The battle of Addu Atoll (must be OT, no politics)
Alan Lothian
This is a what-if, so I am crossposting (very rare, indeed almost
unprecedented for me) to s.m.n and soc.history.what-if.
It is also, for smn, a group poisoned by political rants right now, at
least approximately on topic
For smn-ers: the term OTL means "our time line"; ATL is "alternate time
line".
OTL: April, 1942. Admiral Nagumo has taken the Kido Butai (five
carriers, plus cruisers and destroyers) on a raid into the Indian
Ocean. His objective is to wipe out the RN's Eastern Fleet, which
includes two modern fleet carriers (Formidable and Indomitable) and
some battleships, among which _Warspite_. Nagumo plans a Pearl-Harbor
type strike on Ceylon; meanwhile, Admiral Ozuma is charging around the
eastern Indian Ocean (Bay of Bengal, if you will) with one carrier,
whacking merchies.
Still OTL: Admiral Sir James Somerville, C-in-C, gets early warning of
Nagumo's raid when a Catalina sights the enemy early on 4 April.
Catalina splashed, too late, by Japanese fighters (yes, it's one of
those heroic radio operator stories.. dit dit dit as bullets slash
through the fuselage). Somerville takes almost all of his ships out of
Colombo and Tricomalee to head to his secret base at Addu Atoll, at the
tail end of the Maldives. The Japanese are not aware even of its
existence. Somerville has no intention whatsoever of getting into a
slogging match with the vastly superior Japanese, but is very much
aware of his night-strike capability. He has radar-equipped Swordfish
and Albacores -- not many -- and hopes to find a chance to launch them.
Nagumo launches an attack on Colombo, finds the port empty, and loses
some of his aircraft to defences that were much better than his lazy
and incompetent intelligence people had told him.
OTL, early afternoon 4 April, 1942. The British cruisers _Dorsertshire_
and _Cornwall_, heading for a rendezvous with Somerville's main fleet,
are detected by a Japanese seaplane, launched from a cruiser.
Somerville is not very far away, but knows nothing of this. An hour or
so later, a herd of strike aircraft from the Kido Butai sink the two
cruisers. Somerville knows nothing of this until a day later, when some
of his reconnaissance aircraft see the survivors in the water.
ATL: a Walrus from HMS Dorsetshire is in the air when her mother ship
is lost; tracks the Japanese strike force back; and before it is shot
down, gives course, speed etc to Mamma.
Somerville, as night falls (there is a half-moon in the south, tx to
Starry Night for that) launches two pairs of finder aircraft. At 10 pm,
one of them shouts back: Kido Butai located. _Formidable_ and
_Indomitable_ each launch a dozen Swordfish (some of them are, in fact,
Albacores) half of which are equipped with those nice state-of-the-art
torpedoes with working magnetic fuses. Four aircraft from each force
are also equipped with radar. Lumbering through the sky at around 95
knots groundspeed (seaspeed, really) the aircraft follow the faint blue
lights on their leaders' wing struts and head towards their destiny.
Somerville waits on the bridge of Formidable, his stomach in a knot.
ATL, 0230 hrs, 5 April 1942. After some anxious moments, the strike
leaders (with the radar) locate their targets. Following practice long
ago established in the Mediterranean, one Swordfish from each group
flies *behind* the Japanese carrier group and drops flame floats, to
give an aiming reference for the attackers.
The Japanese don't know what the hell is happening. The flame floats
are optimistically believed to be a gun encounter between an escort and
a submarine; but the first thing they really see is a Swordfish doing
one of those weird helicopter-like manoeuvres up the side of _Akagi_
after launching its fancy torpedo. It is followed shortly by four
others, all of which have launched at ranges of less than 500 metres.
Shooting breaks out frenziedly, without a real target, at about the
same time that Akagi is hit by five torpedoes, two of which explode
underneath the ship's keel.
Akagi turns turtle and sinks within twenty minutes. Three of the
remaining Japanese carriers are also hit, although none by so many
torpedoes. Hiryu escapes, largely because an escorting cruiser quite
inadvertently interposes itself between two Albacores and the carrier.
All of the British aircraft, except one, are successfully recovered by
4. am and the beginnings of dawn. Somerville heads south -- as far away
as possible from the enemy, and in the general direction of Addu Atoll
-- at full speed. One Swordfish, half of a lower plane destroyed by an
encounter with Japanese radio antennas, ditches close to a Japanese
destroyer. In the finest traditions of the Japanese navy, the captured
aircrew are abused and beheaded. Signals from Nagumo (who has
transferred his flag to a convenient cruiser) regarding the aircrew's
origin, are ignored.
The sun is coming up; Somerville is not so far away; the Japanese have
one intact carrier and another just about capable of a launch. What
happens next? Somerville has enough stuff to go for a surface action,
just about, better than the Japanese, but they have more serious air,
even after the events of the previous night. _Warspite_ is the world's
best battleship, but even she has limitations.
Nagumo is not happy about debriefing before the Emperor, and must be
aware that if there are any Brit carriers left by nightfall, he's
toast. Oh, and what with sinking carriers in the middle of the night,
lots of wonderful Japanese aviators are food for fishes.
OTL: just such a strke was what that excellent British admiral hoped to
achieve, this is by no means a crazy fantasy.
--
"The past resembles the future as water resembles water" Ibn Khaldun
My .mac.com address is a spam sink.
If you wish to email me, try alan dot lothian at blueyonder dot co dot uk
John Dallman
(Alan Lothian) wrote:
> The sun is coming up; Somerville is not so far away; the Japanese have
> one intact carrier and another just about capable of a launch. What
> happens next? Somerville has enough stuff to go for a surface action,
> just about, better than the Japanese, but they have more serious air,
> even after the events of the previous night. _Warspite_ is the world's
> best battleship, but even she has limitations.
Tricky ... With ASV Swordfish, Somerville stands a chance of putting a
trailer on the Japanese without them noticing. If they head the wrong way,
then he's a whole lot safer if he dodges them. Submarines are what he
needs at this point; they could discourage the Japanese nicely.
With no subs, and the Japanese closing, he has a problem with getting his
Swordfish into action in daylight. The Japanese have more fighters.
They'll have CAP and the odd scout up. Trying to lop off the scouts and
have an air strike start about five minutes after the surface action looks
like a reasonable idea. Sending one of his carriers away to make sure it
isn't sunk would be against the traditions of the service. This really is
one of those moments when a submarine would be very welcome.
---
John Dallman j...@cix.co.uk
Dott. Piergiorgio
> Sending one of his carriers away to make sure it
> isn't sunk would be against the traditions of the service.
Ehm... In the Med, the britsh ever put back their CV prior to engage the
Italian Navy.
Please examine carefully the battles of Off calabria and Capo Spartivento.
In both actions, the Eagle and Ark Royal, respectively, was put some miles
behind the main force prior to engage the Italian force.
In the latter action, the Ark Royal was attacked by three-engine bombers,
and was ever hidden by watersplash of dozens of bombs, but luckly (for
britsh) wasn't hit.
Best regards from Italy.
--
Dott. Piergiorgio d' Errico- Naval and military historian
Niitakayama nobore ichi ni rei ya
Andre Lieven
turnings of history.
Another take on this situation, can be found in " The Hitler
Options; Alternate Decisions Of World War II ", edited by
Kenneth Macksey.
Specifically Chapter 4, Operation ORIENT Joint Axis Strategy,
by Peter G. Tsouras, The Battle of Dondra Head. Things go far
worse for the RN Eastern Fleet in that alternate history...
Andre
--
" I'm a man... But, I can change... If I have to... I guess. "
The Man Prayer, Red Green.
Alan Lothian
<j...@cix.co.uk> wrote:
> In article <031120031526567464%alanl...@mac.com>, alanl...@mac.com
> (Alan Lothian) wrote:
>
> > The sun is coming up; Somerville is not so far away; the Japanese have
> > one intact carrier and another just about capable of a launch. What
> > happens next? Somerville has enough stuff to go for a surface action,
> > just about, better than the Japanese, but they have more serious air,
> > even after the events of the previous night. _Warspite_ is the world's
> > best battleship, but even she has limitations.
>
> Tricky ... With ASV Swordfish, Somerville stands a chance of putting a
> trailer on the Japanese without them noticing. If they head the wrong way,
> then he's a whole lot safer if he dodges them. Submarines are what he
> needs at this point; they could discourage the Japanese nicely.
Somerville, basically, is trying to avoid being at the receiving end of
a Japanese counter-strike. But he has done *a lot* of harm to Kudo
Butai: one carrier sunk outright, three seriously damaged, at least two
of which are in sinking condition. Only one unharmed. That's still more
nasty shit projection than he would like, of course.
> With no subs, and the Japanese closing, he has a problem with getting his
> Swordfish into action in daylight.
They are dogmeat if they even try, I suspect. Somerville has a handful
of Fulmars, and that's it for air defence. Nowhere near enough. But in
my scenario, the Japanese have been very hard hit the night before.
They're going apeshit. Fucking biplanes, top speed 110 knots, did this
to us? Yup, sure did. It was dark at the time.
I'm with you about subs, though. That would make the whole thing some
kind of piece de resistance. "Fucking biplanes wrecked our carriers in
the middle of the night and then some bastard in a submarine..."
"The four torpedoes fired by HM Submarine Upholder, only one of which
appears to have reached its target, may have been the decisive moment
of the action that has come to be called the Battle of Addu Atoll. That
torpedo, striking Hiryu, the only undamaged Japanese carrier, in her
stern, destroyed three out of her four screws and made it impossible
for her to turn into the wind in the morning and launch her aircraft.
Unfortunately, HM Submarine Upholder did not return from this
operation."
> The Japanese have more fighters.
> They'll have CAP and the odd scout up. Trying to lop off the scouts and
> have an air strike start about five minutes after the surface action looks
> like a reasonable idea. Sending one of his carriers away to make sure it
> isn't sunk would be against the traditions of the service. This really is
> one of those moments when a submarine would be very welcome.
OTL, Somerville sent his sluggish battleships back to Africa. Bunched
up around his carriers (assuming the Japanese find them in the morning:
they have deep troubles of their own, thanks to the night attack) he
might just be able to defend himself against a limited Japanese air
assault. If he does, and *Warspite* and her consorts close with the bad
guys, their aviation spent, the Japanese are in for some serious grief.
Hey, you might yet have Swordfish helicoptering through the shell
splashes of a major fleet action. (Quite a lot of Brit BBs around.) Bad
guys with some gutsy cruiser driving probably manage to put a Long
Lance or two into Warspite, mind you.
My own belief is that if Somerville could have launched that night
attack, things would have been v. nasty for the Japanese, there and
afterwards. And it is not an insane possibility.
Errol Cavit
> John Dallman wrote:
>
> > Sending one of his carriers away to make sure it
> > isn't sunk would be against the traditions of the service.
>
> Ehm... In the Med, the britsh ever put back their CV prior to engage the
> Italian Navy.
>
> Please examine carefully the battles of Off calabria and Capo Spartivento.
> In both actions, the Eagle and Ark Royal, respectively, was put some miles
> behind the main force prior to engage the Italian force.
>
> In the latter action, the Ark Royal was attacked by three-engine bombers,
> and was ever hidden by watersplash of dozens of bombs, but luckly (for
> britsh) wasn't hit.
>
I think John's "suggestion" is to send a carrier away so it is outside
the range of Jap carrier aircraft, rather than merely outside gun
range.
Cheers, Errol Cavit
"Il vino è la luce del sole catturata dall'acqua."
(Wine is sunlight held together by water.)
Attributed to Galileo Galilei
Iain Rae
> In article <memo.2003110...@jgd.compulink.co.uk>, John Dallman
> <j...@cix.co.uk> wrote:
>
>
>>In article <031120031526567464%alanl...@mac.com>, alanl...@mac.com
>>(Alan Lothian) wrote:
>>
>>
>>>The sun is coming up; Somerville is not so far away; the Japanese have
>>>one intact carrier and another just about capable of a launch. What
>>>happens next? Somerville has enough stuff to go for a surface action,
>>>just about, better than the Japanese, but they have more serious air,
>>>even after the events of the previous night. _Warspite_ is the world's
>>>best battleship, but even she has limitations.
but he's lumbered with the R's, does the one outweigh the other?
>>
>>Tricky ... With ASV Swordfish, Somerville stands a chance of putting a
>>trailer on the Japanese without them noticing. If they head the wrong way,
>>then he's a whole lot safer if he dodges them. Submarines are what he
>>needs at this point; they could discourage the Japanese nicely.
>
>
> Somerville, basically, is trying to avoid being at the receiving end of
> a Japanese counter-strike. But he has done *a lot* of harm to Kudo
> Butai: one carrier sunk outright, three seriously damaged, at least two
> of which are in sinking condition. Only one unharmed. That's still more
> nasty shit projection than he would like, of course.
>
>
>>With no subs, and the Japanese closing, he has a problem with getting his
>>Swordfish into action in daylight.
>
>
> They are dogmeat if they even try, I suspect. Somerville has a handful
> of Fulmars, and that's it for air defence.
8 April 1942
"State of fighter aircraft in Fleet now is Martlet 6, Fulmar 8, Sea
Hurricane I 10,Sea Hurricane II 1."
He was looking for 15 Martlets in Illustrious and Formidable, plus 8 or
9 in Indom (plus the other aircraft).
Bear in mind that Somerville didn't rate Formidable as being worked up
to the Ark's standard of operations and the morale of the Eastern Fleet
was not high, something he was aware of when he ordered the fleet to
close and pick up the survivors of the two cruisers despite the warnings
of hist staff.
One of the biographies I've read rated Somerville as being very
foolhardy in what he attempted, foolhardy bordering on the criminal.
The one thing I probably would say is that if he'd had Ark Royal with
him he'd have probably pulled it off.
Keith Willshaw
"Alan Lothian" <alanl...@mac.com> wrote in message
news:041120030049546790%alanl...@mac.com...
Given Warspite's luck her helm would jam hard over and she'd
spun round in circles for 10 minutes while the shocked Japanese
skipper watched his torps miss by feet before hitting
the IJN ship with a full broadside and blowing it out of the water
Keith
John Dallman
Err...@hotmail.com (Errol Cavit) wrote:
> I think John's "suggestion" is to send a carrier away so it is outside
> the range of Jap carrier aircraft, rather than merely outside gun
> range.
Exactly. A way of making sure that you have a carrier afterwards, but
it reduces your force for the fight.
---
John Dallman j...@cix.co.uk
Alan Lothian
<ia...@dcs.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> Alan Lothian wrote:
> > In article <memo.2003110...@jgd.compulink.co.uk>, John Dallman
> > <j...@cix.co.uk> wrote:
> >
> >
> >>In article <031120031526567464%alanl...@mac.com>, alanl...@mac.com
> >>(Alan Lothian) wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>The sun is coming up; Somerville is not so far away; the Japanese have
> >>>one intact carrier and another just about capable of a launch. What
> >>>happens next? Somerville has enough stuff to go for a surface action,
> >>>just about, better than the Japanese, but they have more serious air,
> >>>even after the events of the previous night. _Warspite_ is the world's
> >>>best battleship, but even she has limitations.
>
> but he's lumbered with the R's, does the one outweigh the other?
Well, there was a reason why in real life Somerville sent them all
packing.
<snip>
>
> 8 April 1942
>
> "State of fighter aircraft in Fleet now is Martlet 6, Fulmar 8, Sea
> Hurricane I 10,Sea Hurricane II 1."
This sounds entirely plausible; I'd love a source for it, though.
>
> He was looking for 15 Martlets in Illustrious and Formidable, plus 8 or
> 9 in Indom (plus the other aircraft).
Have I got things that wrong? I thought Somerville had Formidable and
Indomitable, with the luckless Hermes; not Illustrious. Just checked:
Illustrious, after lengthy repairs, showed up in the Indian Ocean in
May, 42. Too late for this imagined adventure.
> Bear in mind that Somerville didn't rate Formidable as being worked up
> to the Ark's standard of operations and the morale of the Eastern Fleet
> was not high, something he was aware of when he ordered the fleet to
> close and pick up the survivors of the two cruisers despite the warnings
> of hist staff.
His ships plucked more than 1100 men from the ocean, though: something
that is surely better for morale than leaving them to drown or die of
exhaustion.
> One of the biographies I've read rated Somerville as being very
> foolhardy in what he attempted, foolhardy bordering on the criminal.
Ask the 1100 guys in the water....
> The one thing I probably would say is that if he'd had Ark Royal with
> him he'd have probably pulled it off.
Good point. Except that Ark Royal was sunk by U-81 in November, 1941.
But it's very easy to forget that one aircraft carrier and its air
group does not necessarily equal another.
Iain Rae
> In article <AHEpb.1817$eT3...@news-binary.blueyonder.co.uk>, Iain Rae
> <ia...@dcs.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>
>
>>Alan Lothian wrote:
>>
>>>In article <memo.2003110...@jgd.compulink.co.uk>, John Dallman
>>><j...@cix.co.uk> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>In article <031120031526567464%alanl...@mac.com>, alanl...@mac.com
>>>>(Alan Lothian) wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>The sun is coming up; Somerville is not so far away; the Japanese have
>>>>>one intact carrier and another just about capable of a launch. What
>>>>>happens next? Somerville has enough stuff to go for a surface action,
>>>>>just about, better than the Japanese, but they have more serious air,
>>>>>even after the events of the previous night. _Warspite_ is the world's
>>>>>best battleship, but even she has limitations.
>>
>>but he's lumbered with the R's, does the one outweigh the other?
>
>
> Well, there was a reason why in real life Somerville sent them all
> packing.
>
>
> <snip>
>
>>8 April 1942
>>
>>"State of fighter aircraft in Fleet now is Martlet 6, Fulmar 8, Sea
>>Hurricane I 10,Sea Hurricane II 1."
>
>
> This sounds entirely plausible; I'd love a source for it, though.
>
It's in his report to the Admiralty on the action, published in "The
Somerville Papers: Selections from the Private and Official
Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Somerville, GCB GBE DSO"
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/1859282075/ref=sr_aps_books_1_2/026-3071043-7285218
>
>>He was looking for 15 Martlets in Illustrious and Formidable, plus 8 or
>>9 in Indom (plus the other aircraft).
>
>
> Have I got things that wrong? I thought Somerville had Formidable and
> Indomitable, with the luckless Hermes; not Illustrious. Just checked:
> Illustrious, after lengthy repairs, showed up in the Indian Ocean in
> May, 42. Too late for this imagined adventure.
Probably he knew he was getting Illustrious and wanted her air group
sorted out ASAP.
>
>
>>Bear in mind that Somerville didn't rate Formidable as being worked up
>>to the Ark's standard of operations and the morale of the Eastern Fleet
>>was not high, something he was aware of when he ordered the fleet to
>>close and pick up the survivors of the two cruisers despite the warnings
>>of hist staff.
>
>
> His ships plucked more than 1100 men from the ocean, though: something
> that is surely better for morale than leaving them to drown or die of
> exhaustion.
>
Yes, that's the point I was trying to make, he knew that morale in the
fleet was very shaky and that they had to rescue survivors, even though
it meant risking the entire fleet to do it.
>
>>One of the biographies I've read rated Somerville as being very
>>foolhardy in what he attempted, foolhardy bordering on the criminal.
>
>
> Ask the 1100 guys in the water....
>
No, I meant in trying to take on the Japanese fleet, even in a night
action, what he was trying to do was balance the risk against the
opportunities, something he'd done very well in the Mediteranean and (to
a lesser extent) at Dunkirk. With hindsight the risk was probably
greater than he'd calculated, but arguably the opportunity was all the
greater too.
>
>>The one thing I probably would say is that if he'd had Ark Royal with
>>him he'd have probably pulled it off.
>
>
> Good point. Except that Ark Royal was sunk by U-81 in November, 1941.
> But it's very easy to forget that one aircraft carrier and its air
> group does not necessarily equal another.
>
With more aircraft and a better worked up team I suspect he'd have stuck
his neck out a bit more than he did.
--
Iain Rae Tel:01316505202
Computing Officer JCMB:2418
School of Informatics
The University of Edinburgh
Danny Bhoy
Albacores actually exist? Just wondering where one fitted the radar,
on the top or bottom wing...
DB
Peter Skelton
wrote:
>>
>Minor clarification requested: Did radar-equipped Stringbags or even
>Albacores actually exist? Just wondering where one fitted the radar,
>on the top or bottom wing...
>
Yes, and well before the time in question. ISTR that the first
fit used some real estate between the wheels so that the equiped
aircraft couldn't be armed. I've seen photos of fits on both
wings, can't sort out in my memory which went with the ASV I (not
even sure of that.)
Charles Lamb's "War in a Stringbag" is a readable and
entertaining I wuz there on early Swordfish operations and very
accurate for the type of book.
Peter Skelton
Alistair Gunn
> On 4 Nov 2003 03:59:24 -0800, warm...@hotmail.com (Danny Bhoy)
> wrote:
>>Minor clarification requested: Did radar-equipped Stringbags or even
>>Albacores actually exist? Just wondering where one fitted the radar,
>>on the top or bottom wing...
> Yes, and well before the time in question. ISTR that the first
> fit used some real estate between the wheels so that the equiped
> aircraft couldn't be armed. I've seen photos of fits on both
> wings, can't sort out in my memory which went with the ASV I (not
> even sure of that.)
I seem to recall (from a book read too far in the past!) that the
receiver aerial was mounted on the centreline of the upper wing with
the transmitter antennas moutned roughly where the struts where? (Or
maybe it was the other way round?)
--
These opinions might not even be mine ...
Let alone connected with my employer ...
Keith Willshaw
"Danny Bhoy" <warm...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:23192cb7.03110...@posting.google.com...
> Minor clarification requested: Did radar-equipped Stringbags or even
> Albacores actually exist?
Absolutely they existed , in fact the first successful radar
guided attack on a ship was carried out by a Swordfish
in 1941
> Just wondering where one fitted the radar,
> on the top or bottom wing...
>
Between the wheels
http://uboat.net/allies/aircraft/swordfish.htm
Keith
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
wrote:
Fit like, Alan.
>Somerville, basically, is trying to avoid being at the receiving end of
>a Japanese counter-strike.
His advantage is in night striking - his disadvantages are in range
and fleet defence against air attack. Even one IJN carrier surviving
into daylight was a very dangerous threat, given that if Somerville
was in range for a night strike, he would be well within range of the
inevtiable Japanese response (assuming we follow your outline of him
getting in range undetected for a night attack to start with, and
hitting the IJN so hard when he does - I have to say I doubt the FAA
would actually do that well).
One thing that really would help here would be having the R's around
as sacrificial goats, assuming their speed differential hadn't left
them too far behind - they could handily disperse the Japanese
response away from the two carriers.
>But he has done *a lot* of harm to Kudo
>Butai: one carrier sunk outright, three seriously damaged, at least two
>of which are in sinking condition. Only one unharmed. That's still more
>nasty shit projection than he would like, of course.
Can't see the strike being that successful, barring some amazing die
rolls.
>> With no subs, and the Japanese closing, he has a problem with getting his
>> Swordfish into action in daylight.
>
>They are dogmeat if they even try, I suspect. Somerville has a handful
>of Fulmars, and that's it for air defence. Nowhere near enough.
A dozen Sea Hurricanes as well IIRC. To return to my focus on evading
or diminishing the counter-strike, how about another suicidal Blenheim
mission from Ceylon hitting the IJN after dawn. This does nothing bar
add a few near misses to the damaged carriers at the cost of yet more
Blenheims and their crews at the bottom of the sea, but it brings
Ceylon back into Japanese attention, and their dawn counterstike gets
aimed at Trincomalee again, where those aircraft must have come from.
A one-carrier strike to the airfields on Ceylon adds a few more
Hurricanes to the Japanese victory totals, at the cost of a few more
dive-bombers and the odd Zero, but more importantly occupies the main
Japanese threat while the RN carriers scarper and the expendable
battleships move in for the kill on the basis of the FAA crew's wild
reports of total devastation.
[snip subs]
>> The Japanese have more fighters.
>> They'll have CAP and the odd scout up. Trying to lop off the scouts and
>> have an air strike start about five minutes after the surface action looks
>> like a reasonable idea. Sending one of his carriers away to make sure it
>> isn't sunk would be against the traditions of the service. This really is
>> one of those moments when a submarine would be very welcome.
>
>OTL, Somerville sent his sluggish battleships back to Africa. Bunched
>up around his carriers (assuming the Japanese find them in the morning:
>they have deep troubles of their own, thanks to the night attack) he
>might just be able to defend himself against a limited Japanese air
>assault. If he does, and *Warspite* and her consorts close with the bad
>guys, their aviation spent, the Japanese are in for some serious grief.
Yeah, but can they close on the hulks fast enough, and will the IJN
stay beside their cripples to permit another Matapan? Will they shag
off instead, after sinking the most badly damaged carrier themselves?
Or are we up for Gottendamerung with the battleships?
>My own belief is that if Somerville could have launched that night
>attack, things would have been v. nasty for the Japanese, there and
>afterwards. And it is not an insane possibility.
I have problems seeing Somerville getting close enough without
detection to launch such a strike, and then seeing it become so
devastatingly effective. The probabilities to my mind were on the IJN
detecting him and destroying his force in daylight, either the day
before or the day after. I'm not sure it was a risk worth taking,
when the RN position could only improve over time while the IJN's
would inevitably deteriorate.
Gavin Bailey
--
"Will Boogie Down For Food".- Sign held by Disco Stu outside the unemployment office.
Alan Lothian
<dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA> wrote:
> An interesting tale, and I would say, not impossible, given the
> turnings of history.
>
> Another take on this situation, can be found in " The Hitler
> Options; Alternate Decisions Of World War II ", edited by
> Kenneth Macksey.
>
> Specifically Chapter 4, Operation ORIENT Joint Axis Strategy,
> by Peter G. Tsouras, The Battle of Dondra Head. Things go far
> worse for the RN Eastern Fleet in that alternate history...
Sadly, I do not have access to this, but once I have paid up my London
Library subscription, I'll have a look.
My scenario requires Somerville to be both gutsy (proven track record
there) and lucky. The Kido Butai has no, rpt no, defence against a
night air attack, and the RN had some units who had got quite good at
this sort of thing. Easily the best in the world in April, 1942.
Someone on this group (I forget whom, and I offer my apologies) pointed
out that Swordfish were the equivalent of attack helicopters. Not your
ordinary, bog-standard torpedo bombers. And if they can do this sort of
stuff in the middle of the night, serious bad vibes for bad guys. As
in, Kudo Butai gutted. Big holes in aircraft carriers. Water allowed
in.
Note that in real history, Admiral Somerville desperately wanted to
launch precisely such a strike, but didn't have a clear enough location
of his enemy. And was well aware of that enemy's retaliatory
capability, and his own force's weakness in training and shortage of
effecive fighters..
Still, imagine yourself as a gun captain on _Akagi_ when a Swordfish
flies over your head at 0300, having dropped its pretty high-tech
torpedo at less than 500 yards. Shoot away, good luck to you. Why not
launch some Zeros?
Stuart Wilkes
<snip>
> Hey, you might yet have Swordfish helicoptering through the shell
> splashes of a major fleet action. (Quite a lot of Brit BBs around.) Bad
> guys with some gutsy cruiser driving probably manage to put a Long
> Lance or two into Warspite, mind you.
What?? Never happen. The ship with a mind of her own takes over and
performs her trademark double circle at top speed, evading all Long
Lances.
Stuart Wilkes
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
Peter Skelton <skel...@cogeco.ca> wrote:
>On 4 Nov 2003 03:59:24 -0800, warm...@hotmail.com (Danny Bhoy)
>wrote:
>>>
>>Minor clarification requested: Did radar-equipped Stringbags or even
>>Albacores actually exist? Just wondering where one fitted the radar,
>>on the top or bottom wing...
>>
>Yes, and well before the time in question. ISTR that the first
>fit used some real estate between the wheels so that the equiped
>aircraft couldn't be armed. I've seen photos of fits on both
>wings, can't sort out in my memory which went with the ASV I (not
>even sure of that.)
I thought that the first radar installations - transmitter on
one wing, receiver on the other (can't remember which way around
it was) and using metre wavelengths did allow a torpedo to be carried
and that it was the later centimetric wave antenna which sat
between the undercarriage legs.
>Charles Lamb's "War in a Stringbag" is a readable and
>entertaining I wuz there on early Swordfish operations and very
>accurate for the type of book.
What comes over loud and clear in Lamb (and other accounts
of Swordfish operations of the period) was that the RN was
entirely happy about night carrier operations, and that
with radar the Swordfish really could hunt at night. that
could have come as a very nasty shock to those who didn't
expect them.
--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Time has stopped, says the Black Lion clock
and eternity has begun" (Dylan Thomas)
Keith Willshaw
"ANDREW ROBERT BREEN" <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote in message
news:bo8hqb$46mm$1...@central.aber.ac.uk...
> In article <0q5fqv0l57v50rtna...@4ax.com>,
> Peter Skelton <skel...@cogeco.ca> wrote:
> >On 4 Nov 2003 03:59:24 -0800, warm...@hotmail.com (Danny Bhoy)
> >wrote:
> >>>
> >>Minor clarification requested: Did radar-equipped Stringbags or even
> >>Albacores actually exist? Just wondering where one fitted the radar,
> >>on the top or bottom wing...
> >>
> >Yes, and well before the time in question. ISTR that the first
> >fit used some real estate between the wheels so that the equiped
> >aircraft couldn't be armed. I've seen photos of fits on both
> >wings, can't sort out in my memory which went with the ASV I (not
> >even sure of that.)
>
> I thought that the first radar installations - transmitter on
> one wing, receiver on the other (can't remember which way around
> it was) and using metre wavelengths did allow a torpedo to be carried
> and that it was the later centimetric wave antenna which sat
> between the undercarriage legs.
>
I think you are correct
> >Charles Lamb's "War in a Stringbag" is a readable and
> >entertaining I wuz there on early Swordfish operations and very
> >accurate for the type of book.
>
> What comes over loud and clear in Lamb (and other accounts
> of Swordfish operations of the period) was that the RN was
> entirely happy about night carrier operations, and that
> with radar the Swordfish really could hunt at night. that
> could have come as a very nasty shock to those who didn't
> expect them.
>
Such as the Italian merchant marine who suffered much from their
depredations as I recall.
Keith
Jack Love
The Custer syndrome (up until that last try) is such a good plan: just
be lucky! :)
>Keith
>
Andre Lieven
> In article <bo6mfp$b0p$1...@freenet9.carleton.ca>, Andre Lieven
> <dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA> wrote:
>
>> An interesting tale, and I would say, not impossible, given the
>> turnings of history.
>>
>> Another take on this situation, can be found in " The Hitler
>> Options; Alternate Decisions Of World War II ", edited by
>> Kenneth Macksey.
>>
>> Specifically Chapter 4, Operation ORIENT Joint Axis Strategy,
>> by Peter G. Tsouras, The Battle of Dondra Head. Things go far
>> worse for the RN Eastern Fleet in that alternate history...
>
> Sadly, I do not have access to this, but once I have paid up my London
> Library subscription, I'll have a look.
Ah. A firm running a set of book ssales here in Ottawa, and in Montreal,
had huge amounts of copies of this book, going for $10 Cdn. Hardcover.
> My scenario requires Somerville to be both gutsy (proven track record
> there) and lucky. The Kido Butai has no, rpt no, defence against a
> night air attack, and the RN had some units who had got quite good at
> this sort of thing. Easily the best in the world in April, 1942.
> Someone on this group (I forget whom, and I offer my apologies) pointed
> out that Swordfish were the equivalent of attack helicopters. Not your
> ordinary, bog-standard torpedo bombers. And if they can do this sort of
> stuff in the middle of the night, serious bad vibes for bad guys. As
> in, Kudo Butai gutted. Big holes in aircraft carriers. Water allowed
> in.
:-)
> Note that in real history, Admiral Somerville desperately wanted to
> launch precisely such a strike, but didn't have a clear enough location
> of his enemy. And was well aware of that enemy's retaliatory
> capability, and his own force's weakness in training and shortage of
> effecive fighters..
Not to mention that he must have been aware that his force had a
much lower speed then the IJN group. Even allowing for his Janes'
claiming that Kaga was only good for around 25 knots, his R's would
barely be good for 20.
> Still, imagine yourself as a gun captain on _Akagi_ when a Swordfish
> flies over your head at 0300, having dropped its pretty high-tech
> torpedo at less than 500 yards. Shoot away, good luck to you. Why not
> launch some Zeros?
Hmm... At that time, did the IJN have any luck with night launches,
to say nothing of what could a Zero do, in the dark, with no ship
guidance.
Remember that the night arriving strike on Coral Sea, day 1, didn't
go at all well for the IJN. Many planes thought that Yorktown was
one of theirs, and none ever got into any kind of fighting position.
All in all, an interesting scenario.
Dave Knudson
> The Battle of Addu Atoll
>
>
> ATL: a Walrus from HMS Dorsetshire is in the air when her mother ship
> is lost; tracks the Japanese strike force back; and before it is shot
> down, gives course, speed etc to Mamma.
>
> Somerville, as night falls (there is a half-moon in the south, tx to
> Starry Night for that) launches two pairs of finder aircraft. At 10 pm,
> one of them shouts back: Kido Butai located. _Formidable_ and
> _Indomitable_ each launch a dozen Swordfish (some of them are, in fact,
> Albacores) half of which are equipped with those nice state-of-the-art
> torpedoes with working magnetic fuses. Four aircraft from each force
> are also equipped with radar. Lumbering through the sky at around 95
> knots groundspeed (seaspeed, really) the aircraft follow the faint blue
> lights on their leaders' wing struts and head towards their destiny.
> Somerville waits on the bridge of Formidable, his stomach in a knot.
Had the British done this before - against a moving target at night?
Taranto was, of course, staionary, and the Walrus has been shot down.
Additionally, the Japanese know (because they shot down the Walrus)
that there is at least a chance that Somerville knows where they are,
and will probably alter course.
> ATL, 0230 hrs, 5 April 1942. After some anxious moments, the strike
> leaders (with the radar) locate their targets. Following practice long
> ago established in the Mediterranean, one Swordfish from each group
> flies *behind* the Japanese carrier group and drops flame floats, to
> give an aiming reference for the attackers.
>
> The Japanese don't know what the hell is happening.
Doubtful. They know the British are at aes and in the area. They are
on alert at the very least, and probably have a CAP up as well.
>The flame floats
> are optimistically believed to be a gun encounter between an escort and
> a submarine; but the first thing they really see is a Swordfish doing
> one of those weird helicopter-like manoeuvres up the side of _Akagi_
> after launching its fancy torpedo. It is followed shortly by four
> others, all of which have launched at ranges of less than 500 metres.
The Japanese were superb in night surface actions against the USN; how
is a swordfish going to get that close?
> Shooting breaks out frenziedly, without a real target, at about the
> same time that Akagi is hit by five torpedoes, two of which explode
> underneath the ship's keel.
Were British torpedoes that accurate?
> Akagi turns turtle and sinks within twenty minutes. Three of the
> remaining Japanese carriers are also hit, although none by so many
> torpedoes. Hiryu escapes, largely because an escorting cruiser quite
> inadvertently interposes itself between two Albacores and the carrier.
>
> All of the British aircraft, except one, are successfully recovered by
> 4. am and the beginnings of dawn. Somerville heads south -- as far away
> as possible from the enemy, and in the general direction of Addu Atoll
> -- at full speed. One Swordfish, half of a lower plane destroyed by an
> encounter with Japanese radio antennas, ditches close to a Japanese
> destroyer. In the finest traditions of the Japanese navy, the captured
> aircrew are abused and beheaded. Signals from Nagumo (who has
> transferred his flag to a convenient cruiser) regarding the aircrew's
> origin, are ignored.
This is plausible. The Japanese traditionally brutalized and executed
their way out of a lot of potentially good intel.
> The sun is coming up; Somerville is not so far away; the Japanese have
> one intact carrier and another just about capable of a launch. What
> happens next? Somerville has enough stuff to go for a surface action,
> just about, better than the Japanese, but they have more serious air,
> even after the events of the previous night.
The British would be slaughtered in the air during the day.
> _Warspite_ is the world's
> best battleship, but even she has limitations.
?!? In what universe? Warspite was built in 1916, and was a slow,
lumbering WWI battleship. It was no better than any of the US
battleships at Pearl, or any of the other dozen or so British BBs of
the same era. Any modern battleship - from the US North Carolinas and
Indianas (to say nothing of the Iowas - not yet available in early
1942) to the Tirpitz to the IJN Yamato would have reduced the Warspite
to slag in short order in a gunnery duel.
> Nagumo is not happy about debriefing before the Emperor, and must be
> aware that if there are any Brit carriers left by nightfall, he's
> toast. Oh, and what with sinking carriers in the middle of the night,
> lots of wonderful Japanese aviators are food for fishes.
>
> OTL: just such a strke was what that excellent British admiral hoped to
> achieve, this is by no means a crazy fantasy.
While I don't think that it is totally implausible, I do think that it
is very unlikely that Somerville could have achieved this. The
Japanese had a numerical and qualitative edge over the RN at this
time. The British carriers were tiny compared to the Japanese ones.
They (the Brits) would have needs more than their fair slice of luck
to find the Japanese at night, and surprise them to the point that
Swordfish and Albacores could be successful.
Thanks.
Dave Knudson
Nik Simpson
> Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com> wrote in message
> news:<031120031526567464%alanl...@mac.com>...
>
>>
>
> Doubtful. They know the British are at aes and in the area. They are
> on alert at the very least, and probably have a CAP up as well.
>
>> The flame floats
>> are optimistically believed to be a gun encounter between an escort
>> and a submarine; but the first thing they really see is a Swordfish
>> doing one of those weird helicopter-like manoeuvres up the side of
>> _Akagi_ after launching its fancy torpedo. It is followed shortly by
>> four others, all of which have launched at ranges of less than 500
>> metres.
>
> The Japanese were superb in night surface actions against the USN; how
> is a swordfish going to get that close?
Fighting a night action against surface ships is a whole different ballgame
to defending against a surprise air attack at night. They would have to be
able to mount effective AA against largely unseen targets.
>
>> Shooting breaks out frenziedly, without a real target, at about the
>> same time that Akagi is hit by five torpedoes, two of which explode
>> underneath the ship's keel.
>
> Were British torpedoes that accurate?
Launched from that close in, torpedoes with working magnetic fuses would
have an excellent chance of doing a lot of damage.
>
>> The sun is coming up; Somerville is not so far away; the Japanese
>> have one intact carrier and another just about capable of a launch.
>> What happens next? Somerville has enough stuff to go for a surface
>> action, just about, better than the Japanese, but they have more
>> serious air, even after the events of the previous night.
>
> The British would be slaughtered in the air during the day.
That's rather the point of the proposed scenario, basically the British
don't attempt an attack during the day and do everything in their power to
avoid an attack by the Japanese during daylight.
>
>> _Warspite_ is the world's
>> best battleship, but even she has limitations.
>
> ?!? In what universe? Warspite was built in 1916, and was a slow,
> lumbering WWI battleship. It was no better than any of the US
> battleships at Pearl, or any of the other dozen or so British BBs of
> the same era.
Yes, but where the battleships guarding the Japanese carriers anymore
modern, they only built two modern BB between the wars, the rest were
modernised to a lesser extent than Warspite.
>Any modern battleship - from the US North Carolinas and
> Indianas (to say nothing of the Iowas - not yet available in early
> 1942) to the Tirpitz to the IJN Yamato would have reduced the Warspite
> to slag in short order in a gunnery duel.
Yamato certainly, Bismark was no certainty, she might well have sunk the
Warspite, but unless she was very lucky she would have recieved significant
damage in the process. Bismark was really just a larger version of WW1
German designs, so not innately superior in most respects to Warspite.
>
> While I don't think that it is totally implausible, I do think that it
> is very unlikely that Somerville could have achieved this. The
> Japanese had a numerical and qualitative edge over the RN at this
> time. The British carriers were tiny compared to the Japanese ones.
> They (the Brits) would have needs more than their fair slice of luck
> to find the Japanese at night, and surprise them to the point that
> Swordfish and Albacores could be successful.
No arguement, it would have required a great deal of good fortune, but
stranger things have happened and it's certainly an interesting scenario.
--
Nik Simpson
Keith Willshaw
"Dave Knudson" <dknu...@minolta.com> wrote in message
news:c3650eb.03110...@posting.google.com...
> Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com> wrote in message
news:<031120031526567464%alanl...@mac.com>...
> > The Battle of Addu Atoll
> >
> > SNIP
> >
> > ATL: a Walrus from HMS Dorsetshire is in the air when her mother ship
> > is lost; tracks the Japanese strike force back; and before it is shot
> > down, gives course, speed etc to Mamma.
> >
> > Somerville, as night falls (there is a half-moon in the south, tx to
> > Starry Night for that) launches two pairs of finder aircraft. At 10 pm,
> > one of them shouts back: Kido Butai located. _Formidable_ and
> > _Indomitable_ each launch a dozen Swordfish (some of them are, in fact,
> > Albacores) half of which are equipped with those nice state-of-the-art
> > torpedoes with working magnetic fuses. Four aircraft from each force
> > are also equipped with radar. Lumbering through the sky at around 95
> > knots groundspeed (seaspeed, really) the aircraft follow the faint blue
> > lights on their leaders' wing struts and head towards their destiny.
> > Somerville waits on the bridge of Formidable, his stomach in a knot.
>
> Had the British done this before - against a moving target at night?
Yes, night attacks against ships and U-Boats were a common
tactic in the Med
> Taranto was, of course, staionary, and the Walrus has been shot down.
> Additionally, the Japanese know (because they shot down the Walrus)
> that there is at least a chance that Somerville knows where they are,
> and will probably alter course.
>
> > ATL, 0230 hrs, 5 April 1942. After some anxious moments, the strike
> > leaders (with the radar) locate their targets. Following practice long
> > ago established in the Mediterranean, one Swordfish from each group
> > flies *behind* the Japanese carrier group and drops flame floats, to
> > give an aiming reference for the attackers.
> >
> > The Japanese don't know what the hell is happening.
>
> Doubtful. They know the British are at aes and in the area. They are
> on alert at the very least, and probably have a CAP up as well.
>
Not at night they didnt
> >The flame floats
> > are optimistically believed to be a gun encounter between an escort and
> > a submarine; but the first thing they really see is a Swordfish doing
> > one of those weird helicopter-like manoeuvres up the side of _Akagi_
> > after launching its fancy torpedo. It is followed shortly by four
> > others, all of which have launched at ranges of less than 500 metres.
>
> The Japanese were superb in night surface actions against the USN; how
> is a swordfish going to get that close?
>
You cant shoot a Swordfish down with a LongLance torpedo :)
Seriously the Japanese practised surface actions at night but
I dont believe they flew many carrier missions after dark.
> > Shooting breaks out frenziedly, without a real target, at about the
> > same time that Akagi is hit by five torpedoes, two of which explode
> > underneath the ship's keel.
>
> Were British torpedoes that accurate?
>
On occasion yes.
Actually the only other British Battleships of that era were less
comprehensively modernised so Warspite was probably the
best of the bunch and her gunnery record was first rate.
> Any modern battleship - from the US North Carolinas and
> Indianas (to say nothing of the Iowas - not yet available in early
> 1942) to the Tirpitz to the IJN Yamato would have reduced the Warspite
> to slag in short order in a gunnery duel.
>
The Yamato wasnt available at the time though and Warpsite was
definitely more than a match for the Kongo's
> > Nagumo is not happy about debriefing before the Emperor, and must be
> > aware that if there are any Brit carriers left by nightfall, he's
> > toast. Oh, and what with sinking carriers in the middle of the night,
> > lots of wonderful Japanese aviators are food for fishes.
> >
> > OTL: just such a strke was what that excellent British admiral hoped to
> > achieve, this is by no means a crazy fantasy.
>
> While I don't think that it is totally implausible, I do think that it
> is very unlikely that Somerville could have achieved this. The
> Japanese had a numerical and qualitative edge over the RN at this
> time. The British carriers were tiny compared to the Japanese ones.
Only Hermes can be so described, Formidable, Illustrious and Victorious
were rather larger but as they carried all aircraft below decks usually
had a smaller complement of aircraft at this time.
The Illustrious Class displaced 29,000 tons and were 673ft long at
the waterline
The Akagi's were around 34,000 tons and 730 ft long while
Soryu was 20,000 tons
> They (the Brits) would have needs more than their fair slice of luck
> to find the Japanese at night, and surprise them to the point that
> Swordfish and Albacores could be successful.
>
Just so
Keith
Alan Minyard
>John Dallman wrote:
>
>> Sending one of his carriers away to make sure it
>> isn't sunk would be against the traditions of the service.
>
>Ehm... In the Med, the britsh ever put back their CV prior to engage the
>Italian Navy.
>
>Please examine carefully the battles of Off calabria and Capo Spartivento.
>In both actions, the Eagle and Ark Royal, respectively, was put some miles
>behind the main force prior to engage the Italian force.
>
>In the latter action, the Ark Royal was attacked by three-engine bombers,
>and was ever hidden by watersplash of dozens of bombs, but luckly (for
>britsh) wasn't hit.
>
>Best regards from Italy.
That is not "hiding", carriers were never intended to be a part of surface
actions. Their job was to launch and recover aircraft. They performed their
job. The US carriers in Leyte Gulf were not in the battle line at Surigaio
Strait, do you think that they were cowards???
Al Minyard
Alan Lothian
Be Televised <occu...@bonkers.net> wrote:
> On Tue, 04 Nov 2003 00:49:54 +0000, Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com>
> wrote:
>
> Fit like, Alan.
Nae bad, Gavin. Ye ken fit it's like. Dam' few, and a' deid.
>
> >Somerville, basically, is trying to avoid being at the receiving end of
> >a Japanese counter-strike.
>
> His advantage is in night striking - his disadvantages are in range
> and fleet defence against air attack. Even one IJN carrier surviving
> into daylight was a very dangerous threat, given that if Somerville
> was in range for a night strike, he would be well within range of the
> inevtiable Japanese response (assuming we follow your outline of him
> getting in range undetected for a night attack to start with, and
> hitting the IJN so hard when he does - I have to say I doubt the FAA
> would actually do that well).
Your analysis is quite accurate; but if the FAA can get two dozen
strike aircraft on to target at 0230, I'd be surprised if they didn't
do some very serious damage indeed. The Japanese are certainly not
going to shoot many of them down.
> One thing that really would help here would be having the R's around
> as sacrificial goats, assuming their speed differential hadn't left
> them too far behind - they could handily disperse the Japanese
> response away from the two carriers.
Mind you, that would look terrible on Somerville's next promotion
report.
> >But he has done *a lot* of harm to Kudo
> >Butai: one carrier sunk outright, three seriously damaged, at least two
> >of which are in sinking condition. Only one unharmed. That's still more
> >nasty shit projection than he would like, of course.
>
> Can't see the strike being that successful, barring some amazing die
> rolls.
Why not? Agreed the strike might not find the Japanese. But if it does,
they really are in trouble. Given what night-strike Swordfish did from
Malta against much smaller targets, *even when quite inexperienced*.
And given Japanese damage control, a couple of 250-lb bombs from the
flame-float layers could have done real grief, too. But 20+
torpedo-carrying aircraft, virtually unopposed, will bring no joy to
any Japanese admiral I can think of. True, you might end up with Akagi
hit by 15 of them... Imagine the oil painting, copies of which are to
be seen to this day in every FAA mess.
> >> With no subs, and the Japanese closing, he has a problem with getting his
> >> Swordfish into action in daylight.
> >
> >They are dogmeat if they even try, I suspect. Somerville has a handful
> >of Fulmars, and that's it for air defence. Nowhere near enough.
>
> A dozen Sea Hurricanes as well IIRC.
Thanks to Ian Rae for accurate OOB here. Doesn't alter the fact that
the last thing S wants to see two hours after sunrise is an incoming
Japanese airstrike, even from "jist the wan wee carrier".
> To return to my focus on evading
> or diminishing the counter-strike, how about another suicidal Blenheim
> mission from Ceylon hitting the IJN after dawn.
In principle, fine. In practice, the co-ordination required is likely
to beyond the parties involved. And if such a strike had been remotely
possible, it's likely that it would have been launched OTL.
> This does nothing bar
> add a few near misses to the damaged carriers at the cost of yet more
> Blenheims and their crews at the bottom of the sea, but it brings
> Ceylon back into Japanese attention, and their dawn counterstike gets
> aimed at Trincomalee again, where those aircraft must have come from.
Hmm.
> A one-carrier strike to the airfields on Ceylon adds a few more
> Hurricanes to the Japanese victory totals, at the cost of a few more
> dive-bombers and the odd Zero, but more importantly occupies the main
> Japanese threat
Surely Nagumo is going to be out for the RN carriers, coute que coute.
He's raging, and wants revenge NOW. Bugger a few Blenheims. (Mind you,
if this were a movie, we'd have a Blenheim in flames on the flight deck
of Hiryu.... loads of interesting big bangs).
> while the RN carriers scarper and the expendable
> battleships move in for the kill on the basis of the FAA crew's wild
> reports of total devastation.
You and I know that the Rs are expendable. Won't look good back home,
though.
<snippaggio>
> Yeah, but can they close on the hulks fast enough, and will the IJN
> stay beside their cripples to permit another Matapan? Will they shag
> off instead, after sinking the most badly damaged carrier themselves?
> Or are we up for Gottendamerung with the battleships?
Good question. A nice Gotter D might be a British surface attack into
the face of the last Japanese air group, while Japanese cruisers lunge
in desperate, destroyer-type fashion.... no, can't believe it, myself.
> >My own belief is that if Somerville could have launched that night
> >attack, things would have been v. nasty for the Japanese, there and
> >afterwards. And it is not an insane possibility.
>
> I have problems seeing Somerville getting close enough without
> detection to launch such a strike,
This, in the real world, was why he did not do it. Somerville was by
anyone's reckoning a fighting admiral and really wanted to launch just
such a night attack. Which I still insist would have ruined K B's
entire Indian Ocean holiday.
> and then seeing it become so
> devastatingly effective.
I still beg to differ here. If S can get a couple of dozen strikers
into contact with the Kido Butai in the middle of the night, then
devastation is actually quite likely. Nothing KB can do will stop them.
If, I grant you. As for how complete the devastation, and Somerville's
own location come sunrise... still, at absolute best, you have Nagumo
ordering the heavy cruiser that now carries his flag to torpedo his
last floating carrier. Tell that to the Emperor, chum. The trundling
sound from the horizon is a pack of ancient British battleships, too.
> The probabilities to my mind were on the IJN
> detecting him and destroying his force in daylight, either the day
> before or the day after.
Indeed, this was the colossal preoccupation for the real-life
Somerville. Not only a fighting admiral, but nobody's fool, either.
(Which of course is why Nagumo never found him. He was also lucky: the
rescue of _Dorsetshire_ and _Cornwall_'s survivors, for a start. 1,122
men plucked from the sea, at the risk of an entire battle fleet. Well,
1,122 naval chaps thought it was worth it.)
> I'm not sure it was a risk worth taking,
> when the RN position could only improve over time while the IJN's
> would inevitably deteriorate.
Good point, , nay, rock solid point.
hlg
news:<031120031526567464%alanl...@mac.com>...
> > The Battle of Addu Atoll
> >
> > SNIP
> >
> > _Warspite_ is the world's
> > best battleship, but even she has limitations.
>
> ?!? In what universe? Warspite was built in 1916, and was a slow,
> lumbering WWI battleship. It was no better than any of the US
> battleships at Pearl, or any of the other dozen or so British BBs of
> the same era. Any modern battleship - from the US North Carolinas and
> Indianas (to say nothing of the Iowas - not yet available in early
> 1942) to the Tirpitz to the IJN Yamato would have reduced the Warspite
> to slag in short order in a gunnery duel.
>
Warspite's gunnery was excellent; she holds the record for the longest range
hit (26,500 yards) in a gunnery action (against the Italian battleship
Giulio Cesare). She did lack speed, true; 25 knots. (This would probably be
achieved without difficulty in 1942; she was fresh out of the dockyard,
after having bomb damage repaired).
Had things got to a slugging match, the battleships accompanying the
Japanese carriers would have been the Hiei and Haruna, or possibly their two
sister-ships Kongo and Kirishima. Of similar vintage but modernised, faster
(28 knots), with 8 x 14-inch guns. Their armour would be inferior to
Warspite's.
Andre Lieven
Theres a difference between anti surface action, and anti air night
action... Especially as fleet anti air doctrine and pratctice was,
in the spring of '42, fairly primitive.
Perhaps. But, as no such ship was in the IJN force, but rather four
similar vintage ex-battlecruisers, with 14 inch guns, its not a bad
call to suggest that a worked up Warspite, with Matapan, and Narvik
already under her belt ( I just now don't recall the name of the
fight with the Cesare class BB, in mid '40... ), she'd be a formidable
opponent for such IJN ships.
>> Nagumo is not happy about debriefing before the Emperor, and must be
>> aware that if there are any Brit carriers left by nightfall, he's
>> toast. Oh, and what with sinking carriers in the middle of the night,
>> lots of wonderful Japanese aviators are food for fishes.
>>
>> OTL: just such a strke was what that excellent British admiral hoped to
>> achieve, this is by no means a crazy fantasy.
>
> While I don't think that it is totally implausible, I do think that it
> is very unlikely that Somerville could have achieved this. The
> Japanese had a numerical and qualitative edge over the RN at this
> time. The British carriers were tiny compared to the Japanese ones.
The RN armoured deck carrier *air groups* were " tiny ", indeed.
Formidable was rated at 36 planes, and Indomitable at 48, though
better uses of deck parks and a/c with folding wings helped that
out, later on in the war. So, their mid '42 airgroups were smaller
than any of the Kido Butai's CV's.
But, as ships, both RN ships well outdisplaced Hiryu and Soryu,
for example, as neither of those was even 20,000 tons, while the
RN armoured deck carriers were at least 23,000 tons.
> They (the Brits) would have needs more than their fair slice of luck
> to find the Japanese at night, and surprise them to the point that
> Swordfish and Albacores could be successful.
Indeed. But, WW2 did show that luck often played it's hand...
> Thanks.
Andre Lieven
was more extensive than what was done to Warspite.
For instance, most of the IJN BBs were not oly re engined, but that
process usually greatly increased their propulsive power over their
pre rebuild states, wheras, Warspite's re-engining only upped her
power output from 75,000 SHP to 80,000.
Plys, most of the IJN ships got longer, in the course of their
rebuilds, which helped them keep their speed up, as their bulges
made them wider, as with Warspite, while the added length kept
their l to b ratio similar to their original states, wheras
Warspite for fatter with the bulges, but no longer, so her
drag factor went up some.
>> Any modern battleship - from the US North Carolinas and
>> Indianas (to say nothing of the Iowas - not yet available in early
>> 1942) to the Tirpitz to the IJN Yamato would have reduced the Warspite
>> to slag in short order in a gunnery duel.
>
> Yamato certainly, Bismark was no certainty, she might well have sunk the
> Warspite, but unless she was very lucky she would have recieved significant
> damage in the process. Bismark was really just a larger version of WW1
> German designs, so not innately superior in most respects to Warspite.
30 knots v/ 24 would allow the faster ship to determine the fight.
>> While I don't think that it is totally implausible, I do think that it
>> is very unlikely that Somerville could have achieved this. The
>> Japanese had a numerical and qualitative edge over the RN at this
>> time. The British carriers were tiny compared to the Japanese ones.
>> They (the Brits) would have needs more than their fair slice of luck
>> to find the Japanese at night, and surprise them to the point that
>> Swordfish and Albacores could be successful.
>
> No arguement, it would have required a great deal of good fortune, but
> stranger things have happened and it's certainly an interesting scenario.
Indeed.
Peter Skelton
BREEN) wrote:
>In article <0q5fqv0l57v50rtna...@4ax.com>,
>Peter Skelton <skel...@cogeco.ca> wrote:
>>On 4 Nov 2003 03:59:24 -0800, warm...@hotmail.com (Danny Bhoy)
>>wrote:
>>>>
>>>Minor clarification requested: Did radar-equipped Stringbags or even
>>>Albacores actually exist? Just wondering where one fitted the radar,
>>>on the top or bottom wing...
>>>
>>Yes, and well before the time in question. ISTR that the first
>>fit used some real estate between the wheels so that the equiped
>>aircraft couldn't be armed. I've seen photos of fits on both
>>wings, can't sort out in my memory which went with the ASV I (not
>>even sure of that.)
>
>I thought that the first radar installations - transmitter on
>one wing, receiver on the other (can't remember which way around
>it was) and using metre wavelengths did allow a torpedo to be carried
>and that it was the later centimetric wave antenna which sat
>between the undercarriage legs.
You are correct about the antenna positions but, in early
operations, the radar-equiped planes dropped flares, not
torpedoes. ISTR thtat that was partly due to some obstruction.
THere was some mesing around with the crew too, I'm confused.
Peter Skelton
Gernot Hassenpflug
> Remember that the night arriving strike on Coral Sea, day 1, didn't
> go at all well for the IJN. Many planes thought that Yorktown was
> one of theirs, and none ever got into any kind of fighting position.
Andre, Zuikaku and Shokaku had the most inesperienced airgroups at the
time, of the Kido Butai carriers. I think that the performance of the
4 other carriers' groups would be vastly better.
--
G Hassenpflug RASC, Kyoto University
Andre Lieven
First of all, the Kido Butai that went on the Indian Ocean romp was
Sho & Zui, plus three other carriers. Kaga stayed home.
Next, why would one necessarily consider that Akagi's, Soryu's,
adn Hiryu's airgroups would be that much better worked up, in
April of '42, then Sho & Zui were a month later, when they were
allowed to solo. Some difference, surely, but by April and May
of 1942, all six IJN fleet carriers had a half year's worth
of fairly intense operations under their belts.
And, at no time during 1942, did IJN carrier groups show any
signoficant night flying and fighting proficiency, especially
in the area of fleet air defense. So, on that basis, I suggest
that in the ATL scenario that was offered, they would not be
any different, in that area of operations.
Even the USN, who did move that area of operations further,
didn't really master it even in small unit operations, until
late in '43.
In this matter, its not a question of degree, as much as it
is one of kind.
Paul J. Adam
Knudson <dknu...@minolta.com> writes
>> Starry Night for that) launches two pairs of finder aircraft. At 10 pm,
>> one of them shouts back: Kido Butai located. _Formidable_ and
>> _Indomitable_ each launch a dozen Swordfish (some of them are, in fact,
>> Albacores) half of which are equipped with those nice state-of-the-art
>> torpedoes with working magnetic fuses. Four aircraft from each force
>> are also equipped with radar. Lumbering through the sky at around 95
>> knots groundspeed (seaspeed, really) the aircraft follow the faint blue
>> lights on their leaders' wing struts and head towards their destiny.
>> Somerville waits on the bridge of Formidable, his stomach in a knot.
>
>Had the British done this before - against a moving target at night?
Yes; lots of night raids against shipping from Malta. (You don't think
that Swordfish flew many day raids in the Mediterranean...?)
>Additionally, the Japanese know (because they shot down the Walrus)
>that there is at least a chance that Somerville knows where they are,
>and will probably alter course.
The British striking force has radar, and the Japanese are not
accustomed to night air attacks; they *are* comfortable in their larger
force and superior training for night surface action. Why would they
evade, when it might reduce the chance of bringing the enemy to blows?
>> ATL, 0230 hrs, 5 April 1942. After some anxious moments, the strike
>> leaders (with the radar) locate their targets. Following practice long
>> ago established in the Mediterranean, one Swordfish from each group
>> flies *behind* the Japanese carrier group and drops flame floats, to
>> give an aiming reference for the attackers.
>>
>> The Japanese don't know what the hell is happening.
>
>Doubtful. They know the British are at aes and in the area. They are
>on alert at the very least, and probably have a CAP up as well.
At night? This is still the era where flying ops end at dusk for most
forces.
>>but the first thing they really see is a Swordfish doing
>> one of those weird helicopter-like manoeuvres up the side of _Akagi_
>> after launching its fancy torpedo. It is followed shortly by four
>> others, all of which have launched at ranges of less than 500 metres.
>
>The Japanese were superb in night surface actions against the USN; how
>is a swordfish going to get that close?
Because it can't be shot down by Long Lance torpedoes. How good was
Japanese AA fire in the dark? How many guns had radar directors?
The Japanese hadn't trained for or practiced night flying operations, or
AFAIK defence against night air attack; certainly not in 1942.
>> Shooting breaks out frenziedly, without a real target, at about the
>> same time that Akagi is hit by five torpedoes, two of which explode
>> underneath the ship's keel.
>
>Were British torpedoes that accurate?
Yes; like the Japanese, we tested fairly extensively pre-war and were
rewarded with good functional weapons as a result. The magnetic exploder
was problematic in 1941 but IIRC it had been de-bugged by 1942.
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill
Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk
Errol Cavit
"Alan Minyard" <aminy...@netdoor.com> wrote in message
news:rjsfqvg5bg1a893k4...@4ax.com...
That's an aggressive interpretation of what was written. How does saying
that a ship was hidden from view by near-misses from bombs imply cowardice?
The English isn't perfect, but understandable with a little effort.
--
Errol Cavit | errol...@hotmail.com
I've heard a tape of collected kakapo noises, and it's almost impossible to
believe that it all just comes from a bird, or indeed any kind of animal.
Pink Floyd studio out-takes perhaps, but not a parrot.
Douglas Adams, _Last Chance to See_
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
wrote:
>> His advantage is in night striking - his disadvantages are in range
>> and fleet defence against air attack. Even one IJN carrier surviving
>> into daylight was a very dangerous threat, given that if Somerville
>> was in range for a night strike, he would be well within range of the
>> inevtiable Japanese response (assuming we follow your outline of him
>> getting in range undetected for a night attack to start with, and
>> hitting the IJN so hard when he does - I have to say I doubt the FAA
>> would actually do that well).
>
>Your analysis is quite accurate; but if the FAA can get two dozen
>strike aircraft on to target at 0230, I'd be surprised if they didn't
>do some very serious damage indeed. The Japanese are certainly not
>going to shoot many of them down.
I agree that the FAA had the capacity to launch a night strike which
could actually find the IJN, and have a realistic chance of doing some
substantial damage. My reading of it is a much less effective attack,
with maybe half a dozen torpedo hits distrubuted on the carriers and
cruisers. I just don't think a single strike could take out three
carriers, with one being an outright sinking. Too many of the leading
dispersed sections attacking the first warship the radar leader
attacks, and contratulating themselves on an excellent attack on a
cruiser leading to a definite hit before suddently seeing a load of
tracer coming up in the night sky a few miles away as the unseen
carriers get attacked by a couple of the other sections.
I agree that few of the attackers are going to go down to IJN AA fire
- although I suggest one downed by AA, another missing and another
crashing in the sea on return (both having hit the sea during the
attack).
However, we have an issue of timing here. You are positing an attack
on the early morning of 5 April, but in OTL the Catalina getting off
the original spotting report didn't do so until 1600hrs on 4 April.
In fact some Albacores from Indom were shot down by the IJN CAP on the
morning of 5 April, when the striking force was hitting Trincomalee.
Not enough time for Somerville to close to contact that night as I see
it.
The best point of departure for this might be the night of the
5th/6th, when Nagumo is withdrawing to the north to attack shipping in
the Bay of Bengal and after the last sighting by an Albacore on the
evening of the 5th.
>> One thing that really would help here would be having the R's around
>> as sacrificial goats, assuming their speed differential hadn't left
>> them too far behind - they could handily disperse the Japanese
>> response away from the two carriers.
>
>Mind you, that would look terrible on Somerville's next promotion
>report.
Yeah, but four battleships plus screen (albeit early-'42 Eastern
Fleet-size) and some scraps of a CAP in the form of sections of
Hurricanes from 30 and 258 squadron from Ceylon are a harder target
than Force Z. The real danger won't be the dive bombers that nailed
the two cruisers and later Hermes, but the torpedo bombers. The
Hurricanes have an excellent chance of breaking up an effective
torpedo attack, even if there are only a section present and they
quickly go down to the Zeroes, and a few bomb hits are unlikely to
kill any of the battlewagons.
>> Can't see the strike being that successful, barring some amazing die
>> rolls.
>
>Why not? Agreed the strike might not find the Japanese. But if it does,
>they really are in trouble. Given what night-strike Swordfish did from
>Malta against much smaller targets, *even when quite inexperienced*.
>And given Japanese damage control, a couple of 250-lb bombs from the
>flame-float layers could have done real grief, too. But 20+
>torpedo-carrying aircraft, virtually unopposed, will bring no joy to
>any Japanese admiral I can think of. True, you might end up with Akagi
>hit by 15 of them... Imagine the oil painting, copies of which are to
>be seen to this day in every FAA mess.
I'd compromise on two carriers hit, one sunk completely, the other
limping away, with a couple of cruisers hit and maybe one of them
down.
>> >> With no subs, and the Japanese closing, he has a problem with getting his
>> >> Swordfish into action in daylight.
>> >
>> >They are dogmeat if they even try, I suspect. Somerville has a handful
>> >of Fulmars, and that's it for air defence. Nowhere near enough.
>>
>> A dozen Sea Hurricanes as well IIRC.
>
>Thanks to Ian Rae for accurate OOB here. Doesn't alter the fact that
>the last thing S wants to see two hours after sunrise is an incoming
>Japanese airstrike, even from "jist the wan wee carrier".
Precisely. We can't realistically eliminate that counter-strike, so
we need it to hit a different target - Ceylon again, or the
battleships as they plough northwards. We just need to deny Nagumo a
credible sighting of the RN carriers, while giving him plenty of
information about active airfields remaining on Ceylon and a load of
battleships closing on him, neither of which he can ignore while
waiting to locate phantom RN carriers which he has no evidence of.
>> To return to my focus on evading
>> or diminishing the counter-strike, how about another suicidal Blenheim
>> mission from Ceylon hitting the IJN after dawn.
>
>In principle, fine. In practice, the co-ordination required is likely
>to beyond the parties involved.
Actually, I don't see this as co-ordinated, just happy accident.
Ceylon were trying to hit Nagumo with Blenheims in retaliation for the
Columbo raids on the morning of the 5th. Some of them actually found
the IJN later, IIRC, but unfortunately with predicatable results. You
have to respect the suicidal bravery involved, though. Still, this
leaves us with the second major threat distraction for Nagumo before
he has any proof there are British carriers about.
>And if such a strike had been remotely
>possible, it's likely that it would have been launched OTL.
It was.... They went the wrong way in OTL. I'll have them blundering
into the IJN just as the anti-BB strike is being ranged on deck and
the Columbo raid is returning....
>> This does nothing bar
>> add a few near misses to the damaged carriers at the cost of yet more
>> Blenheims and their crews at the bottom of the sea, but it brings
>> Ceylon back into Japanese attention, and their dawn counterstike gets
>> aimed at Trincomalee again, where those aircraft must have come from.
>
>Hmm.
"No carriers sighted yet, Nagumo-san, but our pilots have shot down
two shadowing Swordfish (sic) and reported several Fulmars over
Columbo. There are obviously British naval aviation units ashore on
Ceylon which must be destroyed before they can launch a torpedo attack
on us. Ah! The officer of the watch reports that we are being bombed
by twin engined land-planes. Obviously, British forces on Ceylon must
be suppressed."
>> A one-carrier strike to the airfields on Ceylon adds a few more
>> Hurricanes to the Japanese victory totals, at the cost of a few more
>> dive-bombers and the odd Zero, but more importantly occupies the main
>> Japanese threat
>
>Surely Nagumo is going to be out for the RN carriers, coute que coute.
>He's raging, and wants revenge NOW.
But were they from a carrier? Bear in mind a couple of Swordfish on
transit flights from China Bay were shot down by the dawn strike on
Ceylon, which in my TL is the day before the RN night attack, and
neither of us want to give Nagumo a sighting. In which case, the
land-based air threat is his perceived problem (in as much as the
British are giving him any). The only RN ships spotted are the two
cruisers sunk on the afternoon of 5th while running south from Ceylon.
The RN fleet might lie in that direction, then again that would be the
senisible direction to run from an IJN force to the north anyway....
I fully agree with the rage, but in this case I have it directed at
Columbo on the morning of 6th April, with a few more aircraft being
lost for no result (bar a slight increase in replacement Hurricane II
deliveries from Middle East Command), and then the battleships being
spotted and the second and third strikes going against them before the
night-time surface showdown on the night of 6th/7th.
>Bugger a few Blenheims. (Mind you,
>if this were a movie, we'd have a Blenheim in flames on the flight deck
>of Hiryu.... loads of interesting big bangs).
I like this, despite my anti-Hollyood prejudice. How about one lucky
Blenheim from 11 Sqn's retaliation raid hitting home when the next
strike is being ranged on the morning of 5th? Might even spare the
two cruisers that will go down if that strike goes off unhindered.....
>> while the RN carriers scarper and the expendable
>> battleships move in for the kill on the basis of the FAA crew's wild
>> reports of total devastation.
>
>You and I know that the Rs are expendable. Won't look good back home,
>though.
I don't think they'd all go down. One stopped and crippled, maybe.
The rest coming north and praying for a radar-assisted night gunnery
action a la Matapan, while their over-confidence in a night action
would be matched by the IJN smaller units and their training
background and faith in the long lance..... This will be painful, for
both sides, as the British close to point-blank gunnery range through
a massive torpedo spread. Another R going down while Warspite and the
remaining R obliterate anything within range, maybe. We can have RN
and IJN destroyers ramming and even boarding each other in this kind
of situation. Pure savagery.
><snippaggio>
>
>> Yeah, but can they close on the hulks fast enough, and will the IJN
>> stay beside their cripples to permit another Matapan? Will they shag
>> off instead, after sinking the most badly damaged carrier themselves?
>> Or are we up for Gottendamerung with the battleships?
>
>Good question. A nice Gotter D might be a British surface attack into
>the face of the last Japanese air group, while Japanese cruisers lunge
>in desperate, destroyer-type fashion.... no, can't believe it, myself.
I'm coming round to the concept of a night action on the early morning
of 6/7th, after a crippling FAA attack on the early morning of 6th
with the 7th taken up with the Japanese attacking Ceylon again and
then hitting the RN BB's which they spot coming north on the afternoon
of 6th.
We can even squeeze in two FAA night attacks in this scenario, on
5/6th and 6th/7th, concluding with the battleships obliterating each
other in the wee hours of 7th as the RN close in on a crippled and
burning carrier or two.
We can have the sun rising on the morning of 7th to see Somerville
getting reports of the R hit on the afternoon of 6th foundering,
another sunk and another crippled by the night action, plus a couple
of cruisers and half a dozen destroyers sunk or sinking while the
dazed and confused survivors survey a scene of utter carnage and the
recce patrols from Ceylon reporting a sea full of oil, wreckage,
corpses, the odd burning hulk and some scattered survivors but no sign
of the Japanese carriers despite Warspite's jubilant boasting of
sinking two, repeat two enemy fleet carriers by close-range
gunfire....
>> >My own belief is that if Somerville could have launched that night
>> >attack, things would have been v. nasty for the Japanese, there and
>> >afterwards. And it is not an insane possibility.
>>
>> I have problems seeing Somerville getting close enough without
>> detection to launch such a strike,
>
>This, in the real world, was why he did not do it. Somerville was by
>anyone's reckoning a fighting admiral and really wanted to launch just
>such a night attack. Which I still insist would have ruined K B's
>entire Indian Ocean holiday.
I agree that it would have hurt them by any credible expectation, just
that getting in position to do that risked total annihilation.
Somerville had one trump card that relied on getting into range and
back out of range against a longer-reached opponent with a devastating
daytime punch.
>> and then seeing it become so
>> devastatingly effective.
>
>I still beg to differ here. If S can get a couple of dozen strikers
>into contact with the Kido Butai in the middle of the night, then
>devastation is actually quite likely. Nothing KB can do will stop them.
I agree, in that navigation, co-ordination and flying into the sea
would be the main threat to the FAA force, and that a night engagement
maximises their effectiveness (short dropping ranges, impossible to
deliberately evade tropedos you can't see, etc) and minimises any
Japanese counter-measures. I'm just naturally sceptical of
prognostications of annihilating attacks: in reality just too many
external factors intervened to dissipate effectiveness.
>If, I grant you. As for how complete the devastation, and Somerville's
>own location come sunrise... still, at absolute best, you have Nagumo
>ordering the heavy cruiser that now carries his flag to torpedo his
>last floating carrier. Tell that to the Emperor, chum.
Heh heh. I did like the idea of the IJN doing a Lexington or Saratoga
or whatever to themselves for once.
>The trundling
>sound from the horizon is a pack of ancient British battleships, too.
Thinking about it, regardless of the fate of the carriers, pride would
demand that he stood and faced the RN battleline, confident that his
smaller units could win a night engagement, especially after the
reduced-strength strike on the battleships by his one operational
carrier aircrew on 6th scored such sucess (according to the returning
aircrew, who claim two battleships sunk and one crippled, a massive
over-estimate for one cruiser sunk and one battleship crippled and
limping back to Addu or Durban).
"Nagumo-san, fires caused by the enemy land-bomber strike on Akagi
yesterday are out of control. We have lost Hiryu to the enemy night
attack and Shokaku is listing too far for flight operations as a
result of the torpedo hits she sustained at the same time.
Nevertheless, we have sunk two enemy battleships, one small aircraft
carrier sailing independently, four cruisers and numerous smaller
vessels. The enemy only have two battleships left to the south, one
of which we damaged in the afternoon's airstrike. Surely we should
close and destroy the enemy battleships tonight, when we have the
advantage, rather than leave it until daylight tomorrow when his guns
will out-range us?"
>> The probabilities to my mind were on the IJN
>> detecting him and destroying his force in daylight, either the day
>> before or the day after.
>
>Indeed, this was the colossal preoccupation for the real-life
>Somerville. Not only a fighting admiral, but nobody's fool, either.
>(Which of course is why Nagumo never found him. He was also lucky: the
>rescue of _Dorsetshire_ and _Cornwall_'s survivors, for a start. 1,122
>men plucked from the sea, at the risk of an entire battle fleet. Well,
>1,122 naval chaps thought it was worth it.)
He stayed out till 8th April, looking for contact, so I don't think
your reading of his willingness to risk it is far off.
>> I'm not sure it was a risk worth taking,
>> when the RN position could only improve over time while the IJN's
>> would inevitably deteriorate.
>
>Good point, , nay, rock solid point.
We know all those nice shiny carriers were too delayed in the IO for
Coral Sea, and then went off to get sunk at Midway, but even absent
that knowledge any reasonable estimation would have the IJN unable to
match the power of the April '42 force in the Indian Ocean as the USN
remustered itself in the Pacific. If the IJN came back within reach
of the Eastern Fleet later in 1942 or 1943 to disrupt communications
with Burma and Australia, it would be with less force, and it would be
met by increasing RN force. In which case, we could well have your
counter-factual specultation taking place a year later, with the
British forces expanded to be six Hurricane squadrons based in Ceylon
and three carriers with Sea Hurricanes and so forth.
However you play it, that starts to become much better for the British
and much, much worse for the IJN.
Peter Kemp
<alanl...@mac.com> allegedly uttered:
>In article <memo.2003110...@jgd.compulink.co.uk>, John Dallman
><j...@cix.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> In article <031120031526567464%alanl...@mac.com>, alanl...@mac.com
>> (Alan Lothian) wrote:
>>
>> > The sun is coming up; Somerville is not so far away; the Japanese have
>> > one intact carrier and another just about capable of a launch. What
>> > happens next? Somerville has enough stuff to go for a surface action,
>> > just about, better than the Japanese, but they have more serious air,
>> > even after the events of the previous night. _Warspite_ is the world's
>> > best battleship, but even she has limitations.
>>
>> Tricky ... With ASV Swordfish, Somerville stands a chance of putting a
>> trailer on the Japanese without them noticing. If they head the wrong way,
>> then he's a whole lot safer if he dodges them. Submarines are what he
>> needs at this point; they could discourage the Japanese nicely.
How about....
ATL Somerville works to the East of the Japanese Task Force (JTF),
cued by a couple of ASV Stringbags. With the afternoon dwindling and
the Japanese only now getting into their steaming order for a
judicious retreat, the surface fleet closes on the JTF, while the
carriers prepare to launch another strike. Warspite and Co. have
gunnery practice against a JTF silhouetted against the setting sun,
while they have to return fire into the darkness, and shortly after
full dark, the Stringbags arrive for turn 2.
Unfortunately here Warspite's luck does it's usual, and due to a
confusion in a flight leader, four Swordfish mistakenly attack
Warspite, causing minor flooding, but serious prop damage, just after
she starts to hit hard on Hiryu. The British retire, having sunk two
of the damaged carriers, two destroyers, and a cruiser, and caused
enough damage to Hiryu to prevent air ops (flight deck peppered, but
no machinery damaged).
Somerville detaches Warspite to Colombo for repairs at an
eyewateringly slow 5 knots, and continues to Addu with the remainder
of his force, planning to harry the JTF all the way back home.
Warspite doesn't make it, being pounced upon by a Japanese submarine
and going down with all hands.
---
Peter Kemp
Life is short - Drink Faster
Peter Kemp
j...@cix.co.uk (John Dallman) allegedly uttered:
>In article <3abd9d15.0311...@posting.google.com>,
>Err...@hotmail.com (Errol Cavit) wrote:
>
>> I think John's "suggestion" is to send a carrier away so it is outside
>> the range of Jap carrier aircraft, rather than merely outside gun
>> range.
>
>Exactly. A way of making sure that you have a carrier afterwards, but
>it reduces your force for the fight.
Potentially though, it allows you to have CAP over your task force
form the carrier until it closes with the Japanese group, hopefully
limiting losses from the surviving Japanese pilots. What were the
fighters on those carriers at the time?
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
<peter_n_kempathotmaildotcom@> wrote:
>Potentially though, it allows you to have CAP over your task force
>form the carrier until it closes with the Japanese group, hopefully
>limiting losses from the surviving Japanese pilots. What were the
>fighters on those carriers at the time?
Indomitable had a squadron of Fulmars (800) and another of Sea
Hurricanes (880), while Formidable had one squadron of Martlets (888).
Total of about 16 Martlets, 9 Sea Hurricanes and 12 Fulmars on both
carriers. On Ceylon, 273 Sqn had 16 Fulmars and 803/806 sqns another
dozen, with about airworthy 40 Hurricanes (almost all Mk IIBs) split
between 30, 258 and 261 Sqns. All were at a disadvantage against the
Zero, but not impossibly in the case of the Martlets and Hurricanes,
especially with the right tactics (and some of the Hurricane pilots in
258 Sqn had experience against the Japanese in Singapore and Java, and
were already recommending high-speed vertical attacks and avoiding
dogfighting).
Given the problems the RAF defending Ceylon had with 40 Hurricanes
(almost 50% losses defending against each attack for a dozen Japanese
losses and the same number damaged in return) the fleet would have had
a harder time, but this should be offset against the difficulties of
achieving substantive damage against ships with the dive-bombers
(although the Japanese were first-class at that job at this stage of
the war) and the probability that C&C and reaction by the RN defending
themselves at sea would have been better than the sluggish reaction of
the RAF over Ceylon, where on the days of both major attacks, they
managed to squander their early warning advantage and scramble the
Hurricanes late and to attack bombers underneath the Japanese top
cover fighters. As they did repeatedly in Malaya and Java beforehand.
Fighter defence of the fleet against a substantive attack, even with
assistance from Ceylon, would have been expensive but even without
destroying large numbers of Japanese aircraft they would have
distrupted the Japanese attack and considerably reduced it's
effectiveness. With all the Japanese carriers available, it's a
no-hoper, but if we follow Alan's speculation and take it down to one
effective left.....
Gernot Hassenpflug
> The Battle of Addu Atoll
>
> This is a what-if, so I am crossposting (very rare, indeed almost
> unprecedented for me) to s.m.n and soc.history.what-if.
Nice post, and loads of interesting replies! Fortune cookie to you,
sir.
> Nagumo launches an attack on Colombo, finds the port empty, and loses
> some of his aircraft to defences that were much better than his lazy
> and incompetent intelligence people had told him.
Tut tut, Alan. No need to be nasty :-) Mainichi Shinbun, September 6
(Saturday), 2003, front page: (my translation, errors also mine)
"Foreign Ministry draws up military plans" w/ photos of docments drawn
up by the foreign ministry during BM2 for an attack on
Ceylon. Subtitled, "Invasion plans for former Ceylon found in personal
effects of former consular official"
`It has come to light that in April 1943 the Foreign Ministry drew up
detailed attack and invasion plans, including landing points and times
etc., for Ceylon (now Sri Lanka).
Although the war situation had already deteriorated badly, so the
possibilities are that either the Foreign Ministry, which had not been
informed of the latest developments yet, and had drawn up the plans on
their own initiative, or else that they had been drawn up at the
behest of the military. These documents are extremely valuable in that
they demonstrate that even civilian organizations had taken part in
drafting military plans. [staff writers Imanishi Takuto, Fujita
Fumiaki, Wada Hiroaki]
The title of the documents is "Documents relating to the invasion of
Ceylon Island", dated April 1943. The works are divided into volumes:
"Military-related", "Post-battle Management", and "General
Information", coming to a total of 480 pages. On the title page the
Forieign Ministry section name "Foreign Ministry Inspection Branch
No.4 Section" and the employee names are written, and a stamp "Top
Secret" is added, identifying that only those above Branch Head could
have access.
The objective of drawing up the documents is given as "For the
purposes of reference in drawing up battle plans for the invasion of
Ceylon". In the volume entitle "Military-related", the positions and
strengths of the British forces, and their specialities, are
described, as well as the time and 5 landing areas of invasion, as
well as strategic routes and positions.
The invasion of Ceylon was planned with the intention of reversing the
British influence in Asia after the Army and Navy had secured naval
supremacy in the Indian Ocean. However, it appears that this plan
disappeared from discussions following the withdrawal from
Guadalcanal.
The man who apparently drew up the documents, a Foreign Ministry
official, was until Autumn of 1942 a resident consular official on
Ceylon. These documents were among his personal effects [recently
deceased, G.H.].
Copies of the 2 volumes, "Military-related" and "General Information",
were already housed in the Foreign Ministry's Public Records Archives
(in Tokyo), but the words "the invasion of" had been deleted in blue
pen, and in the index [of the library, G.H.] also was only the title
"Documents relating to Ceylon Island", and so they had until now
escaped notice.
The "Inspection Branch" was a section set up to try and revert control
of foreign policy from the military back to the Foreign Ministry. The
"No.4 section" is supposed to have been largely dedicated to
processing information related to foreign countries.'
- end, followed by a few comments from two interviewees -
1. Hata Ikuhiko, contemporary historian, previously professor at Nihon
University.
`Even within the military, only a small fraction knew that the war
was going badly. The Foreign Ministry employees, together with the
majority of the population, were under the impression that Japan was
winning in its war, so it is quite possible that the Foreign Ministry,
looking to the future, drew up these plans on its own initiative.'
2. Morimatsu Toshio, of the Defence Agency Defence Research Institute,
and former reference materials compiler.
`In the Foreign Ministry, not just in the military, there were at
that time people who wanted to expand Japan's foreign dominions. In
Ceylon there was no military attache, and so military intelligence was
completely lacking. Thus, the military quite possibly requested the
necessary information to be drawn up by the Foreign Ministry.'
- end -
Therefore, I suspect that the information on Ceylon was not lacking as
much as you make out, Alan. I have not had a chance to read the
Japanese accounts of the attacks on Trincomalee (I suggest asking
`Cubdriver' since this is right in his area if I am not mistaken). I
cannot argue your point that the Japanese suffered heavier losses than
they expected. Perhaps that was due to the early warning, giving the
British and other aircraft a chance to climb to attack altitude. This
would have less to do with faulty intelligence than with the use of
radar. But I am shooting in the dark here.... in any event, I hope the
newspaper article is of material interest to some of you!
> The Japanese don't know what the hell is happening. The flame floats
> are optimistically believed to be a gun encounter between an escort and
> a submarine; but the first thing they really see is a Swordfish doing
> one of those weird helicopter-like manoeuvres up the side of _Akagi_
> after launching its fancy torpedo. It is followed shortly by four
> others, all of which have launched at ranges of less than 500 metres.
If you are doing an alternative time line, lets imbue the Japanese
with more ingenuity too :-) Let's say Nagumo bamboozles in his usual
fashion, but the same cannot be said of the best carrier admiral in
the Navy, Yamaguchi Tamon. In his book `Yamaguchi Tamon' [PHP
Bunko,1998, 6th impression 1999,422pp] Hoshi Ryoichi quotes Rear
Admiral Tsunoda Kakuji, commander of the 2nd Kido Butai (Ryujo, Hiyo,
Junyo), "Oh how I wish Yamaguchi Tamon were promoted to Commander of
the Kido Butai. Under his command I would gladly work as a subordinate
commander" -- and remembering that Tsunoda was one year _senior_ to
Yamaguchi, this is indeed high praise, coming from a man himself a
very competent officer. "That says everything", concludes Hoshi, in a
discussion on the merits and errors in Nagumo's and Yamamoto's
planning and execution at Midway.
Since the Japanese had been observers in the British raid on Taranto,
a night attack at that, it is unlikely that they would have
under-estimated the dangers of a British night strike. And would
likely have stayed out of range. Not to mention that at the least
bright sparks on board would have at least guessed the reason for the
the `light spectacle'.
Ah, and let's save the Japanese Navy with the sinking of the Akagi:
Nagumo sinks with his ship, and Yamaguchi says his decisive words a
few months early, "I am taking control".
> Akagi turns turtle and sinks within twenty minutes. Three of the
> remaining Japanese carriers are also hit, although none by so many
> torpedoes. Hiryu escapes, largely because an escorting cruiser quite
> inadvertently interposes itself between two Albacores and the carrier.
> All of the British aircraft, except one, are successfully recovered by
> 4. am and the beginnings of dawn. Somerville heads south -- as far away
> as possible from the enemy, and in the general direction of Addu Atoll
> -- at full speed. One Swordfish, half of a lower plane destroyed by an
> encounter with Japanese radio antennas, ditches close to a Japanese
> destroyer. In the finest traditions of the Japanese navy, the captured
> aircrew are abused and beheaded. Signals from Nagumo (who has
> transferred his flag to a convenient cruiser) regarding the aircrew's
> origin, are ignored.
Let's leave Nagumo to sink :-) As for the executions, I doubt the time
would have been found. As for disobeying orders, not a chance! If
those flyers were rescued, they would have been held alive by orders
from above.
> The sun is coming up; Somerville is not so far away; the Japanese have
> one intact carrier and another just about capable of a launch. What
> happens next?
Yamaguchi launches search aircraft at night, Hiryu's aircrew is not
only experienced but is spurned on by their elite commander, who has
great standing with the aircrews. Admiral Onishi and Yamaguchi had an
exchange of views at Etajima, with Onishi vowing to go on to command
airgroups and Yamaguchi vowing to become a carrier admiral from which
Onishi's groups could operate. If the British were in range of the
search aircraft, they would be certainly dead meat. Hiryu has 18
Zeros, 18 Kate's and 27 Vals (I assume, if no losses were incurred
before), and perahps 9 spare Zeros are assembled in the hanger. If the
British are found, the few fighters will soon go down in flames,
unfortunately for the RN, and the BBs and carriers will either be
damaged severely or sunk. The attack on Dorsetshire and Cornwall was
carried out by about 90 aircraft, but IIRC a large part of the latter
half were diverted since the targets were by that time already
sinking. I would say that the British would be very very worried
indeed. Ah well, fun to talk about....we didn't have to be there.
Vince Brannigan
Not to mention VANGUARD was equipped with essentially the same guns.
Vince
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
>> "Dave Knudson" <dknu...@minolta.com> wrote in message
>> news:c3650eb.03110...@posting.google.com...
>>
>>>Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com> wrote in message
>>
>> news:<031120031526567464%alanl...@mac.com>...
>>
>>>>The Battle of Addu Atoll
>>>>
>>>>best battleship, but even she has limitations.
>>>
>>>?!? In what universe? Warspite was built in 1916, and was a slow,
>>>lumbering WWI battleship. It was no better than any of the US
>> Warspite's gunnery was excellent; she holds the record for the longest range
>> hit (26,500 yards) in a gunnery action (against the Italian battleship
>> Giulio Cesare). She did lack speed, true; 25 knots. (This would probably be
This is the point - technically, there were better ships than Warpsite
in 1942, but she had been well modernised and had good fire control -
among the best. More importantly in the circumstances she'd been in
commission for a good length of time with a fairly stable crew and
was extremely well worked up. She'd seen more action - and a greater
variety of action - than any other battleship up to that time, and
by that I mean in her current commission, with the crew she had then.
It's the combination of the ship *and* the crew which does the job, the
best designed ship can be terribly vunerable with an inexperienced
crew.
Warspite could legitimately claim to have (a) operated routinely
in the face of land-based air opposition (b) entered by choice into
close action with destroyer forces in confined waters (c) entered
by choice into close-range night action against forces of unknown
strength (d) carried out co-ordinated operations with carriers,
including guarding carriers launching air strikes from a distance *and*
carriers operating with the battle line. Oh, and (e) seeing the back
of another battleship after clobbering it at extreme range.
Warspite's crew had seen the elephant and quite probably shot
the bugger as well. She was a tight, well-worked up ship and would
have been a lot more formidable than her paper specs suggested (the
modernisation *did* get rid of several vunerabilities, though).
The same couldn't be said about some of the Rs, but Warspite was
capable of being an active hazard to other people's health.
--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Who dies with the most toys wins" (Gary Barnes)
hlg
"Vince Brannigan" <fir...@pressroom.com> wrote in message
news:3FA8FEF5...@pressroom.com...
>
>
<snip>
> >
> > Warspite's gunnery was excellent; she holds the record for the longest
range
> > hit (26,500 yards) in a gunnery action (against the Italian battleship
> > Giulio Cesare). She did lack speed, true; 25 knots. (This would probably
be
> > achieved without difficulty in 1942; she was fresh out of the dockyard,
> > after having bomb damage repaired).
> >
> > Had things got to a slugging match, the battleships accompanying the
> > Japanese carriers would have been the Hiei and Haruna, or possibly their
two
> > sister-ships Kongo and Kirishima. Of similar vintage but modernised,
faster
> > (28 knots), with 8 x 14-inch guns. Their armour would be inferior to
> > Warspite's.
> >
>
> Not to mention VANGUARD was equipped with essentially the same guns.
>
Indeed; they had been in storage since being removed from "Courageous" and
"Glorious" more than twenty years earlier (which means that despite what
"Vanguard's" detractors say, her guns *were* fired in anger. Just, not on
"Vanguard").
It has to be said that there were weaknesses in the designs of British
three- and four-gunned turrets (in the "Nelson" and "King George V"
classes). They suffered from numerous interlock failures (safety features
refusing to let the guns be loaded or fired), and other faults. By
camparison, the twin 15-inch turret was almost 100% reliable. The result was
that the 15-inch gunned ships, with eight guns which went bang every time
they were required, actually had more firepower than the KGV's, with ten
temperamental guns. The 15-inch shell was quite adequate for doing damage at
the receiving end. D. K. Brown, in "From Nelson to Vanguard", claims that
"Vanguard" would have an even chance matched against an "Iowa" class; a lot
would depend on who scored the first hit. [Hastily dons flame-proof
underwear].
However, it should not be forgotten that Somerville had with him the four
survivors of the "R" class ("Revenge", "Resolution", "Ramillies" and "Royal
Sovereign"). They had the same main armament, but weren't very clever
designs to begin with and had never been modernised. In 1942, they lacked
proper fire control, had inadequate secondary and AA armament, and were
barely capable of 21 knots. Somerville could hardly get them out of the way
quickly enough.
The major error in British warship design could be seen in Somerville's two
carriers, "Formidable" and "Victorious". They had armoured flight decks,
which restricted their hangar space and therefore cut down the embarked air
group, not only in terms of numbers but also meant that certain aircraft
could not be carried, due to lack of height. The armoured flight deck's
value has been debated. It saved "Illustrious" from being sunk in short
order when attacked by Stukas in 1941, but she was out of action for so long
that it might almost have been quicker to build a new carrier anyway. Of the
five kamikaze hits suffered in the Pacific, Brown reckons that the armoured
flight deck was important in preventing the ship's loss on one occasion
only.
British naval aircraft design was nowhere near as good as the American;
there was nothing comparable to the Avenger, for instance. The Barracuda was
a clumsy brute, the Seafire with its short range and fragile undercarriage
should have been left on dry land, and the Swordfish should have been
relegated to convoy duties long before 1942. It achieved immortality largely
though its crews' skill and heroism. (That said, one successful
improvisation, trimming the wingtips on the Corsair to make it fit British
carriers, also improved its tip stall characteristics.)
BF Lake
"Peter Skelton" <skel...@cogeco.ca> wrote in message
news:vnpgqvke7v9j9otg5...@4ax.com...
> >I thought that the first radar installations - transmitter on
> >one wing, receiver on the other (can't remember which way around
> >it was) and using metre wavelengths did allow a torpedo to be carried
> >and that it was the later centimetric wave antenna which sat
> >between the undercarriage legs.
>
> You are correct about the antenna positions but, in early
> operations, the radar-equiped planes dropped flares, not
> torpedoes. ISTR thtat that was partly due to some obstruction.
> THere was some mesing around with the crew too, I'm confused.
Not a lot of info, but it seems the radome in the landing gear was for the
ASV fitted in ASW Swordfish of 1943. (Torpedo mission abandoned) By then
they had invented duplexing (see Dec 41 in link below) so the old yagi
separate RX/TX antennae could be dumped.
In the ASW version the telegraphist in back was made the radar operator too
ISTR
I don't see why the older antennae would interfere with the torpedo mission.
Didn't all planes attacking BISMARCK drop and they had radar? Flare
dropping occurred at Taranto, but ISTR none of those planes had radar.
For the IO scenario in Spring of 1942, there was also ASV fitted in US PBY's
summer/fall of 41. So the British ones in the IO would have had radar?
There was a "short range" ASV for Fleet Air Arm planes and a "long range"
ASV for patrol planes but I am unclear on details.
Check out Jul/Aug 1941 in
http://www.ww2pacific.com/notuntil.html
Regards,
Barry
Alan Minyard
I was responding to the comment that "In the med, the British ever (sic) put back
their CV prior to engage this Italian Navy" and "Please examine carefully the
battles of Off calabria and Capo Spartivento. In both actions, the Eagle and
Ark Royal, respectively, was put some miles behind the main force prior to engage
the Italian force". I guess I should have made that clearer : -)
Al Minyard
Dott. Piergiorgio
> That's an aggressive interpretation of what was written. How does saying
> that a ship was hidden from view by near-misses from bombs imply
> cowardice? The English isn't perfect, but understandable with a little
> effort.
I attempt to explain in a (slight) better English.
What I mean wasn't cowardice in the RN. What I mean is that the Britsh put
out of the gun engagement range the CV. Agter all, they have learned the
hard way that CV can't withstand BB when the latter came in the range (HMS
Corageous vs S&G) so they was ever put out of the harm's way prior of the
engagement (contatto balistico, in the Italian Naval parlance).
About the mangled reference to Ark Royal at Capo Spartivento (Capo Teulada
for Italians) I mean that the CV behind the BB-BC was attacked by
land-based SM-79 whose don't score a hit because the aiming device was
intended for static land targets, so the AR simply was hidden from visual
by very spectacular but ineffective bomb splashes whose hide her to the
visual of the escorting DD; a photo I seen in a Book about Capo Spartivento
shows said bomb splashes around her; only the upper part of island and mast
was barely visible.
If this' isn't sufficent clear, I'll repost in Italian and our good friend
Alan Lothian perhaps will be render this in proper English :)
Best regards from Italy.
--
Dott. Piergiorgio d' Errico- Naval and military historian
Niitakayama nobore ichi ni rei ya
Dave J
In addition, the Strinbags are moving slowly, and the deck watches will be
able to hear them coming from some distance away, what with no other
aircraft flying at night...
Athos
> Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com> wrote in message news:<031120031526567464%alanl...@mac.com>...
> > The Battle of Addu Atoll
> >
> > SNIP
> >
> > The Japanese don't know what the hell is happening.
>
> Doubtful. They know the British are at aes and in the area. They are
> on alert at the very least, and probably have a CAP up as well.
CAP will do them very little good at night. No radar on their
aircraft or there ships at this point.
>
> >The flame floats
> > are optimistically believed to be a gun encounter between an escort and
> > a submarine; but the first thing they really see is a Swordfish doing
> > one of those weird helicopter-like manoeuvres up the side of _Akagi_
> > after launching its fancy torpedo. It is followed shortly by four
> > others, all of which have launched at ranges of less than 500 metres.
>
> The Japanese were superb in night surface actions against the USN; how
> is a swordfish going to get that close?
They had no practice in shooting at aircraft at night. The Japanese
had drilled hard for night action before the war started but hadn't
drilled at all for night time airstrikes. The Brits were just
pioneering this.
I think "worlds best battleship" was meant in a romantic "I'm very
fond of her" way. I have to say that looking at her record even as a
"Yank" I have a soft spot for Warspite. For the record I would
happily take her over Tirpitz. The Bismark and her sister are two of
the most over rated ships ever built.
<snip>
>
> While I don't think that it is totally implausible, I do think that it
> is very unlikely that Somerville could have achieved this. The
> Japanese had a numerical and qualitative edge over the RN at this
> time. The British carriers were tiny compared to the Japanese ones.
> They (the Brits) would have needs more than their fair slice of luck
> to find the Japanese at night, and surprise them to the point that
> Swordfish and Albacores could be successful.
>
> Thanks.
>
> Dave Knudson
It comes down to a certain amount of luck and who gets the first punch
in. If the Brits get to launch a night attack then I think the
Japanese are in big trouble. The IJN has very bad damage control
practices, especially compared to the Brits. They lost alot of ships
especially carriers to damamge that they should have been able to
survive.
Pete
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
> Warspite for fatter with the bulges, but no longer, so her
> drag factor went up some.
Actually not nearly as much as you would expect. The ships were long
enough for wave making to be the most important factor. In fact the
bulged RS class actually showed less resistance at speed. From memory
Warspite made slightly over 24 knots at the post rebuild trials, with
much the same installed power as previously, though with considerably
less machinery weight.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)
Andre Lieven
> "Vince Brannigan" <fir...@pressroom.com> wrote in message
> news:3FA8FEF5...@pressroom.com...
>>
> <snip>
>> >
>> > Warspite's gunnery was excellent; she holds the record for the longest
> range
>> > hit (26,500 yards) in a gunnery action (against the Italian battleship
>> > Giulio Cesare). She did lack speed, true; 25 knots. (This would probably
> be
>> > achieved without difficulty in 1942; she was fresh out of the dockyard,
>> > after having bomb damage repaired).
>> >
>> > Had things got to a slugging match, the battleships accompanying the
>> > Japanese carriers would have been the Hiei and Haruna, or possibly their
> two
>> > sister-ships Kongo and Kirishima. Of similar vintage but modernised,
> faster
>> > (28 knots), with 8 x 14-inch guns. Their armour would be inferior to
>> > Warspite's.
>>
>> Not to mention VANGUARD was equipped with essentially the same guns.
>
> Indeed; they had been in storage since being removed from "Courageous" and
> "Glorious" more than twenty years earlier (which means that despite what
> "Vanguard's" detractors say, her guns *were* fired in anger. Just, not on
> "Vanguard").
Indeed. It is worth noting that those 15 inch guns, and the 15 inch
guns on the older RN BBs and BCs that got rebuilds ( Warspite, Valiant,
QE, Renown ) all got modified so that greater elevation of fire, thus
longer range was possible, then in the unmodifed turrets of the other
RN ships with 15 inch guns.
IIRC, Hood was the first ship to carry higher elevation 15 inch turrets,
from the start of her career.
> It has to be said that there were weaknesses in the designs of British
> three- and four-gunned turrets (in the "Nelson" and "King George V"
> classes). They suffered from numerous interlock failures (safety features
> refusing to let the guns be loaded or fired), and other faults. By
> camparison, the twin 15-inch turret was almost 100% reliable. The result
> was
> that the 15-inch gunned ships, with eight guns which went bang every time
> they were required, actually had more firepower than the KGV's, with ten
> temperamental guns. The 15-inch shell was quite adequate for doing damage
> at the receiving end. D. K. Brown, in "From Nelson to Vanguard", claims
> that "Vanguard" would have an even chance matched against an "Iowa" class;
> a lot would depend on who scored the first hit. [Hastily dons flame-proof
> underwear].
Hmm... Well, it was shown during a NATO exercise in the early 50s,
that Vanguard was a better sea boat than an Iowa in a serious storm.
> However, it should not be forgotten that Somerville had with him the four
> survivors of the "R" class ("Revenge", "Resolution", "Ramillies" and "Royal
> Sovereign"). They had the same main armament, but weren't very clever
> designs to begin with and had never been modernised. In 1942, they lacked
> proper fire control, had inadequate secondary and AA armament, and were
> barely capable of 21 knots. Somerville could hardly get them out of the way
> quickly enough.
Indeed, with the shorter range of their unmodified 15 inch turrets,
vis Warspite, adding to the reasons to get them out of the way.
> The major error in British warship design could be seen in Somerville's two
> carriers, "Formidable" and "Victorious". They had armoured flight decks,
> which restricted their hangar space and therefore cut down the embarked air
> group, not only in terms of numbers but also meant that certain aircraft
> could not be carried, due to lack of height.
That was a factor with Indefatigable, and Implacable, with their double
story, 14.5 foot high hangars, than the first three Illustriouses, with
their single 16.5 foot hangar. And, Indomiatble, had one and a half
hangars, again IIRC, of full 16.5 foot heights.
As those first four ships all did well later in the war, with Avengers,
Corsairs, and Hellcats, its not clear what, if any contemporary carrier
aircraft they would have been unable to carry and operate. Only in the
case of non folding Seafires, were they limited to deck only ops, as
a non folded plane would obviously not fit on a 22 foot wide lift.
> The armoured flight deck's value has been debated.
Sure.
> It saved "Illustrious" from being sunk in short order when
> attacked by Stukas in 1941, but she was out of action for so long
> that it might almost have been quicker to build a new carrier anyway.
No. She was repaired and in transit back to the UK in December of
1941, in company with her sister Formidable, which was also repaired
in the US from her Med bomb damage. And, neither was out of action
for even a full year, while even as extemporised carriers as Colossus
class CVLs took far mroe than one year to build.
> Of the
> five kamikaze hits suffered in the Pacific, Brown reckons that the armoured
> flight deck was important in preventing the ship's loss on one occasion
> only.
But, many RN armoured deck carriers in 1945 were able to stay in action,
while their Essex class cousins, afer taking similar hits, had to retire
back to Ulithi, Pearl or the mainland US.
> British naval aircraft design was nowhere near as good as the American;
> there was nothing comparable to the Avenger, for instance. The Barracuda
> was
> a clumsy brute, the Seafire with its short range and fragile undercarriage
> should have been left on dry land, and the Swordfish should have been
> relegated to convoy duties long before 1942. It achieved immortality
> largely though its crews' skill and heroism. (That said, one successful
> improvisation, trimming the wingtips on the Corsair to make it fit British
> carriers, also improved its tip stall characteristics.)
Well, the war situation that the UK found herself in, in 1940,
rather suggested that production of existing fighters took ptiority
over new a/c developments...
Alan Minyard
I think that you have cleared up any misconceptions, excellent post.
I is good to have you back in the group :-)
Al Minyard
Keith Willshaw
"Dave J" <neu...@alltel.net> wrote in message
news:q8bqb.114536$e01.417877@attbi_s02...
>
>
> In addition, the Strinbags are moving slowly, and the deck watches will be
> able to hear them coming from some distance away, what with no other
> aircraft flying at night...
>
>
Carriers arent exactly silent places even at night and even if they hear
something there's not a great deal they can do with no radar controlled
gunnery and no night fighters.
Keith
Dott. Piergiorgio
> I think that you have cleared up any misconceptions, excellent post.
Thanks ! :)
> I is good to have you back in the group :-)
Double thanks !! :))
Alan Lothian
<g...@nospam.com> wrote:
> Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com> writes:
>
> > The Battle of Addu Atoll
> >
> > This is a what-if, so I am crossposting (very rare, indeed almost
> > unprecedented for me) to s.m.n and soc.history.what-if.
>
> Nice post, and loads of interesting replies! Fortune cookie to you,
> sir.
Thank you, much appreciated, sir.
> > Nagumo launches an attack on Colombo, finds the port empty, and loses
> > some of his aircraft to defences that were much better than his lazy
> > and incompetent intelligence people had told him.
>
> Tut tut, Alan. No need to be nasty :-) Mainichi Shinbun, September 6
> (Saturday), 2003, front page: (my translation, errors also mine)
In fact, if the RAF had been better up to snuff, Nagumo would have lost
significantly more planes. But...
> "Foreign Ministry draws up military plans"
Exceedingly interesting. But note:
>
> `It has come to light that in **April 1943** the Foreign Ministry drew up
> detailed attack and invasion plans, including landing points and times
> etc., for Ceylon (now Sri Lanka).
My emphasis added. Another example of a large bureauracy with too much
time on its hands? (By no means an exclusively Japanese problem, oh
dear no.)
<snip>
>
> The invasion of Ceylon was planned with the intention of reversing the
> British influence in Asia after the Army and Navy had secured naval
> supremacy in the Indian Ocean. However, it appears that this plan
> disappeared from discussions following the withdrawal from
> Guadalcanal.
Hmm. Quite so.
> The man who apparently drew up the documents, a Foreign Ministry
> official, was until Autumn of 1942 a resident consular official on
> Ceylon. These documents were among his personal effects [recently
> deceased, G.H.].
How did he manage to be a "resident consular official" many months into
a bitter war? Or am I missing something?
<snip of much interesting stuff>
>
> Therefore, I suspect that the information on Ceylon was not lacking as
> much as you make out, Alan. I have not had a chance to read the
> Japanese accounts of the attacks on Trincomalee (I suggest asking
> `Cubdriver' since this is right in his area if I am not mistaken). I
> cannot argue your point that the Japanese suffered heavier losses than
> they expected.
They weren't that heavy: 9 or ten a/c on each of two raids, IIRC. But
the fighter opposition was unexpected.
> Perhaps that was due to the early warning, giving the
> British and other aircraft a chance to climb to attack altitude.
Ah, but they didn't, although they certainly should have. Gavin Bailey
has already pointed this out.
<snip>
>
> > The Japanese don't know what the hell is happening. The flame floats
> > are optimistically believed to be a gun encounter between an escort and
> > a submarine; but the first thing they really see is a Swordfish doing
> > one of those weird helicopter-like manoeuvres up the side of _Akagi_
> > after launching its fancy torpedo. It is followed shortly by four
> > others, all of which have launched at ranges of less than 500 metres.
>
> If you are doing an alternative time line, lets imbue the Japanese
> with more ingenuity too :-) Let's say Nagumo bamboozles in his usual
> fashion, but the same cannot be said of the best carrier admiral in
> the Navy, Yamaguchi Tamon.
Oddly enough,this very idea cropped up in Another Thread, in Another
Place. But let it be as you wish; alt-Somerville's strike takes out
Akagi, and Nagumo goes down with her. Yamaguchi inherits command.
>
> Since the Japanese had been observers in the British raid on Taranto,
> a night attack at that, it is unlikely that they would have
> under-estimated the dangers of a British night strike.
Note 1: Taranto did not move.
Note 2: The British had spent much of late '41 and early '42 running
really quite nasty night (radar directed, unlike Taranto) strikes
against Axis supply convoys. With Swordfish.
> And would
> likely have stayed out of range.
Hmm, no. In the real world, Nagumo is storming around looking for
Somerville; Somerville is staying out of his way if he can, but always
has precisely such a night strike in mind. He's got to be close enough
to launch, recover and run like hell before morning. He can't be too
close, for obvious reasons. In the real world, it didn't work out.
> Not to mention that at the least
> bright sparks on board would have at least guessed the reason for the
> the `light spectacle'.
I'd bet you anything you like they wouldn't have a clue. First thought
would be enemy light surface striking forces, or even a submarine
tangling with one of K B's destroyers. People will soon start
shooting. And they are *very* unlikely to hit an invisible Swordfish.
Expect friendly fire casualties from 20 mm and 40 mm AA: on ships, that
is. No CAP.
>
> Ah, and let's save the Japanese Navy with the sinking of the Akagi:
> Nagumo sinks with his ship, and Yamaguchi says his decisive words a
> few months early, "I am taking control".
Granted. But (see Gavin Bailey's post -- that's "The Revolution Will
Not Be Televised") the revised Somerville attack amounts to two night
strikes plus a battleship slugfest. Yamaguchi may get an earlier
opportunity to admire the beauty of the setting moon.
> > Akagi turns turtle and sinks within twenty minutes. Three of the
> > remaining Japanese carriers are also hit, although none by so many
> > torpedoes. Hiryu escapes, largely because an escorting cruiser quite
> > inadvertently interposes itself between two Albacores and the carrier.
>
> > All of the British aircraft, except one, are successfully recovered by
> > 4. am and the beginnings of dawn. Somerville heads south -- as far away
> > as possible from the enemy, and in the general direction of Addu Atoll
> > -- at full speed. One Swordfish, half of a lower plane destroyed by an
> > encounter with Japanese radio antennas, ditches close to a Japanese
> > destroyer. In the finest traditions of the Japanese navy, the captured
> > aircrew are abused and beheaded. Signals from Nagumo (who has
> > transferred his flag to a convenient cruiser) regarding the aircrew's
> > origin, are ignored.
>
> Let's leave Nagumo to sink :-) As for the executions, I doubt the time
> would have been found. As for disobeying orders, not a chance! If
> those flyers were rescued, they would have been held alive by orders
> from above.
IJN notoriously weird about prisoners, and even telling seniors about
them. The capturing destroyer *might* have given the FAA aircrew a
glass of sake. But given the command confusion, there is no way that
the destroyer is likely to successfully signal "Prisoners on board" and
have the signal acted on.
> > The sun is coming up; Somerville is not so far away; the Japanese have
> > one intact carrier and another just about capable of a launch. What
> > happens next?
>
> Yamaguchi launches search aircraft at night, Hiryu's aircrew is not
> only experienced but is spurned on by their elite commander, who has
> great standing with the aircrews.
Launches them pre-dawn, you mean. With luck, the Swordfish are now two
hundred miles away, and, given that they have attacked from the north
-- I forgot about this in my first post, despite having checked Starry
Night for the moon position; they circle north of the KB and attack
downmoon, with the ships silhouetted. Standard Mediterranean tactic;
may even obviate the need to drop flame floats.
So: does Yamaguchi find the British? If so, bad news for the RN. If
not...
<snip>
> Ah well, fun to talk about....we didn't have to be there.
Quite so.
--
"The past resembles the future as water resembles water" Ibn Khaldun
My .mac.com address is a spam sink.
If you wish to email me, try alan dot lothian at blueyonder dot co dot uk
Dave Knudson
>
> It has to be said that there were weaknesses in the designs of British
> three- and four-gunned turrets (in the "Nelson" and "King George V"
> classes). They suffered from numerous interlock failures (safety features
> refusing to let the guns be loaded or fired), and other faults. By
> camparison, the twin 15-inch turret was almost 100% reliable. The result was
> that the 15-inch gunned ships, with eight guns which went bang every time
> they were required, actually had more firepower than the KGV's, with ten
> temperamental guns.
Interesting. Did this contribute the Prince of Wales' unfortunate
performace against BISMARCK? On paper, HOOD and PoW were more than a
match for BISMARCK and EUGEN.
> The 15-inch shell was quite adequate for doing damage at
> the receiving end. D. K. Brown, in "From Nelson to Vanguard", claims that
> "Vanguard" would have an even chance matched against an "Iowa" class; a lot
> would depend on who scored the first hit. [Hastily dons flame-proof
> underwear].
Good idea :->.
How can he (Brown) make this argument. The Iowas were A) Bigger B)
Better Armored C) Had Bigger Guns (9 16" that also went 'BANG'
everytime they were fired) D) Longer-range guns E) faster F) had
better radar and G ) No one in WWII could match US BB fire-control.
All other factors being equal (crew and officer quality, setting,
surprise, etc) the Iowas should squish the VANGUARD pretty easily.
> However, it should not be forgotten that Somerville had with him the four
> survivors of the "R" class ("Revenge", "Resolution", "Ramillies" and "Royal
> Sovereign").
Oh. From the original post I thought Somerville just had WARSPITE. I
think that KONGO and HIEI could take WARSPITE in a fight.
> They had the same main armament, but weren't very clever
> designs to begin with and had never been modernised. In 1942, they lacked
> proper fire control, had inadequate secondary and AA armament, and were
> barely capable of 21 knots. Somerville could hardly get them out of the way
> quickly enough.
Still, that's a lot of metal. I think that in surface battle, the
gives the British the edge.
> The major error in British warship design could be seen in Somerville's two
> carriers, "Formidable" and "Victorious". They had armoured flight decks,
> which restricted their hangar space and therefore cut down the embarked air
> group, not only in terms of numbers but also meant that certain aircraft
> could not be carried, due to lack of height. The armoured flight deck's
> value has been debated. It saved "Illustrious" from being sunk in short
> order when attacked by Stukas in 1941, but she was out of action for so long
> that it might almost have been quicker to build a new carrier anyway. Of the
> five kamikaze hits suffered in the Pacific, Brown reckons that the armoured
> flight deck was important in preventing the ship's loss on one occasion
> only.
British carrier - with the exception of Ark Royal, Implacable and
Indefatigable - were not true fleet craiiers as either the IJN or USN
understood the term. On the other hand, they were perfectly adequate
to deal with the naval air and surface forces of Germany and Italy.
> British naval aircraft design was nowhere near as good as the American;
> there was nothing comparable to the Avenger, for instance. The Barracuda was
> a clumsy brute, the Seafire with its short range and fragile undercarriage
> should have been left on dry land, and the Swordfish should have been
> relegated to convoy duties long before 1942. It achieved immortality largely
> though its crews' skill and heroism. (That said, one successful
> improvisation, trimming the wingtips on the Corsair to make it fit British
> carriers, also improved its tip stall characteristics.)
And in my OCEANS of FIRE timeline (where Britain and the US fight in
WWII), the RN is at a serious disadvantage. The USN was, by WWII,
pound for pound, a better fleet than the RN. By 1944, a US ESSEX/IOWA
task Force could devastate anything the RN could throw at them.
Dave Knudson
Keith Willshaw
news:<a4bf13db4b5b7eea...@news.teranews.com>...
> > "Vince Brannigan" <fir...@pressroom.com> wrote in message
> > news:3FA8FEF5...@pressroom.com...
> >
> > SNIP
> >
> > It has to be said that there were weaknesses in the designs of British
> > three- and four-gunned turrets (in the "Nelson" and "King George V"
> > classes). They suffered from numerous interlock failures (safety
features
> > refusing to let the guns be loaded or fired), and other faults. By
> > camparison, the twin 15-inch turret was almost 100% reliable. The result
was
> > that the 15-inch gunned ships, with eight guns which went bang every
time
> > they were required, actually had more firepower than the KGV's, with ten
> > temperamental guns.
>
> Interesting. Did this contribute the Prince of Wales' unfortunate
> performace against BISMARCK? On paper, HOOD and PoW were more than a
> match for BISMARCK and EUGEN.
>
She was certainly having gun problems but to be fair she
was working up at the time
<snip>
>
> British carrier - with the exception of Ark Royal, Implacable and
> Indefatigable - were not true fleet craiiers as either the IJN or USN
> understood the term. On the other hand, they were perfectly adequate
> to deal with the naval air and surface forces of Germany and Italy.
>
This is less than acurate, Illustrious, Victorious, Formidable and
Indomitable
were very definitely fleet carriers and as part of the British Pacific
Fleet would be present at Okinawa.
Indeed Victorious not only served with the USN in the Pacific in 1943
but she went on to be given an angled flight deck and operate jets
in the post war period.
Keith
Peter Skelton
wrote:
>"hlg" <h...@ga110n7744.freeserve.co.uk> wrote in message news:<a4bf13db4b5b7eea...@news.teranews.com>...
>> "Vince Brannigan" <fir...@pressroom.com> wrote in message
>> news:3FA8FEF5...@pressroom.com...
>>
>> SNIP
>>
>> It has to be said that there were weaknesses in the designs of British
>> three- and four-gunned turrets (in the "Nelson" and "King George V"
>> classes). They suffered from numerous interlock failures (safety features
>> refusing to let the guns be loaded or fired), and other faults. By
>> camparison, the twin 15-inch turret was almost 100% reliable. The result was
>> that the 15-inch gunned ships, with eight guns which went bang every time
>> they were required, actually had more firepower than the KGV's, with ten
>> temperamental guns.
The 15" guns did not go bang every time either. No battleship's
guns went bang all the time.
>Interesting. Did this contribute the Prince of Wales' unfortunate
>performace against BISMARCK? On paper, HOOD and PoW were more than a
>match for BISMARCK and EUGEN.
Yes it did although the newness of the ship made things much
worse.
>> The 15-inch shell was quite adequate for doing damage at
>> the receiving end. D. K. Brown, in "From Nelson to Vanguard", claims that
>> "Vanguard" would have an even chance matched against an "Iowa" class; a lot
>> would depend on who scored the first hit. [Hastily dons flame-proof
>> underwear].
>
>Good idea :->.
>How can he (Brown) make this argument. The Iowas were A) Bigger B)
>Better Armored C) Had Bigger Guns (9 16" that also went 'BANG'
>everytime they were fired) D) Longer-range guns E) faster F) had
>better radar and G ) No one in WWII could match US BB fire-control.
The Iowas were bigger by about 5%.
There's no way they were as well armoured - less thickness, lower
quality, less coverage (They were equally armoured to the
preceding SD's where they were armoured but much less of them was
armoured. An Iowa would not be even money against a SD.)
The guns were bigger, but not necessarily as reliable. The USN
successfully resisted reliability testing of their tripples. When
forced to test, they used the fore half of a COLORADO's guns.
There's no data.
Longer range guns for certain but both could reach to the limit
of the fire control.
Faster for certain. That's why they had so much unarmoured area.
Better radar? I doubt this. The RN and USN were trading radars at
the time in question.
Better fire control? The USN had the best fire control? On what
do you base that? The radar outfit is the same. USN fire control
was never tested, British fire control was last tested when D o Y
sank S. There's no data.
>All other factors being equal (crew and officer quality, setting,
>surprise, etc) the Iowas should squish the VANGUARD pretty easily.
I think Brown might know somewhat more than you do on the
subject.
Peter Skelton
Andre Lieven
I believe that Dave's point uses a definition of fleet carrier
that would have it mean " a ship whose carriage and capacity of
aircraft is the uppermost ship design consideration ", such that
such 1927-1945 US and IJN ships ran around 15,000-30,000 tons,
and carried at least 60 planes, up to 90.
While the RN armoured deck carriers fit into that tonnage range,
their capacity does not, as the design number for the first three
armoured deck carriers was 36.
Only Ark and the last two " I's " managed list capacities as high
as 72.
> Indeed Victorious not only served with the USN in the Pacific in 1943
> but she went on to be given an angled flight deck and operate jets
> in the post war period.
Indeed, but requiring far more effort, time and relative
expenditure, as compared to the angled deckings of Essex class
ships.
And, the resulting ship ended up being a faster Hermes, with a
smaller air group then a refitted Essex.
Gernot Hassenpflug
> Better fire control? The USN had the best fire control? On what
> do you base that? The radar outfit is the same. USN fire control
> was never tested, British fire control was last tested when D o Y
> sank S. There's no data.
No argument, but didn't the USN use its fire control in the Surigao
Straits action 10 months later?
On that nore, a quick entry from memory:
The grandfather of a friend of mine here in Kyoto was navigating
officer on Mogami, luckily on the aft navigation bridge when Nachi (?)
rammed Magami cutting her almost in half. Spent several anxious hours
in the water before being picked up by destroyers. I don't know
whether this was due to US PT boats machine gunning the Japanese in
the water, but he picked up a machine gun bullet in the throat, and
was taken back to Kure (it was assumed he would die).
Luckily for my friend he recovered, and was tasked with transporting
Kaiten to bases near Kagoshima from Kure and Hiroshima. On his last
trip, the transport hit a mine, and was damaged. Although he was
supposed to return to Hiroshima the next day, 6 August, he stayed at
the dockyard to supervise repairs. Again, very lucky for my friend....
After the war, he became head of the Jieitai military academy (the
follow-on to Etajima naval academy). Lots of stories about the likes
of Inoue Shigeyoshi, Kakuta Kakuji, Yonai Mitsumasa and others. Have
to find time to write these things down one day!
Gernot Hassenpflug
> In article <vc93cd3...@nospam.com>, Gernot Hassenpflug
> <g...@nospam.com> wrote:
>
>> Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com> writes:
>>
>> > The Battle of Addu Atoll
>
> Exceedingly interesting. But note:
>
>> `It has come to light that in **April 1943** the Foreign Ministry drew up
Yes, I know :-) I also wondered what the meaning of "until autumn
1942" meant. But no other information to go on, sadly.
> How did he manage to be a "resident consular official" many months into
> a bitter war? Or am I missing something?
>
> They weren't that heavy: 9 or ten a/c on each of two raids, IIRC. But
> the fighter opposition was unexpected.
I read GAvian Bailey's posts a while later, got the info you refer
to. Thanks.
>> If you are doing an alternative time line, lets imbue the Japanese
>> with more ingenuity too :-) Let's say Nagumo bamboozles in his usual
>> fashion, but the same cannot be said of the best carrier admiral in
>> the Navy, Yamaguchi Tamon.
>
> Oddly enough,this very idea cropped up in Another Thread, in Another
> Place.
You've been around, then, have you :-)
>> Since the Japanese had been observers in the British raid on Taranto,
>> a night attack at that, it is unlikely that they would have
>> under-estimated the dangers of a British night strike.
>
> Note 1: Taranto did not move.
> Note 2: The British had spent much of late '41 and early '42 running
> really quite nasty night (radar directed, unlike Taranto) strikes
> against Axis supply convoys. With Swordfish.
Sorry, I don't get your point. Given 1 and 2, my point is exactly that
the IJN would be very worried about RN night aerial attacks. What are
you refuting? Below I realize perhaps I erred: the IJN was in range
(perhaps?) Does Nagumo not vary the range to be in during the day and
hopefully out of any range at night? I suppose navigation details
would have to be given here! Also, I am merely speculating the Nagumo
took RN night attacks into consideration. Perhaps he entirely
discounted them (which I doubt, but have no info).
>> And would
>> likely have stayed out of range.
>
> Hmm, no. In the real world, Nagumo is storming around looking for
> Somerville; Somerville is staying out of his way if he can, but always
> has precisely such a night strike in mind. He's got to be close enough
> to launch, recover and run like hell before morning. He can't be too
> close, for obvious reasons. In the real world, it didn't work out.
I think that given the range of the IJN recce aircraft, there is no
way the RN can avoid being in range by morning. A little calculation:
200 nautical miles (generous) range, planes back to carrier at
2am. Carriers head off to the West at 24 knots (lets say Warspite does
that and can keep up for all those hours, how likely is that?) for 6
hours. That say 150 nm, so 350 nm between the two forces. The Japanese
cruiser scouts are trained to fly at night, for spotting purposes, so
they launch in time to be at the outer limits of their search arcs by
dawn. Say they find the RN within an hour after dawn.... and that
Yamaguchi alredy headed West at best speed with the remaning forces,
knowing that the RN can't be more than say 200 nm away! Ugh, makes me
scared just to think about it! I have visions of vengeful IJN aviators
doing kamikaze dives into the RN ships if their bombs miss, to make
sure at all costs. Personally, I think Somerville's plan was more
psychological for morale than anything else :-)
> I'd bet you anything you like they wouldn't have a clue. First thought
> would be enemy light surface striking forces, or even a submarine
> tangling with one of K B's destroyers. People will soon start
> shooting. And they are *very* unlikely to hit an invisible Swordfish.
> Expect friendly fire casualties from 20 mm and 40 mm AA: on ships, that
> is. No CAP.
I'll grant you your point, not having any evidence to the contrary :-)
> IJN notoriously weird about prisoners, and even telling seniors about
> them. The capturing destroyer *might* have given the FAA aircrew a
> glass of sake. But given the command confusion, there is no way that
> the destroyer is likely to successfully signal "Prisoners on board" and
> have the signal acted on.
Again, I can't argue this at present. I would love to get my hands on
some Japanese sources where someone writes these kind of details from
personal experience.
> Launches them pre-dawn, you mean. With luck, the Swordfish are now two
> hundred miles away, and, given that they have attacked from the north
> -- I forgot about this in my first post, despite having checked Starry
> Night for the moon position; they circle north of the KB and attack
> downmoon, with the ships silhouetted. Standard Mediterranean tactic;
> may even obviate the need to drop flame floats.
Thanks for adding that -- nasty blighters, these British. We'll have
to go on feeling them vegetables from Germany until they weaken. I
wrote above the scouts launch at night. Carrier planes, as you point
out, would be pre-dawn. You know, thinking about it, there are quite a
few points about the IJN that the RN is not aware of either! Did they
know about night scouting, or the range of the IJN attack and strike
aircraft? Reminds me of Misawa at Guadalcanal, deciding to withdraw
before daylight despite the (with hindsight) lack of further Allied
forces. He would have been wiped out the next day by air
attack. Somerville may have thought similarly, or not? The range/speed
equations just do not seem to add up favourably.
Mind you, how about letting the carriers escape at 30+ knots, making
sure they can be more than 400 nm away by dawn, and leaving the IJN to
find and maybe sink the less important battleships. After all, Warpite
wouldn't be hit seriously :-)
Cheers, Gernot
BTW I spelt (if that is the right word) Kakuta Kakuji wrong in my
previous post (I mistakenly wrote it Tsunoda, which doesn't seem very
close if you don't know that the kanji are the same and my mind was in
free-wheel drive).
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
Dave Knudson <dknu...@minolta.com> wrote:
>"hlg" <h...@ga110n7744.freeserve.co.uk> wrote in message news:<a4bf13db4b5b7eea...@news.teranews.com>...
>> "Vince Brannigan" <fir...@pressroom.com> wrote in message
>> news:3FA8FEF5...@pressroom.com...
>> the receiving end. D. K. Brown, in "From Nelson to Vanguard", claims that
>> "Vanguard" would have an even chance matched against an "Iowa" class; a lot
>> would depend on who scored the first hit. [Hastily dons flame-proof
>> underwear].
>
>Good idea :->.
>How can he (Brown) make this argument. The Iowas were A) Bigger B)
>Better Armored C) Had Bigger Guns (9 16" that also went 'BANG'
Pardon? How does a thinner belt of inferior armour equate to "better".
Vanguard's belt was significantly thicker (1.5" more, IIRC), more
extensive and of Vickers special, which was about 40% more effective
against AP than the armour of 20 years earlier. US cemented armour
hadn't improved in the same period, so at a rough estimate you could
say that the big V had armour with an effective thickness of around
60% more than Iowa (she was probably the best-protected battlewagon
ever, given the poor quality of the armour carried by the Yamatos).
>everytime they were fired) D) Longer-range guns E) faster F) had
>better radar and G ) No one in WWII could match US BB fire-control.
Vanguard's radar and fire control were at very closely comparible
to the US equipment - many of the radars were the same, of course.
Speed - depends. In calm conditions the Iowa for sure, in bad weather
- as Mariner showed - Vanguard every time.
>All other factors being equal (crew and officer quality, setting,
>surprise, etc) the Iowas should squish the VANGUARD pretty easily.
Either could hurt the other badly. Whoever hit first had the best
chance. Lose speed and you're in trouble: Remember that long protected
bow of the Iowa - a 15" hit there kills your speed advantage right away,
and a near miss will take a lot of it away (Vanguard may have had splinter
protection to guard against that - not sure). Lose radar and rangefinder
and you're probably dead from that moment.
--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Time has stopped, says the Black Lion clock
and eternity has begun" (Dylan Thomas)
Peter Skelton
<g...@nospam.com> wrote:
>Peter Skelton <skel...@cogeco.ca> writes:
>
>> Better fire control? The USN had the best fire control? On what
>> do you base that? The radar outfit is the same. USN fire control
>> was never tested, British fire control was last tested when D o Y
>> sank S. There's no data.
>
>No argument, but didn't the USN use its fire control in the Surigao
>Straits action 10 months later?
>
IIRC two of the US battleships couldn't get solutions and didn't
oopen fire. No modern US ships were involved.
Peter Skelton
Jack Linthicum
> > Exceedingly interesting. But note:
> >
> >> `It has come to light that in **April 1943** the Foreign Ministry drew up
>
> Yes, I know :-) I also wondered what the meaning of "until autumn
> 1942" meant. But no other information to go on, sadly.
>
I have just come from a funeral where the person involved was listed
on the accompanying brochure as having died "October 26, 2004". Talked
with the editor who said three people had reviewed it. Beaucracies
make mistakes, it is their nature. No one ever corrects a printed
error in a archived copy of any official document. Occasionaly someone
will put a correction on with a paper clip or a sticky note, but these
are removed just before the document is archived. Just a guess but I
can believe that April 1942 is meant, that the information is at least
six months old at that time, and this may be the first time anyone has
read it all the way through.
Gernot Hassenpflug
Ah, I see. Why do you mention 'no modern US ships'. Do you mean
the older ships weren't by then equipped with the latest radar
technology? At least for anti-aerial warfare I would assume they
were. What gives?
Gernot Hassenpflug
> Gernot Hassenpflug <g...@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<vc9isly...@nospam.com>...
>>
>> Yes, I know :-) I also wondered what the meaning of "until autumn
>> 1942" meant. But no other information to go on, sadly.
> Beaucracies make mistakes, it is their nature. No one ever corrects
> a printed error in a archived copy of any official
> document. Occasionaly someone will put a correction on with a paper
> clip or a sticky note, but these are removed just before the
> document is archived. Just a guess but I can believe that April
> 1942 is meant, that the information is at least six months old at
> that time, and this may be the first time anyone has read it all the
> way through.
I don't think so Jack. The documents were drawn up in April 1943,
_after_ the withdrawal from Gauadalcanal. The issue here was whether
the person writing the report had actually been on Ceylon until Autumn
1942, or whether that was an error (of year?).
Cheers, Gernot
Chris Williams
wrote:
>The Battle of Addu Atoll
OK, I'm kind of with Alan generally here (although as he knows, I
think that having Somerville lose is innately more interesting) aside
from the number of hits on the IJN. I think that of four carriers, one
sunk outright (five hits), one heavily damaged (5 kts and serious
pumping, and may yet founder), one slightly damaged (friendly AAA),
and one undamaged. And lose a cruiser too.
All this, Somerville will find out at dawn, whereever he decides to
go. Take off two Fulmar crews from his remaining strength.
And where is Hermes in all this? Is there a chance for a feint from
her, while the other carriers get away, to strike another night? Or
has she already been sunk (Roskill's in a box somewhere).
But why should Somerville run away after that? If he can send the KB
to the bottom, the game is essentially over for the IJN. Surely his
best option is to steam right for them with all his battleships? Any
one of the Rs in range can make a mess of all the CVs. Warspite can
probably damage both the battleships, and if they are slowed down, and
the CVs are sunk or damaged, they will be easy meat for the remaining
Swordfish one night.
Meanwhile, the UK can send every submarine to the Nicobars, the
Andamans, and the Sunda Strait. How many did Somerville have to play
with? The nub of the matter is that the KB is only safe once it gets
back into Singapore, which is a long way away.
Can unchallenged RN mastery of the Indian Ocean do much to slow down
the Japanese invasion of Burma? My money's on 'not too much', but
others probably know more.
Anyway, this leads to a VDI Pacific War. The popular conception of a
UK defeat followed by a US victory will change. The USN will have less
potential kudos to regain, but more carriers to regain it with. The
UK's imperial ambitions in the East will be shored up by a resounding
victory ('Pearl Harbour Avenged!') so soon after the surrender of
Singapore. The war in the Med will be very different if Somerville can
give his (slow but confident) BBs back to Cunningham. No need for
Pedestal? Sooner Torch? Worse relations between Allies?
Chris
--
"War is the state's killer app" - Ken MacLeod
[peacetime .sig will return when apposite]
BF Lake
>> >>No argument, but didn't the USN use its fire control in the Surigao
> >>Straits action 10 months later?
> >>
> > IIRC two of the US battleships couldn't get solutions and didn't
> > oopen fire. No modern US ships were involved.
>
> Ah, I see. Why do you mention 'no modern US ships'. Do you mean
> the older ships weren't by then equipped with the latest radar
> technology? At least for anti-aerial warfare I would assume they
> were. What gives?
I have a note that three of the BBs had the Mark 8 FC radar and were able to
open at 20,000 yds.(the range out for the graduated scale on the radar
display--the radar itself had longer detection ranges) The other three had
the older, less capable Mark 3 FC. MARYLAND got her target info from
ranging on splashes from WV, MISSISSIPPI fired only one salvo during the
action, and PENNSYLVANIA was unable to fire at all.
The 1941ish Mark 3 had poor resolution on its display and required optical
confirmation of initial range and spotting splashes. (so not much use at
night!) The Mark 8 had the same detection ranges and the display was
graduated to the same distance ? 20K yds for spotting, but had higher
resolution and was fairly decent. The British FC radar for surface big
guns was as good if not better than the US FC radar, also improving in later
models during the war at roughly the same time frame.
The US FC was much superior in anti-aircraft however, but not due to the
radar itself, but in the way the director computed lead angle (I am vague on
the technicalities of this, but this problem of the "predictor" for AA gun
direction was known in the RN pre-WW2 and not addressed. The USN chose the
right gear)
Regards,
Barry
Peter Skelton
<g...@nospam.com> wrote:
>Peter Skelton <skel...@cogeco.ca> writes:
>
>> On Thu, 06 Nov 2003 15:12:47 +0900, Gernot Hassenpflug
>> <g...@nospam.com> wrote:
>>
>>>Peter Skelton <skel...@cogeco.ca> writes:
>>>
>>>No argument, but didn't the USN use its fire control in the Surigao
>>>Straits action 10 months later?
>>>
>> IIRC two of the US battleships couldn't get solutions and didn't
>> oopen fire. No modern US ships were involved.
>
>Ah, I see. Why do you mention 'no modern US ships'. Do you mean
>the older ships weren't by then equipped with the latest radar
>technology? At least for anti-aerial warfare I would assume they
>were. What gives?
No, they didn't all have the latest. By that time there was no
need to upgrade them, they were essentially employed as monitors.
If they did have to fight, they could expect to be fighting ships
of similar ages and to have numbers strongly on their side.
The date of last rebuild is important. Some were well up to date
while the ones that missed Pearl Harbour tended to be a bit
behind.
ISTR that some ships still had the old 5/25 AA guns. Those
installations wouldn't have leant themselves well to the blind AA
fire modern warships were capable of by the end of the war. Also
I don't think the USN went for radar-controlled 40mm like the
famous installation on HMS Victorious preferring the gyro-based
keep it pointing right at the plane type (not a bad outfit and
much lioghter and easier to install.)
Peter Skelton
Alan Lothian
<vontri...@hotmailthemick.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 03 Nov 2003 15:26:56 +0000, Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com>
> wrote:
>
> >The Battle of Addu Atoll
>
> OK, I'm kind of with Alan generally here (although as he knows, I
> think that having Somerville lose is innately more interesting) aside
> from the number of hits on the IJN. I think that of four carriers, one
> sunk outright (five hits), one heavily damaged (5 kts and serious
> pumping, and may yet founder), one slightly damaged (friendly AAA),
> and one undamaged. And lose a cruiser too.
Well, I was giving the strike force all the luck in the world, and they
weren't all that worked up OTL. Especially not Formidable's. Note,
though, that you have missed out a carrier. (Nagumo had five.) I think
Gavin's estimate of likely strike damage is probably more accurate than
my own optimism, as indeed is your own, but I do believe we can
definitely scratch one big flat top. I also like Gavin's revised timing
for the whole thing, and the second night raid followed by a
let-it-all-hang-out fleet slugfest. But if Nagumo (or any lawful heir
or successor) finds Somerville the next morning.... not good.
> All this, Somerville will find out at dawn, whereever he decides to
> go. Take off two Fulmar crews from his remaining strength.
Might be better just to keep deep dark and dirty.
> And where is Hermes in all this? Is there a chance for a feint from
> her, while the other carriers get away, to strike another night? Or
> has she already been sunk (Roskill's in a box somewhere).
Fraid so. Sunk. All this takes place after D and C have been sunk, too.
> But why should Somerville run away after that? If he can send the KB
> to the bottom, the game is essentially over for the IJN.
Sure, but he has only just hurt it bad. There's still enough of it left
to bring him great grief.
> Surely his
> best option is to steam right for them with all his battleships? Any
> one of the Rs in range can make a mess of all the CVs. Warspite can
> probably damage both the battleships, and if they are slowed down, and
> the CVs are sunk or damaged, they will be easy meat for the remaining
> Swordfish one night.
See Gavin's excellent post.
> Meanwhile, the UK can send every submarine to the Nicobars, the
> Andamans, and the Sunda Strait. How many did Somerville have to play
> with? The nub of the matter is that the KB is only safe once it gets
> back into Singapore, which is a long way away.
Not a whole hell of a lot of RN subs in the IO at the time, unless I am
much mistaken. Still, just the one in the right place.... Hell, why
should the Japanese get all the luck in that first six months?
> Can unchallenged RN mastery of the Indian Ocean do much to slow down
> the Japanese invasion of Burma? My money's on 'not too much', but
> others probably know more.
Don't see it myself -- that job is pretty well done by April 42 anyway.
But their pride has taken one hell of a whacking, certainly -- even if
they do manage to inflict some counter-harm on Somerville.
> Anyway, this leads to a VDI Pacific War. The popular conception of a
> UK defeat followed by a US victory will change. The USN will have less
> potential kudos to regain, but more carriers to regain it with.
Doesn't make that much difference, except for Midway Pre-Empted. The US
needs to build, and build up, troops as well as ships, before it can
push ahead. Much less interference from the IJN, though -- or perhaps
more desperate attacks early.
> The
> UK's imperial ambitions in the East will be shored up by a resounding
> victory ('Pearl Harbour Avenged!') so soon after the surrender of
> Singapore. The war in the Med will be very different if Somerville can
> give his (slow but confident) BBs back to Cunningham. No need for
> Pedestal? Sooner Torch? Worse relations between Allies?
Good questions; hadn't even thought about them. I just had this image
of Swordfish, at 85 knots with a torpedo on board, gutting the elite of
the IJN.
Alan Lothian
Be Televised <occu...@bonkers.net> wrote:
> On Tue, 04 Nov 2003 18:43:00 +0000, Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com>
> wrote:
<snippaggio>
>
> However, we have an issue of timing here. You are positing an attack
> on the early morning of 5 April, but in OTL the Catalina getting off
> the original spotting report didn't do so until 1600hrs on 4 April.
> In fact some Albacores from Indom were shot down by the IJN CAP on the
> morning of 5 April, when the striking force was hitting Trincomalee.
> Not enough time for Somerville to close to contact that night as I see
> it.
Excellent points, and...
> The best point of departure for this might be the night of the
> 5th/6th, when Nagumo is withdrawing to the north to attack shipping in
> the Bay of Bengal and after the last sighting by an Albacore on the
> evening of the 5th.
Excellent suggestions.
<snip>
>
> Yeah, but four battleships plus screen (albeit early-'42 Eastern
> Fleet-size) and some scraps of a CAP in the form of sections of
> Hurricanes from 30 and 258 squadron from Ceylon are a harder target
> than Force Z. The real danger won't be the dive bombers that nailed
> the two cruisers and later Hermes, but the torpedo bombers. The
> Hurricanes have an excellent chance of breaking up an effective
> torpedo attack, even if there are only a section present and they
> quickly go down to the Zeroes, and a few bomb hits are unlikely to
> kill any of the battlewagons.
One hell of a risk, though. Still...
> >> Can't see the strike being that successful, barring some amazing die
> >> rolls.
> >
> >Why not? Agreed the strike might not find the Japanese. But if it does,
> >they really are in trouble. Given what night-strike Swordfish did from
> >Malta against much smaller targets, *even when quite inexperienced*.
> >And given Japanese damage control, a couple of 250-lb bombs from the
> >flame-float layers could have done real grief, too. But 20+
> >torpedo-carrying aircraft, virtually unopposed, will bring no joy to
> >any Japanese admiral I can think of. True, you might end up with Akagi
> >hit by 15 of them... Imagine the oil painting, copies of which are to
> >be seen to this day in every FAA mess.
>
> I'd compromise on two carriers hit, one sunk completely, the other
> limping away, with a couple of cruisers hit and maybe one of them
> down.
Just looked at timings. How many strike aircraft does Somerville have?
I believe we may get in a second strike the same night; easy to find
the target, what what all the bright sparky stuff going on. Just ten
invisible attackers this time. Ups the risk a bit on the considerable
side, come dawn, mind you.
> >> >> With no subs, and the Japanese closing, he has a problem with getting
> >> >> his
> >> >> Swordfish into action in daylight.
> >> >
> >> >They are dogmeat if they even try, I suspect. Somerville has a handful
> >> >of Fulmars, and that's it for air defence. Nowhere near enough.
> >>
> >> A dozen Sea Hurricanes as well IIRC.
> >
> >Thanks to Ian Rae for accurate OOB here. Doesn't alter the fact that
> >the last thing S wants to see two hours after sunrise is an incoming
> >Japanese airstrike, even from "jist the wan wee carrier".
>
> Precisely. We can't realistically eliminate that counter-strike, so
> we need it to hit a different target - Ceylon again, or the
> battleships as they plough northwards. We just need to deny Nagumo a
> credible sighting of the RN carriers, while giving him plenty of
> information about active airfields remaining on Ceylon and a load of
> battleships closing on him, neither of which he can ignore while
> waiting to locate phantom RN carriers which he has no evidence of.
Another excellent suggestion. Note that the night strike should really
circle around KB and attack from the north, the moon being where it
was. (Moon will have set before any putative second strike, but there's
be lots of light around unless Japanese damage control has much
improved from OTL.)
> >> To return to my focus on evading
> >> or diminishing the counter-strike, how about another suicidal Blenheim
> >> mission from Ceylon hitting the IJN after dawn.
> >
> >In principle, fine. In practice, the co-ordination required is likely
> >to beyond the parties involved.
>
> Actually, I don't see this as co-ordinated, just happy accident.
> Ceylon were trying to hit Nagumo with Blenheims in retaliation for the
> Columbo raids on the morning of the 5th. Some of them actually found
> the IJN later, IIRC, but unfortunately with predicatable results. You
> have to respect the suicidal bravery involved, though. Still, this
> leaves us with the second major threat distraction for Nagumo before
> he has any proof there are British carriers about.
Excellent again. HM enemies cower in their beds with this sort of stuff
going on.
> >And if such a strike had been remotely
> >possible, it's likely that it would have been launched OTL.
>
> It was.... They went the wrong way in OTL. I'll have them blundering
> into the IJN just as the anti-BB strike is being ranged on deck and
> the Columbo raid is returning....
Hmmm.
> >> This does nothing bar
> >> add a few near misses to the damaged carriers at the cost of yet more
> >> Blenheims and their crews at the bottom of the sea, but it brings
> >> Ceylon back into Japanese attention, and their dawn counterstike gets
> >> aimed at Trincomalee again, where those aircraft must have come from.
> >
> >Hmm.
>
> "No carriers sighted yet, Nagumo-san, but our pilots have shot down
> two shadowing Swordfish (sic) and reported several Fulmars over
> Columbo. There are obviously British naval aviation units ashore on
> Ceylon which must be destroyed before they can launch a torpedo attack
> on us. Ah! The officer of the watch reports that we are being bombed
> by twin engined land-planes. Obviously, British forces on Ceylon must
> be suppressed."
Sounds plausible. Some of the Japanese are still convinced that
submarines and torpedo boats were involved in Nasty Night #1. IIRC, the
Japanese had very little concept of what radar-equipped Swordfish could
do. (Nobody really did, except the RN and the Italians at the receiving
end.)
> >> A one-carrier strike to the airfields on Ceylon adds a few more
> >> Hurricanes to the Japanese victory totals, at the cost of a few more
> >> dive-bombers and the odd Zero, but more importantly occupies the main
> >> Japanese threat
> >
> >Surely Nagumo is going to be out for the RN carriers, coute que coute.
> >He's raging, and wants revenge NOW.
>
> But were they from a carrier? Bear in mind a couple of Swordfish on
> transit flights from China Bay were shot down by the dawn strike on
> Ceylon, which in my TL is the day before the RN night attack, and
> neither of us want to give Nagumo a sighting. In which case, the
> land-based air threat is his perceived problem
..... I take your point
<snip, cut to slam-bam battle of Dreadnoughts...>
>
> I don't think they'd all go down. One stopped and crippled, maybe.
> The rest coming north and praying for a radar-assisted night gunnery
> action a la Matapan, while their over-confidence in a night action
> would be matched by the IJN smaller units and their training
> background and faith in the long lance..... This will be painful, for
> both sides, as the British close to point-blank gunnery range through
> a massive torpedo spread. Another R going down while Warspite and the
> remaining R obliterate anything within range, maybe. We can have RN
> and IJN destroyers ramming and even boarding each other in this kind
> of situation. Pure savagery.
Killick swinging cutlass: "Take that for Dorsetshire!" I can't really
see a boarding action, mind you.
> ><snippaggio>
> >
> >> Yeah, but can they close on the hulks fast enough, and will the IJN
> >> stay beside their cripples to permit another Matapan? Will they shag
> >> off instead, after sinking the most badly damaged carrier themselves?
> >> Or are we up for Gottendamerung with the battleships?
> >
> >Good question. A nice Gotter D might be a British surface attack into
> >the face of the last Japanese air group, while Japanese cruisers lunge
> >in desperate, destroyer-type fashion.... no, can't believe it, myself.
>
> I'm coming round to the concept of a night action on the early morning
> of 6/7th, after a crippling FAA attack on the early morning of 6th
> with the 7th taken up with the Japanese attacking Ceylon again and
> then hitting the RN BB's which they spot coming north on the afternoon
> of 6th.
If (a very big if) S has an accurate location, he could just about
manage two strikes on the first night. The second one will fly into a
hornet's nest, but it's hard to see how IJN night AAA is going to be
much more effective, and if they want to fly off some Zeros, that's
just a few less to worry about the next day. Still, if S can keep his
distance (due to Nagumo -- or Yamaguchi, Nagumo having gone down with
_Akagi_ -- being suckered into the Ceylon strike) this might be fun.
"Right, lads: this time, don't all attack the same carrier."
> We can even squeeze in two FAA night attacks in this scenario, on
> 5/6th and 6th/7th, concluding with the battleships obliterating each
> other in the wee hours of 7th as the RN close in on a crippled and
> burning carrier or two.
Ah, a Gotterdaemmerung to content anyone, even Hollywood. Need an Evil
Brit officer somewhere, though. Ah, the wicked Somerville gives the
beautiful Japanese pilot to the grunting, panting engine-room (Well,
she wouldn't tell where the Kido Butai was) where she is saved from a
fate worst then Hollywood only by the actions of the nice Irish chief
stoker....
> We can have the sun rising on the morning of 7th to see Somerville
> getting reports of the R hit on the afternoon of 6th foundering,
> another sunk and another crippled by the night action, plus a couple
> of cruisers and half a dozen destroyers sunk or sinking while the
> dazed and confused survivors survey a scene of utter carnage and the
> recce patrols from Ceylon reporting a sea full of oil, wreckage,
> corpses, the odd burning hulk and some scattered survivors but no sign
> of the Japanese carriers despite Warspite's jubilant boasting of
> sinking two, repeat two enemy fleet carriers by close-range
> gunfire....
As she steams in her trademark lazy-8, already mentioned by at least
two other posters.
<snip to Somerville's strike potential>
>
> I agree that it would have hurt them by any credible expectation, just
> that getting in position to do that risked total annihilation.
> Somerville had one trump card that relied on getting into range and
> back out of range against a longer-reached opponent with a devastating
> daytime punch.
I fear so.
> >> and then seeing it become so
> >> devastatingly effective.
> >
> >I still beg to differ here. If S can get a couple of dozen strikers
> >into contact with the Kido Butai in the middle of the night, then
> >devastation is actually quite likely. Nothing KB can do will stop them.
>
> I agree, in that navigation, co-ordination and flying into the sea
> would be the main threat to the FAA force, and that a night engagement
> maximises their effectiveness (short dropping ranges, impossible to
> deliberately evade tropedos you can't see, etc) and minimises any
> Japanese counter-measures.
Exactly. And the Swordfish may well have time to hunt, as opposed to
just going balls-out for the first target they see. They may, as you
point out, crash into things, including the sea, but they are very
unlikely to be shot down. And those preposterous manoeuvres....
> I'm just naturally sceptical of
> prognostications of annihilating attacks: in reality just too many
> external factors intervened to dissipate effectiveness.
You're probably right. Also, those magnetic torpedoes often didn't make
a flash (this from accounts of the Mediterranean strikes from Malta).
Sometimes, you could catch a glimpse of water hurling itself up each
side of a ship. Later, it was often quite hard to find the ship again
(for obvious reasons).
> >If, I grant you. As for how complete the devastation, and Somerville's
> >own location come sunrise... still, at absolute best, you have Nagumo
> >ordering the heavy cruiser that now carries his flag to torpedo his
> >last floating carrier. Tell that to the Emperor, chum.
>
> Heh heh. I did like the idea of the IJN doing a Lexington or Saratoga
> or whatever to themselves for once.
They did just that at Midway.
> >The trundling
> >sound from the horizon is a pack of ancient British battleships, too.
>
> Thinking about it, regardless of the fate of the carriers, pride would
> demand that he stood and faced the RN battleline, confident that his
> smaller units could win a night engagement, especially after the
> reduced-strength strike on the battleships by his one operational
> carrier aircrew on 6th scored such sucess (according to the returning
> aircrew, who claim two battleships sunk and one crippled, a massive
> over-estimate for one cruiser sunk and one battleship crippled and
> limping back to Addu or Durban).
Trouble is, he might actually win just such an engagement. These Long
Lances are not to be trifled with. How many of Somerville's destroyer
skippers have got Mediterranean experience, though? Most, or at least
many of them. Yes, could be exciting. Both sides (neither completely
without reason) convinced of their night-fighting ability.
> "Nagumo-san, fires caused by the enemy land-bomber strike on Akagi
> yesterday are out of control. We have lost Hiryu to the enemy night
> attack and Shokaku is listing too far for flight operations as a
> result of the torpedo hits she sustained at the same time.
> Nevertheless, we have sunk two enemy battleships, one small aircraft
> carrier sailing independently, four cruisers and numerous smaller
> vessels. The enemy only have two battleships left to the south, one
> of which we damaged in the afternoon's airstrike. Surely we should
> close and destroy the enemy battleships tonight, when we have the
> advantage, rather than leave it until daylight tomorrow when his guns
> will out-range us?"
Banzai!
Give 'em two good broadsides and board 'em in the smoke.
BF Lake
"Peter Skelton" <skel...@cogeco.ca> wrote .
> ISTR that some ships still had the old 5/25 AA guns. Those
> installations wouldn't have leant themselves well to the blind AA
> fire modern warships were capable of by the end of the war.
Radar at Sea said "blind" was not possible in surface or AA during the
war because they didn't have a way to lock on for change of bearing. They
could spot fall of shot for range on radar alone, but if the target went
left or right they could not get back "on" without being re-directed.(by the
surface warning radar which would provide the initial detection and then
designate to the FC radar in the first place, or optical) Late in the war
the surface problem here was solved by adding a supplemental radar to the
274 surface FC big gun radar, which showed whether the target was moving off
to left or right. There was no way to do this in AA.
"Blind" has a particular meaning and does not just mean you don't need
optical for range spotting, but that you can lock on and stay on using radar
only as the target moves in all three (?) planes, IIRC.
> I don't think the USN went for radar-controlled 40mm like the
> famous installation on HMS Victorious preferring the gyro-based
> keep it pointing right at the plane type (not a bad outfit and
> much lioghter and easier to install.)
The USN had radar directed 40mm, but the radar antenna was mounted on the
separate director, not on the gun mounting like the British did with their
twin 40s. The RN used separate radar mounted directors with their
pom -poms though. The radar was to get range. Optical gyro prediction
was used for staying on target and getting the lead angle in 20mm and I
suppose in the 40s too but I am not up on gun directors etc
The USN radar assist gun director for the 40mm was apparently superior to
the 5" director for AA and the USN used a way to direct their 5" AA from the
40's director
Regards,
Barry
Dott. Piergiorgio
> Although he was
> supposed to return to Hiroshima the next day, 6 August, he stayed at
> the dockyard to supervise repairs. Again, very lucky for my friend....
*very* lucky, that he escaped the Great Slaughter #1
best, albeit slighty sad, regards from Italy.
P.s. If he was on Mogami in 1942, what he can say about the Mogami-Mikuma
collision ?
Andre Lieven
> On Mon, 03 Nov 2003 15:26:56 +0000, Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com>
> wrote:
>
>>The Battle of Addu Atoll
>
> OK, I'm kind of with Alan generally here (although as he knows, I
> think that having Somerville lose is innately more interesting) aside
> from the number of hits on the IJN. I think that of four carriers, one
Note: Kido Butai's romp in the IO in the spring of '42 brought five
IJN carriers. The PH attack force, minus Kaga, which was doing
training at home.
> sunk outright (five hits), one heavily damaged (5 kts and serious
> pumping, and may yet founder), one slightly damaged (friendly AAA),
> and one undamaged. And lose a cruiser too.
>
> All this, Somerville will find out at dawn, whereever he decides to
> go. Take off two Fulmar crews from his remaining strength.
>
> And where is Hermes in all this? Is there a chance for a feint from
> her, while the other carriers get away, to strike another night? Or
> has she already been sunk (Roskill's in a box somewhere).
>
> But why should Somerville run away after that? If he can send the KB
> to the bottom, the game is essentially over for the IJN. Surely his
> best option is to steam right for them with all his battleships? Any
> one of the Rs in range can make a mess of all the CVs. Warspite can
> probably damage both the battleships, and if they are slowed down, and
> the CVs are sunk or damaged, they will be easy meat for the remaining
> Swordfish one night.
Again, the KB IO op brought along all four Kongo class BBs...
> Meanwhile, the UK can send every submarine to the Nicobars, the
> Andamans, and the Sunda Strait. How many did Somerville have to play
> with? The nub of the matter is that the KB is only safe once it gets
> back into Singapore, which is a long way away.
>
> Can unchallenged RN mastery of the Indian Ocean do much to slow down
> the Japanese invasion of Burma? My money's on 'not too much', but
> others probably know more.
>
> Anyway, this leads to a VDI Pacific War. The popular conception of a
> UK defeat followed by a US victory will change. The USN will have less
> potential kudos to regain, but more carriers to regain it with. The
> UK's imperial ambitions in the East will be shored up by a resounding
> victory ('Pearl Harbour Avenged!')
Not to mention " Force Z Avenged! ".
> so soon after the surrender of
> Singapore. The war in the Med will be very different if Somerville can
> give his (slow but confident) BBs back to Cunningham. No need for
> Pedestal? Sooner Torch? Worse relations between Allies?
Well, it rather makes Midway a non starter..
Peter Skelton
wrote:
>
>"Peter Skelton" <skel...@cogeco.ca> wrote .
>
>> ISTR that some ships still had the old 5/25 AA guns. Those
>> installations wouldn't have leant themselves well to the blind AA
>> fire modern warships were capable of by the end of the war.
>
> Radar at Sea said "blind" was not possible in surface or AA during the
>war because they didn't have a way to lock on for change of bearing. They
>could spot fall of shot for range on radar alone, but if the target went
>left or right they could not get back "on" without being re-directed.(by the
>surface warning radar which would provide the initial detection and then
>designate to the FC radar in the first place, or optical) Late in the war
>the surface problem here was solved by adding a supplemental radar to the
>274 surface FC big gun radar, which showed whether the target was moving off
>to left or right. There was no way to do this in AA.
Interesting but there were occasions when ships (Renown, for
example) did engage aircraft through cloud cover. The risk was
IFF.
Big ships could certainly lock on for change in bearing by the
end of 1943 which was late in the war.
>"Blind" has a particular meaning and does not just mean you don't need
>optical for range spotting, but that you can lock on and stay on using radar
>only as the target moves in all three (?) planes, IIRC.
>
>> I don't think the USN went for radar-controlled 40mm like the
>> famous installation on HMS Victorious preferring the gyro-based
>> keep it pointing right at the plane type (not a bad outfit and
>> much lioghter and easier to install.)
>
>The USN had radar directed 40mm, but the radar antenna was mounted on the
>separate director, not on the gun mounting like the British did with their
>twin 40s. The RN used separate radar mounted directors with their
>pom -poms though. The radar was to get range. Optical gyro prediction
>was used for staying on target and getting the lead angle in 20mm and I
>suppose in the 40s too but I am not up on gun directors etc
The pompom system was quite early (PoW had it). By 1943 the twin
40 outfit was available and it did the pointing as well. In the
VIctorious incident I mentioned, the radar controlled pointer
took one wing of a kamakaize that was found 20 seconds (memory)
befiore impact.
>The USN radar assist gun director for the 40mm was apparently superior to
>the 5" director for AA and the USN used a way to direct their 5" AA from the
>40's director
>
Peter Skelton
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
h...@ga110n7744.freeserve.co.uk (hlg) wrote:
> and the Swordfish should have been
> relegated to convoy duties long before 1942.
The Swordfish was supposed to be replaced by the Albacore, which
entered production in 1939. The Swordfish was still in service after
the last Albacore went.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
skel...@cogeco.ca (Peter Skelton) wrote:
> Yes it did although the newness of the ship made things much
> worse.
There were still dockyard workers aboard. By the way the faults in
the 16 inch guns had largely been cured at the outset of WW2. The main
problem there was blast damage.
> Better fire control? The USN had the best fire control? On what
> do you base that?
Probably on the basis that US AA fire control was definitely superior
which is why IIRC US AA directors were fitted to Vanguard. There was
far less difference in surface fire control.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
> , then in the unmodifed turrets of the other
> RN ships with 15 inch guns.
Those ships did get newer shells and were issued with supercharge.
This extended the range beyond what was possible in WW1. They also had
any angle loading at up to the maximum 20 degree elevation. Do not
know if the Japanese 14 inch guns used a fixed elevation loading
position. While improvements to fire control were limited all British
BB had got long base range finders in the post WW1 refits.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
Hassenpflug) wrote:
> Yamaguchi launches search aircraft at night,
Were Japanese carriers equipped with any sort of night landing
equipment? US ones were not. Besides there is plenty of evidence that
aircraft navigation by day was difficult, let alone at night.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk (Paul J. Adam) wrote:
> How many guns had radar directors?
In 1942 I would say none. Japan never had a dedicated fire control
radar only a combined search and fire control for the LA director,
though that could be fitted with extra cams for AA fire control.
Japanese close range AA never got any form of radar. The first design
of Japanese radar was completed in Early 1942 NWOWW2.
ZZBunker
Why, because the word "modern" doesn't even make sense
for a Battleships. WWII BBs were a hodge-podge of technology
developed from between the 1890s and the 1930s.
Many of them had power plants so old, that's
the question what can a BB do in the open
ocean is irrelevent. Since much of WWII
naval technology has nothing to with
AA, but rather power plants and ASW. Most of
those BB's stayed in harbor, because
they would had been sunk by submarines
almost immediately if they ventured
into the open ocean alone without a carrier escort.
And also because it was only shortly after WWII
that Naval gunnery ceased to even exist
in the way WWI gunnery was conducted.
BF Lake
"Peter Skelton" <skel...@cogeco.ca> wrote in message
news:k18lqv4hvimb8usdh...@4ax.com...
>
> Interesting but there were occasions when ships (Renown, for
> example) did engage aircraft through cloud cover. The risk was
> IFF.
Engaging through clouds would be possible since they normally used barrage
firing, the radar was to get the range to put in the computing gizmo to know
when to fire to put the barrage just ahead of the planes. Shells were either
variable time fuzed to allow a series of barrages as the planes closed or
set to burst at a certain self-destruct range. Either way you need the
range to do it right. (timing would vary for range depending on
height--slant in there) Firing into clouds you would need to discover the
aircraft height somehow --can get that from your fighters who have now
broken off so can fire freely, or from rough sort of radar lobe-based
techniques--a "nodding " height finder radar in the RN only came in late war
Type 277.
>
> Big ships could certainly lock on for change in bearing by the
> end of 1943 which was late in the war.
Don't think so. Radar at Sea went into this. The surface warning radar had
to steer the FC radar on if that lost target left or right. The
supplementary radar for that to work with the 274 came in 1945, possibly
post war , Type (forget --was 9XX, and made in Canada ISTR 3cm)
> The pompom system was quite early (PoW had it). By 1943 the twin
> 40 outfit was available and it did the pointing as well.
Ok, the pom pom director radar was the 281 and PoW had it. Yagi with TX and
RX separate. This same radar ended up on top of the stabilized twin 40 in
1943ish (Hazmumble mark IV) It got range. To be able to steer the beam or
get the gun to follow the beam steering required a feedback system and I
believe the hyperbolic antenna with its horn in the middle that could whirl
around in a "cone" --the 281's two yagis couldn't do that AFAIK. This was
what the STAAG mounting had but it came out in 1946 I believe.
In the
> VIctorious incident I mentioned, the radar controlled pointer
> took one wing of a kamakaize that was found 20 seconds (memory)
> befiore impact.
Need more detail about this. "Pointing" is USN for "laying", which is
working the elevation mechanism of the gun. "Training" is both USN and RN
for moving the gun in bearing. In the twin 4" eg, the layer is the guy with
the trigger because he has the hardest job to be "on" in surface firing. In
AA fire the layer and trainer stay on as best they can each with his own
hand cranks, while the loader fires on his way past the breech after loading
by slapping a button set low on the mounting --he is bent over from loading
with the guns pointing up so the breech is low to the deck. Rate of fire
varies! If the mounting is remote powered, the director can keep the guns
"on" instead of the local layer and trainer combo .
The question at hand is whether the radar in the director can stay "on" the
line of "sight" to the plane so that feedback systems can move the radar
beam to keep it on, while also adjusting the movement of the guns wrt to the
radar beam plus the computed lead angle. Without that you cannot do AA
"blind". AFAIK, this was not achieved during the war past the test bed,
but was soon after WW2, in the GUNNAR system for the 3"/50 in the USN and in
the STAAG twin/multiple 40mm in the RN. Perhaps somebody with a Campbells
can confirm? It is also described in Radar at Sea.
Regards,
Barry
BF Lake
"BF Lake" <nos...@nospam.com> wrote
> Ok, the pom pom director radar was the 281 and PoW had it. Yagi with TX
and
> RX separate. This same radar ended up on top of the stabilized twin 40 in
> 1943ish (Hazmumble mark IV) It got range. To be able to steer the beam
or
> get the gun to follow the beam steering required a feedback system and I
> believe the hyperbolic antenna with its horn in the middle that could
whirl
> around in a "cone" --the 281's two yagis couldn't do that AFAIK. This was
> what the STAAG mounting had but it came out in 1946 I believe.
>
For 281 read 282! :(
Barry
Jack Linthicum
> "The four torpedoes fired by HM Submarine Upholder, only one of which
> appears to have reached its target, may have been the decisive moment
> of the action that has come to be called the Battle of Addu Atoll. That
> torpedo, striking Hiryu, the only undamaged Japanese carrier, in her
> stern, destroyed three out of her four screws and made it impossible
> for her to turn into the wind in the morning and launch her aircraft.
> Unfortunately, HM Submarine Upholder did not return from this
> operation."
>
>
One question: In Combined Fleet Decoded it is mentioned that Hiryu had
an "electronic detection device on board with a blind spot to the
rear". I googed a previous (soc.hwi) thread wherein this was brought
up and poo-pooed as some sort of radar detection device. I have never
heard of a radar detection device with a blind spot to the rear. John
Prados adds a footnote which cites the Hiryu's detailed battle report
No 5 (March 26-April 22, 1942) which can be found in the Naval
Operational Archives (NHC:RJN) Washington Document Center series b37,
folder "WDC 160647". This seems to contradict the above-cited thread
which had a comment from the author of a book about Japanese naval
engagements (Solomons?). The Combined Fleet Decoded chapter mentions a
Blenheim raid that, of course, attacked the Hiryu from the rear.
Peter Skelton
Linthicum) wrote:
>Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com> wrote in message news:<041120030049546790%alanl...@mac.com>...
>> "The four torpedoes fired by HM Submarine Upholder, only one of which
>> appears to have reached its target, may have been the decisive moment
>> of the action that has come to be called the Battle of Addu Atoll. That
>> torpedo, striking Hiryu, the only undamaged Japanese carrier, in her
>> stern, destroyed three out of her four screws and made it impossible
>> for her to turn into the wind in the morning and launch her aircraft.
>> Unfortunately, HM Submarine Upholder did not return from this
>> operation."
>>
>>
>
>One question: In Combined Fleet Decoded it is mentioned that Hiryu had
>an "electronic detection device on board with a blind spot to the
>rear". I googed a previous (soc.hwi) thread wherein this was brought
>up and poo-pooed as some sort of radar detection device. I have never
>heard of a radar detection device with a blind spot to the rear.
This was very common with early radars. There was a generation
that was pointed by pointing the ship.
BTW, I think the IJN had radar of a form quite early. They were
playing with 50 cm radar by 1939 and were one of the two
countries that had the cavity magnetron before the British (the
USSR was the other.) Their problem was making tuning circuits
accurate enhough.
John
>Prados adds a footnote which cites the Hiryu's detailed battle report
>No 5 (March 26-April 22, 1942) which can be found in the Naval
>Operational Archives (NHC:RJN) Washington Document Center series b37,
>folder "WDC 160647". This seems to contradict the above-cited thread
>which had a comment from the author of a book about Japanese naval
>engagements (Solomons?). The Combined Fleet Decoded chapter mentions a
>Blenheim raid that, of course, attacked the Hiryu from the rear.
Peter Skelton
Joe Osman
>
> On 6 Nov 2003 13:55:36 -0800, jackli...@earthlink.net (Jack
> Linthicum) wrote:
>
> >Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com> wrote in message news:<041120030049546790%alanl...@mac.com>...
> >> "The four torpedoes fired by HM Submarine Upholder, only one of which
> >> appears to have reached its target, may have been the decisive moment
> >> of the action that has come to be called the Battle of Addu Atoll. That
> >> torpedo, striking Hiryu, the only undamaged Japanese carrier, in her
> >> stern, destroyed three out of her four screws and made it impossible
> >> for her to turn into the wind in the morning and launch her aircraft.
> >> Unfortunately, HM Submarine Upholder did not return from this
> >> operation."
> >>
> >>
> >
> >One question: In Combined Fleet Decoded it is mentioned that Hiryu had
> >an "electronic detection device on board with a blind spot to the
> >rear". I googed a previous (soc.hwi) thread wherein this was brought
> >up and poo-pooed as some sort of radar detection device. I have never
> >heard of a radar detection device with a blind spot to the rear.
>
> This was very common with early radars. There was a generation
> that was pointed by pointing the ship.
>
> BTW, I think the IJN had radar of a form quite early. They were
> playing with 50 cm radar by 1939 and were one of the two
> countries that had the cavity magnetron before the British (the
> USSR was the other.) Their problem was making tuning circuits
> accurate enhough.
>
or the long line effect would cause the magnetron to detune.
This limited their placement on the mast structure.
> John
> >Prados adds a footnote which cites the Hiryu's detailed battle report
> >No 5 (March 26-April 22, 1942) which can be found in the Naval
> >Operational Archives (NHC:RJN) Washington Document Center series b37,
> >folder "WDC 160647". This seems to contradict the above-cited thread
> >which had a comment from the author of a book about Japanese naval
> >engagements (Solomons?). The Combined Fleet Decoded chapter mentions a
> >Blenheim raid that, of course, attacked the Hiryu from the rear.
>
> Peter Skelton
Joe
-----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =-----
http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World!
-----== Over 100,000 Newsgroups - 19 Different Servers! =-----
Alan Lothian
<nos...@nospam.com> wrote:
>
> Engaging through clouds would be possible since they normally used barrage
> firing, the radar was to get the range to put in the computing gizmo to know
> when to fire to put the barrage just ahead of the planes. Shells were either
> variable time fuzed to allow a series of barrages as the planes closed or
> set to burst at a certain self-destruct range. Either way you need the
> range to do it right.
Snipped much else. Kido Butai, with either no or rudimentary radar,
will not be shooting effectively at my Swordfish. Eat death, Nagumo!
<snipped huge amount of fascinating detail about how WWII FC systems
worked. Not a single one of them would have helped Nagumo.>
Alan Lothian
<ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote:
> In article <TxjaaEG4PLq$Ew...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk>,
> ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk (Paul J. Adam) wrote:
>
> > How many guns had radar directors?
>
> In 1942 I would say none. Japan never had a dedicated fire control
> radar only a combined search and fire control for the LA director,
> though that could be fitted with extra cams for AA fire control.
> Japanese close range AA never got any form of radar. The first design
> of Japanese radar was completed in Early 1942 NWOWW2.
So their defence against a Swordfish night attack in April, 1942, is
effectively zero. They don't even have the practice that Italian
escorts (who did bloody well) got. Just things that go seriously bang
in the night And they would almost certainly think it's an attack from
light surface forces and submarines. In my scenario, if our attackers
keep their cool ( no one is effectively shooting at them, they have
excellent torpedoes, which they can launch almost invisibly at
point-blank range, and they have the Kido Butai against the moon) will
do an extraordinary amount of harm. Note that by spring, 1942 Brit
magnetic exploders (the things that make the torpedoes go off right
under your keel) are very reliable. (At this period, only the Brits and
the Japanese have had reliable torpedoes for a while. The Germans are
just about sorted out, but the US is still a national disgrace.) Two of
these torpedoes will utterly mission kill any Japanese carrier, and
very likely sink it. One of them will cripple a cruiser. (Remember,
these mag exploders blow up *under* your ship.) Two dozen strike
aircraft, under command (difficult, that one) can wreck the Kido Butai.
As in, wreck it. We just need some way to stop the first wave putting
all their torpedoes into the same carrier. Command, again.
But think of yourself as a Brit Swordfish driver: no AAA worth a damn
(mostly, the Japanese are shooting up their own escorts), lots of time
to wander around (you are only doing about 85 knots, and you have a
fair amount of fuel) and a big nasty thing between your legs.
A Swordfish can drop these unpleasant, high-tech things 400 yards or
less from your (just changed "you") ship, stand on its wingtip, and
head off in quite another direction entirely, often a really surprising
one once it has dumped almost a ton of torpedo. *And you can't even
see it to shoot at it.* Attack helicopters, as someone said, wish I
could remember who, but I have resolutely given him credit, albeit
anonymously.
And don't imagine that even a 250-lb bomb on a Japanese flightdeck
would do no harm at all. It will go through, probably, and even if it
doesn't, it will add to the general merriment. Your flame-floaters (the
bomb carriers) will have plenty of time to drop these things in the
right place. And all you need is a little fire on your flightdeck to
attract the last of the Swordfish, wondering where to dump its torp.
Alan Lothian
<ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote:
> In article <vc93cd3...@nospam.com>, g...@nospam.com (Gernot
> Hassenpflug) wrote:
>
> > Yamaguchi launches search aircraft at night,
>
> Were Japanese carriers equipped with any sort of night landing
> equipment? US ones were not. Besides there is plenty of evidence that
> aircraft navigation by day was difficult, let alone at night.
>
Gernot's point is that the Japanese seach aircraft (by docrine,
launched from cruisers, not carriers) were trained to take off at
night, and, as he explains in his own post, reach the edge or near it
of the search circle by daylight. Japanese carrier-borne strikers and
fighers were not night-trained, and there were no night flight
operations "facilities" (sounds like loos). (Although I am sure you can
find one or two examples of people breaking the rules.) Taking off
pre-dawn light is OK, but CAPs in the middle of the night are out of
the question.
John Dallman
Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote:
> One thing that really would help here would be having the R's around
> as sacrificial goats, assuming their speed differential hadn't left
> them too far behind - they could handily disperse the Japanese
> response away from the two carriers.
Not such a great idea if morale is the fleet is poor, never mind the
promotion report.
You know, just once in thirty-some years, this is exactly the point where
the RN needs a flotilla of K-class submarines handy. Not exactly the most
comfortable craft for the tropics, but if the Japanese see four R-class
battleships coming for them, they'll understand it as a glorious suicide
and play their part. So they won't be worrying about the submarines that
were with the battleships - and are now lying doggo about 18,000 yards
closer to the Japanese.
Pure fantasy, of course.
---
John Dallman j...@cix.co.uk
"The British have achieved a reputation for fair play by only playing
dirty when they can do it so thoroughly that nobody is left to complain."
John Penta
wrote:
>After the war, he became head of the Jieitai military academy (the
>follow-on to Etajima naval academy). Lots of stories about the likes
>of Inoue Shigeyoshi, Kakuta Kakuji, Yonai Mitsumasa and others. Have
>to find time to write these things down one day!
Definitely, definitely, definitely! Oral histories are something that
I would personally consider the most valuable thing a veteran from any
side of the conflict could possibly contribute; Properly done, with
the interviewee doing their best not to leave anything out, they can
be as much or even more of a contribution to the historical record
than any memoir from a general or admiral. Even if they didn't serve
on the front lines, every bit can help, even if they just served as an
instructor at one of the training bases or something.
John
Jack Linthicum
> jackli...@earthlink.net (Jack Linthicum) writes:
>
> > Gernot Hassenpflug <g...@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<vc9isly...@nospam.com>...
> >>
> >> Yes, I know :-) I also wondered what the meaning of "until autumn
> >> 1942" meant. But no other information to go on, sadly.
>
> > Beaucracies make mistakes, it is their nature. No one ever corrects
> > a printed error in a archived copy of any official
> > document. Occasionaly someone will put a correction on with a paper
> > clip or a sticky note, but these are removed just before the
> > document is archived. Just a guess but I can believe that April
> > 1942 is meant, that the information is at least six months old at
> > that time, and this may be the first time anyone has read it all the
> > way through.
>
> I don't think so Jack. The documents were drawn up in April 1943,
> _after_ the withdrawal from Gauadalcanal. The issue here was whether
> the person writing the report had actually been on Ceylon until Autumn
> 1942, or whether that was an error (of year?).
>
Not to be difficult I did 40 some years as a US govt bureaucrat. When
did the koki calendar strat, I mean what was its first day in the
year? Showa was in December so the old holdover use of last year
doesn't apply. Is there something internal that says April 1943 and no
other time?
John Penta
wrote:
>Well, the war situation that the UK found herself in, in 1940,
>rather suggested that production of existing fighters took ptiority
>over new a/c developments...
Why not get USN a/c?
Keith Willshaw
"John Penta" <pen...@uofs.edu> wrote in message
news:6bfmqvoki3fk0slp8...@4ax.com...
They did, the RN received its first Wildcats before the USN but after
Dec 1941 for some reason the USN got first pick of the available
production :)
Keith
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
(John Dallman) wrote:
>> One thing that really would help here would be having the R's around
>> as sacrificial goats, assuming their speed differential hadn't left
>> them too far behind - they could handily disperse the Japanese
>> response away from the two carriers.
>
>Not such a great idea if morale is the fleet is poor, never mind the
>promotion report.
From what I remember from my reading on the subject, the lower ranks
of the Eastern Fleet seemed depressed and even annoyed that Ceylon was
hit, the two cruisers lost and yet they failed to make contact. Bear
in mind they didn't realise the size of the carrier taskforce the IJN
had, and were basically in blissful ignorance. Nevertheless, the
prospect of revenge for Force Z and the Java Sea was a stimulant, and
after experience in the Med (pace Warspite) most would have had
confidence in winning a night gunnery action, and, as Alan points out,
not without reasonable cause.
Personally, the battleship taskforce of the Eastern Fleet risked
annihilation against the full four carriers Nagumo had available, but
a one-and-a-half carrier strike is a different matter: dive-bombers
were the most numerous threat, but there would be a quarter of the
force available as compared to that which sunk the two cruisers and
Hermes (plus attrition from another strike on Ceylon), and there would
be some fighter protection to disrupt the attacks from the FAA carrier
CAP and possibly the RAF on Ceylon. Couple that with the increased
resiliance of battleships to dive-bombing and I can see the
dive-bombers damaging three of the ships, but not wiping the whole
force out. However, taking on the dive-bombers and escort will
seriously deplete the available British CAP resources and possibly
expose the fleet to effective torpedo attack. Even with the small
number of torpedo aircraft involved (maybe 20), some fighter cover
(attacking the dive-bombers and getting hammered by their escort),
substantive AA fire and the fleet being able to take avoiding action
in daylight, I can't see the British getting out of this without the
most damaged R class going down.
>You know, just once in thirty-some years, this is exactly the point where
>the RN needs a flotilla of K-class submarines handy. Not exactly the most
>comfortable craft for the tropics, but if the Japanese see four R-class
>battleships coming for them, they'll understand it as a glorious suicide
>and play their part. So they won't be worrying about the submarines that
>were with the battleships - and are now lying doggo about 18,000 yards
>closer to the Japanese.
>
>Pure fantasy, of course.
The subs point is a valid one, but I'm not equipped to discuss it on
the basis of my knowledge. Still, when did that stop anybody on
usenet? I have to say any sub presence will be bad news for the IJN,
especially after the first night strike at 0200 hrs on 6th April when
they are tied to covering several cripples and their ability to evade
continual spotting coverage is all but eliminated. Having Nagumo's
force run into an RN sub-screen is fun, but in my case I'd prefer an
Alan-like heroic coup de grace on Shokaku as an unknown RN sub puts
two torpedoes into her on the afternoon of 6th while the crew are
desperately counter-flooding to counter the two earlier torpedo hits
inflicted by Swordfish from Formidable and Indomitable at 0207 that
morning.
Gavin Bailey
--
"Will Boogie Down For Food".- Sign held by Disco Stu outside the unemployment office.
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
wrote:
[snip unprovoked and sickening agreement; major flogging of dead
horses/long rant about to follow]
>> I'd compromise on two carriers hit, one sunk completely, the other
>> limping away, with a couple of cruisers hit and maybe one of them
>> down.
>
>Just looked at timings. How many strike aircraft does Somerville have?
>I believe we may get in a second strike the same night; easy to find
>the target, what what all the bright sparky stuff going on. Just ten
>invisible attackers this time. Ups the risk a bit on the considerable
>side, come dawn, mind you.
The issue here is distance and timing: Somerville is 600 miles from
Ceylon and Nagumo when he raises steam on the early evening of 4th
April after receipt of the first sighting report in the late
afternoon. It's going to take him a day to get in range (5th April)
steaming ESE, a day while I'm having the Japanese expend their strike
effort at Columbo and then what they *think* is Somerville's fleet,
while fending off some poorly co-ordinated air strikes from Ceylon.
Then (sez me), Somerville finds the IJN with an Albacore which evades
the Japanese detection at 5pm, locates them on the basis of that
report with an ASV Albacore which shadows them after nightfall, and
launches a night strike sometime after 12.00am on 6th. This won't
give him enough time for two strikes and allow him to open up the
distance in the couple of hours before daylight on 6th. It's a fine
line either way, but I'll have him moving the carriers back on the
basis of the results reported by the excited and triumphant aircrews
when they return at 4am: analysing their reports and discounting some
of Formidable's inexperienced crew's understandable overclaiming, he
thinks he's taken two carriers out of commission, and can risk the
slower battleship force closing on them the next day to wipe out the
cripples on the night of 6th/7th. They'll have to risk a daylight
transit through the Japanese air threat, but he can give them some
CAP, and meanwhile Ceylon have a definite fix on the IJN taskforce and
a morale-boosting report of an FAA triumph on the night strike to
encourage them. At all costs he needs to preserve his carriers for
continuing to fix the IJN force and set another night strike at them,
which, if all goes well, should go in before the battleships close for
action later the same night.
>Another excellent suggestion. Note that the night strike should really
>circle around KB and attack from the north, the moon being where it
>was. (Moon will have set before any putative second strike, but there's
>be lots of light around unless Japanese damage control has much
>improved from OTL.)
I think the second night carrier strike (in my TL, the one taking
place at 9-10pm on 6th) would be the one to really hurt: they've all
gained experience from the first, and are on instructions not to hit
the first carrier they see, but all sections to go for independent
targets this time.
>Sounds plausible. Some of the Japanese are still convinced that
>submarines and torpedo boats were involved in Nasty Night #1. IIRC, the
>Japanese had very little concept of what radar-equipped Swordfish could
>do. (Nobody really did, except the RN and the Italians at the receiving
>end.)
The Malta (and Tobruk/Cyrenaica) FAA units had done some very useful
work on Italian convoys at night, but the sheer size and dispersal of
the KB as a target will be a problem for them. But maybe not the
second time round, where I agree it would be likely they would take
their time and not just steam in to attack the first contact.
>> I don't think they'd all go down. One stopped and crippled, maybe.
>> The rest coming north and praying for a radar-assisted night gunnery
>> action a la Matapan, while their over-confidence in a night action
>> would be matched by the IJN smaller units and their training
>> background and faith in the long lance..... This will be painful, for
>> both sides, as the British close to point-blank gunnery range through
>> a massive torpedo spread. Another R going down while Warspite and the
>> remaining R obliterate anything within range, maybe. We can have RN
>> and IJN destroyers ramming and even boarding each other in this kind
>> of situation. Pure savagery.
>
>Killick swinging cutlass: "Take that for Dorsetshire!" I can't really
>see a boarding action, mind you.
I admit I was getting carried away there. Still, I can see there
being some destroyer captains on both sides doing a Glowworm. There
is going to be more confusion and mayhem on both sides than in the
manager's dugout at Pittodrie come Saturday.
>If (a very big if) S has an accurate location, he could just about
>manage two strikes on the first night.
Agreed, but I think he'll rule it out as gambling with the carriers a
little too much. Better to risk some losses amongst the surface force
with the confidence that, backed with another night strike to attrite
the Japanese and firmly locate their major units for the battleships,
they can annihilate the Japanese in a radar-assisted night action a la
Matapan Mk2.
>The second one will fly into a
>hornet's nest, but it's hard to see how IJN night AAA is going to be
>much more effective, and if they want to fly off some Zeros, that's
>just a few less to worry about the next day. Still, if S can keep his
>distance (due to Nagumo -- or Yamaguchi, Nagumo having gone down with
>_Akagi_ -- being suckered into the Ceylon strike) this might be fun.
>"Right, lads: this time, don't all attack the same carrier."
Exactly.
>> We can even squeeze in two FAA night attacks in this scenario, on
>> 5/6th and 6th/7th, concluding with the battleships obliterating each
>> other in the wee hours of 7th as the RN close in on a crippled and
>> burning carrier or two.
>
>Ah, a Gotterdaemmerung to content anyone, even Hollywood. Need an Evil
>Brit officer somewhere, though. Ah, the wicked Somerville gives the
>beautiful Japanese pilot to the grunting, panting engine-room (Well,
>she wouldn't tell where the Kido Butai was) where she is saved from a
>fate worst then Hollywood only by the actions of the nice Irish chief
>stoker....
Don't forget the US advisors telling Somerville which end of his ship
is the stern and pulling the cowardly Brit out from his funk-hole when
the tracer starts flying. There's a Mel Gibson script in here
somewhere.
>> I'm just naturally sceptical of
>> prognostications of annihilating attacks: in reality just too many
>> external factors intervened to dissipate effectiveness.
>
>You're probably right. Also, those magnetic torpedoes often didn't make
>a flash (this from accounts of the Mediterranean strikes from Malta).
>Sometimes, you could catch a glimpse of water hurling itself up each
>side of a ship. Later, it was often quite hard to find the ship again
>(for obvious reasons).
I agree on overkill for one carrier, the first one illuminated
("Blimey, it's huge - sink the bugger! Kipper gone! Another hit! Oh
shit, there are another _four_ of the bastards!")
>> Heh heh. I did like the idea of the IJN doing a Lexington or Saratoga
>> or whatever to themselves for once.
>
>They did just that at Midway.
Indeedy. And I want vicarious revenge for Force Z. Having them put
down their own carriers should just about suffice.
>> >The trundling
>> >sound from the horizon is a pack of ancient British battleships, too.
>>
>> Thinking about it, regardless of the fate of the carriers, pride would
>> demand that he stood and faced the RN battleline, confident that his
>> smaller units could win a night engagement, especially after the
>> reduced-strength strike on the battleships by his one operational
>> carrier aircrew on 6th scored such sucess (according to the returning
>> aircrew, who claim two battleships sunk and one crippled, a massive
>> over-estimate for one cruiser sunk and one battleship crippled and
>> limping back to Addu or Durban).
>
>Trouble is, he might actually win just such an engagement. These Long
>Lances are not to be trifled with. How many of Somerville's destroyer
>skippers have got Mediterranean experience, though? Most, or at least
>many of them. Yes, could be exciting. Both sides (neither completely
>without reason) convinced of their night-fighting ability.
The Brits still have the advantage (thanks to radar) of closing to
gun-range before (hopefully) the Japanese detect them, or at least get
a handle on what they are actually facing. This should deny the IJN
the Java Sea factor of a nice long-range torpedo spread being laid out
in front of the advancing British force. Depending on the moon state
and weather, their first warning of a British surface presence *might*
be salvos from Warspite hitting home, at which time the prime Long
Lance advantage in range has been cancelled out. Even if, as I
suspect, the IJN readiness and skill is sufficient for a picket
destroyer to pick the British up visually and sound the alarm (before
being annihilated by one of the surviving R's), I still don't think
they have enough time to deliver a co-ordinated long-range torpedo
attack. And so we get a night-action where both sides unpleasantly
suprise each other with their effectiveness.
Here's my ATL version on your basis:
[Long diatribe follows]
1600 4 April - OTL - Catalina reports Nagumo's force. Ceylon
disperses shipping, Somerville (arriving back at Addu after an earlier
alarm) raises steam to take the Eastern Fleet to a position within
strike range of the IJN force operating south of Ceylon. The forces
Somerville had detatched on 2nd April to return to Ceylon (Hermes,
Dorestshire and Cornwall) sail from Columbo to rejoin the fleet,
except they do so as a unit (ATL speculation) which will have
substantive consequences the next day. Hermes' Swordfish squadron are
disembarked to China Bay as in OTL to operate from Ceylon - Hermes is
running for Addu, while their search/strike capacity was needed on
Ceylon. Harder to sink their airstrip and hangard while it's on dry
land.
5 April - Morning. While Somerville steams ESE from Addu, Nagumo's
forces hit Ceylon from an operating position to the south of the
island. The dive-bombing is disrupted by the RAF defenders as in OTL,
but they get hit hard by the Zeros escorting. The British lose 19
Hurricanes and three Swordfish, the Japanese 6 bombers and 1 Zero
(with more damaged). An Albacore from Indomitable spots Nagumo's
force for Somverville while this is going on, but is lost to the IJN
CAP before a full report is received, as in OTL.
The British launch a retaliatory strike using the Blenheims of 11 Sqn
escorted by Fulmars from 273 Sqn as the Japanese attack returns to the
carriers. In OTL, this missed, but in this ATL they blunder into the
Japanese fleet, adding some bomb-splashes around the carriers. The
IJN CAP predicatably massacres the Blenheims despite the best efforts
of the Fulmars, but the fact that most of the fighters are being
refueled and re-armed means that the RAF force escapes annihilation.
Five Blenheims and three Fulmars are lost or written off, for two
Zeroes (one to a Blenheim gunner, the other to a lucky Fulmar pilot).
This attack keeps the air threat from Ceylon in the forefront of
Nagumo's mind.
5 April - Afternoon. The second strike, scheduled to hit Ceylon
again, is diverted to attack the Hermes, which has just been spotted
120 miles to the west-north-west by a Japanese cruiser's spotting
aircraft out looking for the Eastern Fleet. Hermes in this ATL is
accompanied by Dorsetshire and Cornwall with two destroyers, reported
as a carrier and three cruisers by the spotters, and assumed to be a
sighting of Somerville's force. By 1430, devastated by a
full-strength Japanese air attack with no fighter protection, all the
vessels have been sunk, to the jubilation of the Japanese for the loss
of one more dive-bomber to AA fire. The IJN prepare one more strike
for Ceylon: another Catalina spotter is lost to the IJN CAP
meanwhile, losing contact so far as Ceylon is concerned and sparing
the remaining Blenheim and Swordfish crews from the planned afternoon
strike against Nagumo. [The key change from OTL here is to conflate
the sinking of the two cruisers with the later sinking of Hermes which
actually took place on 9th April, on the second Japanese attack on
Ceylon].
5 April - Evening. [Much of this is based on what actually happened
on the second strike, although in OTL this happened on 9th April].
The last strike on Ceylon hits Trincomalee, but the fighter defence
are slightly better handled this time, with a standing patrol of three
Hurricanes from 261 Squadron managing to bounce the escort cover,
exposing the dive-bombers to an less-hindered attack from the other
ten Hurricanes in the squadron. Sections of 30 and 258 Squadron from
Columbo arrive too late to affect the bombing, but manage to claim a
couple of damaged bombers and a further Zero for the loss of another
three Hurricanes to add to the two Zeroes and three dive-bombers
claimed by 261 in exchange for six Hurricanes. RAF pilot losses
remain low, due to losses on the gound in the first raid and
successful recovery of bailed-out pilots. Although the defences lose
28 Hurricanes in total during the day, they only lose 13 Hurricane
pilots killed or incapacitated. Late that afternoon, while the
Japanese are recovering the second strike on Ceylon and their overall
efficiency has declined slightly due to the intensive air activity
that day, another Swordfish from Somerville's fleet spots them. By
the time darkness falls an ASV-equipped Albacore is shadowing the
Japanese fleet out of visual range.
[sound of meanacing "Jaws" theme....]
5 April - Night. Nagumo now believes he has probably driven off
Somerville, wherever he might be: the only evidence of the British
fleet has been a single carrier, three cruisers and three destroyers
[numbers according to Excited Aircrew (tm)], spotted heading west from
Columbo and all sunk that afternoon. The numbers are inflated, but
Nagumo doesn't know about Addu Attol, nor does he know what strength
the RN fleet has. Or even if it exists as a fleet in a meaningful
sense. What worries him are the battleships the British are known to
have. With their carrier lost, even one of two available carriers if
the British have them, the feeble British naval aviation threat can
surely be discounted, while he needs to find the battleships. That
means drawing them within range of his aircraft, which demands further
operations against Ceylon to provide a threat for the British
battlefleet to react against.
So he decides to continue air operations the next day against Ceylon,
and remain within easy striking range south and south-east of Ceylon.
And, coincidentally, within striking distance of Somerville's
Albacores a few hours after nightfall]
6 April - 12am. With an accurate and constant fix on the IJN thanks
to his ASV shadowers, Somerville is finally in position to launch a
night-strike against the IJN. He has four Albacore squadrons
available. Retaining some for recce (and having lost two during the
day) gives him a useful strike force of about 23 Albacores (sez me).
All reach the IJN fleet after a long transit and short search.
Following Alan's outline, three ASV-equipped aircraft drop flares
while the rest attack by section of three. 20 aircraft attack in
total. Their attack is concentrated on a heavy cruiser (which takes
four hits out of six attacks, sinking within minutes), a destroyer
(hit by accident or as an alternative target), leaving nine aircraft
attacking Akagi and three, from the only section to circle and observe
the full size of the Japanese task force during the attack, who go for
Shokaku. Akagi is hit by five torpedoes (less misses and
malfunctions), and sinks within minutes, to the jubilation of the
strike pilots, while Shokaku is hit by two, one of which causes
substantial flooding after detonating under the keel with maximum
effectiveness.
I'll go with Alan's outline of the ineffectuality of the IJN defences
to close-range attack using magnetic torpedoes. The FAA lose three
aircraft from this strike, one to lucky close-range AA on a destroyer
escort. One vanishes, presumed to have flown into the sea while
maneuvering at low-level during the attack, while another crashes en
route back to the fleet after sustaining damage.
6 April - early morning. By 4am, the IJN have gathered some of their
wits. Nagumo has gone down with Akagi, while Shokaku is afloat but
with serious flooding and unable to operate aircraft or maintain
speed. One destroyer and a heavy cruiser have been sunk, while the
battleships remain unseen and undetected by the British. It takes
until daybreak before the cruiser and destroyer escort screens from
the seperate battleship and carrier groups stop intermittently firing
at each other, fortunately for the Japanese with only superficial
damage to a cruiser and destroyer, although another destroyer is hit
by what can only be a Japanese torpedo launched in error ninety
minutes after the last FAA aircraft breaks off.
Confusion still reigns, and submarine paranoia is rampant, but without
a sighting of the RN carriers at first light, the realisation that
they have been attacked by torpedo-carrying aircraft has dawned, with
the concurrent assumption that these must have come from land bases on
Ceylon. After all, the only British carrier aircraft spotted so far
were shot down over Ceylon, while the only British carrier spotted so
far has been swiftly sunk with no aircraft on deck or in the air
around it. Has the British admiral transferred his aircraft to
Ceylon, where the land airfields can withstand cumulative damage far
more effectively than they can aboard ship?
The Japanese range another dawn strike against Ceylon, egged on by the
arrival of the first of a series of spotters trying to shadow them
from Ceylon, most of which get shot down by the Japanese CAP as the
day wears on.
Somerville, meanwhile, is withdawing his carriers west as fast as he
can, while mustering the biggest CAP his limited resources will
permit. Up to two Sea Hurricanes and three Martlets are aloft at all
times, with the rest ready to be launched at five minute's notice.
Somerville has split his force at 4am, as the last Albacore was
recovered, with the battleship force steaming at full speed directly
towards the Japanese position, which they should reach by the late
afternoon. He requests fighter cover from Ceylon for the battleship
force to avoid dispersing the CAP from his carriers, but has to split
one of the two available sections to cover the battleships from the
inevitable IJN strike.
His aim is to keep his carriers within CAP range of the battleships
(maybe 80 miles behind), and rely on Ceylon to provide the daytime
strikes against the IJN. He wants to avoid expending his Albacore
force against the formidable Japanese daytime fighter defence, and
above all prevent the Japanese following a shadower or strike force
returning to his carriers to give away their position before
nightfall. His aim is to avoid exposing his carriers to a daytime
attack while covering the battleship force and remaining within range
for a second night strike after nightfall. By this point his previous
visual sighting of one carrier plus supporting vessels has grown into
something much more formidable - maybe as many as four carriers, of
which he can only be sure of sinking one, or maybe two.
At breakfast Ceylon gets hit for the third time by the Japanese, with
their usual efficiency, although meaningful targets are scarcer than
they were the day before. Some damaged merchant ships remaining
afloat at Columbo are sunk, the grass airfields accumulate more bomb
craters and more Hurricanes are lost. However, the loss of two of his
five carriers, the need to retain a larger CAP to protect against
another British torpedo bomber attack in daylight, plus the attrition
and tiredness accumulated over the previous 24 hours leads to the
British defenders avoiding the worst of the attrition they faced
previously, despite being down to only twenty-five airworthy
Hurricanes.
Five out of forty or so dive-bombers are lost, with another couple of
Zeros in exchange for four Hurricanes lost in the air and another two
on the ground. The British on Ceylon lack the resources to provide
air cover to Somerville's force, but prepare a further counter-strike
on the IJN carrier force.
6th April - Late morning, As the IJN raid is proceeding (8am), the
Japanese fleet get their first warning of the presence of the British
fleet, when the battleship force is spotted to the west. The lack of
sufficient numbers of CAP allows the Japanese to report accurately on
the composition of the force and the fact that it contains as many as
five battleships. The spotter is eventually driven off by one of the
Sea Hurricanes, which is understandably believed to be a land-based
Hurricane (this is the first-ever contact with a Sea Hurricane for the
Japanese). This leads Nagumo's successor to believe that the
numerically-reduced fighter defence of Ceylon is partially caused by a
need to cover the RN battleship fleet which is (only just) within
fighter range from Ceylon. This, plus the pulse-racing effect of the
sighting of five enemy battleships heading towards him demands an
appropriate response. Here is his chance to use his powerful and
unmatched carrier air to destroy the RN in the Indian Ocean once and
for all.
As the Ceylon strike returns, the crews are immediately briefed for an
attack on the British fleet, now less than 200 miles away and closing.
There is no time to waste. Then, as the crews on the three remaining
carriers are scrambling to prepare a mass strike on the British fleet,
the British on Ceylon lend a hand. The remaining nine airworthy
Blenheims, escorted by six Fulmars from 273 Sqn, arrive after a tardy
launch based on the most recent Catalina sighting report of the day
(this costs the British two Catalinas and a Swordfish lost during the
day).
The Zeros on CAP wade into the Fulmars, but don't get to the Blenheims
before they can bomb, and amongst the customary near-misses for once
luck takes a hand and a 250-lb bomb from one of the Blenheims hits the
deck park on Soryu, writing off a dozen aircraft and causing major
fires on the deck which spread from burning aviation fuel down into
the hanger. The Zeros are able to disperse the Fulmars for no loss,
claiming four in the process, before hacking down another four
Blenheims after they turn for home.
The IJN are now down to two operable carriers; Zuikaku and Hiryu,
while Soryu is battling major fires and Shokaku is limping back
towards Singapore. The morning strike, delayed by the Blenheim
attack, finally gets underway with less than twenty Zeros, 18 B5N's
and 18 D3A's as all that can be immediately mustered.
The CAP are about to land when the _second_ strike from Ceylon is
spotted: 18 Swordfish from 814 and 788 Sqns in two elements, escorted
by eight Fulmars from 806 and 803 Sqns, while another five from 273
Sqn who missed their RV with the Blenheims they were supposed to
escort earlier arrive at higher level and for once achieve a position
of tactical advantage on the Japanese. Depite losing two Zeros to 273
Sqn, the IJN fighters reach the British aircraft before they can get
to the carriers. The inexperienced 788 Squadron with eight Swordfish
are heavily engaged as they run in to drop their torpedoes on the
cruiser screen. One Swordfish manages an attack which misses, and the
attack is ineffective. One Zero is lost to the escorting Fulmars or a
brave TAG behind his Vickers for no fewer than six Swordfish and two
Fulmars going down, and a further badly-damaged Swordfish limping back
to crash at Columbo.
However, the massacre of 788 Sqn comes at the price of consuming the
Japanese fighter's attention while 814 Sqn with ten Swordfish attack
from a different direction on their selected targets on the other side
of the Japanese fleet; the four Kongo-class battleships. Unlike the
night attacks, the Japanese are fully warned and able to take evasive
action. One Swordfish is lost to AA fire, while three torpedo hits
are achieved; two on one battleship, one on another. The damage in
the second case is minor, but the first ship (Kongo?) sustains major
flooding and is reduced to limping along at 4 knots while desperate,
and ultimately successful efforts at damage control are made.
Having achieved a measure of revenge for the loss of their parent
ship, Hermes, 814 Sqn return to Ceylon, losing another two of their
number to the vengeful IJN Zeroes pursuing them. The Japanese fighter
pilots can't press their attacks, however, as they are needed back on
CAP given the shrinking aircraft numbers available.
The end result of all the Ceylon strikes, at a cost of no less than
ten Swordfish, four Blenheims and six Fulmars, is the Soryu and Kongo
out of action. The cumulative losses to the British have been severe,
and Ceylon is almost out of action in terms of offensive striking
resources, with only three airworthy Blenheims, five Catalinas and ten
Swordfish left. All of these will be needed for daylight
recconaisance search, while the remaining dozen Fulmars and twenty
Hurricanes are reserved for the air defence of Ceylon. The IJN are
forced to detach Kongo and three destroyers to join Shokaku limping
back to Singapore.
While this is going on, the Japanese strike force have no difficulty
finding and attacking the British battleship force. The three
Martlets on station as the only available CAP are brushed aside by the
Zeros, who shot down two for the loss of one of their own. The 18
dive bombers and 18 torpedo bombers go to work unmolested by any
British fighters.
The dispersal of effort involved, with only two carrier's-worth of
attackers taking on five battleships, some with substantive and
experienced AA defence, ends up with Royal Sovereign being the centre
of attention, being hit by five bombs and three torpedos. Warspite
shrugs of two bomb hits while Ramillies accumulates another three,
with a torpedo hit in the stern crippling one propeller shaft and
flooding some boilers. Revenge escapes almost unscathed from two bomb
hits, one of which bounces of a forward main gun turret without
exploding and another which detonates close to the funnel causing
superficial damage to the superstructure. One of the destroyer screen
is unlucky enough to attract a kamikaze strike from a damaged Japanese
aircraft, while the cruiser Enterprise is lost to a catastrophic
explosion after a single bomb hit and torpedo hit simultaneously.
Royal Sovereign falls astern, listing heavily and finally sinking
twenty-five minutes later. Most of her survivors are picked up by the
four destroyers of the following carrier escort screen when they
arrive on the scene three hours later. There are no survivors from
Enterprise, and Ramillies is forced to turn back for Addu with
substantial flooding and a heavy list to the stern after the fires
below deck have been extinguished. This will have substantive
repercussions later in the day.
This leaves the battleship force of Warspite, the two remaining R's,
with two cruisers and six destroyers ploughing ahead towards the IJN.
The Japanese losses are relatively low for the dive-bombers (one lost
to AA), with one Zero lost to the Martlets. The torpedo bombers fare
less well, despite registering at least five hits, and losing six
aircraft, all to AA fire, in the process.
The IJN strike force return to their two remaining carriers by noon.
The crew of Soryu are losing the fight against the internal fires, and
by 1pm ammunition, including torpedo warheads, has begun to detonate
inside the ship's structure. By 2pm the decision has been made to
abandon ship after a series of internal explosions bring her to a
stop, and by 3pm the carrier is heeling over after being torpedoed by
a Japanese cruiser. Scratch one more flat-top.
However, the imminent loss of Soryu can be balanced against the
reports of his pilots from the morning strike: five enemy battleships
spotted, while at least three have been seriously damaged or
destroyed. The explosion of Enterprise is mistaken for the loss of
one of the British battleships, while another two are claimed sunk by
the torpedo bomber pilots. This may mean the British only have 2
battleships left, to face his three. There has been no sign of any
British carriers, while the worst damage inflicted today has
apparently come from the British forces on Ceylon. On balance, he
decides, he needs to eliminate the British air threat from Ceylon,
while he can risk a night action against the remaining British fleet,
confident in the training his surface forces have for night actions
and the advantage offered by their Long Lance torpedoes. At all costs
he wants to avoid a morning battle with his ships against the rising
sun facing the British with longer-ranged guns.
But first there is time for another strike on the British fleet before
dealing with Ceylon and nightfall. The report of one of the pilot's
from the morning raid distrubs him: apparently some unidentified
ships were spotted far behind the British battleships? There are no
further sighting reports, except a constant stream of position reports
from the cruiser's spotter aircraft on station over the British ships,
at least until the remaining spotter is shot down by the next CAP
patrol of two Sea Hurricanes from Indomitable.
The second airstrike takes place in the early afternoon, less than
four hours later, and is proceeded by a search pattern to the west.
The British battleships are quickly spotted, still ploughing on at 20
knots towards the Japanese fleet, and about sixty-seventy miles behind
them another two ships are spotted. These are assumed to be the ships
reported by the first raid, but in fact are Ramillies and an escorting
destroyer, detached from the British carrier screen, limping back to
Addu and towards the British carriers.
The second Japanese attack is less successful than the first: the
numbers involved are lower (only 16 dive bombers and ten torpedo
bombers), and the force is split between the advancing task force and
Ramillies.
In the main force, Revenge takes a bomb hit which puts one of the
after main gun turrets out of action, but otherwise the only other
bomb hit of significance wrecks the bridge of the Tromp and causes
substantial casualties. The Sea Hurricane CAP over the main force
manage to claim two of the ten dive bombers before being driven off
with the loss of one of their number. The four torpedo bombers who
attack the main force score no hits, and lose two of their number to A
fire in the process.
Unable to take any meaningful evanding action, Ramillies takes two
torpedo and four bomb hits from the six torpedo and eight dive bombers
who attack her. Major fires are started in the secondary armament
magazines and the ship swifly heels over. None of her attackers are
lost until the section of Martlets en route to relieve the CAP over
the main force bounce the dive bombers as they leave the sinking shape
of Ramillies. Fortunately, they manage to shoot down two of them,
including the only one pilot of the second wave attackers to spot
anything to the west of the British battleship force. This is the
only spotting of the British carrier force - about thirty miles from
Ramillies - by the Japanese throughout the whole battle. Nonetheless,
the carriers remained unidentified, and with the return of the second
strike on the battleships, the Japanese commander believes his forces
have found and sunk a battleship in a position where it must have been
the origin of the reported unidentified vessels behind the British
main fleet..... Thus the British avoid the last possible chance the
Japanese have of spotting and striking their carriers before
nightfall.
[Cue "Jaws" theme again.]
There is still time for one more strike during daylight on the 6th,
however, and the tired Japanese aircrews, in much reduced numbers,
return to pounding the RAF airfields. With a clear idea of the
location of the Japanese fleet, and the attacks on the Eastern Fleet
battleships, the RAF are better positioned to defend themselves. The
Japanese muster thirty dive-bombers and about a dozen Zeros. The RAF
scramble nineteen Hurricanes, and for once have sufficient relative
force to engage the escorts with one flight and the bombers with the
rest. Only two Hurricanes go down, for two zeros and two dive
bombers. The Japanese bombing remains concenrated and effective, and
the two main British strips at Columbo are rendered inoperative, with
several damaged aircraft written off on the ground and substantive
damage to hangers and fuel stocks.
The Japanese aircrews return to Hiryu and Zuikaku in the evening, as
the remaining Japanese carriers turn eastwards and away from the
oncoming British fleet. Within minutes of darkness falling, the
British Albacore shadowers from the Eastern Fleet have returned, and
the Japanese battleship force, which is heading west to engage the
presumed shattered remnants of the Eastern Fleet, now within twenty
miles, has started to appear on the radars of the British forces. As
the British ships swing out to cross the T of the oncoming Japanese
line, the remaining 19 Albacores pass over them at 6,000 feet en route
to the Japanese carriers, while an alert lookout on a Japanese
destroyer squints harder through his binoculars at what might be
warship masts and aerials emerging against the horizon of the night
sky.....
Anybody want to take on the second strike and the surface action? I
need a cup of tea and a lie-down.
Gavin Bailey4
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised <Gavin.Bailey...@blueyonder.co.uk> wrote:
>
>Anybody want to take on the second strike and the surface action? I
>need a cup of tea and a lie-down.
I'm not suprised after that effort. Bravo Zulu, and roll on the second
strike..
--
Andy Breen ~ Solar Physics Group, UW Aberystwyth
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
Silliness is the last refuge of the doomed: P. Opus
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven) wrote:
> Again, the KB IO op brought along all four Kongo class BBs...
Still with the original belt armour, 8-3 inches and a maximum deck
armour of 4.7 inches over magazines and 3.2 over machinery. Warspite
had 5 inches over the magazines and 3.5 inches over machinery. Not
sure what the R class had at the time.
John Penta
Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote:
>There is still time for one more strike during daylight on the 6th,
>however, and the tired Japanese aircrews, in much reduced numbers,
>return to pounding the RAF airfields. With a clear idea of the
>location of the Japanese fleet, and the attacks on the Eastern Fleet
>battleships, the RAF are better positioned to defend themselves. The
>Japanese muster thirty dive-bombers and about a dozen Zeros. The RAF
>scramble nineteen Hurricanes, and for once have sufficient relative
>force to engage the escorts with one flight and the bombers with the
>rest. Only two Hurricanes go down, for two zeros and two dive
>bombers. The Japanese bombing remains concenrated and effective, and
>the two main British strips at Columbo are rendered inoperative, with
>several damaged aircraft written off on the ground and substantive
>damage to hangers and fuel stocks.
This is the one point where I, an uninformed amateur and a total
newbie to alt-history stuff, have to blink.
The IJN aircrews have done how many sorties today? 2, maybe 3, each
lasting (all told) 3-4 hours of flight time (and let's tack on 30m at
each end for brief/debrief, preflight/postflight, and hopefully the
ability to do stuff like eat and such, just for argument's sake)?
While I've no personal experience, I can't imagine that combat flying
is anything but physically draining; Adrenaline will help, but they're
going to come down from that sooner or later, and chances are it'll be
during that last mission. I would either spike up the losses or at
least reduce their effectiveness. Yes, the Brits are probably in an
equal position, but on Ceylon at least the aircrews have probably had
at least a little more time to rest, feed themselves between sorties,
etc.
John
Errol Cavit
this in SHWI, there are several good posts on SMN only - Google is your
friend. e.g.
http://groups.google.com/groups?as_umsgid=%3C3faba31...@News.CIS.DFN.DE
"BF Lake" <nos...@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:QBaqb.17851$6A4.13465@edtnps84...
>
> "Peter Skelton" <skel...@cogeco.ca> wrote in message
> news:vnpgqvke7v9j9otg5...@4ax.com...
> > >I thought that the first radar installations - transmitter on
> > >one wing, receiver on the other (can't remember which way around
> > >it was) and using metre wavelengths did allow a torpedo to be carried
> > >and that it was the later centimetric wave antenna which sat
> > >between the undercarriage legs.
> >
> > You are correct about the antenna positions but, in early
> > operations, the radar-equiped planes dropped flares, not
> > torpedoes. ISTR thtat that was partly due to some obstruction.
> > THere was some mesing around with the crew too, I'm confused.
>
<snip>>
> In the ASW version the telegraphist in back was made the radar operator
too
> ISTR
>
> I don't see why the older antennae would interfere with the torpedo
mission.
> Didn't all planes attacking BISMARCK drop and they had radar? Flare
> dropping occurred at Taranto, but ISTR none of those planes had radar.
>
Some relevent quotes from "Bring Back my Stringbag" by Lord Kilbracken,
1979 - note that this was NOT referring to fleet carrier service so some
details may differ from the scenario under discussion.
[while preparing for service in the escort carrier HMS ARCHER in Nov 1941]
" The Swordfish carried a regular crew of 3, so Bertie and I were joined
by Leading Airman 'Tommy' Thomas, laughably known as a Telegraphist Air
Gunner, or TAG for short. Laughably because we didn't have any guns. It had
finally been conceded that there were virtually no circumstances in which a
bumbling biplane, with less than half the speed of any likely hostile
aircraft, could ever bring our machine-guns to bear. So out they came. We
recognised the logic of this reasoning and later felt no resentment at going
into action with no defensive armament at all. It reduced our load and it
gave our air gunner (as the TAG was none the less still usually known)
freedom to give his whole attention to the wireless.
Our observers, on the other hand, had a new toy to play with. We were
one of the first squadrons in the Navy to be equipped with the latest ASV,
as airborne radar was known. A primitive version had been in use since May
1941. It was capable of detecting a large vessel on the surface at a maximum
range of 25 miles, and could also be used to locate and identify a
coastline. The range varied widely with the size of the target and the skill
of the operator: it was hard to pick up a submarine at more than four or
five miles."
...[training at RNAS Machrihanish]...
Torpedo attacks against target vessels in the Clyde, depth charges galore on
dummy U-boats, army co-op exercises over Ayrshire, ASV practices. By day or
night they all came alike to us.
[transferred to Coastal Command for night shipping strike and minelaying in
August 1942 as ARCHER _still_ not ready]
"We hadn't any guns and the observer could do the telegraphy as well as the
navigation. So Bertie Ingram was to move into the aftermost cockpit,
hitherto occupied by Tommy Thomas, and his own would be filled with a second
petrol tank, holding 69 gallons. This would increase our range by nearly
50%.
Several problems arose from this clever arrangement, which however did
not become fully apparent till we flew with a full load for the first time.
And this, unbelievably, was not until we hopefully set forth on our first
operational flight. [69 gallons weighs more than TAG, _and_ is aft of centre
of gravity, giving severe taildown attitude]. Next little drawback: the ASV
screen was irremovably located in the observer's cockpit and could therefore
no longer be used. Out went our one modern piece of equipment; we were back
to sharp eyesight and dead reckoning. A relatively minor worry was that the
pilot would now at all times be totally surrounded by high-octane aviation
fuel [2nd cockpit and upper mainplane]
...Brian with his DSO ribbon was one of the few survivors of that suicidal
attack by Eugene Esmonde's squadron on the S&G only a few months earlier.
Elegant and suave, he still had 18 bits of shrapnel in his back, which the
doctors preferred to leave there, and a newly acquired stammer, but was
already thought fit to return to action."
--
Errol Cavit | errol...@hotmail.com
"I completely took it for granted that my life would continue, no matter how
many might perish around me. So long as this absurd fallacy remained firmly
fixed in my mind, I was a pretty damned good pilot."
Lord Kilbracken, _Bring Back my Stringbag_
Alan Lothian
> On Thu, 06 Nov 2003 17:33:35 +0000, Alan Lothian <alanl...@mac.com>
> wrote:
>
> [snip unprovoked and sickening agreement; major flogging of dead
> horses/long rant about to follow]
Quite. Sort of thing that gives UseNet a bad name.
<huge snip of fascinating, entertaining and outrageously
well-researched material. An absolute delight to read>
> Anybody want to take on the second strike and the surface action? I
> need a cup of tea and a lie-down.
Pour yourself something stronger. I'll rise to the challenge (Good
Lord, I actually started it) but I will need a day or two to plough
through references.
Wonderful, wonderful stuff, Gavin. But don't let it go to your head:
they'll think nae mair o' ye in Torrie.
Somerville is going to end up either the highest peer of the realm
or....