FY 2004 Department of Defense Budget Released
Otis Willie
(EXCERPT) Story Number: NNS030204-05 Release Date: 2/4/2003 12:29:00
PM
Special release from the Department of Defense
WASHINGTON (NNS) -- President George W. Bush recently released details
of his fiscal year (FY) 2004 Department of Defense (DoD) budget. The
budget requests $379.9 billion in discretionary budget authority -
$15.3 billion above FY 2003.
The FY 2004 DoD budget is the first to fully reflect the Bush
administration's new defense strategy, which calls for a focus on the
capabilities needed to counter 21st century threats such as terrorism,
rather than on specific regional dangers or requirements.
The central theme of the new budget is "Meeting today's threats while
preparing for tomorrow's challenges." The budget establishes a balance
between near-term and longer-term demands - in FY 2004 as well as over
the 6 years covered by the FY 2004-2009 Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP). The budget funds strong support for:
- Winning the global war on terrorism - Sustaining high quality people
and forces - Transforming the U.S. military and defense establishment
The budget reflects Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's insistence on
realistic funding for all DoD programs. By making tough,
strategy-driven decisions, the department has established a program
that can be executed with the funding projected in the President's
budget.
In the FY 2004 budget, the department continues to acquire
capabilities critical to the war on terrorism. FY 2004 initiatives for
force protection and combating terrorism include intrusion detection
systems, blast mitigation measures, chemical and biological detection
equipment, personal protection gear, waterside security enhancements,
harbor patrol boats, regional command systems, mass notification
systems and initiatives to restrict access to DoD installations.
The FY 2004 budget continues the President's commitment to take good
care of military personnel, which is critical to U.S. security - both
near-term...
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http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=5706
---------------------------
Otis Willie
Associate Librarian
The American War Library
http://www.americanwarlibrary.com
GLof815619
year folks) here is the link to get you there.
`http://navweb.secnav.navy.mil/pubbud/04pres/budget_pb04_u.htm
G Lof
Engineer
Henry J. Cobb
> For those of you interested in the bone chilling facts (it is pretty bad this
> year folks) here is the link to get you there.
>
> `http://navweb.secnav.navy.mil/pubbud/04pres/budget_pb04_u.htm
"The primary mission areas of LCS are small boat prosecution..."
They've reinvented the torpedo boat destroyer?
-HJC
Andrew Toppan
>"The primary mission areas of LCS are small boat prosecution..."
What *OTHER* missions did you cut off the quote? Others often discussed
include ASW, MCM, special operations, logistics, etc.
>They've reinvented the torpedo boat destroyer?
Only if you focus on *one* mission to the exclusion of all others.
--
Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
"Haze Gray & Underway" - Naval History, DANFS, World Navies Today,
Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more - http://www.hazegray.org/
Patrick Pemberton
"Andrew Toppan" <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message
> >"The primary mission areas of LCS are small boat prosecution..."
>
> What *OTHER* missions did you cut off the quote? Others often discussed
> include ASW, MCM, special operations, logistics, etc.
Maybe he rightfully assumed it'll be miserable at ASW and MCM? ;)
GLof815619
the LSC can do. What really scares me is the death spiral going on with the
fleet. Rumsfeld is starving the fleet for money, while forcing it to expend
money on projects that are low priority. I expect the surface combatant force
to drop to ninty ships, or less before Rumsfield is through. I expect carriers
to sail with only three squadrons onboard because of lack of aircraft. And I
expect that typical forward deployments will raise to 7-8 month, with the
resulting reductions in retention and readiness.
As for the LCS, the only question is how much will the navy have to spend to
make them useful combatants after the Light Weight Mafia leaves. I expect the
Navy will have to add ESSM, some Mk32s, and some Anti-ship missiles plus a
strip down versions of SPY-3, as well as a second helo before they really can
contribute.
G Lof
Engineer
Andrew Toppan
> fleet. Rumsfeld is starving the fleet for money, while forcing it to expend
> money on projects that are low priority. I expect the surface combatant force
> to drop to ninty ships, or less before Rumsfield is through.
If the fleet concentrates entirely on high-end ships, as you're advocating, it
certainly *will* drop to less than 90 - probably more like 60. If you allow
for some low-end ships - the ~30 FFGs now in service and their replacements -
numbers around 100 or more can be maintained.
It is hypocritical to complain about small numbers of ships and also complain
about low-end ships. You need low-end ships to maintain the numbers, because
we can't afford 100 or 150 Aegis ships!
>As for the LCS, the only question is how much will the navy have to spend to
>make them useful combatants after the Light Weight Mafia leaves. I expect the
>Navy will have to add ESSM, some Mk32s, and some Anti-ship missiles plus a
>strip down versions of SPY-3, as well as a second helo before they really can
>contribute.
I don't think you understand what an LCS is. Even in the largest of the
proposed versions, there's no way they could accommodate a SPY-type radar.
ESSM - maybe that's one of the modular packages already planned. Anti-ship
missiles - maybe modular too. Second helo? Might be there already. Mk32s?
Useless anyway, and certainly could be modular if needed.
Properly executed, I don't see a fundamental problem with a smaller ship -
call it LCS, FFG, or whatever. You *can't* have a fleet composed entirely of
billion-dollar Aegis ships! The problem comes when people expect
billion-dollar performance from ships that cost 1/5th as much. That's the
"problem" the FFGs have always faced.
The problems with LCS are not the ones you cite, but the problems that
*always* face "smaller" combatants in the US fleet. Armchair admirals
complain they can't do everything the bigger ships can; other people forget
that you need both small *and* large ships, not just one or the other. Every
class of smaller combatants since WWII has faced these same criticisms - DEs,
DEGs, FFs, FFGs, PFs, any many abortive attempts.
In the case of LCS, I do see some other problems - basically rushing to build
the new cool toy before figuring out what it is good for. What the project is
really doing is forcing the Navy to think about something other than 10,000+
ton ships, and that's a good thing.
Ken Adams
[snip]
>
>
> In the case of LCS, I do see some other problems - basically rushing
to build
> the new cool toy before figuring out what it is good for. What the
project is
> really doing is forcing the Navy to think about something other than
10,000+
> ton ships, and that's a good thing.
>
They do appear to be serious about getting hulls wet as quickly as
possible. I submit that this is a Good Thing(tm). Following the
sacred procurement process has netted the USN exactly nothing on the
LPD-17 program, except for a whole ton of cash flowing into Avondale.
The progression from DD-21 to DD(X) won't deliver a damn thing until
somewhere near 15 years after the concept was first discussed.
If they can pull off the LCS the way they claim, then the Navy will
have its first successful new shipbuilding program since the late
'80s. If they don't pull it off, then their procurement credibility
with Congress will be less than zero, and we'll still be building
modified repeats of 1980's designs 50 years from now.
--
Ken
http://www.geocities.com/kmadams85
Watch me goose that sleeping dragon!
-- Famous Last Words
Henry J. Cobb
> I don't think you understand what an LCS is. Even in the largest of the
> proposed versions, there's no way they could accommodate a SPY-type radar.
> ESSM - maybe that's one of the modular packages already planned. Anti-ship
> missiles - maybe modular too. Second helo? Might be there already. Mk32s?
> Useless anyway, and certainly could be modular if needed.
Turning on an active radar paints a big bullseye on your ship.
So just say no.
Now why not send up a flock of UAVs that work together to achive a
combined synthetic aperture radar and use laser comms (much harder to
intercept) to chat back and forth between the UAVs and the manned
ships?
The cheap robots get in the way of the HARMs, your entire fleet gets
the benefit of a single vast "virtual" radar unit and your radar isn't
stopped by the horizon or the shore.
So the result is a CVBG/ARG in the back and a flotilla of LCS forward
with sensor and communication hub UAVs and interceptor UCAVs overhead.
-HJC
DN
>sacred procurement process has netted the USN exactly nothing on the
>LPD-17 program, except for a whole ton of cash flowing into Avondale.
Strange, I was under the impression that NOT following the "sacred procurement
process" is what has caused all the problems on the LPD-17.....
DN
--Remove "nojunk" to Email--
Glof eng
<hp2a4vs71lrligsdm...@4ax.com> wrote;
>On 08 Feb 2003 05:08:08 GMT, glof8...@aol.com (GLof815619) wrote:
>
>> fleet. Rumsfeld is starving the fleet for money, while forcing it to expend
>> money on projects that are low priority. I expect the surface combatant
>>force to drop to ninety ships, or less before Rumsfeld is through.
>>
>If the fleet concentrates entirely on high-end ships, as you're advocating,
>it
>certainly *will* drop to less than 90 - probably more like 60. If you allow
>for some low-end ships - the ~30 FFGs now in service and their replacements -
>numbers around 100 or more can be maintained.
The shortage of money extends not only to shipbuilding, but also to the
operations, To gain money to buy the few ships and aircraft in FY2004, the
navy will have to cut even more ships and squadrons from the fleet, reducing
the available pool of ships for long deployment. To compensate for this reduced
number the navy will have to extend the duration of cruises to seven months.
This in turn will result in reduces retention as sailor level for less
stressful jobs. This in turn will increase training and recruiting costs, while
reducing readiness. The navy will then have to hire civilian experts to repair
the equipment they inexperienced crew can no long maintained. Therefore the
navy will have to cut more ships to play for they increased operation cost. And
therefore the navy’s death spiral will begin again.
>
>It is hypocritical to complain about small numbers of ships and also complain
>about low-end ships. You need low-end ships to maintain the numbers, because
>we can't afford 100 or 150 Aegis ships!
I don’t know who you are questioning, since the Light Weight Mafia are the
ones who are kill lower cost DD21 for buying more Burkes. As for number of
vessels, the USN has already stated it need for 113 DD/DDG/CG in addition to
30-60 LCS. This number is driven mostly by peace time requirements.
>
>>As for the LCS, the only question is how much will the navy have to spend to
>>make them useful combatants after the Light Weight Mafia leaves. I expect
>>the Navy will have to add ESSM, some Mk32s, and some Anti-ship missiles
>> plus a strip down versions of SPY-3, as well as a second helo before they
>> really can contribute.
>
>I don't think you understand what an LCS is. Even in the largest of the
>proposed versions, there's no way they could accommodate a SPY-type radar.
>ESSM - maybe that's one of the modular packages already planned. Anti-ship
>missiles - maybe modular too. Second helo? Might be there already. Mk32s?
>Useless anyway, and certainly could be modular if needed.
May I point out that if you are going to carry ESSM, you are going to need a
guidance and control system, and that SPY-3 is current system of choice in the
new "family of warships". I think that LM can develop a lightweight model for
use on frigate size vessels. And you of all people know that you cannot add a
radar system in a quick change module, who have told me of the difficult of
changing such installation before.
As for the rest, I am sure that GD-Bath team and LM-Litton team are designing
they proposal in such a way that VLS and other launcher can be added, although
I am not sure of the other shop FMHSS proposals. My main concern is to make
that 50 knot requirement, they will be force to sacrifice payload, to the point
where we might as well build TBD for all the good it would do the Navy.
As for the Mk32, remember that these ship will be hunting submarines in coastal
water where they may not contact a submarine until they are right on top of it.
It would be dangerous for them to wait for their LAMP arrive and drop a MK50.
The few tons one or two fixed Mk32 could pay big dividends during a submarine
hunt.
>
>Properly executed, I don't see a fundamental problem with a smaller ship -
>call it LCS, FFG, or whatever. You *can't* have a fleet composed entirely of
>billion-dollar Aegis ships! The problem comes when people expect
>billion-dollar performance from ships that cost 1/5th as much. That's the
>"problem" the FFGs have always faced.
I totally aggree with you there, we don’t need a navy made up of one type of
warship. The Navy need vessel of all types. Today one of the navy biggest needs
are for ships to attack target on shore, but instead of doing everything
possible to fill this need, we are spend their limited resource build
playthings for the LWM. As I stated before, the LCS can be a useful vessel, if
properly equipped.
We have a long way to go before we have a true feeling for what a LCS must be.
>
>The problems with LCS are not the ones you cite, but the problems that
>*always* face "smaller" combatants in the US fleet. Armchair admirals
>complain they can't do everything the bigger ships can; other people forget
>that you need both small *and* large ships, not just one or the other. Every
>class of smaller combatants since WWII has faced these same criticisms - DEs,
>DEGs, FFs, FFGs, PFs, any many abortive attempts.
While building single purpose craft is acceptable during wartime, even if it is
a "Cold war", it is not acceptable during peacetime. During peace, a navy does
not know what challenges it may face in the future. You may end up builds a lot
of ships for the wrong war. In peace time you must build a general purpose
warship that can handle a little of any problem they may face. In fact, the
versatility of the LCS concept is what I like most about it, it where they
don’t provide versatility that bother me the most.
>
>In the case of LCS, I do see some other problems - basically rushing to build
>the new cool toy before figuring out what it is good for. What the project
>is really doing is forcing the Navy to think about something other than
>10,000+ ton ships, and that's a good thing.
>
On the other hand it may convince the LWM that the navy does not need the big
ships they truly do need, which is a bad thing.
Andrew McCruden
news:19c84c65.03020...@posting.google.com:
> Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message
> news:<hp2a4vs71lrligsdm...@4ax.com>...
> Now why not send up a flock of UAVs that work together to achive
> a combined synthetic aperture radar and use laser comms (much
> harder to intercept) to chat back and forth between the UAVs and
> the manned ships?
>
Becuase such high tech distributed systems are a pain in the rear to
implment.
Seriously work IS being done on projects like this, but theres a
long way to go until they are _really_ practical.
Tom Schoene
"GLof815619" <glof8...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20030206235146...@mb-fe.aol.com...
> For those of you interested in the bone chilling facts (it is pretty bad
this
> year folks) here is the link to get you there.
Not as bad as last year, but still pretty gruesome. The big shipbuilding
increase is bigger, but it's still five years away, which is where it's been
for the last decade.
For an adminstration that planned to "rebuild" the military, they're doing a
lot of tearing down and not much building up.
--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)
Andrew Toppan
>Strange, I was under the impression that NOT following the "sacred procurement
>process" is what has caused all the problems on the LPD-17.....
The problem was caused by selecting a contractor who was utterly overwhelmed
by the volume of engineering/design work, and who was depending on an
incomplete, undeveloped CAD system to overcome their problems.
Andrew Toppan
>navy will have to cut more ships to play for they increased operation cost. And
>therefore the navy’s death spiral will begin again.
That's one view. You're in a pessimistic mood.
On the other hand, USN is NOT extending deployments except when required by
war. Instead, they are looking at keeping the *ships* deployed for longer
periods, and rotating the *crew* at 6-month intervals. In theory you get 2-3
times as much productivity from the ships this way.
>I don’t know who you are questioning, since the Light Weight Mafia are the
>ones who are kill lower cost DD21 for buying more Burkes. As for number of
No, DD21 was killed by the Navy's inability to display it as
"transformational", and the Navy's refusal to acknowledge the existence of
low-end ships. Now we have DD(X), which is the same ship with a different
"spin", plus LCS. Not a bad bargain, really.
>guidance and control system, and that SPY-3 is current system of choice in the
>new "family of warships". I think that LM can develop a lightweight model for
>use on frigate size vessels.
I've not seen any LCS proposal that is as large as "frigate sized".
> As for the rest, I am sure that GD-Bath team and LM-Litton team are designing
>they proposal in such a way that VLS and other launcher can be added, although
Wow, you don't even know who the teams are.
"GD-Bath" isn't a "team", because Bath is part of GD. Bath's team includes
Boeing, Austal, and others.
"LM-Litton" isn't a team because Litton no longer exists. The former Litton
shipyards are now Northrop Grumman, and they're *competing against* a Lockheed
Martin team.
The other teams are led by Gibbs, JJMA and Textron.
Tom Schoene
"Henry J. Cobb" <hc...@io.com> wrote in message
news:19c84c65.03020...@posting.google.com...
To a large degree, that's what they are talking about doing. Do some
reading on "Network-Centric Warfare" and the "Littoral Sensor Grid"
concept.
However, I have very little comfort in the idea of a ship that's totally
dependant on off-board sensors for self-protection, for a couple of reasons.
For one thing, networks are not 100% reliable. While they are improving,
it's reasonable to predict that even future networks will fail from time to
time, probably just when they are needed most. This isn't just Murphy's
law -- combat will stress a network with more demands for information, more
jamming (on both sides), and more aggressive maneuvering, than routine
operations.
Anther concern is cost. These networks, with dozens of sensor platforms and
relays, tend to be very expensive to deploy, and are resource-hungry (each
UV you need deployed at a time means at least two and possibly more, on hand
to account for rotation and losses). LCS will certainly contribute some of
the UVs to build the grid, but its small size means it probably can't deploy
them all, even when operating in squadrons. That means the LCS will be
dependant on the presence of battlegroup assets (carriers, large combatants,
and maybe submarines) to deploy the grid. But assuming that an LCS group
will only operate in close concert with a CVBG is problematic. First, a
major stated mission for LCS is to work ahead of the battlegroup, clearing
the way for it to enter the theater unmolested. If it can only survive
with sensors brought by the CVBG, it's not clear how far ahead the LCS
precursor force can actually operate. Second, historical experience shows
that ships are regularly detached from battlegroups to operate independently
or in small groups. If LCS is to fulfill it's other goal of rectifying the
shortfall in US fleet strength, it must be able to undertake the independent
low-to-medium-threat missions now given to destroyers and frigates.
There's a final question here. If LCS is only viable when surrounded by
swarms of sensor and weapon drones deployed by the battlegroup, what exactly
is LCS itself good for? Why not use the sensors and drones to clear the
littoral of threats on their own? LCS may deploy some UVs, but as small
ships they will clearly be less efficient at carrying them than a larger
ship would be. You could make a case for a larger combatant standing
further offshore deploying UVs into the littoral without needing LCS at all.
These UVs would need more range than ones deployed from an LCS, but only
slightly (a few dozen miles, at most).
In short, LCS only makes sense if it has an acceptable ability to survive in
moderate threat levels without being dependant on external sensors. It will
need some combination of passive sensors (EW and IR/optical sensors) as well
as some sort of active radar. This does not mean it needs the top-end SPY-1
or SPY-3, though. There are smaller, cheaper alternatives out there that
should fit the bill.
GLof815619
<971d4v4qigd7vbpkb...@4ax.com> wrote
>On 09 Feb 2003 06:28:17 GMT, glo...@aol.com (Glof eng) wrote:
>
>>navy will have to cut more ships to play for they increased operation cost.
>And
>>therefore the navy’s death spiral will begin again.
>
>That's one view. You're in a pessimistic mood.
I discovered that pessimism help to predict what the LWM will do next,t hat and
re-reading the procurement history from the last time Rumsfeld was in office..
You should see what I am predicting for FY2005.
>
>On the other hand, USN is NOT extending deployments except when required by
>war. Instead, they are looking at keeping the *ships* deployed for longer
>periods, and rotating the *crew* at 6-month intervals. In theory you get 2-3
>times as much productivity from the ships this way.
This is only an experiment at this time, and one that is no way certain to
work. Now if they decided to establish a new home port at Perth Aust. Like they
have at Yokosuka, Japan then there is a real possibility of success.
>
>>I don’t know who you are questioning, since the Light Weight Mafia are the
>>ones who are kill lower cost DD21 for buying more Burkes. As for number of
>
>No, DD21 was killed by the Navy's inability to display it as
>"transformational", and the Navy's refusal to acknowledge the existence of
>low-end ships. Now we have DD(X), which is the same ship with a different
>"spin", plus LCS. Not a bad bargain, really.
That one way of looking at it. Another way to see it was that the Navy tried
to prove they could not afford to build a fleet of "small, useless speedboats"
that might cost a third of what a DD21 would cost operate, but provide none of
the utility of those vessels ( not a very cost effective solution here).
Remember the main driving force behind the DD21 was to replace the DD and FFG
forces with a group of ship that lifetime cost would be at least 1/3 less that
of those ships, while sacrificing none of utility of those ships. By
concentrating the firepower of those 82 ships into 32 hulls that required only
crew of 100, they could afford to keep the fleet as effective as before, even
if it reduce the fleet number by 50 ships.
What the Navy saw was that Adm. Cebrowski taking advantage of his new position
to force they to implement is experiment which he could not convince them to do
while the was still on active duty. Which it turns out is exactly what was
happening. Now the navy is going to try an make a purse out of a swine’s ear,
and hopefully they will make something useful from the LSC.
>>guidance and control system, and that SPY-3 is current system of choice in
>the
>>new "family of warships". I think that LM can develop a lightweight model
>for
>>use on frigate size vessels.
>
>I've not seen any LCS proposal that is as large as "frigate sized".
While there is plans for the FMHSS, I don’t think there are any final set of
requirements yet establish. And was it not you who claim that the LSC was a
replacement for FFGs.
>> As for the rest, I am sure that GD-Bath team and LM-Litton team are
>designing
>>they proposal in such a way that VLS and other launcher can be added,
>although
>
>Wow, you don't even know who the teams are.
>
>"GD-Bath" isn't a "team", because Bath is part of GD. Bath's team includes
>Boeing, Austal, and others.
>
>"LM-Litton" isn't a team because Litton no longer exists. The former Litton
>shipyards are now Northrop Grumman, and they're *competing against* a
>Lockheed
>Martin team.
>
>The other teams are led by Gibbs, JJMA and Textron.
>
>
I stand corrected.
G Lof
Engineer
Andrew Toppan
>Remember the main driving force behind the DD21 was to replace the DD and FFG
>forces with a group of ship that lifetime cost would be at least 1/3 less that
>of those ships, while sacrificing none of utility of those ships. By
DD21 was never seen as an FFG replacement. The FFGs were supposed to be
retired without replacement (in the very near term) because they were
considered useless in a post-Cold-War scenario. Then someobody realized they
were being used effectively, and cost a *lot* less to operate than a SPRUANCE,
so their life was extended, but still no replacement forseen. LCS finally
brings about an FFG replacement.
>While there is plans for the FMHSS, I don’t think there are any final set of
>requirements yet establish. And was it not you who claim that the LSC was a
>replacement for FFGs.
But to replace the FFGs does not necessarily require a ship of the same size
and capability, because the FFGs are not being used as originally intended.
Tom Schoene
>
> But to replace the FFGs does not necessarily require a ship of the same
size
> and capability, because the FFGs are not being used as originally
intended.
Yes, but the most important feature of the FFG is also probably the largest
size driver. Those dual helos take up a lot of volume. Even deleting the
Mk 13 missile launcher entirely (without replacement) and shrinking the crew
with modern automation doesn't make the ship all that much smaller.
Henry J. Cobb
a great deal of time intercepting small boats.
So why not let them buy the LCS, work out the procedures for using
them and when they've got the bugs out then let The Navy ramp up on
them?
The Coast Guard can call them patrol cutters if they like.
-HJC
Anybody else think a flat stealthy deck on top of some of the LCSes
looks like a flat top for launching UCAVs?
Andrew Toppan
>So why not let them buy the LCS, work out the procedures for using
>them and when they've got the bugs out then let The Navy ramp up on
>them?
Because the LCS is not intended as a platform for intercepting small boats.
That's *one* mission it can do - but just one.
Tom Schoene
> On 7 Feb 2003 08:58:39 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
>
> >"The primary mission areas of LCS are small boat prosecution..."
>
> What *OTHER* missions did you cut off the quote? Others often discussed
> include ASW, MCM, special operations, logistics, etc.
Full text is "The primary mission areas of LCS are small boat
prosecution, mine counter measures, shallow water anti-submarine warfare,
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Secondary missions
include homeland defense, maritime intercept, and special operation forces
support."
IOW, more or less the same things they've been saying for the past six
months or more. ISR is gaining ground, probably because they're used to
doing it from vans already. They've already started throwing together some
MCM modules, mostly by repackaging stuff they were already buying but that
no one wanted on their ships (RMS, for example.)
>
> >They've reinvented the torpedo boat destroyer?
>
> Only if you focus on *one* mission to the exclusion of all others.
In a sense, though, they are focusing on one mission -- or at least one
mission at a time.
LCS does suffer the basic limitation of the early Torpedo Boat destroyer,
that it is not suitable for other missions without reconfiguration. And I
have severe questions about the viability of an operating concept that
requires the ships to find a friendly port for a couple of days while they
swap modules (and crews!). The dogma is that the BG commander wil tailor
the LCS loadouts to meed his projected threats, but USN is not notoriously
good at predicting threats six months in advance. I forsee much frustration
when the only LCSs available are loaded for ASuW, ASW, and SpecOps support ,
but the battlegroup suddenly needs to conduct a mine reconaissance sweep.
The operational commander does not want to hear "We'll be back in a week,
and then we'll need to shakedown the new systems," but that's what LCS may
be offering.
Tom Schoene
> Last time I looked, the United State's fifth largest armed force spent
> a great deal of time intercepting small boats.
>
> So why not let them buy the LCS, work out the procedures for using
> them and when they've got the bugs out then let The Navy ramp up on
> them?
There is some interest in having the Coats Guard acquire LCS-based designs.
However, there's enough difference in proposed roles that having the USCG be
the lead agency doesn't make sense. Mine warfare, littoral ASW, and special
operations insertion are not common Coast Guard missions these days. For
that matter, the way the USCG "interdicts" boats is not at all the same way
a Navy LCS would interdict them.
And there's also a political angle. The Navy needs LCS to demonstrate to
OSD that it can run a "transformational" program on a short schedule. And
it needs that if it's going to save some of its more traditional programs,
like DD(X).
Besides, the USCG isn't looking to replace its existing large patrol boats
and small cutters for a decade or more -- its focus right now is on the
large frigate-like National Security Cutter, which it needs ASAP to replace
the aging Hamiltons.
> Anybody else think a flat stealthy deck on top of some of the LCSes
> looks like a flat top for launching UCAVs?
If you think a ship launching one or two UVACs makes sense, perhaps. I
think it's a foolish way to waste tonnage. Small VTOL UAVs, yes; large
UCAVs, no.
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
it was a busy weekend) figured out that LCS =/= "Landing Craft, Support"
in this context...
--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Who dies with the most toys wins" (Gary Barnes)
Jörg Bihlmayr
GLof815619 wrote:
<snip>
> As for the LCS, the only question is how much will the navy have to spend to
> make them useful combatants after the Light Weight Mafia leaves. I expect the
> Navy will have to add ESSM, some Mk32s, and some Anti-ship missiles plus a
> strip down versions of SPY-3, as well as a second helo before they really can
> contribute.
And as a result of all this a bigger hull, lesser maximum speed. ANd then the ship
would be more or less an ordinary frigate.
Jörg
>
>
>
> G Lof
> Engineer
--
"Whenever you feel like criticising anyone, just remember that all the people in
this world haven't had the advantages that you've had."
- F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby, Chapter 1, Page 1
DN
>by the volume of engineering/design work, and who was depending on an
>incomplete, undeveloped CAD system to overcome their problem
Coupled with a USN Supervisor of Shipbuilding who suffered from the very same
problem in another area.....plus the fact that the Navy asked Avondale to come
up with a totally new production planning system which would tell them EXACTLY
what was going on....want to guess what happened the first time this great
system reported out that USN changes and mods were the main cause of delay??
Tom Schoene
"ANDREW ROBERT BREEN" <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote in message
news:b27ro1$9iaq$1...@central.aber.ac.uk...
> This thread was making remarkably little sense to me until I (eventually,
> it was a busy weekend) figured out that LCS =/= "Landing Craft, Support"
> in this context...
Sorry. In case you didn't get to the actual meaning (or for anyone else
wondering) LCS = Littoral Combat Ship, the US Navy's latest idea for small
warships.
GLof815619
<MJY1a.1647$PC1....@tornadotest1.news.pas.earthlink.net>
>
>"ANDREW ROBERT BREEN" <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote in message
>news:b27ro1$9iaq$1...@central.aber.ac.uk...
>> This thread was making remarkably little sense to me until I (eventually,
>> it was a busy weekend) figured out that LCS =/= "Landing Craft, Support"
>> in this context...
>
>Sorry. In case you didn't get to the actual meaning (or for anyone else
>wondering) LCS = Littoral Combat Ship, the US Navy's latest idea for small
>warships.
>
>
Come on Tom, LSC is not " US Navy's latest idea "
G Lof
Engineer
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
Tom Schoene <tasc...@earthlink.invalid> wrote:
>
>"ANDREW ROBERT BREEN" <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote in message
>news:b27ro1$9iaq$1...@central.aber.ac.uk...
>> This thread was making remarkably little sense to me until I (eventually,
>> it was a busy weekend) figured out that LCS =/= "Landing Craft, Support"
>> in this context...
>
>Sorry. In case you didn't get to the actual meaning (or for anyone else
>wondering) LCS = Littoral Combat Ship, the US Navy's latest idea for small
>warships.
I figured that out in the end - retrieved the current .usian usage from
somewhere at the bottom of the memory stack.
Of course, the Landing Craft, Support was surely the ultimate littoral
combatant - to the extent of being intended to fight while sitting on
a sandbar in the shallows.. ;)
Tom Schoene
> "Tom Schoene" tasc...@earthlink.invalid in message:
> <MJY1a.1647$PC1....@tornadotest1.news.pas.earthlink.net>
> >Sorry. In case you didn't get to the actual meaning (or for anyone else
> >wondering) LCS = Littoral Combat Ship, the US Navy's latest idea for
small
> >warships.
> >
> >
> Come on Tom, LSC is not " US Navy's latest idea "
It's becoming more and more the Navy's idea as they get the chance to
actually drive the requirement. See my post on the Northrop Grumman LCS
proposal. It's getting much closer to a ship the Navy would have (and
should have) bought on its own initiative years ago.
Andrew Toppan
>Come on Tom, LSC is not " US Navy's latest idea "
LCS, not LSC.
LCS does seem to be maturing into a "Navy idea". Streetfighter certainly
wasn't a Navy idea - for good reason. LCS, on the, other hand, is becoming a
real frigate-like warship - basically USN finally found an excuse to build a
new frigate, without the "image" problems that made frigates a no-no.
USN is certainly going for LCS vigorously - i.e. quick release of the
next-phase RFP. Some other programs (i.e. MCM re-engine) have been
languishing for *months* without the RFPs being issued.
GLof815619
<04e2a.1906$PC1...@tornadotest1.news.pas.earthlink.net>
>GLof815619" <glof8...@aol.com> wrote in message
>news:20030210233058...@mb-ch.aol.com...
>> "Tom Schoene" tasc...@earthlink.invalid in message:
>> <MJY1a.1647$PC1....@tornadotest1.news.pas.earthlink.net>
>
>> >Sorry. In case you didn't get to the actual meaning (or for anyone else
>> >wondering) LCS = Littoral Combat Ship, the US Navy's latest idea for
>small
>> >warships.
>> >
>> >
>> Come on Tom, LSC is not " US Navy's latest idea "
>
>It's becoming more and more the Navy's idea as they get the chance to
>actually drive the requirement. See my post on the Northrop Grumman LCS
>proposal. It's getting much closer to a ship the Navy would have (and
>should have) bought on its own initiative years ago.
>
I will buy that the Navy is going to try to make the LCS into an useful craft.
And I believe that some of the technology develop for it will help in all
future warcraft design ( I thinking in terms of composite material and modular
weapons systems). The real key will come when we see more realistic expectation
for the LCS come along. As pointed out by Tom, 90,000 shp is a lot of go for
such a small craft. Maybe 40knot would be better that 50 knots, etc.Without
such modification the LCS will become another SES3K..
One question, we have seen two proposals now, When will the other be released
to the public?
G Lof
Engineer
sid
> I will buy that the Navy is going to try to make the LCS into an useful craft.
> And I believe that some of the technology develop for it will help in all
> future warcraft design ( I thinking in terms of composite material and modular
> weapons systems). The real key will come when we see more realistic expectation
> for the LCS come along. As pointed out by Tom, 90,000 shp is a lot of go for
> such a small craft. Maybe 40knot would be better that 50 knots, etc.Without
> such modification the LCS will become another SES3K..
>
> One question, we have seen two proposals now, When will the other be released
> to the public?
>
> G Lof
> Engineer
Programs of Future Past...This is all so like the early proposal days
of the FFGs. Remember how they were supposed to have a crew of about
70-90 people and be versatile by virtue of their numbers?
Of course reality turned out to be quite different and I have no
doubts it will be for the LCS as well.
Andrew Toppan
>One question, we have seen two proposals now, When will the other be released
>to the public?
That would be at the discretion of the teams - and they may choose not to
release them at all.