Mark Klempliar and the BU Bioweapons lab
Mort Zuckerman
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Subject: Mark Klempliar and the BU Bioweapons lab
Date: May 18, 2009 1:17 AM
LA TIMES ARTICLE ABOUT MARK KLEMPLIAR
BELOW
==================================
Thank you.
Mark Klempner is a liar:
http://www.actionlyme.org/MarkKlempner_Fibroblasts.htm
http://www.actionlyme.org/Retro_Klempnerization.htm
Being such an outrageous liar does not give
one much confidence that any more of his and
the CDC's bumbling won't be covered up, and worse,
blamed on their victims:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?Db=pubmed&Cmd=DetailsSearch&Term=12821733[uid]
This is all not to mention the fact that
he's not a very clever liar, and neither is
his buddy Gary Wormser. The HIV and tuberculosis
vaccines all failed for the same reasons Lyme
vaccines failed:
http://www.actionlyme.org/PAM3CYS_IMMUNE_SUPPRESSION.htm
Those two participated in those bogus vaccine trials
which are now internationally infamous, due to the
failed HIV vaccines.
The CDC rewards such lying morons with control of a
another bioweapons lab after Plum Stupid Island:
http://www.actionlyme.org/BIOWEAPONEERS_CORIXA_YALE_TLRS.htm
while at the same time disowning all of Mark Klempner's
"work":
http://www.lymedisease.org/news/files.php?file=Volkman_address_removed_Text_3_09_115176301.pdf
"We, the CDC, have no control over the bullshit
dumped and spewed all over America and Europe
by our own insane colleagues and employees,
but we will continue to support their insane
excuses for research by promoting them to Level
IV Labs in the likes of Boston.
"Thanks and have a nice day.
"Kiersten Kageler
"CDC Fort Collins"
Ya gotta wonder what it takes to get a dot
guv job. These Lyme Crymes were huge, but
the CDC *promoted* that dung-breath, Klempner.
KMDickson
From: M
To: Spin...@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [SpinLyme] Marky Makes The LA Times As Bad Neighbor
Date: May 17, 2009 1:23 PM
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-biolabs17-2009may17,0,6818200.story
Biodefense labs make bad neighbors, residents say
Ted Fitzgerald / Boston Herald
ON HOLD: The opening of the Boston University Medical Center's
biological defense lab has been delayed by lawsuits. Lab supporters
say the research is crucial.
A series of state and federal lawsuits have blocked the opening of a
lab complex in Boston. Neighbors are nervous that toxins could get
out, and some scientists are likewise skeptical.
By Bob Drogin
May 17, 2009
Reporting from Boston -- Klare Allen, a once-homeless mother turned
community activist, was stunned at a public meeting in 2002 when she
and her friends learned that Boston University Medical Center
officials planned to build a biological defense laboratory in one of
the city's poorest neighborhoods.
"We heard anthrax and Roxbury-South End," she recalled. "Then we heard
Ebola. The last thing we heard was bubonic plague. We looked at each
other and said, 'No way are they bringing that . . . into our
community.' "
Seven years later, the $198-million lab complex stands completed
between an apartment building and a flower market. But state and
federal lawsuits by anxious residents, backed by skeptical scientists,
have blocked the opening until late next year at the earliest.
The battle marks the first major setback in the vast growth since the
Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks of labs authorized to research the
world's most dangerous diseases. It also underscores a growing debate
over the safety and security of such labs -- and whether so many are
needed.
Federal officials and scientists say the labs will not secretly create
germ weapons, which the United States renounced in 1969, but they are
determined to stiffen America's defenses against pathogens that
terrorists might use.
"There's nothing military about this operation," said Dr. Mark
Klempner, a microbiologist who heads the Boston lab. "We are
scientists who are interested in defending the nation, and the world,
against infectious diseases."
Klempner said the facility would conduct no classified research for
the government, and would bar any attempt to make an organism more
virulent. "There's nothing nefarious or hidden about this," he said.
The high-containment lab is deep inside the building, a 13,000-square-
foot vault behind foot-thick walls and blast-proof doors. Negative air
pressure will keep germs inside if a leak occurs. Lab workers will
wear fully enclosed, air-supplied moon suits.
But still opponents fear the accidental release of deadly toxins or
organisms into a crowded urban area. They also warn that the supply of
"hot" strains in a lab may attract terrorists, or push other nations
into a biological arms race.
In theory, bioweapons are inexpensive to produce, difficult to detect
and capable of killing millions. In practice, no terrorist group has
launched a successful biological attack, and many U.S. experts believe
the threat is vastly overstated.
"This lab is part of the biodefense enterprise," argued Dr. David
Ozonoff, a professor at the Boston University School of Public Health.
"It's not a public health enterprise. Its goal is to do research on
biological weapons, even if it's defensive. I trust my colleagues. But
no one knows how their research will be used."
Dan Goodenough, a biology professor at Harvard Medical School, worries
that scientists may cut corners with safety rules. "Most of the time,
it doesn't matter," he said. "In this case, it might."
A congressionally ordered, bipartisan study released in December
provided ammunition to both sides.
It warned that the threat of bioterrorism, including the potential use
of genetically modified viruses and germs, was rising. But it also
noted that no single federal agency regulates the labs, and that their
"rapid growth" had "created new safety and security risks."
Critics of the labs cite the 2001 anthrax attacks as proof that gates
and guards cannot stop an insider who aims to do harm.
According to the FBI, a mentally unbalanced scientist at the U.S.
Army's premier biodefense laboratory carried out the worst
bioterrorist attack in U.S. history. The anthrax researcher, Dr. Bruce
Ivins, committed suicide last year before he could be charged with
mailing the spores that killed five people and sickened 17 others.
Less known is a record of recent accidents across the country.
In the most serious case, Texas A&M paid a $1-million federal fine
last year after a citizens' group discovered that the university had
failed to report that a researcher had been infected with the
bacterium Brucella, which causes severe fever, and that others were
exposed to Q fever, another infectious agent.
Most of the nation's high-security labs study diseases that are
curable but could still be used in a terrorist attack, such as anthrax
or tularemia. The federal government is unable to say how many such
labs exist, however. A March report from the Congressional Research
Service estimated the number to range from 386 to 630.
The Boston facility is in a smaller group categorized as "high-
containment" labs. These handle only the most dangerous agents, such
as Ebola and Marburg, for which no vaccines or treatments exist.
The United States operated five high-containment labs before 2001. It
now has 15, and several have come under criticism.
The University of Texas Medical Branch, for example, built a $174-
million facility similar in size and mission to the Boston lab. It
opened last fall in Galveston, just weeks after Hurricane Ike had
ravaged the barrier island. The lab suffered no apparent damage.
"I have trouble understanding why they put a dangerous facility in
such a vulnerable place," said Jim Blackburn, an environmental lawyer
in Houston. "I don't know that it's unsafe. But I do think it's
unwise."
Officials at the National Institutes of Health, which provided most of
the money to construct the Boston and Galveston labs, say they were
designed to withstand hurricanes, earthquakes and other natural
disasters.
Not everyone is convinced. A group of Texas research facilities sued
in federal court last month to block the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security from building a $523-million high-containment lab in
Manhattan, Kan. A tornado struck the town last year.
Citing the danger, the lawsuit seeks to move the proposed National Bio
and Agro-Defense Facility to San Antonio. At stake are hundreds of
jobs, as well as research on hoof-and-mouth disease and other threats
to crops and animals.
In Boston, a black steel fence surrounds the National Emerging
Infectious Diseases Laboratories, as the complex is called. No sign
yet identifies the site to pedestrians.
Training is scheduled to start this summer, lab officials said. But no
work will begin unless U.S. District Judge Patti B. Sarris approves a
risk assessment that the NIH has promised to deliver next year. Two
safety reviews have been rejected as inadequate.
Allen, who first challenged the project, said her neighbors don't plan
to gamble if the lab is allowed to open. "We want the spacesuits that
the lab workers are going to have," she said firmly. "That's the only
way we'll be safe."
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
"[Real] scientists are *fiercely* independent. That's the good
news."-- NIH's Top Fool, Anthony Fauci