"For example, they might read an official report showing that Norway’s
production is set to halve by 2006. Norway is the world’s second
largest exporter."
"I think that a price shock around 2001, if not before, from Middle
East control is inevitable and will probably trigger a stockmarket
crash."
"I think it is absurd that the management of the depletion of the
world's supply of its most important fuel should be left to a few
feudal families controlling the Middle East. The consuming governments
should recognize where their interests lie."
Go to http://www.hubbertpeak.com/ and you will find a link to "A
Presentation to the British Parliament by Dr. Colin Campbell, July 7,
1999."
You will also find many energy papers at my site
http://dieoff.com/page1.htm
Jay
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Anyone?
In point of fact, for the past twenty years, most forecasts have predicted a
near-term peak for everyone outside the Middle East (including the UK, Norway,
Argentina, etc) and in the past twenty years, none of them have actually
peaked.
The Hubbert argument is primarily used for forecasting by people outside the
industry, who are trying to promote ethanol, electric cars, etc. Some
geologists find it an attractive method, and there are some interesting
substantive questions about field size, but the extreme predictions of
Campbell, etc., are not taken seriously.
Michael Lynch, Center for International Studies, M.I.T.
By the way, Michael, I have seen you quoted
in recent articles (either in the Dallas Morning
News or the Houston Chronicle).
One interesting note that I saw in the Oil and
Gas Journal today is the fact that the global
reserve base for natural gas is 66 years of
current use. The reserve base for gas in
the US is only 8 years of current use.
So what will be the source for future gas in
the growing US market? Who's going to
find it after all the recent layoffs?
Danny
MCLynch <mcl...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:19991027073700...@ng-fo1.aol.com...
This would imply a relatively quick upcoming PEAK to production (if it
is going to halve off of what I presume is a current baseline).
Imagine this newsgroup will persist for some time into the future and
(pending the outcome of Mr. Campbell's predictions) we can either hold
him up for ridicule or high praise only with respect to his rather bold
predictions regarding Norway's oil output.
Wait a couple years; let's talk on this topic! Save these posts!!!
Meantime in the practical realm I must mention I've added to my holdings
of Transocean Offshore and the Tidewater Company, as well as RB Falcon.
Apparently these companies are fetching upwardly mobile dayrates on
their drilling equipment. This I can get my mind around.
Even if the apocalyptic predictions completely fall flat, I can get a
handle on improving dayrates. You especially have to like what is going
on in the Gulf of Mexico with some of those rigs now fetching nearly
twice what they did at the nadir in March, 1999. Some of the rigs are
getting $32,000 a day according to recent info off Oceandril.com or
whatever they now call themselves.
Bob in Packerland
> The Hubbert argument is primarily used for forecasting by people outside
the
> industry, who are trying to promote ethanol, electric cars, etc. Some
> geologists find it an attractive method, and there are some interesting
> substantive questions about field size, but the extreme predictions of
> Campbell, etc., are not taken seriously.
[ Snip from THE BEST KEPT SECRECT IN WASHINGTON at
http://dieoff.com/page173.htm ]
For many years, geologists and petroleum engineers have published estimates
of how much oil can be recovered from any given basin. This is known as
"Estimated Ultimately Recoverable" (or EUR) oil. Remarkably, estimates of
total worldwide EUR oil have varied little over the past half century! [8]
Forty years ago, geologist M. King Hubbert developed a method for projecting
future oil production and predicted that oil production in the lower 48
states would peak about 1970. This prediction has proved to be remarkably
accurate. Both total and peak yields have risen slightly compared to
Hubbert's original estimate, but the timing of the peak and the general
downward trend of production were correct. Hubbert showed that oil
production begins to peak and starts to decline when approximately half of
the EUR oil has been recovered.
IHS Energy Group (formerly Petroconsultants) is the world's leading provider
of data and analysis for oil exploration and production. The company
maintains its headquarters at a custom-built communications center in
Geneva. It also has offices in London, Houston, Calgary, Sydney, Perth,
Singapore and Hong Kong and a global information network. The backbone of
the company is a staff of 300, embracing numerous nationalities, cultures
and professions, specializing in petroleum geology, geophysics, petroleum
engineering, economics, political science, petroleum legislation,
cartography, computer science and information technology. [9]
In 1995, Petroconsultants published a report for oil industry insiders
($32,000 per copy) titled WORLD OIL SUPPLY 1930-2050 which concluded that
world oil production could peak as soon as the year 2000 and decline to half
that level by 2025. Large and permanent increases in oil prices are
predicted after the year 2000. [10]
[snip]
[8] OIL AS A FINITE RESOURCE: When Is Global Production Likely to Peak? by
James J. MacKenzie; World Resources Institute, 1966;
http://www.wri.org/wri/climate/finitoil/eur-oil.html
[9] see http://www.petroconsultants.com
[10] THE DEATH OF THE OIL ECONOMY, by Ted Trainer; Earth Island Journal,
Spring 1997; http://dieoff.com/page116.htm
Jay -- www.dieoff.com
> Imagine this newsgroup will persist for some time into the future and
> (pending the outcome of Mr. Campbell's predictions) we can either hold
> him up for ridicule or high praise only with respect to his rather
> bold predictions regarding Norway's oil output.
The forecast comes from the Norwegian Government. See a graph at
http://www.iea.org/pubs/reviews/files/nor97/nor08.htm
>> In point of fact, for the past twenty years, most forecasts have
>> predicted a near-term peak for everyone outside the Middle East
>>(including the UK, Norway, Argentina, etc) and in the past twenty
>> years, none of them have actually peaked.
My goodness!! None? Here are some numbers from Richard Duncan. If you
see any errors, let me know and I will tell him.
Peak
Year
1970,Libya*
1970,USA
1970,Venezuela*
1973,Qatar*
1974,Iran*
1976,Romania
1977,Indonesia*
1977,Trinidad
1979,Brunei
1982,Peru
1985,Australia
1985,Cameroon
1987,FSU
1993,Egypt
1993,PN Guinea
1997,Algeria*
1997,Angola
1997,Syria
1999,Canada
1999,Gabon*
1999,India
1999,UK
2000,Argentina
2000,Congo
2000,Malaysia
2000,Norway
2000,Vietnam
2001,China
2001,Denmark
2001,Ecuador
2002,Oman
2004,Mexico
2006,Yemen
2008,Nigeria*
2009,Tunisia
2010,Brazil
2010,Saudi Arabia*
2011,Colombia
2012,Iraq*
2017,Kuwait*
2017,UAE*
Jay -- www.dieoff.com
GAZPROM!!! One really big mammajamma of a pipeline out of
Azerbaijan/Kazakstan, cross the Caucasus, thru Europe, under the
Atlantic!!! Why not?? They built the Internet, didn't they?
Well, if not the above, then hundreds of tankers loaded with Liquified
Natural Gas cris-crossing the Atlantic out of stable regions like Iraq,
Iran, and the rock-solid Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Sounds like a
low-risk possibility...
Yeah, however you cut it, "oil and gas" and "political stability" don't
seem to belong in the same paragraph together...
In November, 1997, the International Energy Agency (IEA) convened an Oil
Conference in Paris. Laherrère and Campbell presented three papers on oil
depletion against Morris Adelman and Michael Lynch from MIT.
As a result of this conference, IEA prepared a paper for the G8 Energy
Ministers' Meeting in Moscow March, 31, 1998. IEA followed Laherrere and
Campbell's view and forecast a peak in conventional oil for 2010 at 78.9
Mb/d and decrease in 2020 at 72.2 Mb/d. [ Source: Laherrere personal
correspondence ] [1]
According to Richard Duncan, this represents a significant reversal of IEA
position: "This is a real stand-down for them because until recently they
were in the Julian Simon no-limits camp." [ personal correspondence ] See
Duncan's energy paper THE WORLD PETROLEUM LIFE-CYCLE at:
http://dieoff.com/page133.htm
Franco Bernabé, chief executive of the Italian oil company ENI SpA, expects
the world to experience 1970s-style oil shocks starting sometime between
2000 and 2005. http://www.forbes.com/forbes/98/0615/6112084a.htm
-------
IHS Energy Group (formerly Petroconsultants) is the world's leading provider
of data and analysis for oil exploration and production. The company
maintains its headquarters at a custom-built communications center in
Geneva. It also has offices in London, Houston, Calgary, Sydney, Perth,
Singapore and Hong Kong and a global information network. The backbone of
the company is a staff of 300, embracing numerous nationalities, cultures
and professions, specializing in petroleum geology, geophysics, petroleum
engineering, economics, political science, petroleum legislation,
cartography, computer science and information technology. [2]
In 1995, Petroconsultants published a report for oil industry insiders
($32,000 per copy) titled WORLD OIL SUPPLY 1930-2050 which concluded that
world oil production could peak as soon as the year 2000 and decline to half
that level by 2025. Large and permanent increases in oil prices are
predicted after the year 2000. [3]
------
"A recent review of the future prospects of all alternatives has been
published. The summary conclusion reached is that there is no known
complete substitute for petroleum in its many and varied uses." [4] For
example, when the oil's gone, food production will drop to a fraction of
today's numbers: "If the fertilizers, partial irrigation [in part provided
by oil energy], and pesticides were withdrawn, corn yields, for example,
would drop from 130 bushels per acre to about 30 bushels." [5]
------
Although economists haven't got a clue, the end of the market economy in
less than 10 years (perhaps much less) has been known to oil company
insiders for many years.
Jay -- www.dieoff.com
--------------------------------------------
[1] WORLD ENERGY PROSPECTS TO 2020. http://www.iea.org/g8/world/oilsup.htm
[2] see http://www.petroconsultants.com
[3] THE DEATH OF THE OIL ECONOMY, by Ted Trainer; Earth Island Journal,
Spring 1997; http://dieoff.com/page116.htm
[4] THE POST-PETROLEUM PARADIGM -- AND POPULATION, by Walter Youngquist;
Population and Environment: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies Volume
20, Number 4, March 1999; http://www.dieoff.com/page171.htm
[5] ibid. Pimentel, D. (1998a).
As an "oil company insider", I have not heard this mentioned even
ONCE.
Oil production will obviously decline one day, but any declines
within the next ten years will be politically driven. There are
still too many undeveloped areas for a decline within 10
years.
Jay, did you know that Saudi Arabia is producing it's
8 million barrels a day from less than 1,000 wells?
Danny
> Jay, did you know that Saudi Arabia is producing it's
> 8 million barrels a day from less than 1,000 wells?
Hi Danny,
I suppose you should inform Petroconsultants and IEA. Perhaps they
overlooked this fact.
Jay
Actually, we already have that. He predicted it before in a 1991 book, where
he said Norway would peak in 1997 at 2.2 mb/d (actual 1998 was 3.2 mb/d, down
slightly from 1997, due to price collapse.).
>eantime in the practical realm I must mention I've added to my holdings
>of Transocean Offshore and the Tidewater Company, as well as RB Falcon.
>Apparently these companies are fetching upwardly mobile dayrates on
>their drilling equipment. This I can get my mind around.
>
>Even if the apocalyptic predictions completely fall flat, I can get a
>handle on improving dayrates
Precisely. Day-rates are short-term and have little or nothing to do with
long-term resource base, optimistic or pessimistic. (I heard one consultant is
predicting that oil prices will shoot up, but also thinks the drilling
companies will be under pressure, which strikes me as contradictory.)
Granted a whole bunch of small producers (Trinidad, Peru) have peaked, but you
are not asking Why have countries like FSU, Venezuela, etc., peaked. That is
the problem with the Hubbert models and those of others. Libya peaked because
they wanted to cut production and "save" oil for future generations, Venezuela
peaked because they nationalized and cut investment, FSU because of political
turmoil, etc.
The countries which you/Richard show as "peaking" in 1997 haven't necessarily
peaked, just because production is down slightly. Angola is about to boom, for
example, and the others may go up in the future, it is too early to look at
last year's production decline and refer to 1997 as a peak. (The oil price
collapse last year was a factor in some places).
And predictions for the future, as I say, have been notoriously pessimistic.
If you don't believe me, here are the predictions for 1995 production in Norway
by year of forecast:
1982: 22 mt
1985: 40
1988: 80
1990: 106
1992: 113
Actual 1995: 138.5 mt
A little skepticism goes a long way in this business.
In 1987, the same company predicted that Non-OPEC production (excluding the
communist bloc) would peak in 1988, even if prices increased about 35%. It is
still going up.
This is incorrect. The IEA in the 1970s used simple price elasticities to
predict that higher prices would lead to higher oil supply. However, from
their 1982 forecast, they consistently were pessmistic, making similar warnings
(but less severe) to Campbell, et. al., arguing that non-Middle East production
had peaked and that pretty much all future supplies would come from the Middle
East. They have also been consistently wrong as production is either higher
than predicted (in US) or keeps rising (most every other major producer).
Gee, Jay, this is exactly the argument made in the late 1970s: markets are too
stupid to realize that we're running out of oil, and the government has to step
in and make alternatives commercially ready for that date (about 10 years off).
Want to buy a lease on some shale oil holdings?
I have heard similar arguments made before (we're not forecasting, we're
projecting/assuming/testing scenarios) but when you give a number and a date,
arguing that you aren't projecting seems like an effort to avoid the truth.
Hubbert was very careful about what he was doing (more so than many of his
followers) and he noted very explicitly that his world projection was based on
a rough guess of how much oil there was. However, since those numbers remain
uncertain, even for the U.S., it shows the flaw in the method: taking a fixed
point for EUR (or URR) and assuming it won't change. Hubbert had to repeatedly
update and revise his estimates as new numbers came in and new technologies
increased the U.S. resource base.
In the past twenty years, US oil production has not followed Hubbert's path.
Lower-48 production leveled off in 1980-85, and only ceased falling again after
the price collapse in 1986 led to a drilling collapse. Unless you believe that
the price collapse had nothing to do with the drilling collapse, and/or that
the drilling collapse had nothing to do with the subsequent falloff in
production, then it appears that the continuing decline shown by the Hubbert
curve was not holding up.
People in Saudi A. derive great amusement from their predictions that Saudi
Arabia can't increase production significantly. They are sitting on a huge
amount of oil, including fields never developed.
Can't say I even remember that interview, but thanks for the notice, I'll try
to find it.
Gas is the real question mark. There's huge amounts of gas in the Middle East,
Africa, even Venezuela but it means nothing for the US cause it costs to much
to transport. A bunch of us have been discussing this issue at conferences,
since most everyone agrees that consumption in the US is rising, and it's not
clear what price is necessary to make it available.
Unlike oil, I believe US gas prices (wellhead avg.) could go up in the long
run, but not as much as many people think ($3-3.5/Mcf is being widely touted
for 2005-2010). There's a lot of gas out there, including Canada and Mexico,
including US deep areas, but it's not clear how much it will cost to bring it
in, and there is a possibility that people are too optimistic about US demand
(30 Tcf by 2010 seems a little high to me).
This is an important question and deserves a lot more attention than the notion
that world oil production will peak in 2 years, or industrial society is near
an end.
Average output per well is falling in a lot of places, but they have a long way
to fall. In order to offset this, all they need is minimal investment in new
wells, waterflood whatever.
Actually, I wouldn't want a lease, just some shares in a going producer
who is now commercially developing these holdings. Are the majors
involved yet? I must imagine this to be much more capital intensive
than having Unit Corp or UTI come out with a conventional diesel
electric rig and punch some holes in your leased land and start
producing...
Why not have hundreds of Liquified Natural Gas tankers ferrying back and
forth out of the Persion Gulf, thru the Mediterranean, and on to Bayonne
and ports east? Sounds like a safe, politically stable, and
environmentally friendly solution!!
...
...
(tongue in cheek hope you realize)...
www.iea.org/pubs/reviews/files/nor97/nor08.html
Yes, it is. Actually, the shale oil money is going into heavy oil and tarsands
in Canada and Venezuela. No exploration costs, practically a mining operation.
Huge amounts available, costs around $8-10 or so.
How does this respond to the comment of their long track record of predicting
near-term peaks and being grossly in error on the low side? (see below)
>> If you don't believe me, here are the predictions for 1995 production in
>Norway
>> by year of forecast:
>>
>> 1982: 22 mt
>> 1985: 40
>> 1988: 80
>> 1990: 106
>> 1992: 113
>> Actual 1995: 138.5 mt
>>
I've had the opportunity to evaluate a potential heavy-oil project in Venezuela as
a reservoir engineer. The initial estimate of break-even product price was about
$13 US/exported upgraded barrel of oil (the crude oil has a value of maybe $5/barrel
before "upgrading"). The current estimate of break-even product price is probably closer
to $20/exported upgraded barrel of oil. This is only an estimate since the company I
worked for decided to back out of the project.
The technical risk of the project was considerable, including geological risk, despite the
fact the area was reasonably delineated by exploration wells. The upgrader plant under design required
the installation of massive infrastructure. A medium-sized creek had to be "moved".
The political risk was reasonable at the time of the initial study, but has since increased.
What was absolutely certain was that effective tax on the project would be at least 80%.
The general industry interest in heavy oil projects in Venezuela is back to a minimum.
Todd
>> Michael Lynch, Center for International Studies, M.I.T.
>
> People in Saudi A. derive great amusement from their predictions that
Saudi
> Arabia can't increase production significantly. They are sitting on a huge
> amount of oil, including fields never developed.
Tell us Michael, when does your study show that global oil production will
"peak". Can I get a copy?
Tell us Michael, what does your study show for the "net energy" of remaining
oil and gas resources? Can I get a copy?
Tell us Michael, when does your study show that global natural gas will
"peak"? Can I get a copy?
Jay
Question: Is the Venezuelan tar sand resource larger or smaller than
the Athabasca sands in Alberta?
Just a thought: After re-reading a lot of the material on the topic of
the size of ultimately recoverable petroleum deposits, I think a large
part of the "crisis thinking" of those such as Campbell and even Bernabe
of Italy goes to geopolitics rather than straight arithmetic. The West
would rather be able to procure its oil from "friendly faces", Christian
white people that is, than from the scary Muslim world. Now I'm being
facetious and sarcastic and oversimplifying, but I think there's
something to this. The Campbell materials archived at www.dieoff.com
repeated point back to the thread that sometime in the next decade (or
so, plus or minus a decade), the OPEC producers once again will hold the
majority of the market share. And OPEC is a code word for AMPEC, the
"Association of Muslim Petroleum Exporting Countries," and for the West,
this is hard to stomach. People like Saddam Hussein and the Iranian
Ayatollahs bring out all sorts of knee-jerk reactions based on recent
history.
But if a huge undeveloped resource (tar sands) exists in the Western
Hemisphere, specifically The Americas (cue patriotic music of North
American and South America, please), then my guess is that once a point
is reached where Muslim dominance is again looming (in terms of world
petroleum consumption), then vast--I mean VAST--resources will be poured
into developing the white, Christian tar sand regions (Venezuela,
Canada). Hell, if Exxon can invest $40 billion in an undersea city for
natural gas in Indonesia, how much might pour into these regions once we
are threatened by the Qadaffi/Bin Laden/Ayatollah X/Hussein/Hezbollah
oil cartel (again, tongue in cheek here, don't take me as a racist)...
This is my hunch, only, and only my humble opinion. Remember, I'm no
petro engineer, just a guy trying to figure out where to invest his
pension money so he's not scratching around at retirement time...
Todd Flach wrote:
>
> In article <19991110073310...@ng-bh1.aol.com>, mcl...@aol.com (MCLynch) writes:
> >>
> >>> Want to buy a lease on some shale oil holdings?
> >>> Michael Lynch, Center for International Studies, M.I.T.
> >>
> >>Actually, I wouldn't want a lease, just some shares in a going producer
> >>who is now commercially developing these holdings. Are the majors
> >>involved yet? I must imagine this to be much more capital intensive
> >>than having Unit Corp or UTI come out with a conventional diesel
> >>electric rig and punch some holes in your leased land and start
> >>producing...
> >
> >Yes, it is. Actually, the shale oil money is going into heavy oil and tarsands
> >in Canada and Venezuela. No exploration costs, practically a mining operation.
> > Huge amounts available, costs around $8-10 or so.
> >Michael Lynch, Center for International Studies, M.I.T.
>
Well, it responds in that it goes to who the "they" is here. I don't
put the Norwegian govt. in the same category as those of the "dieoff"
tendency who are far more controversial and carrying vastly more baggage
and predict things far more grave.
Okay, if Mr. Campbell et al. are using Norwegian govt. figures to arrive
at this "halving" of petro production out of Norway, perhaps there is
something to all this. Maybe their other data isn't that suspect
either. I did see the Norwegian graph and it clearly projects next year
as the peak.
Also notable is the level of drilling and lease activity in the North
Sea, Norwegian Sea, and Barents Sea mentioned in the Norwegian govt.
report. It is by no means a new "oil rush" up there; things are
proceeding fairly humdrum, workaday, biz-as-usual. So if the Norwegian
govt. mainframe computers coughed out the data that next year, 2000, is
their probable peak, I tend to believe it's their probable peak. There
is no "hot money" pouring into the oil biz these days; the hot money is
pouring into the Internet companies in what may be the biggest paper
money inflation in human history (the "paper money" being stock
certificates). But that is another topic altogether.
So if Campbell and these others are relying on fairly credible sources
like the Govt. of Norway, why is their hypothesis suspect? Granted, in
the 1970s the widespread notion among the environmentalists was that
petro production was going to be in serious decline by 2000, and they
missed their mark. But I don't think they missed it by centuries, by
generations, but perhaps a decade. They weren't hip to horizontal
drilling etc. back then. On the other hand, they weren't hip to the
notion of upgrading every Chinese and every Indian and every Indonesian
to a North American lifestyle with its concomitant devouring of
petroleum resources. (The notion of every Chinese family with a couple
SUVs in their yard has got to have oil company investors just
salivating, eh?) So as demand has ramped-up to meet each technological
breakthru in sucking more oil out of the sediments, the date for
production decline hasn't gone THAT far into the future, IMHO.
But again, I'm not a petro engineer, just a wacky retail investor in the
oil and gas sector.
Orinoco has about 2 trillion barrels total, but the recoverable amount is not
clear (at least some of it will probably be used for steam, etc.). It could be
as low as 10%, maybe 30-50% in very long run, such as fifty years.
>I think a large
>part of the "crisis thinking" of those such as Campbell and even Bernabe
>of Italy goes to geopolitics rather than straight arithmetic.
>The West
>would rather be able to procure its oil from "friendly faces", Christian
>white people that is, than from the scary Muslim world. Now I'm being
>facetious and sarcastic and oversimplifying, but I think there's
>something to this.
This is closer to the real issue, and its not Muslim really. Do you trust
Californians? Australian labor unions? Oil production is gradually becoming
more concentrated in the Middle East, even though more gradual than Campbell
and the IEA fear. This has the potential for serious trouble in the future,
though not of the kind we had in the1970s.
Markets are much more efficient at dealing with shortages, and OPEC realizes
that they shouldn't try to keep prices at $50 after the disruption ends. But
policy-makers change and people forget lessons, so there is always the
potential for a) a big disruption or a bunch of little ones together, b)
governments to screw it up and make things worse, thereby causing c) high
prices for 6 mos. to 3 years, and lots of economic damage.
Interesting datum. I have had quotes of viability as low as $12 for Mayan
(about $15 WTI), but these numbers are never too firm.
Sorry, the "they" is the Norwegian government. They have consistently produced
bad production forecasts, always showing an imminent peak for the last 15
years, and coming in way too low.
**That's the point I'm trying to make. The official estimates are not
credible.**
Jay, send me a snail mail address and I will send you tons of stuff.
I don't show a peak in oil or gas production, because (I think) it's so far
off that my forecasts don't go that far.
My latest "big" study was published by the Gas Research Institute (www.gri.org,
might list it). Jan. 1996, oil markets to 2020.
Mike
You are confusing science with religion. Dr. Hubbert was (I am reliably
informed) a great scientist. However, that doesn't mean that everything he
says is automatically true, or that disagreement with him is criticism of him.
Even Einstein probably made mistakes.
> In article <19991110073310...@ng-bh1.aol.com>, mcl...@aol.com (MCLynch) writes:
> >>
> >>> Want to buy a lease on some shale oil holdings?
> >>> Michael Lynch, Center for International Studies, M.I.T.
> >>
> >>Actually, I wouldn't want a lease, just some shares in a going producer
> >>who is now commercially developing these holdings. Are the majors
> >>involved yet? I must imagine this to be much more capital intensive
> >>than having Unit Corp or UTI come out with a conventional diesel
> >>electric rig and punch some holes in your leased land and start
> >>producing...
> >
> >Yes, it is. Actually, the shale oil money is going into heavy oil and tarsands
> >in Canada and Venezuela. No exploration costs, practically a mining operation.
> > Huge amounts available, costs around $8-10 or so.
> >Michael Lynch, Center for International Studies, M.I.T.
>
> I've had the opportunity to evaluate a potential heavy-oil project in Venezuela as
> a reservoir engineer. The initial estimate of break-even product price was about
> $13 US/exported upgraded barrel of oil (the crude oil has a value of maybe $5/barrel
> before "upgrading"). The current estimate of break-even product price is probably closer
> to $20/exported upgraded barrel of oil. This is only an estimate since the company I
> worked for decided to back out of the project.
>
> The technical risk of the project was considerable, including geological risk, despite the
> fact the area was reasonably delineated by exploration wells. The upgrader plant under design required
> the installation of massive infrastructure. A medium-sized creek had to be "moved".
>
> The political risk was reasonable at the time of the initial study, but has since increased.
> What was absolutely certain was that effective tax on the project would be at least 80%.
>
> The general industry interest in heavy oil projects in Venezuela is back to a minimum.
>
> Todd
>
>
Some anaylsts do use discovery rates, however, Hubbert did not (in any of the
works of his that I've read, including the original 1956 article, where he
first presented the argument).
Discovery rates are unfortunately not very useful because a) they fluctuate
enormously, and b) there is a strong subjective element in them. The size of a
field is not known with much precision on discovery, and they have historically
grown substantially over time with a) more drilling, b) better recovery
methods, and c) better understanding of the geology.
Some Hubbert disciples are arguing that this will not occur in the future,
because we now understand fields so well that their size can be estimated very
precisely at an early stage. However, this argument relies primarily on a
proprietary database and is not proven.
>My apologies for garbled posts. I have posted on prodigy classic and on
>an ultimate bulletin board, but not here. My two computers are
>different. Some of my posts do not go through. I am virtually certain
>that Dr. Hubbert developed the curve using finding rates in the
>lower 48, on land. He did not count Alaska or offshore as he had
>insufficient information to do so. It would be grossly dishonest to
>count Alaska or the Gulf of Mexico and then say Hubbert was wrong. I
>have seen this attempted. I sincerely believe that you are either
>mistaken or that you are cooking data. I hope it is the former.---------
>If you see
>strange xxx's they are to solve a problem I am having with my posts.
>
The garbling isn't that bad; I don't claim to be an Internet wizard myself.
I know that Laherrere uses discovery rates, and considers himself a Hubbert
disciple. However, that is not the case of the original Hubbert work (nor of
the follow up which I have seen).
But if you haven't read Hubbert's original work, then you shouldn't make
assertions about what it says. I have in front of me a reprint from "Drilling
and Production Practice" 1956, the article "Nuclear Energy and Fossil Fuels"
which Shell republished. On p. 12, he discusses the equations used to show
production curves, and the two variables are production and resources,
including change over time. In the section "Future Rates of Production" p.
17,he says, "The same treatment for the world production of crude oil is shown
in Figu. 20. Here the ultimate potential production is taken to be the 1,250
billion barrels shown in Fig. 15....In Fig. 20, the curve has been drawn on the
asumption that the maximum rate of production will be about 2 1/2 times the
present rate, which places the date of the peak at about the year 2000."
Discoveries are referred to only inasmuch as cumulative production and current
reserves are cumulative discoveries, which indicates the nearness of the peak.
You are also incorrect in asserting that he used only onshore data, since he
says (p. 14) The United States Geological Survey has estimated potential
offshore reserves of the United States...."
No one argues that he was including Alaska, and his high forecast for lower-48
was pretty accurate (much better than the bulk of such forecasts have been the
past 25 years). But not all of his forecasts have been correct (world oil, US
gas) because he used low estimates for URR and assumed they wouldn't change,
when the indications are that they tend to grow with technological advances,
infrastructure developments, etc.
And yet you attack me for daring to disagree with one of Hubbert's theories.
>I do not consider
>statements that the Saudi's are laughing at me evidence.
Nor do I, but you have ignored the evidence I have presented.
>The fact that
>Campbell made an incorrect prediction in the past is not scientific
>proof that all of his predictions will be incorrect for the next 100
>years.
No, it isn't proof, but it is evidence. A stopped watch is right twice a day,
but that doesn't mean it is telling time correctly. The fact that Campbell's
predictions have repeatedly failed suggests that there is something wrong with
his model (as I have argued), and nothing has been put forward that I am aware
of to suggest that he has corrected it.
>Regarding the "huge" undeveloped fields that you mentioned in
>Saudi Arabia. Do any of these fields approach the size of Ghawar or
>Safaniya?
No, but what does that mean? If Campbell asserts that Saudi ability to
increase production is sharply constrained and they have lots of giant fields
(albeit smaller than Ghawar) it is again evidence that his model is incorrect
and/or that he is biased in his use/choice of data.
{mixed metaphor mode ON}
"The moon does not mind the barking dog." - Chinese Proverb
Apparently the moons at MIT not only mind the barking dogs,
they squander their own and others lives in endless Internet food fights.
"The dog barks but the caravan moves on." - Arab Proverb
Michael, baby, time to move.
{mixed metaphor mode OFF}
As long as we are citing various quotes and proverbs, here are two that fit
this discussion also:
1). "The frog does not drink up the pond in which it lives" - translated
from an Iranian proverb
(i.e. be nice to the people you meet anywhere while on your way up. You
meet them again on the way down?)
2). "Never get complacent. That's when things go wrong" - Ed Scharlau,
President, Busey National Bank, Urbana, IL
(ie. that's why these discussions, as endless as they my seem, are important
to us).
Cheers,
George D. Klein
SED-STRAT Geoscience Consultants, Inc.
Houston, TX, 77242-2188
email: gdk...@concentric.net
Wesley T. Perkins <wes...@starbath.com> wrote in message
news:_noY3.118301$Ow5.2...@dfw-read.news.verio.net...
The stream runs slowly, the water accumulates.
I have no misconception that I will ever change Jay's mind, gentlemen, he is
obviously a true believer. I respond to him primarily so that others reading
these postings will not think that his is the only view on this subject. It is
clear from postings (and emails to me) that there are many sober, intelligent,
informed readers of this newsgroup (not all of whom agree with me by any
means), but I worry about casual visitors.
However, I have other calls on my time. I would like to invite all to the new
US Association for Energy Economics website, which also has a discussion area,
at www.usaee.org.