In article <
c1f20244-0b8a-4537...@googlegroups.com>,
Arnaud Fournet <
fournet...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
> It would appear that i'm not alone in thinking that you erroneously believe
> to be different from mainstream Chomskyism.
Yes, you and PTD share a delusion.
> > Name three of Chomsky's ideas that you think I agree with (and with
> > which you disagree, of course).
[none given]
> When the word golova was being discussed, your approach
...was never put on the table. No one asked for it, and I never
offered it, though I did hint at it (I know I mentioned exemplar
theory at least once in that discussion).
You want to know *my* approach? As a reminder, here are the relevant
data again:
[g@l6"va] 'head (nom)'
[g6"lofk@] 'head (dim)'
["gol@vu] 'head (acc)'
I would not give the stem 'head' a single consistent underlying
representation /golov-/.
I would not give the word 'head (nom)' a single consistent phonemic
representation /golova/, nor the word 'head (dim)' a single consistent
phonemic representation /galova/, nor the word 'head (acc)' a single
consistent phonemic representation /golavu/.
I would not give the stem 'head' a single consistent morphophonemic
representation {golov-}.
I would give the meaning 'head (nom)' interconnected clouds of
auditory and articulatory memories, corresponding respectively to
perceptual and production events in the speaker's lifetime, with the
most recent memories having the strongest connections to the others.
Similarly, 'head (dim)' and 'head (acc)' would have their own clouds.
And crucially, the memories across these three clouds would all be
connected to each other. And the memories in the 'head (nom)' cloud
would all be connected to all of the memories in all of the other
'(nom)' clouds, and likewise for the '(dim)' and '(acc)' clouds. As
the connections between any two memories grows, their bond
strengthens. So the speaker's memory of his mother saying 'head
(nom)' yesterday would be very strongly connected to his memory of his
mother saying it today, and less strongly connected to his memory of
her saying 'head (acc)' last week, etc.
I'd probably even include negative inhibitory memories, corresponding
to events when other people have said 'head (nom)' but it was not
perceived quickly or correctly the speaker, as well as events when the
speaker articulated 'head (nom)' in ways in which he believes other
people didn't perceive quickly or correctly.
The speaker must also have a similarity metric, which measures whether
a new auditory memory he gains from perceiving someone else's
pronunciation can be categorized within a given cloud of connected
auditory memories, and how reliable that categorization is, something
like a difference from the average given in standard deviation. Every
time a new auditory memory is added to a given cloud, the center of
that cloud shifts.
There must also be an implementation function, which looks at the
cloud of articulatory memories, finds the center, and attempts to
reproduce it. Again, every time the speaker articulates 'head (nom)',
a new articulatory memory is added to the cloud, and the center shifts.
Meanings themselves (as well as sociolinguistic factors like register
and gender, and a host of other properties) would also have similar
interconnected memories, so the relationship isn't between a single
meaning and a cloud of phonetic memories, but between multiple meaning
memories and phonetic memories (and memories for register, gender,
etc.), all part of a big cloud of interconnected memories.
Nowhere in any of this do I have anything at all like the notion of a
single consistent abstract representation for a given word/morpheme, a
notion shared by Chomskyan and structuralism.
> of what is a phoneme
> and what the phonemic description of golova should be was distinctly
> unstructuralist.
Goalpost shift. Chomskyanism is only one of many ways not to be
structuralist.
> > Because I accept reality.
>
> This sounds a bit arrogant.
I am comfortable being called "arrogant" for stating what I know to be
true about the reality of what thoughts I do and do not have.