Liar paradox (Philosophy Now, Wittgenstein)
Scott H
Magazine printed online, if legally possible.
Is anyone acquainted with Lefebvre and Schelein's argument?
I'm also reading here that Wittgenstein thought the liar paradox was a
"useless language game ... so why should anyone be excited?" He is also
famous for having said, "Whereof one cannot speak; thereof one must remain
silent." Is it possible that he regarded the question of the truth value of
the liar statement unanswerable in this way?
--
There are two extremes of beauty in the universe. One is the abhorrent lack
of empathy among conscious beings, and the other is the splendor of orderly
perfection in the laws of nature.
bigfl...@gmail.com
> I would love to see the article _The Liar Lied_ from Philosophy Now!
> Magazine printed online, if legally possible.
>
> Is anyone acquainted with Lefebvre and Schelein's argument?
>
> I'm also reading here that Wittgenstein thought the liar paradox was a
> "useless language game ... so why should anyone be excited?" He is also
> famous for having said, "Whereof one cannot speak; thereof one must remain
> silent." Is it possible that he regarded the question of the truth value of
> the liar statement unanswerable in this way?
Language, of the verbal kind, at one level, is useless. It is exciting
to discover that level of reality.
His response would have been similar to Pythagoras's when a student
presented him with "the square root of minus one".
>
> --
> There are two extremes of beauty in the universe. One is the abhorrent lack
> of empathy among conscious beings, and the other is the splendor of orderly
> perfection in the laws of nature.
The above paragraph is a good example. To separate conscious beings
from the laws of nature is useless, because it is fallacious.
BOfL
Giga
"Scott H" <nospam> wrote in message
news:7oOdnaPPPI3jCx7U...@supernews.com...
>I would love to see the article _The Liar Lied_ from Philosophy Now!
>Magazine printed online, if legally possible.
>
> Is anyone acquainted with Lefebvre and Schelein's argument?
>
> I'm also reading here that Wittgenstein thought the liar paradox was a
> "useless language game ... so why should anyone be excited?" He is also
> famous for having said, "Whereof one cannot speak; thereof one must remain
> silent." Is it possible that he regarded the question of the truth value
> of the liar statement unanswerable in this way?
>
It is a self-referencing statement, i.e. a sentence about itself, this is
not what language was developed for. It is to reference to other things than
itself. Maybe LW thought it was a silly language game, to get language to
refer to itself.
>
Scott H
> On Jan 31, 10:08 am, "Scott H" <nospam> wrote:
>> I would love to see the article _The Liar Lied_ from Philosophy Now!
>> Magazine printed online, if legally possible.
>>
>> Is anyone acquainted with Lefebvre and Schelein's argument?
>>
>> I'm also reading here that Wittgenstein thought the liar paradox was
>> a "useless language game ... so why should anyone be excited?" He is
>> also famous for having said, "Whereof one cannot speak; thereof one
>> must remain silent." Is it possible that he regarded the question of
>> the truth value of the liar statement unanswerable in this way?
>
> Language, of the verbal kind, at one level, is useless. It is exciting
> to discover that level of reality.
Useless in what way? What if some people derive pleasure from certain
discussions involving language or the liar paradox? Would they still be
activities to avoid, or 'useless language games,' as Wittgenstein might say?
How can something pleasurable be useless?
Are certain forms of abstract art 'useless'? How do you judge uselessness?
>> There are two extremes of beauty in the universe. One is the
>> abhorrent lack of empathy among conscious beings, and the other is
>> the splendor of orderly perfection in the laws of nature.
>
> The above paragraph is a good example. To separate conscious beings
> from the laws of nature is useless, because it is fallacious.
I'm not separating conscious beings from the laws of nature. On the
contrary, I hope that in the splendor of their orderly perfection we can
abolish our current lack of empathy.
Don Stockbauer
Self-reference in and of itself is not the problem. (The sentence "I
am going to the store" is perfetly useful). It's that the sentence
"This sentence is false" is meaningless. Go up to someone and utter
it and see how they react. Also, it's indefinite as to which sentence
is being referred to . The referent is not necessarily the sentence
itself; it's ambiguous. Any system rich enough to include self-
reference will be prone to these problems. Any system which excludes
self-reference is not very useful. See Hofstadter's works.
John J
> Useless in what way? What if some people derive pleasure from certain
> discussions involving language or the liar paradox? Would they still be
> activities to avoid, or 'useless language games,' as Wittgenstein might say?
> How can something pleasurable be useless?
>
> Are certain forms of abstract art 'useless'? How do you judge uselessness?
Your post is uninteresting and useless. No fun at all. However, you are
casting bait into a well-fed pool. If you catch something, then perhaps
you and the fish-who-cannot-feed-himself can have a useful conversation
as long as you lie to it, and it lies to you.
LudovicoVan
> I'm also reading here that Wittgenstein thought the liar paradox was a
> "useless language game ... so why should anyone be excited?" He is also
> famous for having said, "Whereof one cannot speak; thereof one must remain
> silent." Is it possible that he regarded the question of the truth value of
> the liar statement unanswerable in this way?
Not unanswerable: meaningless.
-LV
Newberry
> On Jan 30, 7:00 pm, "Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)
>
>
>
>
>
> ho...@yahoo.co> wrote:
> > "Scott H" <nospam> wrote in message
>
> >news:7oOdnaPPPI3jCx7U...@supernews.com...
>
> > >I would love to see the article _The Liar Lied_ from Philosophy Now!
> > >Magazine printed online, if legally possible.
>
> > > Is anyone acquainted with Lefebvre and Schelein's argument?
>
> > > I'm also reading here that Wittgenstein thought the liar paradox was a
> > > "useless language game ... so why should anyone be excited?" He is also
> > > famous for having said, "Whereof one cannot speak; thereof one must remain
> > > silent." Is it possible that he regarded the question of the truth value
> > > of the liar statement unanswerable in this way?
>
> > It is a self-referencing statement, i.e. a sentence about itself, this is
> > not what language was developed for. It is to reference to other things than
> > itself. Maybe LW thought it was a silly language game, to get language to
> > refer to itself.
>
> Self-reference in and of itself is not the problem. (The sentence "I
> am going to the store" is perfetly useful). It's that the sentence
> "This sentence is false" is meaningless.
Right.
> Go up to someone and utter
> it and see how they react. Also, it's indefinite as to which sentence
> is being referred to .
Wrong.
> The referent is not necessarily the sentence
> itself;
It is.
> it's ambiguous.
It is not.
> Any system rich enough to include self-
> reference will be prone to these problems. Any system which excludes
> self-reference is not very useful. See Hofstadter's works.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
William Elliot
> His response would have been similar to Pythagoras's when a student
> presented him with "the square root of minus one".
What did the student present?
Immortalist
> I would love to see the article _The Liar Lied_ from Philosophy Now!
> Magazine printed online, if legally possible.
>
> Is anyone acquainted with Lefebvre and Schelein's argument?
>
> I'm also reading here that Wittgenstein thought the liar paradox was a
> "useless language game ... so why should anyone be excited?" He is also
> famous for having said, "Whereof one cannot speak; thereof one must remain
> silent." Is it possible that he regarded the question of the truth value of
> the liar statement unanswerable in this way?
>
(1) This sentence is false.
If (1) is true, then (1) is false. On the other hand, assume (1) is
false. Because the Liar Sentence is saying precisely that (namely that
it is false), the Liar Sentence is true, so (1) is true. We've now
shown that (1) is true if and only if it is false. Since (1) is one or
the other, it is both.
--------------------------
Leading solutions to the Liar Paradox all have a common approach, the
"systematic approach." The solutions agree that the Liar Paradox
represents a serious challenge to our understanding the logic of
natural language, and they agree that we must go back and
systematically reform or clarify some of our original beliefs in order
to solve the paradox. The solution must be presented systematically
and be backed up by an argument about the general character of our
language. In short, there must be both systematic evasion and
systematic explanation. Also, when it comes to developing this
systematic approach, the goal of establishing a logical basis for a
consistent semantics of natural language is much more important than
the goal of explaining the naive way most speakers use the terms
"true" and "not true." As Vann McGee expresses this point, "The
problem of giving voice to our pre-analytic intuitions about truth is
comparatively less important, just as understanding popular
misconceptions about space and time is comparatively less important
than understanding the actual geometry of space-time."
This "systematic approach" has been seriously challenged by
Wittgenstein.
He says one should try to overcome ''the
superstitious fear and dread of mathematicians
in the face of a contradiction." The proper
way to respond to any paradox is by an
ad hoc reaction and not by any systematic
treatment designed to cure both it and any
future ills. Symptomatic relief is sufficient.
It may appear legitimate, at first, to admit
that the Liar Sentence is meaningful and also
that it is true or false, but the Liar Paradox
shows that one should retract this admission
and either just not use the Liar Sentence in
any arguments, or say it is not really a
sentence, or at least say it is not one that
is either true or false.
Wittgenstein is not particularly concerned with which choice is made.
And, whichever choice is made, it needn't be backed up by any theory
that shows how to systematically incorporate the choice. He treats the
whole situation cavalierly and unsystematically. After all, he says,
the language can't really be incoherent because we've been
successfully using it all along, so why all this "fear and dread"?
Most logicians want systematic removal of the paradox, but
Wittgenstein is content to say that we may need to live with this
paradox and to agree never to utter the Liar sentence, especially if
it seems that removal of the contradiction could have worse
consequences.
Influenced by Wittgenstein, P. F. Strawson has argued that the proper
way out of the Liar Paradox is to re-examine how the term "truth" is
really used by speakers. When we say some proposition is true, we
aren't making a statement about the proposition. We are not ascribing
a property to the proposition--such as the property of correspondence,
or coherence, or usefulness. When we call a proposition "true" we are
approving it, or praising it, or admitting it, or condoning it. We are
performing an action. Similarly, when we say to our sister, "I promise
to pay you fifty dollars," we aren't ascribing some property to the
proposition, "I pay you fifty dollars." Rather, we are performing the
act of promising. For Strawson, when speakers utter the Liar Sentence,
they aren't saying something true or false; they are attempting to
praise something that isn't there, as if they were saying "Ditto" when
no one has spoken. The person who utters the Liar Sentence is making a
pointless utterance. The Liar Sentence is grammatical, but it isn't
being used to express a proposition and so is not something from which
a contradiction can be derived.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/par-liar.htm
bigfl...@gmail.com
> bigflet...@gmail.com wrote:
> > On Jan 31, 10:08 am, "Scott H" <nospam> wrote:
> >> I would love to see the article _The Liar Lied_ from Philosophy Now!
> >> Magazine printed online, if legally possible.
>
> >> Is anyone acquainted with Lefebvre and Schelein's argument?
>
> >> I'm also reading here that Wittgenstein thought the liar paradox was
> >> a "useless language game ... so why should anyone be excited?" He is
> >> also famous for having said, "Whereof one cannot speak; thereof one
> >> must remain silent." Is it possible that he regarded the question of
> >> the truth value of the liar statement unanswerable in this way?
>
> > Language, of the verbal kind, at one level, is useless. It is exciting
> > to discover that level of reality.
>
> Useless in what way? What if some people derive pleasure from certain
> discussions involving language or the liar paradox? Would they still be
> activities to avoid, or 'useless language games,' as Wittgenstein might say?
> How can something pleasurable be useless?
>
> Are certain forms of abstract art 'useless'? How do you judge uselessness?
I dont. To do so is useless.
>
> >> There are two extremes of beauty in the universe. One is the
> >> abhorrent lack of empathy among conscious beings, and the other is
> >> the splendor of orderly perfection in the laws of nature.
>
> > The above paragraph is a good example. To separate conscious beings
> > from the laws of nature is useless, because it is fallacious.
>
> I'm not separating conscious beings from the laws of nature. On the
> contrary, I hope that in the splendor of their orderly perfection we can
> abolish our current lack of empathy.
I dont have a 'current lack of empathy'. "We can"?...now there's a
useless concept.
BOfL
bigfl...@gmail.com
> On Fri, 30 Jan 2009, bigflet...@gmail.com wrote:
> > His response would have been similar to Pythagoras's when a student
> > presented him with "the square root of minus one".
>
> What did the student present?
"The square root of minus one.
He wrote it on a piece of papyrus, and presented it to the master.
Rumor has it, he was then executed, or cast out of the mystery school.
I suspect the latter, in a Masonry sort of way
BOfL
LudovicoVan
> On Jan 31, 3:10 pm, William Elliot <ma...@rdrop.remove.com> wrote:
>
> > On Fri, 30 Jan 2009, bigflet...@gmail.com wrote:
> > > His response would have been similar to Pythagoras's when a student
> > > presented him with "the square root of minus one".
>
> > What did the student present?
>
> "The square root of minus one.
>
> He wrote it on a piece of papyrus, and presented it to the master.
> Rumor has it, he was then executed, or cast out of the mystery school.
FWIW, it was "simply" the square root of 2, i.e., some possibly
geometrical proof of the incommensurability of the diagonal to the
side of the square.
See for instance:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Square_root_of_2#History
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hippasus_of_Metapontum
-LV
turtoni
wrote:
> Language, of the verbal kind, at one level, is useless. It is exciting
> to discover that level of reality.
So when are you going to go green and stop polluting the world with
your "language"?
Now that wood (yes he said wood) be exciting!
Now why would i say such a thing?
Because i recognize that you're an idiot aka a phony fuck.
<*cue dog barking>
HTHelps.
*terminator 1
Patricia Aldoraz
The sentence 'this sentence is false' is not meaningless. It is not
meaningless because a very sensible question could be asked of its
utterance, namely *which* sentence is being referred to? If it is
replied that it is the very sentence itself that is being referred to,
then it could be reasonable said that no meaningful claim is being
made because as dorayme has repeatedly taught, no one has the
slightest idea of what could make for its truth or falsity.
Scott H
> On Jan 31, 11:06 am, "Scott H" <nospam> wrote:
>> Are certain forms of abstract art 'useless'? How do you judge
>> uselessness?
>
> I dont. To do so is useless.
So what you are doing right now is useless? ;)
> I dont have a 'current lack of empathy'.
I'm referring to humanity as a whole.
tg
I like:
"The only rule I follow consistently is to follow no rule
consistently."
I've always thought I made that up but who knows if it was something I
read?
-tg
Scott H
> Your post is uninteresting and useless. No fun at all.
What makes the liar paradox interesting to me is the prospect of
understanding statements of mathematics like Goedel's incompleteness
theorem, which some, notably Roger Penrose, have tied to the problem of
human consciousness and even aesthetics. One of Hilbert's ideas was to
formalize mathematics in such a way that every statement could be judged
true or false. If we do this successfully, we might even be able to call a
priori knowledge complete. Would we not?
Who would not be interested at the thought of complete mathematical
knowledge?
Scott H
> Not unanswerable: meaningless.
But if it's a meaningless statement, then it can't be a true statement, so
it's not a true statement, so the property of 'not true' must apply to it,
so the statement of its being not true must be true. We arrive at the
original paradox. We similarly would if I said, "This statement is either
false or meaningless."
Is the statement,
"The statement, 'This statement is not true,' is not true,"
the same as the statement,
"This statement is not true"?
Can we call the first true without calling the second true?
Scott H
> It's that the sentence "This sentence is false" is meaningless.
> Go up to someone and utter it and see how they react.
That would depend on precisely whom you utter it to.
John J
>
> His response would have been similar to Pythagoras's when a student
> presented him with "the square root of minus one".
His response would have been to demand that student show him using
constructive geometry. I can't see how one could do that.
LudovicoVan
> LudovicoVan wrote:
> > Not unanswerable: meaningless.
>
> But if it's a meaningless statement, then it can't be a true statement, so
> it's not a true statement, so the property of 'not true' must apply to it,
> so the statement of its being not true must be true.
No: a meangless (inconsistent, or incongruent) statement is neither
true nor false. Only of a consistent statement you can say that it is
true or false. An inconsistent statement "cancels itself": it's like
having said nothing -- from the point of view of the informational
content at least, which is what matters to logic.
-LV
Scott H
> No: a meangless (inconsistent, or incongruent) statement is neither
> true nor false. Only of a consistent statement you can say that it is
> true or false. An inconsistent statement "cancels itself": it's like
> having said nothing -- from the point of view of the informational
> content at least, which is what matters to logic.
It still seems to me that by 'falling outside the sphere' of true (and
meaningful) statements, it thereby becomes 'not true,' by the cognitive
meaning of negation.
When you say it 'cancels itself,' like it has 'said nothing,' what do you
mean? I don't understand that.
Don Stockbauer
Utter it to a drunk sailor in a bar.
LudovicoVan
> LudovicoVan wrote:
> > No: a meangless (inconsistent, or incongruent) statement is neither
> > true nor false. Only of a consistent statement you can say that it is
> > true or false. An inconsistent statement "cancels itself": it's like
> > having said nothing -- from the point of view of the informational
> > content at least, which is what matters to logic.
>
> It still seems to me that by 'falling outside the sphere' of true (and
> meaningful) statements, it thereby becomes 'not true,' by the cognitive
> meaning of negation.
The point is: there is not just true and false. Before true and false
there is consistent and inconsistent, and -again- only of a consistent
statement you can say that it is true or false (only a consistent
statement has got a truth-value).
> When you say it 'cancels itself,' like it has 'said nothing,' what do you
> mean? I don't understand that.
The following is an oversimplification, entire books have been written
on this matter, anyway take this simple example:
If I tell you "I am taller than you and I am not taller than you",
what have I said? From the point of view of logic, I have said nothing
at all, that is, my statement is inconsistent and brings no
informational content: in this case, about how tall I am (relative to
you). Such a statement is neither true nor false, it's just that:
inconsistent.
Hope this clarifies a bit,
-LV
John J
> LudovicoVan wrote:
>> No: a meangless (inconsistent, or incongruent) statement is neither
>> true nor false. Only of a consistent statement you can say that it is
>> true or false. An inconsistent statement "cancels itself": it's like
>> having said nothing -- from the point of view of the informational
>> content at least, which is what matters to logic.
Excellent clarification.
> It still seems to me that by 'falling outside the sphere' of true (and
> meaningful) statements, it thereby becomes 'not true,' by the cognitive
> meaning of negation.
There is no duality. It is at this point that the Zen Master slaps the
student silly.
> When you say it 'cancels itself,' like it has 'said nothing,' what do you
> mean? I don't understand that.
It's the same as the children from breeding a hammer and a poodle.
Daryl McCullough
>
>LudovicoVan wrote:
>> No: a meangless (inconsistent, or incongruent) statement is neither
>> true nor false. Only of a consistent statement you can say that it is
>> true or false. An inconsistent statement "cancels itself": it's like
>> having said nothing -- from the point of view of the informational
>> content at least, which is what matters to logic.
>
>It still seems to me that by 'falling outside the sphere' of true (and
>meaningful) statements, it thereby becomes 'not true,' by the cognitive
>meaning of negation.
You're right. LudovicoVan's "resolution" is not a resolution at all.
The claim that the Liar is meaningless is itself as paradoxical as
the Liar, if you also demand that no meaningless sentence can be true.
To see that LudovicoVan's resolution is itself paradoxical, let's
suppose that I write a book, "The Compendium of Paradoxical Sentences",
which is just a list of Liar-type sentences. Presumably, LudovicoVan
could see for himself that every sentence in the book
is indeed paradoxical, and therefore meaningless. He could then reason
as follows:
1. The first sentence in "The Compendium of Paradoxical Sentences"
is paradoxical.
Sentence 1 is true by inspection.
2. No paradoxical sentence can be meaningful.
Sentence 2 is a general principle that we want to maintain.
3. The first sentence in "The Compendium of Paradoxical Sentences"
is meaningless.
Sentence 3 follows immediately from 1&2.
4. No meaningless sentence is true.
Again, sentence 4 is a general principle we want to maintain.
5. The first sentence in "The Compendium of Paradoxical Sentences"
is not true.
Sentence 5 follows immediately from 3&4.
So presumably, LudovicoVan would accept the general principles
that paradoxical sentences are not meaningful, and meaningless
sentences are not true. So if those principles are valid, then
conclusion 5 follows. But now we open "The Compendium of
Paradoxical Sentences", and we find that the very first sentence
is the following:
The first sentence in "The Compendium of Paradoxical Sentences"
is not true.
So, the conclusion of our argument is itself a paradoxical sentence.
So if we adopt the general principles that paradoxical sentences
are not meaningful, and meaningless sentences are not true, then
that allows us to *prove* a meaningless sentence.
This shows that we *can't* accept LudovicoVan's general principles
as valid, because valid principles should always produce true
conclusions from true assumptions.
--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY
ZerkonXXXX
> It is a self-referencing statement, i.e. a sentence about itself, this
> is not what language was developed for. It is to reference to other
> things than itself. Maybe LW thought it was a silly language game, to
> get language to refer to itself.
Yes and, now after a similar discussion, no. It isn't the self
referencing exactly is the self referencing the definition of the true/
false state.
"This sentence is true" has no true/false meaning.
"This sentence has words in it" has meaning.
both self reference.
SO..
The next sentence is true
The previous sentence is false
holds no true false condition.
LudovicoVan
> Scott H says...
>
> >LudovicoVan wrote:
> >> No: a meangless (inconsistent, or incongruent) statement is neither
> >> true nor false. Only of a consistent statement you can say that it is
> >> true or false. An inconsistent statement "cancels itself": it's like
> >> having said nothing -- from the point of view of the informational
> >> content at least, which is what matters to logic.
>
> >It still seems to me that by 'falling outside the sphere' of true (and
> >meaningful) statements, it thereby becomes 'not true,' by the cognitive
> >meaning of negation.
>
> You're right. LudovicoVan's "resolution" is not a resolution at all.
What "resolution" are you talking about? What I have said is
mainstream logical analysis. I'd suggest you have some reading
*oustide* the strict domain of mainstream mathematical logic, where
you are not able to distinguish between inconsistency and falsity
(~a&a <=> _|_).
> The claim that the Liar is meaningless is itself as paradoxical as
> the Liar, if you also demand that no meaningless sentence can be true.
>
> To see that LudovicoVan's resolution is itself paradoxical, let's
> suppose that I write a book, "The Compendium of Paradoxical Sentences",
> which is just a list of Liar-type sentences. Presumably, LudovicoVan
> could see for himself that every sentence in the book
> is indeed paradoxical, and therefore meaningless. He could then reason
> as follows:
Why don't you reason by yourself instead of this gratuitus ad hominem?
You are disgusting: as usual.
> 1. The first sentence in "The Compendium of Paradoxical Sentences"
> is paradoxical.
>
> Sentence 1 is true by inspection.
Sentence 1 is simply false. And, anyway, true or false that it is, it
already invalidates your alleged book of incongruencies.
> 2. No paradoxical sentence can be meaningful.
>
> Sentence 2 is a general principle that we want to maintain.
So this one too is not paradoxical?
> 3. The first sentence in "The Compendium of Paradoxical Sentences"
> is meaningless.
>
> Sentence 3 follows immediately from 1&2.
What "follows" can you have at all when the premises are (you said)
paradoxical?
> 4. No meaningless sentence is true.
>
> Again, sentence 4 is a general principle we want to maintain.
Great: another non paradox.
> 5. The first sentence in "The Compendium of Paradoxical Sentences"
> is not true.
>
> Sentence 5 follows immediately from 3&4.
Non-sequitur; and sentence 1 is already false, by inspection.
> So presumably, LudovicoVan would accept the general principles
> that paradoxical sentences are not meaningful, and meaningless
> sentences are not true.
Get lost, idiot.
> So if those principles are valid, then
> conclusion 5 follows. But now we open "The Compendium of
> Paradoxical Sentences", and we find that the very first sentence
> is the following:
>
> The first sentence in "The Compendium of Paradoxical Sentences"
> is not true.
>
> So, the conclusion of our argument is itself a paradoxical sentence.
> So if we adopt the general principles that paradoxical sentences
> are not meaningful, and meaningless sentences are not true, then
> that allows us to *prove* a meaningless sentence.
What you have proven is just that you have something against me
personally. And public time to waste.
> This shows that we *can't* accept LudovicoVan's general principles
> as valid, because valid principles should always produce true
> conclusions from true assumptions.
"My" principle is not mine at all: I'd rather suggest you have some
reading *oustide* the strict domain of _mainstream_ _mathematical_
logic, where you cannot distinguish between inconsistency and falsity:
~a&a <=> _|_.
Have a nice day, moron.
-LV
Newberry
wrote:
But this is not the first sentence, this is the fifth sentence. 1 is
not true. 5 is true.
Newberry
wrote:
But it IS the very sentence that is being referre to.
Don Stockbauer
> On Jan 31, 12:19 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Jan 31, 12:27 pm, Don Stockbauer <donstockba...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Jan 30, 7:00 pm, "Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)
>
> > > ho...@yahoo.co> wrote:
> > > > "Scott H" <nospam> wrote in message
>
> > > >news:7oOdnaPPPI3jCx7U...@supernews.com...
>
This thread is false.
John Jones
> I would love to see the article _The Liar Lied_ from Philosophy Now!
> Magazine printed online, if legally possible.
>
> Is anyone acquainted with Lefebvre and Schelein's argument?
>
> I'm also reading here that Wittgenstein thought the liar paradox was a
> "useless language game ... so why should anyone be excited?" He is also
> famous for having said, "Whereof one cannot speak; thereof one must remain
> silent." Is it possible that he regarded the question of the truth value of
> the liar statement unanswerable in this way?
>
The useless language game of the liar paradox is when we think a
statement can place its own position on the page it is written on -
'this statement...'.
Don Stockbauer
Makes one believe in a Creator.
bigfl...@gmail.com
The details may be different, but the point is clear.
BOfL
bigfl...@gmail.com
I see...THATS why you would say such a thing.
My language is polluting YOUR world.
Then Im still on track.
>
> <*cue dog barking>
>
> HTHelps.
>
> *terminator 1
Fascinating. So an idiot is a phoney. Is that a phoney idiot, or an
authentic one?
Im sure you must be conversant with such information.
BOfL
bigfl...@gmail.com
> bigflet...@gmail.com wrote:
> > On Jan 31, 11:06 am, "Scott H" <nospam> wrote:
> >> Are certain forms of abstract art 'useless'? How do you judge
> >> uselessness?
>
> > I dont. To do so is useless.
>
Not if it evoked a response ;-)
>
> > I dont have a 'current lack of empathy'.
>
> I'm referring to humanity as a whole.
So Im not part of humanity?
BOfL
bigfl...@gmail.com
That could just as easily read "the knowledge of complete mathematical
thought".
Thought is not knowledge.Thoughts, lIke locus of a point that becomes
eternally closer to the base line, never connect.
This is why Pythagoras reacted in the way he did to 'the square root
of 2' student. It opened the world of 'math for maths sake', and
diverted from the real meaning, being symbolic of the true nature of
man.
Similar to Socrates response to Plato. The start of the age of
'disenlightenment'.
BOfL
bigfl...@gmail.com
Can become convoluted in English . Imay have a greater physical length
than you , but you stand much taller than I in this community.
(Hope that confuses it a bit :-)
BOfL
Nam Nguyen
We should be humble in our desire for knowledge: only God could have
complete knowledge of current mathematics!
--
"To discover the proper approach to mathematical logic,
we must therefore examine the methods of the mathematician."
(Shoenfield, "Mathematical Logic")
Scott H
That is the Fallacy of Division.
Giga
"Don Stockbauer" <donsto...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:383be919-cd6d-4293...@a39g2000prl.googlegroups.com...
On Jan 30, 7:00 pm, "Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)
ho...@yahoo.co> wrote:
> "Scott H" <nospam> wrote in message
>
> news:7oOdnaPPPI3jCx7U...@supernews.com...
>
> >Magazine printed online, if legally possible.
>
> > Is anyone acquainted with Lefebvre and Schelein's argument?
>
> > I'm also reading here that Wittgenstein thought the liar paradox was a
> > "useless language game ... so why should anyone be excited?" He is also
> > famous for having said, "Whereof one cannot speak; thereof one must
> > remain
> > silent." Is it possible that he regarded the question of the truth value
> > of the liar statement unanswerable in this way?
>
> not what language was developed for. It is to reference to other things
> than
> itself. Maybe LW thought it was a silly language game, to get language to
> refer to itself.
>
>
Self-reference in and of itself is not the problem. (The sentence "I
am going to the store" is perfetly useful
>Yes but this sentence refers to the person speaking it, rather than to
>itself, which is what I meant by self-referencing in this case.
). It's that the sentence
"This sentence is false" is meaningless. Go up to someone and utter
it and see how they react.
>Depends if they are interested in philosophy or not : ) It could almost be
>a code word for the Secret Society of Philosophers! : )
Also, it's indefinite as to which sentence
is being referred to . The referent is not necessarily the sentence
itself; it's ambiguous.
>That is very true. I almost think you may of cracked it! Why should we
>assume the reference is the sentence itself and not another sentence???
Giga
This thread is false.
Lol
LauLuna
> However, you are
> casting bait into a well-fed pool. If you catch something, then perhaps
> you and the fish-who-cannot-feed-himself can have a useful conversation
> as long as you lie to it, and it lies to you.
That bait, how does it taste?
LauLuna
> On Jan 30, 7:00 pm, "Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)
>
>
>
>
>
> ho...@yahoo.co> wrote:
> > "Scott H" <nospam> wrote in message
>
> >news:7oOdnaPPPI3jCx7U...@supernews.com...
>
> > >Magazine printed online, if legally possible.
>
> > > Is anyone acquainted with Lefebvre and Schelein's argument?
>
> > > I'm also reading here that Wittgenstein thought the liar paradox was a
> > > "useless language game ... so why should anyone be excited?" He is also
> > > famous for having said, "Whereof one cannot speak; thereof one must remain
> > > silent." Is it possible that he regarded the question of the truth value
> > > of the liar statement unanswerable in this way?
>
> > It is a self-referencing statement, i.e. a sentence about itself, this is
> > not what language was developed for. It is to reference to other things than
> > itself. Maybe LW thought it was a silly language game, to get language to
> > refer to itself.
>
> Self-reference in and of itself is not the problem. (The sentence "I
> "This sentence is false" is meaningless. Go up to someone and utter
> it and see how they react.
THat is no strict sense self-reference. Strict sense self-reference
would be a proposition referring to itself, for example. If the Liar
expressed a proposition p, p would be self-referential. No proposition
is self-referential, though a proposition can refer to the sentence
that expresses it; sentence/proposition distinction is essential here;
sentences are just syntactic objects whereas propositions are semantic
objects. Hence the Liar expresses no proposition.
> Also, it's indefinite as to which sentence
> is being referred to .
No. The sentence is clearly specified. The problem is that the Liar
would have to refer not just to a sentence but to a propsoition, since
only propositions (as semantic objects) can be true/false. Sentences
(as merely syntactic objects )cannot.
Regards
Don Stockbauer
Baity. Self-referentially.
Don Stockbauer
ho...@yahoo.co> wrote:
> "Don Stockbauer" <donstockba...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
So ------- "almost cracked it". Help us all out by cracking it fully!
Don Stockbauer
As H.L. Mencken used to say, "You may be right."
Giga
I almost think you may of cracked it! Was what I said.
I am still thinking.
Herbert Newman
>
> ... since only propositions (as semantic objects) can be true/false.
> Sentences (as merely syntactic objects) cannot.
>
Idiot. You really are an asshole full of shit.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The predicate "true" is sometimes used to refer to psychological phenomena
such as judgments or beliefs, sometimes to certain physical objects,
namely, linguistic expressions and specifically sentences, and sometimes to
certain ideal entities called "propositions." By "sentence" we understand
here what is usually meant in grammar by "declarative sentence"; as regards
the term "proposition," its meaning is notoriously a subject of lengthy
disputations by various philosophers and logicians, and it seems never to
have been made quite clear and unambiguous. For several reasons it appears
most convenient to /apply the term "true" to sentences/, and we shall
follow this course.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Alfred Tarski, THE SEMANTIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF SEMANTICS, 1944.
(http://www.crumpled.com/cp/classics/tarski.html)
Herb
LudovicoVan
> On Sun, 1 Feb 2009 01:26:50 -0800 (PST), LauLuna wrote:
>
> > ... since only propositions (as semantic objects) can be true/false.
> > Sentences (as merely syntactic objects) cannot.
>
> Idiot. You really are an asshole full of shit.
Idiot? Strawson puts it in terms of sentences vs. statements (or
assertions), while even Tarsky, in the article you mention, talks
about (assertable) sentences vs. expressions in general: for instance,
<< we must set up criteria for distinguishing within the class of
expressions those which we call "sentences." >> There is in fact
nothing in the quote below (and in the article) that contradicts what
LauLuna is saying. So, he is quite right, and you, at best, are
pointlessly cavilling on terminology.
-LV
Scott H
Newberry
I do not know if it is necesry to believe in propositions. Gaifman
does not make propositions necessary for his system to work. We can
say that the sentence tokens are the truth bearers.
http://www.columbia.edu/~hg17/gaifman6.pdf
The token "this sentence is false" is meaningless and it also refers
to itself. Gaifman defines meaning as a procedure for determing the
truth, and a token may or may not express a proposition. This is his
terminology (even though it seems to contradict his assertion that
nothin in his system hinges on propositions.) Instead of the term
"expresses a proposition" I think it is more natural to say
"meaningful." Yet there is a procedure to determine that the sentence
token is meaningless, and it is meaningless is precisely because it
refers to itself. If the semantics is non-compositional then a
sentence can have a definite subject and predicate and yet be
meaningless.
Giga
"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)ho...@yahoo.co> wrote in message
news:OtudnTsSFOm9PRjU...@giganews.com...
This sentence, you are reading right now, is not true.
Don Stockbauer
I almost think that you almost have a chance of success.
Jesse F. Hughes
> On Sun, 1 Feb 2009 01:26:50 -0800 (PST), LauLuna wrote:
>
>>
>> ... since only propositions (as semantic objects) can be true/false.
>> Sentences (as merely syntactic objects) cannot.
>>
> Idiot. You really are an asshole full of shit.
Look, the position of George Greene has been filled and the current GG
shows no indication of retiring. You'll have to find some other
schtick.
By the way, a REAL master of the GEORGE GREENE school of emotive logic
knows how to use the CAPS LOCK key. (I'm sure I got it wrong there,
since I'm a mere amateur.)
--
Jesse F. Hughes
"Intelligence. Nothing has caused the human race so much trouble as
intelligence. Hmph. Modern marriage." -- Hitchcock's _Rear Window_
LauLuna
> I would love to see the article _The Liar Lied_ from Philosophy Now!
> Magazine printed online, if legally possible.
>
> Is anyone acquainted with Lefebvre and Schelein's argument?
>
> I'm also reading here that Wittgenstein thought the liar paradox was a
> "useless language game ... so why should anyone be excited?" He is also
> famous for having said, "Whereof one cannot speak; thereof one must remain
> silent." Is it possible that he regarded the question of the truth value of
> the liar statement unanswerable in this way?
>
> There are two extremes of beauty in the universe. One is the abhorrent lack
> of empathy among conscious beings, and the other is the splendor of orderly
> perfection in the laws of nature.
There is a line of thought arguing for the falsity of the Liar
sentence in the following way. Roughly, some deflationist theories of
truth state that p and 'p is true' are the same to the degree that
whenever you state p, you also state 'p is true'. Call L the
(Strengthened) Liar sentence L = L is not true. L (seemingly) states
'L is not true' but then it, trivially, also states L, then it also
states 'L is true'. Hence it states 'L is not true' and 'L is true'.
Therefore L states a contradiction.ASince all contradictions are
false, L is false.
This is the way Prior proceeded and I think Lefebvre and Schelein
follow him in the essential.
Ketland has pointed out some difficulties in deflationist theories of
truth that might counter this interpretation. Namely. the axioms of
Peano arithmetic are not logically equivalent to the proposition 'the
axioms of Peano arithmetic are true'. The consistency of Peano
arithmetic is not a logical consequence of its axioms but it is indeed
a logical consequence of 'the axioms of Peano arithmetic are true'.
Regards
Tim
<bigfl...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:b1125a82-83d1-4e1b...@w24g2000prd.googlegroups.com...
BOfL
--------------------------------------
That doesn't confuse the issue one bit. You are simply using taller in two
different senses and are thereby equivocating.
Giga
Thank you (I think).
Don Stockbauer
"I don't think anymore." POOF! I'm gone. (A stolen Rene Descartes
joke).
Errol
ho...@yahoo.co> wrote:
>
> This sentence, you are reading right now, is not true.
>
It is false because I didn't read it and the statement says it false,
therefore (drum roll) it is false that it is false, and therefore is
true. On the other hand, if it is true, then I must have read it and I
am pretty sure i didn't. oh shit, sod this for a lark. DH was
right :-)
Herbert Newman
>>>
>>> ... since only propositions (as semantic objects) can be true/false.
>>> Sentences (as merely syntactic objects) cannot.
>>>
>> Idiot. [...]
>>
> Idiot?
>
Yes, idiot. And YOU are an even bigger one.
Herb
Herbert Newman
>
> There is a line of thought arguing for the falsity of the Liar
> sentence in the following way. [Bla bla bla].
>
Hey, asshole, in some other post you claimed that a _sentence_ can't be
true/false, only propositions could.
Quote:
"... since only propositions (as semantic objects) can be true/false.
Sentences (as merely syntactic objects) cannot." (LauLuna)
Problems with your short term memory, or just no brain?
Herb
Herbert Newman
> Herbert Newman <nomail@invalid> writes:
>>
>> Idiot. You really are an asshole full of shit.
>>
> Look, the position of George Greene has been filled and the current GG
> shows no indication of retiring. You'll have to find some other
> schtick.
>
Well, ...you are quite right... but I just couldn't resist. Sorry.
Herb
Scott H
> On Feb 2, 2:36 am, "Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)
> ho...@yahoo.co> wrote:
>> This sentence, you are reading right now, is not true.
>>
> It is false because I didn't read it and the statement says it false,
> therefore (drum roll) it is false that it is false, and therefore is
> true.
But if your reading the sentence is conjoined to the sentence's falsehood by
the 'and' relation, then the sentence is false anyway!
Giga
"Errol" <vs.e...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:94d24804-e2cd-49ea...@s1g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
: )
Newberry
There is another problem. Actually if P is meaningless then P & ~P is
also meaningless. That P is meaningfull has yet to be established.
That will be hard to do considering that the attempt to compare the
Liar sentence with reality gets us in an infinite loop.