A more specific question would be helpful. Info on what? Constuction?
History? Sinking?
---
Regards
Malcolm
"The real hero is always a hero by mistake; he dreams of being an honest
coward like everybody else". Umberto Eco ("Travels in Hyper Reality", 1986)
>On Wed, 24 Jun 1998, Ross Perkins signalled:
>>Info required for research project
>A more specific question would be helpful. Info on what? Constuction?
>History? Sinking?
Hello Malcolm and welcome back - how was the fallout?
Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote in article
<35928...@hawk.pix.za>...
Zeneca <michael.o'ne...@phwilm.zeneca.com> wrote in article
<01bda072$7c1af7e0$cc83...@WUSUWPHDEV8L15P.usuwphdev.zeneca.com>...
>Info required for research project
Here the some of the information you wanted, about the British
battleship HMS Repulse & HMS Prince of Wales. I have there
specification and history. I hope this help you out.
Best regards.
Jean
HMS Prince of Wales
Battleship Class: King George V
Names: HMS King George V, HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Duke of York, HMS
Anson, HMS Howe
HMS Prince of Wales information:
Builders: Cammell Laird
Laid down: Jan. 1 1937
Launched: May. 3 1939
Commissioned: Mar. 31 1941
Status: Sunk in company of HMS Repulse by Japanese planes
in South China sea Dec.10/41
King George V class specification:
Displacement: Full Load: 44,650-45,360 tons; Standard: 35,000 tons
Dimensions
Length overall: 745 ft (227.1 m)
Length(W/L): 739.8 ft (225.5 m)
Beam: 103 ft (31.4 m)
Draft: 32 ft 6 in (9.9 m) (Average); 34 ft 6 in (10.5 m) (Max)
Propulsion
Boilers: 8 Admiralty 3 drum type (300 psi working pressure)
Turbines: 4 Parsins single reduction geared turbines
Horsepower: 110,000
Shafts: 4
Max Speed: 27.5 knots, 29.2 knots achieved on trials
Oil Bunkerage: 3,842 tons oil
Range: 15,000 nm at 10 knots; 6,300 nm at 20 knots; 3,200 nm at 27
knots
Armour Protection
Main Side Belt: 15.4 -4.5 in (380-115 mm)
Lower Side Belt: 3 in (76 mm)
Bulkhead: 11in (279 mm)
Deck Armour: 6-5 in (155-127 mm)
Barbettes: 13-11 in (330-280 mm)
Main turrets: 16 in (406 mm) face; 12.75-6 in (325-155 mm) sides
Secondary turrets: 1.5-1 in (38-25 mm)
Citadel: 15 in (381 mm)
Conning tower: 4.5-2 in (114-50 mm)
Armament (Guns)
Main Gun: 10 x 14 in (356 mm)/45 cal MK VII (two quadruple turrets
(forward A & aft Y), one dual turret (forward B).
Secondary Gun: 8x twin 5.25 in (133 mm)/50 cal D. P. (dual-purpose)
Heavy A/A: 32-48 x 2pdr. Pompoms
ten 40mm Bofors
Light A/A: 0-18 x 20mm Oerlikons
Aircraft: 4 aircraft with hangar (converted to movie theater 1943)
Complement: (Usual) 1,530-1,900
History:
The London Treaty. imposed a 35,000 ton limit and a maximum 14-inch
gun size. Although the treaty provisions on gun size would lapse with
the refusal of the Japanese to sign, the design of the King George V
class was set. The King George V class represented the largest single
battleship construction since World War One in Britain. Two ships were
laid down under the 1936 building program and three more followed in
1937. Although descendants of the Nelson class they had some
noticeable differences. The return to an external rather than internal
amoured belt, the arrangement of the armament returned a more
traditional layout. The new 14-inch MK VII gun fired a heavy weight
shell (1,509 lb, 720 kg) at a modest velocity, and at the maximum
40-degrees elevation it had a maximum range of 36,000 yards (32,920
m). The 14-inch were to be mounted in three new quadruple turrets,
giving a twelve gun broadside of 19,080 pounds.
However, it was felt that the magazine and machinery spaces had
inadequate horizontal protected. To rectify this a number of proposals
were investigated.
One of the most favoured was to reduce the main armament to three
triple 15-inch turrets. This made sense as the 15-inch MKI gun was an
extremely reliable and accurate weapon. The ship would have a nine gun
broadside of 17,442 pounds. The adherence of Britain to the London
Treaties 14-inch limit stopped this proposal. Eventually B turret was
reduced from a quad to a twin mounting to allow for more armoured
protection. This reduced the broadside to ten guns of 15,900 pounds.
The 14 inch guns and turrets went through many teething problems
before they became an relatively good gun.
The secondary armament was to be sixteen 5.25-inch guns in eight twin
turrets. The 5.25 inch AA weaponry was among the best in the world. As
with the Nelson class the King George V class adopted an all or
nothing armour protection. The armoured belt extended from the
armoured deck to 8.5 feet below the standard waterline, a total depth
of 23.5 feet. The armoured deck extended over the full length of the
citadel, from forward A turret to aft of Y turret.
The machinery followed the cruiser pattern with unit construction,
which gave better redundancy in the event of failure. The ships were
designed and fitted with an across the deck aircraft catapult
midships.
The new German battleship Bismarck undertaking her first (and final)
sortie into the North Atlantic. Accompanied by the heavy cruiser Prinz
Eugen, she left Korsfjord, Norway. Because the Bismarck had spotted a
RAF Spitfire earlier, the Royal Navy dispatches every ship possible to
intercept them. The new battleship HMS Prince Of Wales who was rushed
into action against the Bismarck while she still had shipyard
contractors workers aboard. On May 24 1941, The Bismarck and Prinz
Eugen were intercepted by the battlecruiser HMS Hood and battleship
HMS Prince Of Wales south of the Denmark Strait. Bismarck fifth salvo
sank the Hood, and Bismarck inflicted severe shells damage on Prince
Of Wales including a direct hit on the bridge, with her jammed
turrets she was forced to break off the engagement. But still manage
to secure two hits of her 14 inch (356 mm) shells on Bismack, and
broken its fuel lines, and with oil leaking from a damaged fuel tank
and reducing its speed. She separated from Prinz Eugen and headed for
Breast, France to join the battleship Scharnhorst and Gneiseneau
(Scharnhorst Class), but she was twice attack by Swordfish torpedo
planes from the carrier Ark Royal and later intercepted. By the Prince
Of Wales sister ship King George V, at that time the flagship of the
C-in-C (Commander In Chief) Home Fleet, played a leading role along
with Battleship Rodney (Nelson Class) and the light cruiser
Dorsetshire in the final destruction of the Bismarck on May 27 1941.
In August 1941, the Prince Of Wales carries aboard British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill to Atlantic (‘Argentia’) Conference, in
Placentia Bay, Newfoundland: Churchill and U. S. President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt meet at sea; to discuss and issue the Atlantic
Charter, germ of United Nations.
Following service with Force "H" in mid-1941. In December 1941
the Prince Of Wales (painted in a First Admiralty Disruptive type
camouflage) became the flagship for Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, of the
ill-fated British squadron sent to the Far East. Force "Z" It
consisted of the battleship Prince Of Wales, the older battlecruiser
Repulse and four destroyers. The were running a terrible risk, it was
late on December 8 and they were heading from Singapore up to Malaya’s
east cost with Force "Z", the ships were making for the Japanese
beach-heads, which they planned to destroy from the sea, if they could
not be dealt with by land. The had no air cover, relied on bad weather
to protect him from enemy bombers.
On December 9, however, the cloud cover began to break and
lookouts spotted Japanese reconnaissance planes. Force "Z" put about
for base, but it was too late. Shortly after ten on December 10,
Japanese planes attacked. Despite British manoeuvres, five torpedoes
hit Prince Of Wales, two ripping a hole in its hull which caused
severe flooding aft and put five of the eight generators out of action
, and damaging the rudder. It veered around in a drunken circle, out
of control.
The bombers turned the attention on Repulse, she received five
torpedoes hits and one bomb hit, and shortly midday it capsized and
sank. The Japanese returned to Prince Of Wales and soon it was gone.
Only the destroyers remained to pick up survivors. Nearly 3,000 men,
including Admiral Phillips died. It was the worst British naval
disaster of the war, the Prince Of Wales became the first modern
battleship (Only one of the King George V class ship lost in WWII) to
be sunk by attacking aircraft on their own had sunk such large ships
at sea.
HMS Repulse
Battlecruiser Class: Renown
Names: HMS Renown, HMS Repulse
HMS Repulse information
Built: John Brown & Co.
Laid Down: Jan.25 1915
Launched: Jan.8 1916
Commisioned: Aug. 1916
Present Status: reconstructed 1918-1921, reconstructed
1933-1936, sunk by Japanese bombers on Dec.10 1941
Renown Class specification
Dimensions
Length overall: 794 ft 2in (242 m)
Length (water line): 787.7 ft (240.1 m)
Beam: 90 ft (27.4 m) (design); 101 ft - 102ft 4in (30.8 - 31.2 m)
(after reconstruction)
Draft: 26.5' (8 m; Average), 30 ft 6 in - 31 ft 6 in (9.2-9.5 m;
Maximum)
Displacement
Full Load: 32,727 tons (Renown), 32,074 tons (Repulse), 37,400 tons
(both after first conversion)
Standard: 27,947 tons (Renown), 27,333 tons (Repulse), 36,800 tons
(both after first conversion), 37,411 tons (Renown after 1939
reconstruction)
Propulsion
Boilers: (Renown after 1936-39 reconstruction ): 8 Admiralty 3 drum
type (300 psi working pressure); 42 Babcock-Wilcox (Repulse)
Turbines: (Renown after 1936-39 reconstruction ): Parsons steam geared
turbines; (Repulse): 2 Brown Curtis direct drive turbines (design)
Range: 3,650 nautical miles at 30 knots
Horsepower: 120,000; 130,000 (Renown after 1936-39 reconstruction)
Shafts: 4
Max Speed: 32 knots, 31.7 knots (trial), 30 knots after first
conversion, 29 knots by 1944 (Renown)
Oil Bunkerage: 4,300-4,500 tons oil
Armour Protection
Main Side Belt: 9 in (230 mm; miships) to 3 in (75 mm; ends)
Lower Side Belt: 2 in (50mm)
Deck Armour: (Renown) 5 in-2.5 in (125-65 mm); (Repulse) 5.75 in-3.5
in (145-90 mm);
Barbettes: 7 in-4 in (180-100 mm)
Turrets: 11in-4.25 in (280-110 mm) face; 7 in (178 mm) sides
Citadel: 10 in (255 mm), rebuilt with 2 in (50 mm) 1936 (Renown only)
Conning tower: 3 in-2 in (75-50 mm)
Armament (Guns)
Main Gun: 6 x 15 in (381 mm)/42 cal Mk I gun in three twin turrets
Secondary Gun: 20 x 4.5 in (114 mm)/45 cal DP in twin mounts (Renown)
12 x 4 in (100 mm)/50
14 x 4 in (100 mm)/50 in seven twin mounts (Repulse)
Light A/A: 16-28 x 1.57 in (40 mm) 8 barrelled Pom-Poms AA (3 x
octuple, 1 x quadruple mount; increase to 28 in Renown)
64 x 0.78 in (20mm) Oerlikons (20x twin, 24 x
single mounts; 1945 Renown only)
16 x 0.5 in (12.7 mm) Browning machine guns
Torpedoes: 2 x 21 in (533 mm) tubes, (1941) 8 x 21 in (533 mm)
Aircraft: 4 spotting seaplane
Complement: (Usual) 1,181-1,205
History:
Admiral Fisher returned to the Admiralty as the First Sea Lord in
October 1914 and the battlecruiser concept returned with him. The
victory of the British battlecruisers in battle of the Falklands
Islands on 8 December 1914 and the fact that no British ships had the
speed to overtake the new German Lutzow gave Fishers requests more
credibility than they perhaps deserved and permission was granted to
build two fast battlecruisers.
Fisher to gain approval for the ships he had promised to have them
completed in record time. And used the two suspended Revenge class
contracts and a fifteen month construction time was written into the
contracts.
Fisher wanted two new fast battlecruisers, with a heavy gun armament,
ships capable of 32 knots, and similar protection to the earlier
battlecruisers (only light protection). He also wanted them with a
shallow draft to be able to take place in his "Baltic" project. This
time frame meant that there was only six 15-inch mountings available.
Thus the design was draw up with three turrets per ship. A and B
turret superimposed and X turret aft.
The main armament was the 15-inch MKI gun in the twin MKI mounting as
used in the previous Queen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign classes.
However the reduction in armament was not viewed favorably by the
gunnery branch as it slowed "spotting".
The secondary armament was reduced to 4-inch MK XIX guns in new triple
TI MKI mountings from the 6-inch guns of previous classes.
The greatest failing in the ships was the very light armour. The ships
were protected by a 6 inch belt, compared to the 13inch on the Queen
Elizabeth class. The turrets were reduced in armour to 9 inch fronts
and 7 inches on the side. This compared unfavorably with the 13inch
fronts and 11 sides on the Queen Elizabeth class.
Deck protection was terrible, with only 2inch plate over the magazines
and only 1inch over the deck.
The machinery was a repeat of the battlecruiser Tiger with three extra
boilers to provide additional power. The engines produced 125,000 SHP
and in trials in 1916 Repulse made 31.725 knots.
As painting had been a problem with the Queen Elizabeth the ships had
considerable stiffening forward. The funnels proved to be a problem
with smoke coming back onto the bridge, and the fore funnels were
increased by six feet in height.
To save weight and time no wooden decks were fitted.
On arrival for service with the Grand Fleet the ships were regarded
with great concern and as white elephants. There arrival soon after
the loss of three battlecruisers at Jutland emphasized the folly of
such lightly armoured ships.
The deck armour was quickly increased in late 1916 by the builders
with the addition of 2-inch high tensile plate over the engine room,
magazines, and on the vertical bulkheads of the lower conning tower.
The increase in armour added 550 tons to the ships. Both were bulged
and given additional vertical and horizontal armour in the 1920’s.
Repulse was refitted in 1933-36, when she received additional deck
armour and an athwartships catapult and hanger (four aircraft
amidship). Her anti-aircraft armament was revised, but the remained
well below standard up to the time of her loss in December 1941. By
1939 she was overweight, and her maximum speed was little more than 28
knots.
Renown was taken in hand in 1936 and was reconstructed on similar
lines to the battleship Warspite. However, her modernization, like
that of Valiant and Queen Elizabeth, were more thorough, and she
emerged in 1939 as the most successful of all British reconstructions.
Eigth Admiralty 3-drum boilers replaced the 42 Babcock-Wilcox boilers
originally installed, and she was given new ligth weigth Parsons steam
geared turbines. This modification saved 2,800 tons with loss of
power, the reduction from six to four boiler romms created additional
space for the magazines of the new 4.5 in (144 mm) anti-aircraft guns.
Twenty of these were installed in twin countersunk turrets, controlled
by four high-angle directors. The elevation of the main guns was
increased from 20 degrees to 30 degrees, and additional armour was
fitted on the decks and barbettes. A catapult and hangers were
installed amidships. The weigth saved by the installation of new
machinery and the removal of the former 4 in (102 mm) secondary
armament was such that in spite of these modifications Renown
displaced 1,500 tons less at full load than she had before
reconstruction.
At the outbreak of the World War II Renown and Repulse, together with
the Hood, formed the Battlecruiser Squadron of the Home Fleet. They
spent much of the early part of the war chasing German surface
raidrers, which included pocket-battleship Deutschland and Admiral
Graf Spee. Both ship were at sea during the German occupation of
Norway. In April 1940 Renown had her biggest day when encountered the
German battlecruiser Scharnhorst and Gneisneau in heavy weather, and
she scored three hits had inflicted serious damage on the Gneisneau
off Vestifjord,Norway before she withdrew at high speed.
In 1940 Renown joined Force "H" at Gilbraltar, and in 1941-42 was
frequently employed as an escort for Malta convoys and relief
operations. Both ship ships participed in the Bismarck chase, albeit
without seeing action, but with tensions in the Pacific rising Repulse
was prepared for service in the Far East.
In December 1941, the ill-fated British squadron sent to the Far East.
Force "Z" It consisted of the battleship Prince Of Wales,
battlecruiser Repulse and four destroyers. The were running a
terrible risk, it was late on December 8 and they were heading from
Singapore up to Malaya’s east cost with Force "Z", the ships were
making for the Japanese beach-heads, which they planned to destroy
from the sea, if they could not be dealt with by land. The had no air
cover, relied on bad weather to protect him from enemy bombers.
On December 9, however, the cloud cover began to break and
lookouts spotted Japanese reconnaissance planes. Force "Z" put about
for base, but it was too late. Shortly after ten on December 10,
Japanese land -based bomber attacked. Despite British manoeuvres, five
torpedoes hit Prince Of Wales, two ripping a hole in its hull which
caused severe flooding aft and put five of the eight generators out of
action , and damaging the rudder. It veered around in a drunken
circle, out of control.
The bombers turned the attention on Repulse, she received five
torpedoes hits and one bomb hit, and shortly midday it capsized and
sank. The Japanese returned to Prince Of Wales and soon it was gone.
Only the destroyers remained to pick up survivors. Nearly 3,000 men,
including Admiral Phillips died. It was the worst British naval
disaster of the war.
Renown also served in the Far East during 1944, but after returning to
the UK in 1945 she was placed in reserve for the remainder of the war.
Her light anti-aircraft armament had by this time increased to 28 x
1.57 in (40 mm) 8 barrelled Pom-Poms (3 x 8, 1 x 4) and 64 x 0.78 in
(20 mm) Oerlikons (20 x 2, 24 x 1).
Because it certainly didn't have sufficient reserve bouyancy for such a
conversion, and because REPULSE was one of only three "big" ships
considered fast enough to *escort* carriers.
--
Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
=====>NEW ADDRESS ==> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ <== NEW ADDRESS <======
US Naval & Shipbuilding Museum/USS Salem Online - http://www.uss-salem.org/
Naval History, World Navies Today, Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more
I have an excellent book that I would highly recommend:
_Battleship - The Loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse_, by
Martin Middlebrook and Patrick Mahoney, Penguin Books LTD, 1977, ISBN
0-14-004899-5.
It seems very well written, with much technical analysis as well as
broad tactical and strategic analysis.
--
Scott M. Kozel koz...@richmond.infi.net
Highway and Transportation History Websites
Virginia/Maryland/Washington D.C. http://www.richmond.infi.net/~kozelsm
PHL area http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Campus/5961/pennways.html
Good enough to make Scharnhorst and Gneisenau turn and run...
--
There are four kinds of homicide: felonious, excusable, justifiable and
praiseworthy...
Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Or waste a ship with guns when you could spend your money on converting
an old tanker.
Ross Perkins <ro...@rperkins.force9.co.uk> wrote in article
<01bd9fb8$ff1afec0$2e90a6c3@default>...
> Info required for research project
>
> Researching for Article to be entitled "The root causes of the sinking of
HM Ships Repulse and Prince of Wales
Wasn't that Renown, Paul? Not that Repulse couldn't have done the same
under the conditions.
(Renown was the modernized sister of Repulse. In the chase commerce raiding
cruisers through carrier escort roles of big, fast gunships in WWII she was
probably the most useful of the Royal Navy's capital ships until Vanguard
came along after the war.)
--
Peter Skelton
Skelton & Associates
613/634-0230
p...@kingston.net
Cause of sinking: Terminal case of bomberitis.
-- Doug Hayden, hayd...@ameritech.net
"The only significant difference (in Windows98 being that) Microsoft
replaced
the little '5' in the corner with a little '8'."
- Craig Kilborn on 'The Daily Show'
>> > Researching for Article to be entitled "The root causes of the sinking of
>> HM Ships Repulse and Prince of Wales
>
>Cause of sinking: Terminal case of bomberitis.
Torpedoes, one would think.
Zeneca wrote:
> Why didn't the RN convert Repulse into an CV? It was worthless as a battle
> platform with only 6 guns and a 6" belt(orig 3") and barbette.
Not true at all. Speciffically she was a huge threat most commerce raiders,
especially the German Pocket Battleships. It also stands up pretty well
against Scharnhorst and Gniesenau. Plus though you would not want ot fight
them unless you had to the older Italian BB's with the 12.6" guns are in
significant danger in a battle with Repulse.
At the start of the war she was one of only three capital ships in the RN that
could catch a German pocket battleship and fight under conditions of
superiority.
Tom Hunter
>Zeneca wrote:
>
>> Why didn't the RN convert Repulse into an CV? It was worthless as a
battle
>> platform with only 6 guns and a 6" belt(orig 3") and barbette.
Belt was increased to nine inches, not six, although still vulnerable.
I think a case could be made that it was the fault of the French and Germans.
If France had not fallen, probably Japan would have stayed out of it,
thus removing the torpedoes. ;)
John Gilbert
On 1998-06-25 michael.o'ne...@phwilm.zeneca.com said:
>Why didn't the RN convert Repulse into an CV? It was worthless as a
>battle platform with only 6 guns and a 6" belt(orig 3") and
>barbette.
By treaty they could only convert two ships and Courageous and Glorious
were them. Furious was an aircraft carrier before the treaty was signed.
: I think a case could be made that it was the fault of the French and Germans.
: If France had not fallen, probably Japan would have stayed out of it,
Would you care to expand on that comment a little. Since Japan had its
own interests and intentions in the region, I am interested in how a
German failure in France would have thwarted Japan's plans.
OJ III
If France does not fall, Italy probably does not join the war. The French
bases are not available to the German Navy.
The RN lost a lot in the Med, all of which would still be available, as
would the French fleet, whose ships would have been commissioned in time.
Additionally, the effort needed to control the Uboats would be limited.
The battle of Britian would not have been fought. That probably means a
stronger RAF.
I don't really think that this would have stopped Japan but it seems likely
that there would have been a real fleet with real carriers at Singapore and
that the air defenses would have been a bit stronger.
OTOH, would Hitler have invaded the Soviets, if he still had a war to fight
in France? Would the lease-lend act have passed?
Patrick Pemberton wrote in message <6n18ik$i8o$1...@geraldo.cc.utexas.edu>...
>
>
>>Zeneca wrote:
>>
>>> Why didn't the RN convert Repulse into an CV? It was worthless as a
>battle
>>> platform with only 6 guns and a 6" belt(orig 3") and barbette.
>
>
>Belt was increased to nine inches, not six, although still vulnerable.
>
>
And it was originally six, not three. Moreover, when the 225mm (~nine inch)
belt was fitted, the old 150mm (~six inch) belt was fitted one deck higher,
creating an upper belt where previously there was only shell plating and
scuttles. IIRC, the 225mm belt came from Almirante Cochrane, Canada's sister
completed as Eagle.
Renown later got a 225mm belt, too, but it was placed higher and the 150mm
was not refitted.
These ships tend to get knocked quite a bit. But they were quite capable of
engaging the Kongos (200mm belts) and the Italian Cavours and Dulios (254mm)
with smaller guns. No doubt the Italians found it unsettling that they
couldn't outrun this pair.
And as someone else points out, they were also quite capable of frightening
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. I wonder what would have happened if Renown had
managed to slow one of those two down that time off Norway. I think
Gneisenau's fighting power was already impaired (damaged fire control and
the after turret disabled) when they managed to break off.
Brad
Ross Perkins <ro...@rperkins.force9.co.uk> wrote in article
<01bda104$aa56d380$7184a6c3@default>...
>
>
> Ross Perkins <ro...@rperkins.force9.co.uk> wrote in article
> <01bd9fb8$ff1afec0$2e90a6c3@default>...
> > Info required for research project
> >
> > Researching for Article to be entitled "The root causes of the sinking
of
> HM Ships Repulse and Prince of Wales
>
> Causes I have identified so far;
> Political
> 1. Force Z was sent as a deterrent tool and should not have been allowed
into battle
> 2. The appointment of Admiral Phillips was mainly to rid Churchill of
him. His ability as a tactical commander was based on WW1 knowledge. At the
time of the battle Phillips' view was that a well handled Battleship would
always defeat air forces.
"FROM CINC EASTERN FLEET
TO SINGPORE
AM UNDER AIR ATTACK, SEND ALL AVAILABLE DESTROYERS"
> Strategic
> 1. Phillips did not stick to his operational pre-requisites of surprise,
airborne recon, and air cover over Signora.
> 2. Blind faith in the Battleship in the face of contrary evidence (POW
was unsinkable).
> 3. Extreme arrogance of superiority of European.
> 4. Failure to provide balanced fleet with Cruiser and more importantly a
Carrier.
> 5. UK failure to provide Air Forces for defence of Malay States, Battle
of Britain well over by Dec 41.
> 6. Field Marshall Smuts suggested combining US and UK fleets to form
single superior Fleet in Pacific. Churchill ignored him.
> Tactical
> 1. Failure to signal for air cover once battle commenced (see signal
above)
> 2. Phillips trying to manouvre battleships as a fleet caused first hit on
Repulse
> 3. Lack of contigency plan when operation compromised meant continuation
of doomed foray by default.
your comments welcomed
>The battle of Britian would not have been fought. That probably means a
>stronger RAF.
I wonder. Nothing makes a force better than finding out what does and
what doesn't work. I am sure that the experience of the Battle of
Britain in 1940 made the RAF, in 1942 and subsequently, a much better
force.
I don't agree (and only kinda follow) this thinking. However the case
could be made that the Japanese war effort would have been slowed if the
French hadn't let them use their bases in FRENCH Indo-China to attack
the Brits (I'm thinking Singapore and Force Z here.) Beside, when in
doubt, blame France.
He tried. But really couldn't.
> > 4. Failure to provide balanced fleet with Cruiser and more importantly a Carrier.
Cruisers wouldn't have made any difference. Infact IIRC he did in fact
have 3 CLs available ("Ds" IIRC.) If a BB and a BC got slaughtered they
wouldn't have made any difference. The only hope for Force Z was
aircover...
Which leads of course to the oft asked "What if/If only...Indomitable
had been there." Well, as it turns out its probably a good thing she
wasn't. Lets say she is, and sails with the Force Z. Things go as they
did up until the attack. Most people will say "ah-ha, now her aircraft
can repulse (no pun intended) the attack..." Unfortunately, no, at the
time she was carrying about 33 aircraft. Only 12 (IIRC) were fighters
(Sea Hurricans.) That means they're out numbered better then 13 to one.
They're good, but not THAT good. While no doubt they would have given a
good account of themselves, the fact is they just couldn't stop the
raid. Odds are Indomitable would have just ended up next to POW and
Repulse on the bottom. The only way to have saved Force Z was for them
to not have been there.
Well, thats my two cents.
I don't recall 156 (12x13) plane strikes on these ships. The strikes in
question were unescorted torpedo planes in the thirty aircraft range.
Twelve of any fighter would have disrupted them enormously. Torpedo hits
are really hard to get against fighter opposition.
A carrier would probably have gotten them through those attacks. They could
have escaped. I don't think it would have let them finish their mission -
to do that they have to get through torpedo strikes with fighter escort
which could be quite different.
>Well, thats my two cents.
--
Those torpedoes didn't come from a sub though. <g>
Adam Howarter (Ahow...@prodigy.net) writes:
> Which leads of course to the oft asked "What if/If only...Indomitable
> had been there." Well, as it turns out its probably a good thing she
> wasn't. Lets say she is, and sails with the Force Z. Things go as they
> did up until the attack. Most people will say "ah-ha, now her aircraft
> can repulse (no pun intended) the attack..." Unfortunately, no, at the
> time she was carrying about 33 aircraft. Only 12 (IIRC) were fighters
> (Sea Hurricans.) That means they're out numbered better then 13 to one.
> They're good, but not THAT good. While no doubt they would have given a
> good account of themselves, the fact is they just couldn't stop the
> raid. Odds are Indomitable would have just ended up next to POW and
> Repulse on the bottom.
The question turns on whether the IJN land-based air fleet had fighters
available. IIRC our discussion last year ended up thinking that they did
not have them, so the handful of fighters would have been effective in
breaking up the attacks. You do not have to shoot them down, just disrupt
their approach. If a few Zeros had been with the raids, it would have
been different. Then only a few of the attacks would have been broken up,
and some of the RN ships would have been sunk. A second attack wave might
have caught them, however.
GaryJ
--
http://www.ncf.carleton.ca/~ar075
To build a community we must be able to communicate freely.
Against unescorted torpedo bombers? Oh, boy, happy FAA pilots.
They can't down the entire strike, but they can break it up and prevent
the co-ordinated torpedo attacks that were so deadly to the two
battleships. Much easier to dodge individual torpedoes than an 'anvil'
attack (torpedoes incoming from both forward quarters: turn to comb one
set and expose your beam to another).
At that point, of course, retreat becomes prudent, because trying the
same trick against an _escorted_ raid will likely produce the results
you describe.
--
There are four kinds of homicide: felonious, excusable, justifiable and
praiseworthy...
Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
First, if there had been some cruisers or modern destroyers,
they could have been scouting out the Japanese landings
(at Kutan? and) farther north, while PW and Repulse stayed
out to sea. Second, some modern cruisers and destroyers
would have been posted around the big ships to give the Japanes
torpedo bombers something to think about while they tried
to line up their shots. (Of course, most up-to-date British
cruisers and destroyers were lying on the bottom somewhere
off Crete.... Or undergoing major repairs after Crete.)
Now if Indomitable had been there? Well, first, she would
have come with some modern escorts. Maybe not many, but
some. Second, she was flying fulmars in late 1941. Not
the best planes to mix it up with Zeros. However, her planes
would have been able to scout out Kutan and other possible
Japanes landing zones. Also, the fulmars might have shot
down the Japanese scouts which found PW and Repulse. And
at one point during the night (day?) before the sinking
of PW and Repulse, a Japanes cruiser force was within
20 or 30 miles of the Force Z. A carrier would have
found them, leading to....? Finally, I bet the captain of
a British carrier would have had enough sense to call
for help from Singapore if a bunch of Japanes airplanes
showed up.
Finally, about Japanese Zeros and the possibility of
there being with the bombers and torpedo planes. The
way I learned it, the Japanese attack planes were
transfered from Tawain sometime in December _after_
the Japanese learned that the British fleet would
arrive at Singapore. If they had through that the
British had a carrier, they would have transfered some
Zeros also....
I don't know if this was his intent, but the rationale that jumps to my
mind is:
After the fall of France, Vichy France was a puppet of Hitler's
Germany. When the
Japanese decided that they needed to get an advantage on China (their
war was not
going as planned), they looked to flank the southern edge and
"requested" bases
in French Indo-china (Vietnam). A strong France would not have allowed
it.
Incidentally, it was from these bases that the attack on Malaya was
launched -
the aircraft from near Saigon, the invasion fleet from Cam Ranh Bay.
Tom
--
"Sometimes I think war is God's way of teaching us geography." --Paul
Rodriguez
Must have missed that one. Saigon had 54 Zeros. Kompong had 18 Nates,
and 18 Oscars. Takeo had 18 Oscars, and 45 Nates.
> A second attack wave might
> have caught them, however.
Thats the Kicker. Maybe the first wave wouldn't have gotten them, but
the second...third...forth...fifth!
Scouting out the landings wasn't the problem. By the nature of the
landings they knew where they were. If the CLs (3 "Ds" were on hand) had
been sent out they would have just been sunk instead of/in addition to
POW and Repulse. The problem here is ANYWHERE Force Z went north of
Singapore they were within range of Japanese aircraft.
> (Of course, most up-to-date British
> cruisers and destroyers were lying on the bottom somewhere
> off Crete.... Or undergoing major repairs after Crete.)
Couldn't have said it better.
> Now if Indomitable had been there? Well, first, she would
> have come with some modern escorts. Maybe not many, but
> some.
Thats questionable.
> Second, she was flying fulmars in late 1941.
Looked it up. She was carrying 2 squads of 9 Wildcats.
> However, her planes
> would have been able to scout out Kutan and other possible
> Japanes landing zones.
To what end?
> Also, the fulmars might have shot
> down the Japanese scouts which found PW and Repulse.
Until they started attacking the transports. Then its all over for them.
> And
> at one point during the night (day?) before the sinking
> of PW and Repulse, a Japanes cruiser force was within
> 20 or 30 miles of the Force Z.
Actually two groups were around. One was the 4 Mogami class C..."L"s
(wink, wink.) The other was Haruna and Kongo with Atago and Takao and
one other CA.
> Finally, I bet the captain of
> a British carrier would have had enough sense to call
> for help from Singapore if a bunch of Japanes airplanes
> showed up.
A) he couldn't *until* Philips was killed. B) He wouldn't have gotten
it. beside the air support he would have recieved would make the Skuas
look like spring chickens. Basically if it was old they sent it to the
far east.
Saigon had 88 Nell, 48 Betty, 54 Zero
Kompong had 6 Lilly, 81 Sally, 18 Oscar, 18 Nate, 9 Babs
Takeo had 81 Lilly, 18 Oscar, 45 Nate, 9 Babs
They *REALLY* wanted Malaya.
> The strikes in
> question were unescorted torpedo planes in the thirty aircraft range.
> Twelve of any fighter would have disrupted them enormously. Torpedo hits
> are really hard to get against fighter opposition.
Tell that to Lexington, Yorktown, and Hornet. And all the ships sunk in
the Med.
> A carrier would probably have gotten them through those attacks.
Na. The first wave, maybe. But the second? The third? Forth? Fifth?
> They could
> have escaped.
Not when they're doing 29kts, at best, and the aircraft are doing 120.
It was a shooting gallery, and they were the ducks.
>> I don't recall 156 (12x13) plane strikes on these ships.
>
>Saigon had 88 Nell, 48 Betty, 54 Zero
>Kompong had 6 Lilly, 81 Sally, 18 Oscar, 18 Nate, 9 Babs
>Takeo had 81 Lilly, 18 Oscar, 45 Nate, 9 Babs
>They *REALLY* wanted Malaya.
>
>> The strikes in
>> question were unescorted torpedo planes in the thirty aircraft range.
>> Twelve of any fighter would have disrupted them enormously. Torpedo hits
>> are really hard to get against fighter opposition.
>
>Tell that to Lexington, Yorktown, and Hornet. And all the ships sunk in
>the Med.
>
Here is the list of the ships you mentioned that were torpedoed by
unescorted torpedo bombers while under fighter protection: < >
>> A carrier would probably have gotten them through those attacks.
>
>Na. The first wave, maybe. But the second? The third? Forth? Fifth?
>
>> They could
>> have escaped.
>
>Not when they're doing 29kts, at best, and the aircraft are doing 120.
>
>It was a shooting gallery, and they were the ducks.
Perhaps you should have marked your snip. The material you removed covered
this.
Adam Howarter wrote in message <35974D...@prodigy.net>...
>Must have missed that one. Saigon had 54 Zeros. Kompong had 18 Nates,
>and 18 Oscars. Takeo had 18 Oscars, and 45 Nates.
Though I expect that only the navy's A6Ms would have been available for a
maritime mission. The army was fighting its own war.
Brad
Nope. This wasn't Italy. The Japanese army and navy did work together.
Not that 54 Zeros wouldn't have been enough.
Up to that point here is the number of battleships that, underway, were
sunk by aircraft:< > Does this mean the Sinking of POW and Repulse by
aircraft was invented by Japanese propoganda when they were really sunk
by, say, a sub who fired it's torpedos at the same time? or the two
Kongos firing their guns from over the horizon? No, of course not.
Besides, those Bombers were far from incapable of defending themselves.
On top of that if there had been a carrier with Z the bombers would have
been escorted. There wasn't so they didn't need to be.
> Perhaps you should have marked your snip. The material you removed covered
> this.
Why. So we can both just end up going
yup
yup
yup
yup
>> Here is the list of the ships you mentioned that were torpedoed by
>> unescorted torpedo bombers while under fighter protection: < >
>
>Up to that point here is the number of battleships that, underway, were
>sunk by aircraft:< > Does this mean the Sinking of POW and Repulse by
>aircraft was invented by Japanese propoganda when they were really sunk
>by, say, a sub who fired it's torpedos at the same time? or the two
>Kongos firing their guns from over the horizon? No, of course not.
>Besides, those Bombers were far from incapable of defending themselves.
>On top of that if there had been a carrier with Z the bombers would have
>been escorted. There wasn't so they didn't need to be.
If you quote something to support an idea, it is better if it actually
suports the idea. If ti does not, you may get called on it.
Care to look up the possibility of fighter escort for these strikes? In
fact, the Japanese were apprehensive about the possibility of land based
fighter cover but pressed on anyway because they had none available. It was
a courageous move that paid off.
I am coming to believe that you are either too lazy to do any research or
incapable of doing it properly. Either way you are amply replete with
feces.
<plonk>
Adam Howarter wrote:
> >
> > Though I expect that only the navy's A6Ms would have been available for a
> > maritime mission. The army was fighting its own war.
>
> Nope. This wasn't Italy. The Japanese army and navy did work together.
> Not that 54 Zeros wouldn't have been enough.
Did you know that the army and navy zeros used incompatible parts? The
difference between Japan and Italy is that the Italians failed to cooperate do
to incompetence, the Japanese worked at cross purposes out of pure malice.
You need to spend some more time with the history books.
Tom Hunter
Adam Howarter wrote:
> > Here is the list of the ships you mentioned that were torpedoed by
> > unescorted torpedo bombers while under fighter protection: < >
>
> Up to that point here is the number of battleships that, underway, were
> sunk by aircraft:< > Does this mean the Sinking of POW and Repulse by
> aircraft was invented by Japanese propoganda when they were really sunk
> by, say, a sub who fired it's torpedos at the same time? or the two
> Kongos firing their guns from over the horizon?
> No, of course not.
> Besides, those Bombers were far from incapable of defending themselves.
The bombers were Bettys which have un-armored not self sealing gas tanks in the
wings. They were very easy to shoot down in the absence of fighter escort.
> On top of that if there had been a carrier with Z the bombers would have
> been escorted. There wasn't so they didn't need to be.
If I recall correctly the Japanese were unable to provide escort because the
range was to great. That might not have been true at the landing site further
North but it was certainly true at the site of the actual sinking.
You need to check you facts on the range of the Japanese fighters and you are
kind of weak on your understanding of torpedo attack by aircraft. Torpedo
planes are terribly vulnerable to fighters during their approach, flying low,
slow and in a straight line. Look at what happened at Midway.
Tom Hunter
>Up to that point here is the number of battleships that, underway, were
>sunk by aircraft:< >
Non-sequitur.
>Besides, those Bombers were far from incapable of defending themselves.
Brewster Buffaloes would have made hash of them. maybe they would have
gotten a hit or two, but it's unlikely thay would have sunk anything.
>On top of that if there had been a carrier with Z the bombers would have
>been escorted. There wasn't so they didn't need to be.
You assume much. The Japanese thought that Force Z would have
land-based air cover, yet they didn't send escorts.
Jay
Ottawa, Ontario
Remove the * when replying.
>> >Must have missed that one. Saigon had 54 Zeros. Kompong had 18 Nates,
>> >and 18 Oscars. Takeo had 18 Oscars, and 45 Nates.
>>
>> Though I expect that only the navy's A6Ms would have been available for a
>> maritime mission. The army was fighting its own war.
>
>Nope. This wasn't Italy. The Japanese army and navy did work together.
>Not that 54 Zeros wouldn't have been enough.
The Japanese Army and Navy never worked well with each other, and only
worked with each other when forced to in the first place.
The Zeros and other fighters at Saigon and other bases were busy with
other missions. They were _not_, I say again, _Not_ available to
escort the mission to attack PoW and Repulse.
>The problem here is ANYWHERE Force Z went north of
>Singapore they were within range of Japanese aircraft.
Singapore was in range of Japanese aircraft, so what's the diff?
>> Now if Indomitable had been there? Well, first, she would
>> have come with some modern escorts. Maybe not many, but
>> some.
>
>Thats questionable.
Not at all. There were still some modern escort ships available, and a
carrier wouldn't have been sent out with just a couple of V&W
destroyers.
>> Second, she was flying fulmars in late 1941.
>
>Looked it up. She was carrying 2 squads of 9 Wildcats.
18 Martlets would have made a pretty good impression on the Bettys and
Sallys that attacked Force Z.
>Actually two groups were around. One was the 4 Mogami class C..."L"s
>(wink, wink.) The other was Haruna and Kongo with Atago and Takao and
>one other CA.
The Mogamis were far and away CAs by this time, and had been for a
couple of years (in fact, I don't think the IJN ever called them
anything different, even when they had 6" armament). In ant case, in a
stand up gunfight I'd put my money on the British ships over the
antiquated Kongos. I grant, however, that a night fight with cruisers
could go very badly for the Brits.
>> Finally, I bet the captain of
>> a British carrier would have had enough sense to call
>> for help from Singapore if a bunch of Japanes airplanes
>> showed up.
>
>A) he couldn't *until* Philips was killed. B) He wouldn't have gotten
>it. beside the air support he would have recieved would make the Skuas
>look like spring chickens. Basically if it was old they sent it to the
>far east.
First of all Phillips ordered air cover, which wasn't provided. Had
they been available, _any_ fighters would have made a difference in
the attack on the British warships.
They both "worked at cross purposes out of pure malice." The only thing
is the Italians had the additional problem of incompetence. When they
wanted to the IJN and IJAF could get it together. They just didn't like
to.
> You need to spend some more time with the history books.
Well, then I guess I'll see you at the library cause you need to do more
reading too.
Only because they didn't need to be. If they had, they would have been
*made* available.
>The Mogamis were far and away CAs by this time, and had been for a
>couple of years (in fact, I don't think the IJN ever called them
>anything different, even when they had 6" armament). In ant case, in a
>stand up gunfight I'd put my money on the British ships over the
>antiquated Kongos. I grant, however, that a night fight with cruisers
>could go very badly for the Brits.
Did the RN know about the long lance or would Phillips have been as
surprised as everyone else was?
You were caught spewing bullshit. For Chrissakes give it up.
> I am coming to believe that you are either too lazy to do any research or
> incapable of doing it properly. Either way you are amply replete with
> feces.
Thats odd. I came to the conclussion you're an incompatent, pompas ass
about 6 months ago. And time and again I have that conclussion
re-enforced. Usually its when Andrew puts you back in your place, but
sometimes you just do it to yourself.
And the Zeros...?
>They were very easy to shoot down in the absence of fighter escort.
Under what conditions?
> If I recall correctly the Japanese were unable to provide escort because the
> range was to great. That might not have been true at the landing site further
> North but it was certainly true at the site of the actual sinking.
Exactly. As I said maybe the first strike wouldn't have sunk them. But
it was only a matter of time as long as they stayed North of Singapore.
> You need to check you facts on the range of the Japanese fighters and you are
> kind of weak on your understanding of torpedo attack by aircraft.
Ummmm, nope. Sorry. You're kinda weak on your context however.
Torpedo
> planes are terribly vulnerable to fighters during their approach, flying low,
> slow and in a straight line. Look at what happened at Midway.
You mean the battle were several torpedos were put in Yorktown dispite a
very persistant CAP augmented by several CAs CLs and a CLAA?
Exactly. The situations of every battle are different.
> Brewster Buffaloes would have made hash of them.
And then when the next strike comes? And the next? And the next? And the
next?
> You assume much. The Japanese thought that Force Z would have
> land-based air cover, yet they didn't send escorts.
No they didn't. They knew Z was to far out to see. On top of that they
knew what type of aircraft they were up against. If Indom had been with
them maybe they would have beaten off the first strike. Maybe Z would
have made it a little further north. But in the end she would have only
bought them a few more hours of life at the cost of her own.
The difference is once Z put to sea she was a threat to their invasion
plans. THAT is when they would act to remove them from the board.
> >> Now if Indomitable had been there? Well, first, she would
> >> have come with some modern escorts. Maybe not many, but
> >> some.
> >
> >Thats questionable.
>
> Not at all. There were still some modern escort ships available,
Most likely Indom would have been with PoW and Repluse. Super Z if you
will. Guessing they go all out it could look like this.
Indomitable
Prince of Wales
Repulse
3 "Ds"
4 DDs
A fine force. But still no match for the number of bombers that could be
thrown at them. Again. Just more targets
> and a
> carrier wouldn't have been sent out with just a couple of V&W
> destroyers.
Hermes.
> >Looked it up. She was carrying 2 squads of 9 Wildcats.
>
> 18 Martlets would have made a pretty good impression on the Bettys and
> Sallys that attacked Force Z.
Not denying that. They would have made the attack more costly for the
Japanese, I seem to remember typing as much. BUT in the end they
wouldn't have changed the outcome, only delayed it.
> The Mogamis were far and away CAs by this time,
Hell yes.
> (in fact, I don't think the IJN ever called them
> anything different, even when they had 6" armament).
Only when talking to foreigners
In ant case, in a
> stand up gunfight I'd put my money on the British ships over the
> antiquated Kongos.
I do to. Didn't say they'd win. Only that they where there. Unless its a
night action and the 3 CAs are allowed to operate independently. 48 long
lances can mess up your hole (bad pun I know) night.
> I grant, however, that a night fight with cruisers
> could go very badly for the Brits.
Well good, we agree on something. I wouldn't want to be on Repluse if 4
long lances hit her side. PoW might have had a better chance, but I'd
rather not find out considering smaller torpedos (type 91s) sank her.
> >A) he couldn't *until* Philips was killed. B) He wouldn't have gotten
> >it. beside the air support he would have recieved would make the Skuas
> >look like spring chickens. Basically if it was old they sent it to the
> >far east.
>
> First of all Phillips ordered air cover, which wasn't provided.
Hence my B)
Had
> they been available, _any_ fighters would have made a difference in
> the attack on the British warships.
Again. Maybe for the first strike. But the Second? Third? Forth? Fifth?
They knew they had torps. So they would have been expecting them. But
what they didn't know was the magnitude of the long lance.
I could say the same thing to you. What don't you understand about "out
numbered beyond hope." Its the original role back attack.
I recall reading in two sources that Nells were used. The only source I have
handy stating that is Dunnigan and Nofi's "Victory at Sea", which has several
niggling minor errors. Anyone have a second source?
>They were very easy to shoot down in the absence of fighter escort.
Still, not as easy as the TBD's at Midway. The Japanese Type 91 torpedoes could
be dropped at considerably higher altitude and speed ("several hundred" feet,
200+ kt.) than the US Mark XIII (50 ft., 110 knots).
Yes they were Nells. But I wasn't going to mention that cause it just
didn't matter that much which type it was.
>> You were caught spewing bullshit. For Chrissakes give it up.
>
>I could say the same thing to you.
You could but you'd be spewing BS. That won't stop you.
. What don't you understand about "out
>numbered beyond hope." Its the original role back attack.
Perhaps yopu'll consider rewriting these lines in English. While you're at
it, look up "roll back attack."
"Role Back Attack" sounds like a good movie for Sharon Stone. Why don't you
go over to a Hollywood group and suggest it?
>> Care to look up the possibility of fighter escort for these strikes?
>Hello! McFly! Aren't you paying attention? I did.
Either you can't understand the references, or you're fibbing about what
you found out or you're fibbing about looking it up. You choose. The
contention that escort would be provided if needed is nonsense. The
Japanese expected fighter cover over the ships and went ahead anyway.
>> I am coming to believe that you are either too lazy to do any research or
>> incapable of doing it properly. Either way you are amply replete with
>> feces.
>
>Thats odd.
Odd? It's rather thoroughly demonstrated.
>I came to the conclussion you're an incompatent, pompas ass
incompetent, pompus
>about 6 months ago. And time and again I have that conclussion
>re-enforced. Usually its when Andrew puts you back in your place, but
reinforced, it's
>sometimes you just do it to yourself.
Andrew & I do not always agree. One of Andrew's virtues is that, when he
knows he is in error, he backs off immediately. Another is that he thinks
about other viewpoints, not necessarily immediately, but always.
I try to get my facts too.
The only argument I remember having with him in the last year or so was
about the keel structure on Constitution. It turned out he misread
something I wrote, which another poster pointed out, politely.
Neither of us has much patience with people who confuse their fantasy
universes with reality.
: Adam Howarter <Ahow...@prodigy.net> wrote:
: >numbered beyond hope." Its the original role back attack.
:
: Perhaps yopu'll consider rewriting these lines in English. While you're at
: it, look up "roll back attack."
The 'Spelling Flame Correllary' of Murphy's Law strikes again.
OJ III
[Who left correlary as correllary to maintain the integrity of the SFC of
ML]
And gave no decent entries for a Stone (ore even Fonda oar Moore) line.
Your know phon, Johnsun.
A *crippled* Yorktown that was only sailing at 19 knots when torpedoed.
--
Scott M. Kozel koz...@richmond.infi.net
Highway and Transportation History Websites
Virginia/Maryland/Washington D.C. http://www.richmond.infi.net/~kozelsm
PHL area http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Campus/5961/pennways.html
Escorted Japanese torpedo bombers hit the Yorktown against heavy opposition.
I think this supports my point that torpedo bombers need escorts to be
effective when operating against enemy ships that have CAP. I thank you for
providing supporting evidence for my argument but I don't think that was your
intention.
Adam Howarter wrote:
> >
> > 18 Martlets would have made a pretty good impression on the Bettys and
> > Sallys that attacked Force Z.
>
> Not denying that. They would have made the attack more costly for the
> Japanese, I seem to remember typing as much. BUT in the end they
> wouldn't have changed the outcome, only delayed it.
Not neccisarily so. First if they shoot down the search planes then force Z
may not be attacked at all. Second if the Japanese come in in waves of 10 to
30 planes at a time, which is what seems to happen in most battles and
ceratinly happened with force Z, even 9 Martlets could break up the attack.
They don't even have to shoot the Japs down, they only have to spoil their
aim.
>
>
> Had
> > they been available, _any_ fighters would have made a difference in
> > the attack on the British warships.
>
> Again. Maybe for the first strike. But the Second? Third? Forth? Fifth?
Agian your making a big assumption. Second third fourth and fifth could all
be small strikes, coordinating large groups of aircraft is difficult. Also
even finding force Z is difficult and was difficult historically. The
Japanese missed them completely the day before, they only barely located them
on they day they were sunk. History is full of second strikes that never
found the enemy and went home.
Finally the Japanese do not have unlimited aircraft. mutiple strikes require
mutiple sorties which very seldom happened in WWII. Even maintaining the
operational tempo you describe would have presented some difficulties.
The carrier doesn't just give the Force Z fighter cover, it increases the
chances that luck will go there way by improving their recon, their defense,
thier offense, and adding to their options.
I still think you greatly over estimate the willingness of the Japanese Army
and Navy to cooperate and you are skating on thin ice in other areas.
So far you have a number of respected voices (and me) disagreeing with you
and all for the same reasons. Your reply seems to run along the lines of I'm
right and your wrong. You entitled to reply any way you wish but that
particular reply usually gets the respect it deserves.
Tom Hunter
Does that just leave INdecent entries then? ...
John Gilbert
'Sign me up'
> The problem here is ANYWHERE Force Z went north of
> Singapore they were within range of Japanese aircraft.
I don't have the references handy but from memory. The original plan
provided for some sort of British land based air cover for the day light
part of the operation. The mistake was not cancelling the operation when
the air cover failed to turn up.
Ken Young
If the CAP had shot them down it wouldn't have mattered what condition
she was in. For further examples where, dispite a heavy, well trained
and guided CAP, backed up by heavy AA bleeders got threw see Princeton,
and the Marianes turkey shot.
>> The Japanese Army and Navy never worked well with each other, and only
>> worked with each other when forced to in the first place.
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Is this supposed to mean something?
>> The Zeros and other fighters at Saigon and other bases were busy with
>> other missions. They were _not_, I say again, _Not_ available to
>> escort the mission to attack PoW and Repulse.
>
>Only because they didn't need to be. If they had, they would have been
>*made* available.
How?
>> Singapore was in range of Japanese aircraft, so what's the diff?
>
>The difference is once Z put to sea she was a threat to their invasion
>plans. THAT is when they would act to remove them from the board.
They have to locate them at sea. They didn't do that 'till quite a
significant time into the mission. Considering that their objective
was likely obvious to the Japanese, I think it goes a long way towards
emphasizing the difficulty of finding ships at sea in WWII.
>Most likely Indom would have been with PoW and Repluse. Super Z if you
>will. Guessing they go all out it could look like this.
>Indomitable
>Prince of Wales
>Repulse
>3 "Ds"
>4 DDs
Anything about Enterprise and Emerald? (Both in the FE at the time).
What about a converted "C?" Not outside the realm of possibility.
However, the above doesn't address the "modern escort" assertion. You
just say "4DDs," anything to back it up? Any potential classes? (My
guess would be J/K/N and maybe O/P, hardly old.
>A fine force. But still no match for the number of bombers that could be
>thrown at them. Again. Just more targets
How many bombers? You've mentioned the _potential_ airpower in the
form of the order of battle, but you have no frame of reference on the
missions being conducted or the actual aircraft availablity.
>> and a
>> carrier wouldn't have been sent out with just a couple of V&W
>> destroyers.
>
>Hermes.
Hermes wasn't exactly a fleet carrier.
>> 18 Martlets would have made a pretty good impression on the Bettys and
>> Sallys that attacked Force Z.
>
>Not denying that. They would have made the attack more costly for the
>Japanese, I seem to remember typing as much. BUT in the end they
>wouldn't have changed the outcome, only delayed it.
>
How do you arrive at this conclusion? It seems to me that you base it
only on what was _potentially_ available, rather than any analysis of
what was _actually_ available.
<re Mogami class>
>> (in fact, I don't think the IJN ever called them
>> anything different, even when they had 6" armament).
>
>Only when talking to foreigners
Like the Americans referred to the Brooklyns as CA?
>Well good, we agree on something. I wouldn't want to be on Repluse if 4
>long lances hit her side. PoW might have had a better chance, but I'd
>rather not find out considering smaller torpedos (type 91s) sank her.
>
Any number of Type 96 torpedoes can ruin your day, though I would
guess that three or four recieved in rapid succession on either
British ship would have decided the issue. However, it's a much more
difficult proposition to have them hit.
Top that off with radar, and the British have a pretty good chance
anyway.
>Again. Maybe for the first strike. But the Second? Third? Forth? Fifth?
You harp on this. Where were those strikes coming from? What's the
turnaround time for the Japanese aircraft (almost _all_ aircraft
available for the air-to-sea mission were committed to Force Z)? How
were they going to maintain contact with Force Z?
Frankly, I doubt they would have gotten in a second strike if the
first had failed (when I say "strike" in this case, I mean the
sequence of arrival of _all_ of the aircraft equipped for this
mission).
>mjmartino@igs*.net (Jay) wrote:
>
>>The Mogamis were far and away CAs by this time, and had been for a
>>couple of years (in fact, I don't think the IJN ever called them
>>anything different, even when they had 6" armament). In ant case, in a
>>stand up gunfight I'd put my money on the British ships over the
>>antiquated Kongos. I grant, however, that a night fight with cruisers
>>could go very badly for the Brits.
>
>Did the RN know about the long lance or would Phillips have been as
>surprised as everyone else was?
That's why I said the night battle could have gone badly. I expect
Phillips knew nothing about the Type 26 torpedo. It's effectiveness in
a night fight would have depended on how closely the Japanese adhered
to their doctrine though. The Radar on the RN ships could have skewed
the results.
>> >Up to that point here is the number of battleships that, underway, were
>> >sunk by aircraft:< >
>>
>> Non-sequitur.
>
>Exactly. The situations of every battle are different.
>
That's still a non-sequitur.
>> Brewster Buffaloes would have made hash of them.
>
>And then when the next strike comes? And the next? And the next? And the
>next?
What additional strikes? I suggest you take a good look at the
military situation at the time, rather than just the order of battle.
>> You assume much. The Japanese thought that Force Z would have
>> land-based air cover, yet they didn't send escorts.
>
>No they didn't. They knew Z was to far out to see. On top of that they
>knew what type of aircraft they were up against. If Indom had been with
>them maybe they would have beaten off the first strike. Maybe Z would
>have made it a little further north. But in the end she would have only
>bought them a few more hours of life at the cost of her own.
Sea.
Reference the above. I'm sure that some Japanese officer must have
made that observation, otherwise I'd have to conclude that you pulled
it out of your butt. The Japanese sent the attack force out fully
expecting it to be challenged by land based air. They felt, correctly,
that the risk was worth it (about 50 land based bombers vs two
battleships, it certainly _was_ worth the risk).
BTW, at the time the attack occurred, Phillips had already decided to
reverse course and head back to Singapore. Apparently you missed that
little tidbit.
> I don't have the references handy but from memory. The original plan
> provided for some sort of British land based air cover for the day light
> part of the operation. The mistake was not cancelling the operation when
> the air cover failed to turn up.
I agree 100%. there is enough blame to go around.
There were also four times as many carriers. Flying Zeros against TBDs
that weren't meant (really) to operate by themselves. The bombers were
meant to operate solo. Now if we change the situation to super duper Z
with all four Illustrious carriers each flying 12 to 18 Martlets or Sea
Hurricans or Fulmars and the bombers come in unescorted in one two
attacks then I'd agree they'd make it out alive. BUT this wouldn't have
happened.
> Escorted Japanese torpedo bombers hit the Yorktown against heavy opposition.
> I think this supports my point that torpedo bombers need escorts to be
> effective when operating against enemy ships that have CAP.
What kind of CAP?
> Not neccisarily so. First if they shoot down the search planes then force Z
> may not be attacked at all.
Agreed. Until they start attacking the transports. Then the Japanese
know exactly where they are.
> Second if the Japanese come in in waves of 10 to
> 30 planes at a time, which is what seems to happen in most battles and
> ceratinly happened with force Z, even 9 Martlets could break up the attack.
How many waves? And what happens when they start coming in in waves of
40 or 50, with fighter escort? The bombers could keep it up all day. How
long untill those fighters have to land on a carrier maneuvering into a
cross wind because they're out of ammo and fuel?
> They don't even have to shoot the Japs down, they only have to spoil their
> aim.
But then the bombers come back. With more torpedos and A LOT more of
their friends.
> Agian your making a big assumption. Second third fourth and fifth could all
> be small strikes, coordinating large groups of aircraft is difficult.
Thats ok, they have all week to get it right.
> Also
> even finding force Z is difficult and was difficult historically.
Most not have been to hard.
> Finally the Japanese do not have unlimited aircraft. mutiple strikes require
> mutiple sorties which very seldom happened in WWII. Even maintaining the
> operational tempo you describe would have presented some difficulties.
That works both ways.
> The carrier doesn't just give the Force Z fighter cover, it increases the
> chances that luck will go there way by improving their recon, their defense,
> thier offense, and adding to their options.
>
> I still think you greatly over estimate the willingness of the Japanese Army
> and Navy to cooperate and you are skating on thin ice in other areas.
Why don't you think the army would want to work with the navy when
there is a BB, a BC, and a CV moving toward THEIR troops? Do you think
they'd rather see their own troops get massacured then work with the
navy?
> So far you have a number of respected voices (and me) disagreeing with you
> and all for the same reasons. Your reply seems to run along the lines of I'm
> right and your wrong. You entitled to reply any way you wish but that
> particular reply usually gets the respect it deserves.
Hmmmm, sounds like you're saying the same thing. "I'm right, you're
wrong. 18 fighters could hold off over ->300<- bombers." And you think
I'm wrong? Your falling into the same trap Phillips did. But your
falling into it 60 years later.
Its almost as if they were sure their planes could have broken threw any
fighters they ran into...
> Neither of us has much patience with people who confuse their fantasy
> universes with reality.
That would explain you bad attitude. Every minute of every day you have
to refrain from killing yourself.
In this corner 18 fighters
In this corner 300+ bombers
"Hi, I'm Peter Skelton. My money is on the fighters."
A while back a few of us researched the event and postulated that should the
Repulse and Prince of Wales be missed they would go on to the landing site.
There they would be met by the Japanese covering force. Through our research
we found that there were 24 DDs 5 CAs and 2 Kongos available. Our assumption
was that these all (we reduced the Japanese DDs to 16) were available to
counter the British Move.
The British escort destroyers were not used - sent home - as in the
origional. We then began a simulation (my own rules based upon Fletcher
Pratt, upgraded quite a bit) with the POW and Repulse trying to force their
way through the Japanese force. The British ships did considerable damage,
but could not cover the overall assault. The Repulse was disabled first,
then the Prince of Wales. We ended up sinking several DDs and CAs (2 I think)
and damaging the Kongos. A no win situation.
Note that there are several books on the subject. I have two good ones at
home and will supply the titles if anone is interested. Much of the blame is
on Phillips, who believed that no aircraft could sink a Battleship under way.
Some blame went to Churchill for concieving such a mission in the first
place (sending capital ships to the far east). Other ships such as the
Rodney, Victorious, and more were slated for transfer there as well. The
ships were there to calm nerves and political appeasement (to Australia). In
any case it appears that Phillips used the ships in a manner not origionally
intended (speculation on my part). But, given the time frame, it was a
perfectly natural assumption that Philips made. Up to that time there was no
proof of the effectiveness of Aircraft against moving targets - such as BBs.
Anyway the books detail it out much better. Interesting to read and speculate
though.
Rich Raspenti
-----== Posted via Deja News, The Leader in Internet Discussion ==-----
http://www.dejanews.com/rg_mkgrp.xp Create Your Own Free Member Forum
>Peter Skelton wrote:
>>
>> o...@cpcug.org (Ogden Johnson III) wrote: some stuff...
>>
>> And gave no decent entries for a Stone (ore even Fonda oar Moore) line.
>
>Does that just leave INdecent entries then? ...
>
Psease sir, this is a family newsgroup. Many children subscribe.
As the RN was unaware of the long lance's capability (the question was
rhetorical) a day battle against the cruisers and DD's might be more
affected than a night one. Battleships seldom hit destroyers at 10,000
yards plus. Phillip's ships might not have been trying seriously at that
range, if there were cruisers to shoot at.
Getting a good long range target solution at night requires very good
visibility, it's easier by day.
>> The
>> Japanese expected fighter cover over the ships and went ahead anyway.
>
>Its almost as if they were sure their planes could have broken threw any
>fighters they ran into...
It means they were heros. Seriously. So were the American pilots at Midway.
>> Neither of us has much patience with people who confuse their fantasy
>> universes with reality.
>
>That would explain you bad attitude. Every minute of every day you have
>to refrain from killing yourself.
>In this corner 18 fighters
>In this corner 300+ bombers
>"Hi, I'm Peter Skelton. My money is on the fighters."
Thank you for the fine example.
Great fantasy. Better than 250 extra bombers.
Jay (mjmartino@igs*.net) writes:
> Adam Howarter <Ahow...@prodigy.net> wrote:
>>Again. Maybe for the first strike. But the Second? Third? Forth? Fifth?
>
> You harp on this. Where were those strikes coming from? What's the
> turnaround time for the Japanese aircraft (almost _all_ aircraft
> available for the air-to-sea mission were committed to Force Z)? How
> were they going to maintain contact with Force Z?
My fault. In my only previous post to this thread I referred to the fact
that *whatever* fighters (even Fulmars) Indomitable had would be enough to
disrupt the first strike, but that they might not be able to hold off
successive waves, especially when fighters came along as escort. Of
course I allow that this might be the next day, but Mr. Howarth appears to
figure they could all come back the same day.
The cycle time for a 2nd strike is an open question. Without a book at
hand, I don't know how many hours flying time back to base, but say 2
hours minimum. Absolute minimum re-fuel re-arm time of 1 hour. Closer to
2 for squadron+ strength. So about 6 hours for a return strike by the
same group of aircraft, minimum.
> Frankly, I doubt they would have gotten in a second strike if the
> first had failed (when I say "strike" in this case, I mean the
> sequence of arrival of _all_ of the aircraft equipped for this
> mission).
A second would have begun to arrive close to dusk, with fewer aircraft
than before, even *assuming* that Force Z was in the same location to be
found. (Big advantage of carriers is that even a handful of fighters can
shoot down search and shadow aircraft.)
So Indomitable would have saved them from serious loss the first day, but
perhaps not the next. Any suggestion for Dec 11 is total speculation.
Force Z might have had to retire with bomb or torpedo damage, but it is
hard to say for sure. Difficult to think that any of the three big ships
would have been lost if Indomitable had been along, but the mission might
have been scrubbed.
GaryJ
--
http://www.ncf.carleton.ca/~ar075
To build a community we must be able to communicate freely.
Adam Howarter (Ahow...@prodigy.net) writes:
>> Second if the Japanese come in in waves of 10 to
>> 30 planes at a time, which is what seems to happen in most battles and
>> ceratinly happened with force Z, even 9 Martlets could break up the attack.
> How many waves? And what happens when they start coming in in waves of
> 40 or 50, with fighter escort? The bombers could keep it up all day. How
> long untill those fighters have to land on a carrier maneuvering into a
> cross wind because they're out of ammo and fuel?
There were only enough IJN planes for about 2 waves of this size, assuming
they could co-ordinate them to do so. And each group would have had a
cycle time of something like 6 hours by the back of my envelope.
Therefore at most 2 waves of 50 and those 6 hours after the first.
>> They don't even have to shoot the Japs down, they only have to spoil their
>> aim.
>
> But then the bombers come back. With more torpedos and A LOT more of
> their friends.
As above. The fighters also land to re-arm.
>> Agian your making a big assumption. Second third fourth and fifth could all
>> be small strikes, coordinating large groups of aircraft is difficult.
> Thats ok, they have all week to get it right.
Nope. A day or so. After that the landing is either ashore or attacked
at the beachhead by force Z.
>> Also
>> even finding force Z is difficult and was difficult historically.
>
> Most not have been to hard.
The attacking planes were on their way home after flying around the
S.China Sea looking for them. Indeed nearly missed the RN group.
>> I still think you greatly over estimate the willingness of the Japanese Army
>> and Navy to cooperate and you are skating on thin ice in other areas.
>
> Why don't you think the army would want to work with the navy when
> there is a BB, a BC, and a CV moving toward THEIR troops? Do you think
> they'd rather see their own troops get massacured then work with the
> navy?
Doesn't matter a whole lot.
1. Army bombers would have been useful only as
decoys for AA and fighters. The war is full of examples of
non-maritime-trained air being almost useless in anti-shipping strikes.
2. Most army fighters were too short-legged to escort a strike far
out to sea.
The only truly viable escorts would have been the Zeros, if they could be
made available.
> Hmmmm, sounds like you're saying the same thing. "I'm right, you're
> wrong. 18 fighters could hold off over ->300<- bombers." And you think
> I'm wrong? Your falling into the same trap Phillips did. But your
> falling into it 60 years later.
It is not 18 holding off 300, only 100, and then only in smaller groups.
Not such a difficult task. That is the thing about anti-shipping strikes.
A torpedo that misses by 10 ft is as good as a mile unless it goes off in
the wake of the ship. A bomb that misses by more than maybe 30 feet is
also a total miss. Doesn't take much to disrupt the bombers' aim. And if
we are talking hypothetical, then consider that Indomitable would have
almost doubled the AA availbale to the fleet.
This troll was interesting for a while, but is getting a bit tiresome in
its repetition without reason.
(raz...@aol.com) writes:
> Note that there are several books on the subject. I have two good ones at
> home and will supply the titles if anone is interested. Much of the blame is
> on Phillips, who believed that no aircraft could sink a Battleship under way.
> Some blame went to Churchill for concieving such a mission in the first
> place (sending capital ships to the far east). Other ships such as the
> Rodney, Victorious, and more were slated for transfer there as well. The
> ships were there to calm nerves and political appeasement (to Australia). In
> any case it appears that Phillips used the ships in a manner not origionally
> intended (speculation on my part). But, given the time frame, it was a
> perfectly natural assumption that Philips made. Up to that time there was no
> proof of the effectiveness of Aircraft against moving targets - such as BBs.
They were sent in what WLSC thought was peacetime, to make a show of
force. I am not sure that there was much thought to operational orders,
because of that and the fact that any RN admiral is assumed ot be able to
adapt to tactiical ops as required.
Cunningham reports that the Med Fleet thought that it was wrong to send
ships not experenced in dealing with air attacks, and that was a majr
factor in the loss.
Only need one.
> > But then the bombers come back. With more torpedos and A LOT more of
> > their friends.
> As above. The fighters also land to re-arm.
During the attack?
> > Thats ok, they have all week to get it right.
> Nope. A day or so. After that the landing is either ashore
In which case Z failed in its mission.
or attacked
> at the beachhead by force Z.
In which case the Japanese know where to find them.
> The attacking planes were on their way home after flying around the
> S.China Sea looking for them. Indeed nearly missed the RN group.
And I nearly won the lottery.
> The only truly viable escorts would have been the Zeros, if they could be made available.
why don't you think they would be?
> > I'm wrong? Your falling into the same trap Phillips did. But your
> > falling into it 60 years later.
>
> It is not 18 holding off 300, only 100,
Lets see. 88 Nells. 48 Betty. 52 Zero. 81 Sally. 87 lilly. Grab your
purple dinosaur calculator and see what that adds up to.
> and then only in smaller groups.
Because they didn't have to launch mass attacks.
> This troll was interesting for a while, but is getting a bit tiresome in
> its repetition without reason.
I agree. Now unless you can come up with something better then "I just
know 18 fighters could do the job, I just know it" go away and let we
who deal in fact and figures do so.
There is evidence to support this thought. For example, PoW had radar
controlled AA. (The YAGI antanae on the mounts are visible in some pictures
the censors didn't get at.) It was (largely or completely - I don't
remember) out of service after the voyage east, given a low repair priority
and not fixed.
>> 1. Phillips did not stick to his operational pre-requisites of surprise
>He tried. But really couldn't.
In fact Phillips turned his force southward once discovered by
Japanese aircraft (which would be shot down had carrier was there)
although I think Force Z was already spotted by Japanese submarine
soon after sailing out of port.
Since this turn has been performed AFTER Japanese recon plane went
over horizont, Japanese planes failed to spot British fleet on the
place where they should have been and had Phillips continued with
retreat no Japanese attack would have occured.
But Phillips received new reports about Japanese landings at Kuantan
(that never took place) much closer to the Singapore than original
landings at Singora, Phatani and Khota Baru he decided to turn
northwards and attack Japanese transports.
>Which leads of course to the oft asked "What if/If only...Indomitable
>had been there." Well, as it turns out its probably a good thing she
>wasn't. Lets say she is, and sails with the Force Z. Things go as they
>did up until the attack. Most people will say "ah-ha, now her aircraft
>can repulse (no pun intended) the attack..." Unfortunately, no, at the
>time she was carrying about 33 aircraft. Only 12 (IIRC) were fighters
>(Sea Hurricans.) That means they're out numbered better then 13 to one.
This ratio would be valid only if Japanese managed to send all those
aircraft at once. However that was not going to happen. Japanese
planes were arriving occasionally from time to time as their frantic
commanders at airports managed to arm, fuel and brief them.
Also, all those torpedo bombers would fly unescorted. I can't say
whether Zeroes could reach British southward going fleet. Zeroes had
long range, but Saburo Sakai says that even for experienced pilots
reaching maximum theoretical range was difficult task.
The reports of surviving British sailors are full of stories of
Japanese torpedo bombers flying as on parade. Well, even a handfull of
fighters are enough to disrupt attacking torpedo bombers and without
some straight flying on law attitude any torpedo attack would fail.
Also, with any hour passed, the distance between British task force
and Japanese bases woulf be increased thus prolonging the time
necessary to reach the fleet. Addtional factor on British side was the
inevitable arrival of darkness that would prevent any attack.
To conclude, in my opinion, the presence of carrier would greatly
inhibit Japanese attack and quite possibly saved entire task force.
Drax
for reply, delete NOSPAM from my e-mail address
I think there were several truths that came out of fleet operations against
air power in WWII. One of those was "Any CAP is better than no CAP". The
mere prescene of the Indomitable, and what meagar CAP she could put up, would
have had a great effect on the quality of the Jap attack. They would still
probably taken a few hits, but I believe the ships would have survived with
some sort of CAP.
PDH
>
> > It is not 18 holding off 300, only 100,
>
> Lets see. 88 Nells. 48 Betty. 52 Zero. 81 Sally. 87 lilly. Grab your
> purple dinosaur calculator and see what that adds up to.
>
>
> I agree. Now unless you can come up with something better then "I just
> know 18 fighters could do the job, I just know it" go away and let we
> who deal in fact and figures do so.
>
Where do you get your figures from?
More of "carefully selected bits, usually out of context"
by
Adam Howarter (Ahow...@prodigy.net) who writes:
>> As above. The fighters also land to re-arm.
>
> During the attack?
As was explained, any possible repeat attacks of similar scale would be well
spaced.
>> The only truly viable escorts would have been the Zeros, if they could be made available.
>
> why don't you think they would be?
As has been pointed out, they were not used and the strikes were expecting
land-based fighter cover for Force Z. And the ranges flown were great
even for the Zero.
Notes by Lt. Takai of Genzan Air Corps: "...since we had flown beyond the
calculated 'point of no return' and then engeged in fuel-consuming battle
manoeuvers'..."
Takai also reports that they poonly had one (*ONE*) torpedo per bomber a t
their bases in Indochina, and could not afford to waste them.
>> It is not 18 holding off 300, only 100,
>
> Lets see. 88 Nells. 48 Betty. 52 Zero. 81 Sally. 87 lilly. Grab your
> purple dinosaur calculator and see what that adds up to.
The attack force was:
9 type 96 for search
2 type 98 for search
26 type 96 with torps
27 type 1 with torps
34 type 96 with bombs
TOTAL = 98
AND 9 of the bombers attacked a small freighter by accident
leaving 89 less 11 searcg = 78 in the strike.
And as was stated, the army planes were not going to be effective in
attacking a naval force. Without training, that was proven ineffective in
too many instances in the war.
> I agree. Now unless you can come up with something better then "I just
> know 18 fighters could do the job, I just know it" go away and let we
> who deal in fact and figures do so.
Hah!
>As the RN was unaware of the long lance's capability (the question was
>rhetorical) a day battle against the cruisers and DD's might be more
>affected than a night one. Battleships seldom hit destroyers at 10,000
>yards plus. Phillip's ships might not have been trying seriously at that
>range, if there were cruisers to shoot at.
Understood. However, torpedoes, even the vaunted Long Lance, rarely
hit at 10,000 yards either.
A battle would depend on what was available to each side. The Japanese
admiral (was it Kurita?) planned to engage with his battleships at
dawn, after harrassing through the night with his cruisers and
destroyers. Perhaps a better plan would be to saturate the British
with his whole force united, at dawn. This way his destroyers and
cruisers could be assured of having full torpedo loadouts, and he
could be certain that the British would be engaging the heavies with
their big guns.
>That would explain you bad attitude. Every minute of every day you have
>to refrain from killing yourself.
>In this corner 18 fighters
>In this corner 300+ bombers
>"Hi, I'm Peter Skelton. My money is on the fighters."
What 300 bombers? My money is on Peter Skelton.
>> There were only enough IJN planes for about 2 waves of this size,
>
>Only need one.
I only need to win your lottery once as well.
>> > But then the bombers come back. With more torpedos and A LOT more of
>> > their friends.
>
>> As above. The fighters also land to re-arm.
>
>During the attack?
Are you _trying_ to be obtuse or does it come naturally. The above was
purely argumentative BS. Check your work.
>> The only truly viable escorts would have been the Zeros, if they could be made available.
>
>why don't you think they would be?
Umm, they weren't in the actual battle, even though they fully
expected the battleships to have air cover. Why do you think they
_would_ be?
>Lets see. 88 Nells. 48 Betty. 52 Zero. 81 Sally. 87 lilly. Grab your
>purple dinosaur calculator and see what that adds up to.
Now you're just being a dickhead. Get out _your_ calculator and tell
me why it says the Lilys and Sallys would have had any great effect.
It was torpedoes that killed the two ships, not bombs, and certainly
not dropped by Army pilots used to hitting a division-sized patch of
real-estate that isn't moving.
Does anything in your OB indicate what the Zeros Sallys and Lilys were
_doing_ on the day? Or do you just think that they were sitting and
waiting for the order to puke some iron onto a couple of battleships?
>Because they didn't have to launch mass attacks.
They couldn't launch mass attacks for one very good reason in this
case. If you're a good boy, and ask nicely, I may even educate you on
why.
>I agree. Now unless you can come up with something better then "I just
>know 18 fighters could do the job, I just know it" go away and let we
>who deal in fact and figures do so.
You claim facts and figures, yet I haven't seen anything to
demonstrate anything other than a knowledge of the starting order of
battle. Where'd you get the info? Probably a wargame, right?
>My fault. In my only previous post to this thread I referred to the fact
>that *whatever* fighters (even Fulmars) Indomitable had would be enough to
>disrupt the first strike
Not your fault at all, as I hadn't seen your previous post.
>The cycle time for a 2nd strike is an open question. Without a book at
>hand, I don't know how many hours flying time back to base, but say 2
>hours minimum. Absolute minimum re-fuel re-arm time of 1 hour. Closer to
>2 for squadron+ strength. So about 6 hours for a return strike by the
>same group of aircraft, minimum.
6 hours sounds like a very reasonable estimate.
>A second would have begun to arrive close to dusk, with fewer aircraft
>than before, even *assuming* that Force Z was in the same location to be
>found. (Big advantage of carriers is that even a handful of fighters can
>shoot down search and shadow aircraft.)
The problem with arriving close to dusk raises the question of whether
the Japanese would have been willing to risk the losses that go with
night landings. While we certainly can't assume that they wouldn't, it
should be taken under consideration.
>So Indomitable would have saved them from serious loss the first day, but
>perhaps not the next. Any suggestion for Dec 11 is total speculation.
>Force Z might have had to retire with bomb or torpedo damage, but it is
>hard to say for sure. Difficult to think that any of the three big ships
>would have been lost if Indomitable had been along, but the mission might
>have been scrubbed.
Well, Phillips had decided to retire before the actual attack, so, if
anything, having air cover may have given him the confidence to go on.
The result, as you say, would be pure speculation. However, consider
that any strikes on the second day would be predicated on contact with
Force Z. Even in the restricted waters of the gulf that wouldn't have
been a trivial task. They had no means of shadowing through the night
as no Japanese ships had gained contact, and the one sub that had
contacted was unable to maintain it.
The bottom line is that in the world of "what if" the fate of Force Z
is hardly written in concrete.
>In fact Phillips turned his force southward once discovered by
>Japanese aircraft (which would be shot down had carrier was there)
>although I think Force Z was already spotted by Japanese submarine
>soon after sailing out of port.
IIRC the sub lost contact shortly after spotting the task force. I
think there was also some other communications problem that made sub
spotting next to worthless. I believe it was a chain-of-command issue.
>To conclude, in my opinion, the presence of carrier would greatly
>inhibit Japanese attack and quite possibly saved entire task force.
Which seems to be the prevailing opinion.
>p...@kingston.net (Peter Skelton) wrote:
>
>>As the RN was unaware of the long lance's capability (the question was
>>rhetorical) a day battle against the cruisers and DD's might be more
>>affected than a night one. Battleships seldom hit destroyers at 10,000
>>yards plus. Phillip's ships might not have been trying seriously at that
>>range, if there were cruisers to shoot at.
>
>Understood. However, torpedoes, even the vaunted Long Lance, rarely
>hit at 10,000 yards either.
True enough. The IJN doctrine seems to have been to put a huge number of
these things in the water at the same time. With the forces available it
could have been a hundred or more.
>
>A battle would depend on what was available to each side. The Japanese
>admiral (was it Kurita?) planned to engage with his battleships at
>dawn, after harrassing through the night with his cruisers and
>destroyers.
If he uses the cruisers and destroyers that way the torpedos won't be
available for the day, as you said.
Perhaps a better plan would be to saturate the British
>with his whole force united, at dawn. This way his destroyers and
>cruisers could be assured of having full torpedo loadouts, and he
>could be certain that the British would be engaging the heavies with
>their big guns.
I think it wold have been better for the IJN.
The night action would have been a conflict of mutual surprise - long lance
against radar. Each side knew about its own advantage but not about the
other sides. (I seem to recall someone posting something similar.)
Any good source should have these figures.
Better hope so.
> As has been pointed out, they were not used and the strikes were expecting land-based fighter cover for Force Z
What land based air cover? the only fighters in the area were the 48
Buffalos at Singapore and the Japanese knew that.
> The attack force was:
> 9 type 96 for search
> 2 type 98 for search
> 26 type 96 with torps
> 27 type 1 with torps
> 34 type 96 with bombs
> TOTAL = 98
Thats what was sent. Not what could have been sent. But hey, thats cool
to. Are you saying 18 Marlets could hold off 98 bombers?
> And as was stated, the army planes were not going to be effective in
> attacking a naval force. Without training, that was proven ineffective in
> too many instances in the war.
You mean like at the Bismarck sea?
Unless you keep going back to buy tickets.
> Are you _trying_ to be obtuse or does it come naturally. The above was
> purely argumentative BS. Check your work.
Are you _trying_ to over inflate the value of 18 fighters? Or are you
_trying_ to underestimate the ability of the Japanese? Or does both come
naturally?
> Now you're just being a dickhead.
And you're being intractable.
> Get out _your_ calculator and tell
> me why it says the Lilys and Sallys would have had any great effect.
My calculator doesn't *say* anything. Does yours talk to you often?
Maybe you have one of those talking ones because you're blind? Thats the
only way I could see you not comprehending how badly out numbered and
classed Force Z was.
> Does anything in your OB indicate what the Zeros Sallys and Lilys were
> _doing_ on the day?
Gee, lets see. They were at war. On the advance. Generally kicking the
ass of anything that got in their way. I see no reason a hand full of
Wildcats would have shared a different fate.
> You claim facts and figures, yet I haven't seen anything to
> demonstrate anything other than a knowledge of the starting order of
> battle.
Thats all we can use. If Indomitable is put in the fold it changes the
dynamics of the whole action. The only thing that stays the same is that
Force Z ends up on the bottom. the Japanese invade Singapore. And the
Brits head for Ceylon and Addu atoll. Whats next? Someone claiming the
four Rs and Warspite could have stopped Kido Butai from hitting Ceylon
if only they'd turned east instead of west?
Where'd you get the info? Probably a wargame, right?
If there is a wargame with this detailed of information I sure haven't
seen it, let alone played it. If it does please tell me, I'd *LOVE* to
try this scenario out. But I'll tell you right now my money, with or
without Indomitable, is on the Japanese.
Not totally correct. Britian was already at war in Europe and the rumblings
in Asia (Japan) made is certain that it would spread there. What Churchill
wanted was to impress the Aussie partners that Britian was able and willing
to protect them if the shooting started.
> Cunningham reports that the Med Fleet thought that it was wrong to send
> ships not experenced in dealing with air attacks, and that was a majr
> factor in the loss.
>
> GaryJ
Yep - exactly as I've read. Also that "tom thumb" (Phillips) was totally
ignorant of air capabilities - combined with his arrogance - a very good
recipe for disaster.
The major book that deals with this is called A Sinister Twilight (Author I
forgot). It goes into a good bit of details about the incident. Provides
maps and references that would end most of the bantering on this subject.
Another is Sea Batles of WWII published by the same group that did the ship
profiles. There the political and strategic implications of the operation are
dealt with, as well as some into the personalities of the leadership invilved
in the hjigh level decision making (Churchill, Cunningham and Phillips).
Very interesting. That one indicated that Phillips was chosen to command the
group to get him out of the way - thorn in the side...(of whom??).
On the turnaround time for sortees - probably a maximum of two that day. If
the group were allowed to proceed (assuming Phillips chose to continue his
action) the turnaround time would have been much less as he approached the
landing area (Note though that Phillips had begun to retire - as indicated
earlier in previous posting).
Anyway, interesting to speculate.....
RAR
What is hard about night landings on land?
Japan is in a risk taking mood after all. Hell,
if you are going to declare war on the USA, UK
and half the world, why not take a big big risk
and land planes at night in Vietnam?
> >So Indomitable would have saved them from serious loss the first day, but
> >perhaps not the next. Any suggestion for Dec 11 is total speculation.
> >Force Z might have had to retire with bomb or torpedo damage, but it is
> >hard to say for sure. Difficult to think that any of the three big ships
> >would have been lost if Indomitable had been along, but the mission might
> >have been scrubbed.
Torpedoes are just too hard to predict though. It only takes one lucky
hit, like on Bismarck, and then the ships are screwed. Anything that
slows a ship's speed would be very deadly, and would give Force Z(+)
some
horrible choices. Suppose one of the three big ships had damage that
took their speed down to ten knots. Do you leave it behind and probably
lose a couple thousand sailors? Do you stay with it and give up your
main
advantage of being hard to find for (coordinated) air strikes?
> The bottom line is that in the world of "what if" the fate of Force Z
> is hardly written in concrete.
Truer words were never written.
John Gilbert
> Battleship Class: King George V
> Names: HMS King George V, HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Duke of York, HMS
> Anson, HMS Howe
Here's a question that I've always had. When people talk about the
KGVs, you always hear about the first three ships listed. What about
the other two? Anything significant about their careers? Or did they
just spend their lives uneventfully. Anybody?
Kennedy
Eighteen Martlets (plus additional AA fire) could have disrupted the
attacks sufficiently to let the ships survive. Delivering an accurate
torpedo attack requires straight, level flight at low altitude: hard to
do while under fighter attack.
>> And as was stated, the army planes were not going to be effective in
>> attacking a naval force. Without training, that was proven ineffective in
>> too many instances in the war.
>
>You mean like at the Bismarck sea?
How about the B-17s attacking at Midway?
The Bismarck Sea attacks were by crews trained in low-level antiship
attack, such training having been shown to be necessary by earlier
failures.
--
Paul J. Adam
KGV was of course the class nameship and HF flagship, and engaged BISMARCK
so she was famous. PoW fought BISMARCK and met a violent end in the
Pacific, so she was famous. DoY fought SCHARNHORST. ANSON & HOWE spent a
lot of time on the Russia convoys, then went over to the Pacific late in
the game. Neither saw any particularly distinguished or well-known
combat, and they operated in generally under-publicized areas.
--
Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
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