http://www.physlink.com/Education/AskExperts/ae13.cfm
"So, it is absolutely true that the speed of light is not constant in
a gravitational field [which, by the equivalence principle, applies as
well to accelerating (non-inertial) frames of reference]. If this were
not so, there would be no bending of light by the gravitational field
of stars....Indeed, this is exactly how Einstein did the calculation
in: 'On the Influence of Gravitation on the Propagation of Light,'
Annalen der Physik, 35, 1911. which predated the full formal
development of general relativity by about four years. This paper is
widely available in English. You can find a copy beginning on page 99
of the Dover book 'The Principle of Relativity.' You will find in
section 3 of that paper, Einstein's derivation of the (variable) speed
of light in a gravitational potential, eqn (3). The result is,
c' = c0 ( 1 + V / c^2 )
where V is the gravitational potential relative to the point where the
speed of light c0 is measured."
http://www.blazelabs.com/f-g-gcont.asp
"So, faced with this evidence most readers must be wondering why we
learn about the importance of the constancy of speed of light. Did
Einstein miss this? Sometimes I find out that what's written in our
textbooks is just a biased version taken from the original work, so
after searching within the original text of the theory of GR by
Einstein, I found this quote: "In the second place our result shows
that, according to the general theory of relativity, the law of the
constancy of the velocity of light in vacuo, which constitutes one of
the two fundamental assumptions in the special theory of relativity
and to which we have already frequently referred, cannot claim any
unlimited validity. A curvature of rays of light can only take place
when the velocity of propagation of light varies with position. Now we
might think that as a consequence of this, the special theory of
relativity and with it the whole theory of relativity would be laid in
the dust. But in reality this is not the case. We can only conclude
that the special theory of relativity cannot claim an unlimited domain
of validity ; its results hold only so long as we are able to
disregard the influences of gravitational fields on the phenomena
(e.g. of light)." - Albert Einstein (1879-1955) - The General Theory
of Relativity: Chapter 22 - A Few Inferences from the General
Principle of Relativity-. Today we find that since the Special Theory
of Relativity unfortunately became part of the so called mainstream
science, it is considered a sacrilege to even suggest that the speed
of light be anything other than a constant. This is somewhat
surprising since even Einstein himself suggested in a paper "On the
Influence of Gravitation on the Propagation of Light," Annalen der
Physik, 35, 1911, that the speed of light might vary with the
gravitational potential. Indeed, the variation of the speed of light
in a vacuum or space is explicitly shown in Einstein's calculation for
the angle at which light should bend upon the influence of gravity.
One can find his calculation in his paper. The result is c'=c(1+V/c^2)
where V is the gravitational potential relative to the point where the
measurement is taken. 1+V/c^2 is also known as the GRAVITATIONAL
REDSHIFT FACTOR."
In 1915 Einstein manages to get rid of Newton's emission theory of
light by replacing the equation c'=c(1+V/c^2) with c'=c(1+2V/c^2):
http://www.mathpages.com/rr/s6-01/6-01.htm
"In geometrical units we define c_0 = 1, so Einstein's 1911 formula
can be written simply as c=1+phi. However, this formula for the speed
of light (not to mention this whole approach to gravity) turned out to
be incorrect, as Einstein realized during the years leading up to 1915
and the completion of the general theory. In fact, the general theory
of relativity doesn't give any equation for the speed of light at a
particular location, because the effect of gravity cannot be
represented by a simple scalar field of c values. Instead, the "speed
of light" at a each point depends on the direction of the light ray
through that point, as well as on the choice of coordinate systems, so
we can't generally talk about the value of c at a given point in a non-
vanishing gravitational field. However, if we consider just radial
light rays near a spherically symmetrical (and non- rotating) mass,
and if we agree to use a specific set of coordinates, namely those in
which the metric coefficients are independent of t, then we can read a
formula analogous to Einstein's 1911 formula directly from the
Schwarzschild metric. (...) In the Newtonian limit the classical
gravitational potential at a distance r from mass m is phi=-m/r, so if
we let c_r = dr/dt denote the radial speed of light in Schwarzschild
coordinates, we have c_r =1+2phi, which corresponds to Einstein's 1911
equation, except that we have a factor of 2 instead of 1 on the
potential term."
http://www.speed-light.info/speed_of_light_variable.htm
"Einstein wrote this paper in 1911 in German (download from:
http://www.physik.uni-augsburg.de/annalen/history/einstein-papers/1911_35_898-908.pdf
). It predated the full formal development of general relativity by
about four years. You can find an English translation of this paper in
the Dover book 'The Principle of Relativity' beginning on page 99; you
will find in section 3 of that paper Einstein's derivation of the
variable speed of light in a gravitational potential, eqn (3). The
result is: c'=c0(1+phi/c^2) where phi is the gravitational potential
relative to the point where the speed of light co is measured......You
can find a more sophisticated derivation later by Einstein (1955) from
the full theory of general relativity in the weak field
approximation....For the 1955 results but not in coordinates see page
93, eqn (6.28): c(r)=[1+2phi(r)/c^2]c. Namely the 1955 approximation
shows a variation in km/sec twice as much as first predicted in 1911."
Replacing the equation c'=c(1+V/c^2) predicted by Newton's emission
theory of light with c'=c(1+2V/c^2) is tantamount to replacing 2+2=4
with 2+2=5: c'=c(1+V/c^2) is consistent with the GRAVITATIONAL
REDSHIFT FACTOR 1+V/c^2 confirmed experimentally (e.g. by Pound and
Rebka); c'=c(1+2V/c^2) is inconsistent with the GRAVITATIONAL
REDSHIFT FACTOR. Einstein's relativity should have been falsified by
the Pound-Rebka experiment and yet this experiment is still regarded
as a glorious confirmation of Einstein's theory. An analogy will make
things clearer. Consider a theory where 2+2=4 has been replaced by
2+2=5. The founders of the new theory obtain:
(A) 3(2+2) = 3*5 = 15
(B) 3(2+2) = 6 + 6 = 12
Note that the TRUE conclusion 3(2+2)=12 belongs to the theory
involving the false equation 2+2=5. That is, the true equation 2+2=4
is partially retained in the new theory. So if an experiment somehow
tests this particular conclusion, the theory (rather, the
inconsistency) would prove deceptively correct.
http://www.online-literature.com/orwell/1984/
George Orwell "1984": "In the end the Party would announce that two
and two made five, and you would have to believe it. It was inevitable
that they should make that claim sooner or later: the logic of their
position demanded it. Not merely the validity of experience, but the
very existence of external reality, was tacitly denied by their
philosophy. The heresy of heresies was common sense. And what was
terrifying was not that they would kill you for thinking otherwise,
but that they might be right. For, after all, how do we know that two
and two make four? Or that the force of gravity works? Or that the
past is unchangeable? If both the past and the external world exist
only in the mind, and if the mind itself is controllable what then?"
Pentcho Valev
pva...@yahoo.com
> Pentcho Valev wrote:
[snip]
That change of subject makes my weekend.
Good one :-)
Dirk Vdm
> George Orwell "1984": "In the end the Party would announce that two and
> two made five, and you would have to believe it.
Not 'have to' but 'would' willingly.
> It was inevitable that
> they should make that claim sooner or later: the logic of their position
> demanded it. Not merely the validity of experience, but the very
> existence of external reality, was tacitly denied by their philosophy.
> The heresy of heresies was common sense.
The perception of the continuity between events was the heresy. So the
'memory holes".
> And what was terrifying was not
> that they would kill you for thinking otherwise, but that they might be
> right. For, after all, how do we know that two and two make four? Or
> that the force of gravity works? Or that the past is unchangeable? If
> both the past and the external world exist only in the mind, and if the
> mind itself is controllable what then?"
2+2=4 is not necessarily right. However, if 2+2 equals four one day but
then said to equal 5 the next and that it never had ever equaled four,
this is then not 'right'.
The function of Newspeak was to force reality into existing in ones own
mind which then was controlled. Doublespeak conflicts so with basic
reasoning which depends on and wants to experience this 'outside' world,
reason breaks down under newspeak and must retreat inward and so be
controlled.
https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/brhoads/www/book/chapt1.pdf
"Internal inconsistency is a defect in a theory that gives grounds for
seeking a better theory. Proving that a theory is inconsistent has the
same import as showing that it has false empirical consequences:
inconsistency guarantees that some part of the theory is false.
Unfortunately, this does not require that we throw out the entire
theory. Inconsistency only requires some modification in the theory,
and logic provides little guidance as to what modification is
appropriate. A classic example will illustrate the point. Special
relativity has two key postulates: the laws of physics are the same
for all frames of reference moving with constant relative velocities,
and the velocity of light is the same in all reference frames. Other
physicists besides Einstein contemplated the reconstruction of physics
on the basis of these two postulates, but abandoned the idea because
it seems easy to show that these postulates are mutually inconsistent.
Einstein notes the problem early in his first relativity paper, 'On
the electrodynamics of moving bodies', and announces that he will show
that these are only apparently inconsistent. He then argues that the
inconsistency actually requires a third proposition: whether two
events (at a distance from each other) are simultaneous is an
objective fact. Before Einstein's analysis, physicists had not
considered this claim to be a hypothesis subject to reconsideration,
and this is the hypothesis that Einstein rejects in order to eliminate
the inconsistency. There is an additional twist that we should note.
An inconsistent theory may be extremely useful if it is deployed with
sufficient care. The classic example here is Bohr's theory of the atom
which postulates that certain electron orbits are stable, but does so
in the context of classical electrodynamics which implies that no
orbits are stable. The theory's inconsistency was recognized as a
defect and this defect was eliminated by the new quantum theory of
Schrödinger and Heisenberg. But inconsistency is not a defect that
immediately blocks legitimate application of the theory. In general,
inconsistency is a formal defect in a theory, but THE DISCOVERY THAT A
THEORY IS INCONSISTENT DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY SPECIFIC RESPONSE FROM
THEORISTS."
Theorists do follow the advice of course. Yet there are embarrassing
views:
http://labnews.co.uk/laboratory_article.php/4514/2/2/attack-on-great-pillar-of-physics
"Precisely because Einstein's theory is inconsistent, its supporters
have drawn on contradictory principles in a way that greatly expanded
their apparent ability to explain the universe. Most crazes die out
when it becomes obvious that they were overblown. The amazing thing
about Einstein's theory of relativity is that it has kept going. It is
built on contradictions, but these very contradictions means that
almost anything 'proves' that it is right. It is a bit like a theory
where you say 1 + 1 = 2, but also that 1+ 1 = 3."
Pentcho Valev
pva...@yahoo.com
Oh, I'm with you. 3:40AM, and this programming assigment is being stubborn.
I really needed that one, thanks.
--Ashton
http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Gravitational_redshift
"The gravitational weakening of light from high-gravity stars was
predicted by John Michell in 1783 and Pierre-Simon in 1796, using
Isaac Newton's concept of light corpuscles (see: emission theory) and
who predicted that some stars would have a gravity so strong that
light would not be able to escape. The effect of gravity on light was
then explored by Johann Georg von Soldner (1801), who calculated the
amount of deflection of a light ray by the sun, arriving at the
Newtonian answer which is half the value predicted by general
relativity. All of this early work assumed that light could slow down
and fall, which was inconsistent with the modern understanding of
light waves. (...) Once it became accepted that light is an
electromagnetic wave, it was clear that the frequency of light should
not change from place to place, since waves from a source with a fixed
frequency keep the same frequency everywhere. The only way around this
conclusion would be if time itself was altered - if clocks at
different points had different rates. This was precisely Einstein's
conclusion in 1911. He considered an accelerating box, and noted that
according to the special theory of relativity, the clock rate at the
bottom of the box was slower than the clock rate at the top. (...) The
changing rates of clocks allowed Einstein to conclude that light waves
change frequency as they move..."
Here Einsteiniana's teachers exercise themselves in crimestop, that
is, they stop short, as though by instinct, at the threshold of the
following dangerous thought:
DANGEROUS THOUGHT: "Interpreting the gravitational redshift as "the
faster running of clocks in regions of weaker gravitational fields" is
compatible with the assumption that the speed of light is CONSTANT in
a gravitational field. Yet Divine Albert has claimed all along that
the speed of light VARIES with the gravitational potential V.
Initially Divine Albert believed that the equation c'=c(1+V/c^2) given
by Newton's emission theory of light is correct, then continued to
believe so (after all, this is the only equation compatible with the
experimentally confirmed frequency shift) but, just in case, replaced
c'=c(1+V/c^2) with c'=c(1+2V/c^2)."
http://www.liferesearchuniversal.com/1984-17.html#seventeen
George Orwell: "Crimestop means the faculty of stopping short, as
though by instinct, at the threshold of any dangerous thought. It
includes the power of not grasping analogies, of failing to perceive
logical errors, of misunderstanding the simplest arguments if they are
inimical to Ingsoc, and of being bored or repelled by any train of
thought which is capable of leading in a heretical direction.
Crimestop, in short, means protective stupidity."
Saying Is Believing: This has been called the "saying is believing"
paradigm. That is, dissonance theory predicts that we begin to believe
our own lies—but only if there is not abundant external justification
for making the statements that run counter to our original attitudes.
...the greater the reward for compliance, the greater the probability
that a person will comply.
...When it comes to producing a lasting change in attitude, the
greater the reward, the less likely any attitude change will occur.
If all I want you to do is recite a speech favoring Fidel Castro, the
Marx brothers, socialized medicine, or anything else, the most
efficient thing for me to do would be to give you the largest possible
reward. This would increase the probability of your complying by
making that speech.
But suppose I have a more ambitious goal: Suppose I want to effect a
lasting change in your attitudes and beliefs. In that case, just the
reverse is true. The smaller the external reward I give to induce you
to recite the speech, the more likely it is that you will be forced to
seek additional justification for delivering it by convincing yourself
that the things you said were actually true. This would result in an
actual change in attitude rather than mere compliance. The importance
of this technique cannot be overstated. If we change our attitudes
because we have made a public statement for minimal external
justification, our attitude change will be relatively permanent; we
are not changing our attitudes because of a reward (compliance) or
because of the influence of an attractive person (identification).
http://tinyurl.com/459wx
We are changing our attitudes because we have succeeded in convincing
ourselves that our previous attitudes were incorrect. This is a very
powerful form of attitude change.
...Leon Festinger and J. Merrill Carlsmith. These investigators asked
college students to perform a very boring and repetitive series of
tasks—packing spools in a tray, dumping them out, and then refilling
the tray over and over, or turning rows and rows of screws a quarter
turn and then going back and turning them another quarter turn. The
students engaged in these activities for a full hour. The experimenter
then induced them to lie about the task; specifically, he employed
them to tell a young woman (who was waiting to participate in the
experiment) that the task she would be performing was interesting and
enjoyable.
Some of the students were offered $20 for telling the lie; others were
offered only $1 for telling the lie.
After the experiment was over, an interviewer asked the liars how much
they enjoyed the tasks they had performed earlier in the experiment.
The results were clear-cut:
Those students who had been paid $20 for lying — that is, for saying
the spool packing and screw turning had been enjoyable — rated the
activity as dull. This is not surprising — it was dull.
But what about the students who had been paid only $1 for lying? They
rated the task as enjoyable. In other words, people who received
abundant external justification for lying told the lie but didn't
believe it, whereas those who told the lie in the absence of a great
deal of external justification moved in the direction of believing
that what they said was true.
Research support for the "saying is believing" phenomenon has extended
beyond relatively unimportant attitudes like the dullness of a
monotonous task. Attitude change has been shown on a variety of
important issues.
...in one experiment, Arthur R. Cohen induced Yale college students to
engage in a particularly difficult form of counterattitudinal
behavior. Cohen conducted his experiment immediately after a student
riot in which the New Haven police had behaved in a rather brutal
manner toward the students.
The students (who strongly believed the police had behaved badly) were
asked to write an essay in support of the actions taken by the police.
They were urged to write the strongest, most forceful defense of the
police actions they could muster. Before writing the essay, students
were paid for their efforts.
There were four conditions: Some students were paid $10; others, $5;
still others, $1; and a fourth group, the paltry sum of 50 cents.
After writing his essay, each student was asked to indicate his own
private attitudes about the police actions. The results were perfectly
linear: The smaller the reward, the greater the attitude change. Thus,
students who wrote in support of the New Haven police for the meager
sum of 50 cents developed a more favorable attitude than did those who
wrote the essay for $1; the students who wrote the essay for $1
developed a more favorable attitude toward the actions of the police
than did those who wrote the essay for $5; and those who wrote the
essay for $10 remained the least favorable. The less the external
justification in terms of money, the greater the attitude change.
Let's look at race relations and racial prejudice — surely one of our
nation's most enduring problems. Would it be possible to get people to
endorse a policy favoring a minority group — and then see if their
attitudes become more favorable toward that group? In an important set
of experiments, Mike Leippe and Donna Eisen-stadt induced white
college students to write an essay demonstrating counter-attitudinal
advocacy: publicly endorsing a controversial proposal at their
university—to double the amount of funds available for academic
scholarships for African-American students. Because the total amount
of scholarship funds were limited, this meant cutting by half the
amount of funds available for scholarships for white students. As you
might imagine, this was a highly dissonant situation. How might the
students reduce dissonance? The best way would be to convince
themselves that they really believed deeply in that policy—that,
taking the big picture into consideration, it was only fair to offer
more financial aid to African-Americans. Moreover, it is reasonable to
suggest that dissonance reduction might generalize beyond the specific
policy— that is, the theory would predict that their general attitude
toward African-Americans would become more favorable and much more
supportive. And that is exactly what Leippe and Eisenstadt found.
What constitutes external justification? As I mentioned a moment ago,
external justification can and does come in a variety of forms. People
can be persuaded to say things or do things that contradict their
beliefs or preferences if they are threatened with punishment or
enticed by rewards other than monetary gain—such as praise or the
desire to please. Furthermore, most of us would consider doing
something that we otherwise wouldn't do if a good friend asked us to
do it as a favor. To take a farfetched example, suppose a friend asked
you to eat an unusual food she or he had recently learned to prepare
in an "exotic foods" cooking class. And just to make things
interesting, let's say the food in question was a fried grasshopper.
Now, imagine the reverse situation—that someone you didn't like very
much asked you to sink your teeth into a fried grasshopper.
Okay, are you ready? Assuming you went ahead and ate the grasshopper,
under which circumstance do you think you would enjoy the taste of it
more—when asked to eat it by a good friend or by someone you didn't
like? Common sense might suggest that the grasshopper would taste
better when recommended by a friend. After all, a friend is someone
you can trust and, hence, would be a far more credible source of
information than someone you didn't like. But think about it for a
moment: Which condition involves less external justification? Common
sense notwithstanding, the theory of cognitive dissonance would
predict that you would come to like eating grasshoppers more if you
ate one at the request of someone you didn't like.
Here's how it works: Your cognition that eating a grasshopper is
repulsive would be at odds with the fact that you just ate one. But if
it was your friend who made the request, you would have a great deal
of external justification for having eaten it—you did it as a favor
for a good friend. On the other hand, you would not have adequate
external justification for munching on a grasshopper if you did it at
the request of someone you didn't like. In this case, how could you
justify your contradictory behavior to yourself? Simple. The way to
reduce dissonance would be to change your attitude toward grasshoppers
in the direction of liking them better—"Gee, they're pretty tasty
critters after all."
While this may seem a rather bizarre example of dissonance-reducing
behavior, it's not as farfetched as you might think. Philip Zimbardo
and his colleagues conducted an analogous experiment in which army
reservists were asked to try fried grasshoppers as part of a study
allegedly about "survival" foods. For half of the subjects, the
request was made by a warm, friendly officer; for the other half, it
was made by a cold, unfriendly officer. The reservists' attitudes
toward eating grasshoppers were measured before and after they ate
them. The results were exactly as predicted above: Reservists who ate
grasshoppers at the request of the unpleasant officer increased their
liking for them far more than those who ate grasshoppers at the
request of the pleasant officer. Thus, when sufficient external
justification was present—when reservists complied with the friendly
officer's request—they experienced little need to change their
attitudes toward grasshoppers. They already had a convincing
explanation for why they ate them—they did it to help a "nice guy."
But reservists who complied with the unfriendly officer's request had
little external justification for their action. As a result, they
adopted a more positive attitude toward eating grasshoppers in order
to rationalize their discrepant behavior.
What Is Inadequate Justification? Throughout this section, I have made
reference to situations where there is inadequate external
justification and to those with an abundance of external
justification. These terms require some additional clarification. In
the Festinger-Carlsmith experiment, all of the subjects did, in fact,
agree to tell the lie—including all of those paid only $1. In a sense,
then, $1 was adequate—that is, adequate to induce the subjects to tell
the lie; but as it turns out, it wasn't sufficient to keep them from
feeling foolish. In order to reduce their feeling of foolishness, they
had to reduce the dissonance that resulted from telling a lie for so
paltry a sum. This entailed additional bolstering in the form of
convincing themselves that it wasn't completely a lie and the task
wasn't quite as dull as it seemed at first; as a matter of fact, when
looked at in a certain way, it was actually quite interesting.
The Social Animal - Elliot Aronson - 8th Edition 1999
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0716733129/
> Pentcho Valev
> pva...@yahoo.com
Camarillo Brillo.
Dirk Vdm
You're shining brillo underpants in your lives.
Pentcho Valev
pva...@yahoo.com
Then they should all get into family counseling.