Open Letter to Professor Penrose
grys...@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
: Lamont Granquist (lam...@u.washington.edu) wrote:
: >I think he develops something interesting in that he provides a
: >basis for what function non-computability in consciousness could
: >provide and why it would be selected for by evolution. Basically, to
: >be able to break out of _any_ arbitrary looping pattern requires
: >non-computability (Penrose mentions this kinda quickly in _SotM_).
: I came up with a similar conclusion three years ago, which I put in a
: article for a local ACM newsletter. But my conclusion was essentially
: based on what Hofstadter wrote in G"odel, Escher, Bach. I believe he
: also implies similar things all through the book.
: If you assume breaking out of "Strange Loops" (as defined by
: Hofstadter) is naturally selected for, and it is an important feature of
: consciousness, then you can see (in an hand-waving manner) how it
: could arise. It's also I think reasonably clear how breaking out of
: loops could be an evolutionary advantage.
Yes I believe that it is, and that the mechanism, is sort of a monitor
that determines the change in the nature of the data at each step in the
process, and stops the process when the data quits changing enough, or
alternately, when it finds itself dealing with the same data in exactly
the same way, too often. This of course requires that ability to recognize
data that is the same as a previous version which involves a sort of logging
effect or long term memory.
: I prefer the G"odelian
: argument for saying that there can't be a neat logical system that
: leads to consciousness.
here I find I am ambivalent, in that I believe that Logic is the wrong
mechanism, but I do not believe that the system cannot be neat in a sort
of Fuzzy and Statistically Determinable manner.
: Anyways, my goal then (and motivation now) was to come up with a
: simulation of an intelligent system (like the human brain). My theory
: is that if you can reproduce or simulate how the human brain (or
: entire body, if you will) functions at some microscopic level, it
: would ultimately lead to sentience. I don't believe macroscopic
: approaches like Neural Nets will do the trick.
Ah, I think you have swallowed the assumption that a Neural Network
is functionally similar to a Neuron, and therefore Macroscopic. The
present state of the art collapses three or four layers of Hebbian Neurons
into a single cell, which must make it to some extent, a model of something
more microscopic, in that the Neural functions must coexist with a living
cell, and are only secondary to the life of that cell.
: I think we understand some of the microscopic details of how the brain
: functions to implement this simulation. However, there are a lot of
: issues that we don't understand, and one of them is the process of
: protein folding (or how to go from amino acid to protein structure),
: which is what I'm working on.
OK, I'll buy that, and it might have something to do with cellular
intelligence, but I question that we need that level of sophistication
to explain the function of the Brain, since much of its ability can be
explained with out resorting to DNA/RNA/Protein Folding
While my Models are not exactly being raved about, I am working with
neural level models of brain function that explain real problems that seem
to occur in a segment of the population. I don't need proton folding for this
but I recently had to accept the role of genetics in defining the efficiency
of Dopamine Transport through errors in the formation of Vesicles that
transport Dopamine to its work areas.
The Neuron Model was not perturbed by this, but the mechanism for the
inefficiency of the Neuron, was changed from being an imballance to being
a supply problem caused by an inefficient transport mechanism, and thus
causing an imballance under load. Perhaps we need protein folding to say
why the error creates smaller vessicles, or something, but not to describe
why, when the neuron does not get enough NT, it does not work correctly.
I think Neural Networks are a valid approach, if you throw away some
unfortuneate assumptions that are taken as gospel.
Grey
--
GRAEME SMITH email: grys...@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
2536 138A ave Edmonton
Ram Samudrala
>I think he develops something interesting in that he provides a
>basis for what function non-computability in consciousness could
>provide and why it would be selected for by evolution. Basically, to
>be able to break out of _any_ arbitrary looping pattern requires
>non-computability (Penrose mentions this kinda quickly in _SotM_).
I came up with a similar conclusion three years ago, which I put in a
article for a local ACM newsletter. But my conclusion was essentially
based on what Hofstadter wrote in G"odel, Escher, Bach. I believe he
also implies similar things all through the book.
If you assume breaking out of "Strange Loops" (as defined by
Hofstadter) is naturally selected for, and it is an important feature of
consciousness, then you can see (in an hand-waving manner) how it
could arise. It's also I think reasonably clear how breaking out of
loops could be an evolutionary advantage.
I wrote this article as an undergraduate and I'm going to expose
myself to ridicule by posting the URL of the HTML converted document
here:
http://www.ram.org/ramblings/dream/titlepage.html.
I've not really worked on it since May, 1993 and there are a lot of
things there I have changed opinions on (i.e., I've learnt more since
then), but the basic philosophy is the same. The section on
philosophical issues might be of interest. I prefer the G"odelian
argument for saying that there can't be a neat logical system that
leads to consciousness.
Anyways, my goal then (and motivation now) was to come up with a
simulation of an intelligent system (like the human brain). My theory
is that if you can reproduce or simulate how the human brain (or
entire body, if you will) functions at some microscopic level, it
would ultimately lead to sentience. I don't believe macroscopic
approaches like Neural Nets will do the trick.
I think we understand some of the microscopic details of how the brain
functions to implement this simulation. However, there are a lot of
issues that we don't understand, and one of them is the process of
protein folding (or how to go from amino acid to protein structure),
which is what I'm working on.
--Ram
m...@ram.org || http://www.ram.org || http://www.twisted-helices.com/th
Hey! Aren't you scared of me Christ? Mr. Wonderful Christ! You're a
joke, you're not the Lord, you are nothing but a fraud. Take him away
he's got nothing to say! ---King Herod in Jesus Chris Superstar
Ram Samudrala
>here I find I am ambivalent, in that I believe that Logic is the
>wrong mechanism, but I do not believe that the system cannot be neat
>in a sort of Fuzzy and Statistically Determinable manner.
Right. You can have a fuzzy heuristic, which can also be considered
"algorithmic", and so I find the comments about there being a
non-algorithmic solution a bit confusing.
>Ah, I think you have swallowed the assumption that a Neural Network
>is functionally similar to a Neuron, and therefore Macroscopic.
Actually, I'm assuming that a neural network is similar to the brain.
That is, the neural interconnections of the brain are arranged in some
form of a network and there is some rough similarity between that
network and the various sorts of self-adapting pattern recognition
systems that we simulate.
>OK, I'll buy that, and it might have something to do with cellular
>intelligence, but I question that we need that level of sophistication
>to explain the function of the Brain, since much of its ability can be
>explained with out resorting to DNA/RNA/Protein Folding
This where I fundamentally disagree. At the extreme, I think detail
at an atomic level is necessary. In most cases (for example, with the
genetic code) that can be ignored when you can obtain a very good
approximation by other means. One could (assuming one had a powerful
computer and one were very clever) could simulate all the molecules
necessary to translate DNA into RNA at an atomic level. However, this
can be done at a higher level, treating a molecule of DNA as a string
of characters and using biological knowledge.
>While my Models are not exactly being raved about, I am working with
>neural level models of brain function that explain real problems that
>seem to occur in a segment of the population. I don't need proton
>folding for this but I recently had to accept the role of genetics in
>defining the efficiency of Dopamine Transport through errors in the
>formation of Vesicles that transport Dopamine to its work areas.
Well, the "role of genetics" in your case is determined mostly by the
proteins involved in the transport and the interactions they make with
other proteins and substrates. The interactions they make is
dependent on their three-dimensional structure. So you know the genes
involved in the process, and thanks to Khorana, from the genes you can
in an instant obtain the amino acid sequences of the proteins
involved, but you don't know their structure. If you accept that the
role of genetics is important in regulation and transport (which it
is), then you also have to worry about proteins. Perhaps you can make
one big leap from amino acid sequence to protein function (skipping
structure), but I doubt this is possible.
I'm fairly convinced you need to stick to the level of proteins mainly
because they are what that do the job in real life. Further, there's
something about doing it from the genetic level (it's a bottom-up
approach) that appeals to me. We have 3 x 10^9 base pairs of DNA in
each cell. This DNA has a lot redundancy and extraneous material, but
in a single zygote, it has all the information encoded in it to give
rise to a complete human being. Now, consider simulating a human
being as a top down process right down to the DNA level. I can't even
conceive how I'd go about doing this. However, your entire genome can
be stored in a space of 1500 MB (using 2 bits per base, if my
calulations are right). Probably a lot less, since you can eliminate
some of the extraneous bits. Now, if you encode in the processes of
replication, transcription, translation, and protein
structure-function in a program, all you need to do is just through
everything together and if you've done things right, it will lead a
human being. Now, all you've done is specify the basic rules for how
these molecules interact (which are essentially based on physics, and
can be approximated with the help of biological research), and you'll
never "understand" how it leads to a human being (far too complex),
but if you have the space and computing resources, it will lead to one
starting from a /single cell/. (So all you have to do is specify one
cell.)
>Perhaps we need protein folding to say why the error creates smaller
>vessicles, or something, but not to describe why, when the neuron does
>not get enough NT, it does not work correctly.
In real life, if this were the case (that the neuron doesn't work
correctly), then it would be due to something that proteins are doing
(or not doing) that would lead to this.
What I'm saying is that in real life, everything essentially happens
at the protein level. Further, I don't think it's possible to program
your system to do something specific (in a top down manner). The way
it all works is dependent on the concentration of molecules and other
thermodynamic and kinetic considerations. I don't think we'll ever
understand how it works in a direct sense, but I think we should just
through the whole thing together in a bowl of soup with a bunch of
bottom-up rules and see what happens.
What I'm also proposing is a neural network---I just propose
constructing the neurons, at a high level of detail, from scratch
(including the process of differentiation from a single cell) and
letting them form their own network.
--Ram
Unfortunately people are not rebelling against Microsoft.
They don't know any better. ---Steve Jobs
Johan Wevers
>But we are more than so much machinery, we are conscious.
Then tell me what conciousness is. I think it's just a name we gave to
an organizing and controlling furnction of our brain.
--
ir. J.C.A. Wevers || The only nature of reality is physics.
joh...@vulcan.xs4all.nl || http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/index.html
Finger joh...@xs4all.nl for my PGP public key. PGP-KeyID: 0xD42F80B1
daan Strebe
> Lamont Granquist (lam...@u.washington.edu) wrote:
>
> >I think he develops something interesting in that he provides a
> >basis for what function non-computability in consciousness could
> >provide and why it would be selected for by evolution. Basically, to
> >be able to break out of _any_ arbitrary looping pattern requires
> >non-computability (Penrose mentions this kinda quickly in _SotM_).
>
> I came up with a similar conclusion three years ago, which I put in a
> article for a local ACM newsletter. But my conclusion was essentially
> based on what Hofstadter wrote in G"odel, Escher, Bach. I believe he
> also implies similar things all through the book.
>
> If you assume breaking out of "Strange Loops" (as defined by
> Hofstadter) is naturally selected for, and it is an important feature of
> consciousness, then you can see (in an hand-waving manner) how it
> could arise. It's also I think reasonably clear how breaking out of
> loops could be an evolutionary advantage.
>
Mr. Hofstadter is a vehement proponent of strong AI, and very much at odds
with Penrose on this matter. He most certainly does not think that
consciousness is non-algorithmic. I could find references if necessary.
daan
Ram Samudrala
>Mr. Hofstadter is a vehement proponent of strong AI, and very much at odds
>with Penrose on this matter. He most certainly does not think that
>consciousness is non-algorithmic. I could find references if necessary.
I did not say (or imply) that Hofstadter thought consciousness is
non-algorithmic.
I was comparing Penrose's argument that consciousness is naturally
selected for, and the idea that the ability to jump out of Strange
Loops is a major feature of consciousness, and this ability could've
been naturally selected for (thus leading to consciousness). The idea
that jumping out of Strange Loops is an important feature of
consciousness is something I got out of Hofstadter (don't know if he
says it explicitly) and the fact that it could be evolutionarily
advantageous is fairly obvious. Penrose, I think, believes a similar
thing, mainly because his examples of calculational behaviour that a
computer fails at relies on its inability to jump out of loops: "Find
the smallest odd number that is the sum of n even numbers." Clearly
you and I have the ability to realise that this isn't possible, and
Penrose argues that we use a "non-calculational" procedure to do
this.
But I find Penrose's position vague. As I understand it, he doesn't
believe in an "calculational" solution (i.e., something that cannot be
performed by a Turing machine), whereas he doesn't discount a system
with "random ingredients". I quote from his essay on Mathematical
Intelligence (which originated from one of the Darwin College
Lectures):
"What about random ingredients? Would they count as
'non-calculational'? In the sense that a strict Turing machine does
not allow for such ingredients, their inclusion would, indeed, take us
out of calculational activity."
So Penrose (in this essay at least), does think a "calculation" with
"random ingredients" might work. But then he goes on to say something
about the fact that it's not practical. Penrose assumes his
calculational procedure "never makes mistakes." This is an
unwarranted assumption. I'm not saying you should program a computer
to make mistakes, but there exist ways of having "mistakes" happen in
your simulation.
But in our brains and in our bodies, there are certainly "random
ingredients" and "mistakes" (mutations being one example, but there
are probably quantum effects and other things we've not discovered
yet). How these arise is one issue. Whether these can be simulated
is another. But there's probably some element of "randomness" (not
pseudo-randomness, since that just boils down to a calculational
procedure) that is necessary in your simulation in order to make this
all work.
--Ram
Instead of inanely repeating the old formula "respect the law," we say,
"Despise law and all its attributes!" In place of the cowardly phrase
"Obey the law," our cry is "Revolt against all laws!" --Peter Kropotkin
Johan Wevers
>Yes I believe that it is, and that the mechanism, is sort of a monitor
>that determines the change in the nature of the data at each step in the
>process, and stops the process when the data quits changing enough, or
>alternately, when it finds itself dealing with the same data in exactly
>the same way, too often.
I would say tht this is a quite common stop criterium in numerical
calculations. I used this technique myself in a numerical model that was
programmed in pascal so it's just an algorithm. This could easilly be
implemented in hardware with a simple opamp circuit.
Dan Hankins
: But in our brains and in our bodies, there are certainly "random
: ingredients" and "mistakes" (mutations being one example, but there
: are probably quantum effects and other things we've not discovered
: yet). How these arise is one issue. Whether these can be simulated
: is another. But there's probably some element of "randomness" (not
: pseudo-randomness, since that just boils down to a calculational
: procedure) that is necessary in your simulation in order to make this
: all work.
You've forgotten the two largest sources of novel inputs (you don't need
randomness, just novelty):
- Time sense
- The five senses
Being connected to the outer world, either by sense of time or {sight,
hearing, taste, smell, touch} or both, is sufficient to break a "turing
machine" out of any "Goedelian loop" it might get into.
(Goedel's Theorem is really just a fancy way of proving that you can't
prove everything deductively from first principles; you have to open your
eyes and take a look around once in a while.)
Dan Hankins
dhan...@gate.net
Brian J. Ritzel
: Joel Katz <stim...@panix.com> wrote:
: >But we are more than so much machinery, we are conscious.
: Then tell me what conciousness is. I think it's just a name we gave to
: an organizing and controlling furnction of our brain.
Exactly. I don't quite understand the obsession in AI with
consciousness. True, it should be studied and appropriate models
developed to emulate it, and I understand that that is not trivial.
However, I find a much more interesting question to be how to model "free
will"--if it indeed exists! I can imagine mechanisms that lead to
consciousness, but I am totally at a loss to imagine anything that
could give rise to true "free will."
Of course, if the standard AI definition of consciousness incorporates
"free will", kindly ignor the above. :-)
2 cents from a non-expert,
-Bri
: --
: ir. J.C.A. Wevers || The only nature of reality is physics.
: joh...@vulcan.xs4all.nl || http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/index.html
: Finger joh...@xs4all.nl for my PGP public key. PGP-KeyID: 0xD42F80B1
--
Brian Jay Ritzel
Urbana, IL USA
rit...@prairienet.org
Copyright (c) 1995
Tim Hollebeek
Brian J. Ritzel <rit...@prairienet.org> wrote:
>Johan Wevers (joh...@vulcan.xs4all.nl) wrote:
>: Joel Katz <stim...@panix.com> wrote:
>
>: >But we are more than so much machinery, we are conscious.
>
>: Then tell me what conciousness is. I think it's just a name we gave to
>: an organizing and controlling furnction of our brain.
>
>Exactly. I don't quite understand the obsession in AI with
>consciousness. True, it should be studied and appropriate models
>developed to emulate it, and I understand that that is not trivial.
>
>However, I find a much more interesting question to be how to model "free
>will"--if it indeed exists! I can imagine mechanisms that lead to
>consciousness, but I am totally at a loss to imagine anything that
>could give rise to true "free will."
Well, if you read his sig, it's obvious what his answer is:
>: ir. J.C.A. Wevers || The only nature of reality is physics.
Which implies that there is no free will, since the world can be
explained entirely in terms of physics. I.e. what you think you
do freely really can (in theory) be explained in terms of the
physics of your brain.
Of course, that's a philosophical position, not a scientific one.
Newton thought the world was completely deterministic; quantum
mechanics says it isn't. Who knows what the next theory will say
on this subject.
If you are a reductionist, and insist on reducing everything to
physics, then quantum mechanics is an attractive way to explain the
unexplainable.
--
Tim Hollebeek | Everything above is a true statement, for sufficiently
PChem Grad Student | false values of true.
Princeton Univ. | t...@wfn-shop.princeton.edu
-------------------| http://wfn-shop.princeton.edu/~tim
grys...@fn1.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
: grys...@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca wrote:
: >here I find I am ambivalent, in that I believe that Logic is the
: >wrong mechanism, but I do not believe that the system cannot be neat
: >in a sort of Fuzzy and Statistically Determinable manner.
: Right. You can have a fuzzy heuristic, which can also be considered
: "algorithmic", and so I find the comments about there being a
: non-algorithmic solution a bit confusing.
Well I for one can't concieve of a non-algorythmic solution to inteligence
I think the problem is that Godelization is confusing the issue, and making
people question the wrong things.
: >Ah, I think you have swallowed the assumption that a Neural Network
: >is functionally similar to a Neuron, and therefore Macroscopic.
: Actually, I'm assuming that a neural network is similar to the brain.
: That is, the neural interconnections of the brain are arranged in some
: form of a network and there is some rough similarity between that
: network and the various sorts of self-adapting pattern recognition
: systems that we simulate.
Ah, well in an sense that is true in that the brain is made up of such
biological entities as neurons, but I think you are missing the level of
complexity possible when you design a system around some billions of neurons
and include multiple Networks Interfacing to each other.
: >OK, I'll buy that, and it might have something to do with cellular
: >intelligence, but I question that we need that level of sophistication
: >to explain the function of the Brain, since much of its ability can be
: >explained with out resorting to DNA/RNA/Protein Folding
: This where I fundamentally disagree. At the extreme, I think detail
: at an atomic level is necessary. In most cases (for example, with the
: genetic code) that can be ignored when you can obtain a very good
: approximation by other means.
Which we now have.
: One could (assuming one had a powerful
: computer and one were very clever) could simulate all the molecules
: necessary to translate DNA into RNA at an atomic level. However, this
: can be done at a higher level, treating a molecule of DNA as a string
: of characters and using biological knowledge.
No question that that is possible and perhaps even desireable, what my
question is, is it necessary to define a system that is "Intelligent",
Personally I believe that it isn't necessary, just ultimately desireable.
This then can be seen as a point of contention between us. It does not
need to be resolved, since we are at least right now, not in a place to
affect each others research at the funding level. (I have no funding, and
no clout with your financial support network).
: >While my Models are not exactly being raved about, I am working with
: >neural level models of brain function that explain real problems that
: >seem to occur in a segment of the population. I don't need proton
: >folding for this but I recently had to accept the role of genetics in
: >defining the efficiency of Dopamine Transport through errors in the
: >formation of Vesicles that transport Dopamine to its work areas.
: Well, the "role of genetics" in your case is determined mostly by the
: proteins involved in the transport and the interactions they make with
: other proteins and substrates. The interactions they make is
: dependent on their three-dimensional structure. So you know the genes
: involved in the process, and thanks to Khorana, from the genes you can
: in an instant obtain the amino acid sequences of the proteins
: involved, but you don't know their structure. If you accept that the
: role of genetics is important in regulation and transport (which it
: is), then you also have to worry about proteins. Perhaps you can make
: one big leap from amino acid sequence to protein function (skipping
: structure), but I doubt this is possible.
I don't see it as my role to research protien function, I am more interested
in neural function. While my model relies on an understanding of the roles
that the proteins play in the neuron, most of the detail can be fuzzified
because it does not affect the function of the Neuron as a whole. Thus while
I again say that your research might be valuable and desireable, I do not
see it as necessary to my own level of work. I think it will be possible
to define a model of brain function at an even higher level than that of
protein-folding despite the fact that all of life itself depends on that
technique.
: I'm fairly convinced you need to stick to the level of proteins mainly
: because they are what that do the job in real life.
A chemist seldom worries about Quarks, (And when they do, the Physicists
get angry).
A Metalurgist seldome worries about atoms that are not metalic.
or have not shown to be improvers of strength.
An Engineer seldom worries about atoms they are much to worried about
stress and strain.
A Machinist seldome worries about stress and strain, they are much to
worried about tolerances.
A Mechanic seldome worries about Machining being much to busy trying to
Tune, and Adjust the results of machining so that they work despite
tolerances and general wear and tear caused by the stress and strain,
on the product of the Metalurgists Alloy, as designed by the Engineer
and changed by the natural chemical processes that the chemist understands.
So while I could design a car as a physicist, there seem to be a few too many
roles other than my own that I would need to take on, if I were to have to
maintain it afterwards. Scope is the problem, and Specialization is the
solution.
(I am not a physicist, by the way, that was an analogy).
: Further, there's
: something about doing it from the genetic level (it's a bottom-up
: approach) that appeals to me.
Well it is artistic, complete, and totally unnecessary.
: We have 3 x 10^9 base pairs of DNA in
: each cell. This DNA has a lot redundancy and extraneous material, but
: in a single zygote, it has all the information encoded in it to give
: rise to a complete human being. Now, consider simulating a human
: being as a top down process right down to the DNA level. I can't even
: conceive how I'd go about doing this.
Personally I prefer a system Oscillating between bottom up and top down
where advances in either direction can be cross fertilized with advances
in the opposite direction to fill in the gaping hole in the middle.
I may have been forced to create a bottom up theory of the Universe, but
that was because none of the existing theories met my needs.
: However, your entire genome can
: be stored in a space of 1500 MB (using 2 bits per base, if my
: calulations are right). Probably a lot less, since you can eliminate
: some of the extraneous bits. Now, if you encode in the processes of
: replication, transcription, translation, and protein
: structure-function in a program, all you need to do is just through
: everything together and if you've done things right, it will lead a
: human being.
Well I think you are missing a few things like time based development,
but I will agree that the basics of genetics are rather simple, its the
combinatrics that come from them that make it such a complex thing to learn.
: Now, all you've done is specify the basic rules for how
: these molecules interact (which are essentially based on physics, and
: can be approximated with the help of biological research), and you'll
: never "understand" how it leads to a human being (far too complex),
that is where I come in, you see, I can help build bridges between the
little pieces and the functions they perform. For instance most people
when they look at Neural Network Formulas see, the Math, but some of us
see the cells that the math is trying to describe, and see how the math
is trying to describe them. Most people cannot go from a three or four
layer network to an understanding of how a cortex, or an executive function
can be built out of neurons, in fact, most people don't understand my
3NT Control Neuron Model. Which is a single cell. But from these basic
fuzzy understandings, I can build models of actual mental conditions
such as ADD, that I believe contribute to the understanding of how the
brain works, and in one specific case how it fails.
: but if you have the space and computing resources, it will lead to one
: starting from a /single cell/. (So all you have to do is specify one
: cell.)
Oh I agree, I just question the assertion that we need to start there
every time, just to get the function, of intelligence. A more sparse
model should work just as well unless we NEED to know what the effect
will be at the protein level, as in trying to understand the effects
of a new pollutant.
: >Perhaps we need protein folding to say why the error creates smaller
: >vessicles, or something, but not to describe why, when the neuron does
: >not get enough NT, it does not work correctly.
: In real life, if this were the case (that the neuron doesn't work
: correctly), then it would be due to something that proteins are doing
: (or not doing) that would lead to this.
True, but so what? unless we need to know why it fails, what we really
need in ADD research is an understanding how to make it WORK again.
My Model is not designed to do that, it is designed to explain why
the function of Attention is affected by Dopamine Transport. A much more
fundamental question, to treatment with current techniques because it
dispells some more of the Myths that crop up around ADD. Until it can
be proven that ADD is Genetic in ALL cases, it merely can point a finger
at why current practice often fails to treat ADD.
: What I'm saying is that in real life, everything essentially happens
: at the protein level. Further, I don't think it's possible to program
: your system to do something specific (in a top down manner).
Well if I were relying on Top Down Only programming, I would have a problem.
Not because it is impossible to do top down to programming level, but because
Top Down does not translate easily to coding if you don't know the limits
of your code-language and tune the results of Top Down Analysis to them.
However, the real problem in Top Down Programming of Neural Networks is
in figuring out the extremely complex feedback effects. A problem that you
will find once you move into protein analysis at the cellular level.
Neural Networks work better if they are Grown than if they are programmed,
if you want something programmable, you would have to move to an intermediate
system such as my Grey-Logic, or its precursor Fuzzy Logic.
: The way
: it all works is dependent on the concentration of molecules and other
: thermodynamic and kinetic considerations. I don't think we'll ever
: understand how it works in a direct sense, but I think we should just
: through the whole thing together in a bowl of soup with a bunch of
: bottom-up rules and see what happens.
Like I said your work is important, it needs to be done, I just don't see
the need for ME to do it.
: What I'm also proposing is a neural network---I just propose
: constructing the neurons, at a high level of detail, from scratch
: (including the process of differentiation from a single cell) and
: letting them form their own network.
Like I said Neural Networks work better when they are grown, or educated in
place.
grys...@fn1.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
: daan Strebe (daans...@eWorld.com) wrote:
: But I find Penrose's position vague. As I understand it, he doesn't
: believe in an "calculational" solution (i.e., something that cannot be
: performed by a Turing machine), whereas he doesn't discount a system
: with "random ingredients". I quote from his essay on Mathematical
: Intelligence (which originated from one of the Darwin College
: Lectures):
: "What about random ingredients? Would they count as
: 'non-calculational'? In the sense that a strict Turing machine does
: not allow for such ingredients, their inclusion would, indeed, take us
: out of calculational activity."
: So Penrose (in this essay at least), does think a "calculation" with
: "random ingredients" might work. But then he goes on to say something
: about the fact that it's not practical. Penrose assumes his
: calculational procedure "never makes mistakes." This is an
: unwarranted assumption. I'm not saying you should program a computer
: to make mistakes, but there exist ways of having "mistakes" happen in
: your simulation.
Calculation with Random, or even pseudo random ingredients is possible
practical and necessary in order to reduce processing time in heavy
search tasks. The Monte-Carlo Algorythm is a good case of where the
use of randomness (or even pseudo-randomness) can result in better results
processing time wise than strict calculation of every possible outcome.
Simulated Annealing is another.
This Calculation Technique uses Topological Techniques to find the
maximum or minimum of a complex figure, and is used heavily in the
design of Micro-Chips to reduce the placement cost of each individual
circuit.
The concept of Center Surround in Neural Networks, suggests that the
brain is not above using an approximation rather than the real value
of a calculation, using the Centroid rather than the Center.
Faced with real world examples of inaccuracy in Intelligence, why do
people insist that our artificial inteligences be limited by less
effective techniques? The Inaccuracy is an efficiency gain, as long as
it doesn't result in excessive error. If we have a monitor for error
anyway, why not take on a little approximation?
Induce a little randomness, select a little more loosely, and cycle
more than once to get the right answer. Its cheaper.
Kerry Thurber
>Joel Katz <stim...@panix.com> wrote:
>
>>But we are more than so much machinery, we are conscious.
>
>Then tell me what conciousness is. I think it's just a name we gave to
>an organizing and controlling furnction of our brain.
I, for one, find myself at a loss to answer the question "what is
consciousness?" which is why I prefer not to trivialize it. If you feel like
it's trivial, go ahead and build something that's conscious. I
understand there's a lot of money in it.
David L. Elliott
maybe some (catatonic schizophenic) people can't! As to how most of us do it-
it's because unlike computers our context (the world around us) changes. No
reiterated problem presented to a human mind stays exactly the same very long.
Meanings change over time.
David
--
David L. Elliott, Vis. Sr. Res. Sci.
Institute for Systems Research/ A.V. Williams Building
University of Maryland/ College Park, MD 20742
(Prof. Emeritus, Washington University) dell...@ISR.umd.edu
Ram Samudrala
>You've forgotten the two largest sources of novel inputs (you don't need
>randomness, just novelty):
>- Time sense
>- The five senses
>Being connected to the outer world, either by sense of time or {sight,
>hearing, taste, smell, touch} or both, is sufficient to break a "turing
>machine" out of any "Goedelian loop" it might get into.
Exactly! Some of this "exposure" does lead to "randomness" (the UV
rays from the sun that cause mutations, for example). I'm surprised
that Penrose doesn't acknowledge this, even though he does say stuff
like consciousness isa product of one's environment.
Of course, how you make your simulation "connect" to the enviroment is
another issue.
--Ram
Up on my podium as the know it all scholar.
Down in my seat of judgement gavel's bang, uphold the law.
Up on my soapbox a leader out to change the world. Down in my pulpit
as the holier than-thou-could-be messenger of god! ---Megadeth
Ram Samudrala
>Well I for one can't concieve of a non-algorythmic solution to inteligence
Do you think your neural network solution will ultimately lead to
intelligence? If so, that is an algorithmic solution.
In any case, to me, this is mostly a philosophical argument. The
reason I do the research I do is motivated by a desire to see AI
happen, but people fund me to do the reseach I do because it has other
practical implications. It is one philosophy. The other approach is
to take the somewhat wholistic approach (neural networks, I think, are
one of them). By no means am I saying you should work on the folding
problem---I am saying without knowing the genetics, you can't perform
an accurate simulation of consciousness/intelligence (which I also
think go together hand in hand). <-: You, of course, disagree to that
and this is fine---the world would be a very boring place if we all
agreed. Since neither of us have really ended up creating artificial
intelligence, that's pretty much how it's going to be I guess.
The reason I claim a sparse model will not work is that it requires
assumptions about abstractions you make. These assumptions, in my
experience in ANY field, in many cases end up sacrificing information
(even the genetic code does a very slight degree). I'm a believer in
the "God is in the detail" school, coupled with a bottom-up approach
for how the "details" interact.
--Ram
God is a conjecture; but I desire that your conjectures should not reach
beyond your creative will. Could you /create/ a god? Then do not speak
to me of any gods. But you could well create the overman. ---Nietzsche
Ram Samudrala
>Calculation with Random, or even pseudo random ingredients is possible
>practical and necessary in order to reduce processing time in heavy
>search tasks. The Monte-Carlo Algorythm is a good case of where the
>use of randomness (or even pseudo-randomness) can result in better results
>processing time wise than strict calculation of every possible outcome.
Right. From a Turing machine point of view though, a Monte Carlo
procedure can simply be replaced with an exhaustive search. I believe
Penrose says (I'm at home and don't have the essay here) that anything
with pseudo-randomness is also "calculable"; that it is impractical
from a simulation of consciousness sense (not in a real-world sense).
>Faced with real world examples of inaccuracy in Intelligence, why do
>people insist that our artificial inteligences be limited by less
>effective techniques? The Inaccuracy is an efficiency gain, as long as
>it doesn't result in excessive error. If we have a monitor for error
>anyway, why not take on a little approximation?
I agree completely---"genuine inaccuracy" (i.e., inaccuracy that is
not programmed) can be introduced in a simulation, which strict Turing
Machines do not have, and which Penrose does not allow.
--Ram
I on a big Trp
/ \
| |
\ /
__/
Johan Wevers
Tim Hollebeek <t...@franck.Princeton.EDU> wrote:
>Which implies that there is no free will, since the world can be
>explained entirely in terms of physics.
That doesn't remove the "free will". Quantum fluctuations can still
happen, although it's questionable or we should call undeterminancy
by them "free will". However, if you calculate the possibility that
a quantumfluctuation will change wether a neuron "fires" or not, it
will be very small. And iot has to be, otherwise the brain would be
totally unpredictable which it certainly isn't. I don't believe in a
really free will, it just looks that way because the brain is so
complex and the interaction with the surrounding and signals from the
body makes it hard (impossible in practice) how a certain person will
react in a (usually not till the quantum levvel described) situation.
>I.e. what you think you
>do freely really can (in theory) be explained in terms of the
>physics of your brain.
>Of course, that's a philosophical position, not a scientific one.
It is a statement that can be researched and falsified, I don't see
why it could not be a possible research subject.
>Newton thought the world was completely deterministic; quantum
>mechanics says it isn't.
Well, the Bell inequalities and Aspects experiments still leave room for
a deterministic but non-local model. This, however, contradicts heavily
with relativity and therefore with quantum field theory.
>Who knows what the next theory will say on this subject.
Quantum field theory agrees. And quantum gravitation doesn't have any
measurable influence on the interactions occuring in everyday life.
>If you are a reductionist, and insist on reducing everything to
>physics, then quantum mechanics is an attractive way to explain the
>unexplainable.
Unless you start to make estimations and calculations. Then you still
come to a point where you have to decide wether you want to call a
very tiny quantum influence free will or not.
--
ir. J.C.A. Wevers || The only nature of reality is physics.
Johan Wevers
>I, for one, find myself at a loss to answer the question "what is
>consciousness?" which is why I prefer not to trivialize it. If you feel
>like it's trivial, go ahead and build something that's conscious.
To make something so complex to be able to implement such a function
requires more money than I have. And wether humans devellop something
comparable with what we call conciousness without any influence from
culture (conciousness could have been develloped during a long
cultural revolution, even with a brain that posessed the latent
capabillity) is still an open question. One of the possible things that
such a person would have difficulties with is the separation between
reality and fantasy. Perhaps our primmitive ancestors called these
people sometimes prophets, nowadays they receive psychological care.
So there's also a programming, or teaching, side on the problem. Just
building the hardware isn't enough.
Having an idea how conciousness is implemented doen't mean one is
able to build it.
>I understand there's a lot of money in it.
Why would someone pay much for a machine that will possibly start a
strike when it doesn't get enough rest? :-) And for the obvious
answer, I don't intend to produce any offspring yet.
Timothy Murphy
>I don't believe in a
>really free will, it just looks that way because the brain is so
>complex and the interaction with the surrounding and signals from the
>body makes it hard (impossible in practice) how a certain person will
>react in a (usually not till the quantum levvel described) situation.
In that case, surely your belief is pre-ordained too,
and so of little value.
--
Timothy Murphy
e-mail: t...@maths.tcd.ie
tel: +353-1-2842366
s-mail: School of Mathematics, Trinity College, Dublin 2, Ireland
Lionell Griffith
>
> Kerry Thurber <ke...@Mystech.com> wrote:
>
> >I, for one, find myself at a loss to answer the question "what is
> >consciousness?" which is why I prefer not to trivialize it. If you feel
> >like it's trivial, go ahead and build something that's conscious.
>
> To make something so complex to be able to implement such a function
> requires more money than I have. And wether humans devellop something
> comparable with what we call conciousness without any influence from
> culture (conciousness could have been develloped during a long
> cultural revolution, even with a brain that posessed the latent
> capabillity) is still an open question. One of the possible things that
> such a person would have difficulties with is the separation between
> reality and fantasy. Perhaps our primmitive ancestors called these
> people sometimes prophets, nowadays they receive psychological care.
> So there's also a programming, or teaching, side on the problem. Just
> building the hardware isn't enough.
>
> Having an idea how conciousness is implemented doen't mean one is
> able to build it.
>
This is quite like "Faith can move mountains. Oh, but I can't move
mountains because I don't have enough Faith." Either do it,
explain in detail how to do it, or shut up.
Snip...
--
Lionell
Windy Hills Ranch, Training Center, and Reading Room: http://www.av.qnet.com/~lgriffith
Ken Seto
consciousness process in my book "Model Mechanics: A New
Interpretation of Nature". For more information about Model Mechanics
please refer to my web page after Jan. 10, 1996. Address for my web
page: <http://www.erinet.com/kenseto/book.html>
Michael Seaton
: joh...@vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) writes:
: >I don't believe in a
: >really free will, it just looks that way because the brain is so
: >complex and the interaction with the surrounding and signals from the
: >body makes it hard (impossible in practice) how a certain person will
: >react in a (usually not till the quantum levvel described) situation.
: In that case, surely your belief is pre-ordained too,
: and so of little value.
Non sequitur.
: Timothy Murphy
--
Michael Seaton(mse...@inforamp.net)
Johan Wevers
>In that case, surely your belief is pre-ordained too,
>and so of little value.
I don't know how my beliefs are formed and what the influence of real
(quantum) undeterminacy is on them. But I don't follow the logic that
claims they are of little value in that case. Can you please explain?
Timothy Murphy
>: >I don't believe in a
>: >really free will, it just looks that way because the brain is so
>: >complex and the interaction with the surrounding and signals from the
>: >body makes it hard (impossible in practice) how a certain person will
>: >react in a (usually not till the quantum levvel described) situation.
>: In that case, surely your belief is pre-ordained too,
>: and so of little value.
>Non sequitur.
Sed secutum.
(It is in Latin, therefore it is true.)
If people have no free will,
then presumably they cannot change their views.
Or do you believe that they _can_ change their views,
but this cannot alter their behaviour?
Timothy Murphy
>>In that case, surely your belief is pre-ordained too,
>>and so of little value.
>I don't know how my beliefs are formed and what the influence of real
>(quantum) undeterminacy is on them. But I don't follow the logic that
>claims they are of little value in that case. Can you please explain?
You claimed (if you were the original poster)
that free-will is an illusion,
and that thoughts are merely the consequence of physical changes
in the brain, which are themselves prescribed by physical laws.
[I don't have the actual posting, and am summarising it from memory.]
While this appears to be a perfectly respectable view,
it seems to me that someone who really believed it
would not waste his time trying to convince others of his view.
The very fact that you do,
convinces me that you do not actually believe it.
Marvin Minsky
>Timothy Murphy <t...@maths.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
>>In that case, surely your belief is pre-ordained too,
>>and so of little value.
>
>I don't know how my beliefs are formed and what the influence of real
>(quantum) undeterminacy is on them. But I don't follow the logic that
>claims they are of little value in that case. Can you please explain?
Perhaps he meant in the same sense that logic itself could be
considered to have no value because its conclusions are determined by
its assumptions. It might be fun to see some proposals for
useful definitions of value--or valuable definitions of useful.
Ken Crossman
> Don't remember where I read this, but I encountered a similiar sentiment
> articulated as follows: No one makes any effort to convince people that
> the sun will rise tomorrow. There's no need. Everyone knows it will.
> When someone expends considerable energy supporting some view it is
> becuase the view is in doubt.
>
> This sentiment makes sense. Even so, if an otherwise reasonable person
> expressed the belief that the sun wouldn't rise tomorrow, I might try
> to pursuade that person that my belief (that the sun will rise) is
> correct.
>
> If anyone knows the source of the sunrise example feel free to refresh
> my memory. Take care. -KMO
I believe that the example is from "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenence"
Sean Broadley
>>
>> Having an idea how conciousness is implemented doen't mean one is
>> able to build it.
>
> This is quite like "Faith can move mountains. Oh, but I can't move
> mountains because I don't have enough Faith." Either do it,
> explain in detail how to do it, or shut up.
I think your claim is completely fallacious. I have some ideas
about how a car works. But I couldn't build a working car.
Scientists know a lot about how cherry trees work, but they
couldn't build a working artificial cherry tree.
That doesn't show that my ideas about how a car works, or
scientist's ideas about how a cherry tree works, are wrong.
Nor does it show that there is something to cars or cherry trees
above and beyond their physical structure. Nor do I think someone
would have the right to tell me to shut up when I said that cars
ran on internal combustion, or if I discussed what a piston does,
on the grounds that since I can't build a car I don't know how they
work.
I know what steel is too. But that doesn't mean I know how to smelt
the stuff. Some knowledge of what something is like is not
necessarily the same as some knowledge of how to construct it.
Sean Broadley
Student, Philosophy Dept, University of Canterbury
New Zealand
KMO
>You <Johan Wevers> claimed (if you were the original poster)
>that free-will is an illusion,
>and that thoughts are merely the consequence of physical changes
>in the brain, which are themselves prescribed by physical laws.
>[I don't have the actual posting, and am summarising it from memory.]
>
>While this appears to be a perfectly respectable view,
>it seems to me that someone who really believed it
>would not waste his time trying to convince others of his view.
>The very fact that you do,
>convinces me that you do not actually believe it.
Don't remember where I read this, but I encountered a similiar sentiment
Bill Skaggs
> You claimed (if you were the original poster)
> that free-will is an illusion,
> and that thoughts are merely the consequence of physical changes
> in the brain, which are themselves prescribed by physical laws.
> [I don't have the actual posting, and am summarising it from
> memory.]
>
> While this appears to be a perfectly respectable view,
> it seems to me that someone who really believed it
> would not waste his time trying to convince others of his view.
> The very fact that you do,
> convinces me that you do not actually believe it.
I don't get it. When I try to convince others of my views, I do so by
talking or writing. Either way it's a physical act, and through a
chain of events induces physical changes inside the brain of the
person I'm trying to convince. Where's the problem? (Incidentally, I
don't agree with the claim that free-will is an illusion: the types of
free will that are worth wanting -- as Dennett nicely puts it -- are
not in conflict with the idea that thoughts consist of physical
changes inside the brain.)
-- Bill
Timothy Murphy
>I don't get it. When I try to convince others of my views, I do so by
>talking or writing. Either way it's a physical act, and through a
>chain of events induces physical changes inside the brain of the
>person I'm trying to convince. Where's the problem?
If you don't have free will,
then the only reason you are "trying" to convince others
is because you were pre-ordained to do so.
In that case, why bother?
The other guy's beliefs are also pre-ordained,
so you might as well pour yourself a drink
and forget about it.
Bill Skaggs
> If you don't have free will,
> then the only reason you are "trying" to convince others
> is because you were pre-ordained to do so.
No. The *reason* for an action is the goal that the action is
intended to accomplish. The fact that something is pre-ordained is
not the reason for it; it is merely a statement that the thing could
in principle have been predicted beforehand. There is no
incompatibility between determinism and the existence of reasons for
actions: they are complementary.
-- Bill
Andrzej Pindor
>>>and so of little value.
>
>>I don't know how my beliefs are formed and what the influence of real
>>(quantum) undeterminacy is on them. But I don't follow the logic that
>>claims they are of little value in that case. Can you please explain?
>
>that free-will is an illusion,
>and that thoughts are merely the consequence of physical changes
>in the brain, which are themselves prescribed by physical laws.
>[I don't have the actual posting, and am summarising it from memory.]
>
>While this appears to be a perfectly respectable view,
>it seems to me that someone who really believed it
>would not waste his time trying to convince others of his view.
>The very fact that you do,
>convinces me that you do not actually believe it.
>
is determined by physical processes, what sense does it make to 'waste' time?
You are attempting to show irrationality of a view opposed to your own using
concepts grounded in your view, which the opposing view claims are obsolete.
You may not like the view that there is no free will, but it is logically
consistent, whereas the view that free will exists cannot be made logically
consistent without going beyond accepted empirical evidence.
Please not that I am not taking sides in this discussion. I am simply pointing
out that to claim the existence of free will (as most commonly understood, in
my experience), one has to rely on belief and not rational arguments.
There are of course compatibilists who want to have a cake and eat it, but
no true believer in free will will accept their version of what free will is.
>
>--
>Timothy Murphy
Andrzej
--
Andrzej Pindor The foolish reject what they see and
University of Toronto not what they think; the wise reject
Information Commons what they think and not what they see.
pin...@breeze.hprc.utoronto.ca Huang Po
Mitchell Porter
Timothy Murphy <t...@maths.tcd.ie> wrote:
>bi...@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs) writes:
>
>>I don't get it. When I try to convince others of my views, I do so by
>>talking or writing. Either way it's a physical act, and through a
>>chain of events induces physical changes inside the brain of the
>>person I'm trying to convince. Where's the problem?
>
>then the only reason you are "trying" to convince others
>is because you were pre-ordained to do so.
>The other guy's beliefs are also pre-ordained,
>so you might as well pour yourself a drink
>and forget about it.
The term "pre-ordained" suggests to me a focus on ultimate causes, such as
fundamental dynamical laws or the initial condition of the universe. But
between the present condition of the universe and its initial condition
lie long chains of causally connected states, and any member of such a
chain is an immediate cause of the next member.
One could therefore say, for example, that an attempt to convince was
caused by a desire to convince and by a belief that there was an
opportunity to do so, and still be a physicalist concerning the mind, so
long as one thinks that desires and beliefs are physical states.
Paying attention to immediate rather than ultimate causes should also
make it clear why it still makes sense to persuade others, or to attempt
anything, in such a universe: in such a universe, your efforts may be a
necessary condition for the desired outcome.
Possibly it will be objected that there is no _free_ will in such a
universe, since your desires and efforts are themselves caused. Even
a particular act is the product of one of your decisions, which itself is
a product of another of your decisions,... eventually the chain of causes
will contain a cause outside yourself. If it is insisted that this is not
free will, so be it. But such an account seems to me consistent with
physics and folk psychology, and with the rationality of action.
Andrzej Pindor
Timothy Murphy <t...@maths.tcd.ie> wrote:
>bi...@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs) writes:
>
>>I don't get it. When I try to convince others of my views, I do so by
>>talking or writing. Either way it's a physical act, and through a
>>chain of events induces physical changes inside the brain of the
>>person I'm trying to convince. Where's the problem?
>
>If you don't have free will,
>then the only reason you are "trying" to convince others
>is because you were pre-ordained to do so.
>In that case, why bother?
As I have noted in another posting, your criticism misses the mark.
>The other guy's beliefs are also pre-ordained,
>so you might as well pour yourself a drink
>and forget about it.
>
He might, depending if he was "pre-ordained to do so".
Johan Wevers
>You claimed (if you were the original poster)
>that free-will is an illusion,
>and that thoughts are merely the consequence of physical changes
>in the brain, which are themselves prescribed by physical laws.
>[I don't have the actual posting, and am summarising it from memory.]
This describes my opinion in this matter.
>While this appears to be a perfectly respectable view,
>it seems to me that someone who really believed it
>would not waste his time trying to convince others of his view.
Why not? I try to generate the input for other peoples brains that will
change their views to this direction. The fact that I do this originates
from my brain. In shorthand, we call this procedure "arguing".
Scott Ellsworth
Timothy Murphy <t...@maths.tcd.ie> wrote:
>joh...@vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) writes:
>
>>>In that case, surely your belief is pre-ordained too,
>>>and so of little value.
>
>>I don't know how my beliefs are formed and what the influence of real
>>(quantum) undeterminacy is on them. But I don't follow the logic that
>>claims they are of little value in that case. Can you please explain?
>
>that free-will is an illusion,
>and that thoughts are merely the consequence of physical changes
>in the brain, which are themselves prescribed by physical laws.
>[I don't have the actual posting, and am summarising it from memory.]
>
>it seems to me that someone who really believed it
>would not waste his time trying to convince others of his view.
>convinces me that you do not actually believe it.
I have heard this argument before. It assumes that the system in
question does not react to the environment - in other words, that his
attempt to convince you of a lack of free will cannot change the state of
your mind. While that might be true for some, I expect that the sensory
impressions (sound, sight) that you have received will alter the present
state of your mind, and perhaps, will alter it to the point where you
agree. Or perhaps you will disagree more - regardless, the argument will
change the state of your mind, producing different behaviors, some of
which the original poster might want more.
Stating that people have no free will does not mean that they are no
longer learning machines, merely that they do not have any choice
in the conclusions they draw given an initial state and a set of inputs.
I have also heard a similar argument claiming that there is variation in
the results produced, but that the variation is entirely in the physical
world, and none can be attributed to conciousness.
Personally, I do believe that there is free will, but I have never come
up with an experiment that could test it, so it is more an inclination on
my part than a theory.
Scott
--
_____________________________________________________________________________
Scott Ellsworth q...@netcom.com
My opinions are my own EViews ftp: ftp.netcom.com:/pub/qm/qms
Quantitative Micro Software - 714 856 3368
"The barbarian is thwarted at the moat" - Scott Adams
Johan Wevers
>If people have no free will,
>then presumably they cannot change their views.
I fail to see the logic behind this reasoning. My computer has no free will
but it can change it's programming given sufficient input. The same holds
for humans: their views can change when exposed to other views which
influence their thinking. Wether there exists something as "free will" is
irrelevant for this procedure.
>Or do you believe that they _can_ change their views,
>but this cannot alter their behaviour?
Again I fail to see the connection.
Johan Wevers
>If you don't have free will,
>then the only reason you are "trying" to convince others
>is because you were pre-ordained to do so.
>In that case, why bother?
Because you were pre-ordained to do that.
>The other guy's beliefs are also pre-ordained,
That doesn't mean they cannot change under sufficient external input.
Since it is observable that people sometimes change their opinion it
is a possibility. Do you really not understand the difference between
deterministic (lets forget QM for a moment) and unchangable?
KMO
>If you don't have free will,
>then the only reason you are "trying" to convince others
>is because you were pre-ordained to do so.
>In that case, why bother?
>The other guy's beliefs are also pre-ordained,
>so you might as well pour yourself a drink
>and forget about it.
You've confused determinism with fatalism. Determinism is the doctrine
that human actions have causes and are law-like in thier operation.
Fatalism is the doctrine that all events are preordaned and no act of
will on the part of a conscious agent can avert the predetermined end.
In the language of supervenience, beleifs and desires which motivate
action supervene on physical (neurophysiological) processes. My brain
states are determined by a combination of antecedent brainstates (e.g.
established beliefs) and current conditions (e.g. current sensory
stimulation, presence of drugs or toxins, etc.) These factors determine
my current brainstate, and my current beliefs and desires supervene on
that brainstate. -KMO
Timothy Murphy
>You obviously do not understand the view you are criticising. If the behavior
>is determined by physical processes, what sense does it make to 'waste' time?
You mean you not only don't believe in free will,
you also don't believe it is possible to waste time?
You must lead a strange life.
>You may not like the view that there is no free will, but it is logically
>consistent, whereas the view that free will exists cannot be made logically
>consistent without going beyond accepted empirical evidence.
I don't see how further information can possibly make something consistent.
br...@ssl.msfc.nasa.gov
>You claimed (if you were the original poster)
>that free-will is an illusion,
>and that thoughts are merely the consequence of physical changes
>in the brain, which are themselves prescribed by physical laws.
>[I don't have the actual posting, and am summarising it from memory.]
>
>While this appears to be a perfectly respectable view,
>it seems to me that someone who really believed it
>would not waste his time trying to convince others of his view.
>The very fact that you do,
>convinces me that you do not actually believe it.
Suppose I programmed a computer to repeat arguments against free will. Would
you doubt that my computer actually believed what it was saying? You'd
probably doubt that my computer could believe anything, but my point is that
there is nothing inherently inconsistent about believing oneself to be a
machine programmed to convince others that they are also machines.
The trouble with "free will" arguments is the definition of the term. There
usually isn't any. People spend endlessly tiresome hours arguing about a host
of different things to which they have attached a single name, and so they never
agree on anything. By the time you've defined "free will" precisely enough
to have an intelligent conversation about it, no one cares anymore.
Mountain Man
>In article <30ef0c53.5...@vulcan.xs4all.nl> joh...@vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) writes:
>>Timothy Murphy <t...@maths.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>
>>>and so of little value.
>>
>>I don't know how my beliefs are formed and what the influence of real
>>(quantum) undeterminacy is on them. But I don't follow the logic that
>>claims they are of little value in that case. Can you please explain?
>
>considered to have no value because its conclusions are determined by
>its assumptions. It might be fun to see some proposals for
>useful definitions of value--or valuable definitions of useful.
Advantage is had from whatever is there;
But usefulness rises from whatever is not. ....... Lao Tzu (500BC)
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Webulous Coordinates: http://magna.com.au/~prfbrown/welcome.html
QuoteForTheDay: "Been there before" : Banjo Patterson 1888
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Lee Kent
>
>> Don't remember where I read this, but I encountered a similiar sentiment
>> articulated as follows: No one makes any effort to convince people that
>> the sun will rise tomorrow. There's no need. Everyone knows it will.
>> When someone expends considerable energy supporting some view it is
>> becuase the view is in doubt.
>>
>> This sentiment makes sense. Even so, if an otherwise reasonable person
>> expressed the belief that the sun wouldn't rise tomorrow, I might try
>> to pursuade that person that my belief (that the sun will rise) is
>> correct.
>>
>> If anyone knows the source of the sunrise example feel free to refresh
>> my memory. Take care. -KMO
>I believe that the example is from "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenence"
Actually the sun doesn't rise at all. We only 'see' it that way. Does
that make my observation of the reality of the rotation of the planet
any more difficult to grasp than those who called for the same
hundreds of years ago and were subjected to cruelty for their belief
in facts instead of meer observational illusion? If Pindor's quotation
was correct the sun would rise and the person who thought otherwise
would be foolish. But since facts stand in the face of observation who
is to tell that 'seeing' is believing? Or is it the thinker who is at
fault????? Am I an unreasonable person? Most who have read my research
would think so. But that is because they 'see' what they have seen and
not what they can. Free will is simply put: The ability of a creature
to make a decision in opposite to the observation purely on the
internal consumation of intellect. To refute free will is to admit the
inability to do so. See below:
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Whom ever said
"IT CAN'T BE DONE"
was convinced of his own
shortcomings. NOT MINE!
Lee Kent n...@ipa.net
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
br...@ssl.msfc.nasa.gov
>it is that everyone is trying to prove. thank you
You can ask, but I don't know the answer.
Raghu Seshadri
: >While this appears to be a perfectly respectable view,
: >it seems to me that someone who really believed it
: >would not waste his time trying to convince others of his view.
: Why not? I try to generate the input for other peoples brains that will
: change their views to this direction. The fact that I do this originates
: from my brain. In shorthand, we call this procedure "arguing".
Just to understand your stance better ...
Are you saying that you cannot stop arguing
by willing so ? That you cannot help it ?
RS
d...@gnn.com
>In article <4cp242$l...@bell.maths.tcd.ie>, t...@maths.tcd.ie (Timothy Murphy) writes:
>>You claimed (if you were the original poster)
>>that free-will is an illusion,
>>and that thoughts are merely the consequence of physical changes
>>in the brain, which are themselves prescribed by physical laws.
>>[I don't have the actual posting, and am summarising it from memory.]
>>
>>While this appears to be a perfectly respectable view,
>>it seems to me that someone who really believed it
>>would not waste his time trying to convince others of his view.
Lionell Griffith
If all you can do is talk about it, then you don't know
anything about it. Define, design, build, and demonstrate!
All the rest is empty noise.
--
Lionell
Windy Hills Ranch, Training Center, and Reading Room:
http://www.av.qnet.com/~lgriffith
Kerry Thurber
I have some ideas
>about how a car works. But I couldn't build a working car.
>Scientists know a lot about how cherry trees work, but they
>couldn't build a working artificial cherry tree.
>
>That doesn't show that my ideas about how a car works, or
>scientist's ideas about how a cherry tree works, are wrong.
>Nor does it show that there is something to cars or cherry trees
>above and beyond their physical structure. Nor do I think someone
>would have the right to tell me to shut up when I said that cars
>ran on internal combustion, or if I discussed what a piston does,
>on the grounds that since I can't build a car I don't know how they
>work.
Quite correct. The original subject was the science of consciousness.
To reduce the subject to a science is as formidable a task as I can
imagine, and I haven't heard of anybody claiming to make much
progress. We would certainly do well to pool all of our insights and
thoughts on the subject, but there are a lot of people ready to jump up
and say "here's the answer! See, it's simple." Quite probably, it is not
simple. We could begin by treating it like the complex phenomenon it
is.
Seriously. If you're going to jump up to say you have the answer,
there's a danger that somebody might call your bluff.
Edward LaBonte
writes:
>
>mse...@norm.inforamp.net (Michael Seaton) writes:
>
>>: >I don't believe in a
>>: >really free will, it just looks that way because the brain is so
>>: >complex and the interaction with the surrounding and signals from
the
>>: >body makes it hard (impossible in practice) how a certain person
will
>>: >react in a (usually not till the quantum levvel described)
situation.
>
>>: In that case, surely your belief is pre-ordained too,
>>: and so of little value.
>
>
>Sed secutum.
>(It is in Latin, therefore it is true.)
>If people have no free will,
>then presumably they cannot change their views.
That doesn't follow at all. It is possible to design a computer program
that can edit itself. Yet the computer program is still not 'free'.
>Or do you believe that they _can_ change their views,
>but this cannot alter their behaviour?
Actually, when a human 'changes his views', what really has happened is
that some circumstance has changed him and affected his viewpoint. The
determining factor is still found in the outside world.
Edward LaBonte
writes:
>You claimed (if you were the original poster)
>that free-will is an illusion,
>and that thoughts are merely the consequence of physical changes
>in the brain, which are themselves prescribed by physical laws.
>[I don't have the actual posting, and am summarising it from memory.]
>
>While this appears to be a perfectly respectable view,
>it seems to me that someone who really believed it
>would not waste his time trying to convince others of his view.
>The very fact that you do,
>convinces me that you do not actually believe it.
On what do you base your conviction? He is attempting to become an
environmental factor in the determination of other peoples views. That
is in no way inconsistent with the view that his desire to affect other
people's views itself is (ultimately) caused by factors outside
himself.
Edward LaBonte
writes:
>: Why not? I try to generate the input for other peoples brains that
will
>: change their views to this direction. The fact that I do this
originates
>: from my brain. In shorthand, we call this procedure "arguing".
>
>Just to understand your stance better ...
>
>Are you saying that you cannot stop arguing
>by willing so ? That you cannot help it ?
Speaking for myself, I would say that my desire to argue or not
originates from somewhere other than my will. If I do will myself to
stop arguing that is simply because of my desire to stop which is a
result of the physical state of my brain. There is nothing free about
the process.
Edward LaBonte
writes:
>>You may not like the view that there is no free will, but it is
logically
>>consistent, whereas the view that free will exists cannot be made
logically
>>consistent without going beyond accepted empirical evidence.
>
>I don't see how further information can possibly make something
>consistent.
I'll take it even further. The idea of free will is meaningless. Free
from what? The only possible way it could be free from outside
influences is if it existed in a vacuum. A willful act occurs within a
specific context and is totally controlled by that context.
Most people use the term 'free will' to simply mean that they do what
they want. But in that sense there is no real freedom since they
obviously don't determine what their desires will be.
Edward LaBonte
writes:
>Do you also argue with your car
>(that probably should read "bicycle" since you come from .nl)?
>And your computer?
>I suggest that the reason you don't
>is because you know perfectly well
>that car and computer don't have free will,
>so it is a waste of time arguing with them.
Not at all. It's because cars and computers don't speak the language. I
don't bother trying to argue with my cat either. Human language is
specifically designed to affect human behavior, and is only useful in
that context. It has nothing to do with free will.
br...@ssl.msfc.nasa.gov
>br...@ssl.msfc.nasa.gov wrote:
>:...
>: The trouble with "free will" arguments is the definition of the term. There
>: usually isn't any. People spend endlessly tiresome hours arguing about a host
>: of different things to which they have attached a single name
>: agree on anything. By the time you've defined "free will" precisely enough
>: to have an intelligent conversation about it, no one cares anymore.
>
>
>
> 1) Does my integral conscious identity exist apart from the
> physical world?
The question refers to dualism, not free will. Dualism is what really concerns
most defenders of the free will idea, though. I understand that. From my
perspective, the answer to your question is "no", but I can still define "free
will" so that I have one. I could also define it so that I don't have one, and
I could define it so that an immaterial soul (also suitably defined) doesn't
have one either.
> 2) If so, can it do anything but watch?
>
>
>#2 is the question of "free will". And it presupposes #1, which is,
>of course, THE question....
I'm not sure a soul must be free. There are deterministic dualists.
I would define "free" as "consistent with my internal motivations". My
internal motivations are either born to me or accumulated through my senses.
I have a free will, but it is constantly changing as I interact with the world.
Some folks insist that I am not *really* free, because my genes and memes
determine my will, but I think those folks need to think less about the meaning
of "free" and more about the meaning of "I". What sort of I could be
completely free of all influences? I like being free. I'm not fond of being
dead ... not right now, anyway.
Timothy Murphy
>>You claimed (if you were the original poster)
>>that free-will is an illusion,
>>and that thoughts are merely the consequence of physical changes
>>in the brain, which are themselves prescribed by physical laws.
>This describes my opinion in this matter.
>>While this appears to be a perfectly respectable view,
>>it seems to me that someone who really believed it
>>would not waste his time trying to convince others of his view.
>Why not? I try to generate the input for other peoples brains that will
>change their views to this direction. The fact that I do this originates
>from my brain. In shorthand, we call this procedure "arguing".
Do you also argue with your car
(that probably should read "bicycle" since you come from .nl)?
And your computer?
I suggest that the reason you don't
is because you know perfectly well
that car and computer don't have free will,
so it is a waste of time arguing with them.
--
br...@ssl.msfc.nasa.gov
>joh...@vulcan.xs4all.nl (Johan Wevers) wrote:
>
>>To make something so complex to be able to implement such a function
>>requires more money than I have.
>
>Don't waste your money. It's true that philosophers cannot (despite
>enormous effort) define conciousness in a way that scientists cannot
>build it. But as soon as it is built, the anthropocentric philosophers
>(whose camp I'm afraid Penrose has joined) will complain, "That's not
>what we meant..."
>--
> red...@az.com
> / // /// ///// /////// /////////// ///////////// / // ///
Yes ... dualism will die hard or not at all. What must we do to boost the
topicality meme in this group, again?
Raghu Seshadri
: Speaking for myself, I would say that my desire to argue or not
: originates from somewhere other than my will. If I do will myself to
: stop arguing that is simply because of my desire to stop which is a
: result of the physical state of my brain. There is nothing free about
: the process.
I don't understand this, so can you explain
a bit more ? It is not clear to me which is
the cause here and which the result. How are
you SURE that the physical state is the
cause and the "will" the result ? How do you
know it is not the other way around ?
RS
John Hey
:...
: The trouble with "free will" arguments is the definition of the term. There
: usually isn't any. People spend endlessly tiresome hours arguing about a host
: of different things to which they have attached a single name
: and so they never
: agree on anything. By the time you've defined "free will" precisely enough
: to have an intelligent conversation about it, no one cares anymore.
I'll try:
1) Does my integral conscious identity exist apart from the
physical world?
2) If so, can it do anything but watch?
#2 is the question of "free will". And it presupposes #1, which is,
of course, THE question....
--
The MOVIE CRITIC(R) opinion-predictor... | http://www.moviecritic.com
You rate movies you've seen... | Or.. telnet moviecritic.com
It tells you YOUR new best bets.... | then login: moviecri
Rick
>To make something so complex to be able to implement such a function
>requires more money than I have.
Don't waste your money. It's true that philosophers cannot (despite
enormous effort) define conciousness in a way that scientists cannot
build it. But as soon as it is built, the antropocentric philosophers
Kerry Thurber
>Timothy Murphy <t...@maths.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
>>You claimed (if you were the original poster)
>>that free-will is an illusion,
>>and that thoughts are merely the consequence of physical changes
>>in the brain, which are themselves prescribed by physical laws.
>This describes my opinion in this matter.
Here is illustrated the stupidest physical change to ever come across a
brain. Can't understand it? Let's just pretend like it's an illusion.
Whatever makes you think the physical changes are real? Couldn't
you just as well argue that physics is an illusion, the effects of which
are merely the consequences of free-will?
MARK YOUNG
know how to do that with the software I'm using]
Timothy Murphy:
> If people have no free will,
> then presumably they cannot change their views.
> Or do you believe that they _can_ change their views,
> but this cannot alter their behaviour?
If people have no free will, can they change their views?
If people have no free will, can they tie their shoes?
Why would a lack of free will would prevent one and not the other?
Changing their views affects the way they behave.
Tying their shoes affects the way they walk.
Why would a lack of free will make one of these false and not the other?
...mark young
Andrzej Pindor
.............
>Actually the sun doesn't rise at all. We only 'see' it that way. Does
>that make my observation of the reality of the rotation of the planet
>any more difficult to grasp than those who called for the same
>hundreds of years ago and were subjected to cruelty for their belief
>in facts instead of meer observational illusion? If Pindor's quotation
>was correct the sun would rise and the person who thought otherwise
>would be foolish. But since facts stand in the face of observation who
You again demonstrate that you do not understand the quote (or rather that
you insist on interpreting it in a twisted way so as to suit you), even
though I have tried to point out the simplest interpretation, i.e. that if
what we 'see' and what we 'think' conflict, it is a wise thing to go with
what we 'see'. Naturally, there are exceptions to everything, like optical
illusions. However, the quote is not meant to be a 'law of nature' (and even
laws of nature may be subject to exceptions).
>is to tell that 'seeing' is believing? Or is it the thinker who is at
>fault????? Am I an unreasonable person? Most who have read my research
>would think so. But that is because they 'see' what they have seen and
>not what they can. Free will is simply put: The ability of a creature
>to make a decision in opposite to the observation purely on the
>internal consumation of intellect. To refute free will is to admit the
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Unless you provide definitions of the terms above, so that we could
have criteria to decide whether 'an intellect was consumed internally' or
not, your 'simple' definition of free will is gibberish.
>inability to do so. See below:
>* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
> Whom ever said
> "IT CAN'T BE DONE"
> was convinced of his own
> shortcomings. NOT MINE!
> Lee Kent n...@ipa.net
>* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
>
Andrzej
--
Andrzej Pindor The foolish reject what they see and
University of Toronto not what they think; the wise reject
Information Commons what they think and not what they see.
pin...@breeze.hprc.utoronto.ca Huang Po
Jim Farmer
> Kerry Thurber <ke...@Mystech.com> wrote:
[snip]
> (conciousness could have been develloped during a long
> cultural revolution, even with a brain that posessed the latent
> capabillity) is still an open question. One of the possible things that
> such a person would have difficulties with is the separation between
> reality and fantasy. Perhaps our primmitive ancestors called these
> people sometimes prophets, nowadays they receive psychological care.
Here is a reference that might be relevant. (I have not read it myself.)
"The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind"
by Julien Jaynes; Houghton Mifflin Co.
Here is an excerpt from my source: "Dr. Jaynes discovered that until 3000
years ago essentially all human beings were void of consciousness. Man
along with all other primates functioned by mimicked or learned reactions."
Apologies if this has already been noted. I seldom read this thread.
Jim Farmer
Edward LaBonte
writes:
Where do you think the desire to do something comes from? It doesn't
come from the will because I don't will myself to desire. Therefore no
matter where the desire comes from it definitely originates outside the
will. I assume that it is caused by my physical state but even if it is
not it is the desire that determines the actions of the will. Every
willful action is preceded by the desire to act. The will is therefore
not free.
Patrick Juola
>bi...@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs) writes:
>
>>I don't get it. When I try to convince others of my views, I do so by
>>talking or writing. Either way it's a physical act, and through a
>>chain of events induces physical changes inside the brain of the
>>person I'm trying to convince. Where's the problem?
>
>If you don't have free will,
>then the only reason you are "trying" to convince others
>is because you were pre-ordained to do so.
>In that case, why bother?
>The other guy's beliefs are also pre-ordained,
Ordained, yes. Pre-ordained, not necessarily. The act of attempting
to persuade is itself a stimulus that may affect the other guy's
"beliefs." It may, in fact, have been pre-ordained that Mr. Skaggs
was brought to the location he was expressly for the purpose of
alterning Mr. Murphy's beliefs, "in this best of all possible worlds."
Patrick
Leibniz
People can obviously change their views, but it must be realised that
these changes themselves are built into the equations.
Edward LaBonte
writes:
>If you don't have free will,
>then the only reason you are "trying" to convince others
>is because you were pre-ordained to do so.
>In that case, why bother?
To use your word, because it is 'preordained'.
>The other guy's beliefs are also pre-ordained,
>so you might as well pour yourself a drink
>and forget about it.
That neglects the fact that you yourself are a part of the system in
which determines what the other guy does. What you do might be
essential in determining what the other guy does even if your actions
are determined by the environment also.
Lee Kent
>In <4d0os8$h...@iii2.iii.net> jh...@iii2.iii.net (John Hey) writes:
>>
>>br...@ssl.msfc.nasa.gov wrote:
>>:...
>>: The trouble with "free will" arguments is the definition of the
>term. There
>>: usually isn't any. People spend endlessly tiresome hours arguing
>about a host
>>: of different things to which they have attached a single name
>>: and so they never
>>: agree on anything. By the time you've defined "free will" precisely
>enough
>>: to have an intelligent conversation about it, no one cares anymore.
>>
>>
>>I'll try:
>>
>> 1) Does my integral conscious identity exist apart from the
>> physical world?
>>
>> 2) If so, can it do anything but watch?
>>
>>
>>#2 is the question of "free will". And it presupposes #1, which is,
>>of course, THE question....
>Not really. Whether or not it does something says nothing about whether
>that act is 'free'. The first statement is equally irrelevent.
First....I am not responsible for how many groups this gets posted to.
It appears to involve a lot in response. SO don't jump on me for the
cross posting. Again.
Second....The issue above questions the word 'free'. Let us assume
that the definition is to be without external control. It can be
argued that input of any nature implies external control and if that
were the case then input would dictate output. But input only provides
reality for output. A basis from which to choose output. Were we
discussing the input-output of a digital computer program we would be
discussing the potential output from predetermined parameters of
choice that can only be reduced to their common point of convergence.
That is NOT FREE will. It can be argued that input of the nature that
humans experience set up predetermined parameters and that may be
correct but what is not is the convoluted observation that those
predetermined parameters (what worked, what didn't work) have direct
control over the outcome of future encounters with the same stimuli.
It does not. Perhaps the best way to explain that is this:
Third....When you see an apple.... if the input controled your output
and if the only criteria you used for determining whether to pick up
that apple or not and whether to consume it or check it for worms
first was the input stimuli and the same speed comparison to what
worked or occured the last time you saw an apple you would either
never pick it up, never eat it, or always check it for worms first and
then eat it. But since you had at one time never picked up an apple
you would therefore never pick up an apple. The brain does not
function in that fashion. A computer does.
Fourth....The brain accepts the input stimuli of the vision of an
apple and through it's protocol compares it with everything within
it's long term memory. Everything that comes close to matching lends
to the further comparison later in the mid term and short term memory
levels. These comparisons are performed at a speed faster than the
input's. In the human the speed of computation of the third or short
level of memory which is a result of the 'conscious' level of
comparison is 900 times faster than the input stimuli. It is this
faster comparison that permits humans the ability to make a decision
that may be based on a very insignificant match. EXAMPLE: An apple
will bring up comparison to size, color, texture, smell, taste,
weight, and memories of the most recent encounters with an apple
including all of the events surrounding each. The human who chooses to
exercise their 'free will' will decide not to pick up the apple
because one time before the experience resulted in being yelled at by
a parent for screaming over the sight of a worm. The decision not to
pick up the apple is then a previous nonimportant criteria that has
nothing to do with the apple, but does have a great deal to do with
the impression a discipline measure lent to the personality of the
observer of the apple. The observer of the event (not the human
deciding on the apple) would see no apparent reason for not picking up
the apple and the human deciding on the apple may not be aware of the
reason but the input has lent a reason that prohibited the picking up
of the apple for which the human then wonders about but nevertheless
does not pick up the apple.
Fifth....Therefore 'free will' is the ability of the human to make a
decision based upon previous input but not based upon previous direct
input. The person who screams at the sight of a snake yet has never
been in contact with one is using 'free will.' It is the ability of
the human to make a decision based on criteria that seemingly has
nothing to do with actual experience or actual reality input. If it
were not true humans would be lower creatures. Reacting to repetitive
stimulus only. But humans, through the faster computation levels of
the second level of comparison and the third memory are able to make
decisions that are in effect 'their own.' Free.
Shez
>
> : >I don't believe in a
> : >really free will, it just looks that way because the brain is so
> : >complex and the interaction with the surrounding and signals from the
> : >body makes it hard (impossible in practice) how a certain person will
> : >react
It's not that we don't have free will, rather that the term "free will"
simply does not mean anything at the cognitive level, so there's no
point wondering whether we have it. It's on a level with the idea that
the Earth is supported by four elephants.
I posted a long polemic ("Re: Free Will") justifying this position to
sci.cognitive on Monday (8th Jan) but the local news server has been
down for a couple of days so I don't know if it made it or whether
anyone commented on it - I've been unable to receive newsgroups in the
intervening days. If no-one saw it I can repost it.
-Shez.
Johan Wevers
>Whatever makes you think the physical changes are real? Couldn't
>you just as well argue that physics is an illusion, the effects of which
>are merely the consequences of free-will?
I could, but I won't. Assuming physics is real gives a much more consistent
theory than using an only vagely defined concept as "free will". Free from
what?
--
ir. J.C.A. Wevers || The only nature of reality is physics.
joh...@vulcan.xs4all.nl || http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/index.html
Finger joh...@xs4all.nl for my PGP public key. PGP-KeyID: 0xD42F80B1
Johan Wevers
>>Why not? I try to generate the input for other peoples brains that will
>>change their views to this direction. The fact that I do this originates
>>from my brain. In shorthand, we call this procedure "arguing".
>Do you also argue with your car
Yes, by generating inputs the car understands: turning the contact key,
pushing pedals, turning the wheel and other things. Since cars don't
have voice receptors (yet), talking to cars is pretty useless. Since
you seem to be able to read, posting replies to your messages isn't
(at least not for that reason).
>(that probably should read "bicycle" since you come from .nl)?
I have 2 in fact, both with flat tires at the moment :-(.
>And your computer?
Sometimes, if the bloody machine doesn't do what I want him to do...
>I suggest that the reason you don't
>is because you know perfectly well
>that car and computer don't have free will,
>so it is a waste of time arguing with them.
No, because I know they don't process that kind of input. I assume you
can process it. That's the only difference.
Raghu Seshadri
: >Are you saying that you cannot stop arguing
: >by willing so ? That you cannot help it ?
: I don't believe in what is usually called "free will", so the question is
: as senseless as asking through which hole the photon went. But wether I
I see, you are saying that what is "sense" and
what is "senseless" is decided by whether you
believe in it or not :-)
: stop arguing is determined by my brain structure and the inputs it gets.
: Your reply, for example, caused my brain to decide to continue arguing.
In other words, I have a complete mastery over
your brain while you yourself don't, you are
a helpless passive reactor only.
RS
Raghu Seshadri
: >
: >: Speaking for myself, I would say that my desire to argue or not
: >: originates from somewhere other than my will. If I do will myself to
: >: result of the physical state of my brain. There is nothing free
: about
: >: the process.
: >
: >I don't understand this, so can you explain
: >a bit more ? It is not clear to me which is
: >the cause here and which the result. How are
: >you SURE that the physical state is the
: >cause and the "will" the result ? How do you
: >know it is not the other way around ?
: Where do you think the desire to do something comes from? It doesn't
: come from the will because I don't will myself to desire. Therefore no
: matter where the desire comes from it definitely originates outside the
: will. I assume that it is caused by my physical state but even if it is
: not it is the desire that determines the actions of the will. Every
: willful action is preceded by the desire to act. The will is therefore
: not free.
Good point.
RS
Edward LaBonte
Ken Seto
>In article <4d6ov8$9...@eri1.erinet.com>, Ken Seto <ken...@erinet.com> wrote:
>
>
>>- It gives a realistic origin of the universe.
>
>-------------------------------------------------------------
>ha! hA! HA!! Ha! ha! ha-ha-ha o ha-ha... What a beautiful
>
> OXYMORON
>
>!!!!! :-)
> Wlod
Your posting suggests that you may be lagging in the intelligent or
creative department. Furthermore, you may not have the mental capacity
to comprehend my theory so from that stand point, you are the true
oxymoron.
ken...@erinet.com
Lee Kent
>KMO <c53...@mizzou1.missouri.edu> writes:
>|> Even so, if an otherwise reasonable person
>|> expressed the belief that the sun wouldn't rise tomorrow, I might try
>|> to pursuade that person that my belief (that the sun will rise) is
>|> correct.
>|>
>|> If anyone knows the source of the sunrise example feel free to refresh
>|> my memory.
>I'd say it's been around since people first noticed the sun rising! It seems
>to be *the* classic folklore/philosophy example of an event that everyone
>thinks is virtually certain, come what may.
>But it's a remarkably poor one, in my opinion! Remarkably. It's often
>annoyed me, so now I'll vent my spleen.
>Firstly, taken colloquially, it's far from true at all! The sun quite often
>doesn't rise! Plenty often there's a ton of cloud getting in the way, and
>if one takes "the sun rises" to mean "the appearance of daylight", even then
>exceptionally heavy weather makes this debatable. But the saying is, "the sun
>rises"; and that damn well means "we can see it rising", in my book. BAD ONE!
>Secondly, let's be generous and allow it to mean, daylight returns... but:
>The saying is usually "the sun will rise tomorrow". Now just what the hell is
>"tomorrow"? Obviously - when the daylight returns! How brilliantly circular!
>What a magnificent example this sunrise business is turning into! It seems
>that all that's left of the saying (after we remove this circularity) is:
>"Daylight will come again , after it's gone next time, (if it *does* go)".
>This already has sunbstantially less force than what was intended by the
>common saying. Huh!
>Well OK then. Yes, I've been speaking from the viewpoint of a reasonably
>sensible but uninformed pre-renaissance type. Mind you, I bet the saying
>was around before then! But of course, we have all been tainted now, by
>learning young, of this new-fangled Galillean theory, where sunrise now means
>earth rotating it into view; and also by unthinking familiarity with very
>accurate timekeeping devices, not available before post-renaissance times.
>So now, "sun will rise tomorrow" can mean, "when our clocks have measured
>off the appropriate time, the sun will just be (apparently) coming up over the
>horizon, except that if the weather is bad, it won't actually be apparent(!)"
>What a bummer!! What on earth kind of saying is that?!
>So there's an awful lot of science, philosophy, interpretation, and whatnot
>behind this apparently simple saying, that IMNSHO makes it virtually useless
>in its intended context of significance; and in any event much much different
>from when it was first coined. Pah.
>So anyway - can someone give us a better example, (not that there's any hope
>of pushing out the old one!), of a (type of) event that's generally agreed
>to be virtually certain to occur (again)?
>And not death-&-taxes; puhleeeeeez.
Of course not. Mankind is capable of asking a question and it is
certain to happen again as long as mankind is around to ask it. SO the
answer is a question. And the sun doesn't rise anywhere. Or have we
once again agreed that the sun rotates around us??? Oh, see there was
another question no matter how stupid it might be.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Lee Kent Hempfling Whom ever said
http:spider.ipa.net/~ntc/ "IT CAN'T BE DONE"
Mail To: n...@ipa.net was convinced of his own
Neutronics Technologies shortcomings. NOT MINE !
The opinions expressed by me are mine. Aren't you
glad you're not responsible for this dribble.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Bill Skaggs
> 2.If all actions were predetermined then :
> Look at it on a global scale, we have a destiny that is
> predetermined yet it has been suggested that by argument one
> can change one's mind. Is this change of mind predetermined?
> If so then there is truly no free will, [ . . . ]
I don't agree with this conclusion.
Consider the following example: George likes pie, in fact he loves it
and never passes up a chance to eat it. George is about to go out for
a walk, when his mother tells him that if he stays home he can have a
piece of her fresh-baked pie. George decides to stay, and anybody who
knows him could have predicted this decision. Does this mean that it
was not an act of free will? I wouldn't say so.
Predetermination, or even predictability, do not necessarily conflict
with free will.
Let me pursue this point a bit further. The idea that determinism
conflicts with free will is a relic of obsolete metaphysics,
specifically the notion of the soul. An action would be said to be
free if it was determined by the soul, rather than the body or the
world; this was a reasonable concept because the soul was considered
to be something separate from the world. Now that we no longer accept
the notion of a nonphysical soul, this line of reasoning has no
validity. Determination of an action by the self (i.e., free will)
can no longer be taken to imply lack of determination by the physical
world.
-- Bill
Patrick Juola
>Free will is simply put: The ability of a creature
>to make a decision in opposite to the observation purely on the
>internal consumation of intellect. To refute free will is to admit the
Okay, here's a definition with some teeth in it, that can be defended or
refuted on its merits. Well done, Mr. Kent.
Unfortunately, I think that this definition is a bit simplistic; or
more accurately, doesn't reflect what the majority of philosphers have
traditionally defined as "free will."
A more traditional definition could be phrased as "an action is taken
as a result of free will if a different action *could* have been taken."
The implication, of course, is that you are only exercising free will when
you are actually making a "free" choice between two or more viable
alternatives. If, for some reason, this choice could not have been made
any differently, then you're not displaying "free will."
Unfortunately, it's still an open question as to whether or not human will
is "free" in the second sense -- and computer programs are among the best
evidence that we have that they are not. A deterministic chess program
is a good example -- it will *always* make the same opening move (by
definition), when presented with the initial board configuration. A
chessboard that (pseudo)randomly selects an opening will always make the
same opening move when presented with the same initial board configuration
*and* the same initial seed. Et cetera.
The board configuration is clearly an "observation" in the sense of your
definition above. I submit that the seed is not an "observation" in the
conventional sense -- and we have no evidence that such "seeds" (hidden
variables that determine [strong sense] human behavior) aren't hidden
inside people. In fact, psychologists strongly believe that there are
such seeds that (weakly) determine human behavior (and a good part of
psychotherapy consists of identifying and defusing the "seeds" of
dysfunctional behavior).
So, I think that a chess program that (pseudo)randomly selects an opening
move displays "free will" according to your definition but not according
to one more generally accepted among philosophers.
Patrick
br...@ssl.msfc.nasa.gov
>br...@ssl.msfc.nasa.gov wrote:
>
>: but I think those folks need to think less about the meaning
>: of "free" and more about the meaning of "I". What sort of I could be
>: completely free of all influences?
>
>sort of soul, unconstrained by matter?
>
>I'm not sure such a thing exists.
>
>If it's not our hardware/hardwiring thats driving us, and it's not
>our software, then what else could it be?
>
>This whole belief in free will seems to be based on the judeo-christian
>belief in some kind of soul. Uh...doesn't it?
>
>From where else could this free will spring? This force that is neither a
>slave to my programing and hardwiring?
>
>coming soon(er or later): http://www.seds.org/~bryce
>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>"If -- as I have claimed all along -- the universe is really just what we
>say it is, then...*say*!"
> - James Burke, "The Day The Universe Changed"
>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>finger br...@seds.lpl.arizona.edu for pgp public encryption key
I agree.
frank forman
posters that we cannot solve the problems of (self-)consciousness and
free will until we define them exactly enough to put them to the test.
Even still, we seem to lack enough understanding of neurology to conduct
a test. Nevertheless, we do manage to use these concepts, and absolutely
no one grows up without using them. We all sorta know what consciousness
and free will mean.
My question: how come we all come to *learn* these concepts?
Frank
br...@ssl.msfc.nasa.gov
>Raghu Seshadri (sesh...@cup.hp.com) wrote:
>
>: : Where do you think the desire to do something comes from? It doesn't
>: : come from the will because I don't will myself to desire. Therefore no
>: : matter where the desire comes from it definitely originates outside the
>: : will. I assume that it is caused by my physical state but even if it is
>: : not it is the desire that determines the actions of the will. Every
>: : willful action is preceded by the desire to act. The will is therefore
>: : not free.
>
>: Good point.
>
>: RS
>
>questions. Very often we control our desire
>by an effort of will. How do you explain
>that ?
>
>RS
Inconsistent memes compete for expression within my cognitive machinery, i.e.
I've learned one set of rules which proscribe one behavior in some situation
(the desire) and another set of rules which proscribe a different behavior in
the same situation (the will). What you call "an effort of will" is the
emergence of a dominant meme complex. My sense that *I* am exerting *my*
will over the desire is a recognition of the dominant complex. Actually, I am
both the will and the desire, and the struggle and the victory and the defeat.
How and why one meme complex wins the dominance struggle is an interesting
question, a central question of memetics.
Bill Skaggs
> I don't get it. When I try to convince others of my views, I do so by
> talking or writing. Either way it's a physical act, and through a
> chain of events induces physical changes inside the brain of the
> person I'm trying to convince. Where's the problem?
ls...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu writes:
> It would seem that the free will believers think that without free
> will, they can simply give up performing undesirable tasks. The
> rational being that since they cannot change their destiny, they
> are not changing anything by being lazy.
>
> This view stems from looking at reality in terms of action, without
> looking at the cause. For instance, it is obvious that
> my mind can make choices, and this is what the free will people
> think about when they make their claims.
>
> What they don't see is that these choices are arrived at
> by a combination of our mental ability, experience and
> environment. Since ultimately we can not control these factors
> which influence our decisions, we have no free will.
No, I don't accept this conclusion. To say that I have free will is
to say that I determine my own actions, that they are not determined
by anything other than me, though of course they may be *influenced*
by a variety of things. If I am a physical system, and I determine my
own actions, then my actions are physically determined, but I have
free will nonetheless. I don't see any contradiction between
determinism and the existence of free will.
-- Bill
Wlodzimierz Holsztynski
Ilias Kastanas
Raghu Seshadri <sesh...@cup.hp.com> wrote:
>Raghu Seshadri (sesh...@cup.hp.com) wrote:
>
>: : Where do you think the desire to do something comes from? It doesn't
>: : come from the will because I don't will myself to desire. Therefore no
>: : matter where the desire comes from it definitely originates outside the
>: : will. I assume that it is caused by my physical state but even if it is
>: : not it is the desire that determines the actions of the will. Every
>: : willful action is preceded by the desire to act. The will is therefore
>: : not free.
>
>: Good point.
>
>: RS
>
>Yes, it is a good point, but raises additional
>questions. Very often we control our desire
>by an effort of will. How do you explain
>that ?
>
>RS
Sartre: "You can do whatever you want, but you cannot want whatever
you want"
Ilias
Mike Oliver
> Now that we no longer accept
>the notion of a nonphysical soul, this line of reasoning has no
>validity. Determination of an action by the self (i.e., free will)
>can no longer be taken to imply lack of determination by the physical
>world.
Who is this "we"? I for one believe in a nonphysical soul.
I'd suggest paring the newsgroups line, though. This doesn't seem
to have a lot to do with the charter of sci.logic, where I'm reading it.
One could also probably drop sci.physics, sci.math, sci.math.symbolic, and
several others.
csaint
>Where do you think the desire to do something comes from? It doesn't
>come from the will because I don't will myself to desire. Therefore no
>matter where the desire comes from it definitely originates outside the
>will. I assume that it is caused by my physical state but even if it is
>not it is the desire that determines the actions of the will. Every
>willful action is preceded by the desire to act. The will is therefore
>not free.
it much easier, at times, to follow our desires, we are still able to
choose our course of action according to our will. I can decide to go
without food for a day, even though I will likely experience sharp
cravings for food throughout the day. This is known as willpower. Now
you may respond by pointing out that I must have had some internal desire
prompt me to decide to fast for the day. True, but when it all comes down
I find that I can actually make a decision between "a" and "b." If I have
chosen "a" I can look back to the point when the decision was made and
know that I could have chosen "b." Now I realize that, in some sense, it
only matters what I have chosen, not what I could have chosen; and I
cannot go back and change my choice. This then allows for the possibility
of having a will that is not free, but in all ways seems free to us. Thus
our path would be predestined, but we would be made to feel as if we were
really the ones doing the choosing. This type of quasi-free will is
probably, and for all practical purposes, the same as completely free
will.
Jeff Dalton
>In article <DKvsF...@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>, pin...@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>>>bi...@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs) writes:
>>>
>>>>talking or writing. Either way it's a physical act, and through a
>>>>chain of events induces physical changes inside the brain of the
>>>>person I'm trying to convince. Where's the problem?
>
>will, they can simply give up performing undesirable tasks. The
>rational being that since they cannot change their destiny, they
>are not changing anything by being lazy.
It's necessary to be careful when talking of "the free will
believers", or (later) "the free will people", because there
are a number of different views.
Still, you're right that a lack of free will does not imply that our
actions do not change our destiny (ie, what happens to us in the end).
The problem is that we (supposedly) cannot choose our actions.
This may be a place where the free will and fatalism issues
diverge. If everything is fated, then the issues are much the same
for fatalism and <determinism as a (supposed) reason why we lack free
will>. But fate is often seen as determining certain key results
rather than everything.
For instance, you're told you'll die in city C, and so you try to
avoid going there. You're not necessarily thought to be _fated_ to
do this avoiding. And if you were in a story, circumstances would
conspire to get you to C anyway. (Didn't something like this happen
to Frederick the Great?) So fate seems to fix the end, but not how
you get there.
Consider, for instance, "The Fatalist" in Lermontov's novel _A Hero of
our Time_. (See http://www.datatext.co.uk/library/lmontov/hero/7.htm)
There's also a view, expressed e.g. by Beowolf, that even the
end may be subject to change. (B says fate sometimes spares
a man if his courage is good.)
-- jd
I Dunno
Mountain Man
>KMO <c53...@mizzou1.missouri.edu> writes:
>
>|> Even so, if an otherwise reasonable person
>|> expressed the belief that the sun wouldn't rise tomorrow, I might try
>|> to pursuade that person that my belief (that the sun will rise) is
>|> correct.
>
>But it's a remarkably poor one, in my opinion! Remarkably. It's often
>annoyed me, so now I'll vent my spleen.
========<snip>========
>What a bummer!! What on earth kind of saying is that?!
It is an entirely geocentric saying ....
It is a terrestial environmental saying.
It is a saying which was generically held to be true until a short time
ago in the long history of our world.
The nature of heliocentricity has yet to be fully perceived.
It was the biggest paradigm shift in the history of "life" itself.
It has been under-analysed, and it has been mis-understood.
Daylight it is quantised by the earth's spin into night and day.
Our consciousness of events and the order of events (from which are
derived theory and prediction) is also similarly quantised.
Thus people sleep and awake.
But life is known as the continuum ...
In the terrestrial realms (upon the earth in its binary system with the
moon) there is my philosphy concerning the "spectrum of duality" of
practically any subject of your choosing.
The only "real and natural" resolution of these dualities will be derived
from acknowledgement of a more cosmic perspective.
Heliocentricity relates to the generic awareness that a living being has
of its environment - but in particular the cosmic environment.
We live on earth.
But it is not a geocentric frame of reference ......
Arguments and duality will not disappear with the dawn unless ....
We acknowledge that we exist as part of a terrestrial eco-system
But that terrestrial eco-system describes a helical path through the
cosmos, for it is part of a binary earth/moon system which orbits the
sun which is at the center of our local cosmic environment.
Which in turn is part of and moves within a local galactic environment
which moves in its own "Way" ....
Therefore, if this open circular letter ever gets to Professor Penrose,
let him know that all of the dualities of consciousness may be explained
in a remarkably simple and natural manner.
The kingdoms of life - mineral, plant, animal and man are part of a
non-cartesian eco-system in which the principle of life is a fundamental
and non-commercial postulate. And the eco-system is a dynamic concern
which is empowered by the engine of the sun at many different levels.
Pete Brown
--------------------------------------------------------------------
BoomerangOutPost: Mountain Man Graphics, Newport Beach, {OZ}
Webulous Coordinates: http://magna.com.au/~prfbrown/welcome.html
QuoteForTheDay: "Been there before" : Banjo Patterson 1888
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Dalton
>to say that I determine my own actions, that they are not determined
>by anything other than me, though of course they may be *influenced*
>by a variety of things. If I am a physical system, and I determine my
>own actions, then my actions are physically determined, but I have
>free will nonetheless. I don't see any contradiction between
>determinism and the existence of free will.
Fair enough, but what does it mean to say you determine your actions?
Some philosophers bring in something called "agent causation" here
which tends to seem rather mysterious, to say the least. But if,
avoiding this, you say only that certain key processes take place
in you brain -- and so, in a sense, in you -- then it's not clear
that this makes free will compatible with determinism, because
those brain processes, and your decisions, were determined and
could not have turned out any other way. (Or so the argument
goes.)
-- jd
I Dunno
I Dunno
David L. Johnson
this discussion? It has nothing to do with the subject of that
newsgroup. If I wanted to follow this discussion, I would subscribe to
an appropriate group.
--
David L. Johnson dl...@lehigh.edu
Department of Mathematics http://www.lehigh.edu/~dlj0/dlj0.html
Lehigh University
14 E. Packer Avenue (610) 758-3759
Bethlehem, PA 18015-3174 (610) 828-3708
Ken Seto
>In article <4d9bcb$m...@eri1.erinet.com>, Ken Seto <ken...@erinet.com> wrote:
>>Your posting suggests that you may be lagging in the intelligent or
>>creative department. Furthermore, you may not have the mental capacity
>>to comprehend my theory so from that stand point, you are the true
>>oxymoron.
>>ken...@erinet.com
>Of course as a true researcher you went to the library,
>you have checked my publications, you have understood them etc.
>Somehow I have my doubts. Instead you are my mind reader.
>And that I doubt too.
I don't care if you have published a thousand books. You have not read
my book and you made an idiotic posting about it--that is a sure sign
of lagging in the intelligent department.
>Ken Seto,
> it's clear that as a philosopher you are a perfect zero.
> "realistic origin of the world"
My book is about a new aether theory that can explain the processes of
nature--including the consciousness process of life. Again, your
statement illustrate your ignorance.
>ha-ha-ha-ha!!!
>"it gives a realistic origin of the world" -- ha-ha-ha, give me a break
>:-)
> Wlod
>PS. C'mon man, cut your loses, just acknowledge that you have written
>a nonsense, no big deal, and that's end of it.
Perhaps you should go back and review your own publications. From what
I seen of your postings, your pubications are probably pure bull
shit--but then I am engaging the same mentality as you so I withdraw
the last statement.
Ken Seto
Betnun
On 13 Jan 1996, I Dunno wrote:
> Fuck you.
>
>
I see someone is exercising his free will.
Toby Bartels
>Consider the following example: George likes pie, in fact he loves it
>and never passes up a chance to eat it. George is about to go out for
>a walk, when his mother tells him that if he stays home he can have a
>piece of her fresh-baked pie. George decides to stay, and anybody who
>knows him could have predicted this decision. Does this mean that it
>was not an act of free will? I wouldn't say so.
>Predetermination, or even predictability, do not necessarily conflict
>with free will.
>Let me pursue this point a bit further. The idea that determinism
>conflicts with free will is a relic of obsolete metaphysics,
>specifically the notion of the soul. An action would be said to be
>free if it was determined by the soul, rather than the body or the
>world; this was a reasonable concept because the soul was considered
>to be something separate from the world. Now that we no longer accept
>the notion of a nonphysical soul, this line of reasoning has no
>validity. Determination of an action by the self (i.e., free will)
>can no longer be taken to imply lack of determination by the physical
>world.
I think you're jumping the gun when you say
`we no longer accept the notion of a nonphysical soul',
because quite a few people still do.
However, I don't accept it, so that's good enough for me.
My problem is: just what do you mean by `free will' then?
Perhaps you mean the feeling of making a choice that George gets;
well, anyone but a behaviourist should believe in that.
But I'll stop trying to guess -- what do you mean?
-- Toby
to...@ugcs.caltech.edu
Johan Wevers
>>stop arguing is determined by my brain structure and the inputs it gets.
>>Your reply, for example, caused my brain to decide to continue arguing.
>In other words, I have a complete mastery over
>your brain while you yourself don't, you are
>a helpless passive reactor only.
There doesn't exist a separation between "me" and "my brain". I _am_ my
brain (and the rest of my body), there isn't any other "me" outside
that. And I think your actions have, together with other stimuli, a rather
deterministic influence on my behaviour. Just as my actions have on you.
--
ir. J.C.A. Wevers || The only nature of reality is physics.
joh...@vulcan.xs4all.nl || http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/index.html
Finger joh...@xs4all.nl for my PGP public key. PGP-KeyID: 0xD42F80B1
Wlodzimierz Holsztynski
>eve...@netcom.com (Wlodzimierz Holsztynski) wrote:
>
>>In article <4d6ov8$9...@eri1.erinet.com>, Ken Seto <ken...@erinet.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>- It gives a realistic origin of the universe.
>
>>
>
>>-------------------------------------------------------------
>>ha! hA! HA!! Ha! ha! ha-ha-ha o ha-ha... What a beautiful
>
>>
>> OXYMORON
>>
>
>>!!!!! :-)
>
>> Wlod
>
>Your posting suggests that you may be lagging in the intelligent or
>creative department. Furthermore, you may not have the mental capacity
>to comprehend my theory so from that stand point, you are the true
>oxymoron.
>ken...@erinet.com
Of course as a true researcher you went to the library,
you have checked my publications, you have understood them etc.
Somehow I have my doubts. Instead you are my mind reader.
And that I doubt too.
Ken Seto,
it's clear that as a philosopher you are a perfect zero.
"realistic origin of the world"
ha-ha-ha-ha!!!