTOL
type a/c without provision for air tankerage and AEW. Perhaps that
will change by the time they are actually built.
Matt Clonfero
<pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>All Civil Servants despise Treasury staff...
>
>One of the areas where they share common ground with defence
>contractors.
In fact, does *anyone* like them? I always get an image of the
accounting trolls from Dilbert...
>>In 1982, a NATO navy almost got handed its head by a third-world air
>>force, using 5 ASMs (of which 1 hit its intended target) and a lot of
>>unguided bombs, delivered by 1960s strike aircraft with no fighter cover
>>in the face of a CAP, Naval and Army SAMs and lots and lots of gunfire.
>
>In part because that NATO navy had been promised and assured that it
>would never have to fight a war out of range of a friendly airbase.
They shouldn't have believed it. It was a big failing in plans; but
which navy would have been in a better position, apart from the USN?
Certainly the Soviet Union - if they could even have sustained a force
at that range - for the size of their navy, they were short on UNREP
capability. Then again, any navy that planned to fight the US Navy would
have been big on anti-air defences in a way that most NATO navies did
without.
Maybe the French - the Crusader wasn't a bad aircraft; but their escorts
were no better than the contemporary RN ones.
>Well, a few Nimrod MR.2s got hasty Sidewinder fits, but it didn't make
>them fighters. But other than some Harrier GR.3s and a couple of
>Vulcans, they were the limit of direct RAF contribution to that war.
Ahem. Canberra; or doesn't intel and recce count as a direct
contribution? You might also mention the stirling service put in by
Bravo November...
(Someone remind me why I'm defending the Crabs?)
>We needed embarked AEW, we needed fighters with significant BVR
>capability and a lot more combat persistence, we needed much more
>maritime strike, we needed much better shipborne defences.
And that's what we're giving away with Sea Harrier.
>>Cancelled, as a cost cutting measure. Did I say cost cutting? I meant
>>due to changed operations circumstances no longer warranting the
>>integration of ASRAAM. Yes, that's what I meant.
>
>Same reason they don't have guns. I don't even believe in the cult of
>the gun, but the arguments raised look too much like "save money" than
>they do "maximise the effectiveness and safety of HM Forces" for
>comfort.
I still think that the aircraft gun is a good all round tool; and
integrated into the airframe doesn't cost that much - probably about the
same as one cabinet junket to foreign parts. Of course, we both know
which one is going to be cut...
Matt Clonfero
<ia...@inf.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>>> In 1982, a NATO navy almost got handed its head by a third-world air
>>> force, using 5 ASMs (of which 1 hit its intended target)
>
>Umm that depends what you mean by intended target, the Carriers (which
>was supposed to be their intended target) no. One of the blobs on the
>Radar screens yes.
Two aimed at SHEFFIELD, one hit one missed
Two aimed at AMBUSCADE, both decoyed and hit Atlantic Conveyor
One aimed at, well either EXETER or AVENGER, missed
>Arguably the GR 3's could have been left at home yes they were better
>suited to the ground attack role but the Shars could have done this at a
>pinch. They were originally sent down to replace all those Sea Harriers
>which were going to get shot out of the sky.
Fundamentally, the Sea Harrier was the only aircraft that could
contribute to the fleet air defence, so it made sense not to use them
for mud moving. However, it would be rude to leave the troops with no
air support; so the GR.3 was called in.
>> We needed embarked AEW,
>
>yes and I'm betting someone had the AEW Sea Kings in mind but was
>looking for a nice quiet budget they could sneak the development money
>out of.
Always the way.
>Sadly we seem not to have learned some of the most important things.
>
>Opps sorry I mean sadly the Politicians seem to know better the armed
>forces requirements that those that serve in them.
Sadly, lessons learnt sometimes need to be re-learnt. The RN knew an
awful lot about ship construction and damage control by 1945; but by
1982 we had SHEFFIELD burn up due to a lack of redundancy in DC
equipment and an excess of flammable, toxic material.
Matt Clonfero
<use...@beyond-comprehension.fsnet.co.uk> wrote:
>*1 On our current budget, IMO we should bite the bullet and admit that both
>local sea control AND power projection are requiremnets on the RN, and
>always will be in the real world*2, double the number of MCMV's and surface
>combantants and add a lower tier 2-Carrier class (not far off the
>Invincibles for size) to command the Atlantic group and complement the CV(F)
>if nessesacy in the power projection group, but the resulting Tax increace
>would be to say the least unpopular
Take it out of the Social Services budget...
Paul J. Adam
>"Paul J. Adam" <pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>The previous incidents (patrol boats crippled, aircraft shot down, SAM
>>sites suppressed) didn't make much noise, and the naval part of the
>>operation was almost unreported: what made the event newsworthy was that
>>the USAF had hit Libya from Upper Heyford.
>
>Paul, in this case I think you are taking what was "newsworthy" in the UK
>and trying to apply the same criteria here in the US.
Sorry, not my intention - I was only referring to the ripples raised in
the foreign press.
I'm sure the US was justly proud of its achievements (admittedly,
beating up Libya wasn't the toughest job, but the pilots dodging SA-5s
were still being shot at and the responses were proficient and
effective) in guaranteeing freedom of navigation across Sirte, but it
wasn't widely reported outside the US.
Using USAF assets from an allied nation when others had refused support
and overflight made it a massive story, while if it had been an all-USN
show then Eldorado Canyon would be as well remembered as Praying Mantis,
or the USN operations off Lebanon in 1983, outside the US.
"Keeping it naval" seems to reduce the smoke.
--
Paul J. Adam
Paul J. Adam
<brad...@attbi.com> writes
Then the ideas you have seen are sadly in error. The air group (up to 48
aircraft) is (according to Jane's) required to surge 130 sorties per day
and sustain 100, and MASC (Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control)
is a key part of the program: indeed, may be driving the carriers
towards CTOL.
MASC is live, as is the FJCA decision process - the Investment
Appraisals Board have met twice and failed to decide between STOVL and
CTOL JSF - and CVF is _definitely_ a live and capable project.
Main Gate will be the kicker, of course.
--
Paul J. Adam
Brad Meyer
<pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In message <tr5anu4h9p86j2efe...@4ax.com>, Brad Meyer
><brad...@attbi.com> writes
>>On Tue, 3 Sep 2002 17:46:58 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
>><pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>In what way?
>>
>>The ideas I have seen are still about a smaller air-group of VSTOL
>>type a/c without provision for air tankerage and AEW.
>
>Then the ideas you have seen are sadly in error. The air group (up to 48
>aircraft) is (according to Jane's) required to surge 130 sorties per day
>and sustain 100, and MASC (Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control)
>is a key part of the program: indeed, may be driving the carriers
>towards CTOL.
IMO if and when it arrives a CTOL one can start talking of a "real"
carrier.
Fred J. McCall
:In message <20020902224128...@mb-ca.aol.com>, John 14 15-21
:<thena...@aol.comsec> writes
:>Paul J. Adam" pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk wrote:
:>>The limiting factor is finding someone willing to let you launch
:>>offensive air missions from their turf. See ELDORADO CANYON in 1986 for
:>>an example: the majority of the sorties, including all the SEAD and
:>>MiGCAP and a lot of the strike, were carrier-based, the land-based F-111
:>>raid being a well-publicised sideshow. Carrier air was just the USN and
:>>Libya facing off as they had done previously and did again later with
:>>little reportage: the USAF flying strikes from Europe made worldwide
:>>news.
:>
:>So your trying to say that a completely USN show on Libya would not have made
:>the news.
:
:The previous incidents (patrol boats crippled, aircraft shot down, SAM
:sites suppressed) didn't make much noise, and the naval part of the
:operation was almost unreported: what made the event newsworthy was that
:the USAF had hit Libya from Upper Heyford.
Actually, what really made it newsworthy was that, after the French
refused overflight permission, the Air Force managed to accidently hit
the French embassy in Tripoli.
As you correctly note, the Navy raid on targets in Benghazi drew
virtually no press attention (but then, they didn't lose any airplanes
and didn't hit any non-targets, while the Air Force did both).
--
You have never lived until you have almost died.
Life has a special meaning that the protected
will never know.
Brooks
"Paul J. Adam" <pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In message <3d75...@news.newsgroups.com>, Brooks <broo...@127.0.0.1>
>writes
>>"Paul J. Adam" <pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>The previous incidents (patrol boats crippled, aircraft shot down, SAM
>>>sites suppressed) didn't make much noise, and the naval part of the
>>>operation was almost unreported: what made the event newsworthy was that
>>>the USAF had hit Libya from Upper Heyford.
>>
>>Paul, in this case I think you are taking what was "newsworthy" in the
UK
>>and trying to apply the same criteria here in the US.
>
>Sorry, not my intention - I was only referring to the ripples raised in
>the foreign press.
>
>I'm sure the US was justly proud of its achievements (admittedly,
>beating up Libya wasn't the toughest job, but the pilots dodging SA-5s
>were still being shot at and the responses were proficient and
>effective) in guaranteeing freedom of navigation across Sirte, but it
>wasn't widely reported outside the US.
>
>Using USAF assets from an allied nation when others had refused support
>and overflight made it a massive story, while if it had been an all-USN
>show then Eldorado Canyon would be as well remembered as Praying Mantis,
>or the USN operations off Lebanon in 1983, outside the US.
Yeah, the French refusal of overflight rights is still remembered by many
over here, as was the UK's support, and it deinitely contributed to more
press attention being channeled towards the 48th TFW. That one of their bombs
just "happened" to land in the French Embassy garden was, I am sure, purely
a coincidence...tragic, wasn't it?
Brooks
>
>"Keeping it naval" seems to reduce the smoke.
>
>--
>Paul J. Adam
-----------== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Uncensored Usenet News ==----------
Andrew McCruden
"Guy Alcala" <g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> wrote in message
news:3D74CE19...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net...
> Andrew McCruden wrote:
> > I would dissagree,. the GR.3's added a level of reserve to the fast
mover
> > assests, however it proved that keeping the Surface combatant numbers up
and
> > the supply of Beans and Bullets was more proablematic than SHAR's but it
> > might have been different if the land based FAA had tried harder to
contest
> > the air from the Sea Based one. (for instance what if initally half the
> > A-4's flew with 3 drop tanks and 2 sidewinders to CAP over west Falkland
> > with the Daggters and Mirgaes in support, OK time on station wouldn't
have
> > been high, but they could havew increaced harrier Losses considerably).
>
> West Falkland was essentially irrelevant,
Sorry, thought East, Typed west for some reason,
> and CAPs (I presume you mean at
> altitude) would have been sitting ducks for either SHAR/AIM9Ls or Sea
Dart.
Sea Dart I'll grant you (assuming they couldn't stay out of range), but the
strategy of Attacking the Task force without trying to force attrition onto
it's air cover first doesn't seem to have been the best use of the FueAA's
and CANA's superior numbers in retrospect.
But then the BEST use might have been to perform a massed co-operative
strike on the Task force proper with the all the Etendards, Skyhawks and
Daggers working in concert, but that would have likely been a one shot(due
to loses), and organisationally more than they could have managed, it may be
in retorspect that to the FueAA and CANA that the Falklands were as much at
the Extreme range of their effective reach as it had been for the RN
Iain Rae
> In article <3D746A4F...@inf.ed.ac.uk>, Iain Rae
> <ia...@inf.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>
>
>>>>In 1982, a NATO navy almost got handed its head by a third-world air
>>>>force, using 5 ASMs (of which 1 hit its intended target)
>>>
>>Umm that depends what you mean by intended target, the Carriers (which
>>was supposed to be their intended target) no. One of the blobs on the
>>Radar screens yes.
>
>
> Two aimed at SHEFFIELD, one hit one missed
> Two aimed at AMBUSCADE, both decoyed and hit Atlantic Conveyor
> One aimed at, well either EXETER or AVENGER, missed
If that's what they were tasked with then the loss of two type 42s and a
type 21 is hardly almost getting handed it's head. And a relatively
small price set against what a properly coordinated attack might have
achieved. If they'd hit all three type 42 pickets and tried to sneak an
iron bomb attack in behind then they might have done some serious
damage, but they'd still have had to take on the CAP and hindsight seems
to suggest that they'd probably only get 1 picket. Other than a lucky
hit five exocets were not an insoluable threat to the fleet, only to
individual ships and particularly to the pickets.
>
>
>>Arguably the GR 3's could have been left at home yes they were better
>>suited to the ground attack role but the Shars could have done this at a
>>pinch. They were originally sent down to replace all those Sea Harriers
>>which were going to get shot out of the sky.
>
>
> Fundamentally, the Sea Harrier was the only aircraft that could
> contribute to the fleet air defence, so it made sense not to use them
> for mud moving. However, it would be rude to leave the troops with no
> air support; so the GR.3 was called in.
Well the word in the press at the time was that the SHARs were almost
completely outclassed (the only advantage they had was the VIFF which
was never used) and the GR3's were being sent as replacement aircraft.
This has been confirmed in several books (I think the Government were
expecting to lose anything up to half of the Sea Harrier force).Sea
Harriers were routinely tasked for ground attack sorties anyway and the
outbound cap was being used for airport suppression all the way up to
the end of the war.
>
Brian Sharrock
"Guy Alcala" <g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> wrote in message
news:3D74CE19...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net...
>
> > "Iain Rae" <ia...@inf.ed.ac.uk> wrote in message
> > news:3D746A4F...@inf.ed.ac.uk...
> > > Paul J. Adam wrote:> > Well, a few Nimrod MR.2s got hasty Sidewinder
fits,
> > but it didn't make
> > > > them fighters. But other than some Harrier GR.3s and a couple of
> > > > Vulcans,
> > >
> > > Don't forget the entire tanker fleet.
> >
> > Who's main contribution (appart from supporting the Ferry of GR.3's )
was to
> > support the Nimrods and Vulcans.
>
> And those rather important Hercules supply/personnel dropping flights.
Early
> on, while the task groups were still relatively far north, it was possible
to
> just use the Hercs that had hastily been modded with internal auxiliary
tanks,
> but as the ships got further south it became necessary to air-refuel the
Hercs
> (some of which had been equally hastily modded with probes).
>
There was mutterings in the pubs surrounding L*n*h*m (semi-vowels and
vowels removed to protect the aircrew^H^H^H^H^H^H^Hmutterers) that it
cost one thousand pound Sterling to Herk-Ex one pound weight of beans
or bullets to the end-users.
--
Brian
Brooks
Doesn't the below (FAA operating at extreme range limit) kind of make the
above (FAA should have gone after the air cover first) kind of difficult,
if not outright impossible? The Argies were in the position of having to
make quick target runs and then vamoose for home; not much time/fuel for
high energy aerial combat, and IIRC they lacked BVR AAM's.
Brooks
>
>But then the BEST use might have been to perform a massed co-operative
>strike on the Task force proper with the all the Etendards, Skyhawks and
>Daggers working in concert, but that would have likely been a one shot(due
>to loses), and organisationally more than they could have managed, it may
be
>in retorspect that to the FueAA and CANA that the Falklands were as much
at
>the Extreme range of their effective reach as it had been for the RN
>
>
-----------== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Uncensored Usenet News ==----------
Fred J. McCall
:
:Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
:>"Brooks" <broo...@127.0.0.1> wrote:
:>
:>:
:>:Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
:>:>"Brooks" <broo...@127.0.0.1> wrote:
:>:>
:>:>:
:>:>:Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote:
:
:>:Stop the presses! That is as close as we will see Fred come to admitting
:>:he was wrauggg...wroooo...(that's OK, just spit it out, Fred-o...)...WRONG!
:>:There, you did it!
:>
:>I do it a lot, Brooksie.
:
:H'mmm...such as?
H'mmm...such as, whenever I'm actually wrong (which usually doesn't
correspond to when I disagree with you).
:>And the last time YOU admitted error was when, again? You seem to be
:>suffering from a serious problem with role reversal here....
:
:Not at all. Actually, the last time was just this past week, when Keith questioned
:my statement regarding whether or not the Lt. Taylor's famous missing Avengers
:had been found. I even offered to dine on a nice meal of crow. And your last
:time (other than when forced to here) was...?
Since admitting I'm wrong when I am isn't exactly that big a deal for
me (unlike you, apparently), I don't exactly keep a log. How about
you? When was the time before that? And the time before that?
:>:>:In short, McD-D did not become involved in the YF-17 program until about
:>:>:the same time as the first flight was in the air, and your idea that
:McD-D
:>:>:was somehow intimately involved in the YF-17 development is patently
:false,
:>:>
:>:>True. Nobody's memory is 100%,
:>:
:>:Translation: I can be expected to make the occasional mistake, which everyone
:>:should ignore...
:>:
:>:>Brooks, not even such pompous asses as
:>:>yourself.
:>:
:>:Translation (continued): "...but by God I reserve the right to pummel anyone
:>:else who *I think* is incorrect!"
:>
:>I think Brooksie's 'translations' stand by themselves, without
:>comment. They say more about his grudge than they do about anything
:>having to do with me.
:
:No grudge. Just an observation that you went rather out of the way to "correct"
:Keith, in this case, and rather snidely (as you are so accustomed to doing),
:and were in the end quite wrong yourself.
Sort of like you when you leapt in, you mean? Yeah, Brooksie. I buy
the 'no grudge' comment. Sure I do. Ever admit you were wrong about
the whole "SLBM as hard target penetrator" thread? No? Not even
after someone debunked all your 'proof' and pointed out that the
budgetary item you found and proclaimed as proof was for artillery
rockets?
:>:>I would have thought, though, that if you were going to
:>:>post such an incredible piece of personal sniping as the effort of
:>:>yours which I am responding to, you would at least have gone to the
:>:>trouble to get the NAME OF THE AIRPLANE COMPANY (NORTHROP) CORRECT.
:>:
:>:Not a personal sniping exercise; just a correction of your false assertion.
:>
:>And that, of course, is why you immediately started with phrases like
:>"you are fantasizing again". Sorry, Brooksie, but the innocent act
:>just doesn't quite wash.
:
:Awww...well, having seen some of your recent insults directed at various
:posters, I assumed you might have a thicker skin. I am so sorry for using
:such a "personally abusive" phrase such as "fantasizing"...
Well, if you're going to start whining about someone insulting you, it
does help make your case more credible if you haven't done it first.
:>:And if my misspelling of Northrop upsets you so much...get away from UseNet
I'd suggest you count the combined market at the time for F-5, F-104,
and Mirage III (outside of France) and compare it to the figure of
3,000 aircraft that they expected to target in the market.
:As Angelucci and Bowers noted, the market for the P-530 was
:intended to be those nations who wanted more performance than the F-5 and
:were willing to pay for it; many nations could not, and Northrop had no plans
:to drop the F-5 line in favor of the P-530. If you try to make Begin's statement
:meet your requirements (that it was intended to replace the F-5 in the Northrop
:stable), then one wonders why they were doing the F-5E at the same time as
:the P-530, and why the F-20 followed the F-5E.
See below. It's that temporal sequence thing again, and parallel
projects were hardly unusual at Northrop. Perhaps you'd care to
explain why they were doing the P-530, the P-600, and the P-610 all at
the same time, in light of your 'reasoning' above?
:And it is interesting that
:Begin used the same identification of platforms that the P-530 was to replace
:(F-5A, Mirage, and F-104) that are mentioned by others as being the goal
:of the IFA...which as you know was won by the F-5E. Just more evidence that
:Northrop realized that the market would continue to support the need for
:true low cost (and lower capability) fighters, and that the P-530 would not
:be able to fill that need.
You're aware of the difference in development time between the F-5E
and the final P-530, aren't you? I explained it. I suspect you just
missed it. On purpose.
:>A few additional corrections for you. The F-5A wasn't developed under
:>MAP, as you imply. It was developed on Northrop money and only later
:>selected for sale under MAP.
:
:Not a correction in this case. I did not say, or intend to imply, that it
:was developed under MAP; but it was selected to be the low-cost fighter that
:the US would market under MAP. MAP is what made it successful.
Not what you said, but we'll let that go.
:>Yes, the F-5E was selected as the winner of the IFA. That was at the
:>end of 1970, with first flight in mid-1972, which was several years
:>before any flyable hardware from the P-530 program existed to be
:>evaluated. The P-530 doesn't "fit in there" (between the -A and -E
:>models) because it was still undergoing wind tunnel testing when the
:>first F-5Es were flying. In other words, it doesn't fit in there
:>because it came AFTER the F-5E. It was common for Northrop to run
:>several generations of designs overlapped and several different
:>designs of the same generation in parallel.
:
:I note no correction there, just your "clarification" of your position. So
:apparently you are agreeing that the F-5A was intended to be followed by/replaced
:by within the Northrop stable by the F-5E, not the P-530.
It's not a "clarification" of my position at all. The statement I
quoted says the P-530 design was originally intended to replace the
F-5 (not the F-5A, but whatever F-5 was extant when P-530 came to
fruition). I also never said that Northrop dropped the F-5 line in
favour of P-530. That's your misstatement of what I said. See the
quote above, about "the main types the new fighter could be expected
to replace".
Sorry, but I don't consider myself wrong just because you misstate
what I've said.
:>As for the F-5G (aka F-20), it came AFTER the P-530 design had grown
:>into the YF-18 Cobra (subsequent to the Navy evaluation and the
:>involvement of MCAIR) and was indeed an effort to come up with
:>something cheaper than the YF-18 aircraft for current F-5E users.
:>Plans change, you see, and the YF-18 had become a much more expensive
:>aircraft than the original YF-17 and P-530 designs originally called
:>for. Given no assembly line for the YF-17, Northrop had the choice of
:>trying to market a cheaper version of the YF-18 (probably not
:>practical, as the airframe and avionics by this time had become
:>overkill for the mission of replacing the Tiger II) or designing a new
:>F-5 variant. They elected to undertake the latter course in 1975 with
:>the original F-5/404 design studies, although it was a pretty
:>low-level 'Mafia' effort until three years later and wasn't a real
:>airplane until the 1980 time frame.
:
:Again, I see no correction there.
Why am I not surprised?
:The fact is that the Northrop continued
:with development of the F-5 line (though the F-20 was a "radical" form of
:continuation; the nose was different, the aft fuselage was redesigned, the
:LEX/wing combo did not match the F-5E's, and the avionics were almost entirely
:new) rather than pursue any P-600/YF-17/F-18 developments (and the issue
:you raise of not having a F-17 assembly line would not matter; the F-20 would
:have required new tooling and jigs as well, so they offered similar challenges
:in that regard).
You're missing that temporal sequence thing again. Again, I'm hardly
surprised.
:>If you want to snipe, at least try to get it right, Brooksie....
:
:Sorry, but I am not seeing all of these "corrections" you keep mumbling about.
Again, this inability on your part to see it when someone points out
your mistakes hardly comes as a vast surprise to me, Brooksie. This
is just further proof, as if any was needed, that a Brooksie hears
what it wants to hear, and disregards the rest.
--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney