What is art? How do we judge it?
Roger Lustig
Here, I'm going after the definition of art Brian proposed. Unlike the
last time, I'm responding to something that's already gone around once
or twice, and much of the intervening discussion is not included, of
course.
>Well, I already posted this once, but it seems to have gone over your
>head the first time, so maybe I'll try again:
You know, after your prissy complaint about what you considered ad
hominem attacks and insults, and after a good deal of serious
discussions of the following (most of which you posted before), finding
an almost unchanged repeat is disappointing. I have seen very little
response to the real concerns that several of us have raised wrt your
discussion as follows.
[I will also mention here that i *do* consider most of the things Brian
listed as "insults" to have been intellectual responses. One or two
were repartee or comments on particularly infelicitous word-choices;
most of the rest were exasperated responses to obvious fallacies. When
I said, "bullshit," I meant that what Brian had said was bullshit.
Quote out of context only makes for a pretty list.]
>If you want an technical definition of art it is: "A selective
>re-creation of reality according to an artist's metaphysical value
>judgements.".
Minor problem: what's an artist? One who makes art.
Major problem: what's a "metaphysical value judgment"? This remains
undefined, even below.
Meanwhile, what of the morning paper? That, too, is a "selective
re-creation of reality," albeit not by artists, in the main -- assuming
we have that prior definition of an artist. Are the value judgments
made by newspaper-makers in no way metaphysical ones?
Seems to me there's a crucial, and obvious element missing: the
functionality, or, rather, non-functionality of art. The things
included in your definition, if I read you correctly, may enrich a life,
but may in no way be construed as being essential to life. That is, the
absence of a given piece of art will never cause primary damage to life,
limb, or property (other than the art-work itself). Nor does the
presence of the work of art further the elemental aspects of life.
>This means that the artist concretizes some aspect of
>reality (for example, a concept
Whoa! Concepts as *aspects* of reality are perfectly OK with me;
however, their concretization is a different matter entirely.
Especially as the concretization produces a new reality -- and at the
same time is only partly able to convey, in and of itself, what the
underlying concept is.
We know this; different viewers will find different concepts
"concretized" in the same work. Moreover, different viewers each
possess different, personal, subjective versions of the same concept
within their minds.
Yes, concepts are subjective, and that derives directly from even Ayn
Rand's definition of them. "A mental integration of two or more
percepts." (IOE, p.15 or so.) Now, as no two people have the same set
of percepts available to them for integration, and as the constant
process of validation of concepts by comparison with further percepts
is, again, always carried out on different sets of percepts, the mental
integrations are bound to be different in their particulars.
This is especially important when we get to the examples:
>a concept like "flight"
Do works of art really do that? I can't think of one that's about
flight per se; most are far more particular, relating flight to a story
(e.g., that of Icarus) or to birds (generally in specific places) or the
like. To generalize and claim that one of these is about flight itself
is highly dangerous, especially as the particulars of any painting (or
story, etc.) would tend to exclude most forms of flight other than the
specific instance being depicted.
>or an emotion like "joy",
Again, I can't think of a work of art that general. Beethoven's 9th
(last movement only) is about some very specific things, and not all
kinds of joy either. Which kinds *is* it about? Even the text, and 165
years of criticism, aren't sufficiently helpful.
Bigger problem: the artwork is not a concretization of joy in any sense,
nor is joy made directly accessible to the senses. The things
accessible to the senses remain as before: shapes, colors, sounds,
textures, etc. The *mind*, as before, is capable of conceptualizing
some cases or forms of the emotion in question.
As I pointed out in the previous posting, the experience of joy in a
work of art is not, in general, the same as the experience of joy as a
response to some life-event other than art-reception. Rather than
making the concept concrete and directly accessible, art actually allows
it to be experienced *only* at the conceptual level, that is, one
*thinks* "that's joyful" and perhaps derives some joy from putting
oneself in a mood to match the subject of the art-work, but one is not
made joyful in the same way as when something good happens to one.
>or an experience like "war",
More of the same, plus a grumble about war being classed as an
experience. Seems to me that war encompasses such a wide range of
experiences that no work of art, even a multi-volume novel, could refer
to them all; instead, specific events and experiences having to do iwth
war are referred to in any piece of war art.
>or a place like "Yosemite") making it directly accessible to the
>senses.
This one upsets the entire apple-and-orange cart. Yosemite is *already*
directly accessible to the senses; a painting or novel makes it
*indirectly* so. Moreover, all the works of art relating to, say,
national parks, that I can think of, are *less* direct than non-art
sensual representations such as documentary photographs (I'm removing
them from the sphere of art for the moment because of their utility) or
even maps.
Worse still, the "directly accessible to the senses" item would seem to
exclude the novel as a work of art, as silent reading involves no sense
except sight, and the sight is used only to make out characters on a
page--the same characters, etc. used in the morning paper. All the
process of art-reception goes on in the mind, perhaps relating to
*memories* of sensual experience and the like, but involving no
particular direct sensual experience relating to the subject.
>The selective
>nature of his choices necessarily requires that he include some aspects
>of reality by including some object, emotion-provoking image, or
>perspective and in doing so he is saying "I think this is important.".
This selection process is an interesting one, as it involves UNreality.
That is, in a painting or a narrative or even a photograph (think of
cropping and other darkroom techniques, not to mention waiting for the
right moment), reality gets diddled in order to make a point.
"Re-created" suddenly takes on a fairly ominous meaning; the art-work is
an alternative to "real" reality, and -- am I getting this right? -- is
to be viewed as reality would be viewed.
Another major problem: we don't receive art that way. Generally, we put
ourselves in an art-receiving state of mind beforehand, and this does
not involve merely suspending the knowledge that the art-work is merely
reality-prime. We view the work as art, in special ways, and relate it
to our own experiences in various ways, not leat to our experiences of
other art. Moreover, we shift outside of ourselves for the purpose of
emotional issues relating to art: we do not relate, say, joy or sorrow
in a painting to our own experiences of joy and sorrow as we would if we
were reminded of them by some event in our lives outside of the art
world.
>If he excludes something, then that choice entails an implicit statement
>that (in the context of the idea being expressed) "This is not
>important.". (And this "inclusion" need not mean that the "important"
>thing actually be in the work, for example, imagine a Norman Rockwell
>Thanksgiving painting with all the family members looking depressed and
>in the center of the picture sits Grandpa's empty chair. The importance
>of the thing could be exposed by showing only the chair but not happy
>old grandpa.)
That is to say, a *context* is included. What's actually in the
painting is n people with glum looks on, n+1 chairs, a table, and a
roast turkey (plus culinary and artistic trimmings). Only Americans
will get the full point. They don't do Thanksgiving in other
countries, and in many countries they don't even do roast turkey;
moreover, family groups vary from place to place, so the picture might
look odd to someone not used to the Rockwellian extended family. Others
might not even "read" the faces as Rockwell had in mind; in Japan, for
instance, big smiles in a formalized item like a painting are considered
rude, and the glumness might not be read as such either.
On the more direct side, you seem to have missed my point about
exclusion (which did prompt your inclusion of the parenthesis above in
your repost of your definition). In the example you give -- is this a
real painting, btw? -- Grandpa's chair tells its story by being
*included,* not by being excluded. Rockwell hasn't excluded Grandpa --
death or illness (I presume) did that. Or, if you will, Rockwell
performed the exclusion when constructing the narrative underlying the
painting, not when executing the narrative visually. And it's *that*
kind of exclusion I'm interested in.
(The other day I saw a 17thC Dutch painting of Judith and Holofernes,
and it occurred to me that many painters hide the severed head of
Holofernes as much as possible, while accentuating Judith's sensuality
even as she holds the head. Yet I, and other viewers, too, I'm sure,
immediately go off looking for the head, only to be distracted by
Judith's sensuality. Think of Klimt! That painters direct the viewer's
eye in one direction or another is nothing new, but this game of
hide-and-peek fascinates me.)
>The value of art lies in it's ability to communicate or express value
>judgements through selective portrayal of something in a medium (such as
>painting, sculpture, movies, literature, etc.).
A very Enlightenment view, I might add. In the pre-Romantic era, the
social function of art -- to further the community by furthering
desirable values -- was its justification.
But, if we differ on concepts and other takes on a given work, how can
we get through to something as abstruse as a value judgment and agree on
what it is? I think viewers may be stimulated to make value judgments
-- and I'm sure that, with older art, viewers of today will be prodded
toward judgments quite different from those of the past -- but I find it
hard to believe that the artist's value judgment ever passes unscathed
through creation, performance (if applicable), and reception.
An example -- from Norman Rockwell. For those who live in New Jersey,
it's the painting featured on the US Healthcare billboards. It's Sunday
morning. Marching in single file are daughter, mother, other daughter,
and son. All four are dressed for church -- impeccably. Son is wearing
a suit (short pants) and a beanie. All four carry hymnals. All four,
except for son, have eyes front. In the foreground sits Dad, unshaven,
in a bathrobe and pajama bottoms, smoking his second cigarette, his
coffee half-drunk, the Sunday funnies and other parts of the paper
already read. He has slunk down as far as possible in his chair. Son
is peeking around the chair slightly as he walks by.
Now, when this was originally a Saturday Evening Post cover (is that
art, btw? It's an advertisement for the contents of the SEP, among
other things, i.e., not just for itself) it probably represented the
attitudes of the SEP and Rockwell: supporting church attendance, family
unity, cleanliness, etc. Its intended effect was that of a wry homily.
But to me the painting has a different message, and an almost horrifying
one. This is a family at war. The parents are battling it out for the
minds of their children, and the mother has succeeded in getting the
daughters to look away as they pass, noses in the air expressing their
superiority. The son is not yet won over -- he can still give Dad a
friendly peek; and (in Rockwell-world at least) Dad and son are natural
allies anyway.
That the issue is one of virtue (i.e., church attendance as opposed to
coffee, cigs, funnies, and probably a small hangover on Sunday morning)
recedes into the background here. Most likely there is more than a rift
over weekend behavior; the father's influence *everywhere* is being
undermined here. His shamefaced expression is evidence enough that he's
lost a battle in some large war; otherwise, it could hardly matter that
much.
Now, did Norman Rockwell intend to show a family in deep (and not just
church-attendance-related) trouble? I doubt it; the message one was
likely to get from the SEP, whether through a picture or in an article,
was that "the family that prays together, stays together." Yet, here
the family that is falling apart doesn't pray together -- quite the
opposite.
Is this unintended? Did Rockwell make a mistake? Or did he intend to
subvert the message by making it too strong? Or did he make two
messages, for different people? Or will different people (among those
capable of "reading" the picture) necessarily get different messages,
and perceive that different value judgments are being made?
>An artist is able to
>say things with his art like "This is what joy is like." or "The world
>is a cesspool." or "This is what it is like to drive a car." or "This is
>what genius is like.". I could go on, but I don't think I have to
>belabor the point.
I wish you *would* belabor the point with some examples, including a
discussion of how the artist "says" things. I don't think an artist
"says" things at all; I think an artist refers to things, suggests
things, depicts things, and so on, but does *not* in general use the
medium as an elaborate billboard.
>I should point out that to arrive at this definition
>requires a significant amount of philosophical development (including a
>theory of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics) but that's beyond the
>scope of this explanation.
And, as several of us have pointed out, your sophistication in all three
of these fields is in question, as you've dropped all kinds of bricks in
parts of your discussion that touched on them.
Moreover, it's no good to say this, especially as an excuse. We *need*
to see your work, and your validation process. We need to see how real
works of art (Michelangelo's _Pieta_, Mozart's G minor symphony, _Bleak
House_, _Citizen Kane_, and _Easter, 1916_, for instance) shape up under
your definition.
Finally, I shall note that nobody else has ever gone through the Big
Three philosophical fields you mention in order just to come up with a
definition of a class of things out there in the real world. "Sports,"
"Architecture," "Play," and other aspects of human endeavor allow
themselves to be defined quite easily without a massive philosophical
underpinning (and one we're not even allowed to see, no less).
In short, your paragraph above sounds like a dodge. And a mighty
unconvincing one, under the circumstances.
>If you would like to address those issues, I would be happy to, but I
>would like to stay focused on the subject at hand.
By all means. But do also address some of our concerns when we bring
them up in response to your assertions.
>The preceding explains WHAT ART IS, as opposed to what the difference
>between art that is good and art that is bad. That's what we will look
>at next.
So as not to repeat myself excessively, I shall refrain from commenting
on the "definition" portion any more except where it obviously clashes
with what's being said.
>As for how to judge art, it can be done on a number of different levels.
An infinite number of levels, wouldn't you say?
>On the most fundamental level, it can be judged just as any other human
>activity can be (and this is not a matter of aesthetics, but one of
>ethics).
But this is not judging it *as art*. Moreover, barring harmful
consequences of making or performing or receiving art, what ethical
objection could there possibly be to art? Art, even by your own
definition, cannot do more than depict or refer or suggest, and perhaps
to convey (to some people) an idea or a message.
Now, if we add in the non-utilitarian aspect of art (which I mentioned
above, but which you brought in about two weeks ago), the ethics of
art-activities recede almost completely. Art does not transmit vital
information, e.g., stock market quotes or weather prognoses or
nutritional information; all the messages it *can* transmit are not
functional in that sense. So what can be the harm in transmitting
them, in that case?
>To have any value, any human activity MUST have a purpose.
Yet art, in a very fundamental sense, is *lacking* purpose, or at least
importance, as we agree. The value of art is strictly volitional, and
up to the individual. Surely the *individual* needs to have a purpose
in making/performing/receiving art; the art-work itself need not.
Moreover, as we can see by the history of older art-works, the purpose
can change over time, and can disappear entirely. This does not sound
like the stuff of ethics to me.
>If it does not, it cannot have value, and is at best a waste of time.
Again, part of the definition of art is that it *is*, in some sense, a
waste of time. Art does not feed or clothe or shelter or prolong life,
except in trivial senses. It furthers no purpose but itself.
>If an artist (or an artwork) accurately claims that a work is
>purposeless then it cannot have value.
But this assumes universal, unchanging purposes across all producers and
consumers of art. Surely if a work of art has a purpose for an
individual, then the work has value -- to that individual.
>Now, if the alleged art work does have a purpose, we can compare it's
>purpose to the definition given above. Is it a recreation of reality?
>Does it express metaphysical value judgements? If so then it is art.
How can we determine the purpose of an art-work before we've done the
definition-comparison? This is a real puzzler to me.
(Again, "metaphysical value judgments" are pretty hard things to pin
down, especially when you only have the art-work itself, and can't ask
the artist. Or can we judge that a work DOES express these, without
knowing exactly what they are?)
>If not, then it is something else. Now, if it is non-art that doesn't
>necessarily mean that it is bad or evil. Decoration can certainly have
>some value, as can purely utilitarian items or sounds, but they are not
>art. That is not to say that art cannot be decorative, but something
>that is ONLY decorative is not art by the definition above.
What if one person and one person only perceives something otherwise
classed as "decorative" as expressing you-know-what? That is, how can
we be certain what is and is not being expressed by or in a work of art?
>OK, now that we have determined that the thing has some purpose and is
>art, we can evaluate it in a number of different ways.
>1. Does it express it's idea effectively? Or is it muddled or
[I'm assuming a missing word or two.]
Again, how do we know what "its idea" *is*? How can we be sure? What
if one person sees Idea A <muddled> but another person sees Idea B
<clear>.
In the view of almost all estheticians: art does *not* express ideas.
>2. Is that idea true? Are the value judgements it expresses valid?
For whom? To whom? Most ideas are far too specific to have universal
"truth" or "falsehood" attached to them, or, if you will, only a very
few, utterly general, banal ideas can be considered universally true
*and* expressible in art.
Likewise, most value judgments are quite subjective, or at least
specific to individual situations. "It's good to live a long time" is
generally true, but arguably not in every case (as with excruciating,
and incurable, pain).
>3. Does the work demonstrate good craftsmanship?
This implies a universal standard of same. We know there are none in
art; for example, consider Beethoven's fugal technique, which was highly
irregular by old standards, but quite enlightening by later ones.
>4. Is it pleasing to the senses directly?
Whose senses? I'm amazed at the lack of human beings in this museum!
>5. Does it evoke the desired reaction?
WHAT desired reaction? Desired by whom? By the creator? We don't know,
generally; in many cases, we know that it does *not* do that. Example:
Brian's reception of Tchaikovsky's 1812 Overture.
>6. Are the elements of the work in harmony? (For example, if the
>subject
[more missing text]
Definitions of harmony change too, and not only in music. For that
matter, the dissection of a work into elements may not be all that easy
or desireable.
>7. Is it successful at implementing the style it attempts to abide by?
>(My intent here is not to provide an exhaustive list of artistic
>virtues, but to point out a few major ones.)
All of which are highly dependent on place and time, making it clear
that the goodness or badness of a work is, by any possible evaluation, a
relative, context-based, culture-based thing.
>Of course, the BEST art would be art which embodies all of these
>artistic virtues, but I can appreciate the value of a work that has at
>least SOME virtue in any of these ways.
Does *any* art work embody *any* of these virtues? Or are these virtues
applied to the work by those who receive it?
>Of course bad craftsmanship,
>evil ideas, muddled delivery, or unproductive ugliness or discord can at
>times counteract the better features of a work. (I should note that
>ugliness and discord are not *always* bad since they could possibly
>contribute to the desired end, for example, an ugly discordant picture
>of a murderer sneaking away from a crime scene would be perfectly
>appropriate.)
Appropriate to what, I wonder? What's the "idea" of such a picture?
How can we tell?
>All of these virtues (and any others one may discover) all can be
>evaluated according to their contribution to the fulfilment of the
>definition of art given above. To the extent that a virtue contributes
>to the ability of a work to fulfil it's purpose.
We are still at a loss as to the determination of that purpose.
There *are* purposes to art-works, of course. Most interesting works
have many different purposes, some of them conflicting with others.
Baroque nudes, for example had purposes including: illustration of a
historical or mythical or religious story; titillation; idealization of
female form (this one with many sub-purposes possible); decoration;
display of owner's wealth; display of painter's technique; moral
commentary as commonly understood to be inherent in the tale being
illustrated; moral commentary *other* than that in the tale; etc. We
know this from writings about nudes, about the purpose of oil painting,
about morality and its teaching, and so on.
What do we do with all this information? Does it affect how *we* see a
great painting? Does it affect *our* estimation of greatness? Of
purpose? Of value? Of interest? Of what "the" idea in the painting
is? Of whether that's a good idea, or whether it's conveyed right?
Give me some examples of how you make those judgments at the top of your
list. I can't see how it's done, or even what it might be.
************
Brian, I have here given you the benefit of the doubt. After extensive
replies, all I got from you were collections of lines of mine you didn't
like, taken without any context or inkling to what they might be
referring to, plus a repeat -- essentially unchanged -- of something you
had written and which had been extensively criticized by more than me,
and not supported with the requested specifics or revised to reflect
the concerns of any of us. I have replied here with all the seriousness
that you, in your sarcasm, suggested I lack; I hope I may get some
answers to my questions, and responses to my critique of your approach
-- and no more sneering and repetition and suggestion that without your
entire philosophical outlook, I am doomed to eternal incorrectness in
everything I say or think, because I won't even be able to understand
your definitions.
Roger