Midway - Torpedo Squadron 8
Scott M. Kozel
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsK1PeoMfNQ
The shot of the planes taking off is the last pictures taken of the
planes of the squadron.
When told by FDR of the fate of VT 8 Churchill was said to have wept.
David E. Powell
Thank you for posting this. Wow.
Ray O'Hara
"Scott M. Kozel" <koz...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:47D5E9FF...@comcast.net...
why would churchill and FDR be talking about any squadron and plenty of
brit squandrons suffered that fate, especially those who flew the
fairy battles during the battle of france, rather similat to the devestator
with its 3 man crew and sitting duck speed.
churchill was never said to have wept for hood, repluse or wales. , nope
don't believe that.
Mortimer Schnerd, RN
> A short version of John Ford's Torpedo Squadron 8 can be found at:
>
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsK1PeoMfNQ
>
> The shot of the planes taking off is the last pictures taken of the
> planes of the squadron.
Very stirring.
--
Mortimer Schnerd, RN
mschnerdatcarolina.rr.com
CCBlack
Great Music Score.
Chris
William Black
Somehow I doubt that.
When told that HMS Hood had been sunk his reaction was:
"That's why we have them, if we can't afford to lose them we shouldn't have
them"...
--
William Black
I've seen things you people wouldn't believe.
Barbeques on fire by the chalets past the castle headland
I watched the gift shops glitter in the darkness off the Newborough gate
All these moments will be lost in time, like icecream on the beach
Time for tea.
TMOliver
"Scott M. Kozel" <koz...@comcast.net> wrote ...
The mother of the only survivor taught me in English in high school long
ago.
As he have said (and others have written) over the years, their loss was
certainly not without accompanying benefit. The arrival and attack of the
torpedo planes diverted the attention of the entire IJN air defense effort
and certainly reduced the amount of AA encountered by the dive bombers. The
Japanese CAP having descended to engage the TBDs, attacks on the SBDs were
greatly reduced. Less AA and absent CAP increased the number of SBDs able
to bomb the IJN carriers and improved the odds for effective attacks.
TMO
Dan
Well, that paired with the lack of organization in the CAP...
The AAA was never a factor. The DBs didn't attack for an hour, so had
there been any control over CAP assets, there was plenty of TIME to get
them up against the later attacks.
The fact is, the IJN was an offensive force, with little real effort
expended in defense. The losses of the TBs was, in the event, slightly
important, but it need not have been had the IJN kept its head.
Note also that no BD was ever intercepted past push-over. Some were
shot down by radar-guided AAA, but none recorded down by fighters. The
window of vulnerability was MUCH smaller than that for the TBs.
Dan
Gordon
> Note also that no BD was ever intercepted past push-over. Some were
> shot down by radar-guided AAA, but none recorded down by fighters. The
> window of vulnerability was MUCH smaller than that for the TBs.
I have to disagree, Dan. A friend of mine shot down five DBs during
their dives at the USS Enterprise at Santa Cruz. And according to
that "Enterprise 360" show, at least one of the Enterprise's DBs was
shot down just after it pulled out, by Zeros. The crew was recovered
by an IJN cruiser and they were strapped to weights and thrown
overboard to their deaths.
Jeff Crowell
>> As he have said (and others have written) over the years, their loss was
>> certainly not without accompanying benefit. The arrival and attack of
>> the torpedo planes diverted the attention of the entire IJN air defense
>> effort and certainly reduced the amount of AA encountered by the dive
>> bombers. The Japanese CAP having descended to engage the TBDs, attacks
>> on the SBDs were greatly reduced. Less AA and absent CAP increased the
>> number of SBDs able to bomb the IJN carriers and improved the odds for
>> effective attacks.
Dan wrote:
> Well, that paired with the lack of organization in the CAP...
>
> The AAA was never a factor. The DBs didn't attack for an hour, so had
> there been any control over CAP assets, there was plenty of TIME to get
> them up against the later attacks.
This not in accordance with what I have read. The Zeroes were
still pursuing and shooting down torpedo bombers when the Daunless
attacks came.
Separate from tactical policy and lack of discipline, one of the critical
problems for the Japanese was that the fighters did not carry radios.
In many cases Japanese surface ships would fire their guns at U.S.
planes well out of range to draw the attention of the Zeroes.
> Note also that no BD was ever intercepted past push-over. Some were shot
> down by radar-guided AAA, but none recorded down by fighters. The window
> of vulnerability was MUCH smaller than that for the TBs.
Also not so. Many of the divebombers were attacked in the dives.
(and that's just if you meant 'at Midway' when you said "ever."
Check out the "First Team" books.
And, "radar-guided AAA"??? Not from Japanese ships!
Jeff
Peter Stickney
It was kinda hard for the IJN to have any control over their CAP at the
time. They didn't have radar, so they had to rely on visual spotting and
reporting of any incoming airplanes. They didn't have anything like a
Combat Information Center, so they couldn't collate reports and allocate
resources. And the radio installations on the Zero fighters didn't work
worth a damn. Once the fighters left their decks, they were on their own
to find and intercept incoming raids.
--
Pete Stickney
Without data, all you have is an opinion
Jeff Dougherty
> >> A short version of John Ford's Torpedo Squadron 8 can be found at:
>
> >>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsK1PeoMfNQ
>
> >> The shot of the planes taking off is the last pictures taken of the
> >> planes of the squadron.
>
> >> When told by FDR of the fate of VT 8 Churchill was said to have wept.
>
> > The mother of the only survivor taught me in English in high school long
> > ago.
>
> > As he have said (and others have written) over the years, their loss was
> > certainly not without accompanying benefit. The arrival and attack of the
> > torpedo planes diverted the attention of the entire IJN air defense effort
> > and certainly reduced the amount of AA encountered by the dive bombers. The
> > Japanese CAP having descended to engage the TBDs, attacks on the SBDs were
> > greatly reduced. Less AA and absent CAP increased the number of SBDs able
> > to bomb the IJN carriers and improved the odds for effective attacks.
>
> > TMO
>
> Well, that paired with the lack of organization in the CAP...
>
> The AAA was never a factor. The DBs didn't attack for an hour, so had
> there been any control over CAP assets, there was plenty of TIME to get
> them up against the later attacks.
The VT-8 attack did indeed end about an hour before the dive bombers
appeared over the Japanese carriers, but later attacks by VT-6 and
VT-3 continued over most of the intervening time. In fact, there's
some evidence that VT-3 may still have been trying to work in against
the Japanese when the dive bombers hit.
Parshall and Tully in _Shattered Sword_ make three points that I think
are worth mentioning here. The first is that the supposed value
attached to VT-8's drawing the Japanese CAP down to sea level has
indeed been overstated- if the Zeroes had been properly controlled and
had time to do so, they could have regained altitude relatively
quickly. The second, though, is that all three torpedo attacks on the
Japanese carrier force combined to increase the horizontal separation
of the CAP fighters, as their poor fighter control meant that they
moved to meet each threat without leaving much of a separate reserve.
The Japanese CAP was thus pulled in all different directions, lost
situational awareness, and consequently failed to detect the American
dive bombers in time to intercept them. The third is that the
constant torpedo attacks from 0920 on forced the Japanese decks into a
constant cycle of launching new CAP fighters and recovering old to
refuel and rearm. They suggest that, along with Admiral Nagumo's
dithering over B5N loadouts, this may have contributed to the
inability of the Japanese to launch their strike package before their
carriers were hit.
The first and second are good points, I think, the third is a bit
shaky considering the great difficulty in knowing exactly what was
spotted where when during that last hour or so before everything went
to Hell for the Japanese. I think it's more than fair to say, though,
that the pilots and crewmen of Torpedo 8 did not die in vain, along
with their comrades in VT-6 and VT-3.
You're right, though, that much of the reason that they were able to
have the impact that they did was the abysmal (or more properly,
nonexistent) state of Japanese fighter control at the time. The fatal
weakness of the Japanese CAP was that it could not react properly to
closely sequenced threats from multiple axes.
> The fact is, the IJN was an offensive force, with little real effort
> expended in defense. The losses of the TBs was, in the event, slightly
> important, but it need not have been had the IJN kept its head.
True. The Japanese seem to have adequate *numbers* of fighters up, so
they didn't ignore defense entirely. I think where you're really
right is that even on CAP, their tactics were fundamentally offensive-
sight the enemy, attack, and keep attacking until all attacking planes
have been shot down. There was no provision for leaving a reserve or
a force to cover other axes, and no provision for a fighter controller
out of the heat of aerial combat to warn them of other threats. The
whole idea that you might use different tactics when defending your
carriers then when conducting an offensive fighter sweep doesn't seem
to have registered.
The Japanese could indeed have dealt with the TB attacks and been able
to counter-move against the dive bombers if they had kept their heads,
as you put it- but I think that their equipment, doctrine, and tactics
all combined to make it very unlikely that they would react as cooly
as they needed to.
-JTD
Weatherlawyer
wrote:
> "Scott M. Kozel" <koze...@comcast.net> wrote in messagenews:47D5E9FF...@comcast.net...
>
> >A short version of John Ford's Torpedo Squadron 8 can be found at:
>
> >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsK1PeoMfNQ
>
> > The shot of the planes taking off is the last pictures taken of the
> > planes of the squadron.
>
> > When told by FDR of the fate of VT 8 Churchill was said to have wept.
>
> Somehow I doubt that.
>
> When told that HMS Hood had been sunk his reaction was:
>
> "That's why we have them, if we can't afford to lose them we shouldn't have
> them"...
The triumph of whisky over flatulence. The occasional volte farce
tends to cut down the political rhetoric.
What happened to the loser in charge of air cover? Did well in
politics later, did he?
Jack Linthicum
wrote:
Military Channel "Battlefields" program has an animated description of
Midway.
Mar 14, 2:00 pm
(60 minutes)
20th Century Battlefields
1942 Midway
TV-PG, CC
William Black
"Weatherlawyer" <Weathe...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:562e69b7-876d-4e68...@b64g2000hsa.googlegroups.com...
> On Mar 11, 10:42 am, "William Black" <william.bl...@hotmail.co.uk>
> wrote:
>> "Scott M. Kozel" <koze...@comcast.net> wrote in
>> messagenews:47D5E9FF...@comcast.net...
>>
>> >A short version of John Ford's Torpedo Squadron 8 can be found at:
>>
>> >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsK1PeoMfNQ
>>
>> > The shot of the planes taking off is the last pictures taken of the
>> > planes of the squadron.
>>
>> > When told by FDR of the fate of VT 8 Churchill was said to have wept.
>>
>> Somehow I doubt that.
>>
>> When told that HMS Hood had been sunk his reaction was:
>>
>> "That's why we have them, if we can't afford to lose them we shouldn't
>> have
>> them"...
>
> The triumph of whisky over flatulence.
1. He drank brandy in the evenings.
2. He was woken in the early hours of the morning to be told. He was
probably reasonably sober.
> What happened to the loser in charge of air cover? Did well in
> politics later, did he?
What 'air cover'?
dump...@hotmail.com
sacrificing their Torpedo bombers in order to give the dive bombers
a clear shot.
If the Dauntlesses had gotten there first, would the the roles have
been reversed? in other words, would the Japanese fighters
have been so busy slaughtering the dive bombers that the
torpedo bombers could have sunk the carriers?
Jack Linthicum
The TV program I cite below says the factor was the DBs came in from
an entirely different direction, leaving the Japanese fighters
confused as to where they were supposed to go.
Jeff Dougherty
> I wonder if the Japanese thought the Americans were deliberately
> sacrificing their Torpedo bombers in order to give the dive bombers
> a clear shot.
If anything, it might have been the opposite. _Shattered Sword_
(which I know I quoted last post, but it's a really well-done book)
suggests that one reason the Japanese fixated so strongly on the
torpedo planes might have been that in the Japanese Navy, torpedo
planes were considered the primary antishipping weapon of a carrier
air group. In other words, they were more likely to have thought that
the American torpedo bombers were the real threat, and that dive
bombers would be a lesser threat.
In hindsight, of course, this is a classic case of projection. The
torpedo bomber was indeed the primary antishipping weapon in the
Japanese Navy, but to assume that it would also be so for the
Americans overlooked several key facts:
1) The Japanese B5N torpedo bomber was much faster than the American
SBD. Its Type 91 torpedo could also be dropped at much higher speeds
and altitudes than the American Mark 13, giving it more freedom to
take evasive action during its run. Thus, Japanese torpedo bombers at
that point in the war were much more able to penetrate a group's
defenses than the Americans.
2) The American SBD dive bomber could carry a 1,000 lb bomb whereas
the Japanese D3A could only carry a 500 lb bomb. This made American
dive bombers much deadlier than their Japanese counterparts.
The Japanese were, of course, not unaware of the dive bomber's
antishipping potential, as shown in Kido Butai's action off Ceylon.
But they expected the real decisive threat to come from torpedo
planes.
> If the Dauntlesses had gotten there first, would the the roles have
> been reversed? in other words, would the Japanese fighters
> have been so busy slaughtering the dive bombers that the
> torpedo bombers could have sunk the carriers?
Hard to say, really- the various air groups were all over the map at
Midway and it really depends on who gets where when. One problem that
the Americans would have in the scenario you outline would be the
TBD's slow speed, which meant that a torpedo attack could take ten
minutes or even more to develop depending on whether they had to stern
chase their targets. (It feels odd to talk about stern chasing in an
airplane, but the TBD had to make its run at slow enough speeds that
such things mattered a lot.) The Zeroes on CAP would have much more
time to notice what was going on and send fighters down against the
TBDs, and as VT-8's example so tragically shows even a few Zeroes
would probably have been able to inflict heavy losses.
-JTD
Ray O'Hara
"Jack Linthicum" <jackli...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:862e9d43-083a-4002-9340-> Military Channel "Battlefields" program has
an animated description of
> Midway.
>
> Mar 14, 2:00 pm
> (60 minutes)
>
> 20th Century Battlefields
> 1942 Midway
> TV-PG, CC
>
>
where every carrier is the ark royal, every battleship the bismarck and all
the destroyrs fletchers.
Jack Linthicum
> "Jack Linthicum" <jacklinthi...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
The island was on the prot side of the Japanese models
Tiger
Not sure what the whisky comment is about but as for air cover? Hornets
airwing was mostly a no show at Midway. The rest of the Wing few in a
another direction and ended up ditching for lack of gas.
Ray O'Hara
"Tiger" <Lana_...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:47D84510...@hotmail.com...
marc mitchner sent the hornets SBDs out with 1000lbs bombs, this cut down
their endurance and they had to turn back before they found the japanese
ships.
spruance blamed mitchner for the loss of the yorktown as spruance had called
for the planes to use 500lbs bombs.
the TB squadrons did a better job of guessing where the japs had moved to
from where they were first sighted, the DBs took longer, thats why the TBs
attacked first and the DBs arrived late. the enterprise dive bombers only
got there because they saw a DD and assumed it was heading for the main
body. otherwise they might have been no shows too.
Ray O'Hara
yup when we all know it was on the catholic side.
Dan
OK, revise that to say "between push-over and pull-out."
Certainly between push-over and bomb-release point.
Dan
Dan
> TMOliver wrote:
>>> As he have said (and others have written) over the years, their loss was
>>> certainly not without accompanying benefit. The arrival and attack of
>>> the torpedo planes diverted the attention of the entire IJN air defense
>>> effort and certainly reduced the amount of AA encountered by the dive
>>> bombers. The Japanese CAP having descended to engage the TBDs, attacks
>>> on the SBDs were greatly reduced. Less AA and absent CAP increased the
>>> number of SBDs able to bomb the IJN carriers and improved the odds for
>>> effective attacks.
>
> Dan wrote:
>> Well, that paired with the lack of organization in the CAP...
>>
>> The AAA was never a factor. The DBs didn't attack for an hour, so had
>> there been any control over CAP assets, there was plenty of TIME to get
>> them up against the later attacks.
>
> This not in accordance with what I have read. The Zeroes were
> still pursuing and shooting down torpedo bombers when the Daunless
> attacks came.
True, but at that time, there was no reason to leave the carriers in the
lurch, a disciplines and/or organized force would have broken off
pursuit of empties and concentrated on PROTECTING THE CARRIERS...
> Separate from tactical policy and lack of discipline, one of the critical
> problems for the Japanese was that the fighters did not carry radios.
Which did not help the organization and control. Radios were available,
but that would have taken away from the attack mindset...
As an aside, TO-RA, rather than meaning "tiger" as portrayed in many
histories, was actually a convenient and quick two-character telegraph
code, since the strike force did not have radios and relied on
radiotelegraphs.
> In many cases Japanese surface ships would fire their guns at U.S.
> planes well out of range to draw the attention of the Zeroes.
Which is just as well, since they never would hit "any" of them anyway!
>> Note also that no BD was ever intercepted past push-over. Some were shot
>> down by radar-guided AAA, but none recorded down by fighters. The window
>> of vulnerability was MUCH smaller than that for the TBs.
>
> Also not so. Many of the divebombers were attacked in the dives.
> (and that's just if you meant 'at Midway' when you said "ever."
> Check out the "First Team" books.
>
> And, "radar-guided AAA"??? Not from Japanese ships!
Reference was to Marianas Turkey Shoot accounts, not limiting to
Japanese cases.
Well, a wildcat could outdive a zero; how is a Dauntless with 1000 kG
bomb attached not going to pull away from one? Dive brakes are employed
later in the dive.
My statement is from memory, so I cannot reference it. I do believe it
to be a statement made by someone other than me, however. Not to say it
can't be wrong, even so.
Dan
Dan
They were also cowboys, with no particular discipline to actually defend
the carriers. They chased the TBs because they were easy prey.
Still, an hour is a long time to dally while the carriers were vulnerable.
Dan
Dan
Well said.
Dan
Dan
The DBs came in from TWO entirely different directions...
Part of the Japanese problem, conceptually, is that the US was so
disorganized, yet got their assets to the target in the event.
The Kido Butai had been under continual attack and threat for hours by
the time the DBs administered the coup de grace.
Dan
Tiger
Was Mitchner the Capt or the CAG of Hornet? My memory fails...
Fighting 8 did not do much ethier as I recall. Funny how Victory clouds
how Hornet wasted 1/3 of the US carrier airpower without much to show
for it.
Matt Wiser
made the Midway cruise. CDR Stan Ring was CAG of CV-8's air group, and he got skewered
in the AAR. However, Mitscher did make up for his mistakes at Midway when he ran TF 38/58
from late '43 to the end of the war.
Greggie Gibson
news:iKSdnYoD2K6CxkXa...@rcn.net:
How much more endurance would they have had if they had flown with 500lb
bombs instead of the 1000lb bombs?
Ray O'Hara
Ray O'Hara
"Greggie Gibson" <Greggie...@noonecares.com> wrote in message
news:Xns9A5FCA5F18EC...@news.albasani.net...
enough to find the japanese carrier force and maybe get the last carrier.
Gernot Hassenpflug
> "Scott M. Kozel" <koz...@comcast.net> wrote in message
> news:47D5E9FF...@comcast.net...
>>A short version of John Ford's Torpedo Squadron 8 can be found at:
>>
>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsK1PeoMfNQ
>>
>> The shot of the planes taking off is the last pictures taken of the
>> planes of the squadron.
>>
>> When told by FDR of the fate of VT 8 Churchill was said to have wept.
>
> Somehow I doubt that.
>
> When told that HMS Hood had been sunk his reaction was:
>
> "That's why we have them, if we can't afford to lose them we shouldn't have
> them"...
My thoughts exactly. Chrchillian tears....brings to mind the image of
a crocodile.
--
BOFH excuse #212:
Of course it doesn't work. We've performed a software upgrade.
Gernot Hassenpflug
> On Mar 12, 11:06 am, dumpst...@hotmail.com wrote:
>> I wonder if the Japanese thought the Americans were deliberately
>> sacrificing their Torpedo bombers in order to give the dive bombers
>> a clear shot.
>
> If anything, it might have been the opposite. _Shattered Sword_
> (which I know I quoted last post, but it's a really well-done book)
> suggests that one reason the Japanese fixated so strongly on the
> torpedo planes might have been that in the Japanese Navy, torpedo
> planes were considered the primary antishipping weapon of a carrier
> air group. In other words, they were more likely to have thought that
> the American torpedo bombers were the real threat, and that dive
> bombers would be a lesser threat.
>
> In hindsight, of course, this is a classic case of projection. The
> torpedo bomber was indeed the primary antishipping weapon in the
> Japanese Navy, but to assume that it would also be so for the
> Americans overlooked several key facts:
I disagree with your insinuation here. Everyone knows that letting
water in at the bottom is the best way to sink a ship. Let us not
confuse complete irregard for safe, reliable and reproducible (read,
scientific) procedures by Nagumo with the comparison of dive bombing
and torpedo strikes. If the dive bombers had not found the carriers
full of fueled planes, hoses all over the decks, unstored arsenals in
the hanger decks and other totally unacceptable safety and risk
management scenarios, I doubt very much that the effects would have
been anything like what they ended up as. In other words, given the
conditions, it is unsurprising that dive bombers sank the carriers,
and probably a lone torpedo would have had similar effects with shock,
fire and explosions on the hanger and flight decks ensuing. That
situation can be laid squarely at the feet of Nagumo, and in lesser
weight at the feet of the local commanders who allowed themselves to
obey his orders.
> 1) The Japanese B5N torpedo bomber was much faster than the American
> SBD. Its Type 91 torpedo could also be dropped at much higher speeds
> and altitudes than the American Mark 13, giving it more freedom to
> take evasive action during its run. Thus, Japanese torpedo bombers at
> that point in the war were much more able to penetrate a group's
> defenses than the Americans.
Agreed.
> 2) The American SBD dive bomber could carry a 1,000 lb bomb whereas
> the Japanese D3A could only carry a 500 lb bomb. This made American
> dive bombers much deadlier than their Japanese counterparts.
True, if the bombs hit. Nevertheless, the torpedo was rightly seen as
a much more dangerous weapon than even a 1000 lb bomb.
> The Japanese were, of course, not unaware of the dive bomber's
> antishipping potential, as shown in Kido Butai's action off Ceylon.
> But they expected the real decisive threat to come from torpedo
> planes.
I don't think any other nation thought differently, nor should it.
>> If the Dauntlesses had gotten there first, would the the roles have
>> been reversed? in other words, would the Japanese fighters
>> have been so busy slaughtering the dive bombers that the
>> torpedo bombers could have sunk the carriers?
>
> Hard to say, really- the various air groups were all over the map at
> Midway and it really depends on who gets where when. One problem that
> the Americans would have in the scenario you outline would be the
> TBD's slow speed, which meant that a torpedo attack could take ten
> minutes or even more to develop depending on whether they had to stern
> chase their targets. (It feels odd to talk about stern chasing in an
> airplane, but the TBD had to make its run at slow enough speeds that
> such things mattered a lot.) The Zeroes on CAP would have much more
> time to notice what was going on and send fighters down against the
> TBDs, and as VT-8's example so tragically shows even a few Zeroes
> would probably have been able to inflict heavy losses.
I expect that had the Zeros been disrupting the DB attacks, none or
few hits would have been gained, regardless of whether any DBs were
shot down. Similarly, had a few Zeros been available down at sea level
to counter the later-arriving TBs, then again probably no hits would
have been made, since the TBs would have been forced to drop at longer
range than normal, been unable to get into a good drop position, and
in any case the IJN ships were maneouvering frantically to avoid
torpedoes.
That said, in the situation Nagumo created, even a single bomb or
torpedo hit on one of the carriers would have likely proved fatal.
--
BOFH excuse #36:
dynamic software linking table corrupted
Steve Hix
Gernot Hassenpflug <ger...@nict.go.jp> wrote:
> "William Black" <willia...@hotmail.co.uk> writes:
>
> > "Scott M. Kozel" <koz...@comcast.net> wrote in message
> > news:47D5E9FF...@comcast.net...
> >>A short version of John Ford's Torpedo Squadron 8 can be found at:
> >>
> >> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsK1PeoMfNQ
> >>
> >> The shot of the planes taking off is the last pictures taken of the
> >> planes of the squadron.
> >>
> >> When told by FDR of the fate of VT 8 Churchill was said to have wept.
> >
> > Somehow I doubt that.
> >
> > When told that HMS Hood had been sunk his reaction was:
> >
> > "That's why we have them, if we can't afford to lose them we shouldn't
> > have
> > them"...
>
> My thoughts exactly. Chrchillian tears....brings to mind the image of
> a crocodile.
Perhaps not. It's not inconceivable that one might be very affected by
the heroic actions of doomed men, and still not fall apart at the loss
of warship in battle.
He had been, after all, First Lord of the Admiralty for a while.
He wouldn't be the first Victorian who could be both very sentimental
and bloody-minded at the same time.
Gernot Hassenpflug
> TMOliver wrote:
>> "Scott M. Kozel" <koz...@comcast.net> wrote ...
>>> A short version of John Ford's Torpedo Squadron 8 can be found at:
>>>
>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsK1PeoMfNQ
>>>
>>> The shot of the planes taking off is the last pictures taken of the
>>> planes of the squadron.
>>>
>>> When told by FDR of the fate of VT 8 Churchill was said to have wept.
>>
>> The mother of the only survivor taught me in English in high school
>> long ago.
>>
>> As he have said (and others have written) over the years, their loss
>> was certainly not without accompanying benefit. The arrival and
>> attack of the torpedo planes diverted the attention of the entire
>> IJN air defense effort and certainly reduced the amount of AA
>> encountered by the dive bombers. The Japanese CAP having descended
>> to engage the TBDs, attacks on the SBDs were greatly reduced. Less
>> AA and absent CAP increased the number of SBDs able to bomb the IJN
>> carriers and improved the odds for effective attacks.
>>
>> TMO
>
> Well, that paired with the lack of organization in the CAP...
>
> The AAA was never a factor. The DBs didn't attack for an hour, so had
> there been any control over CAP assets, there was plenty of TIME to
> get them up against the later attacks.
Against TB they certainly were.
> The fact is, the IJN was an offensive force, with little real effort
> expended in defense. The losses of the TBs was, in the event,
> slightly important, but it need not have been had the IJN kept its
> head.
Agreed.
> Note also that no BD was ever intercepted past push-over. Some were
That is because the IJN fighters were all down low.
> shot down by radar-guided AAA, but none recorded down by fighters.
> The window of vulnerability was MUCH smaller than that for the TBs.
And where did this radar-guided AAA come from?
--
BOFH excuse #345:
Having to manually track the satellite.
Gernot Hassenpflug
Kaga and Hiryu?
--
BOFH excuse #173:
Recursive traversal of loopback mount points
Greggie Gibson
I calculate 500lbs of bomb at just over 60 gallons of gasoline. What does
that equal in flight time/distance? Just curious.
Gernot Hassenpflug
Extra drag and weight also to be considered.
--
BOFH excuse #443:
Zombie processes detected, machine is haunted.
Dan
The comment related to the entire war, not just the carrier attack on
the Kido Butai.
>> shot down by radar-guided AAA, but none recorded down by fighters.
>> The window of vulnerability was MUCH smaller than that for the TBs.
>
> And where did this radar-guided AAA come from?
Specifically, accounts of the Marianas Turkey Shoot.
Dan
Gernot Hassenpflug
> Gernot Hassenpflug wrote:
>> Dan <dnad...@hotmail.com> writes:
/../
> The comment related to the entire war, not just the carrier attack on
> the Kido Butai.
Ah, I see. Still, I see the claim was countered in other posts. I
don't have evidence either way.
>>> shot down by radar-guided AAA, but none recorded down by fighters.
>>> The window of vulnerability was MUCH smaller than that for the TBs.
>>
>> And where did this radar-guided AAA come from?
>
> Specifically, accounts of the Marianas Turkey Shoot.
Hmmm, for sure the IJN never had AA gun-laying radar, they only had
air-warning radar and surface search radar. What accounts are you
referring to here?
--
BOFH excuse #61:
not approved by the FCC
Greggie Gibson
news:87wso7u...@nict.go.jp:
Okay, How much extra did they need to go in time and distance?
Keith Willshaw
"Gernot Hassenpflug" <ger...@nict.go.jp> wrote in message
news:871w6ej...@nict.go.jp...
I think you are wrong about this. ISTR that the Japanese reverse
engineered the US type SCR-268 and produced over 2000
of the type which was certainly capable of being used to lay guns
Keith
mike
wrote:
> Gernot Hassenpflug <ger...@nict.go.jp> wrote
> >> I calculate 500lbs of bomb at just over 60 gallons of gasoline. What
> >>does that equal in flight time/distance? Just curious.
>
> > Extra drag and weight also to be considered.
>
> Okay, How much extra did they need to go in time and distance?
Well, the TBD Pilot's Manual list this difference
@144 knots Cruise High Speed Cruise
(1)2000lbs(MkXIII) 248mi 179mi@167kn
(3) 500 pounders 381mi 275mi@179kn
(12)100 pounders 551mi 392mi@179kn
going from the 1500 and 1200 pound internal bombbay load,
300 pounds makes a big difference, and when fitted with a semi
recessed Torp, was draggy enough to reduce speed even more.
the drag difference between a 500 and 1000 GP Bomb isn't
much, IIRC the diameter is about 2" difference, and if those
1000s were semi armor piercing, those are smaller than the GP,
for less drag
**
mike
**
Dan
I was speaking of a US carrier reporting shooting down a DB in the MTS
with one single burst. I assumed it was radar aimed, but it could have
been a very good gun crew with lots of time to aim (it was the only
action the ship saw; don't remember the account name, though).
Dan
Gernot Hassenpflug
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>> "Gernot Hassenpflug" <ger...@nict.go.jp> wrote in message
>> news:871w6ej...@nict.go.jp...
>>> Dan <dnad...@hotmail.com> writes:
>>>
>>>> Gernot Hassenpflug wrote:
>>>>> Dan <dnad...@hotmail.com> writes:
>>> /../
>>>> The comment related to the entire war, not just the carrier attack on
>>>> the Kido Butai.
>>> Ah, I see. Still, I see the claim was countered in other posts. I
>>> don't have evidence either way.
>>>
>>>>>> shot down by radar-guided AAA, but none recorded down by fighters.
>>>>>> The window of vulnerability was MUCH smaller than that for the TBs.
>>>>> And where did this radar-guided AAA come from?
>>>> Specifically, accounts of the Marianas Turkey Shoot.
>>> Hmmm, for sure the IJN never had AA gun-laying radar, they only had
>>> air-warning radar and surface search radar. What accounts are you
>>> referring to here?
>>> --
>>
>> I think you are wrong about this. ISTR that the Japanese reverse
>> engineered the US type SCR-268 and produced over 2000
>> of the type which was certainly capable of being used to lay guns
That's very interesting Keith, do you have a reference for me? I have
never read anything about this. If you know the Japanese designation I
will have better luck searching on the Japanese websites I frequent.
> I was speaking of a US carrier reporting shooting down a DB in the MTS
> with one single burst. I assumed it was radar aimed, but it could
> have been a very good gun crew with lots of time to aim (it was the
> only action the ship saw; don't remember the account name, though).
I'm pretty sure VT-fused shells shot down plenty of diving planes
including dive bombers. MTS?
--
Gernot Hassenpflug
Keith Willshaw
"Gernot Hassenpflug" <ger...@coda.ocn.ne.jp> wrote in message
news:87skytp...@aikishugyo.dnsdojo.org...
The army version type was usually refereed to as the IJA Tachi 4
and the navy version was the IJN Mark IV Model 2
The following are excerpts from A Radar History of World War IIby Louis
Brown
http://www.vectorsite.net/ttwiz_08.html#m5
Pictures of a Japanese radar installation on Tinian
http://hiketinian.blogspot.com/2008/02/tinians-japanese-radar.html
Keith
Greggie Gibson
4796d6...@8g2000hse.googlegroups.com:
> On Mar 14, 2:17 am, Greggie Gibson <Greggie_Gib...@noonecares.com>
> wrote:
>> Gernot Hassenpflug <ger...@nict.go.jp> wrote
>> >> I calculate 500lbs of bomb at just over 60 gallons of gasoline. What
>> >>does that equal in flight time/distance? Just curious.
>>
>> > Extra drag and weight also to be considered.
>>
>> Okay, How much extra did they need to go in time and distance?
>
> Well, the TBD Pilot's Manual list this difference
>
> @144 knots Cruise High Speed Cruise
> (1)2000lbs(MkXIII) 248mi 179mi@167kn
> (3) 500 pounders 381mi 275mi@179kn
> (12)100 pounders 551mi 392mi@179kn
So I'm guessing that the additional 76 miles in each direction minus
whatever loiter/evasion time they would have gained would have done the
trick. Although that is just comparing the torpedo to the 3 500 lb bombs.
Might be though that a 1000lb bomb would be somewhere in between the
torpedo and the bombs. So maybe their combat radius only increased about
38 miles minus the loiter/evasion time?
Gernot Hassenpflug
> "Gernot Hassenpflug" <ger...@coda.ocn.ne.jp> wrote in message
> news:87skytp...@aikishugyo.dnsdojo.org...
/../
>> That's very interesting Keith, do you have a reference for me? I have
>> never read anything about this. If you know the Japanese designation I
>> will have better luck searching on the Japanese websites I frequent.
>>
>
> The army version type was usually refereed to as the IJA Tachi 4
> and the navy version was the IJN Mark IV Model 2
>
> The following are excerpts from A Radar History of World War IIby Louis
> Brown
>
>
> http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=uYgsr3exvS4C&pg=PA139&lpg=PA139&dq=japanese+radar&source=web&ots=AlICM8hmRK&sig=k9YooQj7LcfD5SXDWnU5dLtJC-4&hl=en
>
> http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=uYgsr3exvS4C&pg=PA421&lpg=PA421&dq=japanese+%22ta+chi%22+4+radar&source=web&ots=AlICM8ifNH&sig=aVo3fQ6ImHlVdB1laMXhxm6374g&hl=en
>
> http://www.vectorsite.net/ttwiz_08.html#m5
>
> Pictures of a Japanese radar installation on Tinian
> http://hiketinian.blogspot.com/2008/02/tinians-japanese-radar.html
Ah, thank you very much. Time to get a new book....
I notice these were land-based radars, not ship-based ones. That
explains my confusions to a large degree, I had never read up on the
Japanese land-based radars. I'll post something from Japanese sites
later on.
Ta!
--
Gernot Hassenpflug
Peter Stickney
The SBD-3 Pilot's manual, and the Operational Characteristics Summary
show no difference in internal fuel carried - both are hauling full internal
fuel, for a Combat radius of 240 NM for the 1,000# bomb, and 260 NM for
the case of the 500# bomb.
Now - if they were hauling the 1,600# Armor Piercing bomb, they'd have had
to reduce fuel - to the tune of a Combat Radius of 'bout 95 NM.
At 140 kts IAS, the difference in profile drag is negligible, compared to
the rest of the airplane. (Daunlesses weren't fast, but they sure were
slow)
--
Pete Stickney
Without data, all you have is an opinion
Gernot Hassenpflug
Hi, I found plenty of Japanese sources, as well as of course Japanese
articles criticizing their own inabilities to develop (technical and
operational) radar. Some nice diagrams too. After I've carved down the
number of URLs to a reasonable amount, I'll post some of them here.
--
BOFH excuse #231:
We had to turn off that service to comply with the CDA Bill.
Gordon
> Now - if they were hauling the 1,600# Armor Piercing bomb, they'd have had
> to reduce fuel - to the tune of a Combat Radius of 'bout 95 NM.
> At 140 kts IAS, the difference in profile drag is negligible, compared to
> the rest of the airplane. (Daunlesses weren't fast, but they sure were
> slow)
....but Deadly :))
Jeff Crowell
> Now - if they were hauling the 1,600# Armor Piercing bomb, they'd have had
> to reduce fuel - to the tune of a Combat Radius of 'bout 95 NM.
I believe you dropped a leading '1' from that range figure, right?
Jeff
Mark Bradford
"Jeff Crowell" <jeffDOT...@hp.com> wrote in message
news:frlmm9$a4q$1...@usenet01.boi.hp.com...
I know this is going to be a dumb question, but here goes anyway. Were the
armor piercing bombs modified naval AP shells similar to what the Japanese
used at PH?
I seem to recall reading somewhere that the Japanese used modified 15" AP
shells as armor piercing air dropped bombs. I assume the effects would be
the same as plunging fire and depending on the height that the bomb was
released the terminal velocity would be pretty much the same as a gun fired
shell.
Mark
Joe Osman
> Gernot Hassenpflug <ger...@coda.ocn.ne.jp> writes:
>
> >> "Gernot Hassenpflug" <ger...@coda.ocn.ne.jp> wrote in message
> >>news:87skytp...@aikishugyo.dnsdojo.org...
> > /../
> >>> That's very interesting Keith, do you have a reference for me? I have
> >>> never read anything about this. If you know the Japanese designation I
> >>> will have better luck searching on the Japanese websites I frequent.
>
> >> The army version type was usually refereed to as the IJA Tachi 4
> >> and the navy version was the IJN Mark IV Model 2
>
> >> The following are excerpts from A Radar History of World War IIby Louis
> >> Brown
>
>
> >>http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=uYgsr3exvS4C&pg=PA421&lpg=PA421&dq...
>
> >>http://www.vectorsite.net/ttwiz_08.html#m5
>
> >> Pictures of a Japanese radar installation on Tinian
> >>http://hiketinian.blogspot.com/2008/02/tinians-japanese-radar.html
>
> > Ah, thank you very much. Time to get a new book....
>
> > I notice these were land-based radars, not ship-based ones. That
> > explains my confusions to a large degree, I had never read up on the
> > Japanese land-based radars. I'll post something from Japanese sites
> > later on.
>
> Hi, I found plenty of Japanese sources, as well as of course Japanese
> articles criticizing their own inabilities to develop (technical and
> operational) radar. Some nice diagrams too. After I've carved down the
> number of URLs to a reasonable amount, I'll post some of them here.
> --
> BOFH excuse #231:
>
>
> - Show quoted text -
You might want to look at REPORTS OF THE U. S. NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION
TO JAPAN 1945 - 1946 at
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/USNAVY/USNTMJ%20Reports/USNTMJ_toc.htm
or http://tinyurl.com/dknsd
Joe
Gernot Hassenpflug
>> - Show quoted text -
>
> You might want to look at REPORTS OF THE U. S. NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION
> TO JAPAN 1945 - 1946 at
> http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/USNAVY/USNTMJ%20Reports/USNTMJ_toc.htm
> or http://tinyurl.com/dknsd
Thanks! One interesting resource I found also were the vast reports
online on the Battle of Leyte Gulf, including the reports from all USN
vessels and their observations and impressions of the enemy
operations, equipment function, tacts and strategy, etc.
--
BOFH excuse #78:
Yes, yes, its called a design limitation
Dan
For the attack on Pearl Harbor, they used 16" AP projectiles from
Nagato/Mutsu fitted with fins, hauled by Kates in their level-bombing
capacity. Apparently, only one hit (Arizona).
Torpedoes were modified with wooden "fins" to slow their sink rate so
they would not bury themselves in the bottom of the harbor. A similar
mod was used in the open ocean to allow higher and faster drop
conditions than before the mods.
Terminal velocity was probably not even approached with the air dropped
version of the projectiles, and as far as I know, this was a one-time
knockoff for a specific event, not repeated.
The Val carried a 500 lb (250 kG) purpose-built AP bomb, which was
effective, if small. The Dauntless early on carried a 1000 lb (500 kG)
purpose-built AP bomb that was defective, with the same problem as the
early US torpedoes - the force of collision with an armored surface
crushed the fusing mechanism, leading to failure to detonate after
penetration. Some (one?) shipboard armorer built a steel cap to protect
the fuse, which was a decent field mod. I'm pretty sure the BuOrd was
apprised of the situation, and later AP ammunition came with better fuses.
The Dauntless also had a problem with window fogging in the dive, and
some other quirks.
Dan
Dan
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
mark...@bellsouth.net (Mark Bradford) wrote:
> I seem to recall reading somewhere that the Japanese used modified
> 15" AP shells as armor piercing air dropped bombs.
14 inch, 15 inch was not a calibre used by Japan.
Ken Young
Gernot Hassenpflug
You are right in your correction of 15 inch as erroneous, but I think
it was 16 inch AP shells from the Nagato class ships that were in fact
used.
--
Gernot Hassenpflug
Mark Sieving
No, a combat radius of 95 nm is correct, though that's for the SBD-5.
(Note that's radius, not total range.) Full internal fuel was 254
gallons, but with the 1600 lb bomb, fuel was limited to 165 gallons.
SBD-5s didn't carry these things very often. I think Essex class
carriers only carried about a dozen 1600 lb bombs total.
http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/hist-ac/sbd-5.pdf
See page 6 of the pdf.
Peter Stickney
Indeed, yes! IIRC, it was the #1 ship-killer airplane for the U.S. Navy.
The navy kept trying to replace it - the Curtiss SB2C ended up about 4 years
late even with wartime priority, and it the SumBitch 2nd Class lowered the
bar for "Acceptable" handling qualities for decades to come.
(Little stuff like a static breakout force of 40# on the elevators, standing
on the ground with no wind.)
Weatherlawyer
> A short version of John Ford's Torpedo Squadron 8 can be found at:
>
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsK1PeoMfNQ
>
> The shot of the planes taking off is the last pictures taken of the
> planes of the squadron.
What happened to the sole survivor? He sounds like a candidate for
post traumatic stress disorder.
Weatherlawyer
> Weatherlawyer wrote:
> >
> > The triumph of whisky over flatulence. The occasional volte farce
> > tends to cut down the political rhetoric.
>
> > What happened to the loser in charge of air cover? Did well in
> > politics later, did he?
>
> Not sure what the whisky comment is about but as for air cover? Hornets
> airwing was mostly a no show at Midway. The rest of the Wing few in a
> another direction and ended up ditching for lack of gas.
Montgomery and Churchill were supposed to have engaged in a bragging
match. One a famous ascetic and closet politician the other a
treacherous glutton and closet soldier.
I heard that Churchill bragged he drank a bottle of whiskey a day at
that meeting.
But who cares about that clown?
None here seems to care that the howling monkey is bragging again how
we are all winning the war in Iraq again. I wish someone would tell
the fool it has a lot in common with the events of WW II -all except
for everything that he believes, that is.
In the meantime, lets ponder over how things might have gone had the
airmen in the US fleet had battle experience or even just decent
training.
I imagine they'd have dumped their torpedoes and headed for home
dragging a tale behind them. That would have been a downer.
Matt Wiser
>
Which explains why the SB2C was also known as "The Beast." And yet pilots who flew the
-1 version and later the -3 said the latter version was much, much improved. Marc Mitscher
told VB-19 that when they got the -3 version on Lexington, after two weeks, they'd sold him
on the plane. And since the SBD production line had been shut down.... no choice but to
keep Helldivers coming into Fleet squadrons. Unless you want all VB to switch to TBMs....
ErrolC
<snip>
>
> What happened to the sole survivor? He sounds like a candidate for
> post traumatic stress disorder.
From similar circumstances, as I quoted a few years ago:
http://groups.google.com/group/sci.military.naval/msg/3304bd618981be3e
"Some relevent quotes from "Bring Back my Stringbag" by Lord
Kilbracken,
1979
...
August 1942
...Brian with his DSO ribbon was one of the few survivors of that
suicidal
attack by Eugene Esmonde's squadron on the S&G only a few months
earlier.
Elegant and suave, he still had 18 bits of shrapnel in his back, which
the
doctors preferred to leave there, and a newly acquired stammer, but
was
already thought fit to return to action."
--
Errol Cavit | "War is waged by men; not by beasts, or by gods.
It is a peculiarly human activity. To call it a crime against humanity
is to miss at least half of its significance; it is also the
punishment of a crime." Frederic Manning, _The Middle Parts of
Fortune_
Weatherlawyer
> On Mar 20, 2:52 pm, Weatherlawyer <Weatherlaw...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> <snip>
>
>
>
> > What happened to the sole survivor? He sounds like a candidate for
> > post traumatic stress disorder.
>
> From similar circumstances, as I quoted a few years ago:
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/sci.military.naval/msg/3304bd618981be3e
>
> "Some relevent quotes from "Bring Back my Stringbag" by Lord
> Kilbracken,
> 1979
> ...
> August 1942
> attack by Eugene Esmonde's squadron on the S&G only a few months
> earlier.
>
> Elegant and suave, he still had 18 bits of shrapnel in his back, which
> the doctors preferred to leave there, and a newly acquired stammer, but
> was already thought fit to return to action."
A peculiarity of battle fatigue I have not heard explained, is that
officers got stammers whilst other ranks were rendered mute.
I wonder how this measures up in modern battle and also how it showed
up in civilian forces used 24/7 where it was instrumental in getting
the stupid fools in high command to realise that exhaustion not
cowardice was the main reason for battle fatigue.
Nervous breakdown in Bletchley Park was I believe the second iron in
that fire
Peter Skelton
<Weathe...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>On Mar 20, 3:37 am, ErrolC <Erro...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Mar 20, 2:52 pm, Weatherlawyer <Weatherlaw...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> <snip>
>>
>>
>>
>> > What happened to the sole survivor? He sounds like a candidate for
>> > post traumatic stress disorder.
>>
>> From similar circumstances, as I quoted a few years ago:
>>
>> http://groups.google.com/group/sci.military.naval/msg/3304bd618981be3e
>>
>> "Some relevent quotes from "Bring Back my Stringbag" by Lord
>> Kilbracken,
>> 1979
>> ...
>> August 1942
>> Brian with his DSO ribbon was one of the few survivors of that suicidal
>> attack by Eugene Esmonde's squadron on the S&G only a few months
>> earlier.
>>
>> Elegant and suave, he still had 18 bits of shrapnel in his back, which
>> the doctors preferred to leave there, and a newly acquired stammer, but
>> was already thought fit to return to action."
>
>A peculiarity of battle fatigue I have not heard explained, is that
>officers got stammers whilst other ranks were rendered mute.
>
It doesn't always work that way. Early in my career, I had an
ex-british private with a stammer he picked up in Burma. (A mild,
polite little guy that nobody was ever rude to.)
>I wonder how this measures up in modern battle and also how it showed
>up in civilian forces used 24/7 where it was instrumental in getting
>the stupid fools in high command to realise that exhaustion not
>cowardice was the main reason for battle fatigue.
>
>Nervous breakdown in Bletchley Park was I believe the second iron in
>that fire
Peter Skelton
Weatherlawyer
> On Thu, 20 Mar 2008 01:12:08 -0700 (PDT), Weatherlawyer
>
> >officers got stammers whilst other ranks were rendered mute.
>
> It doesn't always work that way. Early in my career, I had an
> ex-british private with a stammer he picked up in Burma. (A mild,
> polite little guy that nobody was ever rude to.)
My reference was to Rupert Brooke's stay in a recovery unit and his
visit to a torture chamber that was the recovery unit for other ranks.
In the absence of knowing any better I'd guess it is a condition that
depends on the casualty's ability to find alternative means of
communication.
Officers of WW I would be more likely than not to speak or be familiar
with three languages.
Other ranks would be well educated if they were familiar with one.
Trying to communicate with a superior officer in correct English in
ordinary circumstances might produce a stammer.
Just a wild guess of course.
William Black
"Weatherlawyer" <Weathe...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:900be0f0-48e2-45ba...@x30g2000hsd.googlegroups.com...
> Officers of WW I would be more likely than not to speak or be familiar
> with three languages.
>
> Other ranks would be well educated if they were familiar with one.
By the end of WWI some 50% of officers in the British army had risen from
the ranks.
Did the commissioning process somehow induce a knowledge of foreign
languages?
Or have you been watching 'Blackadder' again?
--
William Black
I've seen things you people wouldn't believe.
Barbeques on fire by the chalets past the castle headland
I watched the gift shops glitter in the darkness off the Newborough gate
All these moments will be lost in time, like icecream on the beach
Time for tea.
Weatherlawyer
wrote:
> "Weatherlawyer" <Weatherlaw...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>
> news:900be0f0-48e2-45ba...@x30g2000hsd.googlegroups.com...
>
> > Officers of WW I would be more likely than not to speak or be familiar
> > with three languages.
>
> > Other ranks would be well educated if they were familiar with one.
>
> By the end of WWI some 50% of officers in the British army had risen from
> the ranks.
>
> Did the commissioning process somehow induce a knowledge of foreign
> languages?
Anyone who went to a grammar school or a Public School in Britain in
those days was subjected to Latin and French possibly German and
Greek. French and Greek being languages that those following
Literature courses would have.
German and Latin of course were the prestige languages of Physics and
the other sciences.
And Officers Classes went to grammar schools at the very least. Those
who went to public schools were likely to have holidays abroad.
It is fairly obvious that of all those likely to be able to
communicate in a number of ways beside the linguine franca, officer
materiel would be in the frame.
Jeff Dougherty
> Jeff Dougherty <dougherty.jeff...@gmail.com> writes:
> I disagree with your insinuation here. Everyone knows that letting
> water in at the bottom is the best way to sink a ship. Let us not
> confuse complete irregard for safe, reliable and reproducible (read,
> scientific) procedures by Nagumo with the comparison of dive bombing
> and torpedo strikes. If the dive bombers had not found the carriers
> full of fueled planes, hoses all over the decks, unstored arsenals in
> the hanger decks and other totally unacceptable safety and risk
> management scenarios, I doubt very much that the effects would have
> been anything like what they ended up as. In other words, given the
> conditions, it is unsurprising that dive bombers sank the carriers,
> and probably a lone torpedo would have had similar effects with shock,
> fire and explosions on the hanger and flight decks ensuing. That
> situation can be laid squarely at the feet of Nagumo, and in lesser
> weight at the feet of the local commanders who allowed themselves to
> obey his orders.
Sorry for the delay in replying, been caught up in work for a while.
I may have to eat my words here to a certain extent. I was prepared
to argue that by that point in the war the Japanese should have known
that the TBD was obsolete and a minimal threat due to its slow speed
and restricted maneuverability. I wasn't aware at the time of the
type's decent record in the early raids against Japanese islands and
at the Coral Sea, and so I think I was too harsh on the Japanese CAP
here. The torpedo planes certainly were a significant threat.
Still, it seems that the Japanese CAP pilots did develop target
fixation during the engagements and allowed themselves to be pulled
out of a position to defend the task force from threats emerging from
other axes. The lack of fighter direction really shows here- you need
someone with a cooler head to make sure an adequate reserve stays back
to deal with other threats.
> > Hard to say, really- the various air groups were all over the map at
> > Midway and it really depends on who gets where when. One problem that
> > the Americans would have in the scenario you outline would be the
> > TBD's slow speed, which meant that a torpedo attack could take ten
> > minutes or even more to develop depending on whether they had to stern
> > chase their targets. (It feels odd to talk about stern chasing in an
> > airplane, but the TBD had to make its run at slow enough speeds that
> > such things mattered a lot.) The Zeroes on CAP would have much more
> > time to notice what was going on and send fighters down against the
> > TBDs, and as VT-8's example so tragically shows even a few Zeroes
> > would probably have been able to inflict heavy losses.
>
> I expect that had the Zeros been disrupting the DB attacks, none or
> few hits would have been gained, regardless of whether any DBs were
> shot down. Similarly, had a few Zeros been available down at sea level
> to counter the later-arriving TBs, then again probably no hits would
> have been made, since the TBs would have been forced to drop at longer
> range than normal, been unable to get into a good drop position, and
> in any case the IJN ships were maneouvering frantically to avoid
> torpedoes.
Agreed. As Kaga's captain showed earlier in the day, a maneuvering
ship could dodge multiple torpedoes from multiple directions if given
enough time to react. Even if part of the Japanese CAP is dealing
with dive bombers, I think the chances of the TBDs inflicting any hits
are minimal- they just take too long during their runs in and give the
defenders too many chances to do something about them. Possibly they
don't get as badly chewed up as they actually did.
> That said, in the situation Nagumo created, even a single bomb or
> torpedo hit on one of the carriers would have likely proved fatal.
And that, really, is the take-home lesson of the American attack. The
SBDs were lucky to arrive when they did, but they couldn't have
inflicted the damage they did without a great deal of help from Adm.
Nagumo. There's blame to go around for other Japanese commanders such
as Yamamoto, but to my mind there's no question where the ultimate
responsibility lies.
The other problem, of course, was that Japanese carriers were perhaps
the ultimate in eggshells with sledgehammers. Their combination of
enclosed hangars and unarmored flight decks made them vulnerable to
fire and internal explosions, they lacked advanced DC systems like
subdivided water mains and CO2 flush systems for their avgas lines and
the Japanese practice of only training a few specialists in damage
control didn't help.
-JTD
Gernot Hassenpflug
> On Mar 13, 1:10 am, Gernot Hassenpflug <ger...@nict.go.jp> wrote:
>> Jeff Dougherty <dougherty.jeff...@gmail.com> writes:
/../
> Still, it seems that the Japanese CAP pilots did develop target
> fixation during the engagements and allowed themselves to be pulled
> out of a position to defend the task force from threats emerging from
> other axes. The lack of fighter direction really shows here- you need
> someone with a cooler head to make sure an adequate reserve stays back
> to deal with other threats.
/../
Hi Jeff, yes, as I quite a few more expert posters have pointed out,
the Japanese control of their fighters was much more poor than that of
the USN at the time, largely as a result of the primitive radio gear
the Japanese used at the time. You know, they had to make do with
varnished paper because they lacked the materials (in quantity) to
make proper insulators. I also want to point out that from reading
Japanese sources, some pilots did not throw the radios out because
they wanted to save weight: they threw them out because they hardly
ever functioned when needed and simply took up excess weight. What
they really wanted was new radios that worked.
> Agreed. As Kaga's captain showed earlier in the day, a maneuvering
> ship could dodge multiple torpedoes from multiple directions if given
> enough time to react. Even if part of the Japanese CAP is dealing
> with dive bombers, I think the chances of the TBDs inflicting any hits
> are minimal- they just take too long during their runs in and give the
> defenders too many chances to do something about them. Possibly they
> don't get as badly chewed up as they actually did.
/../
Yes, and also, the USN torpedos were pretty slow, thereby allowing the
ships to out-maneouver them more easily.
> The other problem, of course, was that Japanese carriers were perhaps
> the ultimate in eggshells with sledgehammers. Their combination of
> enclosed hangars and unarmored flight decks made them vulnerable to
> fire and internal explosions, they lacked advanced DC systems like
> subdivided water mains and CO2 flush systems for their avgas lines and
> the Japanese practice of only training a few specialists in damage
> control didn't help.
This I cannot substantiate. I don't think, for example, that Shokaku
and Zuikaku were terribly vulnerable in the egg-shell sense, as borne
out by their damage taken in 1942 at Coral Sea and in the various
battles around the Solomons later in the year. Nor any of the other
carriers for that matter. After all, the Kaga and Akagi had battleship
and battlecruiser, hulls, respectively, both of which were more
heavily armoured and therefore had more heavy structure, than carriers
built with only cruiser-type protection. We all agree though that
certain critical design flaws were disastrous: vibration damage to
avgas tanks, for example. And yes, damage-control was less advanced
technically, as was almost everything else in the IJN at that time
(except optics and oxygen-powered torpedoes I suppose). I think one
can fairly compare the loss of Lexington with that of the initial
three Japanese carriers at Midway in terms of how the crews coped with
devastating damage from internal explosions (which basically wiped out
the fire-fighting capabilities by cutting hoses, killing the few
specialized teams, and making many areas impassable, etc.).
I am not sure exactly about Hiryu, but I think she might have been
saved had the Japanese not been forced to retreat from the area by the
remaining US airpower. Certainly, the engine rooms were not disabled,
since after her torpedoing by an IJN destroyer, the irate engine room
crews (who resented the fact that the bridge crew had not told them
that they should abandon ship and that the ship was going to be
scuttled by torpedoes) managed to exit the ship at the stern and take
to the boats before she sank, finally being picked up by US ships and
aircraft several days later after a rather harrowing stay in the open
ocean, very unhappy with their leadership.
--
BOFH excuse #37:
heavy gravity fluctuation, move computer to floor rapidly
Gernot Hassenpflug
> "Weatherlawyer" <Weathe...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:900be0f0-48e2-45ba...@x30g2000hsd.googlegroups.com...
>
>> Officers of WW I would be more likely than not to speak or be familiar
>> with three languages.
>>
>> Other ranks would be well educated if they were familiar with one.
>
> By the end of WWI some 50% of officers in the British army had risen from
> the ranks.
>
> Did the commissioning process somehow induce a knowledge of foreign
> languages?
>
> Or have you been watching 'Blackadder' again?
Everybody understands English (or your version thereof) if it is
spoken loudly enough :-)
--
BOFH excuse #235:
The new frame relay network hasn't bedded down the software loop transmitter yet.
Jeff Dougherty
>Certainly, the engine rooms were not disabled,
> since after her torpedoing by an IJN destroyer, the irate engine room
> crews (who resented the fact that the bridge crew had not told them
> that they should abandon ship and that the ship was going to be
> scuttled by torpedoes) managed to exit the ship at the stern and take
> to the boats before she sank, finally being picked up by US ships and
> aircraft several days later after a rather harrowing stay in the open
> ocean, very unhappy with their leadership.
Fuller response later, but I'll just note that it's probably just as
well they were captured. I'd hate to have been the IJN retention
officer trying to convince those lads to reenlist. ;-)
"No, really, we promise we'll tell you the next time we abandon ship!"
-JTD
Jeff Crowell
> The other problem, of course, was that Japanese carriers were perhaps
> the ultimate in eggshells with sledgehammers. Their combination of
> enclosed hangars and unarmored flight decks
Same as the American ships.
> made them vulnerable to
> fire and internal explosions, they lacked advanced DC systems like
> subdivided water mains and CO2 flush systems for their avgas lines
IIRC, the American practice of draining and flushing fuel systems
with CO2 was not force-wide at the time, in fact it had only recently
been invented--by a Chief Aviation Boatswain's Mate, if the story I
read is correct.
Jeff
Gernot Hassenpflug
More like, "you have been negligent but we are generous in giving you
a second chance.... why did you not use the grenades we sent you?"
--
Gernot Hassenpflug
Jeff Dougherty
> Jeff Dougherty wrote:
> > The other problem, of course, was that Japanese carriers were perhaps
> > the ultimate in eggshells with sledgehammers. Their combination of
> > enclosed hangars and unarmored flight decks
>
> Same as the American ships.
Nope. American flight decks were unarmored, but the sides of the
hangar decks were open which reduced the buildup of smoke and
flammable gasses, allowed burning debris to be jettisoned over the
side, and let escorts alongside play hoses in to help with fire
fighting. British carriers of WWII had enclosed hangar decks, but
their flight decks were armored. The Japanese inadvertently managed
to secure themselves the worst of both worlds.
> > made them vulnerable to
> > fire and internal explosions, they lacked advanced DC systems like
> > subdivided water mains and CO2 flush systems for their avgas lines
>
> IIRC, the American practice of draining and flushing fuel systems
> with CO2 was not force-wide at the time, in fact it had only recently
> been invented--by a Chief Aviation Boatswain's Mate, if the story I
> read is correct.
Hmm. That could be, now that I think of it- I've read of it being
used at Midway but only on the Yorktown, since not surprisingly DC
techniques on the other American carriers don't get a lot of attention
in histories of that battle. Do you remember where you read that
story? Sounds like a book I might want to track down.
-JTD
YMC
news:4b9d44dd-128a-401a-8a53-> Hmm. That could be, now that I think of it-
> used at Midway but only on the Yorktown, since not surprisingly DC
> techniques on the other American carriers don't get a lot of attention
> in histories of that battle. Do you remember where you read that
> story? Sounds like a book I might want to track down.
>
> -JTD
You can find it in Shattered Sword:the untold story of the Battle of
Midway... by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, page 407
"Machinist Oscar W Myers, Yorktown's air dept fuel officer had observed that
the demise of Lexington was the result... of an aviation gasoline fire on
her hangar deck. He therefore contrived the notion of draining the fuel
system after usage and filling the pipes with inert CO2 gas. Yorktown's
skirpper, Cap Elliott Buckmaster was quick to give his permission to this
innovation which almost cetainly prevented Yorktown's suffering a calamitous
fire during Kobayashi's dive bomber attack on 4 June. (page 407)
Cheers,
Yau
Ray O'Hara
he fought again at guadalcanal.
he survived the war. became a pilot for TWA and when he died in 1994 his
ashes were scatted over the sea where the rest of his squadron was.
he gave lectures on midway and served as a consultant on the movie midway
he wrote a book sole survivor about the battle
Jack Linthicum
> "Jeff Dougherty" <dougherty.jeff...@gmail.com> wrote in message
William Black
This does not accord with your previous post.
William Black
"Weatherlawyer" <Weathe...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:c2319feb-4c03-4d1a...@k13g2000hse.googlegroups.com...
> On Mar 11, 2:10 am, "Scott M. Kozel" <koze...@comcast.net> wrote:
> > A short version of John Ford's Torpedo Squadron 8 can be found at:
> >
> > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsK1PeoMfNQ
> >
> > The shot of the planes taking off is the last pictures taken of the
> > planes of the squadron.
>
> What happened to the sole survivor? He sounds like a candidate for
> post traumatic stress disorder.
He did ok.
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-g/g-gay.htm
dott.Piergiorgio
> After all, the Kaga and Akagi had battleship
> and battlecruiser, hulls, respectively, both of which were more
> heavily armoured and therefore had more heavy structure,
I fully agree. Also, IIRC from Parshall & Tully, the much more battered
(8 hits) former BB Kaga actually outlives the former BC Akagi (2 1/2
hits)....
Best regards from Italy,
Dott. Piergiorgio.
dott.Piergiorgio
> Everybody understands English (or your version thereof) if it is
> spoken loudly enough :-)
I agree.
Being deaf, I have a rather pathetic English pronunciation but I manage
to get understanded by my mother's Indian servant.....
Ray O'Hara
"William Black" <willia...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote in message
news:fs0uo9$n3j$1...@registered.motzarella.org...
>
> "Weatherlawyer" <Weathe...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:c2319feb-4c03-4d1a...@k13g2000hse.googlegroups.com...
> > On Mar 11, 2:10 am, "Scott M. Kozel" <koze...@comcast.net> wrote:
> > > A short version of John Ford's Torpedo Squadron 8 can be found at:
> > >
> > > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsK1PeoMfNQ
> > >
> > > The shot of the planes taking off is the last pictures taken of the
> > > planes of the squadron.
> >
> > What happened to the sole survivor? He sounds like a candidate for
> > post traumatic stress disorder.
>
>
> He did ok.
>
> http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-g/g-gay.htm
>
>
better than his squadron mates. but i'm sure everybody else getting killed
has to leave a scar on your soul.
i'm sure it helped a little in that he did all he could and didn't have to
think that maybe if he had done X differently things might have been
different.
Jeff Dougherty
<dott.PiergiorgioNI...@KAIGUN.fastwebnet.it> wrote:
> Gernot Hassenpflug ha scritto:
>
> > After all, the Kaga and Akagi had battleship
> > and battlecruiser, hulls, respectively, both of which were more
> > heavily armoured and therefore had more heavy structure,
>
> I fully agree. Also, IIRC from Parshall & Tully, the much more battered
> (8 hits) former BB Kaga actually outlives the former BC Akagi (2 1/2
> hits)....
Kaga actually sank at about 1915 on June 4, Akagi held on until 0520
on June 5. Akagi is known to have been scuttled, and Parshall and
Tully make a fairly good case (IMHO) that Kaga was as well.
-JTD
Matt Wiser
known to have been scuttled, it wasn't until Shattered Sword came out that there were
eyewitness accounts of Kaga and Soryu being scuttled as well. Neither carrier was
salvagable, but with no damage to watertight integrity, they were not likely to sink on their
own. There are more eyewitnesses to Kaga's scuttling than Soryu's, however.
Gernot Hassenpflug
Ah, the luxury of living in a country that eschews the politically
correct in favour of reality :-)
--
Gernot Hassenpflug
YMC
"Matt Wiser" <MattWi...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:120615...@alibistextweb.com...
Hiryu did not scucumb to the effects of the friendly torpedo strike until
the next day. In fact, a group of staff from the engineer section came up
just in time to see the evacuating destroyer leave. They hailed it but got a
curt reply.
The next day, the Hiryu was spotted - still not sunk - so another IJN
destroyer was sent to sink it but failed to find it.
The Hiryu sank in the meantime and the left-behind IJN crew were later
picked up by the Americans.
Gernot Hassenpflug
> "Matt Wiser" <MattWi...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:120615...@alibistextweb.com...
>> All four carriers, according to Parshall and Tully, were scuttled. While
>> Akagi and Hiryu were
>> known to have been scuttled, it wasn't until Shattered Sword came out that
>> there were
>> eyewitness accounts of Kaga and Soryu being scuttled as well. Neither
>> carrier was
>> salvagable, but with no damage to watertight integrity, they were not
>> likely to sink on their
>> own. There are more eyewitnesses to Kaga's scuttling than Soryu's,
>> however.
>
> Hiryu did not scucumb to the effects of the friendly torpedo strike until
> the next day. In fact, a group of staff from the engineer section came up
> just in time to see the evacuating destroyer leave. They hailed it but got a
> curt reply.
They were well and truly pissed, that lot were. I read the book
written by one of the survivors, and it sounds that if they had
somehow gotten hold of a flag officer at that point, they would have
made short work of him :-)
> The next day, the Hiryu was spotted - still not sunk - so another IJN
> destroyer was sent to sink it but failed to find it.
> The Hiryu sank in the meantime and the left-behind IJN crew were later
> picked up by the Americans.
Indeed.
--
Gernot Hassenpflug
Matt Wiser
>
And one of the engine-room crew picked up by the USN was Hiryu's Chief Engineer; he was
despised by the other survivors by his RHIP attitude while adrift in a cutter. Several survivors
said to Ed Layton that they were considering throwing him overboard before they were found
by the USN.
Gernot Hassenpflug
Matt Wiser
>
>Electromagnetic energy loss
Rank Has Its Priviliges. The ChEng insisted on more than a fair share of the food, water, and
even some bottles of beer that the cutter was stocked with. Several of the men in the cutter
were thinking about tossing him over the side when they were found by the USN.
Gernot Hassenpflug
Ah. He also had his fair share of chutzpah then didn't he. I can tell
you he would not have lasted a minute in my boat!
Still, the guys were lucky: they could have ended up like the poor
sods on Wake, where the officers purposely starved them to death
(imaginary crimes led to no food as punishment, making them weak, and
combined with the rule of no work no food this sufficed to kill off
all the people they did not want to keep around to feed) to keep food
for themselves. Japan would have been better off if the men had
revolted and killed 99% of the officers.
--
BOFH excuse #346:
Your/our computer(s) had suffered a memory leak, and we are waiting for them to be topped up.
Jack Linthicum
Imagine what the IJN had been like if the original founders had
emphasized the need to maintain good relations with the crew.
Peter Skelton
In fact they did. But they drifted from their 1875 (approx)
Brirish standard in some cases. Organizations aren't hurt much by
nepotism and the like provided standards must be met. Somehow
that got lost. Other organizations have suffered similarly
Peter Skelton
Jack Linthicum
Has anyone ever traced the development of the Japanese military
attitude both towards enemies and the "lower classes"? IIRC the
Samurai were above it all, being captured only meant ransom, unless
some terrible feud was involved. The "rightness" of junior officers in
the 1920s and 30s seems to have carried over to treatment of enemies
and lowers as some form of filth that needed to be cleaned up from
time to time.
Gernot Hassenpflug
> On Mar 24, 1:46 am, Gernot Hassenpflug <ger...@nict.go.jp> wrote:
>> "Matt Wiser" <MattWiser...@yahoo.com> writes:
>> > Gernot Hassenpflug <ger...@nict.go.jp> wrote:
>>
>> > Rank Has Its Priviliges. The ChEng insisted on more than a fair share of the food, water, and
>> > even some bottles of beer that the cutter was stocked with. Several of the men in the cutter
>> > were thinking about tossing him over the side when they were found by the USN.
>>
>> Ah. He also had his fair share of chutzpah then didn't he. I can tell
>> you he would not have lasted a minute in my boat!
>>
>> Still, the guys were lucky: they could have ended up like the poor
>> sods on Wake, where the officers purposely starved them to death
>> (imaginary crimes led to no food as punishment, making them weak, and
>> combined with the rule of no work no food this sufficed to kill off
>> all the people they did not want to keep around to feed) to keep food
>> for themselves. Japan would have been better off if the men had
>> revolted and killed 99% of the officers.
>
> Imagine what the IJN had been like if the original founders had
> emphasized the need to maintain good relations with the crew.
Heh, they would not have been Japanese then :-) Or more seriously,
perhaps there would have been no war at all.
--
Gernot Hassenpflug
Gernot Hassenpflug
> On Mar 24, 7:27 am, Peter Skelton <skelt...@cogeco.ca> wrote:
>> On Mon, 24 Mar 2008 03:02:30 -0700 (PDT), Jack Linthicum
>>
>>
>> <jacklinthi...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>> >On Mar 24, 1:46 am, Gernot Hassenpflug <ger...@nict.go.jp> wrote:
>> >> "Matt Wiser" <MattWiser...@yahoo.com> writes:
>> >> > Gernot Hassenpflug <ger...@nict.go.jp> wrote:
>>
>> >> >>Electromagnetic energy loss
>>
>> >> > Rank Has Its Priviliges. The ChEng insisted on more than a fair share of the food, water, and
>> >> > even some bottles of beer that the cutter was stocked with. Several of the men in the cutter
>> >> > were thinking about tossing him over the side when they were found by the USN.
>>
>> >> Ah. He also had his fair share of chutzpah then didn't he. I can tell
>> >> you he would not have lasted a minute in my boat!
>>
>> >> Still, the guys were lucky: they could have ended up like the poor
>> >> sods on Wake, where the officers purposely starved them to death
>> >> (imaginary crimes led to no food as punishment, making them weak, and
>> >> combined with the rule of no work no food this sufficed to kill off
>> >> all the people they did not want to keep around to feed) to keep food
>> >> for themselves. Japan would have been better off if the men had
>> >> revolted and killed 99% of the officers.
>>
>> >Imagine what the IJN had been like if the original founders had
>> >emphasized the need to maintain good relations with the crew.
>>
>> In fact they did. But they drifted from their 1875 (approx)
>> Brirish standard in some cases. Organizations aren't hurt much by
>> nepotism and the like provided standards must be met. Somehow
>> that got lost. Other organizations have suffered similarly
>
> Has anyone ever traced the development of the Japanese military
> attitude both towards enemies and the "lower classes"? IIRC the
> Samurai were above it all, being captured only meant ransom, unless
> some terrible feud was involved. The "rightness" of junior officers in
> the 1920s and 30s seems to have carried over to treatment of enemies
> and lowers as some form of filth that needed to be cleaned up from
> time to time.
It's an interesting question with no easy answer at least until now:
some people argue that the difference in Asian (the "problem" from a
Westerner's point of view is not confined to Japan, after all)
perceptions and treatment of out-groups is associated with the
difference between moralism based on sin in the West and that based on
relative measures in the East. Others argue that it is affected by the
difference in scientific thought and philosophy (again, an absolute
versus relative issue) while others follow that latter point up and
tend to argue more along the lines of the evolution of social systems
based on democracy and ideals of equality, versus continuing
permutations of a feudal system with its many in- and out-groups. I
suspect part of the eventual "answer" will prove to be
physiological/biological as well.
--
Gernot Hassenpflug