Subject: Russia and 9/11 (and Georgia)
Date: Sep 4, 2008 12:37 AM
No. No one can report on what Russia is intending to do or did unless
one accepts
and understands that Russia now knows the truth about 9/11 and PNAC:
http://www.actionlyme.org/070426.htm
http://www.actionlyme.org/PNAC.pdf
And the Israelis who were former Americans pulling the strings from
there, associated
with Richard Perle (IASPS.org)
Then, Georgia being full of Israelis, and Israeli Oligarchs having
previously tried
to rape and plunder Russia under Yeltsin...
No one can talk about Russia or anyone's future unless we talk about
what really
happened on 9/11. They don't want WWIII but they're not going to back
down,
either.
Russia has engineers, and guess what, it does not take much to have
better engineers
than American engineers, since... look how many of them are so
cowardly that they
don't join a massive nationwide lobby and march to Washington
demanding certain
people be prosecuted for thermate in WTC7?
Look how many stupid American scientists did not re-discover that Lyme
was a relapsing
fever organism that caused immune suppression-related New Great
Imitator outcomes.
Look how many did not report to the FDA
http://www.actionlyme.org/DICKSON_FDA_SUBMISSION_FULL.htm
that the testing for Lyme (Dearborn) was
a hoax. Look how many MDs did not file RICO charges or a civil suit
against Yale
http://www.actionlyme.org/USDOJ_COMPLAINT_RICO.htm
over "Lyme Disease" and LYMErix, and how RICO that would have fed
billions
into Yale's endowment fund (L2 Diagnostics/Poly Genomics):
http://www.actionlyme.org/LYME_CORRUPTICUT.htm
No one can have any confidence that they can call what Russia will do,
since we
in America do not demand to know the truth about 9/11 or anything
else.
AMERICANS ARE *TOO* *EFFING* *COWARDLY* to even be called a
nation, much less one that wants to be called a "democracy" (since
that infers the presence of the brains and the courage to SPEAK THE
TRUTH).
KMDickson
==========
http://www.antiwar.com/ips/luban.php?articleid=13407
September 4, 2008
The Return of the Return of History
by Daniel Luban
In the wake of Russia's invasion of Georgia last month, many
commentators have
been quick to proclaim that the war signals "the return of history."
But
attentive observers could be forgiven for responding to these
pronouncements with
a sense of déjà vu.
History, after all, was already supposed to have returned once before
– seven years
ago, following the Sep. 11 attacks. Then, "the return of history" was
meant to signal the commencement of an all-out struggle against the
forces of radical
Islam and secular Arab nationalism.
The appropriation and reinterpretation of the phrase in recent weeks –
in many cases
by the same commentators who first made use of it in 2001 – may be
indicative of
a new turn in US foreign policy debates, as hawks move away from a
focus on the
Islamic world and push for more aggressive confrontation with Russia
and China.
It has also touched off a heated media debate about the future of
world politics,
notably pitting erstwhile neoconservative allies Robert Kagan and
Francis Fukuyama
against each other.
It has been nearly 20 years since Fukuyama wrote his influential 1989
essay "The
End of History?," later expanded into a 1992 book. Published just
months before
the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama's
essay
argued that no further ideological alternatives existed to market-
based liberal
democracy, and that the era of large-scale ideologically-driven
conflict was over.
Many hawks initially embraced Fukuyama's thesis, seeing in it the
promise of
a "unipolar" world in which the United States could exercise
"benevolent
hegemony." In the years that followed, with no clear rival in sight,
much of
US foreign policy was oriented toward peacekeeping operations in far-
flung places
like Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans.
But after the Sep. 11, 2001 attacks, many of the same hawks were quick
to fault
Fukuyama for his optimism. According to an instantly ubiquitous
phrase, the 1990s
marked a mere "holiday from history," and radical Islam was destined
to
replace fascism and communism as the consuming focus of US foreign
policy.
Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer, a prominent
neoconservative, spoke
for many in a Weekly Standard article published two months after the
attacks, proclaiming
that "[o]n September 11, our holiday from history came to an end." US
foreign policy, he wrote, had "acquired a new organizing principle: we
have
an enemy, radical Islam...and its defeat is our supreme national
objective."
Krauthammer explicitly rejected the notion that Russian and Chinese
power posed
serious threats to the US, instead viewing them as potential allies.
If cooperation
in the war on terror required recognition of Russia's Great Power
status in
Central Asia, he argued, then so be it.
"Radical Islam" was defined broadly enough to include Sunnis and
Shiites,
religious fundamentalists and secular nationalists. And although
Afghanistan was
the first front, hawks inside and outside the Bush administration
immediately looked
ahead to Iraq – and beyond that, to Iran and Syria.
Much as they derided Fukuyama's optimism, what neoconservatives
proposed was
the armed imposition of the universal liberal democracy that he had
predicted. But
Fukuyama himself was not coming along for the ride; he was skeptical
that liberal
democracy could be imposed by force and broke with his former
neoconservative allies
in opposing the Iraq war.
It would be an understatement to say that the war against radical
Islam has not
gone as its planners had hoped. Whether or not the US can salvage
acceptable political
outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the large-scale democratization of
the Middle
East appears to be off the table for now.
And as moderates seem to have gained the upper hand over hardliners
within the Bush
administration, the US has shown a new willingness to use diplomacy in
its dealings
with the Islamic world.
With the apparent stalling of the war against radical Islam, many felt
that hawkish
elements in Washington had begun casting about for a new threat to
serve as the
"organizing principle" of US foreign policy.
Russia and China, both longstanding neoconservative fixations, made
for something
of a natural fit. In the months before 9/11, the Weekly Standard in
particular had
pushed for more aggressive confrontation with China – a Jun. 18, 2001
editorial
accused the US State Department of engaging in "appeasement of
Beijing's
Communist rulers."
If there has been a central figure in reformulating the "return of
history"
to push for confrontation with Russia and China, it has been Kagan, a
neoconservative
stalwart based at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace who serves as an
advisor to John
McCain.
Kagan's latest book, The Return of History and the End of Dreams,
published
this past April, argues that the 21st century will be dominated by
conflict between
the forces of democracy (led by the US) and autocracy (led by Russia
and China),
in a sort of return to 19th century great power politics.
Kagan's influence was important in leading McCain to call for a
"League
of Democracies" to counter Russian and Chinese power, and in the weeks
since
the Russia-Georgia war his predictions have attracted significantly
more attention.
But although few would argue that Russia and China have gained
increased salience
recently, many critics have questioned whether direct confrontation is
the only
way to deal with their rising power.
Foremost among these critics has been Fukuyama himself. In recent
weeks, he and
Kagan have penned a series of opinion pieces that were clearly written
in response
to each other.
In an Aug. 24 Washington Post op-ed, Fukuyama cautioned against
"facile historical
analogies," and argued against the view that autocratic governments
inherently
share the same interests or seek aggressive territorial expansion.
In an earlier debate with Kagan on the website Bloggingheads.tv,
Fukuyama also claimed
that Kagan's predictions of conflict with Russia and China could prove
to be
a "self-fulfilling prophecy." If Washington simply assumes that
conflict
with Russia and China is inevitable, he and other analysts caution,
then it may
end up making such conflict inevitable.
In a Newsweek article bluntly titled "This Isn't the Return of
History,"
prominent foreign policy realist Fareed Zakaria argued that Russia's
invasion
would be remembered as a blunder rather than a show of strength, and
that globalization
and economic integration would continue to promote a convergence of
interests between
great powers.
Much of the debate has come to revolve around which side can lay claim
to the realist
mantle. In an Aug. 30 Wall Street Journal op-ed, Kagan fired back at
Fukuyama and
Zakaria, accusing them of betraying the disillusioned worldview of
their realist
predecessors by espousing naïve predictions about the end of large-
scale geopolitical
conflict.
Fukuyama, for his part, remains skeptical that even a return to the
19th century
world of great power politics would justify the aggressive policies
espoused by
Kagan and other neoconservatives.
"You can't have it both ways," he said in his Bloggingheads debate
with Kagan. If one accepts the notion of a return to a great-power
world, "then
you take that seriously, and say what do great powers do when we can't
expect
to get everything we want?"
"The normal great power understanding of what you do is you come to an
accommodation,
you give some things up in order to get what's more important to you."
(Inter Press Service)
(Inter Press Service)
Find this article at:
http://www.antiwar.com/ips/luban.php?articleid=13407
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