"Inductive intelligence" or a "generalist" cognitive bias in human
cogn...@gmail.com
last year. I share his frustration with IQ measures & came up with an
explanation of why real-time tests can't capture a high-level
generalization ability, caused by a longer-range induction. Basically,
induction is a search for matches/patterns, & deduction is an
interactive projection of these patterns.
In neocortex there's a tradeoff between the number of basic units:
minicolumns, & the range of connections between them. Longer range
connections allow for range^2 number of possible comparisons, which
would slow down the learning process but improve quality of matches &
generality of the resulting patterns. Correspondingly reduced number
of minicolumns will decrease represented detail/precision.
So, this is a speed & detail, vs depth & generality tradeoff, & real-
time tests are biased for the former & against the latter. The
tradeoff is somewhat ambiguous in terms modern societal utility:
- On one hand, speed & precision was far more important for survival
"in the wild", which probably explains why apes likely have a
photographic memory, superior to humans.
- On the other hand, the functional differentiation of a modern
society probably rewards specialization & precision more than higher
generalization ability on the opposite end of cognitive diversity
spectrum.
I have more on my blog: "Generalist vs Specialist neuroarchitectural
bias" post: http://scalable-intelligence.blogspot.com/2008/04/analytical-depth-vs-response-speed.html
but it does involve a bit of neuroscience.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
> I googled "inductive intelligence" & hit on John W Edser' post of the
> last year. I share his frustration with IQ measures & came up with an
> explanation of why real-time tests can't capture a high-level
> generalization ability, caused by a longer-range induction. Basically,
> induction is a search for matches/patterns, & deduction is an
> interactive projection of these patterns.
Most work in AI is based on a HUGE assumption, i.e., the
assumption that rationality can be reduced to logic. This runs counter
to Godel's logical discovery that mathematical rationality can never
be found in its entirety with a formal (e.g., logical) system.
Here's a line of argument that suggests that "reasoning" is a bit of a
different animal from the one characterized by the Kahneman, Tversky
etc. crowd who are still operating on the logic = rationality
assumption (IMHO). Its from one of my papers presented at
a number of conferences over that past few years in which I draw
a distinction between higher cognition and lower cogntion as follows:
[begin quote]
Higher Cognition (class)
(analogical “reasoning”)
Associations arising from
'the cognition of abstruse
similarity and difference',
e.g., electricity is like
water flowing in a pipe.
Highly individualized.
Lower Cognition (class)
(conditioning)
Associations arising from
'the cognition of obvious
similarity and difference',
e.g., this A + B sequence
is like one's previously
observed. Inter-environ-
mental individualization,
intra-environmental iso-
morphism. Likely progen-
itor of higher cognition.
Higher Cognition:
Not uncommonly, deductive syllogisms such as
‘Socrates is a man, all men are mortal, therefore Socrates is
mortal’, are offered as examples of reasoning. This is not how
I am employing the term in the phylogeny, which is why it appears
in quotation marks. I mean for it to refer to whatever thought
process lies at the heart of ampliative inference, a process
often associated with ‘Aha!’ or ‘Eureka!’ experiences, but
commonly falling below the threshold of an identifiable event
in which much, if not most, of the processing is not
introspectively available. Even so, by applying a bit of the
abstraction and generalization sanctioned by our methodology
and in contrast to the Nisbett and Wilson approach to the
study of “higher order, inference based responses”), I believe
enough is available for us to make a reasonable guess that the
cognition of similarity and difference (analogical/metaphorical
“reasoning”) does most of the heavy lifting. But then I am
hardly the first introspectionist to arrive at that
conclusion:
‘All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison
and a discovery of those relations either constant or inconstant,
which two or more objects bear to each other’ (Hume, 1739).
Lower Cognition:
My unorthodox definition of conditioning as ‘the cognition of
obvious similarity and difference’ stems from my unorthodox
definition of reasoning as ‘the cognition of abstruse similarity
and difference’ which, when combined with the former, offers a
number of explanatory advantages:
1. It allows for continuity between the two concepts and, as
such, allows for an appreciation of how “reasoning” might have
evolved from conditioning. In this view, the ability to
understand electricity by comparing it to how water flows in
a pipe is just an extension of the process that underlies an
organism’s ability to understand a currently observed A + B
sequence (e.g., Pavlov’s dogs) by comparing it to ones previously
observed.
2. It allows one to forego syllogistic deduction (‘Socrates is
a man…”, etc.) as a paradigm for reasoning in that, based on the
analogy with conditioning, concluding that Socrates is mortal
can be viewed as analogous to a conditioned mouse remembering it
must go left at the fourth fork in a maze. In much the manner
the mouse’s recollection would be construed as more a manifestation
of conditioning that has already occurred, we might also conclude
that deducing Socrates is mortal is more a manifestation of
reasoning which has already occurred, and perhaps closer to
remembering than reasoning, at least in an ampliative sense of
coming to a deeper understanding of the nature of reality, and
thereby serving to produce a net increase in one’s rationality.
‘If analogy were merely a special variety of something that
in itself lies way out on the peripheries, then it would be
but an itty bitty blip in the broad blue sky of cognition.
To me, however, analogy is anything but a bitty blip -- rather,
it’s the very blue that fills the whole sky of cognition –
analogy is everything…’ (Hofstadter, 2001).
3. It allows for a naturalistic indeterminism in that one can
surmise that once an event sequence or feature has become cognized
it is easy to appreciate how one might then have the option of
following the sequence or conforming to the feature or not, and
thereby becoming less determined by it, i.e., aware of more options
than prior to the cognition. Another way of saying this is that
it lends itself to the suspicion that there might well be an
inverse correlation between ‘being cognizant’ or ‘being rational’
and ‘being determined’.
[end qutoe]
'Rehabilitating Introspection:
A Procedure for a First Person Psychical Science'
Phil Roberts, Jr.
www.rationology.net
cogn...@gmail.com
> assumption that rationality can be reduced to logic. This runs counter
> to Godel's logical discovery that mathematical rationality can never
> be found in its entirety with a formal (e.g., logical) system.
Logic in general is consistency, there's no virtue in being
inconsistent.
But I find conventional formal logic irrelevant, my logic is Bayesian
beyond Bayesian.
> My unorthodox definition of conditioning as ‘the cognition of
> obvious similarity and difference’ stems from my unorthodox
> definition of reasoning as ‘the cognition of abstruse similarity
> and difference’
"Abstruse" is a matter of degree, not of a kind.
"Conditioning" refers to reflexes, not cognition.
The difference is that reflexes work in isolation,
they shortcut the cortical generalization hierarchy
& produce an immediate "value judgement".
> 3. It allows for a naturalistic indeterminism in that one can
> surmise that once an event sequence or feature has become cognized
> it is easy to appreciate how one might then have the option of
> following the sequence or conforming to the feature or not, and
> thereby becoming less determined by it, i.e., aware of more options
> than prior to the cognition. Another way of saying this is that
> it lends itself to the suspicion that there might well be an
> inverse correlation between ‘being cognizant’ or ‘being rational’
> and ‘being determined’.
If you don't like determinism, tough.
Boris
http://scalable-intelligence.blogspot.com/
Lorentz
> - On the other hand, the functional differentiation of a modern
> society probably rewards specialization & precision more than higher
> generalization ability on the opposite end of cognitive diversity
> spectrum.
I believe that in human mating rituals, higher generalization
ability may be more important than specialization and division.
When two people with different classes in society compete, this
is an asymmetric arms race. The resource being fought for is likely to
be the same in all battles. Food is food, a winning strategy should be
repeated exactly. The specialization of each class gets emphasized.
Therefore, generalization may kick the loser out of the competition.
The next battle may be over the same resource. So specialization pays
for the winner.
In competition of two males for the same female, the competition
is symmetric. Generally both males are in the same class, and if not
they are at least competing for a variable resource. Therefore,
specialization is likely to kick the suitor out of the game. Girls are
different. The next girl will probably want different things than the
first. Same for female on female competition. The next boy may be
different. So generalization pays.
John W Edser
>> cogno...@gmail.com wrote:
>> - On the other hand, the functional differentiation of a modern
>> society probably rewards specialization & precision more than higher
>> generalization ability on the opposite end of cognitive diversity
>> spectrum.
>I believe that in human mating rituals, higher generalization
> ability may be more important than specialization and division.
JE:-
I think that is true of any ritual. A ritual can contain a useful
correlation such that if you faithfully repeat that ritual you may be
able to repeat a correlation and be able to predict the future. This has
enormous survival value and can be observed in animal systems in which
cognition is not present. To be able to make up just a myth which can
also contain a subconscious correlation requires inductive intelligence.
Of course, turning alchemy into chemistry required falsifiable
inductions which do a lot more than just contain a useful correlation.
It makes sense to me to suppose that within our species inductive belief
systems evolved long before theories did because early tribes required
diverse belief systems to bond larger and alrger groups. The fact that
these belief systems may also contain and can therefore pass on a useful
correlation _as a tribal based meme_, remained a bonus. From this our
theory building ability evolved as belief induction became more and more
subject to deduction as a critical test to refutation.
Regards,
John Edser
Independent Researcher
Phil Roberts, Jr.
>>Most work in AI is based on a HUGE assumption, i.e., the
>>assumption that rationality can be reduced to logic. This runs counter
>>to Godel's logical discovery that mathematical rationality can never
>>be found in its entirety with a formal (e.g., logical) system.
>
> Logic in general is consistency,
> there's no virtue in being
> inconsistent.
I think of logic as simply the order we have
cognized in the manner in which we cognize order.
But for me, this process is itself largely
ANA-logical in nature, which is why it's so
hard to computationalize.
> But I find conventional formal logic irrelevant, my logic is Bayesian
> beyond Bayesian.
>
Bayesian logic isn't formal?
>
>>My unorthodox definition of conditioning as ‘the cognition of
>>obvious similarity and difference’ stems from my unorthodox
>>definition of reasoning as ‘the cognition of abstruse similarity
>>and difference’
>
> "Abstruse" is a matter of degree, not of a kind.
> "Conditioning" refers to reflexes, not cognition.
> The difference is that reflexes work in isolation,
> they shortcut the cortical generalization hierarchy
> & produce an immediate "value judgement".
>
Yes. Like similarity and difference themselves, abstruse
and obvious are pretty much in the eye of the beholder.
And yet, this something that is pretty much in the eye
of the beholder is at the very heart of most ampliative
inference, don't you agree?
"All forms of reasoning are nothing but comparing". (Hume)
>
>>3. It allows for a naturalistic indeterminism in that one can
>>surmise that once an event sequence or feature has become cognized
>>it is easy to appreciate how one might then have the option of
>>following the sequence or conforming to the feature or not, and
>>thereby becoming less determined by it, i.e., aware of more options
>>than prior to the cognition. Another way of saying this is that
>>it lends itself to the suspicion that there might well be an
>>inverse correlation between ‘being cognizant’ or ‘being rational’
>>and ‘being determined’.
>
>
> If you don't like determinism, tough.
Perhaps. But that hardly constitutes a counter to the rationale
I have offered for why I suspect there might be a chink in your
metaphysical armor.
PR
cogn...@gmail.com
> cognized in the manner in which we cognize order.
> But for me, this process is itself largely
> ANA-logical in nature, which is why it's so
> hard to computationalize.
Yes, the Induction process, formalized by Bayesian (probabilistic)
logic, although I add a whole new dimension to it by considering
"partial" occurence, or the degree of match (similarity &
difference): http://scalable-intelligence.blogspot.com/2008/04/intelligence-pattern-discovery.html
It's only hard till you know how to do it.
> Yes. Like similarity and difference themselves, abstruse
> and obvious are pretty much in the eye of the beholder.
> And yet, this something that is pretty much in the eye
> of the beholder is at the very heart of most ampliative
> inference, don't you agree?
Not the way I treat it, my definitions of both similarity & complexity
(order of generalization) are perfectly formal, see the link above.
You do need intelligence to recognize intelligence, but this doesn't
make the process of recognition any less formal.
> "All forms of reasoning are nothing but comparing". (Hume)
I'd add projection :).
> >>3. It allows for a naturalistic indeterminism in that one can
> >>surmise that once an event sequence or feature has become cognized
> >>it is easy to appreciate how one might then have the option of
> >>following the sequence or conforming to the feature or not, and
> >>thereby becoming less determined by it, i.e., aware of more options
> >>than prior to the cognition. Another way of saying this is that
> >>it lends itself to the suspicion that there might well be an
> >>inverse correlation between ‘being cognizant’ or ‘being rational’
> >>and ‘being determined’.
>
> > If you don't like determinism, tough.
>
> Perhaps. But that hardly constitutes a counter to the rationale
> I have offered for why I suspect there might be a chink in your
> metaphysical armor.
Just because Reaction is separated from Action by many levels of
generalization doesn't make the process any less deterministic.
The only "metaphysical armor" I have is my concept of Meta-Evolution:
http://scalable-intelligence.blogspot.com/2008/04/entropy-evolution.html
I consider Cognition itself a higher form of evolution in this
framework.
Boris.