How Torture Trapped Colin Powell (UN speech: "Mobile Bio/Chem factories," was torture "data")
Mort Zuckerman
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Subject: How Torture Trapped Colin Powell (UN speech: "Mobile Bio/Chem
factories," was torture "data")
Date: May 19, 2009 6:39 AM
Big Bombshell and probably another war crime
attributable to the "blood-sucking lawyers."
Excuse the Lymecryme/ALDF Crichtonism:
http://groups.google.com/group/sci.med.diseases.lyme/browse_thread/thread/94e9d21309f76177/508d7369ce25f5cc?hl=en&lnk=gst&q=evan+greenberg+mortimer+zuckerman+ALDF+sponsors#508d7369ce25f5cc
KMDickson
http://www.actionlyme.org
===============
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2009/051809a.html
How Torture Trapped Colin Powell
By Ray McGovern
May 18, 2009
Four days before trying to sell the invasion of Iraq to the United
Nations, Secretary of State Colin Powell was ready to scrap dubious
allegations about Saddam Hussein’s ties to al-Qaeda but was dissuaded
by top CIA officials who cited a new “bombshell” that now appears to
have been derived from torture, a top Powell aide says.
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Retired Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, who was then Powell’s chief of staff,
said the key moment occurred on Feb. 1, 2003, as the two men labored
at the CIA over Powell’s presentation to the U.N. Security Council set
for Feb. 5.
“Powell and I had a one-on-one — no one else even in the room — about
his angst over what was a rather dull recounting of several old
stories about Al Qa’ida-Baghdad ties [in the draft speech],” Wilkerson
said. “I agreed with him that what we had was bull___t, and Powell
decided to eliminate all mention of terrorist contacts between AQ and
Baghdad.
“Within an hour, [CIA Director George] Tenet and [CIA Deputy Director
John] McLaughlin dropped a bombshell on the table in the [CIA]
director’s Conference Room: a high-level AQ detainee had just revealed
under interrogation substantive contacts between AQ and Baghdad,
including Iraqis training AQ operatives in the use of chemical and
biological weapons.”
Though Tenet and McLaughlin wouldn’t give Powell the identity of the
al-Qaeda source, Wilkerson said he now understands that it was Ibn al-
Sheikh al-Libi, an al-Qaeda operative who later claimed he gave the
CIA false information in the face of actual and threatened torture.
Not realizing that the new intelligence was tainted, “Powell changed
his mind and this information was included in his UNSC presentation,
along with some more general information from the previous text about
Baghdad's terrorist tendencies,” Wilkerson said.
Wilkerson’s account underscores how the Bush administration’s reliance
on harsh interrogations of al-Qaeda suspects influenced the rush to
war with Iraq, while also pointing out how the need to justify the war
gave impetus to the use of torture for extracting information.
Sealing the Deal
Powell, whose credibility essentially sealed the deal for war as far
as millions of Americans were concerned, also appears to have let
himself be manipulated by senior CIA officials who kept him in the
dark about crucial details, including the fact that the Defense
Intelligence Agency doubted al-Libi’s credibility.
“As you can see, nowhere were we told that the high-level AQ operative
had a name, or that he had been interrogated [in Egypt] with no US
personnel present or much earlier rather than just recently (the clear
implication of Tenet's breathtaking delivery),” Wilkerson said.
“And not a single dissent was mentioned (later we learned of the DIA
dissent) … All of this was hidden from us – the specific identity, we
were informed, due to the desire to protect sources and methods as
well as a cooperative foreign intelligence service. …
“As for me in particular, I learned the identity of al-Libi only in
2004 and of the DIA dissent about the same time, of al-Libi's
recanting slightly later, and of the entire affair's probably being a
Tenet-McLaughlin fabrication – to at least a certain extent – only
after I began to put some things together and to receive reinforcement
of the ‘fabrication’ theme from other examples.”
Among those other examples, Wilkerson said, was the case of an Iraqi
“defector” codenamed Curveball, who supplied false intelligence about
mobile labs for making biological and chemical weapons, and various
Iraqi walk-ins who spun bogus stories about an Iraqi nuclear weapons
program.
Though some of those sources appear to have concocted their tales
after being recruited by the pro-invasion exiles of the Iraqi National
Congress, al-Libi told his stories – he later claimed – to avoid or
stop torture, a central point in the current debate about whether
torture saved American lives.
For those of you distracted by the Fawning Corporate Media (FCM)
spotlight on “what-did-Pelosi-know-about-torture-and-when-did-she-
know-it,” please turn off the TV long enough to ponder the case of the
recently departed al-Libi, who reportedly died in a Libyan prison, a
purported suicide.
The al-Libi case might help you understand why, even though
information from torture is notoriously unreliable, President George
W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and the sycophants running U.S.
intelligence ordered it anyway.
In short, if it is untruthful information you are after, torture can
work just fine! As the distinguished Senator from South Carolina,
Lindsey Graham put it during a Senate hearing on May 13 — with a hat-
tip to the Inquisition — “One of the reasons these techniques have
been used for about 500 years is that they work.”
All you really need to know is what you want the victims to “confess”
to and then torture them, or render them abroad to “friendly”
intelligence services toward the same end.
Poster Child for Torture
Al-Libi, born in 1963 in Libya, ran an al-Qaeda training camp in
Afghanistan from 1995 to 2000. He was detained in Pakistan on Nov. 11,
2001, and then sent to a U.S. detention facility in Kandahar,
Afghanistan. He was deemed a prize catch, since he would know of any
Iraqi training of al-Qaeda.
The CIA successfully fought off the FBI for first rights to
interrogate al-Libi. FBI's Dan Coleman, who “lost” al-Libi to the CIA
(at whose orders, I wonder?), said, "Administration officials were
always pushing us to come up with links" between Iraq and al-Qaeda.
Meanwhile, at the Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba, Maj. Paul Burney, a
psychiatrist sent there in summer 2002, told the Senate, "A large part
of the time we were focused on trying to establish a link between al-
Qaeda and Iraq and we were not successful.
“The more frustrated people got in not being able to establish that
link … there was more and more pressure to resort to measures that
might produce more immediate results."
CIA interrogators elicited some “cooperation” from al-Libi through a
combination of rough treatment and threats that he would be turned
over to Egyptian intelligence with even greater experience in the
torture business.
By June 2002, al-Libi had told the CIA that Iraq had “provided”
unspecified chemical and biological weapons training for two al-Qaeda
operatives, an allegation that soon found its way into other U.S.
intelligence reports. Al-Libi’s claim was well received even though
the DIA was suspicious.
“He lacks specific details” about the supposed training, the DIA
observed. “It is possible he does not know any further details; it is
more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the
debriefers. Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several
weeks and may be describing scenarios to the debriefers that he knows
will retain their interest.”
Despite his cooperation, al-Libi was still shipped to Egypt where he
underwent more abuse, according to a declassified CIA cable from 2004
when al-Libi recanted his earlier statements. The cable reported that
al-Libi said Egyptian interrogators wanted information about al-
Qaeda’s connections with Iraq, a subject “about which [al-Libi] said
he knew nothing and had difficulty even coming up with a story.”
According to the CIA cable, al-Libi said his interrogators did not
like his responses and “placed him in a small box” for about 17 hours.
After he was let out of the box, al-Libi was given a last chance to
“tell the truth.”
When his answers still did not satisfy, al-Libi says he “was knocked
over with an arm thrust across his chest and fell on his back” and
then was “punched for 15 minutes.”
And, as Sen. Graham noted, that stuff really works! For it was then
that al-Libi expanded on his tales about collaboration between al-
Qaeda and Iraq, adding that three al-Qaeda operatives had gone to Iraq
“to learn about nuclear weapons.” Afterwards, he said his treatment
improved.
Al-Libi’s stories misinformed Colin Powell’s U.N. speech, which sought
to establish a “sinister nexus” between Iraq and al-Qaeda to justify
invading Iraq.
Al-Libi recanted his claims in January 2004. That prompted the CIA, a
month later, to recall all intelligence reports based on his
statements, a fact recorded in a footnote to the report issued by the
9/11 Commission.
Bear in mind that before the attack on Iraq on March 19, 2003, polls
showed that some 70 percent Americans believed that Saddam Hussein had
operational ties with al-Qaeda and thus was partly responsible for the
attacks of 9/11.
Just What the Doctor Ordered
George Bush relied on al-Libi’s false confession for his crucial
speech in Cincinnati on Oct. 7, 2002, just a few days before Congress
voted on the Iraq War resolution. Bush declared, "We’ve learned that
Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and
deadly gases."
Colin Powell relied on it for his crucial speech to the U.N. on Feb.
5, 2003. He said: "I can trace the story of a senior terrorist
operative telling how Iraq provided training in these [chemical and
biological] weapons to al-Qaeda. Fortunately, this operative is now
detained, and he has told his story."
For a while, al-Libi was practically the poster boy for the success of
the Cheney/Bush torture regime; that is, until he publicly recanted
and explained that he only told his interrogators what he thought
would stop the torture.
In his disingenuous memoir, At the Center of the Storm, Tenet sought
to defend the CIA's use of the claims made by al-Libi in the run-up to
the Iraq war, suggesting that al-Libi's later recantation may not have
been genuine.
"He clearly lied," Tenet writes in his book. "We just don't know when.
Did he lie when he first said that Al Qaeda members received training
in Iraq or did he lie when he said they did not? In my mind, either
case might still be true."
Really; that’s what Tenet writes.
Tenet's stubborn faith in the CIA's "product" reflects the reality
that he is not a disinterested observer. If there was a CIA plan to
extract a false confession, it's likely he was a key participant.
After all, he devoted 2002-03 to the mission of manufacturing a "slam-
dunk" case for invading Iraq in order to please his bosses. He had
both the motive and the opportunity to commit this crime.
Well, if al-Libi is now dead — strangely our embassy in Tripoli was
unable to find out for sure — this means the world will never hear his
own account of the torture he experienced and the story he made up and
then recanted.
And we will all be asked to believe he “committed suicide” even though
it is apparently true that al-Libi was a devout Muslim and Islam
prohibits suicide.
Hafed al-Ghwell, a Libyan-American and a prominent critic of the
Gaddafi regime, explained to Newsweek, “This idea of committing
suicide in your prison cell is an old story in Libya.”
He added that, throughout Gaddafi’s 40-year rule, there had been
several instances in which political prisoners were reported to have
committed suicide, but that “then the families get the bodies back and
discover the prisoners had been shot in the back or tortured to
death.”
Am I suggesting…?
Anatomy of a Crime
Commenting on what he called the “Cheney interrogation techniques,”
Col. Wilkerson, writing for The Washington Note on May 13, made the
following observations:
“…as the administration authorized harsh interrogation in April and
May of 2002 — well before the Justice Department had rendered any
legal opinion — its principal priority for intelligence was not aimed
at pre-empting another terrorist attack on the U.S. but on discovering
a smoking gun linking Iraq to al-Qaeda.
“So furious was this effort on one particular detainee, even when the
interrogation team had reported to Cheney’s office that their detainee
‘was compliant’ (meaning the team recommended no more torture), the
VP’s office ordered them to continue the advanced methods. The
detainee had not revealed any al-Qa’ida-Baghdad contacts yet.
“This ceased only after Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, under waterboarding in
Egypt, ‘revealed’ such contacts. Of course later we learned that al-
Libi revealed these contacts only to get the torture to stop.”
Stung by Wilkerson’s criticism of her father, Liz Cheney, who worked
in the State Department during the last administration, lashed out at
Wilkerson, charging he has made “a cottage industry out of fantasies”
about the former Vice President.
All that Ms. Cheney could manage in rebuttal, though, was to point out
that al-Libi was not among the three al-Qaeda figures that the U.S.
has admitted to waterboarding.
After his article in The Washington Note, I asked Col. Wilkerson for a
retrospective look at how it could have been that the torture-derived
information from al-Libi was not recognized for what it was and thus
kept out of Secretary Powell’s speech at the UN.
Since al-Libi had been captured over a year before the speech and had
been put at the tender mercies of the Egyptian intelligence service,
should he and Powell not have suspected that al-Libi had been
tortured?
Wilkerson responded by e-mail with the comments cited above regarding
Tenet and McLaughlin interrupting Powell’s evaluation of the Iraqi WMD
intelligence with their new – vaguely sourced –“bombshell.”
I asked Col. Wilkerson: “Were there no others from the State
Department with you at CIA headquarters on Feb. 1, 2003. Was INR
[State’s very professional, incorruptible intelligence unit] not
represented? He answered:
“When I gathered ‘my team’ – some were selected for me, such as Will
Toby from Bob Joseph's NSC staff and John Hanna from the VP's office –
in my office at State to give them an initial briefing and marching
orders, I asked Carl [Ford, head of INR] to attend. I wanted Carl –
or even more so, one of his deputies whom I knew well and trusted
completely, Tom Fingar – to be on ‘my team’.
“Carl stayed after the meeting and I asked him straightforwardly to
come with me or to send someone from INR. Carl said that he did not
need to come nor to send anyone because he had the Secretary's ear (he
was right on that) and could weigh in at any time he wanted to.
“Moreover, he told me, the Secretary knew very well where INR stood,
as did I myself (he was right on that too).
“As I look back, I believe one of my gravest errors was in not
insisting that INR send someone with me.
“Fascinating and completely puzzling at first was the total absence of
a Department of Defense representative on my team; however, after 3-4
days and nights I figured out … DoD was covering its own butt, to an
extent, by having no direct fingerprints on the affair — and being
directly wired into Cheney’s office, Rumsfeld’s folks knew they were
protected by Toby and Hanna.
“When we all arrived at CIA, we were given the NIC [National
Intelligence Council] spaces and staff. [But] I could not even get on
a computer!! Protests to Tenet and McLaughlin got me perfunctory CIA-
blah blah about security clearances, etc. — and me with 7 days and
nights to prepare a monumentally important presentation! …
“[It took] 24 hours before George or John acknowledged I could be on a
computer…. From there on, it was a madhouse.
“But at the end of the day, had I had an INR rep, had I had better
support, had I been more concerned with WHAT I was assembling rather
than HOW on earth I would assemble it and present it on time, I'm not
sure at all it would have made any difference in the march to war.”
Not the Only Crime
So there you have it folks, the anatomy of a crime — one of several
such, I might add.
Mention of Carl Ford and Tenet and McLaughlin remind me of another
episode that has gone down in the annals of intelligence as almost
equally contemptible. This one had to do with CIA’s furious attempt to
prove there were mobile biological weapons labs of the kind Curveball
had described.
Remember, Tenet and McLaughlin had been warned about Curveball long
before they let then-Secretary of State Powell shame himself, and the
rest of us, by peddling Curveball’s wares at the U.N. Security Council
on Feb. 5, 2003.
But the amateur attempts at deception did not stop there. After the
war began, CIA intrepid analysts, still “leaning forward,”
misrepresented a tractor-trailer found in Iraq outfitted with
industrial equipment as one of the mobile bio-labs.
On May 28, 2003, CIA analysts cooked up a fraudulent six-page report
claiming that the trailer discovered earlier in May was proof they had
been right about Iraq’s “bio-weapons labs.”
They then performed what could be called a “night-time requisition,”
getting the only Defense Intelligence Agency analyst sympathetic to
their position to provide DIA “coordination,” (which was subsequently
withdrawn by DIA).
On May 29, President George W. Bush, visiting Poland, proudly
announced on Polish TV, “We have found the weapons of mass
destruction.” [For a contemporaneous debunking of the CIA-DIA report,
see Consortiumnews.com’s “America’s Matrix.”]
When the State Department's Intelligence and Research (INR) analysts
realized that this was not some kind of Polish joke, they “went
ballistic,” according to Carl Ford, who immediately warned Powell
there was a problem.
Tenet must have learned of this quickly, for he called Ford on the
carpet, literally, the following day. No shrinking violet, Ford held
his ground. He told Tenet and McLaughlin, “That report is one of the
worst intelligence assessments I’ve ever read.”
This vignette — and several like it — are found in Hubris: The Inside
Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War by Michael
Isikoff and David Corn, who say Ford is still angry over the
fraudulent paper.
Ford told the authors: “It was clear that they [Tenet and McLaughlin]
had been personally involved in the preparation of the report... It
wasn’t just that it was wrong. They lied.”
Too bad Carl Ford made the incorrect assumption that he could rely on
his credibility and entrée with Secretary Powell to thwart the likes
of Tenet and McLaughlin, as they peddled their meretricious wares at
CIA headquarters — with Col. Wilkerson left to twist in the wind, so
to speak.
Ray McGovern works with Tell the Word, the publishing arm of the
ecumenical Church of the Saviour. He served in all four directorates
of the CIA, mostly as an analyst, and is now a member of Veteran
Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS).
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