On Sep 2, 9:21 am, M a r t i n M i c h a e l M u s a t o v
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
A) Examination of the Concept of a Supreme Being
1) The Supreme Being Is All-Good
...whatever the supreme being wills or commands
or does is the right thing to do. Thus whatever
God decides, does, or commands is
morally right...
2) The Supreme Being Is Omnipotent
...the supreme being has the ability to do anything
at all. But this definition is too loose, because it
does not decide the issue of whether God can
do something that involves a logical
contradiction...
3) The Supreme Being Is Omniscient
...the Supreme Being knows everything. But again
we must be careful, because not even God can be
said to know a falsehood. Thus, it would be better
to say that a supreme being knows all truths....
4) Other Characteristics of a Supreme Being
...There seem to be four additional properties;
- Because the supreme being is all-powerful,
he can be neither -created nor -destroyed,
and is therefore eternal.
- he is the creator of "heaven and earth and
all things" who loves and cares about the
creatures he creates.
- God is holy.
--------------------------------------------
A) Examination of the Concept of a Supreme Being
The problem before us is to characterize adequately a being we would
call God. We already have some idea where to begin, because the word
'supreme' is involved in the concept we are characterizing. Our
question is the following: "Supreme in what regard?" Surely not
supreme in evil, or merely in physical size or prowess, or even in
physical beauty. We generally mean supreme in those characteristics or
properties that make a being more perfect than it would be if it
lacked them, so that we would call a being God only if it were the
most perfect being of which we could conceive. Consequently, we would
claim that the supreme being is one who is supreme in his ability to
perform actions and to know what occurs, and who is certainly supreme
in goodness. Thus we think of God as the being who is all-good, all-
knowing, and all-powerful. That is, he is supreme in goodness,
knowledge, and power. Let us then consider these three characteristics
separately.
1) The Supreme Being Is All-Good
We can understand the statement that the supreme being is all-good to
mean that whatever the supreme being wills or commands or does is the
right thing to do. Thus whatever God decides, does, or commands is
morally right. In addition, however, he always has good motives, for
willing, doing, or commanding in the way he does, because he is a
loving God who cares about the world and its inhabitants. Thus God
does not do the right things with the wrong motives, nor does he have
good motives but mistakenly do the wrong things. Let us take the
statement 'God is good' to mean that God has good motives, and
whatever he wills, does, or commands is morally right. There is,
however, a problem about how to interpret this. We could interpret it
to mean that if the supreme being wills or commands or does something,
then by definition this is the right thing to do. On another
interpretation, the statement means that if the supreme being wills or
commands or does something, then as a matter of fact this is the right
thing to do. Which interpretation should we use? It has been claimed
that neither alternative is appealing, because each is faced with a
problem. If we accept the first interpretation, then if the supreme
being willed or commanded that someone wantonly inflict pain on
innocent babies, or inflicted such pain himself, then inflicting pain
on innocent babies would be defined as being the right thing to do.
Although we shall not consider moral problems in any detail until
Chapter Six, it surely seems that if wantonly inflicting pain on
innocent babies is morally right, then nothing is morally wrong. We
want to deny that this could be morally right. Yet, if a supreme
being's doing or commanding it, which is surely possible, entails that
it is right, we cannot justify such a denial. If it be objected at
this point that God would not engage in or command wanton infliction
of pain, we can ask, "Why not?" The answer cannot be that he could not
because he is good and inflicting pain is wrong. For if he were to
inflict pain, then, on this view, it would follow that doing this is
right. Nor can we find a more helpful answer. This view, therefore,
seems faced with an insoluble problem.
Let us turn to the second alternative. On this view, it is possible
for God to do wrong, although as a matter of fact what he does always
turns out to be right. Thus, although it is true that if God does or
commands an act then it is right, it does not follow that if God were
wantonly to inflict pain, then that would be right. We can say that in
that case he would do wrong, but that, as a matter of fact, God never
would inflict pain needlessly. Thus the second interpretation avoids
the problem facing the first interpretation. However, some people have
objected to one consequence of this view. It is claimed that if God
does not prescribe the standard of what ought to be done, then there
is a moral standard that exists independently of God, so that he can
be judged by reference to it. Surely, it is argued, something has gone
wrong with a view if it entails that we can judge the moral worth of
the supreme being. However, it is not clear why anyone objects to a
view that entails that it is logically possible to judge God's
commands and acts by a standard. If the view entailed that it is not
only logically possible but also morally permissible for a human being
to judge God, then it might well be objectionable. But the view does
not entail that statement. The second interpretation, then, seems to
avoid the objection to it. Let us, therefore, define the sentence 'The
supreme being is all-good' as 'All motives of the supreme being are
good and all acts the supreme being wills, does, or commands are, as a
matter of fact, the right things to do.'
2) The Supreme Being Is Omnipotent
The quickest way to define this statement is by saying that it means
that the supreme being has the ability to do anything at all. But this
definition is too loose, because it does not decide the issue of
whether God can do something that involves a logical contradiction.
Does God, for example, have the ability to make the mercury in a
thermometer be one inch from the bottom of the thermometer at the same
time that it is two inches from the bottom? Does he have the ability
to make a lake frozen at the same time that there is no ice on it?
Some have argued that if we claim that God does not have the ability
to do something involving a logical contradiction, then we must
conclude that he does not have the ability to do everything and thus
is not omnipotent. However, there seems to be no reason why it would
be limiting God's power to say that he is able to do anything that it
is logically possible to do. This rules out nothing that has been
claimed to be among God's acts, including creation out of nothing. It
rules out only acts the descriptions of which involve a contradiction.
Let us therefore try the following: 'The supreme being has the ability
to do anything that it is logically possible to do' as the definition
of the 'The supreme being is omnipotent,' (all-powerful).
At first glance this definition surely seems satisfactory, but we
shall have to make another revision. Consider the act of sitting in a
chair at a time when God is not sitting there. It is clear that you,
I, and almost everyone are able to sit in a chair at a time when God
is not sitting there. But is God able to do this? Is God able to sit
in a chair at the same time God is not sitting there? Clearly not,
and, because it is logically possible to do it (you and I do it), we
must conclude by the preceding definition that God is not omnipotent.
It does not seem, however, that because neither God nor anyone else
can both be at one place and not be there at the same time, this is
any limitation on his power. It is, therefore, not the kind of
inability that should be allowed to count against his omnipotence. Let
us, consequently, revise the definition as follows: 'The supreme being
is omnipotent' means 'The supreme being has the ability to do anything
that it is logically possible that he do.' Using this definition we
can avoid concluding that God is not omnipotent because of the above
inability. The sentence
The supreme being is sitting in a chair at a time when he is not
sitting there.
is a self-contradiction, and so it is logically impossible that God
perform this act.
The definition we have settled on not only avoids the preceding
problem, but also allows us to solve an ancient puzzle. Consider a
boulder so heavy that God does not have the ability to lift it. Does
God have the ability to create such a rock or not? If he has this
ability then there is something else God cannot do, namely, lift the
rock. But either he has the ability to create the boulder or he does
not. Therefore there is something God does not have the ability to do:
both to create and to lift a certain boulder. Therefore God is not
omnipotent.
How might we refute this argument? First, notice that it contains two
conclusions: that there is something God is unable to do, and,
consequently, that God is not omnipotent. We must surely accept the
first, simply because there are many things God cannot do (that is,
whatever involves a logical contradiction). But because God's
inability to do self-contradictory things does not limit his power, we
should question whether we can draw the second conclusion that his
inability both to create and lift this boulder limits his power. Using
the preceding definition, the question is whether or not the statement
that God does these tasks is self-contradictory. If his doing at least
one of them is self-contradictory, then it is fallacious to draw the
conclusion that God is not omnipotent. There seems to be no
contradiction involved in saying that God creates a rock he is unable
to lift, so we must insist that an omnipotent God is able to create
the rock. The question, then, is whether it is logically possible that
God lift such a boulder. That is, is it logically possible that God
lift a boulder that he is unable to lift? The answer is clearly that
it is logically impossible for God to perform this act, and,
therefore, his inability to lift it does not limit his power. We can,
therefore, avoid the conclusion that God is not omnipotent by agreeing
that God is unable to lift such a rock, because such an inability does
not limit his power.
3) The Supreme Being Is Omniscient
We can begin our definition of the sentence 'The supreme being is
omniscient' as we did the previous definition-that is, by saying that
it means that the Supreme Being knows everything. But again we must be
careful, because not even God can be said to know a falsehood. Thus,
it would be better to say that a supreme being knows all truths. There
is, however, still a problem that should be considered. If God knows
all truths, then he knows truths about the future, that is, he knows
what will happen. But, it has been claimed, if God knows that
something is going to happen before it happens-for example, that I
will write the word 'thus' at the beginning of the next sentence-then
it follows that I must write 'thus' there. Thus, God's foreknowledge,
and hence his knowledge of all truths, is incompatible with my free
will. Consequently, either no one has free will, or God cannot foresee
all future events and he is not omniscient. Must we surrender our
belief that human beings have free will in order to guarantee God's
omniscience? We can avoid this because, in the premise "if God
foresees that I do something then I must do it," the word 'must'
indicates that the consequent follows logically from the antecedent.
So the premise can be restated as "It is logically necessary that if
God (or anyone else for that matter) foresees that I do something then
I will so it." But it does not follow from the fact that I will do
something that I must, in the sense of being coerced or forced to do
it against my will. Thus it does not follow, from foreknowledge of
what I will do, that I will not do it of my own free will.
At this point someone might try a new line of attack. If someone has
foreknowledge of what I do, then he can correctly predict what I will
do. But he can correctly predict what I will do only if what I will do
is causally determined and thus predictable on the basis of causal
laws. Consequently, foreknowledge of what I do is not compatible with
my doing it of my own free will. The first thing that can be said here
is that the conclusion follows only if free will and causal
determinism are incompatible. But we have previously found reason to
deny this. Secondly, there is no reason to think that someone can make
a correct prediction only on the basis of causal laws. We often
justifiably predict that, for example, Jones will decide to forgive
his wife her latest infidelity because we know what he will decide. In
addition, it is not clear that "foreknowledge" correctly describes
God's knowledge of my future. It has been claimed that for God the
whole of the temporal span of the universe-past, present, and future-
is like a brief moment of time for us, and thus God knows what I will
do in the way I know what I am doing now. No prediction is involved.
Thus there are reasons for rejecting this second line of attack upon
the compatibility of God's foreknowledge with our free will.
Before we move on, we should consider one other problem concerning
God's omniscience. Let us say that at a certain time, t(n), God
decides for the first time to do something (for example, create a
particular universe). If at that time, t(n), God decides for the first
time to create this world, then at no time before t(n) did God know
what his decision at t(n) would be, because if he did, then he would
not have decided for the first time at t(n) But if God is omniscient,
then there is no time at which he does not know all truths; so if God
is omniscient, then at every moment before t(n) he knows what he
decides for the first time at t(n) to do. Thus, if God decides for the
first time at t(n) to do something, then God is not omniscient, for
there is a time before t(n) at which he did not know what he would
decide. There are several ways to avoid this conclusion. One is to
deny there is a time at which God first decides to do something. Two
different reasons have been given for this. The first is that, no
matter how far back in time you might go, God has already made all his
decisions. The second is that, unlike us, none of God's decisions are
made at some time, because God is not a member of the world of
temporal objects.
There is another way to avoid this problem. This is to deny that it is
impossible for anyone to know at t(n) what he will do and at a later
time, t(n) + 1, to decide for the first time what he will do. Such a
situation is odd, but, according to this proposal, it is not logically
impossible. It surely seems possible, for example, that Jones knows
now that he later will decide for the first time to forgive his wife
her latest in a series of infidelities, although he is firmly resolved
not to forgive her now. He knows this on the basis of what he has done
in the past, each time resolving not to forgive her but each time
finally giving in. If Jones can know beforehand what he will decide to
do, then surely God can. There is no contradiction here.
We can finally rest content with the definition of 'The supreme being
is omniscient.' It means that the supreme being knows all truths.
4) Other Characteristics of a Supreme Being
We have discussed three essential characteristics of a supreme being-
the characteristics of supreme goodness, omnipotence, and omniscience.
The question now arises of whether there are any other characteristics
an entity would have if he were the supreme being. There seem to be
four additional properties. Because the supreme being is all-powerful,
he can be neither created nor destroyed, and is therefore eternal.
Furthermore, he is the creator of "heaven and earth and all things"
who loves and cares about the creatures he creates. And, finally, God
is holy. There is no problem about what it means to say that God is
loving. In being all-good, he is not merely fair and just, but also
benevolent and merciful toward his creatures, and deeply concerned
about their welfare. The only problem about what is meant by calling
the supreme being the creator of everything is whether this means that
he created what there is ex nihilo (that is, out of nothing) or
whether he created what there is out of some primordial chaos. Because
there is disagreement about which is the correct interpretation, let
us leave the question open by defining 'The supreme being is the
creator of heaven and earth and all things' as 'The supreme being
caused heaven and the physical universe to exist in their present
form.' Thus we have not decided by definition whether nor not God's
created everything ex nihilo.
There are two possible ways to interpret 'The supreme being is
eternal.' The first is that as a matter of fact the supreme being
never begins to exist and never ceases to exist. The second
interpretation is that it is logically necessary that the supreme
being neither begins nor ceases to exist. You will notice that neither
interpretation begs the question of whether or not God exists, because
his neither beginning nor ceasing to exist is consistent both with his
always existing and with his never existing. There is, however, an
important difference between the two interpretations. On the first
interpretation, it is logically possible that God be created and
destroyed, but on the second, it is logically impossible that anything
create or destroy God. Let us characterize the two interpretations of
'The supreme being is eternal' by saying that, on the first, if he
exists then he always exists, whereas on the second, if he exists then
he necessarily exists.
Which interpretation shall we choose? Although some people have argued
for the first interpretation, the following, which echoes the
ontological argument that we shall consider later in this chapter,
will justify our choosing the second. We have said that any being we
would call God must be the being supreme in perfection, so that if we
can think of a being more perfect than some particular being, then we
would not call the latter one God. Furthermore, if it is logically
possible that something create or destroy God, then we can think of a
being more powerful and therefore more perfect than God, namely, a
being that it is logically impossible to create or destroy. Therefore
we can conclude that it is logically impossible that anything create
or destroy God. We want, then, to characterize God in such a way that
it is logically impossible that he be created or destroyed. However,
if his eternality is merely a factual contingency, then it is
logically possible that something create or destroy him. But if he is
necessarily eternal, then this guarantees that it is not possible that
anything create or destroy him. Therefore, in order to have this
guarantee, let us use the second interpretation.
The last characteristic of a supreme being that we have to consider is
that such a being is holy. It is perhaps the hardest of all the
characteristics to define. When we say that God is holy we are trying
to express something of our feeling that God is worthy, even more than
worthy, of our full devotion, adoration, and reverence; that God is
that being whom we should worship, honor, and obey. This
characteristic is important for our purposes, because it can be used
as a test of the adequacy of the sum total of the other
characteristics that we have ascribed to the supreme being. If we have
provided an adequate characterization, then the quality of holiness
should really be redundant, because the total of the other
characteristics should include all and only those that would make any
being having them the being most worthy of our worship. In line with
this, let us define 'The supreme being is holy' as 'The supreme being
is that being who is most worthy of the complete devotion and
reverence of humanity.'
We have characterized the supreme being as the eternal, loving, and
holy being who created all things out of his omniscience, omnipotence,
and supreme goodness, and we have analyzed what we are to mean by
these terms. The question now before us is whether or not there is any
reason to think that this concept of the supreme being, which we have
carefully tried to analyze, applies to anything; that is, whether
there is a supreme being in the sense we have described. We are taking
this question as equivalent to asking whether there is any reason to
think that God exists since, in the major Western religious traditions
(Christianity, Judaism, and Islam), God is understood to be the
supreme being we have just described and defined. Certainly many
people believe that God, or the supreme being, exists. It is also true
that many people deny that there is a supreme being. The question
before us is which, if either, is the more reasonable.
A final clarificatory point is in order. Some people mean by the term
'God' such things as this: 'the force for love in the world,' or 'the
original cause of things,' or 'that which sustains the physical
universe,' or 'the transcendent object of ultimate concern.' Other
similarly vague definitions of the term 'God' are often proposed. We
are not asking the question whether God in any of these latter senses
of the term exists. We are not even considering the question. We are
concerned solely with whether God, considered as the supreme being,
exists.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/