Utility of medium navy
KDR
medium-sized ocean-going navy is that it can be offered to larger
navies as a valuable partner; then the larger navies may come to
defend you when you face invasion from your enemy in future.
How true is this? Can anyone give examples that support "I help you on
this, so you help me on that" from recent - 20th & 21st centuries -
history?
How much impact did the Dutch Navy's contribution have on decision
making of the RN or USN during WW2? What about the RAN's or RCN's
case?
Brian Allardice
huma...@hanmail.net says...
What put an end to the U-boats was air cover... we fought the good fight and
here's tae us, but it was the Liberator and radar &c that did for old Jerry.
Here's to the RCN, but, really, the war was won by the Stormovik and the T-34
Our big problem now is sneaky Spanish fishing boats....
Cheers,
dba
Arved Sandstrom
news:lreda.240657$na.12...@news2.calgary.shaw.ca...[ SNIP ]
> What put an end to the U-boats was air cover... we fought the good fight
and
> here's tae us, but it was the Liberator and radar &c that did for old
Jerry.
I would also add the _major_ fact that the Germans were not aware of the
extent to which their U-boat signals were being monitored, in at least two
ways - straight deciphering (Enigma decodes) and RDF. The boats that were
being developed at the end of the war indicate that the Germans finally got
a clue, but it was too little too late. And I'm not referring to just the
development of a snorkel, but anti-radar coatings, true subs with propulsion
systems to keep them down, and radar detection.
> Here's to the RCN, but, really, the war was won by the Stormovik and the
T-34
That's debatable. The RAF battered the Luftwaffe before Russia ever got into
the war, and gave the fighters a bit of a shock, and altered their mindset.
Convoys to Russia subsequently delivered tens of thousands of trucks and
other vehicles, combat airplanes, food, and basically much of the logistics
needed to sustain an army. Although the Russians hate to admit it.
In fact it was Britain that won that war by maintaining several fronts -
number one, just by the reason of its own survival, but also because of
North Africa. It forced Germany to maintain top-grade units in areas that
were not useful to the defeat of its main enemy - Russia.
> Our big problem now is sneaky Spanish fishing boats....
Well, you need to do what us Canadians did in the "Turbot War", and send out
warships and give them a clue. As I understand it, our subs (Oberons at the
time; now it's changed, of course) were also involved in fisheries patrol.
And there is nothing like a sub surfacing next to a trawler to put their
wind up. :-)
AHS
Brian Allardice
says...
>
>I would also add the _major_ fact that the Germans were not aware of the
>extent to which their U-boat signals were being monitored, in at least two
>ways - straight deciphering (Enigma decodes) and RDF. The boats that were
>being developed at the end of the war indicate that the Germans finally got
>a clue, but it was too little too late. And I'm not referring to just the
>development of a snorkel, but anti-radar coatings, true subs with propulsion
>systems to keep them down, and radar detection.
Lucky for us just a bit too late... I know the snorkel and the hydrogen
peroxide, but of the stealth coatings tell me more.....
>> Our big problem now is sneaky Spanish fishing boats....
>
>Well, you need to do what us Canadians did in the "Turbot War", and send out
>warships and give them a clue. As I understand it, our subs (Oberons at the
>time; now it's changed, of course) were also involved in fisheries patrol.
>And there is nothing like a sub surfacing next to a trawler to put their
>wind up. :-)
I've heard the same.... but is this cost effective :-)
Arhhhh... hand over them thar cod......
Cheers,
dba
Jack Love
The truck number IIRC was something like 400000. Delivered through
Iran. And Stalin did admit it -once-.
>In fact it was Britain that won that war by maintaining several fronts -
>number one, just by the reason of its own survival, but also because of
>North Africa. It forced Germany to maintain top-grade units in areas that
>were not useful to the defeat of its main enemy - Russia.
The Afrika Corps was puny by comparison with anything going on in the
eastern front. Not that the campaign didn't contribute...but as a
major military factor, I don' think so. The diplomatic effect of
keeping Turkey out of the war on the German side WAS probably quite
worth it. The alternative of rolling over and losing the entire
Middle East certainly wasn't very palatable...even though (naval
content) the 'round the Horn route was feasible and used.
Jack Linthicum
> "Brian Allardice" <d...@uniserve.com> wrote in message
> news:lreda.240657$na.12...@news2.calgary.shaw.ca...
> > In article <5de75844.03031...@posting.google.com>,
> > huma...@hanmail.net says...
> > >
> [ SNIP ]
> > What put an end to the U-boats was air cover... we fought the good fight
> and
> > here's tae us, but it was the Liberator and radar &c that did for old
> Jerry.
>
> I would also add the _major_ fact that the Germans were not aware of the
> extent to which their U-boat signals were being monitored, in at least two
> ways - straight deciphering (Enigma decodes) and RDF. The boats that were
> being developed at the end of the war indicate that the Germans finally got
> a clue, but it was too little too late. And I'm not referring to just the
> development of a snorkel, but anti-radar coatings, true subs with propulsion
> systems to keep them down, and radar detection.
>
probably within the bomb/depth charge pattern. The anti-radar coatings
had the wartime problem of insufficient quality control--they peeled
off.
> > Here's to the RCN, but, really, the war was won by the Stormovik and the
> T-34
>
> That's debatable. The RAF battered the Luftwaffe before Russia ever got into
> the war, and gave the fighters a bit of a shock, and altered their mindset.
> Convoys to Russia subsequently delivered tens of thousands of trucks and
> other vehicles, combat airplanes, food, and basically much of the logistics
> needed to sustain an army. Although the Russians hate to admit it.
>
> In fact it was Britain that won that war by maintaining several fronts -
> number one, just by the reason of its own survival, but also because of
> North Africa. It forced Germany to maintain top-grade units in areas that
> were not useful to the defeat of its main enemy - Russia.
If the Germans could have avoided having the Italians as allies the
North Africa drain would never have occured.
>
> > Our big problem now is sneaky Spanish fishing boats....
>
> Well, you need to do what us Canadians did in the "Turbot War", and send out
> warships and give them a clue. As I understand it, our subs (Oberons at the
> time; now it's changed, of course) were also involved in fisheries patrol.
> And there is nothing like a sub surfacing next to a trawler to put their
> wind up. :-)
>
> AHS
Go up to Newfoundland and deliver that set of lines to the boys on the
docks with the idle boats. Fishing boats pooey, it was the factory
ships from hell that were the problem.
Arved Sandstrom
> In article <iQeda.31169$cB3.1...@nnrp1.uunet.ca>,
asand...@accesswave.ca
> says...
> >
> >I would also add the _major_ fact that the Germans were not aware of the
> >extent to which their U-boat signals were being monitored, in at least
two
> >ways - straight deciphering (Enigma decodes) and RDF. The boats that were
> >being developed at the end of the war indicate that the Germans finally
got
> >a clue, but it was too little too late. And I'm not referring to just the
> >development of a snorkel, but anti-radar coatings, true subs with
propulsion
> >systems to keep them down, and radar detection.
>
> Lucky for us just a bit too late... I know the snorkel and the hydrogen
> peroxide, but of the stealth coatings tell me more.....
Well, I am no expert on this, just an enthusiast. But as I understand it,
the Germans realised soon enough that radar was being used to detect the
boats. This is after the Allies began relying on RDF of U-boat signals, and
Enigma, to establish general locations. So the Walther was a response, which
did come too late.
I believe this site
(http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Bunker/3351/germweps/elektro.html) is not
that inaccurate as to details. The stealth features would have been
rubbercoating on the snorkel, as mentioned on that page.
AHS
Arved Sandstrom
news:te4b7vkco3ebnml9u...@4ax.com...[ SNIP ]
> >In fact it was Britain that won that war by maintaining several fronts -
> >number one, just by the reason of its own survival, but also because of
> >North Africa. It forced Germany to maintain top-grade units in areas that
> >were not useful to the defeat of its main enemy - Russia.
>
> The Afrika Corps was puny by comparison with anything going on in the
> eastern front. Not that the campaign didn't contribute...but as a
> major military factor, I don' think so. The diplomatic effect of
> keeping Turkey out of the war on the German side WAS probably quite
> worth it. The alternative of rolling over and losing the entire
> Middle East certainly wasn't very palatable...even though (naval
> content) the 'round the Horn route was feasible and used.
The Afrika Korps itself was not large, I agree, although I'd suggest that
the effort of keeping it supplied was not _puny_.
I'm thinking more of the German requirement to garrison and occupy, and
protect borders of their empire. In fact, when I mentioned North Africa, I
did not think of the Afrika Korps, but of the fact that it (North Africa)
was a jumping-off point for an invasion of Europe - which in fact happened
in several major locations - and hence guided German thinking as to
deployment of significant amounts of men and materiel in mainland Europe.
The presence of the British "natural aircraft carrier", and their success at
establishing secondary fronts, was important to keeping German units off the
Eastern Front.
The requirement to garrisoning _France_ was disproportionate to the size of
that country; we already know historically that they collaborated
enthusiastically. So the Germans mostly had to be there in _substantial_
strength because of the proximity of Britain and North Africa. But
garrisoning requirements in countries like Norway and Yugoslavia were also
substantial - you know how many divisions were in Norway, and you know how
many German divisions were tied down in Yugoslavia. And I'd suggest that all
of this could be tied to the existence of a resilient and defiant Britain.
The Russians like to maintain that they won WW II. But they threw mass into
it. The Americans like to maintain that _they_ won WW II. But they also came
in late, and used mass. I respectfully suggest that it was Britain and the
Commonwealth that won WW II. Because of strategic thinking.
AHS
Joachim Schmid
>
> I know the snorkel and the hydrogen
> peroxide, but of the stealth coatings tell me more.....
The snorkel heads of types XXI and XXIII were covered with a foam
material which should absorb radar rays. Also some boats of type VII C
and several of type XXIII got their hulls covered with a synthetic
rubber material to absorb sonar. This material was called "Alberich"
(after the Nibelung dwarf with the magic hat which made the wearer
invisible) and the Germans had so high hopes in it, that they even
accepted high costs and disturbances in U-boat production to become it
applied.
Regards
Joachim
Arved Sandstrom
news:7164002b.03031...@posting.google.com...
> "Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote in message
news:<iQeda.31169$cB3.1...@nnrp1.uunet.ca>...
> > Well, you need to do what us Canadians did in the "Turbot War", and send
out
> > warships and give them a clue. As I understand it, our subs (Oberons at
the
> > time; now it's changed, of course) were also involved in fisheries
patrol.
> > And there is nothing like a sub surfacing next to a trawler to put their
> > wind up. :-)
>
> docks with the idle boats. Fishing boats pooey, it was the factory
> ships from hell that were the problem.
Well, I've been on the Rock, and I live in Nova Scotia. I know _exactly_
what you are talking about, and in fact, I agree. It's an ongoing problem.
When we had the longliners operated by small family concerns, then things
were OK, but since the huge trawlers and factory ships, the seabed is
getting raped. It's not just the Spanish or Russians, it's also the
Canadians themselves - the politically powerful locals basically control DFO
(Department of Fisheries and Oceans).
AHS
Arved Sandstrom
news:3E75CF3F...@fh-duesseldorf.de...
OK, this is really interesting. And I should start by saying that I should
not have said Walther earlier, because that class was an experimental leadup
to the types you mention.
I actually thought the snorkel covering was the synthetic rubber. To be
honest, I had no idea how it would affect radar. :-) It does make much more
sense that it would be anti-sonar and on the hull.
So what was the nature of the foam on the snorkels?
Arved Sandstrom
Peter McLelland
> "Jack Love" <jackx...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
> news:te4b7vkco3ebnml9u...@4ax.com...
> > On Mon, 17 Mar 2003 03:30:13 -0400, "Arved Sandstrom"
> > <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote:
> >
> [ SNIP ]
> > >In fact it was Britain that won that war by maintaining several
fronts -
> > >number one, just by the reason of its own survival, but also because of
> > >North Africa. It forced Germany to maintain top-grade units in areas
that
> > >were not useful to the defeat of its main enemy - Russia.
> >
> > The Afrika Corps was puny by comparison with anything going on in the
> > eastern front. Not that the campaign didn't contribute...but as a
> > major military factor, I don' think so. The diplomatic effect of
> > keeping Turkey out of the war on the German side WAS probably quite
> > worth it. The alternative of rolling over and losing the entire
> > Middle East certainly wasn't very palatable...even though (naval
> > content) the 'round the Horn route was feasible and used.
>
> The Afrika Korps itself was not large, I agree, although I'd suggest that
> the effort of keeping it supplied was not _puny_.
The Africa Corps certainly consumed far more than it's fair share of
supplies, due to the effectiveness of the submarine blockade from Malta.
>
> I'm thinking more of the German requirement to garrison and occupy, and
> protect borders of their empire. In fact, when I mentioned North Africa, I
> did not think of the Afrika Korps, but of the fact that it (North Africa)
> was a jumping-off point for an invasion of Europe - which in fact happened
> in several major locations - and hence guided German thinking as to
> deployment of significant amounts of men and materiel in mainland Europe.
> The presence of the British "natural aircraft carrier", and their success
at
> establishing secondary fronts, was important to keeping German units off
the
> Eastern Front.
There was also the impact on the Germans plans for Russia of the need to
support the Italians in Greece and the Balkans, and the subsequent need to
maintain and supply the forces there.
>
> The requirement to garrisoning _France_ was disproportionate to the size
of
> that country; we already know historically that they collaborated
> enthusiastically. So the Germans mostly had to be there in _substantial_
> strength because of the proximity of Britain and North Africa. But
> garrisoning requirements in countries like Norway and Yugoslavia were also
> substantial - you know how many divisions were in Norway, and you know how
> many German divisions were tied down in Yugoslavia. And I'd suggest that
all
> of this could be tied to the existence of a resilient and defiant Britain.
And the fact that the UK supplied all those who were prepared to fight the
Germans. All of the partisam forces in Europe were supplied out of te UK and
this did as you rightly suggest require Germany to maintain far greater
force levels in occupied Europe that it otherwise might have done.
>
> The Russians like to maintain that they won WW II. But they threw mass
into
> it. The Americans like to maintain that _they_ won WW II. But they also
came
> in late, and used mass. I respectfully suggest that it was Britain and the
> Commonwealth that won WW II. Because of strategic thinking.
>
I am quite sure that if the UK had fallen in 1940, or accepted the peace
terms that Hitler offered then the USSR would have probably fallen, if
nothing else the release of the air fleet which was both attacking the UK
and defending against the RAF would have made a considerable difference
before the troops and supplies released to the eastern front are considered.
Whether or not the UK could have bled Germany to death without US help is
debateable, especially with the Japanese threat to the Empire in the East.
Perhaps if the Japanese threat had receded India may have provided the
manpower to invade Europe at some time, perhaps by 1950.
peter
Joachim Schmid
>
> So what was the nature of the foam on the snorkels?
The cover on the snorkel heads was made of a synthetic rubber foam
(Buna). I do not know if it really served its purpose, but the Germans
relied on it.
Joachim
BF Lake
"KDR" <huma...@hanmail.net> wrote in message
news:5de75844.03031...@posting.google.com...
> One of the most often cited reasons given to justify a case for a
> medium-sized ocean-going navy is that it can be offered to larger
> navies as a valuable partner; then the larger navies may come to
> defend you when you face invasion from your enemy in future.
>
> How true is this? Can anyone give examples that support "I help you on
> this, so you help me on that" from recent - 20th & 21st centuries -
> history?
Check out the history of the RCN and RAN. The London conferences of the
Imperial Defence Committee 1890s (whatever) went into all this as to how
"local navies" could fit into the world-wide RN. The RCN was to have
common everything with the RN so personnel could train with the RN, serve in
RN ships as well as RCN ships, and RN specialists could train RCN personnel
in Canada no probs. The formation of local task groups eg around the
battle cruiser AUSTRALIA in Oz would allow that task group with its cruisers
and destroyers to link up with any RN fleet, and so on.
Regards,
Barry
Lance Kopplin
That's oversimplified a great deal. Without the RCN, the Battle of the
Atlantic might have been lost. And there's your war...
Lance
Andy Dingley
>
> I know the snorkel and the hydrogen
> peroxide, but of the stealth coatings tell me more.....
There was also a low-IR paint, made of (AFAIR) glass beads in a layer
of grey paint over a darker undercoat. Totally pointless, with
hindsight, but the Germans were convinced that the British were
developing IR detectors.
Ogden Johnson III
>One of the most often cited reasons given to justify a case for a
>medium-sized ocean-going navy is that it can be offered to larger
>navies as a valuable partner; then the larger navies may come to
>defend you when you face invasion from your enemy in future.
>
>How true is this? Can anyone give examples that support "I help you on
>this, so you help me on that" from recent - 20th & 21st centuries -
>history?
However true it might have been in the past, I suspect the current
contretemps over Iraq may render the concept moot in the future.
OJ III
Tom Schoene
> medium-sized ocean-going navy is that it can be offered to larger
> navies as a valuable partner; then the larger navies may come to
> defend you when you face invasion from your enemy in future.
>
> How true is this? Can anyone give examples that support "I help you on
> this, so you help me on that" from recent - 20th & 21st centuries -
> history?
I doubt you will find such a direct quid pro quo relationship very often.
The more typical relation ship is that a significant investment in you own
defense shows that you are serious and makes the US more willing to commit
its own resources. Japan would be the classic example of this. The JMSDF
represents the archetypal medium navy, and was built largely as proof that
Japan would fight against the Soviets and that the US could invest its own
fleet to that region as well with some expectation that it would be
reinforced by Japan.
Today, the relationship is more subtle. Nations with the resources to
muster a significant Navy seldom face a real threat of territorial invasion
by an opponent (even the Republic of Korea is reasonably secure in this,
IMO). What a respectable Navy does is give a nation the ability to
participate in overseas peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations. That
means that the political leaders will then be entitled to a seat at the
table when such issues are discussed.
--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)
Jack Linthicum
sells a lot of black shoes too.
KDR
is more of a special case than most countries.
Is there any other example, between countries that have no historical,
blood, language and institutional ties? I wonder whether or not the
Dutch had any tacit understanding or whatever with the British about
the defence of Indonesia against the Japanese in the 1920's and
1930's...?
Cheers,
"BF Lake" <nos...@nospam.com> wrote...
> "KDR" <huma...@hanmail.net> wrote...
BF Lake
> I think the relationship between the RN and other Commonwealth navies
> is more of a special case than most countries.
>
> Is there any other example, between countries that have no historical,
> blood, language and institutional ties? I wonder whether or not the
> Dutch had any tacit understanding or whatever with the British about
> the defence of Indonesia against the Japanese in the 1920's and
> 1930's...?
Not so the navies would notice. That is what was wrong with ABDAFlot in
1942--no common anything. Thus NATO common signal book and manoeuvring
procedures. NATO ideally is what you are talking about, where any ship can
work with any others of any member country. Perhaps the Warsaw Pact navies
too?
Regards,
Barry
Sydney Guy
> "KDR" <huma...@hanmail.net> wrote in message
> news:5de75844.03031...@posting.google.com...
> > One of the most often cited reasons given to justify a case for a
> > medium-sized ocean-going navy is that it can be offered to larger
> > navies as a valuable partner; then the larger navies may come to
> > defend you when you face invasion from your enemy in future.
> >
Cited where? in 30+ years of reading military history & defence
strategy I've yet to come across this gem of wisdom. OTOH it has been
claimed that Australia's support of Britain in 2 world wars and of the
US in Korea & Vietnam were "downpayments on the insurance policy", as
you suggest. Personally, I'm not convinced. In all 4 situations, a
very good case can be made that the actions were in Australia's
strategic interest. And Australia's experience with both Britain & the
US suggests that future support from a great power cannot be relied
on.
Medium powers maintain armed forces to give themselves a degree of
independence in their defence and enable them to defend themselves in
situations short of a direct confrontation with a great power eg a
conflict with another medium power.
> > How true is this? Can anyone give examples that support "I help you on
> > this, so you help me on that" from recent - 20th & 21st centuries -
> > history?
>
I think you'd be hardpressed to find any such examples. Nations,
particularly superpowers, generally have selective amnesia when it
comes to repaying debts for past support.
> Check out the history of the RCN and RAN. The London conferences of the
> Imperial Defence Committee 1890s (whatever) went into all this as to how
> "local navies" could fit into the world-wide RN. The RCN was to have
> common everything with the RN so personnel could train with the RN, serve in
> RN ships as well as RCN ships, and RN specialists could train RCN personnel
> in Canada no probs. The formation of local task groups eg around the
> battle cruiser AUSTRALIA in Oz would allow that task group with its cruisers
> and destroyers to link up with any RN fleet, and so on.
>
> Regards,
> Barry
Can't comment on the RCN, but in the case of the RAN the reason for
its establishment was in reaction to the withdrawal of RN warships
from Australian waters. The colonies were uncomfortably aware that in
the event of war between Britain and another power their shipping and
ports would be vulnerable to shipping raids and bombardment by enemy
cruisers without some sort of naval protection.
The primary purpose of the RAN (and the small Colonial navies that
preceded it) was home defence, and reinforcement of the RN was only a
secondary objective. That is demonstrated by the structure of the
fleet that was ordered in 1910: 1 battlecruiser, 4 cruisers & 6
destroyers. The RN would much rather have had an extra 1 or 2
battleships instead. The home-defence priority was also demonstrated
in 1914-15 and again in 1939-40 - substantial transfers of RAN ships
to RN control was permitted only after the destruction of German
cruisers made protection of home waters less urgent.
The RN strongly opposed the establishment of the independent Dominion
navies and argued instead for the Dominions to pay for ships in the RN
as more efficient (at least from London's POV). New Zealand and Malaya
did just that, paying for a battlecruiser and a battleship
respectively. Australia and Canada countered by pointing out that
after paying the money they would have no control over the ship
deployments and the Admiralty would simply station the ships in the
North Sea leaving them as exposed as ever (precisely what occurred
with HMS New Zealand & HMS Malaya. In other words, they put no faith
in the "mutual obligation" argument. The Imperial Defence conferences
that Barry refers to occurred after the RN had lost that argument and
had to make the best of things.
Joe Osman
>
> "BF Lake" <nos...@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<v7c1p59...@corp.supernews.com>...
> > "KDR" <huma...@hanmail.net> wrote in message
> > news:5de75844.03031...@posting.google.com...
> > > One of the most often cited reasons given to justify a case for a
> > > medium-sized ocean-going navy is that it can be offered to larger
> > > navies as a valuable partner; then the larger navies may come to
> > > defend you when you face invasion from your enemy in future.
> > >
>
> Cited where? in 30+ years of reading military history & defence
> strategy I've yet to come across this gem of wisdom. OTOH it has been
> claimed that Australia's support of Britain in 2 world wars and of the
> US in Korea & Vietnam were "downpayments on the insurance policy", as
> you suggest. Personally, I'm not convinced. In all 4 situations, a
> very good case can be made that the actions were in Australia's
> strategic interest. And Australia's experience with both Britain & the
> US suggests that future support from a great power cannot be relied
> on.
<snip>
What was the experience with the US that suggests that
future support from the US cannot be relied on?
Joe
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KDR
> > > medium-sized ocean-going navy is that it can be offered to larger
> > > navies as a valuable partner; then the larger navies may come to
> > > defend you when you face invasion from your enemy in future.
> > >
>
> Cited where? in 30+ years of reading military history & defence
> strategy I've yet to come across this gem of wisdom.
It seems you haven't digged your own backyard yet. I've seen at least
one below.
http://www.navy.gov.au/seapowercenter/
> OTOH it has been claimed that Australia's support of Britain in 2 world wars
> and of the US in Korea & Vietnam were "downpayments on the insurance policy",
> as you suggest. Personally, I'm not convinced. In all 4 situations, a very
> good case can be made that the actions were in Australia's strategic
> interest. And Australia's experience with both Britain & the US suggests that
> future support from a great power cannot be relied on.
Please elaborate on Australia's strategic interest?
Thanks. BTW, what was Australia's own naval plan from the 1920's upto
1941 against Japan?
Cheers,
Sydney Guy
> sydney...@yahoo.com.au (Sydney Guy) wrote...
> > "BF Lake" <nos...@nospam.com> wrote...
> > > "KDR" <huma...@hanmail.net> wrote...
> > > > One of the most often cited reasons given to justify a case for a
> > > > medium-sized ocean-going navy is that it can be offered to larger
> > > > navies as a valuable partner; then the larger navies may come to
> > > > defend you when you face invasion from your enemy in future.
> > > >
> >
> > Cited where? in 30+ years of reading military history & defence
> > strategy I've yet to come across this gem of wisdom.
>
> It seems you haven't digged your own backyard yet. I've seen at least
> one below.
>
> http://www.navy.gov.au/seapowercenter/
>
Strategy for Medium Powers", and I don't recall Hill making that
argument - quite the reverse IIRC.
I've just checked out that site and I don't see the item you are
referring to. Can you give the exact reference?
I'll concede that it's entirely possible that the RAN is spouting some
such nonsense, they're not noted as great strategic thinkers. To judge
from some of the public statements we hear from retired senior RAN
officers, you'd think that the RAN's greatest ambition was to become
an auxiliary squadron for the USN. That to do so would result in an
unbalanced fleet that would have difficulty if required to fight
without USN support doesn't seem to occur to them. I'll give an
example of what I'm talking about.
A favourite obsession of these retired Commodore Blimps is the loss of
the RAN's naval aviation capability when HMAS Melbourne was not
replaced in 1983. They are continually spouting off about the RAN's
need for a carrier (note the singular). There's no denying that an
organic naval aviation component would be nice to have, but the ship
alone would cost something like $US1 billion before you've even
considered the cost of the aircraft, aircrew and supporting
infrastructure. This would seriously distort the Navy's force
structure because something else would have to be sacrificed to make
room in the budget for the carrier. Yet even if you did that, or the
Govt increased the budget somewhat, there's no way that Australia
could afford more than one carrier - and there's its Achilles Heel.
With only 1 carrier available we would have too many of our eggs in
that one basket, making it too valuable to risk losing. Furthermore,
it can't be in more than one place at a time, so RAN ships in 99% of
Australia's maritime zone are still dependent on shore-based aircover.
Finally, the carrier has to go in for refit sometime, and this is the
best time for a potential adversary to challenge us. (All these
problems applied to HMAS Melbourne BTW)
The only situation where a carrier makes sense is to provide
reinforcement to the USN, who would find it useful but not essential.
OTOH, to provide that carrier Australia would have to sacrifice other
capabilities that might well be essential if we had to fight on our
own. That's been a primary reason why successive govts since 1983 have
refused to consider a replacement carrier.
An aside - one of the downsides of the RAN's close integration with
the RN pre-war was that RAN officers identified _too_ closely with the
RN and failed to consider that they also had a duty to their own
government. One historian commented that when one RAN captain (Collins
IIRC) considered his mission to be unwise and unnecessarily risking
his ship he apparently never considered coimmunicating that opinion to
the Australian Govt, whereas the Army was very clear that loyalty to
one's immediate superior didn't take precedence to loyalty to the Aust
Govt. (Sorry, can't recall the exact citation offhand).
>
> > OTOH it has been claimed that Australia's support of Britain in 2 world wars
> > and of the US in Korea & Vietnam were "downpayments on the insurance policy",
> > as you suggest. Personally, I'm not convinced. In all 4 situations, a very
> > good case can be made that the actions were in Australia's strategic
> > interest. And Australia's experience with both Britain & the US suggests that
> > future support from a great power cannot be relied on.
>
> Please elaborate on Australia's strategic interest?
>
In WW1 & WW2, Australia's interest was in supporting Britain because
to see Britain defeated by Germany would have left us exposed either
to Germany or other predatory Great Powers eg Japan. Bear in mind that
Australia only had a population of 4 million in WW1 and 7 million in
WW2. Aside from that, it would have been politically impossible for
any Aust Govt to have gone against public opinion by not supporting
Britain. Most of the population were either first-generation
immigrants from Britain, or their children and grandchildren eg 25% of
the Australian soldiers who fought in WW1 had been born in Britain.
Today, of course that identification is not so close because the
majority of the population is several generations removed from their
British origins.
In Korea, we were fighting not so much to protect Korea from Communism
as Japan. A communist Korea would represent a springboard to a
communist takeover in Japan, and having just spent 4 years fighting
Japan we had no desire to see Japan again move into a hostile camp.
The US's motivation was the same.
Re Vietnam, you have to recall the situation of SE Asia in 1964 when
Australia agreed to send troops. There had been a long-running
Communist insurgency in Malaya which Australian troops had been
involved in suppressing alongside British forces. There were also
Communist insurgencies in Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam & the
Philippines. Cambodia was allowing North Vietnam to use its territory
as a base to attack South Vietnam. But most worrying of all was
Indonesia, whose leader Sukarno was highly erratic and seemed to be
leaning towards the USSR & China. Indonesia's Communist party, the
PKI, claimed to have 1 million members (the largest outside the
Communist bloc) and was apparently gaining in power and influence. If
the Communists won in Vietnam, Laos & Cambodia would inevitably follow
(as they did). This would then provide bases from which to assist in
the subversion of Thailand, and if Thailand were to fall, that would
then provide further bases from which to subvert Malaysia & Indonesia.
Since it is in Australia's strategic interest that Indonesia not fall
into hostile hands (eg as in 1942) we had a direct interest in
encouraging the US to support South Vietnam.
That the above "domino theory" scenario didn't occur post-1975 is
largely due to four causes:
(a) the 1965-66 confrontation in Indonesia where the Indonesian Army
and the non-communist elements in the country destroyed the PKI after
an aborted coup, bringing Indonesia firmly into the non-Communist
camp.
(b) The further 10 years of war had exhausted North Vietnam
(c) Communist Vietnam post-1975 became bogged down in its own war in
Cambodia against the Communist Khmer Rouge; and
(d) The 10-year interval before Communist victory in Vietnam gave
Thailand & Malaysia the time they needed to put down the insurgencies
and to address the social & economic grievances that the communists
had been able to exploit.
So overall the US (& Australian) intervention in Vietnam largely
achieved its strategic aims. Not much consolation for the Vietnamese &
Cambodians though.
snipped discussion of origins of RAN & RCN
>
> Thanks. BTW, what was Australia's own naval plan from the 1920's upto
> 1941 against Japan?
Will post something on this later.
Arved Sandstrom
news:5cfb6f9f.03032...@posting.google.com...
[ SNIP ]
> I'll concede that it's entirely possible that the RAN is spouting some
> such nonsense, they're not noted as great strategic thinkers. To judge
> from some of the public statements we hear from retired senior RAN
> officers, you'd think that the RAN's greatest ambition was to become
> an auxiliary squadron for the USN. That to do so would result in an
> unbalanced fleet that would have difficulty if required to fight
> without USN support doesn't seem to occur to them. I'll give an
> example of what I'm talking about.
Canada of course has a similar legacy as Australia in this regard. Our last
aircraft carrier was BONAVENTURE, and after that was decommissioned, there
was certainly much of the similar kind of attitude. BRAS D'OR (the
hydrofoil) was similarly retired, and inspired the same kind of emotions,
although I doubt that Canada could have financially supported a reasonable
amount of those vessels.
As it happens, I think the modern thinking in Canadian naval leadership is
probably reasonably sound - they are being hampered by budgetary constraints
and an animus against the defence forces in the ruling Liberal party. A mix
of destroyers, frigates, smaller patrol vessels (albeit not necessarily the
current MCDVs), maritime patrol aircraft, conventional subs, and a well
supported coast guard, and the appropriate supply ships, tenders, and other
auxiliaries, is quite a reasonable proposition for a medium, wealthy nation
with lots of coastline.
I am no longer particularly acquainted with how things are going with
Maritime Command (perhaps someone else can weigh in here), but we have the
issues that the patrol ac (Auroras) are getting old, the destroyers and
frigates have their effectiveness halved because of the ongoing SeaKing
debacle, the CCG (coast guard) is very badly funded, and the supply ship
situation is poor (I have heard no reports one way or the other about the
latter recently, but I know that at least then it was poor).
But I don't think the _naval_ thinking here is that bad. Just my opinion.
AHS
Errol Cavit
<snip great analysis>
>
> An aside - one of the downsides of the RAN's close integration with
> the RN pre-war was that RAN officers identified _too_ closely with the
> RN and failed to consider that they also had a duty to their own
> government. One historian commented that when one RAN captain (Collins
> IIRC) considered his mission to be unwise and unnecessarily risking
> his ship he apparently never considered coimmunicating that opinion to
> the Australian Govt, whereas the Army was very clear that loyalty to
> one's immediate superior didn't take precedence to loyalty to the Aust
> Govt. (Sorry, can't recall the exact citation offhand).
>
I researched this (British/Dominion arguments) some months back after some
discussion on the independence of the Dominions in WWII in
soc.history.what-if.
The best stand-alone citation I found was from Freyberg's (2NZEF commander)
biography. Note that Churchill was embarrassed by what he had to tell the Oz
and NZ governments in order to get permission to use their troops in Greece
(either lies or misleading statements, depending on how much you like
Churchill and the senior Brit commanders). Both Dominion Governments then
gave very clear instructions to their field commanders about informing them
of any concerns that they had.
"One of Blamey's many disagreements with Auchinleck epitomises the attitude
of the British/Indian Army commanders and staff in the Middle East towards
the Dominion generals in the early years of the war. The 9 Australian
Division had been locked up inside Tobruk since it was first invested by
Rommel at the beginning of April 1941. By the summer the units were growing
tired, and many of the men were in poor physical shape. Blamey asked for
their relief, and this was eventually agreed, or so he thought. A Polish
Brigade relived 18 Australian Brigade at the end of August, but when it came
to making arrangements to relieve the other two brigades, Auchinleck
refused. At two stormy meetings at GHQ Cairo the following conversations
were recorded:
AUCHINLECK: I want 9 Division to stay in Tobruk. You must support me, as my
deputy.
BLAMEY: I am your deputy, but I'm also GOC AIF. I want them relieved.
AUCHINLECK: Talking of reliefs, if you take that tone I shall be compelled
to ask for your relief.
BLAMEY: Go ahead and do it [1]
And at the second meeting:
The conference had begun badly. Auchinleck said that he had considered
all the factors, and he decided that Tobruk could not be relieved. Then
Blamey said: 'Gentlemen, I think you don't understand the position. If I
were a French or American commander making this demand, what would you say
about it?'
'But you're not!' said Auchinleck.
'That's where you are wrong,' said Blamey. 'Australia is an independent
nation. She came into the war under certain definite agreements. Now,
gentlemen, in the name of my Government, I demand the relief of these
troops.' [1]"
[1] referenced to Blamey's biography
HTH, please continue with the fascinating discussion.
--
Errol Cavit
to email, my middle initial is G | Newsreels shown in Eire 23 May 1940:
1.Italian Royalty 2.Aus Boat race 3.Sultan of Morocco 4.Mdm Chiang Kai Shek
at Chung King 5.Kentucky Derby 6.Dublin Great Spring Show
Arved Sandstrom
news:b5eed4$bjk$2...@lust.ihug.co.nz...[ SNIP ]
> HTH, please continue with the fascinating discussion.
Among other things, "Canada's Navy - The First Century", by Marc Milner,
University of Toronto Press, 1999, is an excellent background for
understanding the issues associated with the development of one Commonwealth
navy.
I find many of the details fascinating - for example, the
Churchill-Roosevelt meeting at Argentia, Newfoundland in August 1941
discounted RCN input. In effect, the RCN was marginalised in terms of being
able to provide effective convoy escort and perform A/S in the western North
Atlantic. And the British compounded the insult through the rest of the
naval war by not providing proper support (in a number of ways) to a smaller
Commonwealth ally, and then bitterly complained when Canadian escorts did
not perform as properly as those of the RN.
The result is that RCN practices and thought moved rather rapidly over to
the US model - pre WW II it was British-style, and not long after WW II it
was US-style.
AHS
KDR
> sydney...@yahoo.com.au (Sydney Guy) wrote...
> > "BF Lake" <nos...@nospam.com> wrote...
> > > "KDR" <huma...@hanmail.net> wrote...
> > > > One of the most often cited reasons given to justify a case for a
> > > > medium-sized ocean-going navy is that it can be offered to larger
> > > > navies as a valuable partner; then the larger navies may come to
> > > > defend you when you face invasion from your enemy in future.
> > > >
> >
> > Cited where? in 30+ years of reading military history & defence
> > strategy I've yet to come across this gem of wisdom.
>
> It seems you haven't digged your own backyard yet. I've seen at least
> one below.
>
> http://www.navy.gov.au/seapowercenter/
Found two in the RAN's Seapower Centre publications.
http://www.navy.gov.au/seapowercenter/working3.htm
Medium Power Strategy Revisited
Richard Hill
March 2000
" ... Betterment and stability were indeed threatened, and there was a
further factor: the position and reputation of Australia vis-avis the
United States of America. The USA is the superpower of choice if
Australia's territorial integrity or political independence ever do,
however unexpectedly, come to be threatened. In such a contingency,
hanging back in the case of Kuwait will be remembered. The
overwhelmingly sensible thing, as well as the right thing, to do was
to join the coalition, and Australia's most appropriate contribution
to coalition forces in such a case would be naval."
http://www.navy.gov.au/seapowercenter/working1.htm
New Technology and Medium Navies
Norman Friedman
August 1999
" ... For example, the Royal Australian Navy built up before World War
II was intended mainly to defend Australia. However, it was also part
of a larger Empire fleet. The logic was that by participating in the
larger effort, Australia could gain some influence over Imperial
decisions and could demand Empire participation in her local defence.
In fact through the 1930s British naval planners assigned the highest
priority to the Far East, which was very much what the Australian
government of the time sought by its naval participation in the larger
effort."
Cheers,
Alexander (Sandy) McClearn
> I am no longer particularly acquainted with how things are going with
> Maritime Command (perhaps someone else can weigh in here), but we have the
> issues that the patrol ac (Auroras) are getting old, the destroyers and
> frigates have their effectiveness halved because of the ongoing SeaKing
> debacle, the CCG (coast guard) is very badly funded, and the supply ship
> situation is poor (I have heard no reports one way or the other about the
> latter recently, but I know that at least then it was poor).
>
> But I don't think the _naval_ thinking here is that bad. Just my opinion.
That would be my reading of the current situation. The CCG is still
underfunded, despite all the denials from government, and the Sea King
problem is getting more and more acute. Regardless of the (also)
frequent government denials that the cancellation of the EH-101 contract
was a mistake, the fact that the Navy is forced to ship a replacement
Sea King on a containership to replace the one that crashed on IROQUOIS
last month because they didn't have one available is rather pointed
evidence to the contrary.
Other problems include manpower shortages, ageing destroyers, AORs, and
MPAs (despite the impending upgrade program) with no replacement in
sight. We are down to two AORs, and both are rather old (30+ years) and
won't last much longer. The proposed replacement, by new multi-role sea
lift / replenishment vessels seems stalled, and there isn't anyone in
the country who can build anything that big anymore anyway (to the best
of my knowledge anyway).
I think the Navy knows what they need and what to do with it, but they
are hampered by lack of funding. They also recently published Leadmark,
their strategy for 2020, so they are looking ahead.
Regards,
--
Sandy McClearn, P.Eng. Civil Engineer smcc...@hazegray.org
Haze Gray & Underway........Maritime History.........www.hazegray.org
Tall Ships/Foundation Maritime/Ship Tours..www.hazegray.org/features/
Canadian Naval History...............www.hazegray.org/navhist/canada/
Arved Sandstrom
news:3E7D1A63...@is2.dal.ca...
[ SNIP ]
> Other problems include manpower shortages, ageing destroyers, AORs, and
> MPAs (despite the impending upgrade program) with no replacement in
> sight. We are down to two AORs, and both are rather old (30+ years) and
> won't last much longer. The proposed replacement, by new multi-role sea
> lift / replenishment vessels seems stalled, and there isn't anyone in
> the country who can build anything that big anymore anyway (to the best
> of my knowledge anyway).
As to the last point, if there isn't, it would be an excellent opportunity
to follow Tobin's erstwhile vision and use requirements like this to
jumpstart our shipbuilding industry.
AHS
Sydney Guy
snip
> Found two in the RAN's Seapower Centre publications.
>
>
>
> http://www.navy.gov.au/seapowercenter/working3.htm
>
> Medium Power Strategy Revisited
> Richard Hill
> March 2000
>
> " ... Betterment and stability were indeed threatened, and there was a
> further factor: the position and reputation of Australia vis-avis the
> United States of America. The USA is the superpower of choice if
> Australia's territorial integrity or political independence ever do,
> however unexpectedly, come to be threatened. In such a contingency,
> hanging back in the case of Kuwait will be remembered. The
> overwhelmingly sensible thing, as well as the right thing, to do was
> to join the coalition, and Australia's most appropriate contribution
> to coalition forces in such a case would be naval."
>
>
(retired) whose book "Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers" I referred
to in my previous post. I don't recall him making a similar argument
in his book.
Re the Australian commitment to Gulf War 1. I know a former senior
civil servant who was a defence advisor to the Australian PM at the
time, Bob Hawke. He says that he couldn't understand why Hawke was so
gung-ho about the Gulf War and sending Australian forces there. Only
later did the reason become clear, after details became public of a
private agreement Hawke had made with his deputy, Paul Keating. Hawke
had promised that he would retire as PM during the Govt's 2nd term of
office to give Keating his chance as PM. Shortly before GW1, Hawke had
decided to renege and now faced the certain prospect of a Party-room
challenge from Keating. However, Keating could hardly do this while
the country was at war, so Hawke could postpone the challenge for a
while longer. So in order to allow Hawke to hold onto his job for a
few months longer, we have had a sizeable % of our Navy tied up in the
Persian Gulf for the last 12 years.
BTW Hill says “Australia's most appropriate contribution to
coalition forces in such a case would be naval." According to press
reports, the US actually wanted our F-111s and in particular our
RF-111 photo-reconnaissance aircraft, but since at the time these were
quite literally irreplaceable, the Aust Govt refused.
Hill also says "In such a contingency, hanging back in the case of
Kuwait will be remembered". I’d argue quite the reverse:
"In such a contingency, past support in the case of WW2, Korea,
Vietnam, Kuwait, Somalia & Iraq will be conveniently forgotten
whenever & wherever expedient"
I spent 5 years in the US in the 1980s. Most of the people I knew
there were not aware that Australia had been in Vietnam, let alone
WW1, WW2 & Korea. (These were largely college graduates, so it's not a
function of education) Just about the only ones who did were Vietnam
vets, who even then were a small percentage of the population. So in a
population that's blissfully ignorant of past Australian support, why
are US politicians going to go out of their way to repay it? As for
the policy types of Washington DC, they'd sell you down the river in a
second - both political parties.
In fact, there wasn't even much gratitude at the time. I can vividly
recall during the Vietnam War US Senator Proxmire complaining that not
enough Australians were getting killed! This, said the Senator, proved
that the Australians weren't doing enough fighting. (Other people
thought it demonstrated superior tactics and training) In WW2
throughout 1942-43, MacArthur and his sycophants were writing memos to
each other saying that the Australians were incompetent cowards. This
at a time when the Australian troops were doing the vast bulk of the
fighting in SWPA and defeating the Japanese in spite of the
incompetence of Dugout Doug and his staff of bootlickers. Similarly,
in Vietnam the Americans made the same comments about the South
Vietnamese, even though the ARVN throughout the war did the bulk of
the fighting and incurred the bulk of the casualties, with a fraction
of the air and artillery support available to US troops.
>
> http://www.navy.gov.au/seapowercenter/working1.htm
>
> New Technology and Medium Navies
> Norman Friedman
> August 1999
>
> " ... For example, the Royal Australian Navy built up before World War
> II was intended mainly to defend Australia. However, it was also part
> of a larger Empire fleet. The logic was that by participating in the
> larger effort, Australia could gain some influence over Imperial
> decisions and could demand Empire participation in her local defence.
> In fact through the 1930s British naval planners assigned the highest
> priority to the Far East, which was very much what the Australian
> government of the time sought by its naval participation in the larger
> effort."
>
I own a couple of Norman Friedman’s books, and if you want to
know why a US warship was designed in a particular way, he’s
your man. However, I doubt that he knows much about the history and
background of the RAN. I own a sizeable collection of Australian
military history and have read a great deal more, and this is the
first time I’ve seen this “logic” expounded. Strikes
me as the sort of throwaway line that visiting foreigners make when
they have only a sketchy knowledge of the background.
Australia pre-1945 believed it should have influence over Imperial
decisions and should expect Empire participation in its defence
because it was part of the Imperial “family”, not because
it had “paid its dues”. Australians of that day considered
themselves to be just as much British citizens as the English, Scots,
Welsh & Irish, and to a large extent the British considered them so as
well. However, the influence over Imperial decisions largely turned
out to be illusory. And when the crunch came the Empire participation
in local defence wasn’t forthcoming, although that had a great
deal to do with Churchill’s failings as well.
Friedman’s right about the British naval planning on the Far
East, wrong about the timeframe. It wasn’t “through the
1930s” but from 1919 to the mid-1930s. This was because with the
scuttling of the German fleet and with France and the US as Allies,
the RN had no naval rivals in Europe. So as early as 1919 the RN
identified Japan as the most likely potential enemy. However, after
Hitler began to rearm Germany from 1935 onwards and Mussolini became
more adventurous, priority very rapidly switched back to Europe.
BTW, papers by visiting British (Hill) and American (Friedman) authors
don’t necessarily demonstrate that what they are saying
represents RAN thinking. Their perspective is that of the Great Power,
not that of the small Power.
The problem with the “paying premiums on the insurance
policy” argument is that Great Powers, like insurance companies,
are very happy to accept the premiums but extremely reluctant to pay
out when you need to make a claim. The classic example of this is
Churchill’s behaviour in 1942. Although Australia & NZ troops
had fought for Britain in WW1 – 60,000 KIA, more than the USA
– and again in WW2, that counted for nothing when Australia & NZ
were threatened by war with Japan. Churchill was extremely reluctant
to release the Australian & NZ divisions from the Middle East and both
he & Roosevelt attempted to blackmail them into relenting by
threatening to withhold air & naval reinforcement. They were
successful with NZ, mostly unsuccessful with Australia. Also the fact
that thousands of Australians were serving with the RAF bomber
command, and continued to do so through to VE Day, didn’t prompt
Churchill to release any aircraft to Australia. So much for gratitude
for past favours.
Sydney Guy
snipped my previous post
> Canada of course has a similar legacy as Australia in this regard. Our last
> aircraft carrier was BONAVENTURE, and after that was decommissioned, there
> was certainly much of the similar kind of attitude. BRAS D'OR (the
> hydrofoil) was similarly retired, and inspired the same kind of emotions,
> although I doubt that Canada could have financially supported a reasonable
> amount of those vessels.
>
IIRC, Canada got into the carrier business the same way as Australia,
by buying the RN's half-completed Light Fleet Carriers at 50 cents in
the $. At the time it seemed like a way to play in the big leagues at
a bargain basement price. But what they forgot is that the ship is
only the beginning of the expenditure (and the smallest part), then
you have to pay for the crew, the aircraft, the pilots, a flight
training program, shore airfields, etc, etc, etc. Plus they couldn't
foresee the staggering rise in the size, weight & cost of the aircraft
when they switched over to jets. And as the planes got bigger and
landed faster the small carriers quickly reached the limit of the size
of aircraft they could handle. That's why the Argentinian & Brazilian
carriers are still flying aircraft designed in the 1950s - Skyhawks &
Etendards.
In the RAN's case, they ran into financial trouble almost immediately.
Post-war inflation pushed the cost of completing the carriers way over
budget. HMAS Sydney was completed as a straight-deck design in time to
fight in the closing stages of the Korean War, but Melbourne's
construction was held up so as to redesign her as one of the
newfangled angled-deck carriers. It was always intended that Sydney
would be converted to an angled-deck on refit, but they could never
find enough money to do it, so she ended her days as a vehicle
transport shuttling trucks & landrovers to Vietnam. In 1959, the Govt
decided that the fixed-wing aircraft wouldn't be replaced when they
reached end-of-life in the mid-60s. Then in 1964 this was reversed,
partly because Australia was concerned about the possibility of war
with Indonesia, but also because second-hand Skyhawks were now
available from the USN. In 1983 when both the ship and the aircraft
had to be replaced at the same time, the cost simply couldn't be
justified.
It was a classic case of having champagne tastes on a beer budget. In
retrospect, the RAN would have been better to have done without the
carriers, and put the money into other things.
Arved Sandstrom
news:5cfb6f9f.03032...@posting.google.com...
[ SNIP ]
> there were not aware that Australia had been in Vietnam, let alone
> WW1, WW2 & Korea. (These were largely college graduates, so it's not a
> function of education) Just about the only ones who did were Vietnam
> vets, who even then were a small percentage of the population. So in a
> population that's blissfully ignorant of past Australian support, why
> are US politicians going to go out of their way to repay it? As for
> the policy types of Washington DC, they'd sell you down the river in a
> second - both political parties.
99% of the US population was, and is, unaware that Canadians supported them
with distinction in Afghanistan. You're absolutely correct about their
knowledge of Australians in Vietnam; they also don't know that ROKs were
there. They don't know that Turks were in Korea (as again were Canadians).
In fact, they don't know much at all except for the fact that roughly half
of them believe that the earth was created roughly 6,000 years ago.
You can _like_ Americans, and they _are_ nice folks, but they are not
terribly clued in. So their politicos are influenced by that.
> In fact, there wasn't even much gratitude at the time. I can vividly
> recall during the Vietnam War US Senator Proxmire complaining that not
> enough Australians were getting killed! This, said the Senator, proved
> that the Australians weren't doing enough fighting. (Other people
> thought it demonstrated superior tactics and training) In WW2
> throughout 1942-43, MacArthur and his sycophants were writing memos to
> each other saying that the Australians were incompetent cowards. This
> at a time when the Australian troops were doing the vast bulk of the
> fighting in SWPA and defeating the Japanese in spite of the
> incompetence of Dugout Doug and his staff of bootlickers. Similarly,
> in Vietnam the Americans made the same comments about the South
> Vietnamese, even though the ARVN throughout the war did the bulk of
> the fighting and incurred the bulk of the casualties, with a fraction
> of the air and artillery support available to US troops.
[ SNIP ]
I can't disagree with any of your above statements either. In Normandy and
afterwards, in WW II, comments like this were made by the US about allies
also.
You're absolutely right about the South Vietnamese. Despite the various
corrupt governments propped up by the Americans, the South Vietnamese troops
on the ground did yeoman work, and it was only the fact that we (the US)
pulled out that scuppered them before they were fully able to do things on
their own. After all, North Vietnam was getting Chinese and Russian help -
but we just decided that things didn't look good for getting the president
voted in again. Shameful, but there you go.
AHS
Errol Cavit
>
> The problem with the "paying premiums on the insurance
> policy" argument is that Great Powers, like insurance companies,
> are very happy to accept the premiums but extremely reluctant to pay
> out when you need to make a claim. The classic example of this is
> had fought for Britain in WW1 ( 60,000 KIA, more than the USA)
> and again in WW2, that counted for nothing when Australia & NZ
> were threatened by war with Japan. Churchill was extremely reluctant
> to release the Australian & NZ divisions from the Middle East and both
> he & Roosevelt attempted to blackmail them into relenting by
> threatening to withhold air & naval reinforcement. They were
> successful with NZ, mostly unsuccessful with Australia. Also the fact
> that thousands of Australians were serving with the RAF bomber
> Churchill to release any aircraft to Australia. So much for gratitude
> for past favours.
While I agree with your overall point, the divisions from the ME issue is
often overstated. The Oz ME divisions had been promised to return if
required, the only thing in doubt was the timing. US divisions were offered
to fill any gap if they weren't transferred back. NZ took up the offer,
which made sense all round (a desert-experienced division was a useful asset
where it was).
Churchill then pulled his various stunts, pressuring to get the 7th diverted
while on the way home, being misleading about Force Z (on top of what he had
done earlier over Greece) etc.
But there was no difference in the treatment of Oz and NZ when they annoyed
the major allies with the Canberra Pact, despite the earlier differing
levels of compliance with their wishes.
Sydney Guy
> "Sydney Guy" <sydney...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
> news:5cfb6f9f.03032...@posting.google.com...
> [ SNIP ]
> > I spent 5 years in the US in the 1980s. Most of the people I knew
> > there were not aware that Australia had been in Vietnam, let alone
> > WW1, WW2 & Korea. (These were largely college graduates, so it's not a
> > function of education) Just about the only ones who did were Vietnam
> > vets, who even then were a small percentage of the population. So in a
> > population that's blissfully ignorant of past Australian support, why
> > are US politicians going to go out of their way to repay it? As for
> > the policy types of Washington DC, they'd sell you down the river in a
> > second - both political parties.
>
> 99% of the US population was, and is, unaware that Canadians supported them
> with distinction in Afghanistan. You're absolutely correct about their
> knowledge of Australians in Vietnam; they also don't know that ROKs were
> there. They don't know that Turks were in Korea (as again were Canadians).
> In fact, they don't know much at all except for the fact that roughly half
> of them believe that the earth was created roughly 6,000 years ago.
>
> You can _like_ Americans, and they _are_ nice folks, but they are not
> terribly clued in. So their politicos are influenced by that.
>
Arved, agree with you 100%. I met lots of nice folks in America - I
came close to marrying a couple of 'em - and I also met some not so
nice, but that's true anywhere.
The basic problem is that when you live in the US its damned hard to
get _any_ information about what's happening in the rest of the world.
I had to take out a subscription to The Economist in order to get any
news about Australia at all. The Washington Post, for example, will
devote far more pages to the Prince Georges County school board
elections than to foreign affairs.
Besides, what passes for foreign news in the better papers in the US
(NY Times, Washington Post) is actually _American_ news - eg the
Secretary of State visited Country X, the Secretary of Commerce warns
Country Y against producing better & cheaper cars than Detroit, the
President orders cruise missiles to be fired at Country Z because he's
lagging in the opinion polls ....
There's almost no coverage of foreign news that doesn't involve the
USA directly. The accepted wisdom in the US news media is that
Americans aren't interested in foreign news, so don't give 'em any.
This tends to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In fact, the parochialism in the news media is such that I used to
find that on the occasions I went up to Canada for work, the Canadian
TV news had a better coverage of what was happening _in the US_ than
the NY City TV stations. The NYC stations would fill their broadcasts
with the latest media antics of the NYC mayor, or the media antics of
the NY State Governor, with a little time devoted to the media antics
of the US President and damn-all of anythging else.
Nor is this a recent phenomenon - in ~1964 Lederer & Burdick
complained about this same media parochialism and the way it created a
climate of ignorance of foreign affairs. They said that if you were
living in Texas and wanted to know what was happening _in the rest of
Texas_ let alone the rest of the USA, you'd be better off reading any
major Canadian newspaper than your local town newspaper. Haven't been
to Texas, but in my experience that held true for newspapers in
Columbia SC, Blacksburg VA, Norfolk VA, New Jersey, Boston etc. Things
might have changed in the last 20 years, but I doubt it.
> > In fact, there wasn't even much gratitude at the time. I can vividly
> > recall during the Vietnam War US Senator Proxmire complaining that not
> > enough Australians were getting killed! This, said the Senator, proved
> > that the Australians weren't doing enough fighting. (Other people
> > thought it demonstrated superior tactics and training) In WW2
> > throughout 1942-43, MacArthur and his sycophants were writing memos to
> > each other saying that the Australians were incompetent cowards. This
> > at a time when the Australian troops were doing the vast bulk of the
> > fighting in SWPA and defeating the Japanese in spite of the
> > incompetence of Dugout Doug and his staff of bootlickers. Similarly,
> > in Vietnam the Americans made the same comments about the South
> > Vietnamese, even though the ARVN throughout the war did the bulk of
> > the fighting and incurred the bulk of the casualties, with a fraction
> > of the air and artillery support available to US troops.
> [ SNIP ]
>
> I can't disagree with any of your above statements either. In Normandy and
> afterwards, in WW II, comments like this were made by the US about allies
> also.
>
Hell, they're still being made on Usenet, on this ng and shwww-ii
among others.
There's an American book I've seen in the bookstores recently that
claims that the British were totally incompetent in WW1 and were
losing the war until the AEF came along and won it for them. This
despite the facts that:
(a) Most of the weapons, techniques & tactics that broke the deadlock
in 1918 didn't exist in 1914 and the British & French had had to
invent them in the intervening 4 years eg LMGs, trench mortars, tanks,
predicted artillery fire, aerial photography, counter-battery tactics,
sound-ranging, etc
(b) The well-documented fact that not only did the British & French
learn from their mistakes and change their tactics accordingly, but so
too were the Germans changing their tactics in response eg see
Shelford Bidwell's "Firepower" & Paddy Griffiths "Battle Tactics of
the Western Front"
(c) The also well-documented fact that, far from showing originality
of tactics, Pershing seemed determined to repeat all his Allies'
mistakes of the preceding 4 years while re-inventing the wheel
(d) In the last 3 months of the war that the AEF was actually engaged
in fighting, the British Empire Army took by far the largest # of
prisoners, with the French an honourable second and the AEF a long,
long way behind. In the conditions of 1918, this is a pretty fair
indication of which Army was winning the war, not really surprising
considering (c). And despite what we'd like to think, we Aussies,
Canucks & Kiwis can't claim ALL the credit.
Yet we're expected to believe that an Army that hadn't fought a real
war since 1865 could somehow saunter on in and show those dumb Limeys
& Frenchies how its done.
Needless to say, I haven't wasted my time or my money on this piece of
trash, but it'll probably be a best-seller in the US. After all, why
bother with the facts when feeding your prejudices with propaganda is
so much more satisfying? Next thing you know, they'll be believing
that the USA actually _won_ the war of 1812. :-)
> You're absolutely right about the South Vietnamese. Despite the various
> corrupt governments propped up by the Americans, the South Vietnamese troops
> on the ground did yeoman work, and it was only the fact that we (the US)
> pulled out that scuppered them before they were fully able to do things on
> their own. After all, North Vietnam was getting Chinese and Russian help -
> but we just decided that things didn't look good for getting the president
> voted in again. Shameful, but there you go.
>
> AHS
The South Vietnam Govts weren't any more corrupt than the Communist
one that replaced them - at least you didn't have tens of thousands of
people taking to the sea in leaky boats to escape them.
Nor was it the US pullout that scuppered them so much as the US
cutting-off of the ammunition supply and failing to provide the air
support that the US had promised 3 years previously to get the SVN
govt to agree to Kissinger's "peace" deal. The Tet offensive had
broken the Vietcong - the survivors believed that the Northerners had
put them in the front of the battle as cannon fodder, so in the latter
part of the war it was the ARVN vs the NVA.
BTW, remnants of the ARVN 1st Division were reported to be still
fighting a guerilla war in the Mekong Delta 2 years after the fall of
Saigon. Don't sound like cowards to me.
Arved Sandstrom
news:5cfb6f9f.03032...@posting.google.com...
> "Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote in message
news:<bUufa.34408$cB3.1...@nnrp1.uunet.ca>...
> There's an American book I've seen in the bookstores recently that
> claims that the British were totally incompetent in WW1 and were
> losing the war until the AEF came along and won it for them. This
> despite the facts that:
>
> (a) Most of the weapons, techniques & tactics that broke the deadlock
> in 1918 didn't exist in 1914 and the British & French had had to
> invent them in the intervening 4 years eg LMGs, trench mortars, tanks,
> predicted artillery fire, aerial photography, counter-battery tactics,
> sound-ranging, etc
I have to actually respectfully sound off and tell you that the Canadians
were at the forefront of the artillery innovations in WW I - _we_ had Andy
McNaughton
(http://collections.ic.gc.ca/heirloom_series/volume4/126-127.htm). And it is
a fair bet that Canadian artillery in WW II was also unmatched.
> (b) The well-documented fact that not only did the British & French
> learn from their mistakes and change their tactics accordingly, but so
> too were the Germans changing their tactics in response eg see
> Shelford Bidwell's "Firepower" & Paddy Griffiths "Battle Tactics of
> the Western Front"
Thank you for these references. I have a few books myself, and it is
certainly true that all parties were learning. The Germans introduced shock
troops to good effect, for example. And although the Canadians at Vimy Ridge
did not style themselves as such, I'd consider that they also acted in a
more sophisticated tactical manner that late in the war.
[ SNIP ]
> Nor was it the US pullout that scuppered them so much as the US
> cutting-off of the ammunition supply and failing to provide the air
> support that the US had promised 3 years previously to get the SVN
> govt to agree to Kissinger's "peace" deal. The Tet offensive had
> broken the Vietcong - the survivors believed that the Northerners had
> put them in the front of the battle as cannon fodder, so in the latter
> part of the war it was the ARVN vs the NVA.
In fact Tet put the final hurting on them. They were already in trouble.
North Vietnam knew (rather cynically) that the VC were a done deal by then.
> BTW, remnants of the ARVN 1st Division were reported to be still
> fighting a guerilla war in the Mekong Delta 2 years after the fall of
> Saigon. Don't sound like cowards to me.
Nor to me. The unfortunate media image of a little guy struggling with a too
heavy rifle and not fighting too well is way offbase.
AHS
Sydney Guy
I don't claim to be an expert on NZ history, but my understanding was
that the NZ Govt only reluctantly agreed to leave the 3rd Division in
the ME under pressure from the US & UK. And I wouldn't put too much
store in those US divisions. The Aust Official History points out that
the 2 US National Guard divisions that were sent to Australia, the
32nd & 41st, were smaller than an Australian militia division and had
less artillery - half of it the old French 75mm gun of 1897. As their
performance in NG a year later would show, they were also badly
trained & badly led at that time. The US Army didn't have the depth of
combat experience & leadership that 3 years of fighting in WW1 &
another year in WW2 had given to the Aust & NZ Armies. These were a
poor substitute for an Australian or NZ militia division. As an
exchange for the battle-tested and well-equipped 9th Div, we got
cheated.
In one sense, Churchill did us a favour by diverting the 7th's convoy
towards Burma. The original destination was intended to be Java, but
by the time Churchill's order was countermanded, the convoy didn't
have enough fuel left to make Java and needed to return to Colombo for
refuelling. By that time, an Australian general had visited Java &
concluded it was another lost cause, and convinced Curtin to order the
convoy to Australia instead. So without Churchill's intervention, the
7th would have been lost when the NEI collapsed.
I'm not sure I'd agree that the best idea was to leave the NZ Division
in the ME. It meant that the NZEF was at the end of a very long LOC
for reinforcements and repatriation of wounded, and meant that many of
the soldiers would have no home leave for 5 long years. In contrast,
from 1942 Australian units were rotated home from the fighting in NG
to recuperate and had the opportunity to see their families on leave.
And had NZ been directly threatened by Japan, how enthusiastic would
the 3rd have been about fighting in the ME?
Of course, had they returned home the USN would have left them
unutilised just as they did the 2nd (?) Div, so they were of more use
to the war effort in the ME. But that had more to do with the
absurdities of the USN/US Army infighting than to a rational strategic
plan.
Howard Berkowitz
sydney...@yahoo.com.au (Sydney Guy) wrote:
Even before USENET and the Internet, there was lots of information, but
it was harder to get. If you had access to university libraries, it was
much easier.
The mass media, IMHO, should never be thought of as much more than a
quick-reference source.
I recognize that people _want_ to be able to get quick, "objective"
information. People, being people, often will not find something
objective unless it agrees with their biases.
IIRC, the last time a single human could expect to be literate in every
field was around 1840. This can be extrapolated to "single sources."
>
> There's an American book I've seen in the bookstores recently that
> claims that the British were totally incompetent in WW1 and were
> losing the war until the AEF came along and won it for them. This
> despite the facts that:
>
> (a) Most of the weapons, techniques & tactics that broke the deadlock
> in 1918 didn't exist in 1914 and the British & French had had to
> invent them in the intervening 4 years eg LMGs, trench mortars, tanks,
> predicted artillery fire, aerial photography, counter-battery tactics,
> sound-ranging, etc
Do note that many of the technical counterbattery advances were Canadian.
>
>
Greg Yantz
asand...@accesswave.ca says...
> "Sydney Guy" <sydney...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
> news:5cfb6f9f.03032...@posting.google.com...
[snip]
> 99% of the US population was, and is, unaware that Canadians supported them
> with distinction in Afghanistan. You're absolutely correct about their
> knowledge of Australians in Vietnam; they also don't know that ROKs were
> there. They don't know that Turks were in Korea (as again were Canadians).
> In fact, they don't know much at all except for the fact that roughly half
> of them believe that the earth was created roughly 6,000 years ago.
This from someone who freely admits that he doesn't *know* Americans.
> You can _like_ Americans, and they _are_ nice folks, but they are not
> terribly clued in.
So you *are* an American. Heh.
[snip]
> You're absolutely right about the South Vietnamese. Despite the various
> corrupt governments propped up by the Americans, the South Vietnamese troops
> on the ground did yeoman work, and it was only the fact that we (the US)
> pulled out that scuppered them before they were fully able to do things on
> their own. After all, North Vietnam was getting Chinese and Russian help -
> but we just decided that things didn't look good for getting the president
> voted in again. Shameful, but there you go.
Yah. The way the ARVN fought even after we abandoned them only increases
the shame, and don't think there aren't Americans who remember. But
that's generally what you get when you abandon your own principles along
with your friends.
--
Greg Yantz | If you know what you're doing, you're
gly...@comcast.net | not learning anything. -Unknown
Arved Sandstrom
news:mn5n5b...@192.168.0.5...
> In article <bUufa.34408$cB3.1...@nnrp1.uunet.ca>,
> asand...@accesswave.ca says...
> > "Sydney Guy" <sydney...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
> > news:5cfb6f9f.03032...@posting.google.com...
>
> [snip]
>
> > 99% of the US population was, and is, unaware that Canadians supported
them
> > with distinction in Afghanistan. You're absolutely correct about their
> > knowledge of Australians in Vietnam; they also don't know that ROKs were
> > there. They don't know that Turks were in Korea (as again were
Canadians).
> > In fact, they don't know much at all except for the fact that roughly
half
> > of them believe that the earth was created roughly 6,000 years ago.
>
> This from someone who freely admits that he doesn't *know* Americans.
I concede the point. I've said so already. But my above assertions are based
on just being a very assiduous follower of news, both liberal and
conservative. I doubt that you can refute them.
My primary experience with fellow Americans was 6 years with the cream of
the crop - fellow Marines. They were certainly not normal, but they gave me
(I respectfully suggest) a perspective that most Americans don't have
either.
> > You can _like_ Americans, and they _are_ nice folks, but they are not
> > terribly clued in.
>
> So you *are* an American. Heh.
Absolutely, and very proud of it.
> [snip]
>
> > You're absolutely right about the South Vietnamese. Despite the various
> > corrupt governments propped up by the Americans, the South Vietnamese
troops
> > on the ground did yeoman work, and it was only the fact that we (the US)
> > pulled out that scuppered them before they were fully able to do things
on
> > their own. After all, North Vietnam was getting Chinese and Russian
help -
> > but we just decided that things didn't look good for getting the
president
> > voted in again. Shameful, but there you go.
>
> Yah. The way the ARVN fought even after we abandoned them only increases
> the shame, and don't think there aren't Americans who remember. But
> that's generally what you get when you abandon your own principles along
> with your friends.
I know that there are plenty of Americans who are still sick about the
manner in which we pulled out. That ranges from CIA officers to SF to Army
advisors.
AHS
ZZBunker
> One of the most often cited reasons given to justify a case for a
> medium-sized ocean-going navy is that it can be offered to larger
> navies as a valuable partner; then the larger navies may come to
> defend you when you face invasion from your enemy in future.
>
> this, so you help me on that" from recent - 20th & 21st centuries -
> history?
Very true. The US Coast Guard proves it, since the US Navy
can't even protect it's own beaches.
>
> How much impact did the Dutch Navy's contribution have on decision
> making of the RN or USN during WW2? What about the RAN's or RCN's
> case?
Sydney Guy
snip
Howard, I very much doubt that (say) Fairleigh Dickinson or Seton Hall
had a major collection of current foreign newspapers in 1980. Besides,
the issue is that the mass of the public doesn't have the time,
inclination and opportunity to go into a university library and read
the Toronto Globe or the London Times. Even with the internet, only a
very small proportion read the foreign papers online. They _do_ get
their information about the world from the TV news 30-sec soundbites
and the front pages of the papers, or (God help us) from Hollywood.
Even supposedly well-educated Americans make appallingly stupid
statements that demonstrate they know very little about the outside
world. Eg in 2000 Shrub's National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice
told the NY Times that Iran was backing the Taliban. Anyone with a
basic knowledge of the Islamic world would know that Shia Iran
supporting the violently anti-Shia fundamentalist Sunni Taliban is
somewhat less likely than the Vatican financing Protestant terrorists
in Northern Ireland. But then, I doubt that Rice knows much about
Northern Ireland either. And this woman is supposed to be a foreign
policy specialist?
In America I was a number of times complimented on how well I spoke
English!!! That was not an unusual experience for Australians in the
USA, either people were confusing Australia with Austria or didn't
know that Australia is an English-speaking country. Then there was the
nice lady I met at church in Virginia Beach who when she heard that I
came from Australia told me that she was going to be visiting my
country soon on a tour. They would be going to visiting one of our big
cities, now what was the name now? Oh yes, ..... Rio de Janeiro!!!!
I'm not claiming that the majority of Australians are foreign affairs
whizzes, they aren't. But if you want to know about the outside world,
the information is there in our newspapers and TV coverage. In the US,
it wasn't in the 1980s and apparently isn't today either:
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2001/09/27/stupidity/
Howard Berkowitz
There are plenty of sources that aren't "news media."
Funny -- I didn't have trouble getting it even before the Internet. I
tend to use less predigested sources, ranging from think tanks (and
correcting for their sponsorship), to Congressional and intelligence
community reporting, to things like Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, etc. Takes work, though.
And...gasp...I may even read a book. Or two. Or fifty or more, when it
came to such things as a war or near-war. Even in high school, I had
read all of Bernard Fall's works, a reasonable selection of Mao, area
studies guides to East Asia, etc. As Vietnam intensified, I extended my
reading from sources ranging from Giap to Douglas Pike to Dolph Droge to
Ho to the Pentagon Papers.
> > > In fact, the parochialism in the news media is such that I used to
> > > find that on the occasions I went up to Canada for work, the Canadian
> > > TV news had a better coverage of what was happening _in the US_ than
> > > the NY City TV stations. The NYC stations would fill their broadcasts
> > > with the latest media antics of the NYC mayor, or the media antics of
> > > the NY State Governor, with a little time devoted to the media antics
> > > of the US President and damn-all of anythging else.
> >
> > Even before USENET and the Internet, there was lots of information, but
> > it was harder to get. If you had access to university libraries, it
> > was
> > much easier.
> >
> > The mass media, IMHO, should never be thought of as much more than a
> > quick-reference source.
> >
> > I recognize that people _want_ to be able to get quick, "objective"
> > information. People, being people, often will not find something
> > objective unless it agrees with their biases.
> >
> > IIRC, the last time a single human could expect to be literate in every
> > field was around 1840. This can be extrapolated to "single sources."
>
> Howard, I very much doubt that (say) Fairleigh Dickinson or Seton Hall
> had a major collection of current foreign newspapers in 1980.
I can't speak specifically to them. But I can say that the nearby Newark
Public Library did in 1963-1966, when I went off to college. My only
experience with the Seton Hall library was in ...ummm...1962? when I
used it for microbiology reference (I lived in West Orange).
>Besides,
> the issue is that the mass of the public doesn't have the time,
> inclination and opportunity to go into a university library and read
> the Toronto Globe or the London Times. Even with the internet, only a
> very small proportion read the foreign papers online.
And what level of expertise, then, do you expect? Let's put it this
way...I don't have the legal right to prescribe antibiotics. Sometimes
that's an annoyance, but I recognize the need to do so. I also recognize
that my weekly input of technical information on infectious disease is
greater, say, than the average surgeon's. I really could treat many
infectious diseases, but I can barely suture.
There's a message, somewhere, that I can start with basic ingredients
like flour, yeast, etc., and turn out at least adequate bread -- but
much of the world prefers prebaked bread.
>They _do_ get
> their information about the world from the TV news 30-sec soundbites
> and the front pages of the papers, or (God help us) from Hollywood.
So what is your answer? There's no medium that is going to give adequate
information on complex information based on soundbites. Either people
are willing to spend the effort to become aware, or they are not.
>
> Even supposedly well-educated Americans make appallingly stupid
> statements that demonstrate they know very little about the outside
> world. Eg in 2000 Shrub's National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice
> told the NY Times that Iran was backing the Taliban. Anyone with a
> basic knowledge of the Islamic world would know that Shia Iran
> supporting the violently anti-Shia fundamentalist Sunni Taliban is
> somewhat less likely than the Vatican financing Protestant terrorists
> in Northern Ireland. But then, I doubt that Rice knows much about
> Northern Ireland either. And this woman is supposed to be a foreign
> policy specialist?
On its face, it's a ludicrous quote, but I would want to see the
context. Even smart people engage mouths before putting brains in gear.
Incidentally, I don't think you'll see me refer to the Saddam Insane, or
Shrub, or similar epithets that lower the credibility of what else I say.
>
> In America I was a number of times complimented on how well I spoke
> English!!! That was not an unusual experience for Australians in the
> USA, either people were confusing Australia with Austria or didn't
> know that Australia is an English-speaking country.
Dammmit...and I thought I had the platypus and the kiwis in the right
country, I said, sheepishly.
KDR
insurance company when you make a claim. Then the sensible thing to do
is terminate your insurance policy with them right now. Isn't it?
BTW, it may still be argued that sending a couple of frigates to the
Gulf or Arabian Sea is in Australia's strategic interest. But I doubt
Australia has any 'vital' interest there or her contribution, which is
welcome but not essential, can influence over US decisions. Don't they
have more than enough resources to do all the work unaided? What do
you think why Australia helps the US in Iraq now?
Cheers,
sydney...@yahoo.com.au (Sydney Guy) wrote...
> huma...@hanmail.net (KDR) wrote...
KDR
early 1960's in "Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century: The
Australian Experience". The author is Dr Eric Grove, a Briton at the
University of Hull in the UK.
In the late 1950's, the RAN wished to acquire HMS Albion from the RN
and convert HMAS Melborne to a helicopter carrier. They wanted to
modernise the carrier, probably upto HMS Centaur's standards, to
operate the latest aircraft but didn't want Sea Vixen because it was
expensive and unsuited to Australian requiremnts. Instead, the RAN's
FAA looked at four possibilities; a navalised N-156F (later F-5A
Freedom Fighter), Sea Gnat (a navalised Folland Gnat), the projected
NATO light fighter and Etendard IV. Estimated costs of the carrier
programme were 50 million, when the RAN's anuual budget was only 40
million. Actually they assumed the RN would give HMS Albion for free
and just 5 million would suffice to upgrade it.
However, the RN had its own plan for HMS Albion. The ship was needed
as the second Commando carrier after HMS Bulwark, whose conversion to
a Commando carrier was announced in 1958 Defence White Paper. Captain
R. Hart, Director of Plans, suggested the RAN might well do with Sea
Hawk just like the Dutch and Indians, but Rear Admiral Desmond Dreyer,
Assistant Cheif of Naval Staff, backed the RAN's requirement for
modern aircraft because of growing Indonesian threat. On the other
hand, Vice Admiral L. G. Durlacher, Deputy CNS, thought 'one carrier
navy has no future', and the most sensible thing for the RAN to do is
to have a Commando/ASW dual-role carrier to complement the RN strike
carriers.
Then came a policy recommendation paper prepared for the Australian
CNS, Vice Admiral Henry Burrell, who toured London and New York in
1960. The paper said Australia is unlikely to be directly attacked by
nuclear weapons and any of her naval forces would be of value to the
Western world in a broken-backed war after initial nuclear exchange.
The main requirement would be ASW. It also stressted 'a considerable
threat may develop to Australia from her nothern neighbours and she
should be prepared to face such an eventuality, unaided by her allies,
who may be prostrated by nuclear attack.'
Plans division set out four options:
Course A: an ideal, but financialy impossible fleet of 4 carriers and
50 escorts.
Course B: an affordable, but much smaller fleet on the above line. 1
carrier and 6 escorts.
Course C: a small ship navy. This is the most economical fleet, but
lacks any sort of air cover.
Course D: a balanced fleet without sophisticated new weapons.
Affordable, but cannot fight an enemy with first-class weapons.
Difficult to inter-operate with allies.
I'll post the rest later.
Cheers,
sydney...@yahoo.com.au (Sydney Guy) wrote...
> "Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote...
Sydney Guy
snip
Hi Errol, I presume that you are referring to the biography of
Freyberg by his son. My local library has a copy, I've browsed through
it but haven't read it cover to cover.
The incidents you refer to between Blamey & Auchinleck are covered in
great detail in the Australian Official History - Army series. The
appropriate volumes would be Vol 1 "To Benghazi" Vol 2 "Greece, Crete
& Syria", and Vol 3 "Tobruk & El Alamein". David Horner's book "High
Command" also covers them in detail, as does his later biography of
Blamey. Blamey also had similar disputes with Wavell, and no doubt
would have had with Montgomery & Alexander too had he and the bulk of
the Australian divisions not been recalled home.
I'm surprised that you say "Churchill was embarrassed" over Greece,
the man had more hide than an elephant. The whole exercise was one of
deception - if the Aust & NZ Govts had known the true facts they'd
never have agreed to it. Basically, the Australian Prime Minister
Menzies was told that Blamey had already agreed to the scheme, while
Blamey was told that the Aust Govt had already committed the troops.
Faced with an apparent fait accompli, Blamey felt he had no option but
to make the best of a bad job. It was only when it was too late to
back out that the Aust Govt found out that Blamey considered the whole
expedition a lost cause.
What makes the whole episode even more reprehensible was that Menzies
had been passing through Cairo on his way to London while Churchill &
Wavell were exchanging cables on the proposed Greek expedition and the
plan to use Australian & NZ troops. But neither Menzies nor Blamey
were given a hint that such an expedition was being considered. The
obvious reason for keeping them in the dark was that had Menzies
known, he would have naturally consulted Blamey and found out how
doomed the whole venture was.
IMO the conflicts arose to a large extent because of the different
perspective of the Great Power and the small power. Churchill and
Wavell were well aware of the risks, but they also knew that Britain
could not afford to be seen letting Greece go under without lifting a
finger. In that context, the risk of losing 2-3 divisions out of a
total of 100 or more was an acceptable gamble. But for Australia & NZ
the stakes were much higher, since the planned force was the
Australian 6th & 7th Divisions and the NZ 3rd Division - 50% and 100%
of their expeditionary forces respectively. (In the end, the 7th never
made it to Greece) The British Army was only providing a tank brigade,
Commandos & support units, so to a large extent Churchill was gambling
with our money. For us, the loss of those units would have been
extremely serious, as they would not have been available to be
recalled in early 1942.
As it is, the credit for saving as many from Greece as we did is due
to Blamey (and the Navy of course). Before the troops even arrived, he
personally inspected the Peloponnese and marked potential evacuation
beaches. When Jumbo Wilson's HQ belatedly realised evacuation was
necessary and that they had no contingency plans in place, Blamey
pulled out the map and said "get on with it".
Regarding Tobruk, Blamey remarked that British generals tended to keep
a unit in action until it was completely worn out physically and
mentally, and it then required a long time to get it back into
fighting shape. His policy based on his extensive WW1 experience was
to rotate the units so that they could be rested and retain their
condition and morale. (Again, I see this as the difference in attitude
between a small Power that must husband its resources and a large
Power that can afford to be more profligate.) This is what provoked
the dispute about Tobruk.
Blamey's request for relief was sparked by a report from the AIF's
chief medical officer who was alarmed by the physical deterioration in
the soldiers. It was hardly surprising. The garrison had no fresh food
for months, brackish and heavily chlorinated water to drink, and rest
consisted of being rotated from the front line to rear areas that were
shelled and bombed daily. Although morale was high, all the men had
lost considerable weight, the rate of illness was rising, and the
recovery from injury was slower. The concern was that if nothing was
done, the mens' physical condition would deteriorate to the point that
they wouldn't be able to resist a determined attack, and Tobruk would
be lost along with the 9th Division.
This argument went on for literally months, with Churchill seizing the
pretext of every change of Govt in Australia - Menzies was replaced as
PM by his deputy, then subsequently by Labor's John Curtin in Oct (?)
1941 - as an excuse to countermand the relief. Then Auchinleck
reversed the decision on flimsy grounds, provoking the confrontation
in the quote you made.
An additional motivation for wanting the relief of the Tobruk garrison
had been the desire to concentrate the AIF into a single body
commanded by an Australian, in accordance with Blamey's instructions
from the Australian Govt. At this time the 9th Div was in Tobruk along
with one brigade of the 7th Div, the 9th's artillery units were in
Egypt, the rest of the 7th was in Syria, and the remnants of the 6th
were being re-formed in Palestine after being decimated in Greece &
Crete.
The British commanders had a tendency to detach units piecemeal and
break up divisions, a constant source of friction with the Dominion
commanders. Eg Freyberg was asked to lend his HQ signallers for a
temporary period of 3 weeks until the rest of the Division arrived. It
took him _5 months_ of pressure before he had them returned. In fact,
he wasn't able to get all of his troops under his own command until
they embarked for Greece!
Blamey had flatly refused all requests to detach his troops from
Australian command, probably because he'd seen it all before when he
was chief of staff to Monash in WW1, whereas Freyberg had served in
the British Army in WW1 and subsequently. However, Blamey had had to
allow the 9th to garrison Cyrenaica without their own artillery units
because they hadn't been issued with their guns,which were to be
supplied from Britain. He also had had to allow individual Divisions
to be sent to different campaigns because of operational necessity.
ISTM that one reason that the British generals were so ready to
break-up divisions and form mixed formations was so they could appoint
one of their own in command. Blamey referred to them as the "Union of
British Generals" (as in Trade Union). The Dominion Govts would
naturally expect a wholly Australian or South African formation to be
commanded by one of their own officers. At one point it was proposed
that the Australian & NZ contingents be amalgamated to form an
Australian Corps under an Australian general and an Anzac Corps under
Freyberg. The British generals always seemed to find excuses why they
couldn't do it.
Another source of complaint was the way that experienced and
successful Dominion generals continually had inexperienced British
regular officers promoted above them. This was particularly galling
for Freyberg, who when he was retired from the British Army in ~1938
was second only to Wavell in seniority. One of the reasons for this
appears to be that the Dominion officers were mostly citizen soldiers,
and the Sandhurst mafia were looking after their own. For example,
Montgomery told Morshead that only regular officers were fitted for
higher commands - and this said to the man who by defeating Rommel's
assault on Tobruk in April 1941 was the first Allied general to defeat
the German Army in WW2!
Errol Cavit
news:5cfb6f9f.03032...@posting.google.com...
> "Errol Cavit" <err...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:<b5mph4$rni$1...@lust.ihug.co.nz>...
> >
> > While I agree with your overall point, the divisions from the ME issue
is
> > But there was no difference in the treatment of Oz and NZ when they
annoyed
> > the major allies with the Canberra Pact, despite the earlier differing
> > levels of compliance with their wishes.
>
> I don't claim to be an expert on NZ history, but my understanding was
> that the NZ Govt only reluctantly agreed to leave the 3rd Division in
> the ME under pressure from the US & UK. [small error here, it was 2nd NZ
Div in MTO, 3rd NZ Div in Pacific]
The released discussion papers and recent scholarship that I have read (Kia
Kahu: NZ in the 2nd WW I think it was) show a balanced debate behind the
scenes. The major allies' wishes were one factor, but others included the
cost of moving the 2NZEF base, and the best use of the 2nd division in its
current state of training and experience from the POV of the overall war
effort. NZ not being under threat of direct invasion was noted. Of course,
being a small part of a large coalition means that a constant bribery/threat
undertone exists. And then there is the public perception with would
encourage politicians to make it look like they put up a fight.
<snip quality of US-provided divisions>
I'm not too sure of the timings involved, so I won't comment.
> <snip>. So without Churchill's intervention, the
> 7th would have been lost when the NEI collapsed.
>
poetic justice.
> I'm not sure I'd agree that the best idea was to leave the NZ Division
> in the ME. It meant that the NZEF was at the end of a very long LOC
> for reinforcements and repatriation of wounded, and meant that many of
> the soldiers would have no home leave for 5 long years. In contrast,
> from 1942 Australian units were rotated home from the fighting in NG
> to recuperate and had the opportunity to see their families on leave.
After the North Africa campaign was over, the question was examined again.
Transfer to the Pacific as a unit wasn't seriously considered, although
bringing the 3rd Div up to strength and releasing manpower back to NZ (guns
for butter, absolutely literally!) was. The best military option probably
would have been transfer to NW Europe, where skills and experience as an
exploitation unit could have been fully utilised. Again, the cost of moving
the 2NZEF base counted against this. I'm not sure how many non-officers
spent 5 years overseas, there was a furlough programme (including many that
refused to return), as well as the re-organisation of late 44/early 45.
Those OR with >3years overseas returned to NZ, 3rd Div was disbanded, and
the 2nd Div restructured to contain more infantry.
> And had NZ been directly threatened by Japan, how enthusiastic would
> the 3rd have been about fighting in the ME?
>
True. The 'for the greater good' line went down better in NZ than it would
have in Oz. "The ANZAC Spirit" means different things over here.
Of course, Australia wasn't realistically threatened with invasion
(logistics, logistics, logistics), but the public perception was rather
different (especially if you were in Darwin).
> Of course, had they returned home the USN would have left them
> unutilised just as they did the 2nd (?) Div, so they were of more use
> to the war effort in the ME. But that had more to do with the
> absurdities of the USN/US Army infighting than to a rational strategic
> plan.
As well as Dugout Doug's ego, there was the stated position of the US from
early 1944 to make sure that Oz and NZ units wouldn't end the war in
contentious locations that they might want to have a say in running
post-war. A big factor in disbanding 3rd Div. Carrying on the insurance
theme "your claim has been refused. And you sir, with the premium package?
I'm very sorry, but we regret that we are not able to make any payments to
you at this time."
OTOH, what I read in an Oz paper (The Australian IIRC) regarding current
US-Oz trade negotiations was interesting. Something along the lines of
'while the Administration negotiates such treaties purely of trade issues,
we note that recent Australian support is likely to make passage through
Congress easier'.
Arved Sandstrom
news:5de75844.03032...@posting.google.com...
> OK, you know it's extremely unlikely to get money from Anglo-American
> insurance company when you make a claim. Then the sensible thing to do
> is terminate your insurance policy with them right now. Isn't it?
>
> BTW, it may still be argued that sending a couple of frigates to the
> Gulf or Arabian Sea is in Australia's strategic interest. But I doubt
> Australia has any 'vital' interest there or her contribution, which is
> welcome but not essential, can influence over US decisions. Don't they
> have more than enough resources to do all the work unaided? What do
> you think why Australia helps the US in Iraq now?
The US absolutely needs some allies on the ground with them, visible and in
combat roles, to show the world that this is not just them. In the case of
the UK the contribution is substantial but the problem being, much of the
world thinks of Blair as being Bush's lapdog (I don't incidentally, so let's
not run off on that tangent). Australia has a little bit of the same stigma
attached but not nearly to the same extent, so their presence really helps
with the media spin (again, I am being very objective here - I have the
highest regard for Aussie military prowess and the UK troops also).
I think what the US would absolutely love is if they could show soldiers
from a former East Bloc country heroically fighting and dying in liberating
another oppressed people. May sound cynical, but hey, let's be realistic.
AHS
Jack Linthicum
You mean like this:
By that standard, there are only about a half dozen members of the
coalition in the current war. In addition to the 250,000 or so U.S.
troops, there are 45,000 from Britain and about 2,000 from Australia.
Denmark and Spain have sent a small number of troops, though not,
apparently, for ground combat.
Still, it's not certain exactly who is participating. Poland, for
example, had originally said it would help only in a non-combat role.
But the country acknowledged some of its commandos had participated in
the attack when the Reuters news agency produced photographs of masked
Polish soldiers taking prisoners, scrawling graffiti on a portrait of
Saddam Hussein and posing with U.S. Navy SEALs with an American flag.
or this?
Polish Troops May Deploy to Turkey
Szczecin, March 23: Between 70 and 74 Polish chemical troops could be
deployed to Turkey as part of Poland’s contribution to the
anti-terrorist coalition, Polish defence minister Jerzy Szmajdzinski
said in the seacoast city Szczecin. Szmajdzinski, in Szczecin for a
regional congress of his mother party Democratic Left Alliance (SLD),
said the soldiers would have clear orders to operate only on the
Turkish territory. He added that the mission would require accord
between NATO, the Turkish government and the Turkish armed forces.
http://www.polandembassy.org/News/p3-1.htm
Brings Poland full circle as Polish units under British were used in
the Middle East in WWII, one of my professors was in that group.
Arved Sandstrom
news:7164002b.0303...@posting.google.com...
I mean exactly like that. You understand me perfectly. Overflight rights
and/or humanitarian efforts are one thing, as are basing rights, but actual
combat troops are something else.
Quite apart from the Polish, folks will also start to wonder what the
limited contingent of Czech chemical defence troops (after some bow-outs) is
actually doing, considering some obvious concern about recent news.
AHS
TMOliver
>>
>> Even supposedly well-educated Americans make appallingly
>> stupid statements that demonstrate they know very little
>> about the outside world. Eg in 2000 Shrub's National
>> Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice told the NY Times that
>> Iran was backing the Taliban. Anyone with a basic knowledge
>> of the Islamic world would know that Shia Iran supporting
>> the violently anti-Shia fundamentalist Sunni Taliban is
>> somewhat less likely than the Vatican financing Protestant
>> terrorists in Northern Ireland. But then, I doubt that Rice
>> knows much about Northern Ireland either. And this woman is
>> supposed to be a foreign policy specialist?
>
> On its face, it's a ludicrous quote, but I would want to see
> the context. Even smart people engage mouths before putting
> brains in gear.
On the other hand, there seems to be substantial evidence that
Iran was providing both logistics and some weapon supplies to
Baluchi forces (folks with some traditional Iranian ties) during
much of the conflict with the Soviets in the Afghanistan's
South. The tale of how the Taliban emerged as the pre-eminent
force in the country has hardly had a full telling, but
certainly may have much to do with unity of relgious
perspective/purpose overcoming tribal/clan loyalties which
seemed to have little purpose but self-enrichment at great cost
to others.
>
> Incidentally, I don't think you'll see me refer to the
> Saddam Insane, or Shrub, or similar epithets that lower the
> credibility of what else I say.
Don't worry. Dubya lives (weekends) but a few miles away, a ten
minute drive, and I admire him substantially for his capacity to
"touch" the common man (or at least the US version thereof), a
quality unappreciated by most folks here who consider themselves
to be considerably better than average/common). Unflattering
nicknames are the shorthand of the ngs, permitted as long as
widely comprehended. I know its wroing to call Germans "Nazis"
any more , but who could argue with Kraut, Boche or Hun. After
all, one still heras "Tedeschi" in Italy, no more favorable a
sobriguet. "Oz" and "Ozmandian" came to flower during a period
when Australians were noted if not celebrated for their narrow
and parochial perspective, but are hardly epithets today. We
are a bit more sensitive to folks of color these days, but I
only last week heard an educated if offensive Aussie let slip
"Abo" in polite discourse with some semi-educated quasi-
intellectuals. Some of my wife's cousins regularly speak of
each other as "Bohunks" after several too many Old Milwaukees
and a half dozen sausage kolaces (a 'merkin interpolation),
while over on the seamy side of town where are to be found the
cinq a sept motels, "French" is no more a nationality than half
and half's a dairy product.
>
>>
>> In America I was a number of times complimented on how well
>> I spoke English!!! That was not an unusual experience for
>> Australians in the USA, either people were confusing
>> Australia with Austria or didn't know that Australia is an
>> English-speaking country.
No, that too many of us 'merkins, along with the idioms employed
by dwellers of remote corners of Cornwall, North Wales, East
Lunnun and Yorkshire and graduates of Indian universities, the
dialect favored by many Australians can approach the
incomprehensible. Obviously, yours has been improved by travel.
My TexMex (of a sort unused in Spain since the 18th century)
Spanish functions well in South Texas, remote rural Spain and
even in Sicily (adding a gesture or two), but is inadequate in
San Juan or much of New York City, but fortunately, the slow
broad drawl of the Southwest enables English speakers almost
everywhere to understand me, and my 200 words or so of Med
littoral Shore Patrol French has on occasion functioned
adequately in Artois, Picardy, Bruges and downtown Paris, while
a year of college Italian and substantial port and later tourist
visits to Italy provide me with functionality if not fluency. I
can even struggle with but comprehend most the Frisian as spoken
by the residents of the North of the Netherlands (from whence
cometh part of what became "English")
I hesitate, however, to return to SEA carrying nothing but ill-
remembered Vietnamese.
>
> Dammmit...and I thought I had the platypus and the kiwis in
> the right country, I said, sheepishly.
>
>>
>> I'm not claiming that the majority of Australians are
>> foreign affairs whizzes, they aren't. But if you want to
>> know about the outside world, the information is there in
>> our newspapers and TV coverage. In the US, it wasn't in the
>> 1980s and apparently isn't today either:
I suspect that it matters not a whit where one travels in the
world that outside an extemely narrow (and usually extremely
parochial) realm of academics (and a handful of self-elected
elitists), knowledge of folks, places and things in furrin
places remains quite limited. I must admit to having found
folks in rural Apulia forty years ago no wiser than folks in
rural Georgia, and in more recent years to have determined that
the level of awareness of international affairs among rural
Gallowayians was pretty much on a par with the level displayed
among the Scots descendants clinging to patches of land in the
hollows of West Virginia.
Certainly, around the world, Australians fall into the rare
company of 'Merkins when it comes to local jokes (at their
expense) concerning levels of awareness.
In a lifetime of contemplation of the situation, I'm comfortable
that most of my fellow USAians, having lived in an environment
in which all but the very poorest have access to an amazing
variety of entertainment and recreation (mostly the lazy sort)
and, like the Romans of yore, could give less of a shit for the
barbarians until they approach the gates. I suggest that no
matter the claims of the Australian posters, the general
perspective of most Ozmandians (with exception of a few earnest,
sincese and over-wrought whingers) is not dissimilar.
....But then, whether we're speaking of reed harvesters in the
Pripets, Yunnanese subsistence rice farmers, horse wranglers on
Wyoming Dude ranches, cattle drovers in Oz, or a thoudand other
groups about the world representing a clear majority of folks,
if it ain't their goats in the wire or ox in the mire, they
remain little concerned.
Social, political, ideological or philosophical consciousness
are absolute luxuries available to folks well able to support
themselves or supported by the funds or efforts of others. As
one old Prof of mine, the CIA rep on the Univ. of Texas campus
back in '60, used to claim: "Professors and students have
entirely too much time on their hands, and enjoy life's greatest
luxury, falling into bed at night so lacking in physical
exhaustion that they remain awake contemplating the evils of the
world."
So, let's cease and desist with attempting to sell the awareness
and broad interests of most folks, wherever they live, and
realize that the breed who inhabit the newsgroups are a rare and
unattractive lot of objectionable
hybrids/crossbreeds/inbreeds/mutants hardly refelective of the
norm, sometimes genetically classified as genus: "Bullshit
Artistes"
TMO
Jack Linthicum
Unit also got mention in Qatar Cencom briefing this morning. Group is
called GROM, Slavic root runs to "thunder", "huge", gromila (Burglar),
gromit (v) raid, sack, loot, smash up, (adj) loud, etc. You get the
point.
Michael P. Reed
> Quite apart from the Polish, folks will also start to wonder what the
> limited contingent of Czech chemical defence troops (after some bow-outs) is
> actually doing, considering some obvious concern about recent news.
Not sure about the Czechs, but reports are that Ukraine has now given the
go-ahead for their CW defense unit (IIRC) to enter Iraq, when previously the
Ukrainian gov. said it would do no such a thing.
The ROK is now debating sending engineer troops to the Gulf.
Neither exactly combat troops, but are significant (politically) anyway.
--
Regards,
Michael P. Reed
Errol Cavit
<snip>
>
> Unit also got mention in Qatar Cencom briefing this morning. Group is
> called GROM, Slavic root runs to "thunder", "huge", gromila (Burglar),
> gromit (v) raid, sack, loot, smash up, (adj) loud, etc. You get the
> point.
Anyone else having problems getting transcripts of these briefings?
www.defenselink.mil doesn't have them, and I can't get though to
www.centcom.mil. ("The system was unable to communicate with the
server." - this multiple times over the last few days at different
times). Are they mirrored anywhere?
The Aussie ones are at www.defence.gov.au/media/index.html, and Brit
at www.operations.mod.uk/telic/statements.htm (including direct links
to the Qatar briefings)
Thanks
Errol Cavit
Arved Sandstrom
news:ep4ga.3290372$TJ.4...@post-02.news.easynews.com...
Yes, either or both of those would be very significant developments
politically.
AHS
KDR
I fully respect Australian troops' professionalism, but don't think
the Australian forces are absolutely vital there. I mean militarily,
not for the media spin. As I posted earlier, I believe the US can
finish the war with or without Australia's contribution. Several days
ago Rumsfeld said the US might go to war with Iraq even without the
UK...
Cheers,
"Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote...
> "KDR" <huma...@hanmail.net> wrote...
Alexander (Sandy) McClearn
> As to the last point, if there isn't, it would be an excellent opportunity
> to follow Tobin's erstwhile vision and use requirements like this to
> jumpstart our shipbuilding industry.
The industry would die again almost as soon as the contracts were
complete. Canadian military contracts come far too rarely to base a
shipbuilding industry on, and civilian contracts seem to be a rarity.
Saint John Shipbuilding closed out not too long after the frigate
contract was fulfilled, and (as far as I am aware) the only major ships
built by Halifax Shipyard since the MCDV contract are four European
designed offshore tugs for Irving's own towing company, Atlantic Towing.
The last one is just out of the building shed, and will probably launch
in the next two months. I don't know if they have anything planned for
after that.
Moot point, as the Halifax yard doesn't have the facilities to build
anything as big as an AOR these days, nor possibly a frigate or
destroyer (although they do have a habit of up-sizing their
infrastructure every time they build something bigger than the last one).
Regards,
--
Sandy McClearn, P.Eng. Civil Engineer smcc...@hazegray.org
Haze Gray & Underway........Maritime History.........www.hazegray.org
Tall Ships/Foundation Maritime/Ship Tours..www.hazegray.org/features/
Canadian Naval History...............www.hazegray.org/navhist/canada/
Arved Sandstrom
news:3E80FC3D...@is2.dal.ca...
> Arved Sandstrom wrote:
>
> > As to the last point, if there isn't, it would be an excellent
opportunity
> > to follow Tobin's erstwhile vision and use requirements like this to
> > jumpstart our shipbuilding industry.
>
> The industry would die again almost as soon as the contracts were
> complete. Canadian military contracts come far too rarely to base a
> shipbuilding industry on, and civilian contracts seem to be a rarity.
> Saint John Shipbuilding closed out not too long after the frigate
> contract was fulfilled, and (as far as I am aware) the only major ships
> built by Halifax Shipyard since the MCDV contract are four European
> designed offshore tugs for Irving's own towing company, Atlantic Towing.
> The last one is just out of the building shed, and will probably launch
> in the next two months. I don't know if they have anything planned for
> after that.
>
> Moot point, as the Halifax yard doesn't have the facilities to build
> anything as big as an AOR these days, nor possibly a frigate or
> destroyer (although they do have a habit of up-sizing their
> infrastructure every time they build something bigger than the last one).
I didn't mean just the new AORs. I meant "jumpstart" literally. In
population and technical capability we (Canada) are every much as good, or
better, as most of the shipbuilding nations. So why aren't _we_ building our
own ships, and even better, exporting others?
I think we both know why. Short-sighted corporate policies. Now they are
paying for it, and so is society.
AHS
Arved Sandstrom
>
> I fully respect Australian troops' professionalism, but don't think
> the Australian forces are absolutely vital there. I mean militarily,
> not for the media spin. As I posted earlier, I believe the US can
> finish the war with or without Australia's contribution. Several days
> ago Rumsfeld said the US might go to war with Iraq even without the
> UK...
You make an important distinction. The Australians are clearly not going to
care much about helping the White House polling figures. Nor is the UK.
I think that both countries (the UK and Australia) have identified that when
you live in a world where there is a country that is so massively superior
in all respects, it doesn't hurt to be conspicuously allied with it.Benefits
will accrue as a result.
AHS
Alexander (Sandy) McClearn
> I didn't mean just the new AORs. I meant "jumpstart" literally. In
> population and technical capability we (Canada) are every much as good, or
> better, as most of the shipbuilding nations. So why aren't _we_ building our
> own ships, and even better, exporting others?
>
> I think we both know why. Short-sighted corporate policies. Now they are
> paying for it, and so is society.
Expensive labour has as much to do with it as anything, I suppose.
Shipbuilding in the west in general has suffered IMHO from the cheaper
labour available elsewhere.
Derek Lyons
>The basic problem is that when you live in the US its damned hard to
>get _any_ information about what's happening in the rest of the world.
>I had to take out a subscription to The Economist in order to get any
>news about Australia at all. The Washington Post, for example, will
>devote far more pages to the Prince Georges County school board
>elections than to foreign affairs.
Which is hardly surprising, because The Washington Post is after all,
a Washington DC area local newspaper. The United States doesn't have
a 'National' newspaper in the way that many (physically) smaller
nations have. By the time events began moving fast enough that a
'National' newspaper was warranted, and the technology existed to make
such a thing possible, radio had already settled comfortably into that
niche.
>In fact, the parochialism in the news media is such that I used to
>find that on the occasions I went up to Canada for work, the Canadian
>TV news had a better coverage of what was happening _in the US_ than
>the NY City TV stations. The NYC stations would fill their broadcasts
>with the latest media antics of the NYC mayor, or the media antics of
>the NY State Governor, with a little time devoted to the media antics
>of the US President and damn-all of anythging else.
Why should the NY TV stations cover anything more than NY affairs?
National news was the purview of the national networks, and is now the
purview of the national networks and the cable networks. Keep in mind
that until fairly recently US citizens identified more strongly with
their states and regions than with the nation as a whole.
D.
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Arved Sandstrom
> Arved Sandstrom wrote:
>
> > I didn't mean just the new AORs. I meant "jumpstart" literally. In
> > population and technical capability we (Canada) are every much as good,
or
> > better, as most of the shipbuilding nations. So why aren't _we_ building
our
> > own ships, and even better, exporting others?
> >
> > I think we both know why. Short-sighted corporate policies. Now they are
> > paying for it, and so is society.
>
>
> Expensive labour has as much to do with it as anything, I suppose.
> Shipbuilding in the west in general has suffered IMHO from the cheaper
> labour available elsewhere.
Exactly the specific point I was thinking about - the cost of labour. And
that's why I mentioned short-sighted policies - outsourcing and so on.
But it can't be that simple. I'm pretty sure Finnish wages are pretty
respectable, and I know they live well. So why do they have a robust
shipbuilding industry and we don't? I think it might not just be labour
costs, but government interest (including subsidies) and labour politics. On
that latter point, the unions here in Nova Scotia are causing significant
damage to one of the other remaining shipbuilding-related industries we
still have: oil-rig work.
And I do think government support might be as important as the labour costs.
AHS
Sydney Guy
> OK, you know it's extremely unlikely to get money from Anglo-American
> insurance company when you make a claim. Then the sensible thing to do
> is terminate your insurance policy with them right now. Isn't it?
>
Between the Wars, the Australian Govt attempted to interest the US in
an alliance against Japan, but got nowhere. However, from early 1942
onwards we got military support from the US against Japan even though
we had no formal alliance with them, purely because the US in 1942-43
needed Australia as a base from which to prosecute its grudge match
with Japan. OTOH, we would never have been at war with Japan at all
had the US not forced a reluctant Japan into a totally unnecessary
war, so IMHO the score is even.
In ~1950 we signed a formal alliance (the ANZUS pact) with the US.
Since then we have supported the US with Australian forces in Korea,
Vietnam, Somalia, Gulf War 1, Afghanistan & now Gulf War 2. We also
supply the US with intelligence on Indonesia and other SE Asian
countries, an area that the US hasn't paid much attention or resources
to in the 25 years or so since Vietnam. In addition, Australia has
hosted US communication bases for nuclear submarine communications
(Exmouth Gulf) and satellite ground stations for missile early warning
and electronic intelligence satellites. These comms facilities
probably made Australia a nuclear target in the event of a nuclear war
with the USSR, so we were running a considerable risk that wasn't
directly related to Australia's security. Australia has never been
directly threatened by the USSR (unlike most of NATO), nor by China
for that matter. Our immediate security concerns tend to focus more on
nextdoor neighbour Indonesia, with whom relations have have been rocky
at times.
So we can say that the premiums have been paid promptly and in full.
Turning to the claims side of the ledger, Australia has requested US
military support on 3 occasions:
(1) in 1961 to resist Indonesian demands on Dutch West New Guinea
(2) in 1964 re the possibility of a war with Indonesia over Malaysia's
independence
(3) in 1999 re a US military contribution to the Australian-led
peacekeeping force in East Timor
On each occasion we got nothing or in the case of (3), next to
nothing. (I won't go into detail on these events now, as I intend to
cover them in another reply). Suffice to say that in situation (1),
the US preferred to support Indonesia in the hope of maximising its
influence with Jakarta, and in (2) and (3) the US wasn't interested
since they didn't concern its own pissing contests with the USSR and
China.
The lesson is clear: the US will honour its treaty commitments if it
serves the US's own interests, but if no US interest is at stake then
you're on your own. However, the US position on the alliance is that
if Australia doesn't come running when the USA whistles, then they'll
tear it up. Richard Armitage said as much in Sydney a couple of years
back, and he's now an Assistant Secretary of State with responsibility
for Asia-Pacific. I'd suspect there's an element of bluff in this - we
have a few bargaining chips ourselves in the form of those comms bases
and port facilities. However it's an accurate statement of the US
attitude - alliances are binding on the ally, optional for the USA.
Benefits of the US Alliance for Australia
Australia does get certain benefits from the alliance: intelligence,
technology, logistics support, training, and what I'll call the
"uncertainty factor". The Australian military seem to place a lot of
emphasis on the first 4 issues, but IMHO the last one is probably the
most significant.
The Uncertainty Factor
Australia can never be sure that the USA will support it when
necessary. But then neither does the potential aggressor eg Indonesia.
So the alliance is likely to deter them from taking military action in
most circumstances because of uncertainty about the US's position.
Intelligence
Australia since WW2 has been involved in a joint
Intelligence-gathering network with the US, Britain, & Canada that
sweeps up electronic signals for deciphering & analysis. Australia
provides the ground stations for the ELINT satellites in this part of
the world, and we also have our own radio monitoring stations that
monitor Indonesian & other SE Asian signals. There's also an exchange
of non-sigint intelligence between US & Australian intelligence
agencies. This gives us access to Intelligence that we otherwise
couldn't get. OTOH, I'd argue that a lot of this Intelligence eg on
the USSR/Russia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa etc, is a distraction
and not really relevant to Australia's concerns. Where it counts for
us, in SE Asia, Australian intelligence & analysis is probably
superior, particularly in regard to Indonesia.
A danger here is it's easy to get lazy because of this flow of
high-quality sigint, imagery data etc in peacetime and not maintain
our own independent intelligence sources. If the US decided its
interest lay in tacitly supporting the other side (eg as in 1961), we
could find the intelligence tap abruptly turned off. Even under less
drastic conditions, the US can distort the intelligence flow to
Australia in order to influence our decisions. Washington's recent
campaign of disinformation about Iraq's alleged WMDs is a case in
point.
Technology
The Australian military seems convinced that they need the alliance in
order to get the latest & greatest toys to play with. OTOH it doesn't
seem that we get any special deals from the US (look at the Newport
LSTs), and I'm sure we could get the same technology with or without
the alliance just by paying cash for it, which we do already.
Logistics
Under the alliance arrangements, Australia can draw on US stocks of
ammunition and spare parts. This allows us to spend less of our
limited military budget on stockpiles and more on ships, aircraft,
etc. The danger is that when we actually need the stuff, the US may
not deliver. The US in 1972 made treaty commitments with South Vietnam
to supply ammunition and air support in the event of N Vietnam
breaking the "peace" treaty. When the NVA launched a massive armoured
assault only 3 years later, after the last US troops were safely out
of the country, the US ignored its treaty obligations and cut off the
ammo supply and the South went under. What message does that send to
America's allies?
In another thread in this ng I've argued that Australia needs to have
domestic production of its high-usage spare parts & ammo, and second
sources for the things we can't economically produce such as missiles.
Australia has gone a fair way down the first path with local
production of ships, submarines, and army equipment, but I'd argue we
need to do the groundwork on the second path by buying test quantities
of second-source missiles and integrating them with the combat system
software. That way second-sourcing really does become a viable option
if we need it. In fact, having the option of a second source is
valuable just in getting your first-source supplier to deliver, lest
they lose all influence over you.
Training
The Australian forces exercise regularly with US forces eg there's
usually a US contingent at the Aust Army's bi-annual large-scale
exercise, the RAN goes to RIMPAC, and the RAAF to Red Flag. We also do
officer exchanges and send people to the US staff colleges. This helps
to maintain inter-operability with US forces and the services claim
that it keeps them "at the cutting edge". OTOH, a close identification
with the corresponding US service can be a mixed blessing, as I'll
explain below, and countries such as Finland & Sweden manage to
maintain modern efficient forces without a close alliance.
Downsides to the Alliance
Dispersal of Resources on Irrelevant Campaigns
I'd argue that Gulf Wars 1 & 2 and Afghanistan fall into this
category. You can make a thin case for Aust participation in the
liberation of Kuwait on the grounds that as a small nation we're
against larger nations conquering small ones. OTOH it's all a very
long way from us, and we have more immediate needs at home eg the
stability of PNG, Fiji & the Solomons. Ditto Afghanistan. As for GW2,
there's no justification for Australian involvement at all, IMHO. I
see no reason why Australia should go seeking sorrow by involving
ourselves in other people's quarrels.
BTW US commentators have a rather elastic notion of Australia's
"region" as apparently extending from the east coast of Africa to
eastern Siberia and anywhere in between, as if these were all part of
our backyard. In reality, most European countries would be closer to
the Persian Gulf than Australia is. And as for North Korea, does South
Africa concern itself with events in the Baltic? Because that's about
how far the Korean peninsula lies from the populated parts of
Australia.
Getting Taken for Granted by the Major Ally
This has been a major problem for Australia: the US assumes our
support is locked-in so they take us for granted. It frequently seems
that the US spends more attention on tin-pot little countries than it
does to its loyal allies. Eg in 1961, the Kennedy Administration were
more interested in wooing the non-aligned Indonesia than in supporting
steadfast ally Australia. They did so because they believed they could
double-cross us at no cost to themselves - and they were right.
Similarly, when Australian troops were fighting in Vietnam the
Australian Govt complained to the US when they discovered that the US
had provided Britain with greater intelligence on the situation in
Vietnam than they had supplied to us. The US reply was "but we don't
need to tell you anything, you're already committed." If you want a
recent example, look at how the US attempted to bribe Turkey with a
$US15Bn aid package. Will a grateful US reward its faithful ally
Australia by dropping some of its many restrictions on our exports?
Don't hold your breath.
The minor ally frequently assumes that an alliance will give them
influence over the major ally eg Britain's delusions of its "special
relationship" with the US, or Australia's with Britain. However, not
only does it usually not work out that way, frequently you can find
the major ally taking actions directly contrary to the minor ally's
interest.
Distortion of Force Structure
By this I mean that the force structure becomes unbalanced because it
is overly specialised and equipped solely to provide a component of a
larger Allied force, to the extent that it cannot operate on its own.
The RCN in the Cold War seems a good example with its focus on ASW.
Something similar occurred with the RAN with its carrier obsession,
whereas they neglected other areas eg amphibious capabilities.
This is a real danger for Australia in the near future. The idiot we
currently have as PM has been mouthing off about restructuring the
Australian Defence Force for expeditionary tasks - ie he sees the real
task of the ADF not as the defence of Australia but as America's
Gurkhas to be sent anywhere in the world at Washington's whim. There
have been a number of throwaway comments about the "need" for
strategic airlift (ie long-distance jets instead of C-130s), about
restructuring the Army for high-intensity conflict (heavy armour for
warfare in the ME?) etc etc. Since the defence budget will not be
increased to meet these grandiose ambitions, they can only come at the
expense of capabilities that are more relevant to Australia's own
defence needs.
Lack of Coherence and Co-ordination between Services
This was a major problem in the era of Forward Defence from the 1950s
until the mid-1970s. The individual Australian services in those days
had far more contact with the corresponding British or US Service than
they did with each other. Eg in Vietnam the Australian Army had its
operational area east of Saigon, but the bulk of the RAAF contingent
was involved in supporting US & ARVN forces in the rest of the
country, and the RAN's destroyers & frigates were escorting USN
carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. The result was that there was almost
no co-ordination and coherence of planning between the Services until
the emphasis switched in the 70s & 80s to the defence of the
Australian continent.
Undoubtedly things have improved, however traces of these attitudes
still linger. To give an example, for a short period (in the 80s IIRC)
the RAN's amphibious ships were transferred to Townsville where they
could exercise with the Army brigade that specialises in amphibious
warfare. By all accounts it worked very well, but then the RAN lost
interest and transferred the ships back to the main fleet base at
Sydney over 2000km away. Presumably the RAN didn't like their sailors
associating with soldiers. The amphibious ships are still homeported
in Sydney, and the amphibious brigade is still based in Townsville.
A related problem has been that taking a subsidiary role in other
people's campaigns meant that the ADF had very little practice at
strategy and strategic planning, and really floundered for a while
when they had to do it for themselves post-1976. I'd argue that the
quality of strategic thinking was superior pre- and during WW2 than
what came afterward.
Aping the Bigger Ally & Equipment Envy
Close association with the armed forces of a superpower seems to
induce a desire to be just like them, including having all the same
toys. Some regular soldiers, sailors and airmen in the ADF seem to
want to be part of a "real" army, navy or airforce (ie US ones) by
having the same gear, even though this would mean a smaller and
overall less capable ADF. For example, the toy-fanciers in the RAAF
really wanted to buy F-15s in the 1980s and not F-18s, and today they
are lusting after F-22s. That the resulting smaller airforce would be
in aggregate less capable doesn't seem to concern them, nor the fact
that the threat from regional airforces doesn't require anything of
the sort.
In similar fashion, the RAN never really liked the
"fitted-for-but-not-with" concept on the Anzac frigates. They used the
opportunity of a change of Govt to get the policy reversed and stuff
the ships with expensive high-tech toys that are irrelevant to the EEZ
patrols that are the ships' primary task. Yet the policy made a lot of
sense for Australia, since it meant maximising the number of hulls
that the RAN could afford, while fitting most of the expensive weapons
& systems only if and when it seemed likely we'd need them - most
likely never. We would thus have had a considerable mobilisation
potential since we would have the long lead-time items (the hulls) in
place already and the B+V MEKO design is well suited to rapid
upgrading. As it is now, the money spent on the ANZAC Weapons
Improvement Program will have to come at the expense of some other
capability, and the RAN now has no mobilisation potential whatsoever.
(The same can be said for the Army & Airforce)
So why did they do it? AFAICT the real reason was that the RAN brass
didn't like having the RN, USN and the editor of Janes sneering at
them. That plus they have a concept that war is a "come as you are"
affair - another result of associating with the USN. If you're a
superpower, you have so many global interests that one of them could
explode at any time, so you need to have forces that are capable of
action with limited notice. For a medium power like Australia, the
area of concern is much more limited. If the situation is benign as it
is now, threats will take plenty of time to emerge and you can ratchet
up your forces to meet the threat. That's exactly what happened in the
lead-up to WW2 - rearmament in Australia began in 1934, was
intensified in 1936, was massively increased in 1937, and massively
increased again in 1938 following Munich. The notion that threats just
emerge overnight is nonsense.
Alliance - Yes or No?
On balance, Australia's alliance with the US probably brings more
pluses than minuses. So it's worth having, but it has to be managed to
keep it that way. My own position on the alliance is that we should
treat it in exactly the same hardnosed way that the US does - the
benefits to us have to outweigh the costs. We need to put strict
limits on what we will and will not do, and the geographical areas we
will commit our forces in. Above all, we have to make it quite clear
that we are not giving a blank cheque to the US. We never did it for
Britain, so why do it for the USA?
We need to manage our force structure so that our capabilities suit
the needs of Australia's defence first and foremostly. If they can
also be used for other purposes, that's nice but not essential. Our
procurement policies must ensure that we have the maximum autonomy and
can defend Australia's strategic interests without being dependent on
Washington's whims (or London or Paris for that matter). In essence, I
am proposing the same Gaullist strategy that Admiral J.R. Hill
advocates for the UK - look out for your own interests because no-one
else will do it for you.
> BTW, it may still be argued that sending a couple of frigates to the
> Gulf or Arabian Sea is in Australia's strategic interest. But I doubt
> Australia has any 'vital' interest there or her contribution, which is
> welcome but not essential, can influence over US decisions. Don't they
> have more than enough resources to do all the work unaided? What do
> you think why Australia helps the US in Iraq now?
>
That's the question that I and the rest of the 2/3rds of the
Australian public who oppose the war would like to know. The short
answer is that our current PM is a fool who knows nothing about
foreign affairs or defence strategy and cares less, but has somehow
got the idea into his head that supporting the US is a sure-fire
vote-winner.
Sydney Guy
> sydney...@yahoo.com.au (Sydney Guy) wrote:
> >The basic problem is that when you live in the US its damned hard to
> >get _any_ information about what's happening in the rest of the world.
> >I had to take out a subscription to The Economist in order to get any
> >news about Australia at all. The Washington Post, for example, will
> >devote far more pages to the Prince Georges County school board
> >elections than to foreign affairs.
>
> Which is hardly surprising, because The Washington Post is after all,
> a Washington DC area local newspaper. The United States doesn't have
> a 'National' newspaper in the way that many (physically) smaller
> nations have. By the time events began moving fast enough that a
> 'National' newspaper was warranted, and the technology existed to make
> such a thing possible, radio had already settled comfortably into that
> niche.
>
Well the Sydney Morning Herald is also a local newspaper, but it also
has a lot of foreign and national news. I would have thought that
because Washington is the capital of a country that has much wider
global interests than Australia does, the politicians, civil servants
and defence personnel that live there would have an interest in world
affairs. but clearly they have more important things on their minds,
such as who will be on the school board in Nowheresville, MD.
> >In fact, the parochialism in the news media is such that I used to
> >find that on the occasions I went up to Canada for work, the Canadian
> >TV news had a better coverage of what was happening _in the US_ than
> >the NY City TV stations. The NYC stations would fill their broadcasts
> >with the latest media antics of the NYC mayor, or the media antics of
> >the NY State Governor, with a little time devoted to the media antics
> >of the US President and damn-all of anythging else.
>
> Why should the NY TV stations cover anything more than NY affairs?
> National news was the purview of the national networks, and is now the
> purview of the national networks and the cable networks. Keep in mind
> that until fairly recently US citizens identified more strongly with
> their states and regions than with the nation as a whole.
>
Why? Gee, could it being something about an informed citizenry being
an essential part of a democracy? If your government is going to do
things around the world in your name, IMO you have a duty to know
enough to know whether they're doing right or doing wrong. And the
news media have a duty to provide that information. Citizenship of a
democracy confers duties as well as rights, and one of those duties is
to do more than contemplate your own navel.
When I referred to NYC TV stations I was including the NYC affiliates
of the national networks. While I lived there, they'd devote half the
news time to City & State affairs. A large percentage of this was
utter trivia - Mayor Ed Koch kissing babies, Mayor Koch rushing to
this photo-opportunity, Mayor Koch rushing to that photo-op, Governor
Cuomo kissing babies, etc, etc. The national news wasn't much
different, only now featuring President Reagan instead of Ed Koch
kissing the babies and rushing between photo-ops. This went on day-in
day-out ad nauseum. On the rare occasion when anything of substance
was covered, complex issues would be reduced to 30-second sound bites.
This dumbing-down of news coverage trivialises most of the political
debate in the US - witness the media obsession for months on end about
whether or not Bill Clinton got his rocks off with Monica Lewinsky.
That isn't news, it's gossip-mongering.
Joel Shepherd
> huma...@hanmail.net (KDR) wrote in message news:<5de75844.03032...@posting.google.com>...
>
> US not forced a reluctant Japan into a totally unnecessary
> war, so IMHO the score is even.
A "reluctant" Japan? Japan was not forced to invade China -- which
they did *years* before conflict broke out with the US -- and they
demonstrated no reluctance to fight in their operations there.
Repeatedly, when faced with a need to obtain access to raw materials
and supplies for its people, Japan chose force over diplomacy and trade.
Argue all you want over whether the war was necessary, but to make it
sound like Japan was dragged into it kicking and screaming is to turn
historical fact on its ear.
--
Joel.
ZZBunker
> huma...@hanmail.net (KDR) wrote in message news:<5de75844.03032...@posting.google.com>...
> > OK, you know it's extremely unlikely to get money from Anglo-American
> > insurance company when you make a claim. Then the sensible thing to do
> > is terminate your insurance policy with them right now. Isn't it?
> >
>
>
>
The reason that Australia and Canada support the war is that they
need Hollywood for they're very existence. Whereas the
US obviously has buisness to take care of.
Sydney Guy
> "Sydney Guy" <sydney...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
> news:5cfb6f9f.03032...@posting.google.com...
> > I don't claim to be an expert on NZ history, but my understanding was
> > that the NZ Govt only reluctantly agreed to leave the 3rd Division in
> > the ME under pressure from the US & UK. [small error here, it was 2nd NZ
> Div in MTO, 3rd NZ Div in Pacific]
>
> The released discussion papers and recent scholarship that I have read (Kia
> Kahu: NZ in the 2nd WW I think it was) show a balanced debate behind the
> scenes. The major allies' wishes were one factor, but others included the
> cost of moving the 2NZEF base, and the best use of the 2nd division in its
> current state of training and experience from the POV of the overall war
> effort. NZ not being under threat of direct invasion was noted. Of course,
> being a small part of a large coalition means that a constant bribery/threat
> undertone exists. And then there is the public perception with would
> encourage politicians to make it look like they put up a fight.
>
One of the problems of official histories is that they are often
sanitised so the decisions look better. I doubt that the NZ Govt in
early 1942 was in any position to say that NZ would not face a threat
of direct invasion at some point, especially if Australia went under.
An unkind observer might say that NZ was relying on Australia to
defend it, but of course I'd never suggest such a thing. :-)
snip
>
> > And had NZ been directly threatened by Japan, how enthusiastic would
> > the 3rd have been about fighting in the ME?
> >
> True. The 'for the greater good' line went down better in NZ than it would
> have in Oz. "The ANZAC Spirit" means different things over here.
>
> Of course, Australia wasn't realistically threatened with invasion
> (logistics, logistics, logistics), but the public perception was rather
> different (especially if you were in Darwin).
>
Well, nobody really knew that for sure in January 1942. Realistically,
Britain wasn't threatened by invasion in the latter half of 1940, but
the British Govt took precautions nevertheless. And actually a
Japanese occupation of Darwin following the air raid would have made a
lot of sense for them. Reconquering Darwin overland would have been
nearly impossible for the Allies given the logistics.
I also think that a swift invasion early in 1942 of the populated SW
corner of Western Australia would have been a good move for them.
After the SW fell, occupying the whole west coast from Perth to Darwin
is child's play. This would have:
1) provided air & naval bases to cut off Australia's westward LoCs. If
nothing else it would have forced the homeward-bound AIF to go the
long way round via Cape Horn
2) denied those same bases to the Allies, in particular the USN is now
unable to base its submarines at Fremantle and has much longer
transits to the Japanese shipping lanes and correspondingly lesser
time on station.
3) the logistics for the Allies of reconquering the SW overland are
even worse than Darwin
4) conversely, the logistics of the Japanese occupying force are eased
because the SW is a food-exporting region
5) holding the civilian population of WA hostage offers Japan's best
chance of forcing Australia to sign a separate peace and withdraw from
the war.
This last is a long shot, but would certainly have been worth trying
for the Japanese. If they could have forced Australia into neutrality,
then NZ would undoubtedly follow. The US then loses the southern base
for attacks on Japan, Japan occupies NG, the Solomons, New Hebrides,
Fiji, Tonga & New Caledonia with minimal opposition, and can
concentrate most of its resources on the sole remaining US axis of
advance in the Central Pacific.
In regard to Australia's SE where most of the population live, the
logistics are indeed daunting. The logistics problems for Japan were
to a large degree the result of the large forces that would have been
required to overcome Australian resistance. The IJA estimated that it
needed 12 divisions to be certain of success, and that supporting
these troops would require 2.5 million tons of shipping for a period
of 6 months. The problem was that Japan had neither the troops nor the
ships to spare. The ships were unavailable because they were urgently
needed to transport raw materials back to Japan. The ships had already
been requisitioned for 6 months to transport the forces for the
conquest of SE Asia, and in the meantime Japanese industry had been
running down its stockpiles. To requisition them for a further 6
months would have exhausted the stockpiles and caused Japanese
industry to collapse.
But why did Japan need 12 divisions to conquer Australia when they had
just conquered Malaya, the NEI & the Philippines with only 11
divisions? Particularly since legions of left-wing "historians" have
asserted that Australia was defenceless in 1942 owing to the neglect
and stupidity of the right-wing Lyons & Menzies Govts in despatching
Australia's only troops to fight Britain's wars overseas. Well the
answer is that the 4 divisions of the AIF were merely the tip of the
iceberg of Australia's Army. At its peak, the Army raised 10 divisions
plus about 2 division's worth of non-divisional units eg the Darwin
Garrison had the strength of a division but wasn't formally designated
as one. Even allowing for the loss of the 8th Div, that leaves 11
divisions, and those divisions were heavier armed than a Japanese one.
Given the requirement of a local 3:1 superiority in numbers for the
attacker, the Japanese estimate of the forces needed begins to look
over-optimistic.
> > Of course, had they returned home the USN would have left them
> > unutilised just as they did the 2nd (?) Div, so they were of more use
> > to the war effort in the ME. But that had more to do with the
> > absurdities of the USN/US Army infighting than to a rational strategic
> > plan.
>
> As well as Dugout Doug's ego, there was the stated position of the US from
> early 1944 to make sure that Oz and NZ units wouldn't end the war in
> contentious locations that they might want to have a say in running
> post-war. A big factor in disbanding 3rd Div. Carrying on the insurance
> theme "your claim has been refused. And you sir, with the premium package?
> I'm very sorry, but we regret that we are not able to make any payments to
> you at this time."
>
Far be it for me to be defending a megalomaniac & braggart, but in the
specific case of the misuse of NZ troops Dougie is innocent, m'lud.
The guilty party is the US Navy who insisted on NZ being placed in its
Central Pacific (!!!!) area of operations in defiance of any
strategic, operational or logistic considerations. IIRC NZ troops took
part in the latter part of the USMC's Solomons campaign in 1942-43 but
thereafter found themselves being relegated to garrison duties only.
It would have made more sense to have united Oz & NZ troops and used
them in the Solomons.
I'm aware of the US desire to keep Oz units out of the latter stages
in order to minimize our leverage in the peace, but I wasn't aware
that they'd said it in so many words. Can you indicate a source?
Oz also had to demobilise men from the armed forces in the last couple
of years of the war because we were getting increasing demands for
supplies for the US & Britain under Reverse Lend-Lease and there
weren't enough Australians to go around.
> OTOH, what I read in an Oz paper (The Australian IIRC) regarding current
> US-Oz trade negotiations was interesting. Something along the lines of
> 'while the Administration negotiates such treaties purely of trade issues,
> we note that recent Australian support is likely to make passage through
> Congress easier'.
Yes, I've heard similar nonsense being expressed. Note that the US has
discriminated against Australian farm exports since at least 1930 to
my knowledge, and probably longer. Since Australian support in WW2,
Korea, Vietnam, Somalia & Gulf War 1 didn't sway Congress to abandon
farm protectionism, why now? People who make such statements don't
understand US politics or history. I might also point out that the
proprietor of that paper has been a US citizen for over 20 years now,
and only comes back to Oz to attend News Corp AGMs. He's been running
a virulently pro-US and pro-war line in his papers for the last year.
John Howard's enthusiasm for a free-trade deal with the US is rather
puzzling since nobody really believes that it'll amount to much. See:
http://sunday.ninemsn.com.au/sunday/cover_stories/article_1224.asp
The major area where Australian exports face barriers are farm
products, and both the White House and Congress are far too sensitive
to the farm vote (and the $ of farm lobbyists) to abandon
protectionism and subsidies. What the US is asking for from Australia
is outrageous - abandonment of quarantine control, preventing parallel
imports so Microsoft & the record companies can rip us off, killing
the Australian film & TV industry, etc, etc. The danger is we'll give
them everything and get nothing in return. But shucks, Johnnie can
always trumpet his "success" and hope nobody reads the fine print.
Actually, the best argument I've heard for negotiating with the US
about a trade deal came from an economist who was Keating's ambassador
to Washington. He pointed out that the US is in the process of
negotiating FTAs with a number of other countries. In the process, the
painless option for the US is to take away our current limited market
access and award it to (say) Argentina in exchange for something the
US wants. So unless we are also negotiating, the temptation will be
almost overwhelming for the US to bargain away our rights. So maybe
the best approach is to string out the negotiations until all these
other deals are finalised, and then let the deal founder.
Alan Lothian
<olive(DEL)@calpha.com> wrote:
> Howard Berkowitz <h...@gettcomm.com> iterated.....
>
>
> >
> > Incidentally, I don't think you'll see me refer to the
> > Saddam Insane, or Shrub, or similar epithets that lower the
> > credibility of what else I say.
I propose to follow similar rules of engagement myself, Howard. It does
no good, as you say, and merely poisons the wells of honest discourse.
I will never again refer to Tony Blair as "The Running-Dog Lickspittle
Blairite..." oh, come to think of it, I never have.
<snip: I fear I am about to deliver a point of information to TMO>
> After
> all, one still heras "Tedeschi" in Italy, no more favorable a
> sobriguet.
"Tedesco", and its various adjectival endings ("tedesca, tedeschi,
tedesche") are simply the Italian words for "German". Cf "Deutsch", of
which "tedesco" is no more than an Italian variation. There is no
loading whatsoever, other than what history brings. You're plain wrong
here, TMO.
As to your other points, you may have a point. Limeys, gringos, (and in
British English the word Yank can be used both with and without
affection; the recipient generally notes the difference) etc. But
"tedesco" just means "German". A literal translation. I know the word
sounds nasty to an English-speaking ear, but it plain ain't.
<snipped the rest of a comfortably entertaining and erudite TMO post;
we expect no less, and indeed some of us rely on these things to feed
our greying matter.>
--
"The past resembles the future as water resembles water" Ibn Khaldun
My .mac.com address is a spam sink.
If you wish to email me, try alan dot lothian at blueyonder dot co dot uk
Paul J. Adam
<joel...@ix.netcom.com> writes
>A "reluctant" Japan? Japan was not forced to invade China -- which they
>did *years* before conflict broke out with the US -- and they
>demonstrated no reluctance to fight in their operations there.
>
>Repeatedly, when faced with a need to obtain access to raw materials
>and supplies for its people, Japan chose force over diplomacy and trade.
Begs the question of why the US saw Japan as a threat, but Germany (and
the USSR) not.
--
Paul J. Adam
Howard Berkowitz
.com wrote:
> In article <Xns93497C8CE1BE...@216.166.71.233>, TMOliver
> <olive(DEL)@calpha.com> wrote:
>
> > Howard Berkowitz <h...@gettcomm.com> iterated.....
> >
> >
> > >
> > > Incidentally, I don't think you'll see me refer to the
> > > Saddam Insane, or Shrub, or similar epithets that lower the
> > > credibility of what else I say.
>
> I propose to follow similar rules of engagement myself, Howard. It does
> no good, as you say, and merely poisons the wells of honest discourse.
> I will never again refer to Tony Blair as "The Running-Dog Lickspittle
> Blairite..." oh, come to think of it, I never have.
There are always temptations in our path. Not long ago, the North
Koreans referred to the "Imperialist Warhawks". That didn't sound like
an epithet, but a potential name for a sports team or a sports car.
Mind you, I had a personal epiphany once, while consulting in the New
York financial district. On a street of great symbolic name, I watched
a marginally professional dog-walker attempt to regain control of his
slavering pack of poodles. Turning to my colleagues, I managed to gain
sufficient self control to thank Providence that finally, I had seen the
Running Dogs of Wall Street.
Sydney Guy
> early 1960's in "Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century: The
> Australian Experience". The author is Dr Eric Grove, a Briton at the
> University of Hull in the UK.
>
> In the late 1950's, the RAN wished to acquire HMS Albion from the RN
> and convert HMAS Melborne to a helicopter carrier. They wanted to
> modernise the carrier, probably upto HMS Centaur's standards, to
> operate the latest aircraft but didn't want Sea Vixen because it was
> expensive and unsuited to Australian requiremnts. Instead, the RAN's
> FAA looked at four possibilities; a navalised N-156F (later F-5A
> Freedom Fighter), Sea Gnat (a navalised Folland Gnat), the projected
> NATO light fighter and Etendard IV. Estimated costs of the carrier
> programme were 50 million, when the RAN's anuual budget was only 40
> million. Actually they assumed the RN would give HMS Albion for free
> and just 5 million would suffice to upgrade it.
>
> However, the RN had its own plan for HMS Albion. The ship was needed
> as the second Commando carrier after HMS Bulwark, whose conversion to
> a Commando carrier was announced in 1958 Defence White Paper. Captain
> R. Hart, Director of Plans, suggested the RAN might well do with Sea
> Hawk just like the Dutch and Indians, but Rear Admiral Desmond Dreyer,
> Assistant Cheif of Naval Staff, backed the RAN's requirement for
> modern aircraft because of growing Indonesian threat. On the other
> hand, Vice Admiral L. G. Durlacher, Deputy CNS, thought 'one carrier
> navy has no future', and the most sensible thing for the RAN to do is
> to have a Commando/ASW dual-role carrier to complement the RN strike
> carriers.
>
> Then came a policy recommendation paper prepared for the Australian
> CNS, Vice Admiral Henry Burrell, who toured London and New York in
> 1960. The paper said Australia is unlikely to be directly attacked by
> nuclear weapons and any of her naval forces would be of value to the
> Western world in a broken-backed war after initial nuclear exchange.
> The main requirement would be ASW. It also stressted 'a considerable
> threat may develop to Australia from her nothern neighbours and she
> should be prepared to face such an eventuality, unaided by her allies,
> who may be prostrated by nuclear attack.'
>
> Plans division set out four options:
> Course A: an ideal, but financialy impossible fleet of 4 carriers and
> 50 escorts.
> Course B: an affordable, but much smaller fleet on the above line. 1
> carrier and 6 escorts.
> Course C: a small ship navy. This is the most economical fleet, but
> lacks any sort of air cover.
> Course D: a balanced fleet without sophisticated new weapons.
> Affordable, but cannot fight an enemy with first-class weapons.
> Difficult to inter-operate with allies.
>
> I'll post the rest later.
>
> Cheers,
>
I'll have to dig a copy of that book out of my local library. That's
the first I've heard of this plan, but most of the published
historical research on the RAN has focussed on its earlier years.
Offhand, I'd say that this is the sort of absurd grandiose plan that
the RAN staff seem to be noted for. Some obvious flaws with the plan:
(a) Why on earth would the RN give us Albion for free?
(b) Why convert Melbourne into a helo carrier when we had Sydney
sitting around under-utilised?
(c) Where was the money going to come from for refitting both Albion &
Melbourne simultaneously when we couldn't afford to convert Sydney?
(d) The 5 million Pds refit estimate was highly optimistic.
(e) Who was going to pay for navalising the F-5A, Gnat etc?
(f) Just how could they afford to do all this on a 40 million Pd
annual budget?
If this is the sort of nonsense that the RAN was proposing, no wonder
the Cabinet decided against fixed-wing naval aviation in 1959.
The paper you refer to in 1960 would seem to be after the Cabinet
decision, so presumably the RAN's staff were having difficulty facing
reality. IIRC the purpose of Burrell's trip was to discuss the RN's &
USN's plans for guided-missile destroyers so that the RAN could decide
which to buy - the County class or the Charles F. Adams class. With
the planned phaseout of the RAN's fighter cover by the mid-60s, the
DDGs had become essential. In his memoirs, Burrell says that on this
trip Adm Arleigh Burke offered to give the RAN one of the USN's
laid-up unmodified Essex class carriers (ie straight-deck), but
Burrell had to decline because of the cost of modification.
BTW KDR, which country are you from?
Arved Sandstrom
news:270320032238465987%alanl...@mac.com...
[SNIP ]
> As to your other points, you may have a point. Limeys, gringos, (and in
> British English the word Yank can be used both with and without
> affection; the recipient generally notes the difference) etc. But
> "tedesco" just means "German". A literal translation. I know the word
> sounds nasty to an English-speaking ear, but it plain ain't.
You hit the nail on the head. It's not _what_ you say, but _how_ you say it.
Although "Yank" is somewhat affectionate; "Yankee" and "cowboy" somehow
aren't.
AHS
Arved Sandstrom
news:hcb-1902E8.1...@text.giganews.com...
[ SNIP ]
> Mind you, I had a personal epiphany once, while consulting in the New
> York financial district. On a street of great symbolic name, I watched
> a marginally professional dog-walker attempt to regain control of his
> slavering pack of poodles. Turning to my colleagues, I managed to gain
> sufficient self control to thank Providence that finally, I had seen the
> Running Dogs of Wall Street.
You just made me literally laugh out loud. :-) I still am. :-)
Although I don't know that I'd call a poodle, or Pomeranian, or chihuahua,
or any other similar small rodent, a "dog". Any putative canine that can be
beaten up by a cat, or allows itself to be prettified, does not deserve to
be called a dog.
AHS
Vince Brannigan
Arved Sandstrom wrote:
"Wherever it has adapted, in whatever ecological niche in whatever part of the
world, the cat reigns supreme among carnivores in its size class. It is the
penultimate hunter, with a finely-honed stalking and killing ability that
other carnivores can only dream about."
http://www.tigertouch.org/en/felidae/catpix/overview.html
Worth noting that while some small dogs were very effective "Ratters" in a pit,
to actually hunt rats on a ship you needed a cat.
Vince
Alan Lothian
Berkowitz <h...@gettcomm.com> wrote:
<wholesale snippaggio>
> Turning to my colleagues, I managed to gain
> sufficient self control to thank Providence that finally, I had seen the
> Running Dogs of Wall Street.
O most wonderful, and justifying my shocking insomnia this night.
Of course, in some parts of East Asia, when short of protein they are
quite keen on wokking the dog.....
seeks deep cover
KDR
correctly. The book is "Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century: the
Australian Experience" edited by David Stevens. Publisher is Allen &
Unwin in Sydney.
Eric Grove's "Advice and Assistance to a very independent people at a
most crucial point: the British Admiralty and the Future of the RAN
1958-60" is a chapter of the book.
RAN Sea Power Centre Working Paper No. 2 "Struggling for a Solution:
The RAN and the Acquisition of a Surface to Air Missile Capability" by
Peter Jones and James Goldrick at
http://www.navy.gov.au/seapowercenter/working2.htm also recounts the
RAN's decision to acquire Charles F. Adams class DDGs in the early
1960's.
The RN's Plans Division prepared the paper for Vice Admiral Burrell
and the one they recommended was Course D, a balanced fleet without
latest weapons. Actually the RN briefly toyed with a more nonsensical
scheme such as an Integrated Commonwealth Fleet - the RN provides
strike carriers, while escorts are from the RAN and RNZN. However,
they frankly acknowledged its political impossibility. London wants to
send the fleet to defend Kuwait against Iraq (as in 1961), but
Australia and New Zealand don't agree, then it goes nowhere.
BTW, I am a South Korean temporarily living in Singapore.
Cheers,
sydney...@yahoo.com.au (Sydney Guy) wrote...
> huma...@hanmail.net (KDR) wrote...
> > Found an interesting story about the RAN's carrier plan late 1950's to
> > early 1960's in "Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century: The
> > Australian Experience". The author is Dr Eric Grove, a Briton at the
> > University of Hull in the UK.
> >
[snip]
KDR
alliance. I'm impressed. I fully agree with you that Austalia (or
South Korea for that matter) should look out for her own interests
first.
BTW, what's your opinion on the RAN's force structure that suits
Australia's defence needs?
Cheers,
sydney...@yahoo.com.au (Sydney Guy) wrote...
> huma...@hanmail.net (KDR) wrote...
Chris Manteuffel
> Begs the question of why the US saw Japan as a threat, but Germany (and
> the USSR) not.
Errrrm, I think you have misread the US position. FDR's foreign policy
in 1941 is best described as desperately trying to get into a war with
Germany, while trying to scare Japan into not attacking. Between
December 7 and December 11 (US time) FDR's foreign policy was a
complete disaster. Then Hitler bailed him out.
But... the US was selling warships to Britain, escalating to full Lend
Lease, then the Neutrality Zone and the battles with U-boats.
Declarations that you will shoot enemy ships on sight is an act of
war, you know, when you carry through as the US did. It's just that
FDR did not feel confident about his position enough to make it
official. Absent Japanese attack or German declaration, the US would
almost certainly have entered the war in a few more months- which
would probably be a net positive for the allies, since US force
contributions during that period were miniscule anyway, and the threat
of the neutrality zone was enough to have Hitler pull Donitz back from
half the Atlantic, a half of the ocean that could not be protected
properly due to lack of assets, as was demonstrated during Drumbeat.
The US public was slowly coming 'round to the necessecity of fighting
Germany. Polls that claim that the US didn't want to fight Germany
were taken in 1939, by 1941 the American public was accepting that
Germany was an evil that needed to be dealt with (very similiar to
what we just witnessed, in fact). It was not unaniumous and, had FDR
pushed hard and trampled things, he probably would have faced
opposition very similar to what Wilson faced in Big Mistake One-
70-80% of the country in support, 20-30% against. Then 2000 sailors,
soldiers, and airmen died and all the political calculations became
meaningless.
To say that the US did not consider Germany a threat and did consider
Japan is wrong, categorically. Germany first was decided *before* the
US went to war, after all,that was Rainbow-5. The celebrated oil
embargo was instituted on Japan almost two years after the effective
embargo of all goods for Germany (Cash and Carry combined with the
immediate internment of all German merchant ships in the US plus the
Royal Navy being told where German ships were by "neutral" Americans =
very effective embargo). And the US never had a policy of shooting
Japan on sight until they had the war warning in front of them, unlike
the Germans.
The very grave danger for FDR during that 4 day period was that the US
public would become so preoccupied with Japan that they would lose
interest in Germany until after we had finished crushing them.
As for the USSR, Wilson's AG, Palmer, had launched a major crackdown
of the Communists during the Russian Revolution and throughout the
1930's there were gov't crackdowns on Communists. Between 1920 and
1939, however, the Soviet Union was preoccupied internally and did not
attmept to expand and the threat gradually died away in the minds of
many. By 1942 they became our ally (Mission to Moscow, anyone?) and
then by 1947 they were our enemy again.
Chris Manteuffel
Brian Sharrock
"Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote in message
news:wxOga.36188$cB3.2...@nnrp1.uunet.ca...
> "Alan Lothian" <alanl...@mac.com> wrote in message
> news:270320032238465987%alanl...@mac.com...
> [SNIP ]
> > As to your other points, you may have a point. Limeys, gringos, (and in
> > British English the word Yank can be used both with and without
> > affection; the recipient generally notes the difference) etc. But
> > "tedesco" just means "German". A literal translation. I know the word
> > sounds nasty to an English-speaking ear, but it plain ain't.
>
AIUI, the 'German' people consisted of many tribes, each linguistic
group applied the name of its contiguos tribe to what was later
know as German. Thus Italians fought against the tedesci, Slavs against
the Nemyetski, Brits against the Huns, French against the Boche ...
> You hit the nail on the head. It's not _what_ you say, but _how_ you say
it.
>
> Although "Yank" is somewhat affectionate; "Yankee"
Always thought this was a American (New England colonists) term
of derision for the Dutch colonists (New Amsterdam, Jonkers, etc),
whom the Americans called 'Jan Kees' or Johnny Cheese.
--
Brian
Arved Sandstrom
news:3e8443c5$0$7476$afc3...@news.easynet.co.uk...
>
> "Arved Sandstrom" <asand...@accesswave.ca> wrote in message
> news:wxOga.36188$cB3.2...@nnrp1.uunet.ca...
> > "Alan Lothian" <alanl...@mac.com> wrote in message
> > news:270320032238465987%alanl...@mac.com...
> > [SNIP ]
> > > As to your other points, you may have a point. Limeys, gringos, (and
in
> > > British English the word Yank can be used both with and without
> > > affection; the recipient generally notes the difference) etc. But
> > > "tedesco" just means "German". A literal translation. I know the word
> > > sounds nasty to an English-speaking ear, but it plain ain't.
> >
>
> AIUI, the 'German' people consisted of many tribes, each linguistic
> group applied the name of its contiguos tribe to what was later
> know as German. Thus Italians fought against the tedesci, Slavs against
> the Nemyetski, Brits against the Huns, French against the Boche ...
Since I am ethnically Estonian, I can tell you that Germans are "sakslased"
(originally "saksid", meaning more or less "foreign overlords"), Russians
are "venelased" (a "vene" being a small boat used on Lake Peipsi between
Russia and Estonia), Finns are "soomlased" (the Estonians and Finns are
ethnically related and the Estonians pretty much follow the Finnish term of
self-reference as Suomilainen - or something like that. LOL). We also go
along with the Swedish term for their own country and call them
"rootslased". These are all the plural terms - replace "sed" with "ne" for
the singular.
It's not uncommon at all for ethnic groups to find out what other ethnic
groups call themselves, and then adapt the term to their own language. But
other terms often take also, as my examples above also demonstrate.
> > You hit the nail on the head. It's not _what_ you say, but _how_ you say
> it.
> >
> > Although "Yank" is somewhat affectionate; "Yankee"
>
> Always thought this was a American (New England colonists) term
> of derision for the Dutch colonists (New Amsterdam, Jonkers, etc),
> whom the Americans called 'Jan Kees' or Johnny Cheese.
OK, you are now going _way_ back. :-) Not 1 in 1000 of Americans would know
that either.
But you get my point.
AHS
David Phillips
wrote:
><snipped the rest of a comfortably entertaining and erudite TMO post;
>we expect no less, and indeed some of us rely on these things to feed
>our greying matter.>
You betcha!
My SOP for s.m.n, reading via Forte Agent, is to sort by author, after
I've gone through in sort by thread.
That way, I'll pick up any TMO posts in threads I had skipped for
other reasons.
David Phillips
On the other hand, a standard poodle can be a pretty nice (and large)
dog.
I'm far from the world's greatest expert on dogs, but weren't the
poodles (real ones, not miniature or toy) hunting dogs of some sort?
Still I'd rather have one of the wolfhounds (Irish over Russian though
.. a little more heft, as I understand it.)
Arved Sandstrom
news:vah88v88udfc5ksci...@4ax.com...
[ SNIP ]
> I'm far from the world's greatest expert on dogs, but weren't the
> poodles (real ones, not miniature or toy) hunting dogs of some sort?
Yes, you're right, a poodle in its natural state is neither a miniature nor
unpleasant. But they do have an unfortunate name, and I have no idea where
_that_ comes from. :-)
AHS
TMOliver
>
> Worth noting that while some small dogs were very effective
> "Ratters" in a pit, to actually hunt rats on a ship you
> needed a cat.
>
As legend if maybe not fact has it, cats would only kill enough
to eat, while the terriers, their blood lust aroused would kill
until exhausted.
Several of the terrier breeds including "Rat" and "Manchester"
seem to have been bred for barn or food storage rodent control.
Of course, the legendary Jack Russells, including mine of
the short legged sort, were bred to go into the den after the
fox, grab a mouthful and hang on as they were hauled by their
stumpy curtails to the surface, then release the fox so that
hounds and horsemen could have their sport.
One thing about the English....They could hardly have had either
sport or trade without breeding up dogs or the Irish for the
hard parts....
TMO
Vince Brannigan
TMOliver wrote:
> Vince Brannigan <vze2...@verizon.net> iterated.....
>
>
> >
> > Worth noting that while some small dogs were very effective
> > "Ratters" in a pit, to actually hunt rats on a ship you
> > needed a cat.
> >
>
> As legend if maybe not fact has it, cats would only kill enough to
> eat, while the terriers, their blood lust aroused would kill
> until exhausted.
IIRC kill yes, hunt no. Sled dogs were used in polar exploration
because they would happily eat one another.
> Several of the terrier breeds including "Rat" and "Manchester" seem to
> have been bred for barn or food storage rodent control.
never heardd of them used that way on ships. Cats hav retractable claws
that make them both more silent and better climbers.
>
> Of course, the legendary Jack Russells, including mine of the short
> legged sort, were bred to go into the den after the
> fox, grab a mouthful and hang on as they were hauled by their stumpy
> curtails to the surface, then release the fox so that
> hounds and horsemen could have their sport.
Dogs were always willing to be trained as domestic workers. Cats by
their nature can be domesticated but are not "workers"
> One thing about the English....They could hardly have had either sport
> or trade without breeding up dogs or the Irish for the
> hard parts....
In the fire business, We tell people this about their pets
Don't bother about the birds they have such high metabolism that if
there is a fire they are soon dead.
Don't bother about the dogs, they have a great sense of smell are built
low to the ground and bark from the front lawn
Don't bother about the cats, the police will arrest them for the arson.
Vince
Arved Sandstrom
news:Xns934C748DC2AD...@216.166.71.233...
> Vince Brannigan <vze2...@verizon.net> iterated.....
>
[ SNIP ]
> Several of the terrier breeds including "Rat" and "Manchester"
> seem to have been bred for barn or food storage rodent control.
> Of course, the legendary Jack Russells, including mine of
> the short legged sort, were bred to go into the den after the
> fox, grab a mouthful and hang on as they were hauled by their
> stumpy curtails to the surface, then release the fox so that
> hounds and horsemen could have their sport.
That's exactly the whole purpose of dachshunds, as ridiculous as they may
seem now. They were bred to go into animal dens.
AHS
Joe Osman
I thought that Nemyetski originally meant "deaf and dumb
person" and was given to the Germans because their language
sounded like grunting, and they waved their arms while
talking.
Joe
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Andrew Chaplin
news:3E848AD5...@verizon.net...
> Dogs were always willing to be trained as domestic workers. Cats by
> their nature can be domesticated but are not "workers"
It's all politics: dogs are totalitarians, cats are anarchists.
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)
Howard Berkowitz
<david.p...@sas.com> wrote:
Waterfowl retrievers. The "sissified" poodle cut actually started out as
something that reduced drag on their hind legs while swimming, yet kept
warm fur up front.
My cats seem to combine the pleasant characteristics of dogs and cats.
Very loyal, affectionate, and demonstrative, but less
maintenance-intensive. Playful, but I've had well-bonded cats step
between me and a perceived threat on more than one occasion.
At the moment, I have one ex-tom, about 3 years old, and two adolescents
about a year old each. The three were adopted together, and immediately
bonded to each other and to me.
The senior, Mr. Clark (Tom Clancy reference), wound up being a doting
parent to then kittens. His face exemplified voluntary martyrdom when
he let them both nurse on him. Now, he makes sure everyone has washed
their faces (including mine).
Errol Cavit
>
> Hi Errol, I presume that you are referring to the biography of
> Freyberg by his son. My local library has a copy, I've browsed through
> it but haven't read it cover to cover.
>
Yes, 'Freyberg VC, Soldier of Two Nations', Peter Freyberg (a career British
Army officer). Published in the early 90's from memory - importantly after
Alan Clark(e)'s book on Crete, whose criticisms are directly addressed. And
out of print, dammit, although any library system in the country that
doesn't have it should be pilloried.
<snip>
> Blamey also had similar disputes with Wavell, and no doubt
> would have had with Montgomery & Alexander too had he and the bulk of
> the Australian divisions not been recalled home.
>
Maybe not on the last point.
"Only when Generals Alexander and Montgomery arrived on the Middle East
scene in the summer of 1942 were the realities of the situation
acknowledged, the Dominion troops treated separately from the British Army,
and everyone's time and energies at last released to concentrate on
defeating the enemy." p237
You may perhaps have the impression that Freyberg had a better relationship
with the early desert commanders than Blamey. However, there appeared to be
little difference by the time of 1st Alamein, with Freyberg telling Holmes
that he was willing to refer the issue of the 2NZ Div's being restricted to
a defensive box to the NZ Govt (p373). This in the middle of a full-blown
military crisis!
Pages that refer to this overall issue are 236-7, 342-3 (including the
benefits of his WWI Corps Staff and Brigadier experience with large
artillery
fire plans), and all of C.21 'The Lebanon and Minqar Qaim.'
> I'm surprised that you say "Churchill was embarrassed" over Greece,
> the man had more hide than an elephant. The whole exercise was one of
> deception - if the Aust & NZ Govts had known the true facts they'd
> never have agreed to it.
I've found (and bought [1] :-) the passage that I failed to summarise well.
"NZ perception of [the British political behaviour towards SE Europe] -
which is important because, to the embarrassment of the British leaders, NZ
and Australian troops comprised the majority of British troops sent to
Greece- has greatly changed. Since colonial days NZ had always insisted on
private, frank and full information and a voice in decision-making, but had
so loyally followed decisions once made that many historians tend to see NZ
playing a very subservient role. During the exploratory discussions over
Greece it would not have occurred to anyone that deliberate deception on the
part of Britain would become a factor. it is extremely unlikely that [NZ
politicians] would have anticipated that Churchill or the immaculate and
prestigious Eden might misrepresent vital information."
<snip, with agreement with your opinions>
> The British commanders had a tendency to detach units piecemeal and
> break up divisions, a constant source of friction with the Dominion
> commanders. Eg Freyberg was asked to lend his HQ signallers for a
> temporary period of 3 weeks until the rest of the Division arrived.
This particular poaching is mentioned in 'Freyberg VC' also, and had a big
impact.
It
> took him _5 months_ of pressure before he had them returned. In fact,
> he wasn't able to get all of his troops under his own command until
> they embarked for Greece!
>
I assume that the troops of 5th Brigade at least got off the ships that
brought them from the UK mere days before getting to Greece, to combat-load
if nothing else! As much of the Div artillery was in the same contingent
(and hadn't trained with 4th and 6th Bdg), it's probably just as well that
the division didn't fight as one in Greece (due to the terrain)
<snip>
>
> Another source of complaint was the way that experienced and
> successful Dominion generals continually had inexperienced British
> regular officers promoted above them. This was particularly galling
> for Freyberg, who when he was retired from the British Army in ~1938
> was second only to Wavell in seniority.
Some of the initial NZ Brigadiers weren't at all keen on Freyberg, that's
for sure! Freyberg was informally offered permanent Corps command (and of
course promotion) after his desert successes, but chose to stay as 2ndNZ Div
and 2NZEF commander, and occasional ad-hoc Corps commander.
<snip>
[1] 'The Balkan dilemma', Ian Wards, one of the essays in 'Kia Kaha, NZ in
the 2nd World War', ed John Crawford 2000/2, from a conference in 1995.
--
Errol Cavit
to email, my middle initial is G | Newsreels shown in Eire 23 May 1940:
1.Italian Royalty 2.Aus Boat race 3.Sultan of Morocco 4.Mdm Chiang Kai Shek
at Chung King 5.Kentucky Derby 6.Dublin Great Spring Show
Errol Cavit
news:5cfb6f9f.03032...@posting.google.com...
> "Errol Cavit" <err...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:<b5p52r$md3$1...@lust.ihug.co.nz>...
> > "Sydney Guy" <sydney...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
> > news:5cfb6f9f.03032...@posting.google.com...
> snip
>
> > > I don't claim to be an expert on NZ history, but my understanding was
> > > that the NZ Govt only reluctantly agreed to leave the 3rd Division in
> > > the ME under pressure from the US & UK. [small error here, it was 2nd
> > NZ Div in MTO, 3rd NZ Div in Pacific]
> >
> > The released discussion papers and recent scholarship that I have read
>
> One of the problems of official histories is that they are often
> sanitised so the decisions look better.
I doubt that the NZ Govt in
> early 1942 was in any position to say that NZ would not face a threat
> of direct invasion at some point, especially if Australia went under.
> An unkind observer might say that NZ was relying on Australia to
> defend it, but of course I'd never suggest such a thing. :-)
>
More like we were depending on a major naval power to defend us from another
major naval power - its just that the one doing the defending wasn't the one
that we expected pre-war!
> snip
>
> >
> > > And had NZ been directly threatened by Japan, how enthusiastic would
> > > the 3rd have been about fighting in the ME?
> > >
> > True. The 'for the greater good' line went down better in NZ than it
would
> > have in Oz. "The ANZAC Spirit" means different things over here.
> >
> > Of course, Australia wasn't realistically threatened with invasion
> > (logistics, logistics, logistics), but the public perception was rather
> > different (especially if you were in Darwin).
> >
>
<snip alternative Jap strategy for SW Pacific>
Mmmm. Care to post that in soc.history.what-if for discussion?
<snip detail of Oz home defence prep>
> Given the requirement of a local 3:1 superiority in numbers for the
> attacker, the Japanese estimate of the forces needed begins to look
> over-optimistic.
>
From memory, the Jap army used a figure that they could kind-of-plausibly
claim to provide, while being too large for the Navy to supply. Can't think
why they would do that ;-)
> > > Of course, had they returned home the USN would have left them
> > > unutilised just as they did the 2nd (?) Div, so they were of more use
> > > to the war effort in the ME. But that had more to do with the
> > > absurdities of the USN/US Army infighting than to a rational strategic
> > > plan.
> >
> > As well as Dugout Doug's ego, there was the stated position of the US
from
> > early 1944 to make sure that Oz and NZ units wouldn't end the war in
> > contentious locations that they might want to have a say in running
> > post-war. A big factor in disbanding 3rd Div.
> >
>
> Far be it for me to be defending a megalomaniac & braggart, but in the
> specific case of the misuse of NZ troops Dougie is innocent, m'lud.
I didn't mean to imply that he was guilty in NZ's case, just that that
senior US reaction to the Canberra pact impacted both Oz and NZ
> The guilty party is the US Navy who insisted on NZ being placed in its
> Central Pacific (!!!!) area of operations in defiance of any
> strategic, operational or logistic considerations.
But it kept Dougies area as small as possible, which was probably the point.
IIRC NZ troops took
> part in the latter part of the USMC's Solomons campaign in 1942-43 but
> thereafter found themselves being relegated to garrison duties only.
> It would have made more sense to have united Oz & NZ troops and used
> them in the Solomons.
Yes, being the only unit organised and equipped along British lines in the
South Pacific Area caused unneccesary logistical problems. The naval and
RNZAF assets are another matter.
> I'm aware of the US desire to keep Oz units out of the latter stages
> in order to minimize our leverage in the peace, but I wasn't aware
> that they'd said it in so many words. Can you indicate a source?
>
The policy was stated, the reasons given weren't as blatently given (there
were plausible operational reasons for using US forces only). However,
following the reference trail, it goes back to a cable from NZ's Minister to
the US, to the NZ PM on 16 May 44 [Doc 87 in 'The Australia NZ Agreement
1944', Robin Kay, NZ Historical Publication Branch 1972].
"...I know unofficially that Halsey would like the NZ Squadrons to work with
him but I also know from a reported personal conversation that King has
stated that the operations in the Marshalls and Carolines are to be
exclusively undertaken by USA forces. King is also reported to have said
"the Australians and New Zealand agreeing apparently want a say in what is
to be done with the Marshalls and Carolines and neither Australians or New
Zealand are going to have a right to claim a say in what is to be done with
these islands on account of their having taken part in the operations for
the capture of them."...King's veiws I am told are personal to him and are
due to his strong resentment to the clause 26 in the Canberra Agreement..."
"Clause 26: The two Governments declare that the interim administration and
ultimate disposal of enemy territories in the Pacific is of vital importance
to Australia and New Zealand and that any such disposal should be effected
only with their agreement and as part of a general Pacific settlement."
The USN was also hostile to clause 16 as it stated that wartime use of
territories was not a basis for claiming those territories afterwards. All
this appeared to threaten the USN's access to bases in the area post-war.
They even wanted to try it on with Western Samoa, but State would let them.
You may find it easier to access 'NZ and the US 1840-1944', Lissington, Govt
Printer Wgtn, 1972 pp.69 77-99; or Unequal Allies:Australian-American
Relations and the Pacific War, RJ Bell, Melbourne University Press, 1977 pp.
144-59 for US reaction to the Pact.
Overall, several essays in Kia Kaha: NZ in the 2nd WW, John Crawford, Oxford
UP Oz 2000/2 may be of interest:
NZ's Strategical Approach (Ian McGibbon);
The Balken dilemma (Ian Wards);
American Strategies in the Pacific War (John b. Hattendorf);
Australia, NZ and Allied grand strategy 1941-43 (Carl Bridge);
Dr Marsden and Admiral Halsey (Ross Galbreath) (provided Lissington and Bell
refs above);
Post-war security policy (John Battersby)
> Oz also had to demobilise men from the armed forces in the last couple
> of years of the war because we were getting increasing demands for
> supplies for the US & Britain under Reverse Lend-Lease and there
> weren't enough Australians to go around.
>
part of the lend-Lease to NZ was 7,000 tractors to offset the labour
shortage. That was some multiple (3? 4?) of the tractors in NZ pre-war.
<snip>
>
> John Howard's enthusiasm for a free-trade deal with the US is rather
> puzzling since nobody really believes that it'll amount to much.
Including our PM - admittedly, this is while defending her government's
current external relations policy (<---look, ObSMN, given what our ANZAC
frigate's currently doing - or rather, not doing.)
<snip>
So unless we are also negotiating, the temptation will be
> almost overwhelming for the US to bargain away our rights. So maybe
> the best approach is to string out the negotiations until all these
> other deals are finalised, and then let the deal founder.
Could you email that suggestion to our PM? :-)
Andrew Chaplin
>
> "Andrew Chaplin" <abch...@yourfinger.rogers.com> wrote:
>
> > It's all politics: dogs are totalitarians, cats are anarchists.
>
Two through my boyhood. Lived with 13 at one point. Have a dog because
SWMBO is allergic to cats (she's also allergic to dogs, but less so
than she is to cats, and we didn't find out until the mutt took up
residence).
> Cats are just as totalitarian as dogs - the difference is that a dog
> will think "Oh, somebody else is around - he must be higher than me,
> better do what he tells me", while a cat always knows that IT is the
> supreme leader of the planet.
Actually, that's close to a pure anarchy in which everyone is the
ruler of their own universe.
Arved Sandstrom
news:3E8592A2...@yourfinger.rogers.com...
> Juergen Nieveler wrote:
> >
> > "Andrew Chaplin" <abch...@yourfinger.rogers.com> wrote:
> >
> > > It's all politics: dogs are totalitarians, cats are anarchists.
> >
> > Methinks you've never had a cat :-)
>
> Two through my boyhood. Lived with 13 at one point. Have a dog because
> SWMBO is allergic to cats (she's also allergic to dogs, but less so
> than she is to cats, and we didn't find out until the mutt took up
> residence).
>
> > Cats are just as totalitarian as dogs - the difference is that a dog
> > will think "Oh, somebody else is around - he must be higher than me,
> > better do what he tells me", while a cat always knows that IT is the
> > supreme leader of the planet.
>
> Actually, that's close to a pure anarchy in which everyone is the
> ruler of their own universe.
I'm not a big fan of cats, but they like _me_...that's something they do on
purpose. I prefer dogs.
My parents have had plenty of cats...I remember so much differing behaviour
that I think it's difficult to characterise a cat as opposed to dogs. We had
one tomcat that would disappear for days at a time and then reappear all
beat up and bleeding (he eventually disappeared MIA), we had one supremely
efficient mouser (a female). The last one we actually took to my folks'
cottage one time, and never did it again, because of the baby bunny that she
hunted and proudly presented to my Mom.
Then there was another female that my older sister recovered in a park
during the winter, who was indifferent about hunting, but behaved exactly
like a dog. She actually heeled, and needed as much affection as a dog
would.
AHS
TMOliver
>
> I'm not a big fan of cats, but they like _me_...that's
> something they do on purpose. I prefer dogs.
>
I have a similar problem. All my life, cats have "liked" me (as
much as cats can "like", I suppose), while I've never knowingly
encouraged one or, perish the thought, owned one.
Folks' cats (ones that won't even sit in their laps) will curl
up beside me, and gradually work their way into my lap (and all
I've done is simply the minimal ear scratching).
I've always had dogs, now the stumpy Jack Russell who I hope
lasts me the rest of my dog owning days. I've always believed
that dogs were better, if for no other reason, because they
believe what you tell and teach them.
On the other hand, cats act like newsgroup nincompoops,
accepting no constructive education, remaining fixed in their
ways, either agreeably crafty or dumber than fenbceposts and not
realizing it.
TMO
Arved Sandstrom
[ SNIP ]
> I've always had dogs, now the stumpy Jack Russell who I hope
> lasts me the rest of my dog owning days. I've always believed
> that dogs were better, if for no other reason, because they
> believe what you tell and teach them.
I have a huge fondness for Jack Russells. My parents' neighbours have one,
now a grizzled veteran himself. Well, when I was temporarily living at home,
some neighbourhood yahoos attempted to steal my mountain bike (which was in
the backyard), and this little dog just started yapping and barking and
sounded the alert. I would have been out over a thousand bucks if it hadn't
been for him.
Needless to say I made a special point of going out and buying a chewie and
dog treats. :-)
AHS
TMOliver
>
> Needless to say I made a special point of going out and
> buying a chewie and dog treats. :-)
>
Elijah, sitting beside me on a side table next to the computer,
has started grabbing at my left hand to inform me that it is his
dinner hour, and no matter the level of compliment with which I
intend to describe him to others, his needs are momentarily
greater than my activities.
You'd like him. He'd yelp and bark if they looked like they
were coming into the yard.
TMO
Sydney Guy
> "Sydney Guy" <sydney...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
> news:5cfb6f9f.03032...@posting.google.com...
snip
>
> > early 1942 was in any position to say that NZ would not face a threat
> > of direct invasion at some point, especially if Australia went under.
> > An unkind observer might say that NZ was relying on Australia to
> > defend it, but of course I'd never suggest such a thing. :-)
> >
> More like we were depending on a major naval power to defend us from another
> major naval power - its just that the one doing the defending wasn't the one
> that we expected pre-war!
>
The problem with that was that in January-February 1942 the IJN was
sweeping everything before it and the USN was crippled and navally
inferior. Until a few lucky bombs changed the equation at Midway in
June 1942, it would have been very courageous (to quote Sir Humphrey)
to have assumed that the USN would have regained naval supremacy in
the next 1-2 years. Plenty of time for Japan to invade Oz & NZ - and
what comfort would an eventual Allied victory be if our populations
had been conquered & enslaved in the meantime?
What I'm trying to say is that it is no use evaluating the decisions
of the past on the basis of our knowledge of what actually happened
subsequently. The only basis is: was this a reasonable & prudent
decision for them to make _given what they knew at the time_. By that
standard, I don't believe the NZ Govt made a particularly rational
decision.
snip
> <snip alternative Jap strategy for SW Pacific>
>
> Mmmm. Care to post that in soc.history.what-if for discussion?
>
Maybe later, got my hands full with this thread right now.
> <snip detail of Oz home defence prep>
> > Given the requirement of a local 3:1 superiority in numbers for the
> > attacker, the Japanese estimate of the forces needed begins to look
> > over-optimistic.
> >
> From memory, the Jap army used a figure that they could kind-of-plausibly
> claim to provide, while being too large for the Navy to supply. Can't think
> why they would do that ;-)
>
The usual explanation given is that the IJA didn't want to get
distracted from its war in China by unimportant affairs in the Pacific
(!!!). Because _of course_ you wouldn't need 12 divisions to invade a
defenceless Australia, now would you? But actually, the IJA's Feb 1942
estimate of the number of troops in Oz was quite accurate, and it
referred to Australian troops since there weren't any US combat forces
in Oz at that time.
Mind you, the same historians also usually make the fatuous claim that
had Japan succeeded in occupying the island chain Solomons-New
Caledonia they would have "isolated" Australia & "cut off aid from
abroad". Huh? Do these people ever bother to look at a globe of the
world? It was _impossible_ to effectively blockade Australia in the
1940s. Possession of Fiji & New Caledonia by Japan merely means that
convoys from the US must steer further south. To really cut-off the
Pacific routes, Japan would need to conquer NZ first. That still
leaves the Indian Ocean route wide open.
> > > > Of course, had they returned home the USN would have left them
> > > > unutilised just as they did the 2nd (?) Div, so they were of more use
> > > > to the war effort in the ME. But that had more to do with the
> > > > absurdities of the USN/US Army infighting than to a rational strategic
> > > > plan.
> > >
> > > As well as Dugout Doug's ego, there was the stated position of the US
> from
> > > early 1944 to make sure that Oz and NZ units wouldn't end the war in
> > > contentious locations that they might want to have a say in running
> > > post-war. A big factor in disbanding 3rd Div.
> > >
> >
> > Far be it for me to be defending a megalomaniac & braggart, but in the
> > specific case of the misuse of NZ troops Dougie is innocent, m'lud.
>
> I didn't mean to imply that he was guilty in NZ's case, just that that
> senior US reaction to the Canberra pact impacted both Oz and NZ
>
> > The guilty party is the US Navy who insisted on NZ being placed in its
> > Central Pacific (!!!!) area of operations in defiance of any
> > strategic, operational or logistic considerations.
>
> But it kept Dougies area as small as possible, which was probably the point.
>
From the point of the USN's private war against the US Army, maybe,
but from the point of view of fighting the war against Japan it was
counter-productive. Like a lot of the USN's behaviour in WW2.
Eg. Thanks to the way in which the USN starved SWPA of naval support,
landing craft etc, Australian troops had to fight a totally
unnecessary campaign on the Kokoda Track and at Buna/Gona, and the
losses at the latter were higher than necessary due to a total absence
of any landing craft that could transport light tanks or artillery.
Meanwhile, masses of shipping and landing craft sit around idle in the
New Hebrides under USN control.
> IIRC NZ troops took
> > part in the latter part of the USMC's Solomons campaign in 1942-43 but
> > thereafter found themselves being relegated to garrison duties only.
> > It would have made more sense to have united Oz & NZ troops and used
> > them in the Solomons.
>
> Yes, being the only unit organised and equipped along British lines in the
> South Pacific Area caused unneccesary logistical problems. The naval and
> RNZAF assets are another matter.
>
Actually, the naval assets were just as much of a logistical problem.
But naval participation didn't have the same political impact as
troops on the ground, so the US was happy to use RAN (& RNZN?) ships
in the invasion of the Philippines, but not Australian Army units.
> > I'm aware of the US desire to keep Oz units out of the latter stages
> > in order to minimize our leverage in the peace, but I wasn't aware
> > that they'd said it in so many words. Can you indicate a source?
> >
>
> The policy was stated, the reasons given weren't as blatently given (there
> were plausible operational reasons for using US forces only).
Make that IMplausible operational reasons :-)
snipped quotations
>
> The USN was also hostile to clause 16 as it stated that wartime use of
> territories was not a basis for claiming those territories afterwards. All
> this appeared to threaten the USN's access to bases in the area post-war.
> They even wanted to try it on with Western Samoa, but State would let them.
>
There were a lot of Manifest Destiny-style comments from various
American officers that the US should take control of New Guinea, the
Solomons etc after the war as "the US had done all the fighting".
(Complete nonsense, since Australian troops had done the bulk of the
fighting in SWPA during 1942 & 1943.) I think that the Canberra Pact
clauses about territories was as much about holding on to our pre-war
position as anything else.
> You may find it easier to access 'NZ and the US 1840-1944', Lissington, Govt
> Printer Wgtn, 1972 pp.69 77-99; or Unequal Allies:Australian-American
> Relations and the Pacific War, RJ Bell, Melbourne University Press, 1977 pp.
> 144-59 for US reaction to the Pact.
>
I actually have Roger Bell's book, but it's currently packed away in
storage along with the rest of my collection. Another book that deals
with the friction with bthe US is Christopher Thorne's "Allies of a
kind: the United States, Britain and the war against Japan,
1941-1945". Although written from the British PoV, it has quite a lot
on Oz-US-UK relations. It makes the interesting point that while the
Curtin Govt initially veered towards the US following the Singapore
surrender, by 1944 or so they were eager to get the British back into
the scene as a counterweight to the US and so give Oz some leverage
against getting trampled. (Warning: Thorne's writing style is
excruciatingly dense & boring).
snip
>
> > Oz also had to demobilise men from the armed forces in the last couple
> > of years of the war because we were getting increasing demands for
> > supplies for the US & Britain under Reverse Lend-Lease and there
> > weren't enough Australians to go around.
> >
> part of the lend-Lease to NZ was 7,000 tractors to offset the labour
> shortage. That was some multiple (3? 4?) of the tractors in NZ pre-war.
>
Since agriculture before the War was horse-based and labour-intensive
in almost all countries, the diversion of a large number of men into
the military and war production meant a fall in farm production. The
US & UK compensated for this by producing tractors to mechanise
agriculture. Lacking an automobile industry Oz couldn't follow suit
and farm production suffered. I'm not aware of us receiving any
Lend-Lease tractors, although it's possible.
Slightly OT: my grandfather ran the family haulage firm in Edinburgh.
They used a mixture of trucks & horse-drawn wagons until after the
war, and I believe that was pretty typical for the UK at the time.
> <snip>
> >
> > John Howard's enthusiasm for a free-trade deal with the US is rather
> > puzzling since nobody really believes that it'll amount to much.
>
> Including our PM - admittedly, this is while defending her government's
> current external relations policy (<---look, ObSMN, given what our ANZAC
> frigate's currently doing - or rather, not doing.)
>
> <snip>
> So unless we are also negotiating, the temptation will be
> > almost overwhelming for the US to bargain away our rights. So maybe
> > the best approach is to string out the negotiations until all these
> > other deals are finalised, and then let the deal founder.
>
> Could you email that suggestion to our PM? :-)
I thought that NZ had proposed a free trade deal, and the US had said
"not interested now, come back later".
Sydney Guy
> "Sydney Guy" <sydney...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
> news:3e831520...@news.pacific.net.au...
>
> >
> > Hi Errol, I presume that you are referring to the biography of
> > Freyberg by his son. My local library has a copy, I've browsed through
> > it but haven't read it cover to cover.
> >
> Yes, 'Freyberg VC, Soldier of Two Nations', Peter Freyberg (a career British
> Army officer). Published in the early 90's from memory - importantly after
> Alan Clark(e)'s book on Crete, whose criticisms are directly addressed. And
> out of print, dammit, although any library system in the country that
> doesn't have it should be pilloried.
>
> <snip>
> > Blamey also had similar disputes with Wavell, and no doubt
> > would have had with Montgomery & Alexander too had he and the bulk of
> > the Australian divisions not been recalled home.
> >
> Maybe not on the last point.
> "Only when Generals Alexander and Montgomery arrived on the Middle East
> scene in the summer of 1942 were the realities of the situation
> acknowledged, the Dominion troops treated separately from the British Army,
> and everyone's time and energies at last released to concentrate on
> defeating the enemy." p237
>
The big improvement from the Dominion viewpoint was that Monty
believed in fighting as divisions, not breaking them up. But he
basically replaced all the senior commanders in 8th Army with his own
men from the UK. For that reason I still think he would have balked at
giving Corps Commander positions to Dominion generals, even when the
Corps in question was 100% from the same Dominion. Since the NZEF was
only one division strong, this issue didn't arise directly, but would
have with the AIF. IIRC didn't Freyberg have Horrocks promoted over
his head as Corps commander of a Corps that was exclusively NZ & South
African?
> You may perhaps have the impression that Freyberg had a better relationship
> with the early desert commanders than Blamey. However, there appeared to be
> little difference by the time of 1st Alamein, with Freyberg telling Holmes
> that he was willing to refer the issue of the 2NZ Div's being restricted to
> a defensive box to the NZ Govt (p373). This in the middle of a full-blown
> military crisis!
>
No, I merely think that the scope for disputes was more limited with
the NZEF because of its smaller size eg no arguments about creating a
NZ Corps. Freyberg was naive initially in lending his men, but wised
up very rapidly thereafter! As I said, I think this was due to the
fact that he hadn't been commanding Dominion units in WW1, so didn't
recognise at first that there would be a problem.
> Pages that refer to this overall issue are 236-7, 342-3 (including the
> benefits of his WWI Corps Staff and Brigadier experience with large
> artillery
> fire plans), and all of C.21 'The Lebanon and Minqar Qaim.'
>
I was particularly interested in Freyberg's comment that the problem
with the 8th Army leadership was that they hadn't served on the
Western Front in WW1 and consequently didn't appreciate the
effectiveness of massed artillery and the need for concentrating your
forces. Rather turns the conventional wisdom on its head (hidebound
British generals refighting WW1).
> > I'm surprised that you say "Churchill was embarrassed" over Greece,
> > the man had more hide than an elephant. The whole exercise was one of
> > deception - if the Aust & NZ Govts had known the true facts they'd
> > never have agreed to it.
>
> I've found (and bought [1] :-) the passage that I failed to summarise well.
>
> "NZ perception of [the British political behaviour towards SE Europe] -
> which is important because, to the embarrassment of the British leaders, NZ
> and Australian troops comprised the majority of British troops sent to
> Greece- has greatly changed. Since colonial days NZ had always insisted on
> private, frank and full information and a voice in decision-making, but had
> so loyally followed decisions once made that many historians tend to see NZ
> playing a very subservient role.
Sounds like you've got the same bunch of left-wing Anglophobic
propagandists in NZ as we have here in Oz, masquerading as historians
while falsifying the nation's history. :-)
In real life, there's plenty of evidence that Oz govts of all
political persuasions were well aware that their own and the UK's
interests were not always the same, and took steps to safeguard
Australia's interests. But at the same time they say themselves as
shareholders in the British Empire, and voting shareholders at that.
> During the exploratory discussions over
> Greece it would not have occurred to anyone that deliberate deception on the
> part of Britain would become a factor. it is extremely unlikely that [NZ
> politicians] would have anticipated that Churchill or the immaculate and
> prestigious Eden might misrepresent vital information."
>
The Australian Govt likewise did not anticipate that Churchill would
deceive them in so blatant a way. I think it's fair to say that the
Greek episode soured relationships between London & Canberra, and
Singapore was the final straw. Also, Menzies spent several months in
London during 1941 attempting (unsuccessfully) to get greater Dominion
say in the War Cabinet, and came away with a rather jaundiced view of
WSC's character and strategic ability.
> <snip, with agreement with your opinions>
>
> > The British commanders had a tendency to detach units piecemeal and
> > break up divisions, a constant source of friction with the Dominion
> > commanders. Eg Freyberg was asked to lend his HQ signallers for a
> > temporary period of 3 weeks until the rest of the Division arrived.
>
> This particular poaching is mentioned in 'Freyberg VC' also, and had a big
> impact.
>
The biography is my source for that and the stuff below.
> It
> > took him _5 months_ of pressure before he had them returned. In fact,
> > he wasn't able to get all of his troops under his own command until
> > they embarked for Greece!
> >
> I assume that the troops of 5th Brigade at least got off the ships that
> brought them from the UK mere days before getting to Greece, to combat-load
> if nothing else! As much of the Div artillery was in the same contingent
> (and hadn't trained with 4th and 6th Bdg), it's probably just as well that
> the division didn't fight as one in Greece (due to the terrain)
>
> <snip>
> >
> > Another source of complaint was the way that experienced and
> > successful Dominion generals continually had inexperienced British
> > regular officers promoted above them. This was particularly galling
> > for Freyberg, who when he was retired from the British Army in ~1938
> > was second only to Wavell in seniority.
>
> Some of the initial NZ Brigadiers weren't at all keen on Freyberg, that's
> for sure!
Because they wanted his job for themselves, I expect.
During WW2 there was a continual rivalry in the Australian Army
between the Regular Army and the CMF (militia) officers. Blamey,
Morshead, Bennett & others had all been senior CMF officers pre-war,
although Blamey had been a regular until ~1924 or so. When the 2nd AIF
was formed, the Menzies Cabinet decided that all the senior commands
should go to CMF officers - not unreasonable in view of the extensive
WW1 command experience of the individuals concerned. The Regulars were
outraged, and conducted a campaign of white-anting the CMF officers.
Blamey also had to contend with ambitious subordinates who coveted his
job. When you read criticism of Blamey's character and abilities, you
have to bear all this in mind.
> Freyberg was informally offered permanent Corps command (and of
> course promotion) after his desert successes, but chose to stay as 2ndNZ Div
> and 2NZEF commander, and occasional ad-hoc Corps commander.
> <snip>
Re Freyberg refusing promotion: that would have had the effect of
blocking the promotion of everybody below him, since they wouldn't
have been promoted to command British Army units. Are you sure about
that?
I'll have to dig the appropriate volume of the Aust Official History
out of the local public library and post the relevant passages.
BTW I think that one reason Blamey got the command in Greece, and
Freyberg in Crete, was that everybody knew that it was a lost cause
and didn't want to take the fall. Much the same as the Americans were
happy to let Wavell have command of the doomed ABDA forces in the NEI.
KDR
[snip]
> Aping the Bigger Ally & Equipment Envy
[snip]
> concept on the Anzac frigates. They used the opportunity of a change of Govt
> to get the policy reversed and stuff the ships with expensive high-tech toys
> that are irrelevant to the EEZ patrols that are the ships' primary task. Yet
> the policy made a lot of sense for Australia, since it meant maximising the
> number of hulls that the RAN could afford, while fitting most of the
> expensive weapons & systems only if and when it seemed likely we'd need them
> - most likely never. We would thus have had a considerable mobilisation
> potential since we would have the long lead-time items (the hulls) in place
> already and the B+V MEKO design is well suited to rapid upgrading. As it is
> now, the money spent on the ANZAC Weapons Improvement Program will have to
> come at the expense of some other capability, and the RAN now has no
> mobilisation potential whatsoever. (The same can be said for the Army &
> Airforce)
Aren't they overarmed and overmanned for EEZ patrol? I guess the
British Castle class or Irish Roisin class OPVs are more than enough
for that task.
http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/464.html
http://www.military.ie/naval/roisin.htm
Cheers,