NeoCon's Lack of Process Mimics IDSA-Lyme Cryme's Lack of Process (Blumenthal Lawsuit)
Mort Zuckerman
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Subject: NeoCon's Lack of Process Mimics IDSA-Lyme Cryme's Lack of
Process (Blumenthal Lawsuit)
Date: Mar 26, 2010 11:32 AM
ARTICLES/LINKS BELOW
=========================
Hmm.
How remarkable. I feel like
I am reading the exact same
outline:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janine-r-wedel/emshadow-eliteem-march-to_b_512697.html
and:
http://www.actionlyme.org/BLUMENTHAL_IDSA_FEB_2010.pdf
http://www.actionlyme.org/080430_RICO_CABAL_CAVES.htm
"How did we get this nonsense?"
"Where was the PROCESS?"
"WHO *ARE* these people?"
And, remarkably, what was Edward
McSweegan doing in an Israel bioweapons
factory?
http://groups.google.com/group/scilyme2/browse_thread/thread/97145b659573ba9d/91f61251f09c793f?hl=en&lnk=gst&q=McSweegan+blog#91f61251f09c793f
Why would Sweeg go to Israel?
It's *here* in America, where we
still need to find out what
OspA is, since *here* in America
is where it was made into a
"vaccine"... And rather than
respond to the lawsuit, they
attack Blumenthal like they
http://www.actionlyme.org/BLUMENTHAL_FORSCHNER.htm
attacked Lyme and LYMErix
victims:
http://www.actionlyme.org/GOLDWATER_LETTER.htm
^^^"The Mossad is gonna get" me,
apparently.
http://www.actionlyme.org/BLUMENTHAL_FORSCHNER.htm
"Blaser added that clinical guidelines have to be based on science,
not economics. "This is research of the literature. What does the
literature support and what does it not support," said Blaser, ..."
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19995919
"As ^^^ has been demonstrated many
times and reported by us and IDSA
http://www.actionlyme.org/BRAIN_PERMANENT.htm
http://www.actionlyme.org/RICOCHRON.htm
http://www.actionlyme.org/CHP_9_IDSA_REVIEWS.htm
many times, Lyme is not completely
curable with any kind of antibiotics."
Welp, the short version of the Lyme
crimes is that Yale owns a scientifically
http://www.actionlyme.org/CENTRAL_LYME_RICO_PATENTS.htm
valid test for Lyme that they did not
use to qualify LYMErix, because they
knew LYMErix did not prevent Lyme.
Meanwhile, Yale's Robert Schoen knew
LYMErix caused a Lyme-like illness in
1995, since he was in on the CORIXARICO
patent with Dave Persing:
http://www.actionlyme.org/CORIXARICO.htm
in case anyone thinks this lawsuit
won't be easy or winnable.
KMDickson
http://www.actionlyme.org
http://www.relapsingfever.org
=============================
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janine-r-wedel/emshadow-eliteem-march-to_b_512697.html
Shadow Elite: March to War -- The Neocon Playbook
During March, to mark seven years since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the
Shadow Elite column has been focusing on what I call in my book the
"Neocon core," a tiny circle of longtime ideological allies who used
their interlocking relationships across government, think tanks,
business, and national borders to achieve their vision of asserting
American power, and firepower, to remake the Middle East. We conclude
the March to War series this week by examining how I came to
understand the core's modus operandi: through my experience studying
the mechanisms of power and influence in post-Cold War eastern Europe.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you were to look at the bulk of my three decades of experience,
research and expertise, you might find yourself asking, what does a
social anthropologist who spent much of her career specializing in
eastern Europe have to say about the neoconservatives who helped take
the United States to war in Iraq?
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, I was in Warsaw, having already
spent some four years in the region throughout the 1980s. And in a
twisted sort of way, examining eastern Europe up close--through its
transformations away from communism over the last quarter century--has
been excellent preparation for making sense of how a small group of
power brokers helped engineer the invasion of Iraq, and more broadly,
how a new system of power and influence has taken hold globally, one
that, as I write in my book Shadow Elite, undermines democracy,
government, and the free market.
In communist Poland, the necessity of getting around the state-
controlled system created a society whose lifeblood--just beneath the
surface--was vital information, circulated only among friends and
trusted colleagues, information that was not publicly available. Under-
the-radar dealings that often played on the margins of legality - this
was the norm, not the exception.
Then, in 1989, the system collapsed in eastern Europe, and in 1991,
the Soviet Union came apart. The command structure of these centrally
planned states that had owned virtually all the property, companies
and wealth broke down and no authoritarian stand-in was put in its
place. The result? Long-standing informal networks, positioning
themselves at the state-private nexus, rose to fill leadership vacuums
and, at times, reaped the spoils of previously state-owned wealth.
Known variously as "clans" in Russia, "institutional nomadic networks"
in Poland, and by still other names elsewhere, always their members
were energetic and well-placed, sometimes also ethically challenged.
And these are networks that can't be reduced to a political party,
business or lobbying organization, NGO, social club, yet they have
some of the attributes of all of them.
Fast forward from transitional eastern Europe to this decade in the
United States. I began to recognize a familiar (to me) architecture of
power and influence. I started to follow the networks and overlapping
connections in government, foundations, think tanks, and business of a
tiny set of neoconservatives - just a dozen or so players I call the
"Neocon core".
Some core members have been working together from in and outside of
government for some 30 years to refashion a more aggressive American
foreign policy. They have capitalized on an ever-more hospitable
environment shaped by such trends as the hollowing out of the state,
the explosion of private entities that fill in for government, and the
questioning of authority and professional expertise.
In doing so the modus operandi of the Neocon core bears a strong
similarity to that of the networks that shaped government, politics,
and business in eastern Europe. Members of the core formed an
intertwined and exclusive network, not unlike Russian clans in the
post-Cold War years who positioned their members in and around the
state to best promote their group's political, financial, and other
strategic agendas.
The playbook of the Neocon core seemed to come straight from that of
the top players of transitional eastern Europe.
In both cases, players who already knew each other set up a host of
organizations--organizations that seemed more like an extended family
franchise than think tank, populated by the same set of individuals.
2010-03-25-ILLUSTNeocsOrgscol500.jpg
In both cases, a network of players straddled state and private
involvements, conflating state and private agendas, and assuming
multiple roles in and out of government, with a great deal of
ambiguity surrounding those roles. Where does the officially-
sanctioned power begin and end for someone who's been a government
advisor (or official), a consulting firm official, then a think-
tanker, then back as a government advisor? (Or frequently, a player
will assume two or more of these roles of influence at once.) And
while the title or venue may change, the loyalty does not: he serves
the agendas of his network at the expense of the organizations he
works for.
In this murky environment, ambiguity often serves the player's
purposes and a single title doesn't even come close to indicating the
real scope of a player's power. During my time in eastern Europe in
the 1990s, many officials I was interviewing gave me multiple business
cards bearing their different job titles.
But that is a model of transparency when compared to the Neocon core.
Consider the title of Richard Perle, the linchpin of the core, during
the run-up to the Iraq war: chairman of the Defense Policy Board. This
moniker hardly conveyed Perle's ability to broker deals, connect
people through decades of associations, and mentor, protect and
promote other core members into key positions of influence. These
promotions happened despite the fact that Perle and two other core
members, Douglas Feith and Paul Wolfowitz, were investigated at
various points during their careers by the U.S. government for alleged
breaches involving classified information surrounding Israel.
Journalist George Packer calls Perle the "impresario" of the Iraq war,
"with one degree of separation from everyone who mattered."
And in both cases, power brokers personalized bureaucracy, bypassing
official process while bending the rules. Perle acted much like a
Russian blatmeister--a master manipulator at using informal contacts
and privately-hoarded information to advance the cause of the core and
its associates. Standard procedures were bypassed or circumvented and
quite often disdained, not unlike the dynamics I saw in eastern
Europe, where it was a given that the real power resided somewhere in
the neverland of state and private.
Insiders variously placed in the bureaucracy under George W. Bush are
strikingly unified in observing that members of the core thwarted
established processes and bureaucracy. And they marginalized officials
who were not part of their network.
The Neocon core had its people - loyalists - staffing two secretive
offices in the Pentagon that dealt with policy and intelligence after
September 11--the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of
Special Plans. The core helped create these alternative structures to
construct their own official versions of the Iraq threat, and then
branded them as the most authoritative.
The specific modus operandi helped the core create this desired
reality. And this is one of the key reasons that the actions of the
core go well beyond simple corruption or old notions of conflict of
interests. As a Washington observer sympathetic to the
neoconservatives' aims told me, "There is no conflict of interest,
because they define the interest."
And despite a new administration in Washington, not to mention the
damage done to their credibility since the Iraq invasion, the Neocon
core lives on, because networks like it are self-propelling,
multipurpose, and enduring. Steve Clemons, head of the American
Strategy Program of the New America Foundation said this recently to
reporter Matthew Duss, writing for The Nation.
They always continue to sort of lurk in the framework and look for
opportunities to animate their crowd and bring in their fellow
travelers...
As a social anthropologist, my focus is not on whether the U.S. should
have invaded Iraq, but rather how that decision was made, who made it,
and what mechanisms of power and influence were used to make it. Paul
R. Pillar, a veteran CIA officer in charge of coordinating the
intelligence community's assessments regarding Iraq, described the
march to war to me this way:
There was no process. . . . No one has identified a single
meeting, memorandum, showdown in the situation room when the question
was on the agenda as to whether this war should be launched. It was
never discussed. . . . That is the respect in which this case is
markedly different from anything I've seen in the past. . . . There's
well established machinery for this . . . For the decision to go to
war in Vietnam there was meeting after meeting, policy briefing after
briefing. The Iraq war was qualitatively different in that there was
no such process. . . . In Iraq such machinery never got used.
From my vantage point, the actions of the Neocon core should disturb
Americans of any political stripe. By acting more like the cowboys of
the so-called Wild East of the post-Communist era, these power brokers
perfected this new system of influence, subverting the standards of
accountability and transparency that a healthy democracy demands.
Americans were left almost wholly in the dark about the most important
foreign policy decision a nation can make: to go to war. And when I
asked Secretary of State Colin Powell's Chief of Staff Lawrence
Wilkerson how that fateful decision was reached, he echoed Paul
Pillar: without hesitation, he said, "I don't know."
Linda Keenan edits the Shadow Elite column.
Books & More From Janine R. Wedel
Shadow Elite
============================
http://www.actionlyme.org/BLUMENTHAL_IDSA_FEB_2010.pdf
"[Real] scientists are *fiercely* independent. That's the good
news."-- NIH's Top Fool, Anthony Fauci