Cleanup From Fukushima Daiichi: Technological Disaster Or Crisis In
Governance?
Crisis In Fukushima
More than 19,000 Japanese drowned, their bodies scattered on Japan’s
eastern shores when a tsunami struck Japan on March 11, 2011. Kevin
Wang wanted to help, and his Anaheim, Califonia-based company,
PowerPlus, had the cleaning know-how to handle almost anything. Wang
has spent decades developing equipment to clean up almost every sort
of nasty gunk in existence, from massive oil spills, to radiological
contamination, to dead bodies in quantity.
Immediately after the tsunami, Wang visited the Japanese consul
general in Los Angeles to offer his company’s assistance in dealing
the huge threat to public health posed by this mass casualty event.
The response by Japan’s consul-general made Wang’s jaw drop.
“Absolutely not,” the consul replied, continuing on with rejection
language so brusque, Wang had no doubt his offer was taken as an
insult.
Far from being an isolated incident, the encounter that Wang had now
seems to be a harbinger of the systemic denial that has crippled the
Japanese government’s response to the Fukushima Daiichi disaster.
First-hand witnesses have described a deeply flawed reaction to the
nuclear meltdown that has been marked by an underestimation of the
extent of the contamination, insufficient radiological testing, and a
glacially-slow response making clean-up harder as time passes. Most
damning of all has been a stubborn unwillingess to use desperately
needed clean-up assistance by ignoring technical competence in favor
of political influence.
Undeterred by the consul’s rebuff, Wang was galvanized to action in
the days after the tsunami when the safety systems at Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant subsequently began to fail and massive
amounts of radiation started spewing into the air and sea. Wang
assembled a crew of indepent decontamination experts and shipped
custom radiological decontamination gear to Japan. Wang and his team
arrived in Japan to do decontamination demonstrations in June of 2011.
In an effort to begin the intense cleanup work, Wang and his crews
demostrated their cleanup capabilities to a variety of audiences
during that trip and three more trips to Japan, the second in October
2011, the third in February 2012, and the last in January 2013. His
team was observed by television crews, city, prefecture, and national
government officials, bureacrats from Japan’s Ministries of Defense
and Environment, dozens of businesses, as well as representatives of
the Tokyo Power Company (TEPCO), the owners of the ill-fated Fukushima
plant.
Wang’s crew had notable success decontaminating a car towed out of the
highly radioactive “exclusion zone” surrounding the Fukushima plant,
reducing the radiation contaminating the car by 99 percent. Given the
difficulty in cleaning more porous materials, Wang’s team also
inevitably turned in some less-stellar results, which included
suffering cold-weather equiment failure more than once. Overall,
these trips clearly demonstrated that Wang and his crews could
consistently clean biological materials in their natural condition,
substantially reducing contamination on substances that many others
considered uncleanable, including dirt, grass, and water, even
reducing the radiation on living cherry trees up to 70%. Even on the
days plagued by equipment failure, the team still managed to reduce
the radiation levels in frozen earth by 20-40%.
Sam Engelhard, an industrial hygenist and certified radiation
protection technologist with years of radiological decontamination
work under his belt, was one of the independent consultants who
accompanied Wang on all four trips to Japan. Wayne Schofield, a
radiation health physicist with decades of on-the-job decontamination
experience, including both Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, was
present for only the February 2012 trip to Japan..
Shortly after arrival on their first trip to Japan, the group headed
for Shirikawa, a city 45 miles west and a few miles south of the
Daiichi nuclear plant. Industrial hygienist Engelhard was shocked as
soon as he unpacked his radiation sensor gear and turned it on. Here
they were almost 50 miles from the accident site and in the opposite
direction of the prevailing winds, and the crew’s radiation alarms
immediately started going off.
“The radiation levels we were seeing were 1,000 times background,
higher in spots,” Engelhard said. “If we had been working on a site
this contaminated in the US, we would have been fully suited up in
radiation protection suits, gloves, and respirators. Yet people were
walking around and going about their business, with no idea of how
contaminated everything around them was.”
One of the first demonstrations conducted by Wang’s team was at a
Japanese school still in routine use. The contamination was
widespread and included troubling accumulations of radiation in
biological materials. While the asphalt driveway was contaminated,
the grass next to it was four times as radioactive as the asphalt.
The worst were the patches of fungus on the bleachers at the school’s
baseball field, which had sucked-up radionuclides to such a degree
that they were emitting radiation at 70-times the contaminated
asphalt.
Engelhard described the chilling phenomena of the fungus-turned-
radiation-sponge as, “a remarkable example of biological
amplification.”
Wang said it more bluntly, “A boy sitting on that patch to watch a
baseball game could do real damage to his gonads.”
More disturbingly, during the June 2011 trip, the American decon crew
was stunned at how little the government disaster-response “experts”
they encountered understood about radiation. After observing the
radiation officials’ attempts to use their radiation meters,
industrial hygienist Engelhard said, “They didn’t seem to understand
what their radiation sensor equipment did, or how to work it.”
After pointing out to three Japanese disaster-response officials from
various governmental entities that a nearby concrete bench was “hot,”
Wang’s team was amazed to see the officials perched on the bench.
On subsequent trips to Japan, Engelhard found that the expertise of
the Japanese radiation techs he met was much higher.
“I can only presume that during our first trip, Japan’s ‘first string’
radiological experts were actually in the hottest zones around the
Fukushima plant itself, and we were seeing third-string officials,” he
said. “Still, it was pretty disconcerting to consider how little the
first bunch seemed to understand.”
In Fukushima City, more than 40 miles northwest of the nuclear plant,
Engelhard made another disquieting discovery at a lighted sign where
the real-time radiation dose rate was allegedly being posted for local
residents. However, when Engelhard stood next to the sign and turned
on his own detection gear, he found the actual radiation dosage was up
to 50% higher than what the sign was reporting.
“I don’t know if they had a sensor calibration problem or the number
was being deliberately under-reported. But the information being fed
to the citizens of Fukushima City by that sign was wrong,” Engelhard
said.
During the first trip, when Wang asked an official from Fukushima
prefecture what testing methodology to use when recording post-
decontamination sensor readings, he was rebuked.
“Don’t be an idiot. Don’t average your results, report only the
lowest number you get,” the prefecture official informed him. That
technique is a shady practice that had Wang followed it, would have
resulted in under-reporting real radiation levels.
The false readings in Fukushima City and the faulty reporting
methodology incidents were not the only times Engelhard and Wang saw
evidence that radiation readings were being under-reported.
During the January 2013 demo trip, Wang and Engelhard compared the
readings the American crew was obtaining to those from the Japanese
government techs’ instruments. The Japanese instruments were
consistently under-reporting radiation levels by 30-50%. Wang’s US
crew verified their instruments were reading accurately by testing
them with an on-the-spot “check source,” a source that produces a
precisely-known amount of radiation in order to properly calibrate
equipment.
The next day, the Japanese techs returned with instruments correctly
calibrated, and explained that their problem the previous day was due
to “a bad cable.”
Engelhard was skeptical. “In my experience,” he said, “when you get a
bad cable, you either get a zero reading, an infinite reading, or a
greatly inconsistent reading because you have to jiggle the cable.
What you don’t get are low readings off by fixed percentages. A ‘bad
cable’ doesn’t wash.”
According to Engelhard, another problem was that cleanup efforts
seemed to be entirely focused on looking for cesium 134 and 137.
“Cesium is definitely the most abundant of the contaminants, and as a
‘gamma emitter,’ cesium is also the easiest to find with standard
detection gear. But cesium was not the only problematic isotope
released, and so the easy-to-find gamma emitters are not the only
contaminants to worry about”, Engelhard emphasized.
Engelhard was not alone in expressing his concern. Team member and
veteran radiation health physicist Wayne Schofield said, “In the most
contaminated areas, I’d expect to find high levels of cesium, but also
strontium-90, plutonium, cobalt, and other contaminants that can be
dangerous. Strontium-90 has a thirty-year half-life and it is a ‘beta-
emitter.’ Beta radiation is very difficult to find with hand-held
instruments, and easily shielded from detection by a minimal amount of
dirt or leaves. “
Generally speaking, both ’alpha’ and ’beta‘ emitters are of little
concern, if they remain outside the body, but they can become deadly
when ingested.
Engelhard explained, “Your body recognizes strontium as calcium and
puts it into your bones, right next to the bone marrow that is the
heart of the human immune system. That’s bad news.”
Health physicist Wayne Schofield agreed that focusing solely on cesium
to the exclusion of other contaminants is a mistake. “If you aren’t
doing comprehensive surveys when looking for hotspots, that’s sloppy
science.”
Guidelines for allowable levels of radiological contamination in food
released by Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare in March
2012 specifically mention strontium-90 as a “regulated radionuclide,”
but ambiguous language in the footnotes of the guidelines calls into
question whether Japan is actually looking for strontium-90,
plutonium, and other contaminants, or simply relying on estimated
levels.
“Effective dose from radionuclides other than cesium are added to
these estimates in reality, because these values are estimated only
from radioactive cesium.” [i]
Engelhard opined, “It sounds like they’ve come up with a ‘fudge
factor,’ to estimate of how much of these other contaminants may be
present. In a nuclear industrial setting, estimating beta radiation
based on a known quantity of gamma radiation is a valid technique,
because the chemistry of what is going on inside a reactor is very
well known. However, once you have an accident, you don’t know how
the contaminants released are interacting in the environment. The
only way you are going to find alpha or beta emitters in the
environment is to test for them, but that kind of testing is much more
material and labor intensive.”
Virgene Mulligan, the Vice President of radiological lab services at
ARS International, confirmed the difficulty and expense of finding
strontium-90, explaining, “Specifically identifying strontium-90 in a
sample takes 14-20 days, because a chemical reaction has to take place
and the resin used in the test is expensive. That doesn’t mean they
shouldn’t be testing for it at all.”
Further complicating testing efforts is that water is an effective
radiation shield for alpha, beta, and gamma emitters: water, or food
with high water content, can be highly contaminated but nevertheless
give off a false low-contamination reading unless measured with
specialized and highly sensitive laboratory detection gear.
Bad as the Fukushima radiation release initially was, health physicist
Wayne Schofield passed along estimates that, at first hearing, sound
highly encouraging, “At a guess, radiation levels across all the
contaminated areas in Japan have dropped considerably, probably by
about 80%, since the Fukushima accident. Over time, rain and wind
naturally reduce radiation levels by washing or blowing contamination
away.”
The single “hottest” spot the American team found in Japan, located
almost a full year after the disaster, was a metal grating below a
rain gutter downspout. It emitted a combined beta and gamma
radiation rate five times the threshold rate used in US nuclear power
plants to determine when to start limiting radiation worker exposure
times.
The “hot” grating rather pointedly illustrates that contaminants
washed off a surface by rain are not gone, but rather linger in the
biosphere. In Germany as recently as 2010, more than 1,000 wild boars
were found to be contaminated past government health limits with
radionuclides that came from the 1986 Chernobyl disaster; even though
the closest point in Germany to the failed Chernobyl plant is 650
miles away.
Engelhard further explained “the 80 percent that has been washed or
blown away is that portion of the contamination that was loose and
would have been relatively easy to clean up, if someone had gotten to
it in time. The 20 percent now left behind is not the same.
Radiological contaminants start to bond to the material they have
settled on over time. Some of the contaminants that could have once
been cleaned away easily are now chemically or molecularly bonded, and
bonded contaminants are harder to remove.”
As with Wang’s run-in with the Japanese consul in Los Angeles,
Engelhard was baffled by the Japanese officials he talked to. “When
we got to Japan the first time, they were really glum. They were much
more upbeat on later visits, but both the initial glumness and the
later improved attitudes were strange.”
“Initially the Fukushima meltdown was seen as a shameful blow to
national pride, and the improved attitudes a year later seemed a
general sense that things were better with the embarrassment of
Fukushima mostly behind them”, he added.
“Shameful situations are something you avoid and minimize, that’s the
exact wrong response to a radiological crisis like Fukushima. A
crisis of this magnitude needs to be dealt with by an “all hands on
deck” mentality, accepting help wherever you can find it, to minimize
long-term health consequences,” Engelhard emphasized.
Wang believes the Fukushima radiological contamination far more
widespread that most Japanese understand. “One thing I heard so often
during my trips to Japan that it became a mantra, was that ‘Fukushima
is a Japanese problem and we have to fix it ourselves.’ So far, I
haven’t seen any evidence that the government is taking the right
steps to fix things. Instead, the wounded pride of government
officials, and a lack of understanding at the urgency of the problem,
prevented Japan from taking the steps they needed to.”
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On all four trips, Wang’s team was greeted with enthusiasm and relief
by many in Japan’s business community. Several Japanese companies
offered to partner with the California firm to import the technology
and equipment, and Wang never doubted his Japanese business partners
tried their utmost to break through the governmental logjam.
Despite the enthusiasm from the audiences who saw the demonstrations,
closing in on two years after the Fukushima disaster, no PowerPlus
equipment has been sold, and no decontamination contracts have been
forthcoming. Far from unique, this cold reception by the Japanese
government was identical to experience of dozens of both Japanese and
US firms with decontamination expertise to offer. Health physicist
Wayne Schofield is not surprised at PowerPlus’ lack of headway, noting
that another company he consults for, a leader in the radiation
remediation field in the US, has spent even more money on clean-up
demonstrations than Wang’s company, and had just as poor a reception.
According to Schofield, the US radiation remediation industry
grapevine has it that the bizarre freeze-out by the Japanese
government has happened to nearly every company in the field. The
reasons given by Japanese officials for not making use of foreign
expertise approaches the bizzare, including a statement by Hidehiko
Nishiyama, deputy director of the enviorment ministry, that foreign
techinques won’t work because “the soil in Japan is different…and if
we have foreigners roaming around Fukushima, they might scare the old
grandmas and granddads.”
Japanese cleanup firms firms have fared little better than their
foreign counterparts. Instead, cleanup contracts have gone to Japan’s
major construction firms, companies with political clout, but grossly
lacking in decontamination capability. Disgusted at the shoddy cleanup
work being done by the construction firms, Masafumi Shiga, president
of a refurbishing company in Fukushima, told the New York Times
simply, “What’s happening on the ground is a disgrace.”
Disasters, both man-made and natural, are as inevitable as the tides.
History may well judge that it was not the Fukushima disaster, but the
bungled response to it, that ultimately proves to be the most lasting
source of shame to Japanese officialdom. Plagued by delayed action,
haphazard radiological testing, and the freeze-out of nearly every
company with substantive decontamination expertise to offer, both
inside and outside of Japan, it now appears that somewhere along the
way, Japan’s government put national pride and a ‘we don’t want any
help’ attitude ahead of the lives of Japan’s citizens.
SOURCE:
http://fairewinds.org/demystifying/cleanup-from-fukushima-daiichi-technological-disaster-or-crisis-in-governance