26/11: Questions That Need to be Posed & Answered
PakistanPal
The 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai left many important questions
unanswered, if not unposed.
What kind of intelligence was available----from the Indian as well as
foreign agencies?
How and by whom were the reports analysed, assessed and disseminated?
Were the gaps in the available intelligence identified and was action
taken to fill those gaps?
What follow-up action was taken on the available intelligence----
however inadequate it might have been?
What action was taken to strengthen physical security----- hotel and
coastal security---- in Mumbai keeping in view the fact that the
available intelligence---even if general and not specific--- spoke of
likely sea-borne attacks on hotels, the Taj Mahal Hotel being one of
them?
Who co-ordinated the physical security measures in the Governments of
India and Maharashtra?
Some media reports immediately after the attack had quoted a senior
executive in the Taj Mahal Hotel as saying that security was
strengthened in the hotel for some days before the attack, but was
subsequently down-graded. Who took the decision to down-grade physical
security? On what basis?
Who co-ordinated the investigation after the terrorist attacks? What
was the role of the Government of India in the co-ordination?
Were the foreigners, who escaped from the custody of the terrorists,
debriefed thoroughly after they were rescued before they were allowed
to go back to their countries? Who debriefed them? Were the
debriefings recorded in writing? Where are those notes kept?
If they were not debriefed, why? Was their being allowed to leave
India without being debriefed due to negligence or was it the result
of a conscious decision? If so, who took that decision?
Was a detailed reconstruction of the terrorist attacks made? Who made
that reconstruction? What were the conclusions of that reconstruction?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that apart from
the 10 Pakistani terrorists who came by sea from Pakistan, no other
Pakistani accomplice was involved on the ground in Mumbai?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that apart from
the two Indian Muslims arrested and prosecuted, there was no
involvement of any other Indian Muslim?
On what basis did the police come to the conclusion that there was no
evidence of any pre-9/11 reccee of the places attacked by the LET or
its accomplices?
Did the police seize the guest registers of the hotels attacked, make
out a list of persons of Pakistani origin who had stayed there in the
months preceding the attacks and verify their background? If so, did
the name of David Colemn Headley, who had reportedly stayed twice in
the Taj Mahal Hotel, figure in that list? The fact that the Mumbai
Police became aware of Headley's stay in the hotel only after they
were tipped off by the FBI recently show that the registers were
either not scrutinised or were scrutinised superficially.
Did the police seize the immigration records of the Mumbai airport to
check the particulars of persons of Pakistani origin who had arrived
in the days preceding the attacks and left in the hours following the
attacks?
Were the investigators able to get any evidence beyond the confession
of Kasab, the lone terrorist captured alive?
2. 26/11 in Mumbai was the most well-planned, well-organised and well-
executed terrorist attack since 9/11 in the US. The National
Commission appointed in the US made a detailed enquiry into the sins
of commission and omission, which made 9/11 possible. Its report was
debated in the US Congress and made available to the public. The
relatives of US citizens killed by the 9/11 terrorist strikes
mobilised themselves to ensure that there would be no cover-up, that
the truth would be brought out and that follow-up action would be
taken to identify and remove the deficiencies in the intelligence and
physical security agencies.
3. The Government of India, by taking advantage of the apathy and
confusion in the Bharatiya Janata Party, (BJP), has skilfully avoided
any enquiry into the 26/11 terrorist attacks and diverted public
attention away from its sins of commission and omission. The
Government of Maharashtra did appoint an enquiry committee headed by
S.D.Pradhan, former Home Secretary, but its report has been classified
and not shared with the legislative assembly and the public on the
unconvincing ground that releasing it could affect the ongoing
prosecution.
4. The relatives of the security forces officers and civilians, who
were killed by the terrorists, should emulate the relatives of those
killed on 9/11 in the US, mobilise themselves and campaign for the
constitution of a national commission to enquire into the terrorist
strikes.
5. Kavita Karkare, the widow of Hemant Karkare, the brave head of the
anti-terrorism squad of the Maharashtra Police who was brutally killed
by the terrorists, should take the lead in the matter.
6. I had known Hemant personally. I met him for the first time at a
seminar in Bangalore in February last year. I subsequently met him
again in Jaipur in May last year after the explosions caused by the
Indian Mujahideen. We were in telephonic contact with each other off
and on. He never failed to return my calls-----whether they were
professional or personal. He was an extremely sincere officer who,
like the other officers killed by the terrorists, sacrificed his life
in the fight against terrorism. Their sacrifice and the sacrifice of
the civilians who were killed should not be allowed to go in vain.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt.
of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical
Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seven...@gmail.com)
Article Source : http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3517.html