Re: Wikipedia articles under attack
Michael C Price
news:44e2d534$0$2016$ba62...@text.nova.planet.nl...
> Michael C Price wrote:
>> Hi all;
>>
>> The following articles on Wikipedia are under a concerted attack
>> which attempts to rubbish all non-mainstream ideas:
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megavitamin_thearpy
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optimum_nutrition
>>
>> If you want to spread the message then join in and contribute with
>> facts and fighting misinformation.
>>
>> Take the time to read about their editorial policiy, though. Original
>> research is banned, so all statements should (in theory!) be backed up
>> with references and written from a neutral point of view.
>>
>> - Michael C Price
>
> I just read some creationists are editing the articles on Wikipedia on
> evolution, DNA etc. They are using a bad cop-good cop ploy. One puts a
> creationist POV in the article that is totally unsupported by any
> evidence, then one of the others comes in on the discussion page and
> pretends to be pro-science/ pro-evolution but insists the unsupported idea
> must remain to maintain a 'neutral point of view'. I think Wikipedia's
> NOPV policy is up for revision. I think tackling the problem by the roots
> is more productive then starting an edit-war.
Unsupported evidence can be removed by their verification rule
(if you can't provide a verifiable and reputable supporting citation
then it gets eliminated if challenged) so I doubt that that particular
strategy will work.
- Michael C Price
Juhana Harju
: "JohnDoe" <no...@ofyourbusiness.com> wrote in message
I have similar experiences. I contributed to the Finnish speaking Wikipedia
but I stopped it as my writings were removed. The facts in my articles did
not fit to someone's world view. After those experiences I quit writing
there. By its structrure Wikipedia supports mainstream ideas, even if they
are somewhat wrong and outdated.
--
Juhana
"All facts are theory-laden"
- Paul Feyerabend
Vernon
"Juhana Harju" <shantig...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:4khc01F...@individual.net...
Wickipedia is as reliable as New York Times, Los Angeles Times, AMA, JAMA
and is very seldom in agreement with standards such as Oxford.
I forgot the Hollywood mags and the Examiner.
Mr. Natural-Health
Hey Wikipedia Droogie!
This is smn rather than Wikipedia.
Just thought that the lost fool might want to know. :)
Curious
> I have similar experiences. I contributed to the Finnish speaking Wikipedia
> but I stopped it as my writings were removed. The facts in my articles did
> not fit to someone's world view. After those experiences I quit writing
> there. By its structrure Wikipedia supports mainstream ideas, even if they
> are somewhat wrong and outdated.
Indeed i have similar experiences even though in a different field in
Wikipedia (Andean anthropology, preincaic cultures etc). The issue
however is often with "moderators" pursuing their "truth" and not even a
consent...
Regards
Curious
--
"I don't wanna die, there's no future in it!"
-Curly Howard
Juhana Harju
: Juhana Harju wrote:
:: I have similar experiences. I contributed to the Finnish speaking
:: Wikipedia but I stopped it as my writings were removed. The facts in
:: my articles did not fit to someone's world view. After those
:: experiences I quit writing there. By its structrure Wikipedia
:: supports mainstream ideas, even if they are somewhat wrong and
:: outdated.
:
: Indeed i have similar experiences even though in a different field in
: Wikipedia (Andean anthropology, preincaic cultures etc). The issue
: however is often with "moderators" pursuing their "truth" and not
: even a consent...
Right. I have experienced that, too. It is a pitty as the basic idea of
Wikipedia is great.
Mr. Natural-Health
Michael C Price wrote:
> >> The following articles on Wikipedia are under a concerted attack
> >> which attempts to rubbish all non-mainstream ideas:
> >>
> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megavitamin_thearpy
Plonk!
Ha, ... Hah, Ha!
I told you so. What you wrote on yesterday, has just been deleted by
some bigoted idiot.
You wont see me wasting my time in Wikipedia. :)
Vernon
I know I'll be acused of being trite, but, we get what we pay for.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
Such problems and negatives arise precisely because the "basic idea" is
*not* "great". To be "great" an idea, theory or practice must be
consistent with reality and then it can not, in the long run, have
negatives. To be consistent with the nature of human beings (actually
all lifeforms, as energy requiring and negative local entropy
generating entities), any whole program must provide a return of value
(a variant of energy) to the contributor (as determined by hir)
commensurate with that which s/he has contributed. Otherwise, in the
long run (ie. after a short period of initial investment of value while
checking out if a return is forthcoming) any logical/reasonable
contributor will stop contributing. For details check out the essays on
"value for value" on my websites and the discussions on that subject in
the Yahoo group MoreLife.
--Paul Wakfer
MoreLife for the rational - http://morelife.org
Reality based tools for more life in quantity and quality
The Self-Sovereign Individual Project - http://selfsip.org
Rational freedom by self-sovereignty & social contracting
Paul Antonik Wakfer
It may be trite, but it is also wise. Unfortunately, too few people
have followed that wisdom to it's logical conclusion and fully
understood from where it derives and why it is absolutely critical to
all human social exchanges. "It is in one's longest range widest
self-interest to pay for what one gets" is another (but less often
stated) wise idea, which logically follows. Together this idea forms
the core of the concept of "value for value" that I have been espousing
for sometime and briefly described in my reply to Juhana.
Juhana Harju
: Juhana Harju wrote:
:: Curious wrote:
::: Juhana Harju wrote:
:::: I have similar experiences. I contributed to the Finnish speaking
:::: Wikipedia but I stopped it as my writings were removed. The facts
:::: in my articles did not fit to someone's world view. After those
:::: experiences I quit writing there. By its structrure Wikipedia
:::: supports mainstream ideas, even if they are somewhat wrong and
:::: outdated.
:::
::: Indeed i have similar experiences even though in a different field
::: in Wikipedia (Andean anthropology, preincaic cultures etc). The
::: issue however is often with "moderators" pursuing their "truth" and
::: not even a consent...
::
:: Right. I have experienced that, too. It is a pitty as the basic idea
:: of Wikipedia is great.
:
: Such problems and negatives arise precisely because the "basic idea"
: is *not* "great". To be "great" an idea, theory or practice must be
: consistent with reality and then it can not, in the long run, have
: negatives. To be consistent with the nature of human beings (actually
: all lifeforms, as energy requiring and negative local entropy
: generating entities), any whole program must provide a return of value
: (a variant of energy) to the contributor (as determined by hir)
: commensurate with that which s/he has contributed.
It all depends on the motivation of the person who contributes. I believe -
based on my own experience - that it is possible *to give freely*, without
expecting anything in return. That kind of act stems from a source which can
not be emptied, and that kind of giving is a pleasure to the giver. Ideas
and feelings are *not* like material goods. In fact ideas and feelings
spread and multiply by giving them forth although the current economic
system is trying to handle them in the same way as does handle material
things.
: Otherwise, in the
Paul Antonik Wakfer
No. It is simply not possible to act for no value in return. You and
others only think it is because you do not have a sufficiently
generalized concept of value.
> That kind of act stems from a source which can
> not be emptied, and that kind of giving is a pleasure to the giver.
Which means that the giver receives value from the action (the giving).
You and others may think that this is simply "begging the question" or
distorting the meaning of "getting some return". However, I maintain
that it is instead being fully consistent with that meaning and that
until people begin to be consistent about this issue (instead of
pretending that they are doing something for no return), they will not
be able to begin to address the greater issue of just what and how are
the optimal ways for them to maximize their lifetime acquisition of
happiness (ie of obtained total value).
> Ideas and feelings are *not* like material goods.
Nothing that I said implied that they were like material goods in all
their aspects. However, they are like material goods in some of their
aspects particularly with respect to the requirement of allocation of
scarce resources of time and other material goods for their production.
Furthermore, they all contribute to happiness, which in its generalized
definition (see SelfSIP.org for definitions) is the goal of all human
action.
> In fact ideas and feelings
> spread and multiply by giving them forth
Again nothing I said precluded the action of "sending forth" ideas
(emitting or transmitting them from oneself to others). (Only the word
"give" is inappropriate for use here, since one *can* never give
something without any conscious or subconscious thought of return. In
addition, one cannot, in principle, transmit emotions - feelings, but
only descriptions of emotions.) My point was and is that others should
be prepared to return value to those who send forth ideas to the extent
they are valued by the receiver, in a form that is valued by the
sender. One does this for the very simple reason that one wants to
encourage the sender to send forth more value. And similarly if one
does not value what is sent out by someone, one should not return any
value so that one discourages that person from sending forth ideas that
are of not value to one. Note the similarity of this process to the
market ordering and organizing mechanism of buying products that you
want and not buying products that you do not want.
> although the current economic
> system is trying to handle them in the same way as does handle material
> things.
I am totally in agreement with your criticism of the way the current
economic system (actually a government promulgated system rather than a
freely socially determined and self-adjusting system) handles
non-material goods (generally called intellectual property).
--Paul Wakfer
Juhana Harju
: Juhana Harju wrote:
Then I have been testifying some impossible acts happening. :-)
:: That kind of act stems from a source which can
:: not be emptied, and that kind of giving is a pleasure to the giver.
:
: Which means that the giver receives value from the action (the
: giving). You and others may think that this is simply "begging the
: question" or distorting the meaning of "getting some return".
Yes, I do.
: However, I maintain that it is instead being fully consistent with
: that meaning and that until people begin to be consistent about this
: issue (instead of pretending that they are doing something for no
: return), they will not be able to begin to address the greater issue
: of just what and how are the optimal ways for them to maximize their
: lifetime acquisition of happiness (ie of obtained total value).
"...maximize their lifetime acquisition of happiness." That sounds alarming.
I don't think that happiness is something to be collected. It is a
by-product of a life well-lived. It sounds to me that you are trying to make
the life fit to your principles and not the other way round.
:: Ideas and feelings are *not* like material goods.
:
: Nothing that I said implied that they were like material goods in all
: their aspects. However, they are like material goods in some of their
: aspects particularly with respect to the requirement of allocation of
: scarce resources of time and other material goods for their
: production. Furthermore, they all contribute to happiness, which in
: its generalized definition (see SelfSIP.org for definitions) is the
: goal of all human action.
:
:: In fact ideas and feelings
:: spread and multiply by giving them forth
:
: Again nothing I said precluded the action of "sending forth" ideas
: (emitting or transmitting them from oneself to others). (Only the word
: "give" is inappropriate for use here, since one *can* never give
: something without any conscious or subconscious thought of return. In
: addition, one cannot, in principle, transmit emotions - feelings, but
: only descriptions of emotions.)
If I can feel the other person's feelings or emotions then it is possible to
transmit them. It is a meaningless semantic game to say that emotions
themselves are not transmitted but their descriptions. Again, you are trying
to make the reality to fit your scheme of things by applying rigid
principles on reality. The problem is that you want to escape the fact that
people share a common life; people are connected in the deepest sense. You
are trying to escape this fact by playing with concepts and words.
: My point was and is that others should
: be prepared to return value to those who send forth ideas to the
: extent they are valued by the receiver, in a form that is valued by
: the sender.
You just described some of the workings of the ego. But there is the
possibility of a higher order, or higher way of being and acting. Some
philosophical or religious systems speak about the importance of not being
attached to the fruits of action. In the Oriental philosophy it is thought
that if we expect something in return that expectation is attachment. This
attachment in turn creates causes that we have to experience in some future
time. This is the way keep ourselves bound.
The highest order is unconditional love. Perhaps everyone has experienced
something which comes close to that. That is to feel that the other person
accepts you expecting nothing in return.
: One does this for the very simple reason that one wants to
: encourage the sender to send forth more value. And similarly if one
: does not value what is sent out by someone, one should not return any
: value so that one discourages that person from sending forth ideas
: that are of not value to one. Note the similarity of this process to
: the market ordering and organizing mechanism of buying products that
: you want and not buying products that you do not want.
:: although the current economic
:: system is trying to handle them in the same way as does handle
:: material things.
:
: I am totally in agreement with your criticism of the way the current
: economic system (actually a government promulgated system rather than
: a freely socially determined and self-adjusting system) handles
: non-material goods (generally called intellectual property).
Property word spoiles the fact that by the very nature non-material goods
are potentially expansive and can not be confined.
Vernon
Yes, it is possible and self profitable to "give freely".
Ideas and feelings are "exactly" like material things. In a free society
there is mutual, synergistic and explosive growth of "product", material or
spiritual (feelings and ideas).
When you are in a position as a "taker" (of free things), you are obviously
not a giver.
Democracy is not free
Personal integrity is not free
Security is not free.
Health is not free.
Self esteem is not free.
To be very crude for those who have very little thought on this or anything
else.
Love from another is almost useless unless returned in kind. That can be
interelations or sex.
Vernon
> Paul Antonik Wakfer wrote:
> : Juhana Harju wrote:
> :: Paul Antonik Wakfer wrote:
> ::: Juhana Harju wrote:
> :::: Curious wrote:
> ::::: Juhana Harju wrote:
Yep wicky pee is junk.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
No, you have only being witnessing (I think that is what you meant by
"testifying") some acts of value being contributed for either a form of
return that you yourself would not value (but the contributor does or
s/he would not have acted in such a manner), or for a hope for some
value being returned which, in fact, does not materialize. I never said
that value *will* always be returned, only that psychologically one
cannot take any action unless one consciously or subconsciously thinks
that there will be a net gain in value to oneself by doing so.
> :: That kind of act stems from a source which can
> :: not be emptied, and that kind of giving is a pleasure to the giver.
> :
> : Which means that the giver receives value from the action (the
> : giving). You and others may think that this is simply "begging the
> : question" or distorting the meaning of "getting some return".
>
> Yes, I do.
Good. Being honest, open and frank is the first necessary step toward
cooperative social exchange to mutual advantage - towards maximizing
the lifetime happiness of all at once and together.
> : However, I maintain that it is instead being fully consistent with
> : that meaning and that until people begin to be consistent about this
> : issue (instead of pretending that they are doing something for no
> : return), they will not be able to begin to address the greater issue
> : of just what and how are the optimal ways for them to maximize their
> : lifetime acquisition of happiness (ie of obtained total value).
>
> "...maximize their lifetime acquisition of happiness." That sounds alarming.
> I don't think that happiness is something to be collected. It is a
> by-product of a life well-lived. It sounds to me that you are trying to make
> the life fit to your principles and not the other way round.
Sorry for any misunderstanding. "Acquisition" does not for me imply
collecting in the sense of amassing some form of asset. Perhaps it was
a poor choice of word. I simply meant
gaining/emoting/enjoying/experiencing. Happiness is not merely "a
by-product of a life well-lived", it is the very purpose of life itself
and the standard by which "well-lived" is determined. The purpose of
life is to gain/emote/enjoy/experience happiness to the maximum extent
possible and unhappiness to the minimum extent possible. From a longer
range pov the goal of life is to maximize one's integrated lifetime
happiness (one's instantaneous happiness integrated in the mathematical
sense over the entire time of one's life). Again in my writings on my
SelfSIP.org website I define and discuss this in great detail.
>
> :: Ideas and feelings are *not* like material goods.
> :
> : Nothing that I said implied that they were like material goods in all
> : their aspects. However, they are like material goods in some of their
> : aspects particularly with respect to the requirement of allocation of
> : scarce resources of time and other material goods for their
> : production. Furthermore, they all contribute to happiness, which in
> : its generalized definition (see SelfSIP.org for definitions) is the
> : goal of all human action.
> :
> :: In fact ideas and feelings
> :: spread and multiply by giving them forth
> :
> : Again nothing I said precluded the action of "sending forth" ideas
> : (emitting or transmitting them from oneself to others). (Only the word
> : "give" is inappropriate for use here, since one *can* never give
> : something without any conscious or subconscious thought of return. In
> : addition, one cannot, in principle, transmit emotions - feelings, but
> : only descriptions of emotions.)
>
> If I can feel the other person's feelings or emotions then it is possible to
> transmit them.
But you *cannot* feel "the other person's feeling or emotions", you can
only feel your own feelings or emotions. The closest that you can come
is to feel what you *think* that the other person is emotionally
experiencing. Within the limits of current technology, you can not
actually know how close your feelings are to hirs.
> It is a meaningless semantic game to say that emotions
> themselves are not transmitted but their descriptions.
No it is not a game. It is being true to reality. Instead, the clouding
and distorting, exaggeration and meaninglessness is in stating and
thinking that one *can* "feel the other person's feelings or emotions".
> Again, you are trying
> to make the reality to fit your scheme of things by applying rigid
> principles on reality.
Not at all. I am trying to bring out the essence of the reality of
human mental processes and relationships. Besides I have no idea what
principles (rigid or not) you are talking about. I am not stating
principles. I am stating and describing facts of reality which are
grossly distorted by current language and by the thinking of most
people in current society.
> The problem is that you want to escape the fact that
> people share a common life; people are connected in the deepest sense.
I am not sure what you can possibly mean by "a common life". Each
person lives hir own life and such life is often intimately related to
the lives of a few others. However, in the very deepest sense of being
in direct mental connection, people are highly unconnected. I have
wished for decades that all humans could read the minds of all others
(particularly for myself, to be able to read the minds of others and
for them to be able to read my mind), but longing for such does not
make it become real. People only share lives to the extent that they
cooperatively and as deeply and honestly as possible communicate with
each other. This is shown by the simple example of a hermit living
alone without any contact with other humans. S/he most certainly has no
life "in common" or even *known* by any others. More generally, people
are only connected in any deep sense to a minuscule number of other
people (and far too many have walled themselves off from a deep
connection to anyone else). To all others they are only connected to a
relatively minor extent (which is a major cause of all the harmful
actions of so many individuals - they are not sufficiently connected
with the results of their actions).
> You
> are trying to escape this fact by playing with concepts and words.
No. I am trying to help you and others see that *you* are trying to
escape (or to deny) the full reality of being human - a lifeform that
is fundamentally and inescapably individual. But, as I have stated
already, this individuality does not preclude one from immensely
benefiting by fully open and honest cooperation with other similarly
individual humans.
> : My point was and is that others should
> : be prepared to return value to those who send forth ideas to the
> : extent they are valued by the receiver, in a form that is valued by
> : the sender.
>
> You just described some of the workings of the ego. But there is the
> possibility of a higher order, or higher way of being and acting.
If it is not true for reality (ie not a valid part of the essential
nature of human beings) then it is certainly not any "higher" order and
its adoption (being inconsistent with reality) can only be harmful in
the long run to those adopting it.
> Some
> philosophical or religious systems speak about the importance of not being
> attached to the fruits of action.
One can immediately see, by taking this to its logical extreme, that it
is anti-life and therefore inconsistent with the nature of any lifeform
- certainly with any human being.
> In the Oriental philosophy it is thought
> that if we expect something in return that expectation is attachment. This
> attachment in turn creates causes that we have to experience in some future
> time. This is the way keep ourselves bound.
This is just unattainable nonsense which is completely inconsistent
with the reality of human lifeform requirements.
> The highest order is unconditional love. Perhaps everyone has experienced
> something which comes close to that. That is to feel that the other person
> accepts you expecting nothing in return.
That is one of the dumbest ideas around. The only time anyone has ever
experienced such a thing is in their most unreal fantasies. To think
that way and be convinced it should be possible is to place oneself on
a path to certain failure. The widespread acceptance of such ideas as
this is the major reason for the failures of so many relationships.
Besides if love is unconditional then what reason would you have for
loving one person over another? Why would you not love Osama Bin Laden
or George Bush just as much as you do your most cherished friend or
lover. I once had a woman with whom I was friends turn violently
against me for suggesting that friendship depended on mutual esteem and
regard for one another and that it might change over time as each
person continuously judged the merits of the other. Can you not see the
inconsistency of her act in disagreeing with my statement but at the
same time acting in accord with it by judging me to be no longer worthy
of friendship? I have a deeply satisfying relationship with my wife
Kitty, but our love for each other constantly varies and each of us
knows it is in no manner unconditional. Any such notion is thoroughly
repugnant to both of us.
> : One does this for the very simple reason that one wants to
> : encourage the sender to send forth more value. And similarly if one
> : does not value what is sent out by someone, one should not return any
> : value so that one discourages that person from sending forth ideas
> : that are of not value to one. Note the similarity of this process to
> : the market ordering and organizing mechanism of buying products that
> : you want and not buying products that you do not want.
>
> :: although the current economic
> :: system is trying to handle them in the same way as does handle
> :: material things.
> :
> : I am totally in agreement with your criticism of the way the current
> : economic system (actually a government promulgated system rather than
> : a freely socially determined and self-adjusting system) handles
> : non-material goods (generally called intellectual property).
>
> Property word spoiles the fact that by the very nature non-material goods
> are potentially expansive and can not be confined.
Note that *I* did not apply that term. I only stated that such was the
generally used term. Ideas are property in the sense that they are
protectable from and unusable by others, only so long as they are not
communicated to others or are communicated only under non-disclosure
contracts. For example, none of the ideas which you and I are
expressing on this thread may properly be considered to be property.
OTOH, that fact is quite irrelevant to the value of those ideas and
whether or not someone reading and valuing them ought (in hir own best
self interest) to remit a corresponding amount of value to you or I
(whoever is the originator of the valued idea).
Olafur Pall Olafsson
No it is not. It is the result of a well-lived life not the by-product
of it. To realise why, you first have to realise that your goal in life
(and the goal of every human being) is to maximize your lifetime
happiness. I maintain that since you are a human being, this is your
goal in life. Consequently for every action you've taken in your life,
if you think deaply enough about the reasons behind it you will realise
that every one of them was taken with this goal in mind. And happiness
cannot at the same time be the goal of every action you take and the
by-product of any action you take. Think of these two scenarios:
1) Imagine your goal is to throw a stone as far as you can. You throw
the stone and a window that just happens to be in the way breaks as a
result.
2) Imagine your goal is to break a window by throwing a stone at it.
You throw the stone at the window and it breaks.
Now in case 1. the broken window was a by-product of your action to
throw the stone, since your goal was not to break the window but to
throw the stone as far as you could. In case 2. on the other hand the
broken window was not a by-product of your action. It can't be a
by-product since breaking the window was your goal and your purpose of
throwing the stone. Similarly for a person whose goal is to maximize
his/her lifetime happiness, any increase in happiness is the result and
the goal of his actions not a by-product of his actions.
> It sounds to me that you are trying to make
> the life fit to your principles and not the other way round.
You cannot do it the other way around. Paul's principels are based on
facts of reality (and in fact as such they shouldn't be called his
principles). In case of the value for value principle it is based on
the simple fact that the goal of every human being is to maximize
his/her lifetime happiness. Following from this fact is the fact that
it is in the persons best interest to ask for value in return for value
received since that is in accordance to his/ger goal of increasing
his/her lifetime happiness. From these facts the principle of value for
value is derived. And these are facts that you cannot change and
therefore the only thing you can do is to make your life fit these
facts and the principles derived from them. Trying to do it the other
way around is like trying to change gravity to go up on the roof of a
house. You can't do that. Your only choice is to ajust yourself to the
facts of reality, by f.ex. using a ladder to climb up against gravity.
Vernon
"Olafur Pall Olafsson" <olafu...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1155957590.3...@75g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
Happiness is a growth of synapses with peptides. The "taking" person
reduces those synapses and peptides to the point that self destruction is
perceived as happiness.
Juhana Harju
: Juhana Harju wrote:
:: Paul Antonik Wakfer wrote:
::: Juhana Harju wrote:
::::: Such problems and negatives arise precisely because the "basic
I understand your resistance because what I said goes contrary to widely
held believes about life. The modern notion of happiness is widely tied to
the fulfilment of desire. Seeking happiness in this way is an elusive goal
as every time you achieve something you have longed for you find out that it
did not give you as much pleasure as you had expected and that it did not
last as long as you had wished. And so you start to chase another goal. In
this way happiness is an elusive goal pursued directly, and it escapes. The
problem with the notion of happiness is that it is to small. It is related
to short-lived satisfaction and sense pleasure to be achieved is some future
time, and it is not concerned wheather the sense of happiness or pleasure is
based on illusion or not.
I am not against happiness. :-) Everyone wants to feel happy. My point is
that it is achieved rather by doing the right thing than by chasing it
directly. Doing the right thing is to follow an inner sense of direction you
have in life and listening to your heart.
--
Juhana
Vernon
For sure.
There is another saying that sort of addresses the issue. "Who me worry?"
Just take life and have fun giving to others.
john...@naturalhealthperspective.com
> Juhana Harju wrote:
> > Curious wrote:
> > : Juhana Harju wrote:
> > :: I have similar experiences. I contributed to the Finnish speaking
> > :: Wikipedia but I stopped it as my writings were removed. The facts in
> > :: my articles did not fit to someone's world view. After those
> > :: experiences I quit writing there. By its structrure Wikipedia
> > :: supports mainstream ideas, even if they are somewhat wrong and
> > :: outdated.
> > :
> > : Indeed i have similar experiences even though in a different field in
> > : Wikipedia (Andean anthropology, preincaic cultures etc). The issue
> > : however is often with "moderators" pursuing their "truth" and not
> > : even a consent...
> >
> > Right. I have experienced that, too. It is a pitty as the basic idea of
> > Wikipedia is great.
>
> Such problems and negatives arise precisely because the "basic idea" is
> *not* "great". To be "great" an idea, theory or practice must be
> consistent with reality and then it can not, in the long run, have
> negatives. To be consistent with the nature of human beings (actually
> all lifeforms, as energy requiring and negative local entropy
> generating entities), any whole program must provide a return of value
> (a variant of energy) to the contributor (as determined by hir)
> commensurate with that which s/he has contributed.
What a load of B/S!!!
Typical academic drivel that reads like Tom Matthews is on drugs.
May I suggest that you spend your time updating Wikipedia's article on
Tampoons?
You have my condolences, Tom. When will they pull the plug on
MoreLife? Ha, ... Hah, Ha! Not too many academic institutions are
quoting your site. I wonder why? Could be that it is Kookier than
mine?
Us normal people would like to know how the deranged academic thinks.
Tell us, so that we can all ponder the wisdom of your B/S.
Ha, ... Hah, Ha!
Olafur Pall Olafsson
I agree that feelings of happiness never last as long as one wishes
they did, since of course one wants them to last forever which isn't
possible. But I disagree that every time you achieve something you find
out that it did not give you as much pleasure as you had expected. Sure
that happens a lot of times but what also happens sometimes is that
something you did not expext to give you much pleasure ends up giving
you much more pleasure than you expected.
> In
> this way happiness is an elusive goal pursued directly, and it escapes. The
> problem with the notion of happiness is that it is to small. It is related
> to short-lived satisfaction and sense pleasure to be achieved is some future
> time, and it is not concerned wheather the sense of happiness or pleasure is
> based on illusion or not.
Whether the feeling is based on illusion or not does not matter. F.ex.
you could call a person and tell him he won the lottery. He would have
some feelings upon being told this, but his feelings would be the exact
same regardless of the wether you were telling him the truth or lying
to him (as long as he thinks you're telling the truth). In other words
his feelings would be the same whether they were based on an illusion
of winning or truly winning. In the case you lied to him it is only
afterwards when he finds out about it that his feelings are different
from what they would be if you would not have lied. But that is another
feeling. His initial feeling when you told him he won the lottery does
not change as it is in the past.
> I am not against happiness. :-) Everyone wants to feel happy.
I didn't expect you to be as it would be incredibly stupid to be
against happiness:-)
> My point is
> that it is achieved rather by doing the right thing than by chasing it
> directly.
I maintain that you should chase it directly, but by that I do not mean
that for every action you take you should think: "will this make me
more happy or not", this happens more subconciously. However you should
be aware that maximizing your lifetime happiness is your goal in life
and that every action you take is aimed towards that goal.
> Doing the right thing is to follow an inner sense of direction you
> have in life and listening to your heart.
This kind of thinking is not rational as there is no such thing as
"innere sence of direction", and you cannot really listen to your heart
except in the sense that you can listen to your heartbeat. However I
assume that by listening to your heart you meant listening to your
feelings. If that is the case you should have said that instead since
thinking that you can listen to anything more than your heartbeat by
listening to your heart is a distortion in your thinking process. And
such distortion only contributes to irrational thinking among people
and is not conductive to increasing your lifetime happiness. Anyways
listening to ones feelings is a good thing to do as long as one tries
to analize them and determine if they are reasonable or not, and if
they are not reasonable one should try to eliminate those feelings.
Olafur Pall Olafsson
Clearly you do not understand what he means by what he wrote above, but
still you think you are capable of judging wether what he wrote is
bullshit or not. If you don't understand it how would you know it is
bullshit. Can anyone see the sarcasm here:-)
And no, I'm not replying to any childish insults you may have in
response to this post of mine (as I excpect you will have). Waste your
time if you wish, but I'm not wasting mine.
Vernon
There are those who have been conditioned to be against happiness.
>
>> My point is
>> that it is achieved rather by doing the right thing than by chasing it
>> directly.
>
> I maintain that you should chase it directly, but by that I do not mean
> that for every action you take you should think: "will this make me
> more happy or not", this happens more subconciously. However you should
> be aware that maximizing your lifetime happiness is your goal in life
> and that every action you take is aimed towards that goal.
Sounds too close to "If it feels good, do it".
Happiness is incidental. Sadness is a trained trait. If one has to think
about it, one needs to adjust priorities.
Once iin a while one might think about it in the respect that, "Boy I sure
am glad I don't have their troubles / problems."
Vernon
"Olafur Pall Olafsson" <olafu...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1155999931.6...@m79g2000cwm.googlegroups.com...
> Juhana Harju wrote:
>
> "innere sence of direction", and you cannot really listen to your heart
> except in the sense that you can listen to your heartbeat.
English is not your primary language.
If you want to be technical, one cannot listen to their feelings either.
Feelings don't make a sound. If you want to get technical try, "One reacts
to synaptic emotions according to a trained set of responses made such by
the person training those synapses."
It is specifically and technically called "inner sense of direction
(response / reaction)"
Curious
not include *everything* but rather the required text to understand the
reply.
This thread is a prime example as it is nearly unreadable and while you
are entitled to quote as much as you want (there is no quote-police :-)
) you definitively will reach more people with your *opinions* when you
present them in a form that is more easily accessible.
I think this is rather easily understood and less in question then the
"pursuit of maximum happiness theory" beeing discussed here.
Best
Paul Antonik Wakfer
No. Any profit (net increase in value from an exchange to either or
both parties) would be inconsistent with the commonly accepted
definition of "give" applied to one of the parties. With respect to
"freely" (meaning without coercion - or to some people without any
psychological pressure), when an exchange is not freely done then it
may not be profitable (although it still could be).
> Ideas and feelings are "exactly" like material things.
I am going to assume here that your quote marks around "exactly" were
meant as emphasis (typically asterisks for bold) rather than signifying
some non-standard meaning, because I cannot imagine what the latter
would have meant. If that is the meaning of your statement then it is
quite false. For one thing, ideas can be copied with almost no cost of
additional scarce resources of raw materials and energy. As I described
before, feelings being unique to the individual, only fully discernible
by hir and sufficiently complex to be not completely describable, are
not fully transmissible to others as are material objects and even
simple ideas.
> In a free society
> there is mutual, synergistic and explosive growth of "product", material or
> spiritual (feelings and ideas).
The critical definition here is that of "a free society" which you do
not supply. It is not nearly so clear, uniquely understood and
simplistic as you and many others seem to think.
> When you are in a position as a "taker" (of free things), you are obviously
> not a giver.
This does not logically follow at all. There is nothing to preclude one
from being both a taker and a giver. All warlords, dictators, mafia
dons and government leaders have been both. If they were not also
givers then they did not last long.
> Democracy is not free
Maybe so, but if it is not wanted (I don't want any kind of "-cracy",
which signifies being ruled by one or more others), who cares.
> Personal integrity is not free
Yes it is. To be completely honest is no effort at all. It is
subterfuge, exaggeration and lying which take effort.
> Security is not free.
> Health is not free.
> Self esteem is not free.
Again, yes the last is. It is the natural state of any lifeform to love
and esteem itself. That state is primary to wanting to remain alive and
acting to stay alive.
> To be very crude for those who have very little thought on this or anything
> else.
> Love from another is almost useless unless returned in kind. That can be
> interelations or sex.
The meaning of your second to last statement depends on the meaning and
attributes that you attach to love. However, it is invalid for any
reasonable attachment of meanings. If love from another comes without
any transmission of value, then it is always useless in the sense of
adding to the happiness of one's life. If it comes with transmission of
value then it is never useless (ie never without value to the
receiver). Whether or not the love (with or without added value) is
returned or not has no logical bearing on these statements about
received love. The only aspect of the return of true love accompanied
by transmission of value which bears on the question is that if love is
not returned in amount commensurate with what is received, then, in the
long run, the transmitted value of the received love will diminish (if
the contributor of the love is acting rationally) - just as I stated
below 2 posts back in this thread was true for any sending forth of
value.
john...@naturalhealthperspective.com
Ha, ... Hah, Ha!
You academics are so full of it, that it is about time that a common
folk put you into your place.
Just thought that you might want to know that your B/S doesn't fool
anybody. :)
Personally, I am a deep thinker. The above is so full of it, that only
a fool would believe what you just wrote.
Who says so? I do.
So, tell me oh Deep Thinker. Tell me in plain Engligh what Tom
Matthews just wrote that I had failed to comprehend? And, can you
please restrict your answer to 50 words or less?
Remember this oh great one. All philosophers eventually end up going
mad. But, those who can articulate their thoughts in plain English
with 50 words or less, can make money by writing advertising copy.
Just thought that the loafty academics out there might want to know.
Olafur Pall Olafsson
Vernon wrote:
> "Olafur Pall Olafsson" <olafu...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:1155999931.6...@m79g2000cwm.googlegroups.com...
> > Juhana Harju wrote:
> >
> > This kind of thinking is not rational as there is no such thing as
> > "innere sence of direction", and you cannot really listen to your heart
> > except in the sense that you can listen to your heartbeat.
>
>
> English is not your primary language.
That is correct, but if you are referring to my error of writing
"innere" above instead of "inner", as most people that regularly read
my posts would figure out that was simply a typing error not a spelling
error.
> If you want to be technical, one cannot listen to their feelings either.
> Feelings don't make a sound.
While that is correct in the sense that they do not make a sound the
word listen can also mean simply "paying attention to", and that is the
meaning I had in mind when I used the word listen. You can certainly
pay attention to your feelings by thinking about them when they occur
and try to analize them and by doing so you can learn to act upon those
feelings that are rational and try to eliminate those that are not and
thereby contribute to increasing your lifetime happiness. The same
thing cannot be said about listening to or paying attention to your
heart.
> If you want to get technical try, "One reacts
> to synaptic emotions according to a trained set of responses made such by
> the person training those synapses."
>
> It is specifically and technically called "inner sense of direction
> (response / reaction)"
Now you're just nitpicking. First of all there is no such thing as a
"synaptic emotion", neither is there such thing as "inner sense of
direction". What you and others may be referring to by "inner sense of
direction" is what is called subconsciousness. Some people also talk
about listening to ones instinct but instinct is nothing but the
subconsciousness influencing the brain.
Vernon
>
> Vernon wrote:
>> "Olafur Pall Olafsson" <olafu...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>> news:1155999931.6...@m79g2000cwm.googlegroups.com...
>> > Juhana Harju wrote:
>> >
>> > This kind of thinking is not rational as there is no such thing as
>> > "innere sence of direction", and you cannot really listen to your heart
>> > except in the sense that you can listen to your heartbeat.
>>
>>
>> English is not your primary language.
>
> That is correct, but if you are referring to my error of writing
> "innere" above instead of "inner", as most people that regularly read
> my posts would figure out that was simply a typing error not a spelling
> error.
Not at all. I am always surprised when I don't make a typo.
I was refering to the common and "universally" understood in the English
speaking world as well as much of latin, "listen to your heart"
>
>> If you want to be technical, one cannot listen to their feelings either.
>> Feelings don't make a sound.
>
> While that is correct in the sense that they do not make a sound the
> word listen can also mean simply "paying attention to", and that is the
> meaning I had in mind when I used the word listen. You can certainly
> pay attention to your feelings by thinking about them when they occur
> and try to analize them and by doing so you can learn to act upon those
> feelings that are rational and try to eliminate those that are not and
> thereby contribute to increasing your lifetime happiness. The same
> thing cannot be said about listening to or paying attention to your
> heart.
>
>> If you want to get technical try, "One reacts
>> to synaptic emotions according to a trained set of responses made such by
>> the person training those synapses."
>>
>> It is specifically and technically called "inner sense of direction
>> (response / reaction)"
>
> Now you're just nitpicking. First of all there is no such thing as a
> "synaptic emotion", neither is there such thing as "inner sense of
> direction". What you and others may be referring to by "inner sense of
> direction" is what is called subconsciousness. Some people also talk
> about listening to ones instinct but instinct is nothing but the
> subconsciousness influencing the brain.
>
I was only nit picking in response to your claim that one cannot feel their
heart except for it's beat.
BTW, again, some call it subconsciousness. It is a real physical occurrence
and brain waves "train" that synaptic response often called "subconscious".
OR, in other words, It takes "training" to be happy. Once trained, and
never has been proven to be otherwise, it occurs as a result of giving
without the expectation of return. One does not make a concerted effort to
be "happy". It doesn't work except superficially. All this is actually
measurable with physical (magnet / electronic) instrumentation.
Vernon
"Paul Antonik Wakfer" <pa...@morelife.org> wrote in message
news:1156008486.1...@p79g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
Definition: Give without expectation of return by the receiver or any one
else. One may expect a self satisfaction or euphoria.
Over your head.
Your "religion" *religion* (religion) {religion} is getting in the way.
You are a VERY unhappy person and have trained yourself beyond recovery.
I just wanted to hear it from you, as I have.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
No. That is merely the definition of "give" (as opposed to exchange or
transfer). If you meant no more than that by "give freely" than your
use of the word "freely" was redundant and all redundancies are
potentially confusing.
> One may expect a self satisfaction or euphoria.
Not if you are giving "without expectation of return" since any "self
satisfaction or euphoria" would be a return (gain of value from the
action).
Since do not know me to any significant extent and have presented no
evidence for these statements (which make no sense anyway), no response
to them is necessary or even possible.
Finally your lack of response to my points about your previous post
makes it clear that you have nothing of any further merit to contribute
to this discussion. Therefore, I will spend no more time in addressing
you.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> One thing that would make me happy is seeing people learn to quote. i.E.
> not include *everything* but rather the required text to understand the
> reply.
>
> This thread is a prime example as it is nearly unreadable and while you
> are entitled to quote as much as you want (there is no quote-police :-)
> ) you definitively will reach more people with your *opinions* when you
> present them in a form that is more easily accessible.
I agree, and I am very glad that you brought this up. I apologize for
not trimming my responses in this thread of extraneous previous
material as I generally always do (see any of my posts in previous
threads for examples). My only excuse in this case is that I am now
posting from google's rather tiny window instead of from a news reader
(few and fewer ISPs provide news servers these days), which makes
editing of lengthy posts more problematic, particularly since there is
always the chance of losing everything before posting if one takes too
long. I often take the whole post into an external program (usually a
mail reader) to clean it up before posting. I will try to do so always
henceforth.
> I think this is rather easily understood and less in question then the
> "pursuit of maximum happiness theory" beeing discussed here.
Again I agree, but the notion of cleaning posts of extraneous material
is not nearly so important as the general idea that the purpose of life
is to maximize one's lifetime happiness (even though its application is
actually one example of such mutually advantageous cooperative
maximizing actions).
> Best
> Curious
Thanks again for raising this point about posting.
Olafur Pall Olafsson
Curious wrote:
> One thing that would make me happy is seeing people learn to quote. i.E.
> not include *everything* but rather the required text to understand the
> reply.
>
> This thread is a prime example as it is nearly unreadable and while you
> are entitled to quote as much as you want (there is no quote-police :-)
> ) you definitively will reach more people with your *opinions* when you
> present them in a form that is more easily accessible.
I agree with you and I realise that I've not been doing a good job at
this lately, and for that I apologize. I will try to improve on this,
thanks for the reminder.
Juhana Harju
: Juhana Harju wrote:
:: I understand your resistance because what I said goes contrary to
:: widely held believes about life. The modern notion of happiness is
:: widely tied to the fulfilment of desire. Seeking happiness in this
:: way is an elusive goal as every time you achieve something you have
:: longed for you find out that it did not give you as much pleasure as
:: you had expected and that it did not last as long as you had wished.
:: And so you start to chase another goal.
:
: I agree that feelings of happiness never last as long as one wishes
: they did, since of course one wants them to last forever which isn't
: possible. But I disagree that every time you achieve something you
: find out that it did not give you as much pleasure as you had
: expected. Sure that happens a lot of times but what also happens
: sometimes is that something you did not expext to give you much
: pleasure ends up giving you much more pleasure than you expected.
I think that you miss my point. While achieving something you have desired
might occationally bring even more happiness than you have expected, the
following disappointment is always inherent in this kind of pursuit of
happiness.
:: In
:: this way happiness is an elusive goal pursued directly, and it
:: escapes. The problem with the notion of happiness is that it is to
:: small. It is related to short-lived satisfaction and sense pleasure
:: to be achieved is some future time, and it is not concerned wheather
:: the sense of happiness or pleasure is based on illusion or not.
:
: Whether the feeling is based on illusion or not does not matter. F.ex.
: you could call a person and tell him he won the lottery. He would have
: some feelings upon being told this, but his feelings would be the
: exact same regardless of the wether you were telling him the truth or
: lying to him (as long as he thinks you're telling the truth). In
: other words his feelings would be the same whether they were based on
: an illusion of winning or truly winning. In the case you lied to him
: it is only afterwards when he finds out about it that his feelings
: are different from what they would be if you would not have lied. But
: that is another feeling. His initial feeling when you told him he won
: the lottery does not change as it is in the past.
You should consider the whole circle of emotions and not only the first
phase of the circle which is happy. If your happiness is based on illusion,
you'll become disillusioned and unhappy after realizing the fact.
:: I am not against happiness. :-) Everyone wants to feel happy.
:
: I didn't expect you to be as it would be incredibly stupid to be
: against happiness:-)
:
:: My point is
:: that it is achieved rather by doing the right thing than by chasing
:: it directly.
:
: I maintain that you should chase it directly, but by that I do not
: mean that for every action you take you should think: "will this make
: me more happy or not", this happens more subconciously. However you
: should be aware that maximizing your lifetime happiness is your goal
: in life and that every action you take is aimed towards that goal.
To me this sounds slightly narcistic and hedonistic as a think that we are
not here only to find our own happiness but also the help other people. You
may rationalize that helping people will ultimately increase your own
happiness but I think that that kind of motivation is not quite OK because
the scheming distorts the motivation and quality of the action.
:: Doing the right thing is to follow an inner sense of direction you
:: have in life and listening to your heart.
:
: This kind of thinking is not rational as there is no such thing as
: "innere sence of direction",
I refer to an individualized sense of calling or purpose in life. I may not
be able to help if you are not aware of such thing. However, many people
sense a direction in their life if they look at their own life backwards.
They realize that there is a meaningful thread running through their whole
life. If you develop this ability further you will be aware of a sense of
direction in the present moment, in the very /now/.
: and you cannot really listen to your
: heart except in the sense that you can listen to your heartbeat.
: However I assume that by listening to your heart you meant listening
: to your feelings.
Rather than to feelings I refer to a very deep place within ourselves. That
part in us is capable to detect things in a very sensitive way and with
clarity.
: If that is the case you should have said that
: instead since thinking that you can listen to anything more than your
: heartbeat by listening to your heart is a distortion in your thinking
: process. And such distortion only contributes to irrational thinking
: among people and is not conductive to increasing your lifetime
: happiness.
I don't think that listening to heart distorts any rational thinking. Quite
the opposite. Many people are in constant turmoil because they fluctuate
between two choices. Listening to heart means an ability to queiten the
constantly busy discoursive mind and to find a calm place within yourself
where you can see more clearly which direction to take.
: Anyways listening to ones feelings is a good thing to do
: as long as one tries to analize them and determine if they are
: reasonable or not, and if they are not reasonable one should try to
: eliminate those feelings.
It is always to good to check the decision rationally.
Vernon
> Olafur Pall Olafsson wrote:
> : Juhana Harju wrote:
"pursuit of happiness." is a statement applicable ONLY to one who is not
happy or does not have happiness, a degenerative mental state.
Olafur Pall Olafsson
> Olafur Pall Olafsson wrote:
> : Juhana Harju wrote:
> I think that you miss my point. While achieving something you have desired
> might occationally bring even more happiness than you have expected, the
> following disappointment is always inherent in this kind of pursuit of
> happiness.
But I would not be disappointed when something gave me even more
happiness than I expected.
> You should consider the whole circle of emotions and not only the first
> phase of the circle which is happy. If your happiness is based on illusion,
> you'll become disillusioned and unhappy after realizing the fact.
That happens a lot of times but some people live in an illusion until
they die and never discover that it was an illusion.
> To me this sounds slightly narcistic and hedonistic as a think that we are
> not here only to find our own happiness but also the help other people.
My purpose in life has nothing to do with *why* I am here. I am not
here to find happiness or help other people. The reason I was created
and am here now is simply because my parents decided that having a baby
would make them more happy. And although they may not have thought of
it directly that way, they were merely trying to maximise their
lifetime happiness and decided that having a baby would be a good
decision towards that goal. But my purpose just like theirs is to
maximize my own lifetime happiness not that of anyone else. My purpose
has everything to do about my nature as a human being but nothing to do
about the underlying reasons of why I am here.
> You
> may rationalize that helping people will ultimately increase your own
> happiness but I think that that kind of motivation is not quite OK because
> the scheming distorts the motivation and quality of the action.
Helping other people does not always contribute to increasing my
lifetime happiness. And I don't see how it would distort the motivation
and quality of the action, quite on the contrary if I ever help someone
I am doing it because I think it will contribute to maximizing my
lifetime happiness (whether I think about it or not) and if anything
this would only motivate me more since I am infact doing this for
myself not just the person I am helping.
> :: Doing the right thing is to follow an inner sense of direction you
> :: have in life and listening to your heart.
> :
> : This kind of thinking is not rational as there is no such thing as
> : "innere sence of direction",
>
> I refer to an individualized sense of calling or purpose in life.
My purpose in life has nothing to do with an inner sense of calling or
an inner sense of direction. My purpose in life is derived from the
nature of a human being and the fact that I am one. I have simply
realised my purpose in life by rationally thinking about and analizing
the reality I live in.
> I may not
> be able to help if you are not aware of such thing.
I think I know what you mean by "individualized sense of calling" but
as a rational person I maintain that it does not exist and exists only
within your imagination. If it is not your imagination than what
exactly is it that "calls" you and tells you your purpose in life.
IMO imagination is one of humans greatest strengths but also one of
it's greatest weaknesses because it prevents them from thinking
rationally about reality.
> However, many people
> sense a direction in their life if they look at their own life backwards.
> They realize that there is a meaningful thread running through their whole
> life. If you develop this ability further you will be aware of a sense of
> direction in the present moment, in the very /now/.
Sure you can analyze your past life and see where you have been going
but that is not a good way to find your purpose in life. Human beings
have all kinds of different pasts but they all have the same life
purpose, some of them just don't realise it.
> : and you cannot really listen to your
> : heart except in the sense that you can listen to your heartbeat.
> : However I assume that by listening to your heart you meant listening
> : to your feelings.
>
> Rather than to feelings I refer to a very deep place within ourselves. That
> part in us is capable to detect things in a very sensitive way and with
> clarity.
What part in you? If you cannot say what part it is in you then how can
you say it is not simply your imagination.
> I don't think that listening to heart distorts any rational thinking. Quite
> the opposite. Many people are in constant turmoil because they fluctuate
> between two choices. Listening to heart means an ability to queiten the
> constantly busy discoursive mind and to find a calm place within yourself
> where you can see more clearly which direction to take.
I did not mean that the thinking process you described above would
distort rational thinking, I meant that thinking of this process as
listening to your heart distorts rational thinking because this really
has nothing to do about your heart as an organ. Sure people use the
expression "listening to your heart" but I think it is silly becaue
what they are referring to generally has nothing to do with their heart.
Michael C Price
Hi Olafur
> My purpose in life has nothing to do with *why* I am here.
> I am not here to find happiness or help other people. The
> reason I was created and am here now is simply because my
> parents decided that having a baby would make them more
> happy. And although they may not have thought of it directly
> that way, they were merely trying to maximise their lifetime
> happiness and decided that having a baby would be a good
> decision towards that goal. But my purpose just like theirs is to
> maximize my own lifetime happiness not that of anyone else.
Neither humans nor other animals act to "maximise their lifetime
happiness". They always act to maximise *present* happiness. The
extent to which actions attempt to maximises total lifetime happiness
will depend on their arrationally set discounting function: the thought
of a reward in n years time is valued less than now -- evolution has
programmed all neural structures that way. When we defer a reward
we only do this because the thought of a deferred reward gives
us immediate happiness.
> My purpose has everything to do about my nature as a human
> being but nothing to do about the underlying reasons of why I
> am here.
I agree. And the greatest realisation we can have (which escapes
most people) is that we are animals, driven by the same instincts,
except that we call them goals or values instead to feel better
about it.
- Michael C Price
Olafur Pall Olafsson
Michael C Price wrote:
> Neither humans nor other animals act to "maximise their lifetime
> happiness". They always act to maximise *present* happiness.
I disagree with this. What would you rather want, to get 1000$ today or
10000 dollar in a year. If you chose the latter then why?
> The
> extent to which actions attempt to maximises total lifetime happiness
> will depend on their arrationally set discounting function:
I am not quite sure what you mean here since I can't find the word
"arrational" in a dictionary.
> the thought
> of a reward in n years time is valued less than now -- evolution has
> programmed all neural structures that way.
I disagree with this. Humans differ from animals in the respect that
they have the ability to predict the future consequenses of their
actions. Also they have the ability to train their responses to stimuli
where the response is not an autonomic one (such as moving your hand
away from a flaming fire). I for one do not value a reward in n years
time as less than now as long as I think the reward will be just as
valuable to me in n years. But this last of course is not always true
or even guaranteed, particularily since I could die anytime and never
get another chance to get the reward. So it would be best to get it now
while I can. But if I have some reasons to think the reward will be
more valuable to me later then it is time to evaluate wether I should
get it now while I can or wait to get the bigger reward later and take
the chance that my prediction that it will be more valuable to me will
hold to be true and that I will be alive to get it.
Perhaps you are thinking about much longer time, f.ex. deciding if you
should have a reward now or in 30 years. But the further ahead you're
thinking about defering a reward the higher the chances that you might
not be alive at that time and also the harder it is for you to predict
how valuable the reward will be to you when you finally receive it. If
I could somehow predict the future and be 100% sure I would be alive
and the reward would be of the exact same value to me at some time far
in the future, then I would have no good reason to chose it now rather
then later, except for the reason you mentioned that the thought of a
future reward can bring happiness to the person. But this of course is
not possible.
> When we defer a reward
> we only do this because the thought of a deferred reward gives
> us immediate happiness.
Or when we think the reward will be more valuable to us later.
> > My purpose has everything to do about my nature as a human
> > being but nothing to do about the underlying reasons of why I
> > am here.
>
> I agree. And the greatest realisation we can have (which escapes
> most people) is that we are animals, driven by the same instincts,
> except that we call them goals or values instead to feel better
> about it.
I do not think about these as instincts, or as something that is
written in my brain and I can't change. That is only true for autonomic
reflexes.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> Hi Michael,
>
> Michael C Price wrote:
> > Neither humans nor other animals act to "maximise their lifetime
> > happiness". They always act to maximise *present* happiness.
>
> I disagree with this. What would you rather want, to get 1000$ today or
> 10000 dollar in a year. If you chose the latter then why?
Olafur's answer is entirely correct. However from my experience with
Michael, I tend to think that in many respects he actually does "act to
maximise *present* happiness". This nature is, of course, the basic
operating method of hedonism - the philosophy of "eat, drink and be
merry, for tomorrow we may die". Of course, Michael (and everyone who
remains alive) does not and can not act *only* in this manner.
> > The
> > extent to which actions attempt to maximises total lifetime happiness
> > will depend on their arrationally set discounting function:
>
> I am not quite sure what you mean here since I can't find the word
> "arrational" in a dictionary.
The prefix "a" on an attribute generally means "without regard to or
independently of" that attribute - as with "amoral" being without
regard to morals as opposed to either moral or immoral. So what Michael
meant by "arrationaly set discounting function" was that the percentage
that a person discounts future value (reduces the future value
proportional to its time in the future in order to estimate its present
value to hirself) is not a rational decision nor an irrational decision
and therefore must be something like a whim or an instinct.
With this, of course, I totally disagree. A person's discounting rate
varies constantly over time and with respect to the nature of the value
being discounted and is related to hir estimation of the likelihood
that such value will actually be forthcoming in the future. This is as
rational an estimation and decision as is any other, since *all*
decisions are about the future in one way or another.
> > the thought
> > of a reward in n years time is valued less than now -- evolution has
> > programmed all neural structures that way.
>
> I disagree with this. Humans differ from animals in the respect that
> they have the ability to predict the future consequenses of their
> actions.
Since humans are also animals and there is an evolutionary continuum
from lower animals to humans, it is an incorrect statement to say that
human differ totally from animals in any particular respect. All that
one can correctly say is that certain specific abilities are so much
more developed in humans than most animals as to be almost like a new
emerged attribute that is different in kind. Nevertheless, many animals
also concern themselves with future consequences (ie. by sequestering
food for the winter). If you ever own a pet cat or dog then you will
appreciate that they can think, estimate and decide just like humans in
a surprisingly large number of rudimentary ways.
However, Michael's statement is false based on the evidence that the
amount of discount of future rewards varies enormously from person to
person and situation to situation. In most people it is quite clear
that such discounting is thoughtfully estimated rather than decided by
any instinctual whim.
> Also they have the ability to train their responses to stimuli
> where the response is not an autonomic one (such as moving your hand
> away from a flaming fire). I for one do not value a reward in n years
> time as less than now as long as I think the reward will be just as
> valuable to me in n years. But this last of course is not always true
> or even guaranteed, particularily since I could die anytime and never
> get another chance to get the reward. So it would be best to get it now
> while I can.
There is another major reason why you would want the reward now rather
than later and even be willing to now accept less than the future
dollar value of the reward (even ignoring inflation or deflation). That
is because having the asset now would either allow you to use it to
gain additional daily happiness from its use over all those years
between now and then or to invest it to produce more value by that
future time than would be the original value offered at that time. Both
of these choices would clearly increase your total lifetime happiness.
> But if I have some reasons to think the reward will be
> more valuable to me later then it is time to evaluate wether I should
> get it now while I can or wait to get the bigger reward later and take
> the chance that my prediction that it will be more valuable to me will
> hold to be true and that I will be alive to get it.
Because of what I wrote above, I cannot think of any situations in
which this makes sense except:
1) the reward is based on an amount of currency and you think that the
currency is likely to be devalued (undergo deflation) between now and
then.
2) the reward is of a type which will automatically lose value (decay.
spoil, etc.) with time and you have sufficient of that type of good at
this time.
3) the reward is of a type of which you have sufficient currently,
cannot exchange and have reason to think that you may not have
sufficient at that later time.
> Perhaps you are thinking about much longer time, f.ex. deciding if you
> should have a reward now or in 30 years. But the further ahead you're
> thinking about defering a reward the higher the chances that you might
> not be alive at that time and also the harder it is for you to predict
> how valuable the reward will be to you when you finally receive it. If
> I could somehow predict the future and be 100% sure I would be alive
> and the reward would be of the exact same value to me at some time far
> in the future, then I would have no good reason to chose it now rather
> then later,
Yes you would, for the two important reasons that I described above.
> except for the reason you mentioned that the thought of a
> future reward can bring happiness to the person. But this of course is
> not possible.
It is certainly possible (and in fact happens a lot) that the thought
of a future reward brings happiness to people. I think that is a major
reason why people buy lottery tickets - they get pleasure from the time
that they buy the ticket until the draw from the thoughts and dreams of
all that they will do with the money when they win it. I know that my
parents did this and I know that I too in my younger years gained more
happiness from thoughts of future possibilities than I do now. Although
I am convinced that this is somewhat irrational, it may serve a
necessary function with respect to all planning and choice making.
Therefore, as long as it does not interfere with the reality of the
need to actually act thoughtfully and purposefully to gain any real
value and bring about enduring happiness, it is likely a necessary
occurrence.
> > When we defer a reward
> > we only do this because the thought of a deferred reward gives
> > us immediate happiness.
This is an argument that I had not seen before. But while it may
sometimes be true, I think that it most often is not. This is because
(except for the situations listed above) I cannot imagine why anyone
would think they will benefit more from the same value in the future
than they will by having it now.
> Or when we think the reward will be more valuable to us later.
As I stated above, I cannot think of any situation where that would be
true except for the situations listed above.
> > > My purpose has everything to do about my nature as a human
> > > being but nothing to do about the underlying reasons of why I
> > > am here.
This was well stated.
> > I agree. And the greatest realisation we can have (which escapes
> > most people) is that we are animals, driven by the same instincts,
> > except that we call them goals or values instead to feel better
> > about it.
>
> I do not think about these as instincts, or as something that is
> written in my brain and I can't change. That is only true for autonomic
> reflexes.
Yes, what Michael and many others do not seem to accept is that
although it is importantly true that humans are animals, the number of
true instincts that remain in humans are extremely rudimentary, of
physiological low level and have virtually no relevance to the
important recent (evolutionary-wise) brain developments. For one thing,
there simply has not been sufficient evolutionary time for any major
instinctual behavior to have been set into the very recently expanded
brain size and capabilities.
Michael C Price
our differences are partly terminological, I think.
>> Neither humans nor other animals act to "maximise their
>> lifetime happiness". They always act to maximise
>> *present* happiness.
>
> I disagree with this. What would you rather want, to get
> 1000$ today or 10000 dollar in a year. If you chose the
> latter then why?
$10,000 in a year's time, since the thought of the large future
reward makes me happier now than a paltry $1000 now does.
>
>> The extent to which actions attempt to maximises total
>> lifetime happiness will depend on their arrationally set
>> discounting function:
>
> I am not quite sure what you mean here since I can't find
> the word "arrational" in a dictionary.
"Arrational" means neither rational nor irrational. Our primary
goals are arrational since reasoning can only be applied within
a context of goals.
>> the thought of a reward in n years time is valued less than
>> now -- evolution has programmed all neural structures that
>> way.
See
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1284970
Temporal discounting refers to the decrease in the present, subjective value
of a reward as the time to its receipt increases. Results from humans have
shown that a hyperbola-like function describes the form of the discounting
function when choices involve hypothetical monetary rewards. In addition,
magnitude effects have been reported in which smaller reward amounts are
discounted more steeply than larger amounts. The present research examines
the cross-species generality of these findings using real rewards, namely
food pellets, with both pigeons and rats. As with humans, an adjusting
amount procedure was used to estimate the amount of immediate reward judged
equal in value to a delayed reward. Different amounts of delayed food
rewards (ranging from 5 to 32 pellets in pigeons and from 5 to 20 pellets in
rats) were studied at delays varying from 1 s to 32 s. A simple hyperbola,
similar to the hyperbola-like mathematical function that describes the
discounting of hypothetical monetary rewards in humans, described the
discounting of food rewards in both pigeons and rats. These results extend
the generality of the mathematical model of discounting. Rates of
discounting delayed food rewards were higher for pigeons than for rats.
Unlike humans, however, neither pigeons nor rats showed a reliable magnitude
effect: Rate of discounting did not vary systematically as a function of the
amount of the delayed reward.
> I disagree with this. Humans differ from animals in the respect
> that they have the ability to predict the future consequenses of
> their actions. [......]
I disagree with your opening statement (which Paul has addressed),
so rather than answer all your subsequent points I'll just mention the
last point where you say:
> the thought of a future reward can bring happiness to the person.
> But this of course is not possible.
Did you really mean to say this? It doesn't make sense to me at all.
My key point is
>> When we defer a reward we only do this because the
>> thought of a deferred reward gives us immediate happiness.
>
> Or when we think the reward will be more valuable to us later.
Only if the thought of the future happiness makes us happy now.
>> > My purpose has everything to do about my nature as a human
>> > being but nothing to do about the underlying reasons of why I
>> > am here.
>>
>> I agree. And the greatest realisation we can have (which escapes
>> most people) is that we are animals, driven by the same instincts,
>> except that we call them goals or values instead to feel better
>> about it.
>
> I do not think about these as instincts, or as something that is
> written in my brain and I can't change. That is only true for
> autonomic reflexes.
I think of our primary goals as mostly fixed and arrationally set,
although they may develop in ways outside our control. However
we cannot rationally choose to change them because reasoning
requires the context of other goals -- either primary goals which by
definition will resist their own adjustment, or secondary goals
which will reinforce the primary goals.
If you think you can change a primary goal then I invite you
contemplate removing your will to survive -- which I imagine
you won't want to do since that conflicts with your goal of
survival.
- Michael C Price
Michael C Price
Marshall Price
> Hi Olafur,
> our differences are partly terminological, I think.
>
>
>>>Neither humans nor other animals act to "maximise their
>>>lifetime happiness". They always act to maximise
>>>*present* happiness.
>>
>>I disagree with this. What would you rather want, to get
>>1000$ today or 10000 dollar in a year. If you chose the
>>latter then why?
>
>
> $10,000 in a year's time, since the thought of the large future
> reward makes me happier now than a paltry $1000 now does.
>
>>>The extent to which actions attempt to maximises total
>>>lifetime happiness will depend on their arrationally set
>>>discounting function:
>>
>>I am not quite sure what you mean here since I can't find
>>the word "arrational" in a dictionary.
>
>
> "Arrational" means neither rational nor irrational. Our primary
> goals are arrational since reasoning can only be applied within
> a context of goals.
There's no reason for doubling the r. Unlike "irrational", in which
adding the prefix in- to rational requires changing the in- to ir-,
adding a prefix of a- wouldn't require any such change. But arational
isn't in my (unabridged) dictionary, either. :-(
Incidentally, Bill Moyers had Pema somebody (Gudrun?), a Buddhist nun
(and author), on his television show August 12 (I think), and she argued
that people try maximizing happiness (and minimizing suffering), but
often fail. Getting it right is a central goal in Buddhism.
Similarly, an author-psychologist appearing on the August 18 radio show
"Science Friday" (I think) said that although we're the only animals
capable of imagining our futures, we are often wrong, expecting bad
outcomes to be overly bad, and bright futures to be overly rosy. He
pointed out that people who lost their eyesight and those who became
paraplegic are just as happy as they were before, and often say they'd
never choose to "correct" their conditions. People born as conjoined
twins are often appalled to hear arguments in favor of separating them
or others. He gave many examples of counter-intuitive lessons on
projected happiness and unhappiness.
When I was wealthy, I had a terrible dread of losing my money, until it
happened and turned out ridiculously inconsequential. Of course, I'll
never have a helipad or escape rocket on my hydrofoil yacht, but I still
wake up some mornings with memories of delightful dreams: not involving
yachts at all!
--
Marshall Price of Miami
Known to Yahoo as d021317c
Juhana Harju
: Incidentally, Bill Moyers had Pema somebody (Gudrun?), a Buddhist nun
: (and author), on his television show August 12 (I think), and she
: argued that people try maximizing happiness (and minimizing
: suffering), but often fail. Getting it right is a central goal in
: Buddhism.
Pema Chödrön. I have read couple of her books.
Marshall Price
> Marshall Price wrote:
>
> : Incidentally, Bill Moyers had Pema somebody (Gudrun?), a Buddhist nun
> : (and author), on his television show August 12 (I think), and she
> : argued that people try maximizing happiness (and minimizing
> : suffering), but often fail. Getting it right is a central goal in
> : Buddhism.
>
> Pema Chödrön. I have read couple of her books.
You're way ahead of me!
I'd like to join a Buddhist monastery some day.
Juhana Harju
: Juhana Harju wrote:
:: Marshall Price wrote:
::
::: Incidentally, Bill Moyers had Pema somebody (Gudrun?), a Buddhist
::: nun (and author), on his television show August 12 (I think), and
::: she argued that people try maximizing happiness (and minimizing
::: suffering), but often fail. Getting it right is a central goal in
::: Buddhism.
::
:: Pema Chödrön. I have read couple of her books.
:
: You're way ahead of me!
: I'd like to join a Buddhist monastery some day.
She is worth of reading. Perhaps I've got more /karma/ to work with. ;-)
Michael C Price
>>> thought of a deferred reward gives us immediate happiness.
>
> This is an argument that I had not seen before. But while it
> may sometimes be true, I think that it most often is not. This
> is because (except for the situations listed above) I cannot
> imagine why anyone would think they will benefit more from
> the same value in the future than they will by having it now.
I didn't say "same" value in the future, which is ambiguous and
also begs the question. The answer though, of course, is seen
by turning the chronology around (swapping "now" and "in the
future") to restate:
"I cannot imagine why anyone would think they
will benefit more from the same value now than
they will by having it in the future."
which contradicts the whole empirically based concept of
hyperbolic discounting:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperbolic_discounting
- Michael C Price
Michael C Price
>
>> > I agree. And the greatest realisation we can have (which escapes
>> > most people) is that we are animals, driven by the same instincts,
>> > except that we call them goals or values instead to feel better
>> > about it.
>>
>> I do not think about these as instincts, or as something that is
>> written in my brain and I can't change. That is only true for
>> autonomic reflexes.
>
> Yes, what Michael and many others do not seem to accept is that
> although it is importantly true that humans are animals, the number of
> true instincts that remain in humans are extremely rudimentary, of
> physiological low level and have virtually no relevance to the
> important recent (evolutionary-wise) brain developments. For one thing,
> there simply has not been sufficient evolutionary time for any major
> instinctual behavior to have been set into the very recently expanded
> brain size and capabilities.
That depends on how you define "instinct".
Death avoidance can be viewed as an instinct. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instinct#Instincts_in_humans
- Michael C Price
Michael C Price
"Marshall Price" <d021...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:AoSGg.12895
> Michael C Price wrote:
>> Hi Olafur,
>>>the word "arrational" in a dictionary.
>>
>>
>> "Arrational" means neither rational nor irrational. Our primary
>> goals are arrational since reasoning can only be applied within
>> a context of goals.
>
> There's no reason for doubling the r. Unlike "irrational", in which
> adding the prefix in- to rational requires changing the in- to ir-, adding
> a prefix of a- wouldn't require any such change. But arational isn't in
> my (unabridged) dictionary, either. :-(
>
much more common than "arrational".
- Michael C Price
Olafur Pall Olafsson
Paul Antonik Wakfer wrote:
> Olafur Pall Olafsson wrote:
> > Hi Michael,
> >
> > Michael C Price wrote:
> > I am not quite sure what you mean here since I can't find the word
> > "arrational" in a dictionary.
>
> The prefix "a" on an attribute generally means "without regard to or
> independently of" that attribute - as with "amoral" being without
> regard to morals as opposed to either moral or immoral. So what Michael
> meant by "arrationaly set discounting function" was that the percentage
> that a person discounts future value (reduces the future value
> proportional to its time in the future in order to estimate its present
> value to hirself) is not a rational decision nor an irrational decision
> and therefore must be something like a whim or an instinct.
Thanks for the explanation, I understand now.
> With this, of course, I totally disagree. A person's discounting rate
> varies constantly over time and with respect to the nature of the value
> being discounted and is related to hir estimation of the likelihood
> that such value will actually be forthcoming in the future. This is as
> rational an estimation and decision as is any other, since *all*
> decisions are about the future in one way or another.
I am in agreement with you here.
> Since humans are also animals and there is an evolutionary continuum
> from lower animals to humans, it is an incorrect statement to say that
> human differ totally from animals in any particular respect. All that
> one can correctly say is that certain specific abilities are so much
> more developed in humans than most animals as to be almost like a new
> emerged attribute that is different in kind.
I agree, and that is essentially what I meant, I just stated it poorly.
> Nevertheless, many animals
> also concern themselves with future consequences (ie. by sequestering
> food for the winter). If you ever own a pet cat or dog then you will
> appreciate that they can think, estimate and decide just like humans in
> a surprisingly large number of rudimentary ways.
This I agree with but must say that I lack personal experience with
since I've never owned a pet.
> There is another major reason why you would want the reward now rather
> than later and even be willing to now accept less than the future
> dollar value of the reward (even ignoring inflation or deflation). That
> is because having the asset now would either allow you to use it to
> gain additional daily happiness from its use over all those years
> between now and then or to invest it to produce more value by that
> future time than would be the original value offered at that time. Both
> of these choices would clearly increase your total lifetime happiness.
Good point.
> > But if I have some reasons to think the reward will be
> > more valuable to me later then it is time to evaluate wether I should
> > get it now while I can or wait to get the bigger reward later and take
> > the chance that my prediction that it will be more valuable to me will
> > hold to be true and that I will be alive to get it.
>
> Because of what I wrote above, I cannot think of any situations in
> which this makes sense except:
> 1) the reward is based on an amount of currency and you think that the
> currency is likely to be devalued (undergo deflation) between now and
> then.
> 2) the reward is of a type which will automatically lose value (decay.
> spoil, etc.) with time and you have sufficient of that type of good at
> this time.
> 3) the reward is of a type of which you have sufficient currently,
> cannot exchange and have reason to think that you may not have
> sufficient at that later time.
Yes this would only apply to some special situations which are not very
common, particularily since with the help of the internet you can trade
almost anything today.
> > Perhaps you are thinking about much longer time, f.ex. deciding if you
> > should have a reward now or in 30 years. But the further ahead you're
> > thinking about defering a reward the higher the chances that you might
> > not be alive at that time and also the harder it is for you to predict
> > how valuable the reward will be to you when you finally receive it. If
> > I could somehow predict the future and be 100% sure I would be alive
> > and the reward would be of the exact same value to me at some time far
> > in the future, then I would have no good reason to chose it now rather
> > then later,
>
> Yes you would, for the two important reasons that I described above.
I agree.
> > except for the reason you mentioned that the thought of a
> > future reward can bring happiness to the person. But this of course is
> > not possible.
>
> It is certainly possible (and in fact happens a lot) that the thought
> of a future reward brings happiness to people.
In fact I was refering to predicting the future when I said it wasn't
possible. My apology for not stating this more clearly.
Olafur Pall Olafsson
Michael C Price wrote:
> $10,000 in a year's time, since the thought of the large future
> reward makes me happier now than a paltry $1000 now does.
I think this is also your choice because you think you will be happier
when you finally receive that $10,000 in a year than you will be when
you receive a $1000 dollars today, not just because the thought of the
$10,000 makes you happy right now. But I don't think I can prove this
point since to do so I would have to show you that you would rather
want $10,000 in a year than $1000 right now even if you would not gain
any happiness from thinking about the reward. But this of course is
only possible if you don't know about the future reward and that is not
possible so this seems to be an impossible scenario to prove.
Or perhaps not. Here's an idea! What if there was a catch accompanying
the future reward but not the instant one. The catch is that if you
chose the higher delayed reward you have to do some work every day
untill the day you get the reward, and this is some kind of work you
really dislike, so much that even with the thought of the reward your
present happiness is reduced considerably. And if you resign this job
anytime during the followig year you will not receive the reward. And
to make the later reward more tempting let's raise the bar and say you
have a choice between $1000 now or $1,000,000 in a year. Now present
happiness is mostly reduced and this is much more a case of predicting
your future happiness. What would you choose in this case?
> "Arrational" means neither rational nor irrational. Our primary
> goals are arrational since reasoning can only be applied within
> a context of goals.
Thanks for the explanation, but I think this only applies to the
primary goal of maximizing ones lifetime happiness, compared to which
any other goal is merely a subgoal which can be rational or not based
on it's relationship with the goal of maximizing ones lifetime
happiness.
Thanks. But that just means that the future reward has to be that much
higher in amount than the present reward for one to value it higher.
> > I disagree with this. Humans differ from animals in the respect
> > that they have the ability to predict the future consequenses of
> > their actions. [......]
> I disagree with your opening statement (which Paul has addressed),
> so rather than answer all your subsequent points I'll just mention the
> last point where you say:
> > the thought of a future reward can bring happiness to the person.
> > But this of course is not possible.
> Did you really mean to say this? It doesn't make sense to me at all.
As I pointed out in my reply to Paul this is not what I meant, my
sentence was poorly stated.
> My key point is
> >> When we defer a reward we only do this because the
> >> thought of a deferred reward gives us immediate happiness.
> >
> > Or when we think the reward will be more valuable to us later.
>
> Only if the thought of the future happiness makes us happy now.
Not necessarily, see my example above.
> If you think you can change a primary goal then I invite you
> contemplate removing your will to survive -- which I imagine
> you won't want to do since that conflicts with your goal of
> survival.
In fact I think I don't want to do it since it conflicts with my goal
of maximizing my lifetime happiness. My goal of survival is merely
derived from my goal of maximizing my lifetime happiness, and the fact
that as long as I am still alive I still have chances to further
increase my lifetime happines and thereby contributing to my goal of
maximizing it. F.ex. even if I was being constantly tortured, leading
to extreme misery and saw no escape from that situations, as long as I
am alive there is always a chance that I will someday get out of that
situation and possibly after doing so live a very happy life for a time
long enough to make all the misery worth the happiness that follows. It
is because this possibility can never be totally ruled out that no
matter how miserable my life is I will always have some will to
survive. In this context I maintain that there really is only one
primary goal from which all others are derived, and that is my goal of
wanting to maximize my total lifetime happiness. Consequently I think
my will to survive should only be called a primary goal (or perhaps
better yet a primary sub-goal) because it is *directly* based on my
goal of wanting to maximize my lifetime happiness.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
Michael C Price wrote:
> "Paul Antonik Wakfer" <pa...@morelife.org> wrote in message
> >
> >>> When we defer a reward we only do this because the
> >>> thought of a deferred reward gives us immediate happiness.
> >
> > This is an argument that I had not seen before. But while it
> > may sometimes be true, I think that it most often is not. This
> > is because (except for the situations listed above) I cannot
> > imagine why anyone would think they will benefit more from
> > the same value in the future than they will by having it now.
>
> I didn't say "same" value in the future,
Your expressions "defer *a* reward" and "*a* deferred reward" (emphasis
mine) implied to me that the reward in the future was the same as now.
> and which is ambiguous and also begs the question.
Yes, if we are discussing only perceived subjective value. But that is
why it is best to discuss these things first in terms of only the value
of some currency (which granted must also be examined with respect to
possible deflation or inflation), which has some kind of objectivity if
only related to the general cost of living (ie other essential goods
and services).
> The answer though, of course, is seen
> by turning the chronology around (swapping "now" and "in the
> future") to restate:
> "I cannot imagine why anyone would think they
> will benefit more from the same value now than
> they will by having it in the future."
> which contradicts the whole empirically based concept of
> hyperbolic discounting:
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperbolic_discounting
I don't know why you say that "the answer, of course, is seen by
turning the chronology around" since most things that operate one way
in time do not operate similarly the other way. I have no problem at
all agreeing that most people "think they will benefit more from the
same value now than they will by having it in the future" and I do not
agree that such a statement violates the hyperbolic discounting theory.
Furthermore I am highly suspicious of all psychological studies of
human behavior until I have read in detail the full paper involved. In
fact, once I have (or often even before I have) I can see that the
study contains major inadequacies in its methodology and/or its
conclusions. This is far more often the case with psychological studies
of human behavior than it is with physiological studies of humans, and
those of us on sle who analyze such
physiological/nutrition/biochemical/medical/longevity studies know well
how often they are flawed in one or more respects.
Moreover our major difference here and the problem with such
psychological studies is that they characterize only the average
behavior of a group of humans and often compare this to the average
behavior of groups of other species. This does little to characterize
the breadth of differences in human behavior (in the method and amount
of their discounting as well as many other aspects of behavior) which
vast variety (gained mostly through learning and character development)
I am convinced is the hallmark of the human species and is based on
their far greater brain capabilities than other species. Finally such
studies are often irrelevant to my position of what is the essence of
being human, since they merely test those humans who have not yet
understood what *is* the essence of their nature and have thus not yet
learned to think logically and act rationally. I am not interested in
what humans are (which based on the current state of the world is
certainly a sorry state), but about what they could become if they
learned to fully understand their nature, and ought to become in their
own longest term widest viewed self interest.
To close, all that I need say to refute this hyperbolic discounting
theory is to state that I and some others that I know do not operate
that way. Does this mean that we are not human? I think not. Does this
mean that those who do operate that way are not human? No, but it does
mean that such people have not yet fully understood, accepted and
learned to operate according to the essence of their human nature.
Michael C Price
>> $10,000 in a year's time, since the thought of the large
>> future reward makes me happier now than a paltry
>> $1000 now does.
>
> I think this is also your choice because you think you will be
> happier when you finally receive that $10,000 in a year than
> you will be when you receive a $1000 dollars today, not just
> because the thought of the $10,000 makes you happy right
> now. But I don't think I can prove this point since to do so I
> would have to show you that you would rather want $10,000
> in a year than $1000 right now even if you would not gain
> any happiness from thinking about the reward. But this of
> course is only possible if you don't know about the future
> reward and that is not possible so this seems to be an
> impossible scenario to prove.
If our respective explanations are impossible to empirically
distinguish then I prefer to stick with the model that also
applicable to other animals. Explanations that posit a
fundamental difference between humans and other animals
stretch my credulity..
> Or perhaps not. Here's an idea! What if there was a catch
> accompanying the future reward but not the instant one. The
> catch is that if you chose the higher delayed reward you have
> to do some work every day untill the day you get the reward,
> and this is some kind of work you really dislike, so much that
> even with the thought of the reward your present happiness is
> reduced considerably. And if you resign this job anytime
> during the followig year you will not receive the reward. And
> to make the later reward more tempting let's raise the bar and
> say you have a choice between $1000 now or $1,000,000 in
> a year. Now present happiness is mostly reduced and this is
> much more a case of predicting your future happiness. What
> would you choose in this case?
I would probably choose the deferred reward and knuckle
down the unpleasant job, consoling myself with the thought of
the future to happiness to keep me happy in the meantime.
So I don't think the example really proves anything, Any
argument about choosing "total lifetime happiness" can always
be recast in terms of maximising present happiness.
>
>> "Arrational" means neither rational nor irrational. Our primary
>> goals are arrational since reasoning can only be applied within
>> a context of goals.
>
> Thanks for the explanation, but I think this only applies to the
> primary goal of maximizing ones lifetime happiness, compared
> to which any other goal is merely a subgoal which can be
> rational or not based on it's relationship with the goal of
> maximizing ones lifetime happiness.
I don't see it this way. Thinks of reason/intelligence/the cerebral
cortex as a tool to resolve goal conflicts (including by the creation
of secondary goals). The primary goals are hardwired in our
lower areas. They can't be reasoned with, but reason dictates how
we go about satisfying them.
[....]
>> My key point is
>> >> When we defer a reward we only do this because the
>> >> thought of a deferred reward gives us immediate happiness.
>> >
>> > Or when we think the reward will be more valuable to us later.
>>
>> Only if the thought of the future happiness makes us happy now.
>
> Not necessarily, see my example above.
See my counter points also.
>> If you think you can change a primary goal then I invite you
>> contemplate removing your will to survive -- which I imagine
>> you won't want to do since that conflicts with your goal of
>> survival.
>
> In fact I think I don't want to do it since it conflicts with my goal
> of maximizing my lifetime happiness. My goal of survival is merely
> derived from my goal of maximizing my lifetime happiness, and the fact
> that as long as I am still alive I still have chances to further
> increase my lifetime happines and thereby contributing to my goal of
> maximizing it. F.ex. even if I was being constantly tortured, leading
> to extreme misery and saw no escape from that situations, as long as I
> am alive there is always a chance that I will someday get out of that
> situation and possibly after doing so live a very happy life for a time
> long enough to make all the misery worth the happiness that follows. It
> is because this possibility can never be totally ruled out that no
> matter how miserable my life is I will always have some will to
> survive. In this context I maintain that there really is only one
> primary goal from which all others are derived, and that is my goal of
> wanting to maximize my total lifetime happiness. Consequently I think
> my will to survive should only be called a primary goal (or perhaps
> better yet a primary sub-goal) because it is *directly* based on my
> goal of wanting to maximize my lifetime happiness.
I find this generally unconvincing as a model of how humans behave.
It only takes a small amount of continuous torture (e.g. Chinese water
torture) to "break" someone, anyone. I suggest this is because their
present happiness is reduced to below zero and death becomes
preferable.
- Michael C Price
Michael C Price
>> by turning the chronology around (swapping "now" and "in the
>> future") to restate:
>> "I cannot imagine why anyone would think they
>> will benefit more from the same value now than
>> they will by having it in the future."
>> which contradicts the whole empirically based concept of
>> hyperbolic discounting:
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperbolic_discounting
>
> I don't know why you say that "the answer, of course, is seen by
> turning the chronology around" since most things that operate
> one way in time do not operate similarly the other way.
Some people (most people) discount the future, but some people
value the future more than the present (e.g. misers). So any general
theory should be time invertible.
[.....]
> To close, all that I need say to refute this hyperbolic discounting
> theory is to state that I and some others that I know do not operate
> that way. Does this mean that we are not human? I think not. Does
> this mean that those who do operate that way are not human? No,
> but it does mean that such people have not yet fully understood,
> accepted and learned to operate according to the essence of their
> human nature.
Or you could be deluded about your nature (as are most people --
so this has to be my default hypothesis about you as well, especially
since I have seen no new insights resulting from your imagined
greater self-knowledge.).
- Michael C Price
Paul Antonik Wakfer
I disagree that death avoidance is an instinct since few humans do all
that is possible to avoid death and many actively seek it.
I also completely disagree with the idea of replacing the phrase
"motivational forces" with "instinctual drives". OTOH, I would also
never use "motivational force" since this is an incorrect, diluting and
obfuscating use of the word "force" , which should always be reserved
for physical force. I would rather use the phrase "motivational desires
and estimations of action to achieve".
I accept that some reflex or autonomic instincts exist in humans
(moreso in babies than adults). But I totally reject the rubbish that
"altruism, disgust, face perception, and language acquisitions" are
instincts for both the same reasons as given above for death avoidance
and additionally because these are all under directly conscious or
learned habit control (again except for babies with respect to the last
two listed).
Like so much that is written on wikipedia, this is one pov without even
lip-service to any of the others. That is why I do not use wikipedia as
any kind of authority or complete source, but only occasionally to get
a mere inkling or start.
Finally, Michael (and the wikipedia article) ignore the argument I gave
above that:
> > there simply has not been sufficient evolutionary time for any major
> > instinctual behavior to have been set into the very recently expanded
> > brain size and capabilities.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> "Paul Antonik Wakfer" <pa...@morelife.org> wrote in message
> >
> >> The answer though, of course, is seen
> >> by turning the chronology around (swapping "now" and "in the
> >> future") to restate:
> >> "I cannot imagine why anyone would think they
> >> will benefit more from the same value now than
> >> they will by having it in the future."
> >> which contradicts the whole empirically based concept of
> >> hyperbolic discounting:
> >>
> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperbolic_discounting
> >
> > I don't know why you say that "the answer, of course, is seen by
> > turning the chronology around" since most things that operate
> > one way in time do not operate similarly the other way.
>
> Some people (most people) discount the future, but some people
> value the future more than the present (e.g. misers). So any general
> theory should be time invertible.
Huh? That's one of the craziest ideas I have ever come across!
You are completely ignoring the individual and even assuming that the
weighted average of behaviors in either direction is equal. This has no
relevance at all to establishing a theory of what individual actions
will maximize a given human's lifetime happiness.
> [.....]
> > To close, all that I need say to refute this hyperbolic discounting
> > theory is to state that I and some others that I know do not operate
> > that way. Does this mean that we are not human? I think not. Does
> > this mean that those who do operate that way are not human? No,
> > but it does mean that such people have not yet fully understood,
> > accepted and learned to operate according to the essence of their
> > human nature.
>
> Or you could be deluded about your nature (as are most people --
> so this has to be my default hypothesis about you as well, especially
> since I have seen no new insights resulting from your imagined
> greater self-knowledge).
Since we are now getting nowhere except to sling insults ( you have
crazy ideas and I am deluded), since you refuse to acknowledge or even
respond to the many insights and demolishing of your points that I have
provided here and since you do not appear to have read any of the
greater detail at my website, I think it is time to end this discussion
between us.
Michael C Price
Because they have other, conflicting instinctual drives as well.
> I also completely disagree with the idea of replacing the phrase
> "motivational forces" with "instinctual drives". OTOH, I would
> also never use "motivational force" since this is an incorrect,
> diluting and obfuscating use of the word "force" , which should
> always be reserved for physical force. I would rather use the
> phrase "motivational desires and estimations of action to achieve".
>
> I accept that some reflex or autonomic instincts exist in humans
> (moreso in babies than adults). But I totally reject the rubbish that
> "altruism, disgust, face perception, and language acquisitions" are
> instincts for both the same reasons as given above for death
> avoidance
And wrong for the same reason.
> and additionally because these are all under directly conscious
> or learned habit control (again except for babies with respect
> to the last two listed).
Consciousness has nothing to do with the issue of where our
goals/drives/motivations come from.
> Like so much that is written on wikipedia, this is one pov without
> even lip-service to any of the others.
Obviously you didn't very far or you missed:
"Other sociologists argue that humans have no instincts, " etc etc
I would have never have expected to see you on the side
of the sociologists! :-)
> That is why I do not use wikipedia as any kind of authority
> or complete source, but only occasionally to get a mere inkling
> or start.
>
> Finally, Michael (and the wikipedia article) ignore the
> argument I gave above that:
>
>>> there simply has not been sufficient evolutionary time for
>>> any major instinctual behavior to have been set into the
>>> very recently expanded brain size and capabilities.
Ignored because I see no evidence for this conjecture and a lot
of evidence that contradicts it. Drives drive us, obviously.
Drives are like axioms in maths, and reasoning is the logic that
gets us from axioms to conclusions. Without axioms nothing
can be proved. Without drives nothing is desired or sought after.
Without goals there can be no goal seeking behaviour. Axioms
can't be derived, they have to be assumed. Similarly primary
goals can't be derived from other goals. They are hard-wired
at the instinctual level.
- Michael C Price
Michael C Price
> Michael C Price wrote:
>> "Paul Antonik Wakfer" <pa...@morelife.org> wrote in message
>> >
>> >> The answer though, of course, is seen
>> >> by turning the chronology around (swapping "now" and "in the
>> >> future") to restate:
>> >> "I cannot imagine why anyone would think they
>> >> will benefit more from the same value now than
>> >> they will by having it in the future."
>> >> which contradicts the whole empirically based concept of
>> >> hyperbolic discounting:
>> >>
>> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperbolic_discounting
>> >
>> > I don't know why you say that "the answer, of course, is seen by
>> > turning the chronology around" since most things that operate
>> > one way in time do not operate similarly the other way.
>>
>> Some people (most people) discount the future, but some people
>> value the future more than the present (e.g. misers). So any general
>> theory should be time invertible.
>
> Huh? That's one of the craziest ideas I have ever come across!
> You are completely ignoring the individual and even assuming that the
> weighted average of behaviors in either direction is equal. This has no
> relevance at all to establishing a theory of what individual actions
> will maximize a given human's lifetime happiness.
>
I am not ignoring the individual; on the contrary I am explicitly
acknowledging individual variation. Nor did I assume the weighted
average in either direction was equal.
- Michael C Price
Michael C Price
> Since we are now getting nowhere except to sling insults
> ( you have crazy ideas and I am deluded), since you refuse
> to acknowledge or even respond to the many insights and
> demolishing of your points that I have provided here and
> since you do not appear to have read any of the greater
> detail at my website, I think it is time to end this discussion
> between us.
You should note for future reference that I will often ignore
points you make that precede statements such as
" This is an argument that I had not seen before."
since I know you make a point of not reviewing earlier
comments in light of later insights, within a message response.
Since I can't tell which of your earlier comments you might
have altered if you had taken the time to respond "holistically"
rather than "sequentially" it seemed prudent to ignore them.
Note: I always answer posts holistically.
- Michael C Price
Paul Antonik Wakfer
[snip]
> Some people (most people) discount the future, but some people
> value the future more than the present (e.g. misers).
I decided to address this one again because Michael's statement about
misers is totally incorrect. A miser (of anything) is one who, for one
or more reasons, places high intrinsic value (ie gains great happiness)
in having some material thing(s) (what to most people is a larger
amount they they would require) rather than using it to gain other
things. A miser of money greatly enjoys having lots of money. He
specifically does not want to spend to gain any other value not now or
in the future. Most certainly a miser does not value the future more
than the present any more than does anyone else who seeks to gain and
hold material assets. All those who save in order to have money in the
future are not valuing the money more in the future than now
(particularly when that invest to increase that money), they are merely
wanting to ensure that they have money in the future by not spending it
all now. Actually in a certain respect anyone who thinks long range and
does without any current pleasure that s/he could have (acts
non-hedonistically) can be said to be acting in a miserly fashion, but
instead is simply acting rationally to maximize his total lifetime
happiness.
In any case the term is completely relative. A "miser" is often just a
word use by someone (a spender?) who thinks that the miser saves too
much for the future - just as "spendthrift" is a word used by a someone
(a saver?) who thinks that the spendthrift does not save enough for the
future :-)
Olafur Pall Olafsson
Michael C Price wrote:
> Hi Olafur
> >> $10,000 in a year's time, since the thought of the large
> >> future reward makes me happier now than a paltry
> >> $1000 now does.
> >
> > I think this is also your choice because you think you will be
> > happier when you finally receive that $10,000 in a year than
> > you will be when you receive a $1000 dollars today, not just
> > because the thought of the $10,000 makes you happy right
> > now. But I don't think I can prove this point since to do so I
> > would have to show you that you would rather want $10,000
> > in a year than $1000 right now even if you would not gain
> > any happiness from thinking about the reward. But this of
> > course is only possible if you don't know about the future
> > reward and that is not possible so this seems to be an
> > impossible scenario to prove.
>
> If our respective explanations are impossible to empirically
> distinguish then I prefer to stick with the model that also
> applicable to other animals. Explanations that posit a
> fundamental difference between humans and other animals
> stretch my credulity..
As Paul stated previously psychological studies on human behavior only
represent average humans. I am certainly no average human and any model
derived from such studies does not necessarily apply to me.
> > Or perhaps not. Here's an idea! What if there was a catch
> > accompanying the future reward but not the instant one. The
> > catch is that if you chose the higher delayed reward you have
> > to do some work every day untill the day you get the reward,
> > and this is some kind of work you really dislike, so much that
> > even with the thought of the reward your present happiness is
> > reduced considerably. And if you resign this job anytime
> > during the followig year you will not receive the reward. And
> > to make the later reward more tempting let's raise the bar and
> > say you have a choice between $1000 now or $1,000,000 in
> > a year. Now present happiness is mostly reduced and this is
> > much more a case of predicting your future happiness. What
> > would you choose in this case?
>
> I would probably choose the deferred reward and knuckle
> down the unpleasant job, consoling myself with the thought of
> the future to happiness to keep me happy in the meantime.
But then you are clearly making a decision based on your lifetime
happiness not your present happiness, since if you were only thinking
about your present happiness then you would soon quit the boring job.
> So I don't think the example really proves anything, Any
> argument about choosing "total lifetime happiness" can always
> be recast in terms of maximising present happiness.
This I totally disagree with. I have a job that is a bit boring. Not
very boring, but boring enough that I would definitely not do it if I
did not get paid for it. Now I will be taking a night shift this
saturday at my job. How would you recast that in terms of maximizing
present happiness? You can't. I can tell you that I am going to work on
this night shift as I think it will contribute to maximizing my
lifetime happiness. If I were only thinking about my present happiness
then I would not go to work on saturday since I'd rather want to do
something else.
> > Thanks for the explanation, but I think this only applies to the
> > primary goal of maximizing ones lifetime happiness, compared
> > to which any other goal is merely a subgoal which can be
> > rational or not based on it's relationship with the goal of
> > maximizing ones lifetime happiness.
>
> I don't see it this way. Thinks of reason/intelligence/the cerebral
> cortex as a tool to resolve goal conflicts (including by the creation
> of secondary goals). The primary goals are hardwired in our
> lower areas. They can't be reasoned with, but reason dictates how
> we go about satisfying them.
I can't change my goal of maximizing my lifetime happiness since it is
inherent in my nature as a human being, but I can certainly reason
about how to achieve it. And I don't know about you but I don't think
there is any goal hardwired in my brain except my goal of maximizing my
lifetime happiness.
> I find this generally unconvincing as a model of how humans behave.
> It only takes a small amount of continuous torture (e.g. Chinese water
> torture) to "break" someone, anyone. I suggest this is because their
> present happiness is reduced to below zero and death becomes
> preferable.
You seem to have missed my point. My point was that I will always have
*some* will to survive as long as I am aware of my goal of increasing
my lifetime happiness. I did not mean that my will to survive would
always be *higher* than my will to die. Surely if I would be constantly
tortured I would eventually reach a point where my will to end the
misery by dying would be higher than my will to survive.
Michael C Price
> Hi Michael,
>> If our respective explanations are impossible to empirically
>> applicable to other animals. Explanations that posit a
>> fundamental difference between humans and other animals
>> stretch my credulity..
>
> As Paul stated previously psychological studies on human
> behavior only represent average humans. I am certainly no
> average human and any model derived from such studies
> does not necessarily apply to me.
True, but to suggest that the basic psychological mechanisms
we are discussing differ between any two humans -- that sounds
a big claim to me, and one that I don't believe. It's a bit like
claiming that you have free-will and no-one else has.
>> I would probably choose the deferred reward and knuckle
>> down the unpleasant job, consoling myself with the thought of
>> the future to happiness to keep me happy in the meantime.
>
> But then you are clearly making a decision based on your
> lifetime happiness not your present happiness, since if you
> were only thinking about your present happiness then you
> would soon quit the boring job.
I was explaining my actions in terms of maximising present
happiness. If you think I was, in your example, "clearly
making a decision" on any other basis then we must be
talking past each other.
>> So I don't think the example really proves anything, Any
>> argument about choosing "total lifetime happiness" can always
>> be recast in terms of maximising present happiness.
>
> This I totally disagree with. I have a job that is a bit boring.
> Not very boring, but boring enough that I would definitely
> not do it if I did not get paid for it. Now I will be taking a
> night shift this saturday at my job. How would you recast
> that in terms of maximizing present happiness? You can't.
Of course I can. You work at your job because the thought
of the deferred rewards you will accrue brings you pleasure
now. I really don't see the problem in *understanding* this
model -- irrespective of whether you *believe* in the model;
surely understanding it can't be that hard, can it?.
> I can tell you that I am going to work on this night shift
> as I think it will contribute to maximizing my lifetime happiness.
> If I were only thinking about my present happiness then I
> would not go to work on saturday since I'd rather want to do
> something else.
No, because the thought of the future benefits of commiting to
the job makes you happy now -- happier than the non-job
activities would make you.
>>> Thanks for the explanation, but I think this only applies to the
>>> primary goal of maximizing ones lifetime happiness, compared
>>> to which any other goal is merely a subgoal which can be
>>> rational or not based on it's relationship with the goal of
>>> maximizing ones lifetime happiness.
>>
>> I don't see it this way. Thinks of reason/intelligence/the cerebral
>> cortex as a tool to resolve goal conflicts (including by the creation
>> of secondary goals). The primary goals are hardwired in our
>> lower areas. They can't be reasoned with, but reason dictates how
>> we go about satisfying them.
>
> I can't change my goal of maximizing my lifetime happiness since it is
> inherent in my nature as a human being, but I can certainly reason
> about how to achieve it. And I don't know about you but I don't think
> there is any goal hardwired in my brain except my goal of maximizing
> my lifetime happiness.
You don't think your sex drive is hardwired in any way? Or your
hunger for food? Or thirst for water? Any of these drives could,
under some circumstances, compromise your lifetimes happiness
>> I find this generally unconvincing as a model of how humans behave.
>> It only takes a small amount of continuous torture (e.g. Chinese water
>> torture) to "break" someone, anyone. I suggest this is because their
>> present happiness is reduced to below zero and death becomes
>> preferable.
>
> You seem to have missed my point. My point was that I will
> always have *some* will to survive as long as I am aware of my
> goal of increasing my lifetime happiness. I did not mean that my
> will to survive would always be *higher* than my will to die. Surely
> if I would be constantly tortured I would eventually reach a point
> where my will to end the misery by dying would be higher than my
> will to survive.
That isn't what you originally seemed to say on the subject of
torture, which I interpreted as you saying you would always hold
out, since there would always be the chance of respite:
"even if I was being constantly tortured, leading to extreme
misery and saw no escape from that situations, as long as I
am alive there is always a chance that I will someday get out
of that situation and possibly after doing so live a very happy
life for a time long enough to make all the misery worth the
happiness that follows."
- Michael C Price
Olafur Pall Olafsson
Michael C Price wrote:
> Hi Olafur,
> > Hi Michael,
> >> If our respective explanations are impossible to empirically
> >> distinguish then I prefer to stick with the model that [is] also
> >> applicable to other animals. Explanations that posit a
> >> fundamental difference between humans and other animals
> >> stretch my credulity..
> >
> > As Paul stated previously psychological studies on human
> > behavior only represent average humans. I am certainly no
> > average human and any model derived from such studies
> > does not necessarily apply to me.
>
> True, but to suggest that the basic psychological mechanisms
> we are discussing differ between any two humans -- that sounds
> a big claim to me, and one that I don't believe. It's a bit like
> claiming that you have free-will and no-one else has.
I'm not following, what basic psychological mechanisms are you refering
to here?
> >> I would probably choose the deferred reward and knuckle
> >> down the unpleasant job, consoling myself with the thought of
> >> the future to happiness to keep me happy in the meantime.
> >
> > But then you are clearly making a decision based on your
> > lifetime happiness not your present happiness, since if you
> > were only thinking about your present happiness then you
> > would soon quit the boring job.
>
> I was explaining my actions in terms of maximising present
> happiness. If you think I was, in your example, "clearly
> making a decision" on any other basis then we must be
> talking past each other.
I just cannot understand how that could be explaining your actions in
terms of maximizing present happiness since in the example I gave the
job was supposed to be so boring that *even* with the thought of later
reward your present happiness while at the job was reduced.
> > This I totally disagree with. I have a job that is a bit boring.
> > Not very boring, but boring enough that I would definitely
> > not do it if I did not get paid for it. Now I will be taking a
> > night shift this saturday at my job. How would you recast
> > that in terms of maximizing present happiness? You can't.
>
> Of course I can. You work at your job because the thought
> of the deferred rewards you will accrue brings you pleasure
> now.
That's not true in my case. The pleasure of thinking about the deferred
reward is not very high, even with that pleasure the job is still not
something I enjoy doing. Only if for this particular night shift I
would get a huge bonus, like if I would get payd 100 times my normal
pay for it, would the constant thought of the reward make the shift fun
enough that I would rather be at work with that thought in my mind than
being home doing something I like doing but without that thought in my
mind. The ~$170 I get for the night shift just isn't cutting it. Not
only is the reward not very high (just a fraction of the total amount
of money I own), but because it is not high I would not be thinking
about it a lot. On the other hand the huge bonus would cause a
considerable increase in the total amount of money I own so not only
would the thought of it bring me much more happiness than the though of
getting the ~$170 but I would be thinking about it much more often
during the shift being so exited about getting this huge bonus. In that
case the constant happy thought would probably make the night shift
very fun. I sometimes work at official holidays getting double pay for
it and while the shift is certainly more fun knowing that I will get
payd double I'd still rather be doing something else than be at work.
> I really don't see the problem in *understanding* this
> model -- irrespective of whether you *believe* in the model;
> surely understanding it can't be that hard, can it?.
I understand that the thought of the defered reward brings me pleasure
now if that is what you are asking about. But there is still always the
question of wether or not that increase in happiness is high enough to
outweight the decrease in happiness from actually doing the boring job.
> > I can tell you that I am going to work on this night shift
> > as I think it will contribute to maximizing my lifetime happiness.
> > If I were only thinking about my present happiness then I
> > would not go to work on saturday since I'd rather want to do
> > something else.
>
> No, because the thought of the future benefits of commiting to
> the job makes you happy now -- happier than the non-job
> activities would make you.
That is not true in my case. The non-job activities I would do instead
most certainly would make me happier than thinking about the tiny
increase in my assets the ~$170 would cause. But proving that would
require me to show you that I would be more happy if I would not work
at that night shift than if I would work at the night shift only to be
told afterwards that I would not get payd for it. In the latter case,
since I would not know until after the night shift that I would not be
payd for it I would still get the same feeling of happiness from
thinking about the reward during the shift. While I cannot prove this I
think I would definitely be happier doing the non-job activities than
doing the job and finding out afterwards that I would not get payd for
it.
> > I can't change my goal of maximizing my lifetime happiness since it is
> > inherent in my nature as a human being, but I can certainly reason
> > about how to achieve it. And I don't know about you but I don't think
> > there is any goal hardwired in my brain except my goal of maximizing
> > my lifetime happiness.
>
> You don't think your sex drive is hardwired in any way? Or your
> hunger for food? Or thirst for water? Any of these drives could,
> under some circumstances, compromise your lifetimes happiness
That is true, the difference is that I don't think of these as goals.
F.ex. to eat when I am hungry is not necessarily a goal of mine, in
many cases I actually delay eating rather than eating as soon as I'm
hungry. But eating when I'm hungry can definitely under some
circumstances contribute to my lifetime happiness.
> > You seem to have missed my point. My point was that I will
> > always have *some* will to survive as long as I am aware of my
> > goal of increasing my lifetime happiness. I did not mean that my
> > will to survive would always be *higher* than my will to die. Surely
> > if I would be constantly tortured I would eventually reach a point
> > where my will to end the misery by dying would be higher than my
> > will to survive.
>
> That isn't what you originally seemed to say on the subject of
> torture, which I interpreted as you saying you would always hold
> out, since there would always be the chance of respite:
Well I probably could've stated my meaning more clearly but at least
you get my point now.
andrew...@hotmail.com
readers of this topic
http://www.geocities.com/andrewvecsey/happiness.html
kind regards
andrew vecsey
PS
giving causes more happiness than receiving because giving is active
and receiving is passive. We control what we give, but have no control
of what we receive. Sometimes recieving can be frustrating especially
when we receive something other than what we want.
Michael C Price
>>>> If our respective explanations are impossible to empirically
>>>> distinguish then I prefer to stick with the model that [is] also
>>>> applicable to other animals. Explanations that posit a
>>>> fundamental difference between humans and other animals
>>>> stretch my credulity..
>>>
>>> As Paul stated previously psychological studies on human
>>> behavior only represent average humans. I am certainly no
>>> average human and any model derived from such studies
>>> does not necessarily apply to me.
>>
>> True, but to suggest that the basic psychological mechanisms
>> we are discussing differ between any two humans -- that sounds
>> a big claim to me, and one that I don't believe. It's a bit like
>> claiming that you have free-will and no-one else has.
>
> I'm not following, what basic psychological mechanisms are you
> refering to here?
I refer to the mechanism that makes a rat stimulate its pleasure
center in preference all other activities, to the point of death:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pleasure_center
I believe that any human, like other animals, will behave likewise.
No doubt our pleasure centers are wired in a more complex
fashion, but the principle is the same.
>>>> I would probably choose the deferred reward and knuckle
>>>> down the unpleasant job, consoling myself with the thought of
>>>> the future to happiness to keep me happy in the meantime.
>>>
>>> But then you are clearly making a decision based on your
>>> lifetime happiness not your present happiness, since if you
>>> were only thinking about your present happiness then you
>>> would soon quit the boring job.
>>
>> I was explaining my actions in terms of maximising present
>> happiness. If you think I was, in your example, "clearly
>> making a decision" on any other basis then we must be
>> talking past each other.
>
> I just cannot understand how that could be explaining your
> actions in terms of maximizing present happiness since in
> the example I gave the job was supposed to be so boring
> that *even* with the thought of later reward your present
> happiness while at the job was reduced.
We are interpreting the same behaviour in different ways
(i.e. have different explanatory models). A behavourist
model (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviorism
and especially http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radical_behaviorism)
would interpret going to work (or any other voluntary
activity) as meaning that the immediate pleasure gained from
work *must have* outweighed the immediate pleasure that
could have been gained from the alternative, unrealised activities
-- or else it would reject the whole concept of pleasure and
happiness altogether (which is a bit *too* behaviourist for me,
although I have some sympathy with this extreme position).
That you might complain and grumble at work (an imaginary
example, of course - I'm not saying you do) is not evidence
that you are unhappier at work than you would be doing something
else. Self-reporting of internal mental states is notoriously
unreliable, which is why the behavourists rejected such evidence
a long time ago. If you had skipped work you might not have
been able to enjoy these non-work actvities as much as you
had antcipated because of the thought of forthcoming
unpleasant repercussions (e.g. lack of wages, getting fired).
I guess what I doing is trying to tie the notion of happiness
directly to behaviour, and not to what people report.
>> I really don't see the problem in *understanding* this
>> model -- irrespective of whether you *believe* in the model;
>> surely understanding it can't be that hard, can it?.
>
> I understand that the thought of the defered reward brings me
> pleasure now if that is what you are asking about. But there is
> still always the question of wether or not that increase in
> happiness is high enough to outweight the decrease in
> happiness from actually doing the boring job.
To me this question is answered behaviourly: if you go to work
it is *because* the immediate happiness of work outweighs the
alternatives. That we don't often expresss it like this reflects our
lack of insight into our natures, or the way we choose to define
terms. It's a figure of speech to say, whilst having choosen to
do X, that "I'd rather be doing X than Y", but the mere fact that
are have *choosen* to do X indicates that the contrary
is true.
>>> I can tell you that I am going to work on this night shift
>>> as I think it will contribute to maximizing my lifetime happiness.
>>> If I were only thinking about my present happiness then I
>>> would not go to work on saturday since I'd rather want to do
>>> something else.
>>
>> No, because the thought of the future benefits of commiting to
>> the job makes you happy now -- happier than the non-job
>> activities would make you.
>
> That is not true in my case. The non-job activities I would do instead
> most certainly would make me happier than thinking about the tiny
> increase in my assets the ~$170 would cause. But proving that would
> require me to show you that I would be more happy if I would not work
> at that night shift than if I would work at the night shift only to be
> told afterwards that I would not get payd for it. In the latter case,
> since I would not know until after the night shift that I would not be
> payd for it I would still get the same feeling of happiness from
> thinking about the reward during the shift. While I cannot prove this I
> think I would definitely be happier doing the non-job activities than
> doing the job and finding out afterwards that I would not get payd for
> it.
I don't quite see the relevance of considering the hypothetical case
of working without pay (clearly not something you (nor I) would
choose to do). Hopefully (?) I have answered your other points
elsewhere.
>>> I can't change my goal of maximizing my lifetime happiness since
>>> it is inherent in my nature as a human being, but I can certainly
>>> reason about how to achieve it. And I don't know about you but
>>> I don't think there is any goal hardwired in my brain except my
>>> goal of maximizing my lifetime happiness.
>>
>> You don't think your sex drive is hardwired in any way? Or your
>> hunger for food? Or thirst for water? Any of these drives could,
>> under some circumstances, compromise your lifetimes happiness
>
> That is true, the difference is that I don't think of these as goals.
But I do: this is what I meant by some of our differences are due
to terminology or definitions. Hunger is, for example in my view,
a physiologically responsive goal in that our level of hunger, and
the urgency with which we seek to satisfy it, primed by various
physiological parameters. Same with thirst (a dehyrated person
gains more pleasure from a glass of water than a hydrated person).
> F.ex. to eat when I am hungry is not necessarily a goal of mine,
> in many cases I actually delay eating rather than eating as soon
> as I'm hungry. But eating when I'm hungry can definitely under
> some circumstances contribute to my lifetime happiness.
Obviously eating *can* contribute to lifetime happiness. But,
as the unpopularity of CR demonstrates, humans have great
difficulty in overcoming these basic drives. CRers rewire,
over time, themselves to gain greater immediate happiness from
the thought of extending their lifespan than from the act satisfying
their hunger. This is an example of how goal conflict (hunger
vs survival) within the thalamus or some "lower" brain structure
is resolved by intelligence/reasoning within our cerebral cortices
or "higher" brain structures.
>>> You seem to have missed my point. My point was that I will
>>> always have *some* will to survive as long as I am aware of
>>> my goal of increasing my lifetime happiness. I did not mean
>>> that my will to survive would always be *higher* than my will
>>> to die. Surely if I would be constantly tortured I would
>>> eventually reach a point where my will to end the misery by
>>> dying would be higher than my will to survive.
>>
>> That isn't what you originally seemed to say on the subject of
>> torture, which I interpreted as you saying you would always
>> hold out, since there would always be the chance of respite:
>
> Well I probably could've stated my meaning more clearly but at
> least you get my point now.
I get your point, but I simply don't believe it. I'm not sure if
you get my point yet, or whether you just don't believe it.
- Michael C Price
Olafur Pall Olafsson
In a lot of the parts below we simply disagree with each other. But
because I have pretty much made my points clear I don't think there is
much to benefit by continuing this discussion further. I also do not
have much interest in doing so, therefore I may not reply to any
additional comments you have.
Michael C Price wrote:
> > I'm not following, what basic psychological mechanisms are you
> > refering to here?
>
> I refer to the mechanism that makes a rat stimulate its pleasure
> center in preference all other activities, to the point of death:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pleasure_center
>
> I believe that any human, like other animals, will behave likewise.
> No doubt our pleasure centers are wired in a more complex
> fashion, but the principle is the same.
This I disagree with. What the rat does not realise, but I as a human
do, is that if she would take breaks from pushing the lever to eat she
could get much more happiness out of it since she would not die out of
hunger soon.
> We are interpreting the same behaviour in different ways
> (i.e. have different explanatory models). A behavourist
> model (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviorism
> and especially http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radical_behaviorism)
> would interpret going to work (or any other voluntary
> activity) as meaning that the immediate pleasure gained from
> work *must have* outweighed the immediate pleasure that
> could have been gained from the alternative, unrealised activities
> -- or else it would reject the whole concept of pleasure and
> happiness altogether
I disagree that it rejects the concept of pleasure and happiness as I
think people sometimes do things that are unpleasant in order to get
more pleasure later.
> (which is a bit *too* behaviourist for me,
> although I have some sympathy with this extreme position).
> That you might complain and grumble at work (an imaginary
> example, of course - I'm not saying you do) is not evidence
> that you are unhappier at work than you would be doing something
> else. Self-reporting of internal mental states is notoriously
> unreliable, which is why the behavourists rejected such evidence
> a long time ago.
I agree.
> If you had skipped work you might not have
> been able to enjoy these non-work actvities as much as you
> had antcipated because of the thought of forthcoming
> unpleasant repercussions (e.g. lack of wages, getting fired).
This is true and a good point. But if you're thinking about the
forthcoming unpleasant repercussions aren't you thinking about your
lifetime happiness rather then just your present happiness?
> > That's not true in my case. The pleasure of thinking about the deferred
> > reward is not very high, even with that pleasure the job is still not
> > something I enjoy doing. Only if for this particular night shift I
> > would get a huge bonus, like if I would get payd 100 times my normal
> > pay for it, would the constant thought of the reward make the shift fun
> > enough that I would rather be at work with that thought in my mind than
> > being home doing something I like doing but without that thought in my
> > mind. The ~$170 I get for the night shift just isn't cutting it. Not
> > only is the reward not very high (just a fraction of the total amount
> > of money I own), but because it is not high I would not be thinking
> > about it a lot. On the other hand the huge bonus would cause a
> > considerable increase in the total amount of money I own so not only
> > would the thought of it bring me much more happiness than the though of
> > getting the ~$170 but I would be thinking about it much more often
> > during the shift being so exited about getting this huge bonus. In that
> > case the constant happy thought would probably make the night shift
> > very fun. I sometimes work at official holidays getting double pay for
> > it and while the shift is certainly more fun knowing that I will get
> > payd double I'd still rather be doing something else than be at work.
>
> I guess what I doing is trying to tie the notion of happiness
> directly to behaviour, and not to what people report.
Yes and the difference between us lies in the fact that I think humans
behave according to their lifetime happiness while you think they
behave according to their present happiness.
> > I understand that the thought of the defered reward brings me
> > pleasure now if that is what you are asking about. But there is
> > still always the question of wether or not that increase in
> > happiness is high enough to outweight the decrease in
> > happiness from actually doing the boring job.
>
> To me this question is answered behaviourly: if you go to work
> it is *because* the immediate happiness of work outweighs the
> alternatives. That we don't often expresss it like this reflects our
> lack of insight into our natures, or the way we choose to define
> terms.
The difference between us is that I think it is in human nature for
them to act in accordance to their lifetime happiness while you think
they act in accordance with their present happiness.
> It's a figure of speech to say, whilst having choosen to
> do X, that "I'd rather be doing X than Y", but the mere fact that
> are have *choosen* to do X indicates that the contrary
> is true.
I'm avare of this figure of speech so I'm guessing you meant to say
"whilst having choosen to do Y" above? But I don't think it is true.
F.ex. if I say "I'm doing Y, but I'd rather be doing X" I mean that I
really would rather be doing Y but I do X instead because I realise
that sometimes you have to do things you don't want to do to get more
happiness later.
> >>> I can tell you that I am going to work on this night shift
> >>> as I think it will contribute to maximizing my lifetime happiness.
> >>> If I were only thinking about my present happiness then I
> >>> would not go to work on saturday since I'd rather want to do
> >>> something else.
> >>
> >> No, because the thought of the future benefits of commiting to
> >> the job makes you happy now -- happier than the non-job
> >> activities would make you.
> >
> > That is not true in my case. The non-job activities I would do instead
> > most certainly would make me happier than thinking about the tiny
> > increase in my assets the ~$170 would cause. But proving that would
> > require me to show you that I would be more happy if I would not work
> > at that night shift than if I would work at the night shift only to be
> > told afterwards that I would not get payd for it. In the latter case,
> > since I would not know until after the night shift that I would not be
> > payd for it I would still get the same feeling of happiness from
> > thinking about the reward during the shift. While I cannot prove this I
> > think I would definitely be happier doing the non-job activities than
> > doing the job and finding out afterwards that I would not get payd for
> > it.
>
> I don't quite see the relevance of considering the hypothetical case
> of working without pay (clearly not something you (nor I) would
> choose to do). Hopefully (?) I have answered your other points
> elsewhere.
My point is that while working you wouldn't know that you were working
without pay so your present happiness while working would be the same
as if you were getting payd for it.
> > F.ex. to eat when I am hungry is not necessarily a goal of mine,
> > in many cases I actually delay eating rather than eating as soon
> > as I'm hungry. But eating when I'm hungry can definitely under
> > some circumstances contribute to my lifetime happiness.
>
> Obviously eating *can* contribute to lifetime happiness. But,
> as the unpopularity of CR demonstrates, humans have great
> difficulty in overcoming these basic drives. CRers rewire,
> over time, themselves to gain greater immediate happiness from
> the thought of extending their lifespan than from the act satisfying
> their hunger. This is an example of how goal conflict (hunger
> vs survival) within the thalamus or some "lower" brain structure
> is resolved by intelligence/reasoning within our cerebral cortices
> or "higher" brain structures.
What you refer to as resolving goal conflict above is what I refer to
as reasoning about how to maximize ones lifetime happiness. I think a
man that decides to go on CR has reasoned that the loss of immediate
happiness gained by eating is offset by the potential gain in happiness
by the added lives he may get.
> I get your point, but I simply don't believe it. I'm not sure if
> you get my point yet, or whether you just don't believe it.
I think I get it, but I don't believe it.
john...@naturalhealthperspective.com
digitized very large numbers of original editions of books written by
John Harvey Kellogg; such as the following.
The New dietetics, what to eat and how
By John Harvey
Kellogghttp://books.google.com/books?vid=0s_chOPD1KNQ6SEZllxQ&id=CBGxvXF332cC&printsec=toc&dq=inauthor:john+inauthor:kellogg&ie=ISO-8859-1
In the pursuit of my own happiness I wll now be able to provide FREE
online editions of all of Kellogg's major written works thanks to
Google.
1921 is in fact the year that the natural health movement was born.
And, John Harvey Kellogg is the Father of Natural Health.
Just thought that TC might want to know. :)
Michael C Price
yes, I did get X and Y mixed up at one point, as you observed.
Our differences are mostly (although not entirely) interpretational.
Until experiment can distinguish between our views I shall
simply prefer an interpretation which models all animal behaviour,
including human behaviour, within one paradigm, rather than treat
non-humans and some humans as radically different.from other
humans.
- Michael C Price
"Olafur Pall Olafsson" <olafu...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1157136330....@i3g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
Paul Antonik Wakfer
Michael C Price wrote:
> Hi Olafur,
> yes, I did get X and Y mixed up at one point, as you observed.
> Our differences are mostly (although not entirely) interpretational.
> Until experiment can distinguish between our views I shall
> simply prefer an interpretation which models all animal behaviour,
> including human behaviour, within one paradigm, rather than treat
> non-humans and some humans as radically different.from other
> humans.
> - Michael C Price
Michael appears to have missed the whole point of what I and Olafur
have been saying.
We are *not* saying that it is false that {many humans often, and
animals almost always, behave in the ways that behavioral studies have
described}. Instead we are saying that, as opposed to most animals,
most humans can examine, evaluate and modify their behavior. In fact,
that ability is the essence of what makes a human different from most
non-humans. And we are further saying that if a human really wants to
maximize hir lifetime happiness (which is the only purpose for
existence that is consistent with hir nature and reality), then s/he
ought to learn ways of behavior that are more rational than the animal
behavioral studies have found, because those methods of operation will
be more effective towards that purpose.
Michael C Price
>> Hi Olafur,
>> yes, I did get X and Y mixed up at one point, as you observed.
>> Our differences are mostly (although not entirely) interpretational.
>> Until experiment can distinguish between our views I shall
>> simply prefer an interpretation which models all animal behaviour,
>> including human behaviour, within one paradigm, rather than treat
>> non-humans and some humans as radically different.from other
>> humans.
>> - Michael C Price
>
> Michael appears to have missed the whole point of what I and
> Olafur have been saying.
>
> We are *not* saying that it is false that {many humans often,
> and animals almost always, behave in the ways that behavioral
> studies have described}.
Eh? I never said you said that. Seems *you* have missed the point
here. It's the "other humans" we are discussing.
> Instead we are saying that, as opposed to most animals,
> most humans can examine, evaluate and modify their behavior.
"examine" & "evaluate" are internal strates. What we *observe*
is that "higher" animals, including humans, can modify their behaviour.
The more complex the nervous system the more the behaviour
can be modified.
> In fact, that ability is the essence of what makes a human
> different from most non-humans.
I see no essential difference anywhere, rather a difference of
degree. But that, of course, is a matter of taste and definitions.
> And we are further saying that if a human really wants to
> maximize hir lifetime happiness (which is the only purpose
> for existence that is consistent with hir nature and reality),
> then s/he ought to learn ways of behavior that are more
> rational than the animal behavioral studies have found,
> because those methods of operation will be more effective
> towards that purpose.
Statements about the "purpose of existence" are generally
unverifiable / meaningless. Morality ("ought") is best
understood, is a product of group selection in our evolutionary
past. Google for
"Explaining altruistic behavior in humans" by
Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Ernst Fehr
and
"The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment" by
Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Peter J Richerson
to get the full text PDFs.
- Michael C Price
Michael C Price
The Economics of Fair Play: Biology and economics may explain why we value
fairness over rational selfishness by Karl Sigmund, Ernst Fehr and Martin A.
Nowak
--
- Michael C Price
"Michael C Price" <michael....@tesco.net> wrote in message
news:0dwKg.5304$tG3....@newsfe3-win.ntli.net...
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> "Paul Antonik Wakfer" <pa...@morelife.org> wrote in message
> >
> > Michael C Price wrote:
> >> Hi Olafur,
> >> yes, I did get X and Y mixed up at one point, as you observed.
> >> Our differences are mostly (although not entirely) interpretational.
> >> Until experiment can distinguish between our views I shall
> >> simply prefer an interpretation which models all animal behaviour,
> >> including human behaviour, within one paradigm, rather than treat
> >> non-humans and some humans as radically different.from other
> >> humans.
> >> - Michael C Price
> >
> > Michael appears to have missed the whole point of what I and
> > Olafur have been saying.
> >
> > We are *not* saying that it is false that {many humans often,
> > and animals almost always, behave in the ways that behavioral
> > studies have described}.
>
> Eh? I never said you said that.
Perhaps not explicitly, but you definitely implied it by constantly
referring to the behavior of such animals and humans.
> Seems *you* have missed the point
> here. It's the "other humans" we are discussing.
Yes, that is the group that I and Olafur were talking about, but *you*
kept referring to animals and all humans.
> > Instead we are saying that, as opposed to most animals,
> > most humans can examine, evaluate and modify their behavior.
>
> "examine" & "evaluate" are internal strates.
Most certainly they are. In fact, all human reasoning and choice of
actions is necessarily subjective. It only becomes objectified by being
compared with the chosen actions of other humans in the marketplace of
personal and economic interactions. See http://selfsip.org for details
on this idea of the global objectification of the locally and
individualistically subjective.
> What we *observe*
*We* don't observe anything! Only individuals observe.
> is that "higher" animals, including humans, can modify their behaviour.
The term "higher animals" is biased specie-ism. Whether or not
something is "higher" depends both on the particular attribute under
consideration and on what one considers its purpose and how well it
achieves that purpose.
> The more complex the nervous system the more the behaviour
> can be modified.
Isn't this what I have been saying all along?
> > In fact, that ability is the essence of what makes a human
> > different from most non-humans.
>
> I see no essential difference anywhere, rather a difference of
> degree. But that, of course, is a matter of taste and definitions.
All differences can be either viewed as not essential or when
sufficiently great can be viewed as emergent properties. In one sense
there is no difference between any two life-forms, but it is certainly
helpful to define such differences and categorize life-forms
accordingly. For the same reason, I am convinced it is useful to
categorize humans as essentially different than most animals having
emergent properties that most animals do not have, always bearing in
mind, of course, that there was a smooth and gradual evolutionary
transition from the state of not having that emergent property to the
current state of some humans clearly exhibiting it very strongly.
> > And we are further saying that if a human really wants to
> > maximize hir lifetime happiness (which is the only purpose
> > for existence that is consistent with hir nature and reality),
> > then s/he ought to learn ways of behavior that are more
> > rational than the animal behavioral studies have found,
> > because those methods of operation will be more effective
> > towards that purpose.
>
> Statements about the "purpose of existence" are generally
> unverifiable / meaningless.
This depends on what the "purpose of existence" is. If the purpose is
existence itself without which purpose existence itself would not
obtain, then that purpose is a logical necessity and therefore neither
unverifiable or meaningless.
> Morality ("ought")
Again you show your ignorance of the logic of statements.
Yes, an unconditional "ought" statement (eg "thou shalt not kill") is a
moral imperative.
However, a conditional statement of the form ("if one wants X then one
ought to do Y") is a *conditional* imperative. It is not a moral
statement but instead a simple statement of what action is necessary in
order to accomplish a given result (eg. if one wants to be dry then one
ought to get out of the water or rain).
> is best
> understood, is a product of group selection in our evolutionary
> past.
For moral imperatives that would be correct, but for conditional
imperatives it is not.
> Google for
> "Explaining altruistic behavior in humans" by
> Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Ernst Fehr
> and
> "The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment" by
> Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Peter J Richerson
> to get the full text PDFs.
I have read this kind of information for many years and found that it
is poorly studied, highly biased, having misconceived notions of the
meanings of its own evidence, and mostly irrelevant to my own entirely
logical theory about the reality of the human potential for maximizing
lifetime happiness by means of behavioral modification.
At some time in the future, I will write some detailed specific
criticisms of such behaviorist studies and "explanations", but right
now I have my hands full trying to convince those that are already
closer to my viewpoint of its validity and superiority over others (by
completing a full presentation of it). New paradigms are always
exceedingly difficult to get understood and even harder to get accepted
(granted, as is only proper).
Mr. Natural-Health
> MoreLife for the rational - http://morelife.org
> Reality based tools for more life in quantity and quality
> The Self-Sovereign Individual Project - http://selfsip.org
> Rational freedom by self-sovereignty & social contracting
Do NOT forget your drivel, Tom, which went like this.
"If those who copy text from or link to this website gain value from
that action,
then they are similarly expected to return some of that value to its
creators." http://morelife.org
I have been doing that for years, on these SCI ngs. Why is my VALUE
not appreicated? It is certainly NOT do as I do. Cause I do NOT do
B/S. It is NOT my style. And, you certainly don't even do as you
write. :(
Here, is a parting thought for Tom.
Illegal Mexicians can walk across the border all the time, and get away
with it. But, can Tom?
Ha, ... Hah, Ha!
Michael C Price
> Michael C Price wrote:
>> "Paul Antonik Wakfer" <pa...@morelife.org> wrote in message
>> >
>> > Michael C Price wrote:
>> >> Hi Olafur,
>> >> yes, I did get X and Y mixed up at one point, as you observed.
>> >> Our differences are mostly (although not entirely) interpretational.
>> >> Until experiment can distinguish between our views I shall
>> >> simply prefer an interpretation which models all animal behaviour,
>> >> including human behaviour, within one paradigm, rather than treat
>> >> non-humans and some humans as radically different.from other
>> >> humans.
>> >> - Michael C Price
>> >
>> > Michael appears to have missed the whole point of what I and
>> > Olafur have been saying.
>> >
>> > We are *not* saying that it is false that {many humans often,
>> > and animals almost always, behave in the ways that behavioral
>> > studies have described}.
>>
>> Eh? I never said you said that.
>
> Perhaps not explicitly, but you definitely implied it by constantly
> referring to the behavior of such animals and humans.
No, not even implicitly.
>> Seems *you* have missed the point
>> here. It's the "other humans" we are discussing.
>
> Yes, that is the group that I and Olafur were talking about, but
> *you* kept referring to animals and all humans.
There's obviously some basic misunderstanding going on.
>
>> > Instead we are saying that, as opposed to most animals,
>> > most humans can examine, evaluate and modify their behavior.
>>
>> "examine" & "evaluate" are internal strates.
>
> Most certainly they are. In fact, all human reasoning and choice of
> actions is necessarily subjective. It only becomes objectified by being
> compared with the chosen actions of other humans in the marketplace
> of personal and economic interactions. See http://selfsip.org for details
> on this idea of the global objectification of the locally and
> individualistically subjective.
>
>> What we *observe*
>
> *We* don't observe anything! Only individuals observe.
I could make the same fatuous comment about your use of "we" above.
But I shan't.
>
>> is that "higher" animals, including humans, can modify their behaviour.
>
> The term "higher animals" is biased specie-ism.
Which is why I put it in quotes.
> Whether or not
> something is "higher" depends both on the particular attribute under
> consideration and on what one considers its purpose and how well it
> achieves that purpose.
>
>> The more complex the nervous system the more the behaviour
>> can be modified.
>
> Isn't this what I have been saying all along?
So we agree?
>> > In fact, that ability is the essence of what makes a human
>> > different from most non-humans.
>>
>> I see no essential difference anywhere, rather a difference of
>> degree. But that, of course, is a matter of taste and definitions.
>
> All differences can be either viewed as not essential or when
> sufficiently great can be viewed as emergent properties. In one sense
> there is no difference between any two life-forms, but it is certainly
> helpful to define such differences and categorize life-forms
> accordingly. For the same reason, I am convinced it is useful to
> categorize humans as essentially different than most animals having
> emergent properties that most animals do not have, always bearing in
> mind, of course, that there was a smooth and gradual evolutionary
> transition from the state of not having that emergent property to the
> current state of some humans clearly exhibiting it very strongly.
Agreed.
>> > And we are further saying that if a human really wants to
>> > maximize hir lifetime happiness (which is the only purpose
>> > for existence that is consistent with hir nature and reality),
>> > then s/he ought to learn ways of behavior that are more
>> > rational than the animal behavioral studies have found,
>> > because those methods of operation will be more effective
>> > towards that purpose.
>>
>> Statements about the "purpose of existence" are generally
>> unverifiable / meaningless.
>
> This depends on what the "purpose of existence" is. If the purpose is
> existence itself without which purpose existence itself would not
> obtain, then that purpose is a logical necessity and therefore neither
> unverifiable or meaningless.
A tautology then, and therefore redundant.
>> Morality ("ought")
>
> Again you show your ignorance of the logic of statements.
> Yes, an unconditional "ought" statement (eg "thou shalt not kill")
> is a moral imperative.
> However, a conditional statement of the form ("if one wants X then
> one ought to do Y") is a *conditional* imperative. It is not a moral
> statement but instead a simple statement of what action is necessary
> in order to accomplish a given result (eg. if one wants to be dry then
> one ought to get out of the water or rain).
Okay, fair enough. You are correct about the conditional "ought"
being amoral, but the fact remains that no new paradigm is required
to model the attempt to maximise total lifetime happiness. "All" you
have to do (within the conventional paradigm) is set your discounting
function so that there is no
discounting of future happiness over present happiness; converting
the normal hyperbolic curve to a constant (the process of maturation
usually involves some flattening of the discounting curve). Then
anticipation of any future amount of happiness makes you equally
happy now and any action you take to maxmise present happiness
will also (attempt to) maxmise total lifetime happiiness.
>
>> is best
>> understood, is a product of group selection in our evolutionary
>> past.
>
> For moral imperatives that would be correct, but for conditional
> imperatives it is not.
>
>> Google for
>> "Explaining altruistic behavior in humans" by
>> Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Ernst Fehr
>> and
>> "The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment" by
>> Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Peter J Richerson
>> to get the full text PDFs.
>
> I have read this kind of information for many years and found that it
> is poorly studied, highly biased, having misconceived notions of the
> meanings of its own evidence, and mostly irrelevant to my own entirely
> logical theory about the reality of the human potential for maximizing
> lifetime happiness by means of behavioral modification.
>
> At some time in the future, I will write some detailed specific
> criticisms of such behaviorist studies and "explanations", but right
> now I have my hands full trying to convince those that are already
> closer to my viewpoint of its validity and superiority over others (by
> completing a full presentation of it). New paradigms are always
> exceedingly difficult to get understood and even harder to get accepted
> (granted, as is only proper).
>
I look forward to seeing such a detailed criticism.
Olafur Pall Olafsson
Michael C Price wrote:
> "Paul Antonik Wakfer" <pa...@morelife.org> wrote in message
> > Michael C Price wrote:
> >> "Paul Antonik Wakfer" <pa...@morelife.org> wrote in message
> >> >
> >> > Michael C Price wrote:
> >> What we *observe*
> >
> > *We* don't observe anything! Only individuals observe.
>
> I could make the same fatuous comment about your use of "we" above.
> But I shan't.
In fact you can not. Note that prior to writing what he did he
specifically stated that he was refering to me and himself by stating
"I and Olafur" in this sentence:
"Michael appears to have missed the whole point of what I and Olafur
have been saying."
*After* doing so he uses the word "we" twice in this sentence, clearly
implying that he is refering to me and himself:
"We are *not* saying that it is false that {many humans often, and
animals almost always, behave in the ways that behavioral studies have
described}. Instead we are saying that, as opposed to most animals,
most humans can examine, evaluate and modify their behavior."
And he is entirely correct in that this is what I was saying among
others. The reason he can correctly use the word "we" above is because
he knows (with sufficient certainity that he can "speak for both of
us") that we are in total agreement with respect to this. In fact I am
basically in agreement with everything he has written in this thread,
not just this part. And this is totally different from using the word
"we" *without* specifying who these "we" are. Without specifying who
these "we" are you could be speaking for anyone, which of course is
ridiculous since in order to correctly do so you would have to know
everyones view on the matter, something that isn't possible. It is only
when the person knows the members of the group he refers to as "we"
sufficiently well that he is able to use the phrase "we" correctly.
This is true for me and Paul as we have come to know each other very
well in terms of the way we think, well enough that we (I and Paul) in
many cases can correctly use the word "we" to describe the view of both
of us. And of course, even with people that know each other as well as
I and Paul do, there will be cases where one of the persons incorrectly
uses "we" to describe the view of both of them, as there are limits to
how well you can know a person and in the end each individual can only
speak for himself. However if the persons know each other very well
these occurances will be rare and easily corrected.
cathyb
Oh, for pity's sake.
Michael C Price
but so was mine. Since my statement was expressing a
universal fact (as I see it) "we" can be *any* group of
individuals you like.
In general arguing about use of pronouns is not very
productive, and I will not engage in the sort of pedanty
common amongst post-Objectivists.
I'd rather the substantive points were addressed.
- Michael C Price
Olafur Pall Olafsson
Michael C Price wrote:
> Yes, Olafur, Paul's use of "we" was clear in context,
> but so was mine. Since my statement was expressing a
> universal fact (as I see it) "we" can be *any* group of
> individuals you like.
It was not totally clear to me who you were refering to as "we" in this
sentence, as you had not specified to what it refered to:
"What we *observe* is that "higher" animals, including humans, can
modify their behaviour. The more complex the nervous system the more
the behaviour can be modified. "
In this sentence you could have been meaning "me you and Paul" when
using "we" but you could also have been meaning simply any group of
individuals. I actually thought the former was the case but you have
now made clear that the latter was the case, and since that is the case
I disagree with you, since while you me and Paul do observe this there
are a lot of individuals that have never observed this. Therefore I
disagree that it is a universal fact.
> In general arguing about use of pronouns is not very
> productive, and I will not engage in the sort of pedanty
> common amongst post-Objectivists.
Although it may not be productive to *argue* about the use of pronouns,
I think rationally talking about the use of pronouns (which is what I'm
trying to do) can definitely be very productive. For once language
(with help of the internet) is the medium we use to communicate with
each other. Therefore proper use of language is of prime importance to
get the message across. Imagine if we could prevent all language caused
misunderstanding between us. I bet it would save both of us a lot of
time.
> I'd rather the substantive points were addressed.
I'm sorry, I was not trying to start an argument. I realise that this
is not the subject we were initially discussing and may look like
nitpicking to many people, but I personally think the inaccurate or
plain incorrect use of the pronoun "we", which is so common in todays
society, is a subject worth bringing up. Particularily as its incorrect
use is so often a sourse of of misunderstanding and contributes to
distorted thinking, yet few people seem to realise it.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> "Paul Antonik Wakfer" <pa...@morelife.org> wrote in message
> > Michael C Price wrote:
> >> "Paul Antonik Wakfer" <pa...@morelife.org> wrote in message
[snip]
> >> is that "higher" animals, including humans, can modify their behaviour.
> >
> > The term "higher animals" is biased specie-ism.
>
> Which is why I put it in quotes.
Putting something in quotes is often used as a way to assert something
and still be free of any charge of having asserted it - a way to take
an action (referring to humans as higher animals) and attempt to avoid
responsibility for it - to have your cake and eat it too.
However, perhaps I should give you the benefit of the doubt here and
assume that you were merely using the phrase "higher animals" as a
short form for the full explanation of the attributes to which you were
referring. However, it was still worth pointing out for others that are
guilty of such specie-ism and lack of clear definition of meanings,
often without being aware of it.
[snip]
> >> > And we are further saying that if a human really wants to
> >> > maximize hir lifetime happiness (which is the only purpose
> >> > for existence that is consistent with hir nature and reality),
> >> > then s/he ought to learn ways of behavior that are more
> >> > rational than the animal behavioral studies have found,
> >> > because those methods of operation will be more effective
> >> > towards that purpose.
> >>
> >> Statements about the "purpose of existence" are generally
> >> unverifiable / meaningless.
> >
> > This depends on what the "purpose of existence" is. If the purpose is
> > existence itself without which purpose existence itself would not
> > obtain, then that purpose is a logical necessity and therefore neither
> > unverifiable or meaningless.
>
> A tautology then, and therefore redundant.
Yes, it is basically a tautology, but unfortunately one that
surprisingly many people neither understand nor accept, either directly
or, more importantly, in its implications following from the facts of
human nature. I think this is because the surrounding peripheral ideas
are not clearly understood and are generally clothed in mysticism
mostly remaining from the past when the nature of reality was far less
understood.
> >> Morality ("ought")
> >
> > Again you show your ignorance of the logic of statements.
> > Yes, an unconditional "ought" statement (eg "thou shalt not kill")
> > is a moral imperative.
> > However, a conditional statement of the form ("if one wants X then
> > one ought to do Y") is a *conditional* imperative. It is not a moral
> > statement but instead a simple statement of what action is necessary
> > in order to accomplish a given result (eg. if one wants to be dry then
> > one ought to get out of the water or rain).
>
> Okay, fair enough. You are correct about the conditional "ought"
> being amoral, but the fact remains that no new paradigm is required
> to model the attempt to maximise total lifetime happiness.
Since most people appear not to even realize that maximizing their
total lifetime happiness is the only life purpose consistent with their
nature as humans, it appears that a new paradigm is necessary to
describe and present that fact and just how it should be done from a
general pov (ie. consistent with the vast and valuable differences in
subjective estimation of happiness which exist between human
individuals).
> "All" you
> have to do (within the conventional paradigm) is set your discounting
> function so that there is no
> discounting of future happiness over present happiness; converting
> the normal hyperbolic curve to a constant (the process of maturation
> usually involves some flattening of the discounting curve). Then
> anticipation of any future amount of happiness makes you equally
> happy now and any action you take to maxmise present happiness
> will also (attempt to) maxmise total lifetime happiiness.
Here you appear to have gone from one extreme to the other.
The so-called "hyperbolic" discounting was posited to take account of
the irrationalities of animal and some human behavior toward
discounting of value relative to the time in the future when it would
become available. (I wrote "so-called" and put hyperbolic in quotes
because, I am not at all sure that these behaviorists really know what
is the true mathematical meaning of hyperbolic and that any such
experimentally determined curve, even for animals, is a true
hyperbola.) Instead, rational discounting would use an exponential
discounting function with respect to time (the reverse of constant
interest rate continual compounding) modified with respect to
inflationary or deflationary expectations of the unit of measure in
which the asset is valued. No reasonable person would ever value an
asset that will only exist in the future (or the amount of happiness
that it can bring) the same as that asset existing in the present (or
the amount of happiness it could bring in the present), which appears
to be what you are saying in your last sentence above. All that
maturity (or more confidence in one's likelihood of actually gaining
future happiness) would accomplish would be to reduce the exponential
rate coefficient (eg. the interest rate). This is shown historically by
the fact that in stable times and more stable countries interest rates
are generally lower than in more volatile times and countries.
I think this confusion is partly a result of your continuing to hold to
the notion that all estimations of happiness are based on happiness
received in the present rather than the view held by me (and Olafur)
that a more useful and fruitful viewpoint is that current actions are
based on anticipation of future happiness. I wrote "more useful and
fruitful viewpoint" because, at the moment, I tend to agree with you
that most thoughts of future happiness can be viewed instead as present
happiness about that future possibility. However, I also think there
are subtle differences between the two views which actually make them
not totally equivalent, some of which Olafur has well elucidated in his
responses. As I remarked when this potential equivalence first arose
(from you), this was an idea that I had not considered in full detail
before. Since the equivalence is not as totally transparent as you
appear to think (and I actually think it can be shown to be incorrect),
this will take some time for me to dwell upon and resolve effectively.
> >> Google for
> >> "Explaining altruistic behavior in humans" by
> >> Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Ernst Fehr
> >> and
> >> "The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment" by
> >> Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Peter J Richerson
> >> to get the full text PDFs.
> >
> > I have read this kind of information for many years and found that it
> > is poorly studied, highly biased, having misconceived notions of the
> > meanings of its own evidence, and mostly irrelevant to my own entirely
> > logical theory about the reality of the human potential for maximizing
> > lifetime happiness by means of behavioral modification.
> >
> > At some time in the future, I will write some detailed specific
> > criticisms of such behaviorist studies and "explanations", but right
> > now I have my hands full trying to convince those that are already
> > closer to my viewpoint of its validity and superiority over others (by
> > completing a full presentation of it). New paradigms are always
> > exceedingly difficult to get understood and even harder to get accepted
> > (granted, as is only proper).
> >
> I look forward to seeing such a detailed criticism.
If you really mean that, then you should begin by reading what is
already written on my website http://selfsip.org (another major work to
be posted soon), since what is there already is the basis upon which
many of my criticisms will be built.
Michael C Price
> Michael C Price wrote:
>> no new paradigm is required to model the attempt to
>> maximise total lifetime happiness.
>
> Since most people appear not to even realize that maximizing their
> total lifetime happiness is the only life purpose consistent with their
> nature as humans, it appears that a new paradigm is necessary to
> describe and present that fact and just how it should be done from a
> general pov (ie. consistent with the vast and valuable differences in
> subjective estimation of happiness which exist between human
> individuals).
>
>> "All" you
>> have to do (within the conventional paradigm) is set your
>> discounting function so that there is no
>> discounting of future happiness over present happiness; converting
>> the normal hyperbolic curve to a constant (the process of maturation
>> usually involves some flattening of the discounting curve). Then
>> anticipation of any future amount of happiness makes you equally
>> happy now and any action you take to maxmise present happiness
>> will also (attempt to) maxmise total lifetime happiiness.
>
> Here you appear to have gone from one extreme to the other.
I do not understand why you think this -- but I guess it doesn't
matter.
> The so-called "hyperbolic" discounting was posited to take account of
> the irrationalities of animal and some human behavior toward
> discounting of value relative to the time in the future when it would
> become available. (I wrote "so-called" and put hyperbolic in quotes
> because, I am not at all sure that these behaviorists really know what
> is the true mathematical meaning of hyperbolic and that any such
> experimentally determined curve, even for animals, is a true
> hyperbola.) Instead, rational discounting would use an exponential
> discounting function with respect to time (the reverse of constant
> interest rate continual compounding) modified with respect to
> inflationary or deflationary expectations of the unit of measure in
> which the asset is valued.
I too would expect the discount function to be an exponential.
Perhaps it is.
> No reasonable person would ever value an
> asset that will only exist in the future (or the amount of happiness
> that it can bring) the same as that asset existing in the present (or
> the amount of happiness it could bring in the present), which appears
> to be what you are saying in your last sentence above. All that
> maturity (or more confidence in one's likelihood of actually gaining
> future happiness) would accomplish would be to reduce the exponential
> rate coefficient (eg. the interest rate). This is shown historically by
> the fact that in stable times and more stable countries interest rates
> are generally lower than in more volatile times and countries.
>
> I think this confusion is partly a result of your continuing to hold to
> the notion that all estimations of happiness are based on happiness
> received in the present rather than the view held by me (and Olafur)
> that a more useful and fruitful viewpoint is that current actions are
> based on anticipation of future happiness. I wrote "more useful and
> fruitful viewpoint" because, at the moment, I tend to agree with you
> that most thoughts of future happiness can be viewed instead as
> present happiness about that future possibility.
Your last sentence indicates that we are in substantial agreement -
although it seems at odds with your earlier statement about my
confusion.
> However, I also think there
> are subtle differences between the two views which actually make them
> not totally equivalent, some of which Olafur has well elucidated in his
> responses. As I remarked when this potential equivalence first arose
> (from you), this was an idea that I had not considered in full detail
> before. Since the equivalence is not as totally transparent as you
> appear to think (and I actually think it can be shown to be incorrect),
> this will take some time for me to dwell upon and resolve effectively.
You're correct, I do think the equivalence is rather transparent.
>> >> Google for
>> >> "Explaining altruistic behavior in humans" by
>> >> Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Ernst Fehr
>> >> and
>> >> "The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment" by
>> >> Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Peter J Richerson
>> >> to get the full text PDFs.
>> >
>> > I have read this kind of information for many years and found that it
>> > is poorly studied, highly biased, having misconceived notions of the
>> > meanings of its own evidence, and mostly irrelevant to my own entirely
>> > logical theory about the reality of the human potential for maximizing
>> > lifetime happiness by means of behavioral modification.
>> >
>> > At some time in the future, I will write some detailed specific
>> > criticisms of such behaviorist studies and "explanations", but right
>> > now I have my hands full trying to convince those that are already
>> > closer to my viewpoint of its validity and superiority over others (by
>> > completing a full presentation of it). New paradigms are always
>> > exceedingly difficult to get understood and even harder to get accepted
>> > (granted, as is only proper).
>> >
>> I look forward to seeing such a detailed criticism.
>
> If you really mean that, then you should begin by reading what is
> already written on my website http://selfsip.org (another major work to
> be posted soon), since what is there already is the basis upon which
> many of my criticisms will be built.
>
- Michael C Price
Michael C Price
>> Yes, Olafur, Paul's use of "we" was clear in context,
>> but so was mine. Since my statement was expressing a
>> universal fact (as I see it) "we" can be *any* group of
>> individuals you like.
>
> It was not totally clear to me who you were refering to as
> "we" in this sentence, as you had not specified to what it
> refered to:
>
> "What we *observe* is that "higher" animals, including humans,
> can modify their behaviour. The more complex the nervous
> system the more the behaviour can be modified. "
>
> In this sentence you could have been meaning "me you and
> Paul" when using "we" but you could also have been meaning
> simply any group of individuals. I actually thought the former
> was the case but you have now made clear that the latter was
> the case, and since that is the case I disagree with you, since
> while you me and Paul do observe this there are a lot of
> individuals that have never observed this. Therefore I
> disagree that it is a universal fact.
But I do, and that justified the use of "we". I added the "(as I see it)"
rider precisely to avoid this digression.
>> In general arguing about use of pronouns is not very
>> productive, and I will not engage in the sort of pedanty
>> common amongst post-Objectivists.
>
> Although it may not be productive to *argue* about the use of
> pronouns, I think rationally talking about the use of pronouns
> (which is what I'm trying to do) can definitely be very productive.
> For once language (with help of the internet) is the medium we
> use to communicate with each other. Therefore proper use of
> language is of prime importance to get the message across.
> Imagine if we could prevent all language caused
> misunderstanding between us. I bet it would save both of us a
> lot of time.
>
>> I'd rather the substantive points were addressed.
>
> I'm sorry, I was not trying to start an argument. I realise that
> this is not the subject we were initially discussing and may look
> like nitpicking to many people, but I personally think the
> inaccurate or plain incorrect use of the pronoun "we", which is
> common in todays society, is a subject worth bringing up.
> Particularily as its incorrect use is so often a source of
> misunderstanding and contributes to distorted thinking, yet
> few people seem to realise it.
No, the whole political correctness movement agrees with you.
But where do we* stop? Are we ban all metaphor,
allusion and poetry?
Returning the substantive issue, I note that Paul and myself
are in agreement, with perhaps some "subtle" differences..
Do you concur with this also?
- Michael C Price
*=any subset of everybody
Paul Antonik Wakfer
[snip]
> But where do we* stop? Are we ban all metaphor,
> allusion and poetry?
> *=any subset of everybody
Once again, there is no "we" that can "stop" or "ban" anything!!
And your asterisk footnote does not help at all here because subsets
are not *individuals*.
Only individuals can perform these actions for themselves or by
coercing others.
Neither I nor Olafur are suggesting any kind of coercion. We (clearly
designating "I and Olafur") are merely attempting to point out the
distortion/ambiguity to language and meaning which can occur when the
precise set of individuals to which a plural pronoun applies (to each
member of the set) is not defined, particularly when one person
attempts to "represent" others without their permission, explicit or
implicit.
As I have stated in other posts relating to this issue, these points
are made in much more detail on my website in the essay:
"Collectivism in Language: Its Effects on Valid Reasoning"
http://selfsip.org/fundamentals/we.html
> Returning the substantive issue, I note that Paul and myself
> are in agreement, with perhaps some "subtle" differences.
That I and you "are in agreement, with perhaps some 'subtle'
differences" is merely *your* opinion. Perhaps you do not understand
that "subtle" does not mean trivial or inconsequential. Something that
is subtle can be hard to understand and/or "tease out" (disentangle and
clearly distinguish from other aspects) of reality, but it can still
have *highly important and fundamental* effects. My view is that we
(clearly designating "I and you") are still far apart on the essentials
of this issue. Any reasonable person (even Michael :) who reads the
parts of my selfsip.org website relating to happiness will clearly
understand and accept the validity of my view that our (mine and
Michael's) differences are large and fundamental.
I have only stopped replying to you because I have concluded that
anything more is a waste of my time. But this is something that I have
concluded before and only continue to forget the lesson that I have
learned, from time to time, because of your clear intelligence and my
never ending hope that intelligent people can eventually be persuaded
to accept valid reasoning about reality. In fact, the main reason that
I went as far as I did with this discussion was not because I had any
real expectation that you would ever change, but because I hoped that
the presentation might help other readers to do so.
I am well aware that a common retort to the above will be: "Who the
hell do you think you are to be right about this issue and be trying to
convince others to change?! Perhaps *you* should change!" Well my
answer to that is that I have been contemplating these issues for my
whole adult life (~45 of 68 years) and have already changed many times
on them. I have now (within the last 4 years) developed what I am
convinced is a consistent and complete approach which I am attempting
to present to all others. I am always open to be corrected and "set
straight" by means of logic and reason. Anyone who wishes to engage me
in such logic and reason is welcome to do so, preferably (to me) on the
Yahoo group MoreLife. However, for any fruitful discussion to ensue it
is necessary to clearly define the meanings of terms used. This is
something which was not done in the current discussion and was, I
think, a major impediment to the discussion. In fact, I am convinced
that any discussion of anything but the clearest scientific evidence
will most often end in wrangling and misunderstandings because of the
lack of commonly understood meanings.
Michael C Price
"Paul Antonik Wakfer" <pa...@morelife.org> wrote in message
> Michael C Price wrote:
>
> [snip]
>
>> But where do we* stop? Are we ban all metaphor,
>> allusion and poetry?
>
>> *=any subset of everybody
>
> Once again, there is no "we" that can "stop" or "ban" anything!!
> And your asterisk footnote does not help at all here because subsets
> are not *individuals*.
>
> Only individuals can perform these actions for themselves or by
> coercing others.
> Neither I nor Olafur are suggesting any kind of coercion.
Neither am I.
> We (clearly
> designating "I and Olafur") are merely attempting to point out the
> distortion/ambiguity to language and meaning which can occur when the
> precise set of individuals to which a plural pronoun applies (to each
> member of the set) is not defined, particularly when one person
> attempts to "represent" others without their permission, explicit or
> implicit. As I have stated in other posts relating to this issue, these
> points are made in much more detail on my website in the essay:
> "Collectivism in Language: Its Effects on Valid Reasoning"
> http://selfsip.org/fundamentals/we.html
>
>> Returning the substantive issue, I note that Paul and myself
>> are in agreement, with perhaps some "subtle" differences.
>
> That I and you "are in agreement, with perhaps some 'subtle'
> differences" is merely *your* opinion. Perhaps you do not understand
> that "subtle" does not mean trivial or inconsequential.
Perhaps you do not understand that I never implied that
subtle = trivial or inconsequential.
Something that
> is subtle can be hard to understand and/or "tease out" (disentangle and
> clearly distinguish from other aspects) of reality, but it can still
> have *highly important and fundamental* effects. My view is that we
> (clearly designating "I and you") are still far apart on the essentials
> of this issue. Any reasonable person (even Michael :) who reads the
> parts of my selfsip.org website relating to happiness will clearly
> understand and accept the validity of my view that our (mine and
> Michael's) differences are large and fundamental.
>
> I have only stopped replying to you because I have concluded that
> anything more is a waste of my time. But this is something that I have
> concluded before and only continue to forget the lesson that I have
> learned, from time to time, because of your clear intelligence and my
> never ending hope that intelligent people can eventually be persuaded
> to accept valid reasoning about reality. In fact, the main reason that
> I went as far as I did with this discussion was not because I had any
> real expectation that you would ever change, but because I hoped that
> the presentation might help other readers to do so.
>
> I am well aware that a common retort to the above will be: "Who the
> hell do you think you are to be right about this issue and be trying to
> convince others to change?! Perhaps *you* should change!" Well my
> answer to that is that I have been contemplating these issues for my
> whole adult life (~45 of 68 years) and have already changed many times
> on them.
FYI I adhered to your view that my self-selected purpose of life was
to maximise total (infinite-) lifetime happiness from the age of 11/12 to
approximately 15/16, but I abandoned this view when I heard about
Skinner's experiments. I do not reject your views because of lack of
familarity with them, but rather because I've been there, done that and
moved on.
> I have now (within the last 4 years) developed what I am
> convinced is a consistent and complete approach which I am attempting
> to present to all others. I am always open to be corrected and "set
> straight" by means of logic and reason. Anyone who wishes to engage me
> in such logic and reason is welcome to do so, preferably (to me) on the
> Yahoo group MoreLife. However, for any fruitful discussion to ensue it
> is necessary to clearly define the meanings of terms used. This is
> something which was not done in the current discussion and was, I
> think, a major impediment to the discussion. In fact, I am convinced
> that any discussion of anything but the clearest scientific evidence
> will most often end in wrangling and misunderstandings because of the
> lack of commonly understood meanings.
- Michael C Price
Hormesis
> > the notion that all estimations of happiness are based on happiness
> > received in the present rather than the view held by me (and Olafur)
> > that a more useful and fruitful viewpoint is that current actions are
> > based on anticipation of future happiness. I wrote "more useful and
> > fruitful viewpoint" because, at the moment, I tend to agree with you
> > that most thoughts of future happiness can be viewed instead as
> > present happiness about that future possibility.
>
> Your last sentence indicates that we are in substantial agreement -
> although it seems at odds with your earlier statement about my
> confusion.
>
> > However, I also think there
> > are subtle differences between the two views which actually make them
> > not totally equivalent, some of which Olafur has well elucidated in his
> > responses. As I remarked when this potential equivalence first arose
> > (from you), this was an idea that I had not considered in full detail
> > before. Since the equivalence is not as totally transparent as you
> > appear to think (and I actually think it can be shown to be incorrect),
> > this will take some time for me to dwell upon and resolve effectively.
>
> You're correct, I do think the equivalence is rather transparent.
The equivalence seems rather obvious to me as well. Current actions
are
based on anticipation of future happiness due precisely to the present
happiness produced by choosing to take that course of action instead of
some less desirable course of action. It's tautological right? One
can only be happy in the present and make decisions in the present.
And since the decisions that make us happy are by definition the only
decisions that we can make (otherwise we would choose something else),
then a person by definition is constantly maximizing their immediate
present happiness, regardless of what lifetime purpose they may have
succeeded or failed to act in accord with. That life purpose could be
a ridiculously discounted hyperbolic distortion of lifetime happiness,
a step function, or a mild mannered exponential valuation or something
stranger such as a willful present act to modify of one's future
underlying human nature/drives/perceptions with the intent of creating
some alien "anti-life" life purpose. Those that fail to act in accord
with their stated life purpose have in fact only failed to identify or
confess to their true present life purpose. Obviously one could not
hold a maximal lifetime happiness life purpose (whatever that means)
and at the same time act in a manner willingly contradictory to that
purpose without causing a sudden tumultuous overhaul of one's entire
life purpose.
Thanks Michael. I actually think this is a more fruitful way of
looking at the whole life purpose question. The only way to modify
one's life purpose is by modifying what decisions produce happiness in
the present or by modifying the present estimated happiness generated
by certain types of decision. In other words, in order to change your
life purpose, you must rewire yourself to enjoy a new type of life.
How though? Change one's perception of reality? Attempt to alter
one's drives and desires? Think differently? Perhaps by fiddling with
all of the above one can home in on the framework that has a better
chance of fostering the sort of individual decisions that even in the
present societal mess are more likely to maximize global happiness, and
do it without compromising the individual's present and future lifetime
happiness, whatever modified form that might take.
All the same, I look forward to seeing how Michael can be shown to be
incorrect on this point.