Why is the Army so hard headed when it comes to selecting new rifles?

[Soldier in a Combat Zone]

It just seems that the Army has issues with new weapons. It sticks
with weapons far too long (ie the Springfield Trapdoor and the
Springfield '03), fights new technology and takes too long to make a
decision.

The M14, while a great weapon, should have been developed earlier in
WW2. We should have had a better machine gun back then as well. In
the '50s why didn't we go with the FN-FAL and the British .280?

Now we seem to resist replacing the M16/M4 with a better rifle as well
as replacing the 5.56x45mm cartridge. I am leaning towards the
Remington ACR and the 6.8mm SPC but there are other good candidates.
Who are those who makes these decisions? Anyone have a profile of
them?

These two sites go through the history of the M14 and reach similar
conclusions about where we should be heading. BTW, the Russian sites
is "dirty" so have your protection on.

[MODERATOR: *snip* Dirty is an understatement, especially with
one of the links mentioned. See poster off-line if you still
want the links.]


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[Jon Gallt]

In article <jbaop5$qnh$1...@news.albasani.net>,
Soldier in a Combat Zone <omeg...@gmail.com> wrote:

# It just seems that the Army has issues with new weapons. It sticks
# with weapons far too long (ie the Springfield Trapdoor and the
# Springfield '03), fights new technology and takes too long to make a
# decision.
#
# The M14, while a great weapon, should have been developed earlier in
# WW2. We should have had a better machine gun back then as well. In
# the '50s why didn't we go with the FN-FAL and the British .280?
#
# Now we seem to resist replacing the M16/M4 with a better rifle as well
# as replacing the 5.56x45mm cartridge. I am leaning towards the
# Remington ACR and the 6.8mm SPC but there are other good candidates.
# Who are those who makes these decisions? Anyone have a profile of
# them?

There are very few "decision makers" in government. "Decisions" are
made by committees, lots of committees. You rarely find anyone who says
"I made the decision" unless it is an opportunity to take credit for
something positive and then everyone steps forward. Government has a
lot of incompetent bureaucrats, and they all are on committees somewhere.

If you want rapid decisions you never use a committee. The government
rarely does not use a committee.

[Soldier in a Combat Zone]

On Dec 2, 9:53=A0am, Soldier in a Combat Zone <omega....@gmail.com>
wrote:
# It just seems that the Army has issues with new weapons. =A0It sticks
# with weapons far too long (ie the Springfield Trapdoor and the
# Springfield '03), fights new technology and takes too long to make a
# decision.
#
# The M14, while a great weapon, should have been developed earlier in
# WW2. =A0We should have had a better machine gun back then as well. =A0In
# the '50s why didn't we go with the FN-FAL and the British .280?
#
# Now we seem to resist replacing the M16/M4 with a better rifle as well
# as replacing the 5.56x45mm cartridge. =A0I am leaning towards the
# Remington ACR and the 6.8mm SPC but there are other good candidates.
# Who are those who makes these decisions? =A0Anyone have a profile of
# them?
#
# These two sites go through the history of the M14 and reach similar
# conclusions about where we should be heading. =A0BTW, the Russian sites
# is "dirty" so have your protection on.
#
# =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 [MODERATOR: *snip* Dirty is an understatement, especially=
with
# =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0one of the links mentioned. See poster off-line if you=
still
# =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0want the links.]
#

These are "clean" sites that comment on the selection process for the
new rifle

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704124504576118550237336920.html#articleTabs_comments
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-m4-carbine-controversy-03289/
http://www.chuckhawks.com/index3.naval_military_history.htm

[penultimate]

It seems to me that with a broader general historical awareness, you
would not ask these questions, or would ask different ones instead.
As to "who" makes decisions and how and why - go read the records from
past arms selections trials. They are readily available.

For example as a "different" question, you might ask when and where
availability of a new small arm was delayed by Congress not
appropriating the money necessary to purchase more than token
quantities of new arms and the ammunition they required and/or failing
to anticipate looming necessity for a lot more "new" weapons than were
on hand. Certainly that was the case with the Krag being empirically
slow in supplanting the trapdoor Springfield and in Springfield (03/
A3) production being fired up again for WWII when there were not
enough M1 Garands to be had.

In a context where there was no clear need to replace the trapdoor,
(the Indian Wars were won, America had no know foreign enemies, and
American was politically isolationist) there was little technological
point in replacing the trapdoor until the advantages of smokeless
powder were obvious. The Brits, after all, were still using Snyder
black powder single shots and world military doctrine saw a big,
heavy, slow, lead bullet as necessary to stop the HORSE in a cavalry
charge. The Brits had black powder Lee Metford repeaters, but
fouling was a problem in the rifles and the "small" 303 round driven
at black powder velocity and range would not definitively stop a
cavalry charge. You can probably peg the advantages of smokeless and
the weapons capabilities so enabled being OBVIOUS by about 1889.
There were French Lebels (using smokeless Poudre B) and the first
Mauser 1888's (using the German copy of Poudre B) a bit earlier, but
not in any quantity. And it took 6 years for the Brits to give up
(in 1894 when they adoped the then new Lee Enfield rifle) trying to
get the Lee-Metford repeaters to be reliable with cordite charged
loads.

My point is simply that the US Army had adopted the Krag (after
extensive tests) with smokeless loads in 1892 --- not exactly a big
delay after it was clear that this was a good idea. But Congress had
not funded equipping the entire regular Army with Krags (and not the
militias at all) when America was surprised by the Spanish American
War a few years later. There we found out that Mauser's were a bit
better than Krags. It really did not take very long at all to come up
with our own Mauser (the 1903 Springfield). As to decision makers in
government, TR made some pretty quick and clear decisions about the
Springfield 03. But, once again, Congress would not pay for enough of
the new Springfields for America's Army to be fully armed with them
(or even Krags!) come America's entrance to WWI. Fortunately,
America's arms makers (mostly Remington) had tooling on hand to build
the new British Rifle (the P-14 Enfield) which had been designed to be
quick and cheap to manufacture. Rechambered to 30-06, more American
soldiers went off to fight in France with 1917 Enfields than with 1903
Springfields. After WWI, the Army was indeed a bit provincial in
deciding the 03 Springfield was better than the "British" 1917.

Now, there is no doubt that America's M1 Garand equipped combat foot
soldier in WWII had more firepower than his British, French, Japanese,
German, or Russian equivalent. But, same story as before, the Garand
was adopted by the Army in 1936 and Congress did not fund fully
equipping even our small standing armed forces with them before Pearl
Harbor (at the end of 1941). So, when we needed rifles, out came
everything we had and we started making more 1903's using the tooling
which was still on hand too, But, except for the Marines that at the
outset were set in their ways with their beloved Springfield 03, we
pretty much made sure the combat battalions had M1's. So much for
your first paragraph.

I guess I would agree the M-14 is a great weapon, if for no other
reason than it is no more than an M1, shooting the slightly smaller
and slower 7.62 Nato cartridge (instead of the 30-06) with "select
fire" capability and a detachable magazine (rather than en-block
clip). At least for a couple of magazines (until it overheated), you
had the firepower of a mini BAR in your hands. Overheating, of
course, camouflaged its true chief liability --- like a BAR you pretty
much needed a couple of folks carrying ammo to sustain fire. But
"should have had it earlier in WWII" is pretty much nonsense because
what moron would have tried changing cartridges in the middle of a
war? This is exactly why the Brits fought WWII with the aging 303
round rather than adopting the 280 (with its slight, and largely
imaginary, advantage) as the British Army was want just before the
Nazi's invaded Poland.

Why didn't we pick the FAL? We did after all win the war. The M1
worked - and was a lot better than anything it opposed. M1 designs,
parts, and tooling mostly served for M-14 production. Why would any
sensible person change when the M-14 was an interim (and clearly
perceived as short-term) alternative and not obviously inferior to the
FAL in any clear way? Why didn't we pick the 280? Same story, not to
mention a total absence of any data (just like today) showing the 280
might be intrinsically superior. And the 7.62 Nato was indeed newer
technology which could use bullets and tooling already on hand!

In any event, the Nato round was not developed until 1954. So the
M-14 had nothing to do with WWII - at all. And your comments about
"better machine guns" back then are a bit mystifying too, since what
we use today is just a modestly improved John Browning (WWI) or before
design. And the M16 was deployed a few years after the M-14 simply
because the cartridges were small enough for a single soldier with a
select fire rifle to carry enough to, in theory, last through a fire
fight. In the dark, in the jungle, in Vietnam where you couldn't
visualize a target more than 20 feet away, firing lots of bullets was
a comfort. The only way to get a soldier to carry more cartridges is
make them smaller and lighter - which conventional wisdom says means
less powerful. So it really boils down to whether you want a more
power cartridge or more of them. And, the chief complaint about the
03 and the M1? They kicked too hard - something which pretty much
comes with the extra range and power. In these days where combat is
in more open country and in a time when light weight body armor is
readily available, the pendulum shifts in favor of more range and
power. Nothing about a 6.8 SPC is "special" or in and of itself a
significant technological advance,

[TimR]

On Dec 2, 5:32=A0pm, penultimate <drwi...@cimtel.net> wrote:
# It seems to me that with a broader general historical awareness, you
# would not ask these questions, or would ask different ones instead.
# As to "who" makes decisions and how and why - go read the records from
# past arms selections trials. =A0They are readily available.

Excellent summary, to which I'd add only a couple of items:

Conservatism in a large organization is necessary to prevent going
down wacko sidetracks. New ideas have difficulty making inroads, but
in the long run 99% of new ideas are wacko, so some innate
conservatism keeps many disasters away.

The fight between one round as big as possible and many rounds as fast
as possible dates to the Revolutionary period; there has always been
this conflict. It was intensified during the Civil War. Reading the
history of the national armories at the time is fascinating. The
quartermasters did a lot to limit how many rounds you could shoot
because they had trouble supplying enough.

And finally, the rifle caliber has to be considered in the context of
the strategic purpose of the rifle. This is something few of us
hunters understand. From talking to experts in the military, I am
convinced that the 5.56 is the optimum combat choice and will never be
bested by any powder propelled projectile. Of course there will be
specialized uses for which it does not serve well (but it handles
somewhat) but the choices for those specialized uses are nowhere near
as generally useful as 5.56. You will notice the Russians
standardized on 5.45 and the Israelis on 5.56. Eventually all
research converges on the solution.

When we get directed energy weapons all bets are off.

[nord...@yahoo.com]

# These are "clean" sites that comment on the selection process for the

# new rifle

Anthony G Williams has done some excellent research and writing on the
topic as well

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/future%20small%20arms.htm

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/Assault.htm

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/The%20Next%20Generation.htm

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/256brit.htm

[nord...@yahoo.com]

# America's arms makers (mostly Remington) had tooling on hand to build

# the new British Rifle (the P-14 Enfield) which had been designed to be
# quick and cheap to manufacture. =A0Rechambered to 30-06, more American
# soldiers went off to fight in France with 1917 Enfields than with 1903
# Springfields.

# the Brits fought WWII with the aging 303
# round rather than adopting the 280 (with its slight, and largely
# imaginary, advantage) as the British Army was want just before the
# Nazi's invaded Poland.

The 280 British was an intermediate cartridge developed in the late
1940s for the EM2 bullpup assault rifle. The 276 Enfield was a magnum
sort of 7mm intended for the 1913 Enfield the adoption of which was
squelched prior to the First World War, not the Second. The 1913 then
became the 1914 in 303 and the 1917 in 30'06. As it turns out, the No.
4 was arguably the best bolt action battle rifle ever and the 303 Mk
VII cartridge was no slouch in comparison to other full power
cartridges of the day.

# Now, there is no doubt that America's M1 Garand equipped combat foot
# soldier in WWII had more firepower than his British, French, Japanese,
# German, or Russian equivalent.

It's interesting to remember that the M1 Garand was intended to be a
10 shot rifle chambered for the 276 Pedersen - an intermediate
cartridge with much the same performance offered by the modern 6.8 SPC
or 6.5 Grendel - precisely because the 1903 Springfield kicked so much
as to interfere with marksmanship instruction. Intermediate
cartridges were much on the minds of the world's militaries before,
during, and after the Second World War. The US M1 carbine was
technically a sidearm but it was used much like an assault rifle by
airborne troops. The German sturmgewehrs and the Russian SKS carbine
were wartime inventions chambered for assault rifle cartridges of
intermediate power.

Did we go too low when we adopted the 5.56x45, maybe. Perhaps if we
had adopted the Garand in 276 Pedersen we wouldn't have felt the need
for a lighter kicking rifle. Of course if we're going to play "What
If" had the Japanese had adopted the Federov Avtomat in the 1920s we
probably would have had to fight them house to house in San Francisco.

[Gunner Asch]

Good post and well reasoned.

Bravo Sir..Bravo indeed!

Gunner

[Wayne]

Additionally, the military has a huge supply chain, training, storage,
documentation, etc. It isn't as simple as the military buying x hundred
thousand rifles at $y per rifle.

[pyotr filipivich]

There is this problem of the conflict between what the Army Wants,
and what Congress will pay for.
The story goes that in the thirties the army decided then needed a
"subcaliber" rifle - .270/6mm or so. But there was one difficulty in
fielding such a rifle. The several gazillion rounds of 30-06
ammunition left over from the Great War, plus the "installed base" of
30-06 firing firearms. And with the Army at peace, War having been
banned by international treaty, and the ongoing economic crisis -
Congress was not going to spring for the Millions it would cost to
replace the ammo and weapons.
--
pyotr filipivich
Rifles, muskets, long-bows and hand-grenades are inherently democratic weapons.
A complex weapon makes the strong stronger, while a simple weapon -- so long as
there is no answer to it -- gives claws to the weak. ~~ George Orwell

[sta...@prolynx.com]

OK, I'l play. Seems like at least 15 years since the "replace the M16/
M4" mantra has been going. The short answer is that the candidates
haven't been THAT much better than the current rifle/carbine to pay
out 2-4x more. I refer to the current arms' performance as a
"Stoner". Are the new "super-rifles" 2-3 Stoners better? Don't think
so. They may be better in one way or another, but not overall.

A lot of the flak has been stirred up by the special forces crowd who
use M4s like SAWs, not their intended tactical role which was as a
submachinegun replacement for armored crews and noncombatants. You
dump a combat load non-stop at full auto through any non-watercooled
gun and it isn't going to do well afterwards.

As far as heavier calibers, this war has been fought and the 5.56
won. Go any heavier and the number of rounds in a combat load gets
reduced. What's been done is to give selected marksmen heavier
caliber rifles and this tactic seems to work.

It's been rather amusing to watch, although my wallet doesn't like all
the taxes being spent, but during ALL of the M16's service life it's
been a stopgap for something better and that's going on 50 years now.
First it was the SPIW, which didn't work after billions spent, then
there were any number of other ones including that 20-something pound
combined computerized grenade launcher and rifle. I've read that the
smart grenade launcher has been fielded, the rifle portion was
dropped. So far, "something better", enough better, hasn't been
found.

And as the other poster said, you aren't just replacing a rifle,
you're replacing a whole section of the logistical infrastructure.
Billions involved(that we don't have and have to borrow). So that's
spare parts, storage, ammo(if that changes), all sorts of
publications, training and tools for the ordnance repairmen, training
how to use it for the soldiers. It's not just handing in old rifles
and handing out the new ones and saying " go get 'em".

Stan

[Murff]

On Sat, 03 Dec 2011 18:53:15 +0000, Wayne wrote:

# Additionally, the military has a huge supply chain, training, storage,
# documentation, etc. It isn't as simple as the military buying x
# hundred thousand rifles at $y per rifle.

Indeed. We've been here before. TimR's position on the 5.56mm - that it
won't be bested short of ray guns - may well be true for the individual
weapon. As I've argued here before, considering the wider infantry
requirements (machine guns, mainly, but also snipers) the 5.56mm is less
attractive...

... but it does have the enormous benefit of incumbency. NATO, and
principally US, forces won't be in Afghanistan forever. They may not be
many places overseas at all for a while given current economic factors.
And the next time there is a need for an expeditionary force it may well
not be somewhere that shows up the weaknesses of the 5.56mm as an all-
round choice quite so much.

But the discussion on the "Defence Industry Daily" site wasn't about
changing from 5.56mm. It was about changing from the M4. That, too has
the benefit of incumbency - in this case that there are many service
people who know how to use and maintain one, there are spares around and
so on. Major change is expensive - it is expensive in financial terms,
yes. But it also carries a lot of overhead in terms of training and
logistics. And risk, since soldiers equipped with the new weapon must
understand it properly in the dark and rain.

It is clear that there exist alternatives to the M4 that are superior
military weapons, in particular in terms of their reliability. It is also
clear that, to take a "leap" between the M4 and some other weapon would
be more attractive if that change were to feature some very significant
leap in capability. Ray guns, or OICW if you like (and don't have to
carry it).

It is also reasonable to suggest that to make such a change during peace-
time is a good deal easier, and would reduce the costs and risks.

Where does that leave us ?

An army fully equipped and trained with one of the new-generation weapons
would be more effective than one equipped with the M4, on the data given
by the DID article, largely due to its greater reliability. It is not
clearly the case that between now and that army, there would not be a
sharp decline in effectiveness - translated means more dead good guys -
and *that* is the cause of the risk aversion.

Yes, it can be dressed as corruption, incompetence, flat-earthism and so
on. But it is not proven that taking a risk with a whole army is as much
of a no-brainer as suggested by those who advocate the G-36, HK416 and so
on.

Murff...

[clarkm...@gmail.com]

I listened to my father complain 50's through 80's about how he couldn't se=
ll his revolutionary new gun deigns to Rock Island Arsenal.
All he could get were contracts responding to requests for quotes from Detr=
oit Arsenal.=20

I have worked on many defense contracts over the last 35 years, but I was a=
lways a sub sub contractor looking for some little $1M in non recurring eng=
ineering.

I interviewed at a gun sight manufacturer ~ 8 years ago.
I was trying to act really straight, but the guys in the engineering confer=
ence room had looked up my name on the internet and my hot loads. The chief=
engineer was not a black powder guy, but was half way there. They never m=
ade an offer, but I did learn some things about their political contributio=
n to one of our anti gun US senators.

I know some of the B1-B contracts I got were just because of what state I w=
as in.

Talking to my father about military contracts, he had to buy the fire contr=
ol from Hughes, he had to buy the Diesel engine from Cummings, and the tran=
smission from Borg Warner. When he got the contract, it came with strings.

When I worked in the Boeing 767 design, we had to hire engineers on contrac=
t from Japan Radio, and buy the tail section from Kawasaki, so that we got =
the contract to sell to Japan Airlines.

What does it all mean?
These big contracts are not awarded based on technology or quality, but are=
political and quid pro quo deals.

What incentive does Rock Island Arsenal have to keep their ear to the groun=
d for something new? None. It is all politics at the top.

[Bill C]

Yep you got that right. Cousin is a no BS, mission first type who's
fairly senior in contracting at the Pentagon. The stories are scary.
It's ALL about Congress critters, patent control, lobbyists, friends,
State Dept handouts to "allies" for contracts and especially "Gee
Whiz" factors are key.
Quality, usefulness, flexibility, etc...are WAY down the criteria for
procurement of just about anything.
They can and do fake testing, hand out no bid etc... to stroke the
"right folks" despite what's actually best for the people having to
use this crap.
The fact that they want to cut 2/3 of the Army's combat brigades to
protect their MIC suppliers, and development contracts is a VERY clear
indication of priorities.
Bill C

[TheSnipe at anti-spamdotmindspringdotcom]

Is there surprise info here some where ? Only to the general
population I suppose - it's all SOP for Gov Contracting since forever
I think...

[John Buol]

On Friday, December 2, 2011 8:53:25 AM UTC-6, Soldier in a Combat Zone wrote:
# It just seems that the Army has issues with new weapons.

Here's my write up in three parts.

http://firearmusernetwork.com/2008/09/24/need-new-military-rifles/

http://firearmusernetwork.com/2009/02/11/need-new-military-rifles-2/

http://firearmusernetwork.com/2009/04/15/why-we-do-not-need-new-military-rifles-part-three/

[Murff]

On Thu, 26 Apr 2012 00:20:56 +0000, John Buol wrote:

# On Friday, December 2, 2011 8:53:25 AM UTC-6, Soldier in a Combat Zone
# wrote: # It just seems that the Army has issues with new weapons.
#
# Here's my write up in three parts.
#
# http://firearmusernetwork.com/2008/09/24/need-new-military-rifles/
#
# http://firearmusernetwork.com/2009/02/11/need-new-military-rifles-2/
#
# http://firearmusernetwork.com/2009/04/15/why-we-do-not-need-new-
military-rifles-part-three/

Sorry, but these focus on gripes about the M16 family in a "moan
about"/"defend" sort of way.

All firearms have their good and bad points. Not all of those are
apparent to any given commentator, whether that commentator is currently
on the sharp end of their use, or not.

We've discussed here, before, replacements for the 5.56NATO. It doesn't
come down to the M16 family. Maybe G36 is better, maybe it isn't. Maybe
it is not so much better as to make it worthwhile re-arming with another
5.56NATO rifle.

It is the utility of the ammunition in the whole infantry and logistic
environment in which it is now deployed, and its ability to help forces
on the ground do their job, that is the deciding factor in re-arming. Not
fouling characteristics or maintenance regimes for a particular weapon.

Murff...

[pyotr filipivich]

My CQB instructor did not like my rifle, as it was rather long
for doing the CQB Cha-Cha. But it was what I had.
Which is not to say that I don't want his bullpup variant which is
nice and compact.

|
|We've discussed here, before, replacements for the 5.56NATO. It doesn't

|It is the utility of the ammunition in the whole infantry and
|logistic environment in which it is now deployed, and its ability to
|help forces on the ground do their job, that is the deciding factor
|in re-arming. Not fouling characteristics or maintenance regimes for
|a particular weapon.

The story is told that the US Army came up with a "better idea"
between the wars, but was informed that Congress was not going to buy
any rifle not chambered for 30-06, seeing as how there was so much of
it left over from the Great War, (aka the War to End all Wars.)
--
pyotr filipivich

[Chris Morton]

In article <jnf1bi$ujm$1...@news.albasani.net>, pyotr filipivich says...

# The story is told that the US Army came up with a "better idea"
#between the wars, but was informed that Congress was not going to buy
#any rifle not chambered for 30-06, seeing as how there was so much of
#it left over from the Great War, (aka the War to End all Wars.)

And probably a good thing too, given the bind that the Japanese and the Italians
got themselves into with their incomplete transitions to 7.7mm and 7.35mm
respectively.

Being a Japanese ordnance officer must have been like being Lindsay Lohan's
chaperone... with a lot less predictability.

[Stanley Schaefer]

Nope, not Congress, Dougie MacArthur made that decision, being head of
the Army at the time. The target cartridge for the new rifle was to
be the .276 Pedersen, Garand had a nifty 10-shot rifle all developed
for that. MacArthur said there was too much ammo in .30-06 in the
bunkers as well as machine guns, tooling, etc., and said NO. So back
to the drawing board for a .30 caliber version and 8 shots. The .276
ballistics were coincidentally just about what the 6.8 SPC has. See
Hatcher's Book of the Garand. Probably was the right decision during
the early '30s, all the armed forces(except Hitler's) were making do
with little or nothing.

Other than the US adding the M1 Carbine cartridge and gun, I can't
think of any combatant that really successfully added a totally new
cartridge to replace an older one during WWII. The Italians were mid-
way through the rifle conversion, the Germans tried 7.92x57->7.92x33,
the Japanese had any number of rimless/semi-rimmed/rimmed cases, all
had one characteristic, they lost. From what I've read, the Japanese
tried to keep all one sort of cartridge tied to one infantry formation
to cut down resupply headaches. Some of the US formations had
problems too, Springfield clips being issued to Garand shooters,
Garand clips being issued to BAR guys. At least they all were the
same ammo and given enough time, the guys could come up with shootable
packages.

Stan

[Tom S.]

"Stanley Schaefer" <sta...@prolynx.com> wrote in message
news:jnv7fv$3f3$1...@news.albasani.net...
# Nope, not Congress, Dougie MacArthur made that decision, being head of
# the Army at the time. The target cartridge for the new rifle was to
# be the .276 Pedersen, Garand had a nifty 10-shot rifle all developed
# for that. MacArthur said there was too much ammo in .30-06 in the
# bunkers as well as machine guns, tooling, etc., and said NO. So back
# to the drawing board for a .30 caliber version and 8 shots. The .276
# ballistics were coincidentally just about what the 6.8 SPC has. See
# Hatcher's Book of the Garand. Probably was the right decision during
# the early '30s, all the armed forces(except Hitler's) were making do
# with little or nothing.
....

I've wondered why they have such a emphasis on accuracy, when most troops
were woefully UNSKILLED and under trained at marksmanship (the Marines being
an exception).

I'd figure I didn't fire 300 rounds from Basic through AIT, and I was Combat
Arms (95B).

[Giampingjack]

Il 04/05/2012 02:22, Stanley Schaefer ha scritto:
#
#
# . The Italians were mid- way through the rifle conversion,


We stopped in the mid 1940 the production of 7,35 rifles not much build.
but we were using also the so called 7,7mm , world know like.... 303
british! largely used in our Regia Aereonautica (air force) and others,
in machineguns Breda-SAFAT

[penultimate]

On Thursday, May 3, 2012 7:22:23 PM UTC-5, Stanley Schaefer wrote:
# Nope, not Congress, Dougie MacArthur made that decision, being head of
# the Army at the time. The target cartridge for the new rifle was to
# be the .276 Pedersen, Garand had a nifty 10-shot rifle all developed
# for that. MacArthur said there was too much ammo in .30-06 in the
# bunkers as well as machine guns, tooling, etc., and said NO. So back
# to the drawing board for a .30 caliber version and 8 shots. The .276
# ballistics were coincidentally just about what the 6.8 SPC has. See
# Hatcher's Book of the Garand. Probably was the right decision during
# the early '30s, all the armed forces(except Hitler's) were making do
# with little or nothing.

#=20

I think it is easy here to put the cart in front of the horse. =20

At the time and by those involved in Garand development, the Pedersen cartr=
idge was NOT viewed in any serious way as superior cartridge for infantry u=
se to the 30-06. It was more limited in range, a factor viewed as important=
to infantry riflemen in light of WW1 trench warfare experience. It had les=
s potential as an armor piecing round, a "new" consideration as tanks and a=
rmored vehicles emerged on the battlefield. And machine gunners and the ai=
r corps were terribly troubled at the idea that they might become armed wit=
h a less potent cartridge than their opponents.

The driving consideration was that the 276 Pedersen (as a smaller and less =
powerful cartridge than the 30-06) was an enabler for a semi-automatic rifl=
e design which met size, weight, and compactness goals. On one end, the BA=
R was viewed (correctly) as way to heavy and big for use by the average siz=
e infantryman. On the other, the Springfield was viewed by Army regulars a=
s "just right." Likewise, these same regulars had recently won the battle =
of NOT issuing the several million Enfield P.17's on hand(packing them off =
to armory storage) in favor of preserving use of their beloved Springfield =
(present in much smaller quantity). The only objective fact in favor of thi=
s decision (since the Enfield was more durable, at least as accurate, had b=
etter sights, and cost less to make) was that the Springfield was a bit mor=
e compact and lighter. The regulars didn't like toting an Enfield, leaving=
that task pretty much to the far more numerous "temporary soldiers" who di=
dn't know any better. =20

Anyway, my point is that the context made rifle weight, dimensions, and "fe=
el" a big deal in the design of a replacement semi-auto by Garand. Garand =
set out on his task with the idea that he could achieve these rifle weight/=
size goals with a smaller cartridge while he doubted success was possible w=
ith the bigger and more powerful 30-06. Garand also though the extra case =
taper of the Pedersen was necessary for reliable extraction. So he built h=
is first rifles on the 276 Pederson and found they worked very well indeed.=
But he also now knew how to build a reliable, reasonably light, reasonabl=
y compact, semi-auto infantry rifle. The key point was coming to understan=
d how to "design tune" the gas activated mechanism in terms of power and ti=
ming for effective extraction and cycling.

This is where MacArthur stepped in. Considering all of the shortcomings of=
the 276 Pedersen cartridge in comparison to the 30-06 (including available=
ammunition already on hand), MacArthur ASKED Garand if he could design ess=
entially the same rifle in 30-06 and if so, how long that would take and ho=
w much would it cost. Garand basically said that in light of what he now k=
new, "yes", "not long", and "not much, other than 2 rounds in the magazine =
and it will save a bundle by not having to build a new ammunition stock. B=
eing a much brighter than average General, MacArthur said "make it happen.=
" =20

The interesting and entirely hypothetical question is what might MacArthur =
have decided if Garand said a good semi auto infantry rifle was not possibl=
e in 30-06. But my point is that the design driving force was the rifle, n=
ot the cartridge. The 276 Pedersen was chosen as the development platform =
for the rifle because its properties were WRONGLY thought necessary to an e=
ffective rifle design. =20