Pentagon's Think Tank Delivers Bold New Proposal For the U.S. Navy
dump...@hotmail.com
So they want more smaller hulls. Is that really bold or new?
Dean
> See:
>
> http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController...
>
> So they want more smaller hulls. Is that really bold or new?
Either way, it ain't gonna happen anytime soon.
dump...@hotmail.com
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/01/streetfighter-2010-new-navy-fighting.html
That includes a lengthy analysis.
Mark Test
news:fccb8dad-79b3-4fed...@35g2000yqa.googlegroups.com...
> There's another article on the proposal at:
>
> http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/01/streetfighter-2010-new-navy-fighting.html
>
> That includes a lengthy analysis.
Wow, this study is spot on regarding LCS and the critical warfare areas
of ASW and MIW:
"Someone in the Navy should be forced to explain the logic of a fleet of 55
Littoral Combat Ships but only 64 mission modules. Why are we spending $600
million per hull if the number of spare interchangeable modules for the
entire class is nine. If we assume each ship will have a module assigned to
it all the time, then we have not planned spare capacity very well. If we
are not assigning a mission module to ships all the time, then why are we
going through the trouble of multiple crews to keep the ships operating at a
higher operational tempo? Presumably the crew would train how they fight,
right? This study gets MIW and ASW exactly right, these are not generic
naval capabilities that get swapped around and can be made available on
demand, rather are true 'arts of naval warfare' that require dedicated
specialization of both men and equipment. Attempting to apply a 'services on
demand' enterprise model to the most lethal forms of naval warfare is a
highly questionable and perhaps an incredibly dubious approach, particularly
when it comes with such an enormous added cost."
From Streetfighter 2010
LCS and rotational crews will be known as the Navy's greatest blunder...
Mark
Jim Yanik
news:Nkm1n.3579$rH7....@newsfe19.iad:
you can be sure that all 9 spare modules will not be standing ready for
service at any given time,either.
Some will be down for maintenance or modifications.
Maybe even a "hangar queen".
--
Jim Yanik
jyanik
at
localnet
dot com
dott.Piergiorgio
Aube on steroids....
but some points are interesting, esp. CVL, the author points correctly
on what he call "distribuitability", whose is the core of my Naval
thinking.
The main disagreement on his analysis of the cost ratio give me some
perplexity, because we built the same CVL the author suggests on 1B euro
(the purchasing power is slighty 1.10 to dollar, that is, 1� in
practice, is equivalent to 1.10 $) I don't known about the "pork barrel
inflating" in US, but for sure here (Italy) I can estimate the pork
barrel inflating at about 10% and I also known that the builders takes
into account that was pratically certain that will be a one-ship class,
so I consider excessive the 3B price tag he hypothise, and that the
"distribuitability" has large benefits on costs, because putting in
mothball, ordinary, etc. a pair or three of these CVL in periods of
quietness on seas and/or economy/budget issues, has little or no impact
on US capabilities re. mothballing a CVN (aside that the N can be
detrimental on the savings from a mothballing)
I agree on author' s analysis of the current and foreseeable menaces
from CVN point of view, and also add that today is rather improbable a
sudden nuclear first strike with USN facilities & US shipbuilding yards
well up into the target priorities.
so I guess that the "always commissioned and ready to set sail" typical
of the cold war should be safely shelved.
For the rest, I have given only a quick glance, but seems to me, as the
incipit of this post, Aube on steroids, esp. with these 400+160 patrol
vessels (since the rather abysmal failure of the same idea on Jefferson
& Madison's days USN has steered well clear from these concepts)
Best regards from Italy,
Dott. piergiorgio.
dott.Piergiorgio
> dump...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> :There's another article on the proposal at:
> :
> :http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/01/streetfighter-2010-new-navy-fighting.html
> :
> :That includes a lengthy analysis.
>
> The real issue is how do these small, relatively short ranged
> platforms deploy? Platforms that make sense for European and Asian
> nations don't necessarily make as much sense for us, as stuff either
> needs to be small enough to be picked up and ferried to be deployed or
> it needs sufficient range to cross the Pacific.
>
> This is the same reasoning behind us not having conventional
> submarines.
seems that you never heard about heavy lift ships:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heavy_lift_ship
One of these was used to bring back USS Cole stateside, so even an
hyper-patriotic "ammeregano" [1] as you should known :P
Returning to the point, these HL ships can also carry a flotilla of
small craft (there are somewhere the picture of the delivery of an
half-dozen of ~200t craft with this type of ship...)
Put together a logistic train of a heavy lift ship (ACS ?) and AD (that
is, a repair/logistic/command ship for small craft) and a (small) AO or
two and a combined AK/AP there's a deployable flotilla (I have written
on this when I suggest that from Cyclone PC can be derived a good fast
craft/RHIB destroyer)
ah, if you haven't noticed, type 212 has crossed more than once the
Atlantic, both E-W and N-S, showing that are more like the Type VII of
yore...
[1] this simply means "an american with questionable manners and/or
behaviour" ;) In Italy, we distinguish our political disagreement
("amerikano/i") with our cultural/taste disagreement ("ammeregano/i")
and I feel that in the end the disagreement between us is mainly on your
manners :)
Best regards from Italy,
Dott. Piergiorgio.
dott.Piergiorgio
> :[1] this simply means "an american with questionable manners and/or
> :behaviour" ;) In Italy, we distinguish our political disagreement
> :("amerikano/i") with our cultural/taste disagreement ("ammeregano/i")
> :and I feel that in the end the disagreement between us is mainly on your
> :manners :)
> :
>
> Or on yours.
This is the actual point; you seems to not understand that sometimes
what you wrote is considered questionable, if not outright offensive by
people of different culture, and in my giving you a taste of bad wording
about US and American people is actually an application of Socrates's
maieutics principles in explaining the point above.
On my actual naval content, of course, as I wrote in another post, I
have understand this 400+150 small craft thing as a repeat of the
Jeffersionian mistake in Naval policy, so was implied that the entire
redeploying scenario and the accompanying logistical train is an
eventual mission for the mosquito flotillas, meaning that is an once in
a while effort, and there is possible to requisition or lease the needed
ships, the only full Naval specialized ship seems to me being the AD,
with the repair/maintenance equipment & their trained crewmen and the
command/administrative accomodations & equipment.
Paul J. Adam
<fjmc...@gmail.com> writes
>"dott.Piergiorgio" <dott.Pierg...@KAIGUN.fastwebnet.it> wrote:
>:seems that you never heard about heavy lift ships:
>
>Now think about how long it takes to use those to shuffle 500 short
>range patrol boats around the world every 6 months or so.
At those numbers? No. But the RN has managed to sustain OP AINTREE. It's
possible to sustain relatively small, short-ranged craft in a theatre of
interest for some time, particularly when there are friendly ports
nearby: the big problem is rapid response to something unpredicted.
--
He thinks too much, such men are dangerous.
Paul J. Adam
dott.Piergiorgio
> :This is the actual point; you seems to not understand that sometimes
> :what you wrote is considered questionable, if not outright offensive by
> :people of different culture, and in my giving you a taste of bad wording
> :about US and American people is actually an application of Socrates's
> :maieutics principles in explaining the point above.
> :
> Now come stand over here. Ask yourself why it is that it always seems
> to be the rest of the world insisting Americans must adjust to them
> while they make no effort to do the same to us (or, worse,
> automatically react against us).
The trouble is indeed in what is (more or less mutually) asked: there's
difference between "adjusting", "understanding", "tolerate" and so on;
the core issue lies in (mutual) level of acknowledging the others and
their way of thinking (whose is the root & germ (botanical sense) of the
way of living).
Shifting the prospective from the reefs of politics & diplomacy, and
sailing into the safest waters of the grand strategy, I suspect that now
we have an attempt of quaedists to make a divide-et-impera, forcing US
admins to take a more "big stick" stance & taking decisions whose are
questionable to the eyes of foreign gov't. To be more blunt, I feel that
was not a case that the emasculated bomber's last leg is from Denmark (a
not-so-much EU country, by the way) and the not-to-be case isn't about
the cartons incident (Danes have immediately apologised, but in the
meantime these big ships[1] was quickly completed & completed; typical
EU/Roman style of handling of foreign issues, I notice)
I regret to point that putting a wedge between US and EU will be a
really big strategic success for te quaedists,
Of course, as every strategy whose depend on enemy's reaction is a
definite sign of weakness, so the core is quickly get the actual
strategic objective of the quaedists here, and if is somewhat along the
lines I sketched, react accordingly, that is with what quaedists *DON'T*
expect and gives them the most heavy, perhaps fatal, blow.
> :On my actual naval content, of course, as I wrote in another post, I
> :have understand this 400+150 small craft thing as a repeat of the
> :Jeffersionian mistake in Naval policy, so was implied that the entire
> :redeploying scenario and the accompanying logistical train is an
> :eventual mission for the mosquito flotillas, meaning that is an once in
> :a while effort, and there is possible to requisition or lease the needed
> :ships, the only full Naval specialized ship seems to me being the AD,
> :with the repair/maintenance equipment & their trained crewmen and the
> :command/administrative accomodations & equipment.
> :
> The preceding is not clear to me. Please explain how these ships
> would rotate through forward deployments, keeping in mind that the
> usual US pattern is to rotate ships from the US into forward
> deployment and back again so that few ships are PERMANENTLY home based
> in foreign ports.
meh... perhaps if I use buzzwords like "surge" you can grasp the concept
? if something gives problems and has plenty of littoral waters
(examples, Indonesia or Adriatic/Aegean) and also (small) craft
optimized for this type of operations (we known much about this; end
result, there's no austrian Naval flag nor warships since little less
than a century ago) fielding an expeditionary DUSTRON (lacking better
terms) can be useful, perhaps: I repeat, I'm extremely skeptic on this
idea, TB and their various successive equivalents can defend a coastline
or deny it to enemies, providing enough tactical advantage in
coastlines, but can't win wars (aside the sinking of 1/4 of enemy
battleline, of course, but OTOH, by summer 1918 the KuK marine was
nearing the disgregation level)
[1] I never get where to put in a Naval registry that Absalom class..
Best regards from italy,
Dott, Piergiorgio.