Refocus: Hist. Accuracy in Nap gaming
Matt DLM
The argument has been going around between Bob Jones and others, myself
included, concerning the nature of a term like “historical accuracy” and its
application to Napoleonic wargaming.
I believe that the debate initially boils down to three fairly simple
questions:
1) Pragmatically speaking, can one rules set, in part or in whole, be widely
agreed upon to be more historically accurate than another?
2) Can a set of various criteria be developed (hopefully here) that would
assist the critical gaming community in evaluating and/or discussing a rule
set’s claims to being historically accurate (in an item by item assessment and
perhaps in a general assessment as well) ?
3) Would such discourse be interesting and potentially useful?
Basically, my answer to all the questions is a qualified yes. (naturally, I
would share those qualifications in time).
Matt DeLaMater
Malcolm McCallum
is no point in discussing the earlier ones until the latter are answered.
My response to the last would be to ask firstly:
If hypothetically a Napoleonic rules set could be deemed more realistic than
another in whole or in part, does that in any way guarantee that it is a
better game?
There is an implication in the question that one is searching for some
criteria to determine the better rules set by finding some way to quantify
the realism. I believe that a more realistic game could still be a very bad
and even unplayable game.
Also, one should ask the question: Is the 'realism' that is modelled (or
otherwise represented) historically accurate realism or flavour realism?
Flavour realism would be the kind of realism that feels right and lets the
commander feel like he is wearing Wellington's muddy boots. Historically
accurate realism would be the kind of realism that may very well make the
whole affair seem pedestrian and unromantic but might accurately model the
real world mechanics of fighting a Napoleonic battle.
Example. I want my boys to be able to get in there and mix it up with cold
steel in the open. If de Segur tells me that he never once witnessed a
bayonet melee that was not in a fortification or town, I have to decide if I
want my game system to not make it possible to melee in the open. The latter
may be more accurate but the former is more evocative.
The realism that is portrayed in heroic paintings (however historically
inaccurate) is indeed a realism on an equal level so far as simulations are
concerned. Both realities are valid in a gaming system but may very well be
incompatible in the matter of designing a playable game.
Matt DLM <mat...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20000206174017...@ng-fs1.aol.com...
Quid Veritas
I think the functional word here is "game".
Piquet is a true game that goes so-so on the "realism" -- if that.
The Empire genera were an attempt at the more "realistic" end of things
and got to be not much of a game as time went on.
I hate to say it but the most important thing about any set of rules is
"what does your local group like to play" -- that is paramount. Since
different folks have different tastes (that often change from month to
month). It ain't realism that is important. It's having a good time.
I will say this however, -- if you want a "realistic" game, you need to
have some type of mechanism that is unpredictable. Now this might be
just a die roll for some folks, and it might be a deck of cards for
others.
I know first hand, in the era of modern warfare, with all our whizzy gig
communications systems, troops still get lost; still just sit there and
don't do anything for inexplicable periods of time; still find gaps in
the enemy lines (sometimes without intentionally doing so); and still go
to ground when fired upon and won't get up. The commander who assumes
everyone is on task and moving ahead is a fool. You do the best you can
with what you have to work with -- sometimes you can really rock and
roll -- sometimes things fall apart before you make contact with the
enemy. Of course better troops with better training will often have a
better chance of completing a mission in many circumstances.
Personally, I have been trying to hit that magical "realistic" set of
rules Since the early 70's. All I can tell you is the longer I am in
the hobby, the more I change my mind about what "realistic" really
was/is -- and therefore, so change my rules.
By the way, the local group wants #1 fast; #2 simple; and #3 rules that
allow every one to be involved in the game as much as possible.
"Realistic" isn't even a priority for most of them.
mjc
Insane Ranter
Troll Evaluation
Practical Execution: 9 / 10
Content: 8 / 10
Amusement Value: 8 / 10
Offensive Value: 3 / 10
Credibility: 3 / 10
Total: 31/50. 62%.
Dallas Gavan
I think it would be an interesting discussion but I don't know if there
would be any agreement. Gaming, like food, caters to different tastes
and appetites. What makes one person turn up their nose will make
another salivate. And that's where the strength of the hobby lays, I
think. With so many different rules and approaches there's a lot of
discussion, argument and interaction. If a particular set did gain the
sort of supremacy that WRG gained with ancients at one stage, then we
may see some of the drawbacks of that occasion- lack of development of
other ideas, derision of dissenting opinion as "wrong" (which,
appearances here to the contrary, isn't that common) and rules that
seem to sprout edition after edition with minimal changes.
Of course the rules have to follow history in some ways. A set that
made artillery crews the prime weapon of choice for storming
fortifications would be a tad sus. Rules that made cavalry vulnerable
to close-combat by skirmishers in all circumstances would be
questionable as well. In most games these things are usually treated
with similar viewpoints. It's the minor points of history and the game
mechanics where most variations occur. Even the hardware vs human
approaches really don't vary all that much except in the mechanics of
each game.
Just my Oz$67.03 (about US$0.02).
Dal.
--
http://www.historyserver.org/spanners.toolbox/index.shtml
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
COL Bill Gray
I tend to agree with Dallas. Any discussion will likely prove to be both
interesting and enlightening, but I doubt whether a definitive agreement can
ever be reached. Some points that you might want to consider:
- Detail. The more detail a game has could on the surface be thought to
make a game more realistic as it directly portrays a greater proportion of
the variables present in battle. However, does the wealth of detail itself
become a distractor from more important historical aspects of the game by
making it too difficult and time consuming to play?
- Interpretation. While there may be some historical aspects of the
Napoleonic Wars that are universally agreed upon that their exclusion
results in a less realistic game (eg, we know now that the French to a very
great extent formed their Massed Batteries from 6 and 8 lb foot batteries
stripped from the Infantry Divisions - can't do this in Nappy's Battles as
the batteries are not portrayed, their firepower being factored into the
Infantry Brigades), there are some others that are still being extensively
debated (eg, Nappy's Battles again with its brigade size units limits Corps
Commander/Player involvement with battalions, indicating that such activity
is Colonels and Brigadiers' business; I totally agree and believe this is
one of the more realistic aspects of the game, but as I recall you had a
distinctly opposite point of view). Looking at interpretation and the
previous point, there well may be disagreement as to what game function can
be "factored in" and what must be directly portrayed and still leave the
game "realistic."
- Definition of Realism (THE BIG ISSUE IMHO). When I got into a similar
discussion on another Newsgroup as regards cardboard games, we finally
determined that, IN GENERAL, miniature rules tend towards the "Design to
Model" (DTM) concept while cardboard folks tended towards the "Design for
Effect" (DFE) School. In the former the idea is that if the Austrian Army at
Austerlitz in 1805 was known to be very unresponsive and cumbersome C2 wise,
the manner in which it was cumbersome as well as the game mechanics
reproducing this effect should be accurately portrayed (eg, orders with %
chance for activation upon receipt representing the difficulty and extended
time it took to move orders up and down the Chain of Command, etc). In the
latter the idea is that the Austrian Army should should be cumbersome to
handle within the context of the game, but the type of unresponsiveness
protrayed or the game mechanics causing same need not be realistic at all
(eg, short command radius and if outside, everyone moves at half speed,
cannot engage enemy, etc). The board game folks were perfectly happy with
this definition of realism and thought the DTM school no more than
irrelevant minutia. Obviously, there is room for a hybred of both schools,
but looking at point above please note that many of the criticisms directed
at Napoleon's Battles don't hold water if you subscribe to the DFE school of
design.
Just my two cents ($ OZ 67.03:).
Warmest regards to all,
Bill Gray
Dallas Gavan wrote in message <87lvor$5k1$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
>G'day, Matt.
//SNIP//
Rich R
experience, reading, and biases...
One experience should suffice:
A friend of mine determined that two Graf Spee AC should take on the HMS
Rodney and defeat her. I gave him three and won each time - four times
in all. He determined that the game system was therefore incorrect!
Since I wrote the game system, I was taken aback. Now who was correct?
Much of the "historically accurate" issue is of the same Genre - Very
difficult to define.
Good luck with this attempt
Rich R.
Tom & Kris Lytle
Matt,
I tend to agree with Lamont, any attempt to quantify what constitutes a
"better" or "best" set of rules will be defined by the level of abstraction
one is willing to accept. Napoleon's Battles has shown that a large number
of gamers are willing to accept a fairly high, IMHO, degree of tactical
abstraction in exchange for ease and speed of play. Yet, there is still a
community of gamers, myself included, who enjoy the feeling of leading the
cheering grenadiers into the smoke and carnage. (Bad paraphrase, sorry)
Consequently, what I consider the best set of rules may be anethema to
another group who enjoy a different feel. In the end, I believe that if God
himself came down and told us that those light cavalry have no chance of
breaking a British battalion in square, someone would go to their grave
thinking he was full of it and insist on the chance to try. We are a fickle
lot, so play what you like and feel comfortable with.
Thanks,
Tom
<mur...@my-deja.com> wrote in message news:87noqo$fv1$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> Matt-
>
> i think your first question will always depend upon what each gamer
> wishes to experience by gaming napoleonics as an historical medium ( as
> opposed to ACW or ancients or WWII for example)- and i will assume for
> argument sake that most of us who game nappies do so for its unique
> historical flavor-
>
> It would seem that the true uniqueness of nappy gaming lies in between
> grand strategy (consider operational games like the Napoleon at Bay
> series of the cardboard genre, or even empires in arms at the grand
> extreme) and small unit fire and melee- At the upper level, there is
> nothing in execution to distinguish napoleonic strategic movement from
> WWI strategic movement, and thus, no "flavor"- at the smallest end of
> the scale, it might be hard to see mechanistic differences between
> nappies and ancients or shootout at the OK corral- for me at least, the
> colorful uniforms, although immensely rewarding to the gaming
> experience, are not of themselves sufficient-
>
> So- in between you have anything from corps (even army) down to
> battalion; regardless of whether you are commanding at corps/division
> level or brigade/battalion, for me the crux of napoleonic gaming
> resides in two elements:
>
> (1)unit formations and evolutions and their varied
> effectiveness in the combined arms context-
>
> (2) variation in unit quality and ability both within a
> nationality and between nationalites, especially as such variation may
> pertain to the extant military doctrine of a nationality-
>
>
> give me some rules that make me "feel" like those elements are
> elegantly addressed (and eminently playable!!!) and i can be quite
> happy- all that one would wish for after that is to have the
> opportunity to "watch" ones troops attempt to meet their objectives
> with the resources at hand-
>
> with regard to fog of war, i am quite content to let dice manage that
> (i find that the 10 vs 1 die rolls in napoloeon's battles provide
> enough uncertainty in unit behavior to require constant reappraisal of
> unit orders)
>
> and frankly, having only played historical miniatures for only 1 year
> now, and that only with NB, in reading Bowden's austerlitz book and
> another one titled "Tactics and the experience of battle in the age of
> napoleon" (forgive me, author, i cannot recall your name), i am amazed
> by how much of the history rings true in my experience on the game
> table in NB ONCE i have accepted the illusions this particular system
> demands for playability-(really, i don't think i want to bother with
> breaking out and moving skirmishers)
>
> SO... with respect to criteria for judging historiocity (a word?), in
> my opinion effectively simulating the 2 elements i described above are
> a starting point-
>
>
> lamont anderson
Mike Hillsgrove
Realistic at what level of command? Army level?, Brigade level? Corp level?
What factors are you modelling? Command and Control systems? Campaign effects?
Weaponry and casualtys? [You can't say everything, the game would be an absolute
nightmare to get through!]
I have a picture of George Washington on my wall. Does this count as a realistic
simulation of knowing the man personally? Short of getting 100,000 of my closest
friends to form up and attack 80,000 of your closest friends "realistic" is
basically a myth. At best, we can play with the mathematical possibilites, but
that is really all.
> 1) Pragmatically speaking, can one rules set, in part or in whole, be widely
> agreed upon to be more historically accurate than another?
Not really, until you narrow the question into command levels and areas of
military operations. That would defeat your purpose in crowning one candidate as
"King of the Napoleonic Wargames"
> 2) Can a set of various criteria be developed (hopefully here) that would
> assist the critical gaming community in evaluating and/or discussing a rule
> set’s claims to being historically accurate (in an item by item assessment and
> perhaps in a general assessment as well) ?
Within Command levels, yes.
> 3) Would such discourse be interesting and potentially useful?
Probably not. It is after all just a game. It can also be thought of as a living
experiment in history, like a choose your own end book. Gamers will pick their
set of rules the way we have always done so
1) Ease of Play
2) Whatever your friends play
3) Whatever supports your favorite misconceptions.
Andy O'Neill
<quidv...@netscape.net> writes
>I hate to say it but the most important thing about any set of rules is
>"what does your local group like to play" -- that is paramount. Since
>different folks have different tastes (that often change from month to
>month). It ain't realism that is important. It's having a good time.
Definitely.
If ruleset A is more realistic than B it matters little if A is as dull
as ditch-water to play.
You can set certain broad parameters which cannot be reasonably argued
over...
Cavalry should either be incapable of breaking square or it should be at
least virtually impossible.
I recently read an article in Military Illustrated on muskets.
Muskets had very short effective range, becoming ineffective over
somewhere around 200 yards or so.
Muskets versus open formed skirmishers are almost ineffective beyond
about 80 to 100 yards.
Once you've fired a couple of rounds you're looking at a cloud of smoke.
Beyond such provable facts you're on into the realms of hearsay and
conjecture.
One view is as worthwhile as another.
Andy O'Neill
www.l-25.demon.co.uk/index.htm
Liverpool Wargames Association
www.l-25.demon.co.uk/LWA.htm
mur...@my-deja.com
Jay
>Unfortunately this is a highly subjective estimate - based upon ones
>experience, reading, and biases...
>
>One experience should suffice:
>
>A friend of mine determined that two Graf Spee AC should take on the HMS
>Rodney and defeat her. I gave him three and won each time - four times
>in all. He determined that the game system was therefore incorrect!
>
>Since I wrote the game system, I was taken aback. Now who was correct?
You were. It's a pretty extreme example. Do you know his reasoning
behind the idea? It's easy enough in any such subjective argument to
say "I believe this," but the nature of debate is to explain _why_.
That being said, minds are rarely changed in such a discussion, at
least on the internet. However such a debate could be interesting so
long as flames a subtle jabs at personalities are avoided.
What're the odds of that happening?
Jay
"The essence of war is destruction. Moderation in war is
imbecility."
Lord Fisher, attributed.
Remove the wildcard from the "reply-to" address
if replying by e-mail.
MGluteus
>By the way, the local group wants #1 fast; #2 simple; and #3 rules that
>allow every one to be involved in the game as much as possible.
>"Realistic" isn't even a priority for most of them.
That is exactly the case with my group (incontinuous existance for 32 years!)
Also they have a very eclectic interest in periods and ALL play everything from
Ancients to WW11 land and naval and want the same for all periods.
Mgluteus(Dick Bryant - The Courier)
Jeff McCulloch
collector of rules sets, all accumulated while trying to find the perfect
set.
Maybe we should be asking questions like "If Wellington were to design a
set of Napoleonic rules, what would they look like?".
Kriegsspiel was written in 1824 to simulate Napoleonic warfare. Seeing how
most military esablishments still used those tactics, I'd say it is fairly
"accurate" for the period. There is even a comment about it being "more
accurate" than it's predecessor rules set. Yet, most people won't play it
nowadays. Why not?
There's the story of the Japanese playing out Midway and finding it a
losing proposition? Did they ignore it because it was too accurate? Or did
they feel it was totally off? If we were able to get the rules that were
used and try them ourselves, would we be able to say they were accurate?
What would we be able to base our reasoning on that the Japanese command
didn't have?
Even today, for modern warfare, most of the technical details are available
and battle accounts abound. Modern tabletop games rank fairly low in
popularity. Mostly because we tell ourselves that it doesn't make a good
game because "if you can see it you can kill it"? Would a person two
hundred years from now be able to more accurately model today's combat?
Maybe games like Little Wars and Charge! really are better games and models
to boot.
And, by the way, there is the perfect simulation/game out there. It just
takes several thousands of us to play it.
From a tired gamer with the flu...
Jeff
Rich R
mjma...@joker.home.com (Jay) wrote:
> Rich R <raz...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>
> >Unfortunately this is a highly subjective estimate - based upon ones
> >experience, reading, and biases...
> >
> >One experience should suffice:
> >
> >A friend of mine determined that two Graf Spee AC should take on the
HMS
> >Rodney and defeat her. I gave him three and won each time - four
times
> >in all. He determined that the game system was therefore incorrect!
> >
> >Since I wrote the game system, I was taken aback. Now who was
correct?
>
> You were. It's a pretty extreme example. Do you know his reasoning
> behind the idea? It's easy enough in any such subjective argument to
> say "I believe this," but the nature of debate is to explain _why_.
The friend said that the other game systems the Graf Spee wins.
Therefore, since my game systems resulted in the opposite it must be
incorrect. There was no way to explain the physics of the result - nor
the fact of my 15 years doing simuations for the US Navy helped.
Similar things happen in wargaming - each person has his/her set of
knowledge and it's basis. Rarely is it going to be changed - evidence
of this is very easy to find on this newsgroup.
I've even had a friend (High School grad) that tried to show me that
the world was flat - you can see that.... No attempts to show him
otherwise changed his opinion. Sad, but true.
> That being said, minds are rarely changed in such a discussion, at
> least on the internet. However such a debate could be interesting so
> long as flames a subtle jabs at personalities are avoided.
>
> What're the odds of that happening?
Probably none - but we can hope........
Let's see how long it can go......
Rich R.
Matt DLM
"better" or "best" set of rules will be defined by the level of abstraction
one is willing to accept.>>
I agree that the perspective of the game has to be considered of high
importance - most Napoleonic miniature games are grand-tactical (1:50-1:120
figure ratio).
So, what about the "level of abstraction"? It would seem that abstraction in a
system should be appropriate to the designer's goals. Napoleon's Battles gets
criticized for abstracting out too much - such things as medium artillery and
skirmishing can't be said to be accurately delineated in the system. Empire
gets criticized because of "excessive" tactical detail such as moving
individual skirmish companies.
But the more important question is: does the level of abstraction relate to the
game's historical accuracy?
Can a game be too abstract to get high marks in historical accuracy?
Is amassing accurate details necessarily the same thing as producing historical
accuracy?
What I see here is that a fair thing to judge a game on is its abstraction
level. Does the amount of abstraction meet the needs of the game's perspective?
What historical factors are missing? Are these missing factors decisive at the
level of the game's perspective?
Conversely, does a morass of detail produce non-historical results? (probably
because of excessive control and micro-managing) Are players making decisions
well beyond the scope of the design? Have minor details skewed the game and
become overly decisive factors?
Matt DeLaMater
Matt DLM
resides in two elements:
(1)unit formations and evolutions and their varied
effectiveness in the combined arms context-
(2) variation in unit quality and ability both within a
nationality and between nationalites, especially as such variation may
pertain to the extant military doctrine of a nationality-
>>
I realize lamont, that you are new to Napoleonic gaming.
But many people, including some of Napoleon's Battle biggest fans, recognize
that the two factors you consider most important are two areas that Napoleon's
Battles comes up for a lot of criticism, particularly in its representation of
formations and combined arms.
What I find very interesting is that given the two books you read, which have
abundant tactical detail and focus, you decided that a high level, abstract
grand-tactical game "rings true".
What about Napoleon's Battles rings true for you? What illusions do you find
easiest and hardest to accept? That is sort of what I hope this thread is
about. Not to attack a set of rules, but to break it down and see where it
jives best with your sources and impressions.
Matt DeLaMater
Gen...@earthlink.net
if you look at a wargame like a map.
a scaled down representation of events rather than geography then maybe
this is a better way of discribeing the "realisim" of the game
if you are trying to get from one point to another in a car then you
purchase a roadmap that has a great deal of detail concerning the
matters important to travel.
while if hikeing then a map showing the elivations, water barriers, and
other natural barriers to movement
so on and so forth.
Games present a certian section of the tactical or stratigic situation
while abstracting the issues that effect the game but are not the focus
of its play.
when useing a road map you really don't need to know why the road curves
to your left due to a mountian only that the road does curve to the
left. the road map doesn't show the mountain only the "result" of the
mountian the curve in the road.
main trouble with some games, and some maps is that they try to include
to much detail resulting in an overcomplicated and difficult to
understand game/map. the players/LT get confused and lost in trying to
read it and end up frustrated and gives up.
Steve Burt
>You can set certain broad parameters which cannot be reasonably argued
>over...
>
>Cavalry should either be incapable of breaking square or it should be at
>least virtually impossible.
There was an article (I think in Age of Napoleon magazine) recently by Carl Reavley which listed several dozen incidents where cavalry broke formed squares throughout the Napoleonic wars.
Here's an excerpt from near the end:
Also of interest are the nations whose squares broke. These are as follows:
Austrian 6
British 0
French 11
Prussian 5
Russian 6
Spanish 2
So I'd say any rules which say cavalry can never break squares (or even make it almost impossible) are wrong. Yes, it should be rare, but clearly it happened.
'Unbreakable squares' may be another one of those bits of "wargaming wisdom" which we all pick up over the years (like the +1 for Lancers charging) which are not actually based on history at all.
--
Steve Burt
The moral is to the physical as three is to one
Napoleon
Lori Brom
... .It is after all just a game. It can also be thought of as a living
> experiment in history, like a choose your own end book. Gamers will pick their> set of rules the way we have always done.....>
> 1) Ease of Play
> 2) Whatever your friends play
> 3) Whatever supports your favorite misconceptions.
Well said, Mike. After 48 years of historical miniature gaming and
associating with hundreds of gamers, I believe you have summed up
mainstream gamings approach to recreational gaming. The dissenters, of
course, will be the "scholars", the "purists" and the "professionals" of
our hobby.
Bravo, Good Gaming to all. Larry Brom.....
--
And That's The Way It Was...
Builders of Historical Dioramas
213 Third Street NE
Hickory, NC 28601
Phone: 828.324.0751
Andy O'Neill
writes
>
>if you look at a wargame like a map.
>
>a scaled down representation of events rather than geography then maybe
>this is a better way of discribeing the "realisim" of the game
FWIW
As I posted some time back....
Wargames are a system of sorts.
I work in the computer industry and I trained to design systems.
I have worked on quite a number which have been put in by other people,
quite often attempting to sort out fundamental flaws which were in the
original design.
I've designed and implemented a number of successful systems.
If the people trained me in systems analysis and design were shown most
of the systems which I've been asked to fix I think they'd have a field
day spotting all the "classic" mistakes.
Some of these don't really map to wargaming, but some of the fundamental
ones do.
Most designers ( in both wargaming and my profession ) do not use top
down design techniques.
(For description see previous posts via deja ).
Sticking to wargaming...
As a result of lack of design discipline/ability/training/whatever
designers get bogged down in the morass of the details of what they're
attempting to model.
In turn the relative significance of factors is mixed up, a mish mash of
mechanics is used, some relatively unimportant things are modelled
whilst some more important are overlooked.
rjo...@rmi.net
1. Squares can never be broken.
2. Emergency Squares really existed and were used by infantry when 'surprised'
by cavalry-which happened a lot.
3. Cavalry was REALLY effective as a battlefield arm of decision.
4. Cavalry was a major arm on EVERY battlefield and FREQUENTLY used to charge
the enemy.
5. Long Range fire was always ineffective and seldom used.
6. Short Range fire was always devastating and the primary range of engagement.
7. Artillery was constantly firing during battle.
8. Artillery moved a lot on the battlefield(i.e.,Senarmont was typical).
9. Bayonet charges usually closed with the enemy and led to bloody hand-to-hand
resolutions.
10. Small unit drill differences, and small unit(battalion and below) structure
were REALLY important.
11. The relatively minor technological differences between most nationalties'
weaponry-muskets, artillery, and ammunition- were REALLY important.
12.Skirmishers were extensively used thoughout the Napoleonic wars and were
REALLY important.
13. National Differences involving 'character', rather than simple quality
differences in units and leadership(including 'accepted' practice), were REALLY
important.
14. That optimum musters, or even dated campaign O.B.s and musters, were REALLY
accurate representations of the number of men present on the day of battle. A
corollary is that losses reported and unit status after battle is REALLY well
known and agreed to.
15. That the next Napoleonic history book, or latest translation from some rare
Prussian, Russian, or Austrian source, will change EVERYTHING and be REALLY
important! A corollary is the the latest set of rules is the answer to all
problems and REALLY supports all my REALLY important opinions-especially the
ones listed above!
Here are the real 'abstractions' of Napoleonic Wargaming! As Pogo said, "We have
met the enemy, and it is us!"
BJ
PS-Opinion #15 has spawned the largest single industry in badly written books on
a single subject in book publications, exceeded only by diet plans and
self-improvement titles.
mur...@my-deja.com
First let me qualify my interests- i have long been a reader of
military history, primarily as a derivative of my cardboard gaming in
the heyday of SPI; i especially liked Nappy games and history, played
Wellington's Victory among others, and heartily scoffed at anyone who
would take away from gaming time to paint and mount a big army that
could only be used for one type of experience- later in life, i was
forced to resort to the only game in town for a fix, it was NB with
lead, i was hooked, especially by combination of painting and pushing
my own units in a nappy context- since then my reading of nappy history
is colored by the references i can make to table top examples and how i
think while trying push the other guy off the table with my troops-
now to address NB rules that ring true or not- i will admit that my
first experiences were disconcerting (what? you mean my guys in line do
not get to fire better than my guys in column? that is preposterous!)-
but after i began to understand the level of abstraction, things made
much more sense- AND i would argue that people who reject NB as an
oversimplification and ahistorical have not delved deep enough into the
rich matrix of unit interactions- let me support my point with some
examples:
LINE vs COLUMN: the subtle factor here is that "fire" combat really
mostly represents the action of skirmishers and battalion artillery and
thus does not change with unit "formation" in NB- as stated in the
rules, formation simply means that "most" of the battalions of that
brigade are arrayed in line or column- of course movement is affected
by formaion differences; "close combat" is representative of BOTH melee
and 100 yds or less fire- here is where line formation shows
superiority to column due to the formation modifier on the die roll- in
reading the "tactics and experience of battle" book (TEB), i learned
that clashes of steel were rare, and one unit usually broke from fire
or fear while the other advanced- so fire and "melee" with line vs
column are quite reasonably portrayed by this abstraction, which is
pretty much required if one is manipulating brigades
CAV vs SQUARE- pretty accurately modelled i believe- not impossible to
break on some units, but always very hard, and greatly facilitated if
disorder has been incurred by the infantry- the usual cav bounce back
(unformed) with one casualty in any unsuccessful (non-routing) attack
is a wonderful image of horsemen filtering back there rally point at
the behest of their trumpeter and leaders- and then waiting one turn as
they form up for another charge- i can see it all on the table and on
the battlefield in my mind
CAV REACT and RECALL- the ability to respond to your opponents move in
the middle of his turn is elegant and functional- besides keeping one
always glued to the table (interactive throughout both sides turns), it
wonderfully models the pre-emptive nature of the cavalry charge intent
on disrupting an enemy assault in open ground- including cav charge and
counter charge- such actions are repeatedly found in historical
accounts- the follow up of a successful charge with a recall roll is
also comfortable, with the caveat that the lucky general who makes four
recall rolls in a row (hard to do) can drastically alter the outcome of
a battle, but think of Murat at the front of 10,000 cav (was that at
eylau?)
ROUT and RALLY- if you close, you win or lose that contest- always, one
unit breaks (or bounces maybe if cav), the other stays or advances-
exactly as it happened of course- and each rout makes a unit more
brittle as it loses troops, while rally by a leader will allow the unit
to get back up and try to hold again, until so many loses have
occurred, the unit is no longer capable of presenting as a functional
force- so simply integrated in this system-
ARTILLERY- OK, so i don't get to fire battalion guns- and French massed
batteries using such are not in the game- well, one could use house
rule of course- make extra batteries while at the same time applying a
minus 1 to fire of infantry brigades to show loss of battalion guns-
completely uneccessary from my perspective at this level of abstraction-
Modelling of real nappy tactics:
STRONG POINT DEFENSE- as elaborated upon by bowden, the elan and
training of 1805 french troops facilitated a common tactic of placing
grenadiers or other elites in a fortified position, out front, as a
breakwater for the enemy assault- cav and inf behind this position
counterattack enemy units that are often disrupted at some level by
their attack on the elites- beating off the assault, the support troops
return to their 1st position to await the next wave of attack while the
grenadiers hold firm- a real tactic, used quite successfully and very
accurately by more sophisticated members of our gaming club
ADVANCE THE GUN LINE- unlimber your guns, supported by infantry, cav on
the flanks, always on react, plod forward daring your opponent to
assualt your cannon front- disoderfront line troops with cannon fire
and then over the top with an infantry assault protected from cav
intervention by your cav on both flanks- not atypical for a nappy
frontal assault on an enemy line-
COMBINED ARMS- do i force his infantry to square with my cav during my
react phase, bouncing my cav but giving shots on his square, and then
close my infantry column on his square for very favorable modifiers in
melee, OR do i pin his infantry with my infantry, preventing square,
then throw in my cav for the killer modifier, holding some cav on react
to peel off any of his reacting cav that try to squelch my cav attack?
Hmmm... can't say that "pinnin" was a term used by nappy commanders-
more likely, it was the effect of enemy formed formations so close by
would likely keep a unit from making square in face of a cav charge;
BUT i do believe the interplay of the 3 arms is well executed in NB and
makes for very interesting decision making on the gametable. and you
cannot do nappy gaming without serious exposure to this facet of the
period.
Simplicity and Complexity and History
I do like how everything in NB comes down to a competitive die roll-
simplicity in execution and application of combat results- but before
that die roll, all of the modifiers for terrain, national military
doctrine, and unit quality are incorporated-
Complexity in the game resides in the unit tables, where we find
numerical evaluations of all unit capabilites relative to each other-
this is where variability in nationalities is stored and it is rich in
history- take the 1812 Berg vs 1812 French as an example- those Berg
infantry weren't as good as Hesse or French line in a fight, but they
trained under the french model prior to joining the confederation of
the rhine, marching 12 miles a day in training, and look at them scoot
across the table (12" move compared to 10" for french line [ french
lights also move 12"])- look at the Berg Lt Cav in 1812- they are just
like French Lt Cav in every quality, but they had better unit
discipline (think of King's German Legion cav or even Saxon heavies-
something about teutonic horseman) and lo and behold, their formation
change cost is 5", not 6" like the French LC; only 1" i know, but
miniatures is often a game of millimeters, eh? Russian Cossacks? these
guys trot many miles in a day, move through woods like a hot knife
through butter (for horsey guys), would pillage and loot (if allowed in
the game rules), chase down routers quite effectively, but severely
balk at facing a formed unit- all in the table; i believe there are
only four nationalities that get a +2 on arty fire- French and Brits
and 1815 Prussians and who else? why, the Wurtemburgers, whose gun
crews were french trained! there is scads of history in those well
crafted tables and numbers, you just have to read the books to see it-
well, OK, my prettily painted lancers are nothing more than Light Cav
(well, the Berg were lancers and they are special)-but given unit
sizes, a cav "brigade" would usually contain hussars and chasseurs as
well- i guess you could do a house rule that let lancer+ units have a
modifier when faced by prone infantry..........
in conclusion, i think that detractors of NB for history evasion just
have not looked deep enough into the game structure or perhaps could
read up a bit more-
detraction for oversimplification is absurd- chess is a game of simple
rules- and managing a successful combined arms attack in the face of a
stout opponent is anything but simple-
my last qualifier: i have yet to play any other nappy system in detail-
i may get that chance at cold wars, but than i am so satisfied right
now with NB, who knows....
lamont anderson
COL Bill Gray
is coming from on 14 of the 15 items below. The only one that raised my
eyebrows was No 12 on skirmishers.
Now, I am at work and don't have access to all my references, but my
impression was that skirmishers were used extensively throughout the period
by France, and by most other countries as well - with varing degrees of
success - after about 1808 when the majority of Napoleon's victims began to
understand how beneficial such support could be.
In terms of effectiveness, my impression was that skirmishers were
universally a pain in the ass with a high potential of being selectivly
decisive as used by the French, again until 1808 (and generally never
against the British or KGL) when most of the Allied Powers begain to adopt
similar measures, effectively negating the French advantage. At this point
of course, skirmish warfare became a non-event on the battlegfield because
everybody did it.
Admittedly, some of this impression comes from secondary sources (eg,
Maude's Jena Campaign, Paret's Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform and
Lynn's Bayonets of the Republic), but I do have a couple of primary sources
that seem to bear this out. One is the regimental history of a Saxon
formation at Jena and the other is a marvelous work published decades ago by
Mittler & Sons from Germany. The latter work is basically a compilation of
testimony given to the Prussian Military Tribunals in 1807-08 charged with
determining what went wrong and how to fix it. One work, if I remember
correctly, was provided by Hohenlohe's Chief of Staff (I'll get the name
tonight), a gentleman who suddenly found himself on the front lines trying
to assist in shoring up what was becoming a rapidly deteriorating situation.
He described, first hand, a French skirmisher attack and specifically noted
not only how the enemy was targeting the officers, but also the amount of
Hell this was inflicting on the target battalions as regards C2 and
cohesion. For some reason his description of the skirmish swarm as (quote)
"eternal" seems to stick in my mind. His writing made it seem like a the
skirmishers were methodically wrecking his battle line to pieces while
trying to reply was like attempting to swat a fly with a Baby Grand.
I dunno. Maybe Herr Oberst was only trying to save his own professional skin
or maybe the experience was truly unique to the Prussians of 1806 (Dr
Richard Gabriel of the US Army War College did note (quote), "In 1806 all of
Europe wondered of the Prussian Army was still the Army of Frederick the
Great - it was and that was the entire problem.") or maybe its just a matter
of interpretation.
Anyway, my two cents ($ Oz 67), which with a buck additional will get you a
damn good cup of coffee down here in Crystal City, VA:).
Regards to all,
Bill Gray
rjo...@rmi.net wrote in message <87pfp3$11...@edrn.newsguy.com>...
>
>
>1. Squares can never be broken.
//SNIP//
John Haines
Andy O'Neill <An...@l-25.dont-spam-me.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> In article <389E70E9...@netscape.net>, Quid Veritas
> <quidv...@netscape.net> writes
> >I hate to say it but the most important thing about any set of rules
> >is "what does your local group like to play" -- that is paramount.
> >Since different folks have different tastes (that often change from
> >month to month). It ain't realism that is important. It's having a
> >good time.
> Definitely.
> If ruleset A is more realistic than B it matters little if A is as
> dull as ditch-water to play.
> You can set certain broad parameters which cannot be reasonably
> argued over...
> Cavalry should either be incapable of breaking square or it should be
> at least virtually impossible.
I know why cavalry broke the square at Garcia Hernandez but if, on the
table, a square is broken because the cavalry threw 6 and the infantry
threw 1, I don't really know WHY the square broke.
I don't think any rules could give me what makes me interested in
battles. At best they give a game which is based on reality and looks
good.
That's probably why I wargame very infrequently, only real life is
realistic.
John
COL Bill Gray
to NB, who does understand the level of abstraction necessary for a game at
this level. And sure enough nearly all of the items Lamont mentioned don't
bother me as well. Personally, I like flanks in a game, but I understand the
logic as to why they don't exist in NB, makes sense, to me so I can live
with it just fine. Its all part of the concept that recognizes the player as
Lieutenant General, and a Lieutenant General normally doesn't perform the
functions of a battery commander or a Chef de Bataillon. Wholeheartedly
agree
My issues remain (and I write this to point out, for example, how my
interpretation of history influences what I like and dislike in a game, and
also how differeing schools of realism (Design to Model vs Design for
Effect) impact similarly:
- Command & Control, a subject that Lamont did not mention. The Army War
College, where I was faculty, declares this to be perhaps the most important
battlefield revolution to emerge from the Napoleonic Wars, and the Command
Radius system simply doesn't work the way USAWC described Napoleonic C2. In
some cases it doesn't work correctly period (generally when the battlefield
is non-linear, but compressed like at Auerstadt or Friedland from 1600 hours
on).
- Artillery. Another important revolution to emerge was the use of massed
batteries that made the guns a decisive battlefield opperating system in
their own right. The French normally pulled this off while being
outnumbered in guns by their opponents, due to both the treatment of
artillery as a co-equal battlefield partner as well as possessing the
Command & Control system to allow the stripping of medium foot batteries
away from the infantry to mass at the decisive point. IMHO, this is an
aspect you simply cannot disregard or abstract. Can't do this in NB and I
think this is a critical mistake that calls for house rules (and on a purely
personal note, I'd miss some of the neat looking units, like the Royal
Italian Guard Foot Artillery, entirely a 6lb organization:).
However, as far as battalion guns are concerned (eg, those 2 gun sections
directly assigned to infantry regiments, not the actual foot batteries
attached to a division or bregade - Lamont I think the latter is what you
meant by "battalion guns"), I'd also factor them into the infantry.
- Squares. Real nit here, likely born out of my inexperience with the game.
It seems that since you are forced to physically form a square, the brigade
frontage will physically decrease on the tabletop, thus opening up huge gaps
by which infantry and artillery can pour through. Shouldn't happen as
brigades didn't form squares (the Battle of the Pyramids notwithstanding),
their constituent battlaions did, so the frontage of a brigade really
doesn't decrease.
Is this a problem, and if not why not?
The C2 issue is critical enough for me to play something else. However,
except for an additional nit here and there, I really don't have a lot of
heartburn with the game, really like the idea of letting Corps Commanders do
Corps Commanders' work, and note it is sure is nice to finish a battle in a
single setting.
Warmest regards to all,
Bill Gray
mur...@my-deja.com wrote in message <87ps7p$lf$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
rjo...@rmi.net
to be accurate. Ignore the fact that no ruleset can successfully achieved this,
nor has this statement ever been supported by any distinctive logic as to its
desirability.
2. Written orders are the ONLY way for a rule set to be realistic. No other
mechanic is acceptable.
3. Big games of over 50 units on a side, and thousands of figures are without
exception superior to smaller games of 12-28 units on a side and a few hundred
figures.
4. The best solution to any unusual result in a wargame is to write a rule
prohibiting it.
5. Games with simple mechanics may never be 'realistic' or challenging to play,
and, conversely, rules with complex mechanics are always 'realistic' and
challenging to play.
6. Napoleonics are provably more sophisticated and intellectual, and make for
better simulations than any other period.
6.5 Any use of cards in the mechanics of a design automatically makes it less
realistic and NOT a simulation. :-)
William McHarg
>6.5 Any use of cards in the mechanics of a design automatically makes it less
>realistic and NOT a simulation. :-)
Well, yeah.. duh.. :)
Mac
Malcolm McCallum
results in NB. The more we played though, the more we found that the
subtleties in the game do correct the apparently unrealistic results.
> - Command & Control, a subject that Lamont did not mention. The Army War
> College, where I was faculty, declares this to be perhaps the most
important
> battlefield revolution to emerge from the Napoleonic Wars, and the Command
> Radius system simply doesn't work the way USAWC described Napoleonic C2.
In
> some cases it doesn't work correctly period (generally when the
battlefield
> is non-linear, but compressed like at Auerstadt or Friedland from 1600
hours
> on).
>
Yes, NB suffers from this. I've always wanted to be able to somehow put the
Legacy of Glory command and Control system on top of NB. Trouble is that the
both NB and LoG are not very modular and rich subtleties in each game make
it very difficult to mess with parts of them.
Still, the single best fix for the NB C2 problem is multi-player games.
Afterall, the system works fine on a Corps down level. It is when you have
Napoleons running around putting everything within 23" in command that the
system begins to skew.
Also, the system works better when you don't always take the best leaders
available. The differences between an army led by Napoleon and an army led
by Eugene are stark.
> - Artillery. Another important revolution to emerge was the use of massed
> batteries that made the guns a decisive battlefield opperating system in
> their own right. The French normally pulled this off while being
> outnumbered in guns by their opponents, due to both the treatment of
> artillery as a co-equal battlefield partner as well as possessing the
> Command & Control system to allow the stripping of medium foot batteries
> away from the infantry to mass at the decisive point. IMHO, this is an
> aspect you simply cannot disregard or abstract. Can't do this in NB and I
> think this is a critical mistake that calls for house rules (and on a
purely
> personal note, I'd miss some of the neat looking units, like the Royal
> Italian Guard Foot Artillery, entirely a 6lb organization:).
>
I disagree with this one. The French have +2 on their batteries while most
early enemy have 0 or maybe +1. As well, the French guns are maneuverable
and often smaller caliber than their opponents so they can mass in specific
areas and dominate the artillery duel while being grievously outnumbered IF
they are commanded by a daring and creative player. Yes, they will lose a
slugfest but that isn't a bad thing.
Another way that this is reflected is often through the addition of a
designated artillery commander. This allows an army to draw guns from
infantry and cavalry divisions to mass where required.
It works.
> - Squares. Real nit here, likely born out of my inexperience with the
game.
> It seems that since you are forced to physically form a square, the
brigade
> frontage will physically decrease on the tabletop, thus opening up huge
gaps
> by which infantry and artillery can pour through. Shouldn't happen as
> brigades didn't form squares (the Battle of the Pyramids notwithstanding),
> their constituent battlaions did, so the frontage of a brigade really
> doesn't decrease.
>
I hadn't considered this problem before and I agree it is a bit of a
problem. Of course, a brigade in column loses no frontage while a brigade in
line has its frontage generally halved.
Worse, I've seen a unit that formed line suddenly find itself out of command
due to its decreased frontage and so could not reform line.
Yes, it seems a bit skewed but I won't throw out a perfectly good game for
one small abstraction error.
Tom & Kris Lytle
In my opinion, and it is only that, MY opinion nothing more, the answer to
the abstraction question as it pertains to these two rule sets is yes. In
NBs, a player can execute historically accurate grand tactical manuvers
involving higher level formations. Empire gives the player the ability to
execute historically accurate tactical manuvers. In other words, I "feel"
and vicariously experience the problems and issues relevant to a commander
at the tactical and grand tactical levels. I think that if you asked a
division commander and an army commander about a given battle you would get
two very different descriptions. Hence, different rules that allow players
to experience historical combat at different levels. Obviously, one can
argue over the details of this, but I do believe that this is largely an
accurate assesment. As someone else pointed out though, there is no
substitute for having the proper number of players for the given rule sets.
There are few things more frustrating than trying to run a game without
enough players. Conversely, there are few things in the hobby more
enjoyable than playing a large battle with the correct number of players
involved. The fog of war can become all too real when mulitple
personalities are involved. Thanks for the thread, very interesting.
Tom
Matt DLM <mat...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20000208020231...@ng-fq1.aol.com...
Tom & Kris Lytle
Since the 10th Legere is rated as "Grenadiers" in my rules of choice,
Empire, I would promptly kick the hell out of those poor white-coated,
veteran-line-fire-as-conscript-scum! Seriously, your point is well made.
Tom
Brick <Jdma...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:38A0D4EC...@worldnet.att.net...
> Matt, Tom & the Interested,
>
> In the course of playing your last miniature wargame, did either of you
ever stop
> for a moment to ponder the question of 'where am I' amongst the turmoil
that lay
> before you?
>
> The transcendental nature of contemporary wargame mechanics makes it
almost
> impossible for the player to identify himself (with any tangible
certainty) to any
> particular time or place on our wargame battlefields. Because of this,
there never
> seems to be any real destination between you (your personnel role) and
your game
> level of command (be it Corp/Division/Brigade). All you typically are is
the
> wargame middleman between the rule book and the smallest level of troops
that can
> be pushed around on the tabletop.
>
> The role playing aspect of command definitely seems to be missing from the
game.
> How can you truly lead those cheering Grenadiers into the smoke and
carnage if you
> are not really there yourself?
>
> I think wargame realism and historical accuracy both begin within 'you'.
You are
> the primary source of History. The wargames themselves are merely
synthetic
> environments. Than rationally, any realism and/or historical accuracy
that you can
> obtain as a participant in a wargame is only limited by the type and
quality of the
> environment 'you' are in. Right?
>
> If the environment is good enough the rest is easy. You wouldn't even
need rules.
> See for yourself. Let's imagine for a few moments that you are the
Commanding
> Officer of the French 10th Legere and your Corps Commander rides up to you
and
> says:
>
> Marshal Davout: "Colonel, How many men are in that village?" (pointing to
Ober
> Laichling to your front).
>
> YOU: "About two thousand."
>
> Davout: "And on the flank?"
>
> YOU: "One thousand and five cannons"
>
> Davout: "And in the woods on the heights?"
>
> YOU: " I do not know; but I believe it is well defended: from here you can
see
> abatis which cover their position."
>
> Davout: "You see the clock tower on our right, that's Eckmuhl! The Emperor
will be
> there in one our; when you see his
> advance guard engaged with the enemy, without waiting for orders, you will
take
> that village and then the woods."
>
> YOU: "With my lone regiment?"
>
> Davout: "Of Course!"------------an actual historical vignette from,
"Crisis on the
> Danube", by James R. Arnold
>
> Now back to reality! My questions to you after all of this are 1) Are
these orders
> clear enough for you? 2) What wargame rules do you think you need (if
any) and 3)
> Why would you want rules at all?
>
> For me the only thing needed here is a confident, "Yes Sir!"
>
> What do you think?
>
> Regards,...James (aka, The Director of the Napoleonic Environmental
Protection
> Agency)
>
Brick
(Olson Serious)
>
> Matt, Tom & the Interested,
>
> In the course of playing your last miniature wargame, did either of you ever stop
> for a moment to ponder the question of 'where am I' amongst the turmoil that lay
> before you?
Stan: hmmm, in the canteen, preparing my Potato Cannon
for the final big push, against the Kaiser .....
Or as Mary Poppins, floating over the Austrian Alps.
With my Trusty Potato Cannon, ready to put some
extra starch into the litre hosen of the next
would be fuerurer .... (ok me, And the European Union )
Stan
Jay
>The friend said that the other game systems the Graf Spee wins.
>Therefore, since my game systems resulted in the opposite it must be
>incorrect. There was no way to explain the physics of the result - nor
>the fact of my 15 years doing simuations for the US Navy helped.
Oh. I have to wonder what your arguments were, however, I can
understand how someone would cling to a theory against all odds.
>Similar things happen in wargaming - each person has his/her set of
>knowledge and it's basis. Rarely is it going to be changed - evidence
>of this is very easy to find on this newsgroup.
This newsgroup is actually more an example of how the anonymity of
Usenet allows people to be obstinate without consequence. Points are
often conceeded in a face-to-face discussion.
>I've even had a friend (High School grad) that tried to show me that
>the world was flat - you can see that.... No attempts to show him
>otherwise changed his opinion. Sad, but true.
More bizzarre than sad.
Jay
"There is nothing more exhilarating than to be shot at
without result."
W.S. Churchill
Jay
>Cavalry should either be incapable of breaking square or it should be at
>least virtually impossible.
I don't have any info ready to hand, but IIRC the number of squares
broken historically is higher than usually assumed. However, I find
some game systems are more wont to allow it than others.
Jay
"Truth is mighty and will prevail"
Thomas Brooks, 1662
Jay
>6.5 Any use of cards in the mechanics of a design automatically makes it less
>realistic and NOT a simulation. :-)
Ooh!
Jay
"If you would have peace, prepare for war."
Tacitus
COL Bill Gray
First, I'm really not sure about the square issue. It may not be a problem
at all, but was just something I noticed.
As regards C2 and Artillery, I think the way NB approaches these not only
reflects its The Battles of Frederick the Great heritage, but also the
Design for Effect philosophy I've mentioned before. Thus we all know that
the French are considered to have had the best artillery in Europe, so NB
reflects this with French artillery that is mobile, sports a +2 DRM and a
few Artillery Commanders here in there. Not really the way it happened
(example: despite the scenario book reference Friedland, Senarmont could not
and would not have commanded every 12lb battery in the army as he was only
the I Corps Artillery Commander and had authority over only those guns, but
given his artillery charge was such a significant part of the battle and
that half his guns historically were 6 lb foot batteries stripped from the
infantry, the authors had to do something, even if it played fast and loose
with the facts), BUT it does convey the CORRECT OVERALL impression that the
French had a significantly better artillery arm than everyone else.
If this DFE level of realism is acceptable to you, and it seems very popular
in the boardgaming world, there is no problem whatsoever and in fact you'd
likely be very uncomfortable playing something like Valmy. And I actually
think DFE is very appropriate in some areas, just not this one.
Same thing for C2 and it does work most of the time. Generals (like nearly
any Austrian besides Charles) with a short Command Radius will always have
some commands outside their span, forcing their subordinate commanders to
roll their Response Number or face a number of engagement restrictions.
Again, not the way it really happened, but it does convey the CORRECT
OVERALL perception that the French Army with Napoleon and his huge Command
Radius is a much easier force to coordinate towards a particular objective
and more easily reacts to unforseen battlefield opportunities. Not so for
folks like Russia's General Bennigsen and though the process doesn't
duplicate history, the end result makes the 1807 Russian Army very
cumbersome and unresponsive, just as it should be.
EXCEPT ..........
At Friedland where we had a bunch of NB Grognards play this scenario several
times, multiplayer, changing sides, Napoleon getting whipped every time. We
started at 1600 hours after the entire French Army had made it to the field
and found that even though Napoleon had a huge Command Radius, he couldn't
cover everything with some Commanders invariably blowing their Response
Number. However, because the Russians were pushed back into the small pocket
around Friedland, even Bennigsen with his abysmal Command Radius could place
nearly everything on the table in good C2 status. This is exactly the
opposite of what happend historically with Somov's VI Division not being
able to cross the Alle some 4.5 hours after directed to do so (pulled it
off in two, maybe three turns in the game).
Interestingly enough the same glitch surfaced when I assisted Joe Miranda
with his boardgame The Emperor's First Battles (Decision Games). Command
Radius worked in fine DFE style at Austerlitz but fell apart in the
Jena-Auerstadt scenario. Here Joe found that what he thought was a pretty
restricted Command Radius for the Prussians at Jena, made them way too
flexible up around Auerstadt where the terrain channeled their army into a
small area, eg, the short command span didn't matter. Reduce the Command
Radius and while it works for Auerstadt, the Prussians are crippled far more
than they should be when fighting the linear engagement of Jena (anyone
wanna guess how he solved it?).
Its at this point that I think NB is flawed historically as opposed to just
relying on a different theory of game design, and for the life of me I can't
see how multiplayer settings will correct this.
NEVERTHELESS, Matt, the main point is that both I and Malcolm are looking at
Napoleonic wargames from two very different perspectives of what reality
actually is (Design to Model vs Design for Effect), and what I expect and
desire realism wise is different and opposite of what Malcome does. Our
definitions of what reality is are totally different, and that is why tyring
to make a definitive call as to which game is more realistic than another is
virtually impossible. What is realism for me isn't necessarily realism for
somebody else.
And that folks, is what the above and the previous two post were supposed to
point out:)!!!
Warmest regards to all,
Bill Gray
(Who, BTW, uses the NB mounting system for his Fire & Fury Napoleonic
variant:)!!!
Malcolm McCallum <mmcc...@bc1.com> wrote in message
news:38a0...@news.pacificcoast.net...
> I'll jump into this one as someone who originally had severe problems with
> results in NB. The more we played though, the more we found that the
> subtleties in the game do correct the apparently unrealistic results
file://SNIP//
Matt DLM
<<Sticking to wargaming...
As a result of lack of design discipline/ability/training/whatever
designers get bogged down in the morass of the details of what they're
attempting to model.
In turn the relative significance of factors is mixed up, a mish mash of
mechanics is used, some relatively unimportant things are modelled
whilst some more important are overlooked.>>
What I had hoped to accomplish was to produce a discussion of just what the
"relative significance of factors is" in a grand-tactical (or tactical)
Napoleonics simulation.
Please elaborate. I think your "systems" viewpoint is most intriguing.
I think it is interesting that most wargamers are appalled if we allow muskets
to shoot accurately at 300 yards, but if we produce command and control systems
that essentially allow for radio control, or mass telepathy, that's not a
problem.
In terms of your ideas on "top down" design, does this mean we should focus on
issue of command control and perspective as the first step in design?
Matt DeLaMater
Matt DLM
a very similar topic, something like "Biggest Myths Perpetrated In Napoleonic
Wargaming Rules". You've hit upon several of the things we were considering.
Let me sort of reverse the perspective of your ideas for a moment, and approach
them from the Rules end.
<<1. Squares can never be broken.>>
Do any Napoleonic rules really state this? Would be interesting to see what the
chances are of breaking squares in the various rules sets, given a few
different hypotheticals.
<<2. Emergency Squares really existed and were used by infantry when
'surprised'
by cavalry-which happened a lot.
>>
Not sure why you are so exercised over emergency squares, although the
terminology itself is a bit comical.
Some rules allow the formation of square as a reaction rather than as just an
action.
Again, how many rules have "emergency squares" and what makes them such an
inferior mechanic?
<<3. Cavalry was REALLY effective as a battlefield arm of decision.>> and <4.
Cavalry was a major arm on EVERY battlefield and FREQUENTLY used to charge
the enemy.>>
What is your contention here Bob? These statements seem very provocative. Are
you saying cavalry was not REALLY effective? What rule sets does cavalry seem
overly effective?
You seem to want to make a big contention here, but you need to be a bit more
specific.
I will agree that cavalry armed with radios, able to start and stop on a dime,
would have been REALLY effective on the Napoleonic battlefield.
<<5. Long Range fire was always ineffective and seldom used.>>
I'd like to hear your evidence if you believe the opposite! Of course, you'd
have to define "long range"
and give us examples of when long range fire was frequently used and
occassionally quite effective. Given the specifics, we might agree with you. In
wargame rules, I find long range fire is often over used.
<<6. Short Range fire was always devastating and the primary range of
engagement.>>
Interesting - I don't necessarily believe this (using rules like "always" makes
it ridiculous). Do most rule sets match this description?
<<7. Artillery was constantly firing during battle.
8. Artillery moved a lot on the battlefield(i.e.,Senarmont was typical).>>
I agree with you here. Many rules sets allow artillery to fire too much, too
often.
<<9. Bayonet charges usually closed with the enemy and led to bloody
hand-to-hand
resolutions.>>
Few wargamers believe this.
<<11. The relatively minor technological differences between most nationalties'
weaponry-muskets, artillery, and ammunition- were REALLY important.
>>
Not in the Napoleonic period, and most wargamers recognize this.
<<12.Skirmishers were extensively used thoughout the Napoleonic wars and were
REALLY important.>> Sorry, I have to agree with Bill Gray on this one.
<<13. National Differences involving 'character', rather than simple quality
differences in units and leadership(including 'accepted' practice), were REALLY
important.>>
Again, very interesting.
Certainly, it is an anachronistic and facile view on our part to Pooh-pooh
national differences. The memoirs of all the participants recognize them as
real and true, and there is no denying that at least national differences were
a self-fulfilling prophecy at the very least.
So, if we want to create the proper atmosphere of the late 18th and early 19th
century on our tabletops, treating national differences as "real" and "true"
may not be an invalid design technique.
Matt DeLaMater
Matt DLM
Once again your "worst opinions" are really just a gigantic straw man. However,
you are getting close to some of the issues I would like to discuss. Perhaps we
can discuss them more fairly?
In stating the positions you disagree with in straw man form, you wrote:
<<1. A miniature ruleset must only have one level of command for the gamer for
it to be accurate. Ignore the fact that no ruleset can successfully achieved
this, nor has this statement ever been supported by any distinctive logic as to
its
desirability.>>
I don't think anyone would agree with this statement, that one level of command
is all that should be represented.
A perspective based game is just that, a game that focuses primarily on certain
levels of command decisions being made by the player. In other words, the
player is not constantly switching hats, from corps commander, then division
commander, then battery commander, then battalion commander, then skirmish
company commander (with a magically unifying telepathy going down the whole
chain).
A perspective based system locks out or restricts players from certain decision
making levels and places their ability to make decisions into a realistic
framework more constrained than the radios and helicopter school of Napoleonic
design.
<<2. Written orders are the ONLY way for a rule set to be realistic. No other
mechanic is acceptable.
>>
Again, if you don't want deadly accurate muskets at 500 yards, why would you
want a grand-tactical game without plans and binding orders? Being obsessed
with Napoleonic hardware, and paying no attention to how Napoleonic armies
actually functioned in the field, is patently ridiculous.
Not that eveything in a simulation has to have a very literal mechanic, but
binding orders are extremely crucial to the perspective of an army, corps and
divisional commander, and there existence produces historically accurate
effects that no other mechanic I've seen reproduces.
Every strategy game requires a plan to win, from chess to Stratego to Piquet.
But having a plan, and having to contend with a plan beyond the point when it
is even useful, are enormously different things.
<<3. Big games of over 50 units on a side, and thousands of figures are without
exception superior to smaller games of 12-28 units on a side and a few hundred
figures.
>>
No one would agree with this. Has anyone ever said this?
<<5. Games with simple mechanics may never be 'realistic' or challenging to
play, and, conversely, rules with complex mechanics are always 'realistic' and
challenging to play.>>
Yet another figment of your imagination. No one argues this. Complex games have
more often failed to be particularly historically accurate in results because
of the micromanagement it permits - despite its wealth of details. Detail
without perspective is as nonsensical as no accurate detail at all.
<<6. Napoleonics are provably more sophisticated and intellectual, and make for
better simulations than any other period.>>
Another ridiculous straw man assertion. I would say that historical minatures
is a great medium for the Napoleonic and Revolutionary wars, perhaps more so
than for some other periods. Debateable, of course, but my opinion.
Matt DeLaMater
Andy O'Neill
<mat...@aol.com> writes
><<3. Big games of over 50 units on a side, and thousands of figures are without
>exception superior to smaller games of 12-28 units on a side and a few hundred
>figures.
>>>
>No one would agree with this. Has anyone ever said this?
No matter how long some people play wargames, they are demonstrably
capable of making what would appear to be the same mistakes again and
again.
If you were to visit our club....
They're playing a piece of Kursk on the first table you walk in past.
This has been going on for 5 or 6 weeks.
It's expected to last at least 3 or 4 weeks more.
Some people think that big games are better.
To a bystander these would appear to be ponderous and dull games, but
some participants claim to enjoy them.
Andy O'Neill
<mat...@aol.com> writes
>In terms of your ideas on "top down" design, does this mean we should focus on
>issue of command control and perspective as the first step in design?
Ahh... stick, wrong end of.
As I said, I have previously tried to explain this approach.
Top down analysis is about the level of detail you look at.
You start by looking at the whole system (game) and figuring out what
the most significant parts are.
All of them.
Then you look at the next level down of detail and figure out what's
there.
By looking at things from the perspective of most important first and by
understanding how the whole thing hangs together before you look at the
twiddly bits.... it's easier to end up with the similar mechanics for
everything, you have a chance of getting some elegance in the design.
It's easiest to understand by explaining what the opposite is: bottom
up.
In bottom up design you look at (say) your bakers dozen of opinions.
You think up mechanics for each in turn.
In the end you probably forget a number of things before you first play
the game ( "D'Oh! cavalry....").
Perhaps you saw a way to do that C2 stuff in another game - you graft
that bit on.... then variable movement takes your fancy - nail that on.
The whole thing grows almost of it's own accord with no overall design
to aim for.
Like getting a builder in and telling him to forget architectural plans,
just build a living room, now attach a kitchen...
We ran out of money before the roof?
Gen...@earthlink.net
probobly in the same place I was on the only real battle field I
experianced
honkered down in a bunker saying OH &^%*^$
sorry had to have a bit of levity
Gen...@earthlink.net
not to seem like a party buster and thank you for the information on
broken squares. but in order to produce a percentage chance of breaking
a square you need the other side of the fraction. That being the total
number of squares formed and charged
and although I have a love for the british I recall at least one or two
breaking during the hundred days.
Quatra bra comes to mind
COL Bill Gray
From: Matt DLM <mat...@aol.com>
Subject: Re: A Baker's Dozen(plus 2) of the Worst Wargamer Opinions About
Napoleonic Warfare
Date: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 1:16 AM
Very interesting post Bob. Jean Lochet and I were talking about doing a talk
on
a very similar topic, something like "Biggest Myths Perpetrated In
Napoleonic
Wargaming Rules". You've hit upon several of the things we were considering.
Let me sort of reverse the perspective of your ideas for a moment, and
approach
them from the Rules end.
<<12.Skirmishers were extensively used thoughout the Napoleonic wars and
were
REALLY important.>> Sorry, I have to agree with Bill Gray on this one.
DOUBLE SNIP
Oh yeah, right. The document I referred to was 1806-Das Preussische
OffizierKorps und die Untersuchung der Kriegsereignisse, herausgegeben vom
Grossen Generalstabe Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung II and the chap's name
was actually Major von der Marwitz, the Adjutant to Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen.
Yes I have and have read it. Yes I have to get a life:).
Regards,
Bill Gray
Steve Burt
A square breaking was considered an unusual event, so people remarked on it.
As to how unusual..... that's a judgement call for the rules designer.
One would need to look in detail at the troop quality and state or morale of both infantry and cavalry involved in the incidents, asuuming such information is even available.
At Quatre Bras, some French cavalry got inside a square of the 42nd Highlanders (the Black Watch) while it was forming, but the rear ranks turned round and killed them. The square didn't break. If you know of an instance of a square breaking during the Hundred Days, I'd be very interested to hear about it (the article I referred to seemed to have trawled through the sources pretty exhaustively).
--
Steve Burt
The moral is to the physical as three is to one
Napoleon
Brick
If you think about it, 'Writing Orders' with a pencil and paper (at the beginning
of a wargame) 'is' the most historically accurate thing any of us can do.
Usually this is done with very little information available to the players on
either side. The problems with information saturation begins after the game is
under way.
Once completed this Order acts as your 'known/understanding' (in this base
document) of the world you are entering. Granted its value is fleeting when the
first couple of round shots come bounding by, but it acts as your starting
reference point in determining, How, When and Where,..... and IF you'll be able to
react.
On several (actual) occasions I've wonder if I hadn't in fact contracted with the
very Devil himself. If that isn't a fair definition of the 'Fog of War' I don't
know what could top it.
Orders are quite different from any 'random act' generator. Because you have an
established (written) view and reference point of what your operational
expectations are. Sticking to one's plan and having to stick to the plan are two
very powerful and historically accurate design tools that are as cheap to take
advantage of as it gets.
With that notion in mind, there could never be an Austerlitz, Bussaco or Waterloo,
because hindsight and helicopters would always serve to eliminate them.
Regards,...James
Jon-Paul Filkins
Bob Rodgers
: ><- Command & Control, a subject that Lamont did not mention. The Army War
: ><College, where I was faculty, declares this to be perhaps the most important
: ><battlefield revolution to emerge from the Napoleonic Wars, and the Command
: ><Radius system simply doesn't work the way USAWC described Napoleonic C2. In
: ><some cases it doesn't work correctly period (generally when the battlefield
: ><is non-linear, but compressed like at Auerstadt or Friedland from 1600 hours
: ><on).
I'm particularly interested in this item of your discussion.
I don't like NB for most of the reasons you stated, but the command
radius, while being admittedly abstract, really didn't bother me that
much. It seemed a quick, easy, common way to do it.
I've also played games where aide-de-camp figures were riding all over
the table delivering messages. Those games were probably closer to
reality but were also longer and prone to other problems.
My question would be, What rules system in your opinion, is closest to
the USAWC model of C2 and why? I haven't really found the "perfect"
way to model this yet.
Bob R.
script...@bigpond.com
paper (at the beginning of a wargame) 'is' the most historically
accurate thing any of us can do.
But James, your last comment regarding Davout defined a verbal order.
Which then is the "most historically accurate", the mouth or the
pencil? What is the percentage ratio of verbal orders to written
orders on the battlefield (not strategic)?
Steven
Martin Rapier
<87rj8l$5vc$1...@lure.pipex.net>...
<Gen...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:38A1356C...@earthlink.net...
>
>not to seem like a party buster and thank you for the information on
>broken squares. but in order to produce a percentage chance of breaking
>a square you need the other side of the fraction. That being the total
>number of squares formed and charged
I think the biggest problem with all of this is that breaking squares et al
is only really a concern of the brigade commander. I prefer Napoleonic
battles where the smallest individual element is at worst a brigade, and
preferably a division - such petty matters as the deployment of the 13th
Regiments Voltiguers or whatnot are of no interest whatsoever.
All that matters in higher level games is that steady infantry formations
will generally be able to repel cavalry assaults, however a cavalry
division/corps lugs enough horse artillery along so that it has at least a
chance of defeating an opposing infantry division, just not a very good one
in the absence of additional infantry and artillery support.
Cheers
Martin.
Matt DLM
I am always careful to use the term "binding" orders rather than written
orders, so that no one gets hung up
on the difference historically between a verbal and a written order. In game
terms, they are one and the same, and binding. And if you are playing a
friendly game, you don't necessarily need to write the orders down (you can
state them to the ref, draw them on a map, etc.)
That said, your post hits it on the head exactly - binding orders are crucial
to a perspective based game because they do create an initial "world view" .
You wrote:
<<Orders are quite different from any 'random act' generator. Because you have
an established (written) view and reference point of what your operational
expectations are. Sticking to one's plan and having to stick to the plan are
two very powerful and historically accurate design tools that are as cheap to
take advantage of as it gets.>>
This concept sounds like a subtle difference to those who don't play
perspective based games, but it makes all the difference.
Matt DeLaMater
Brick
First of all, there's no discrepancy or problem here at all. I did say
written Orders (at
the beginning of the game), when information about the current situation
is at its lowest level.
Secondly, A Verbal FRAGOs (fragmentary orders), like Davout's Order to the
Colonel of the 10th Legere here, is the main way commanders in the field
communicate changes to their 'base plans'. They happen quite regularly
after the operation itself gets under way. These FRAGOs can be verbal or
written.
Here's the FRAGO definition right out of the book:
"A FRAGO is the normal method of issuing orders once an operation
begins. The FRAGO contains a change in the operation that is of
immediate concern to subordinate elements. All other elements of the
current Order remain in effect, less those specifically changed by the
FRAGO."
This looks to me to be a very close match to Davout's actual
statements, which would qualify them as a FRAGO.
Try to give me something harder next time.
James
COL Bill Gray
First, see the second posting I did. The AWC considers Napoleon the ultimate
"Intuitive General" and points out that much of his genius may well have
been due to the formal and practised staff structure the French had,
especially when operated by Berthier. This allowed Napoleon to simply make
general plans for battle, quickly reacting to enemy mistakes or initiatives
by the way his staff could rapidly move orders up and down the Chain of
Command. And in pinch he could use those MG Imperial Aides de camp to bypass
the staff process altogether (the Soviets used a simlar process called "skip
echeloning" whereby a Regimental Commander could bypass everyone and give
orders direct to a Platoon Leader).
The Allies were actually pretty good (though Austerlitz shows that even here
. . .) at preparing detailed orders for execution prior to the battle being
joined. However, when something unexpected happened or when Reserves had to
be committed or especially if a unit had to be withdrawn from the
battleline, their non-staff system was unbelievable slow and cumbersome in
getting the commander's intent translated into orders, the orders produced,
sent out and eventually executed. Part of the reason seems to have been the
excruciating detail which the orders conveyed as opposed to the mission type
orders (tell the commander what to do and accomplish, let him figure out
how) used by the French and today as well. What was important here was that
it made no real difference whether the executing corps or division was right
down the road nearby, or on another flank of the battlefield, the process
was very slow and painful. Distance from the issuing HQ was a very minor
factor.
Thus it would seem that the systems closest to the interpretation above are
those used by Empire/Legacy/Valmy which forces the player to choses specific
orders from a preset menu and then roll the die (with National modifiers,
eg, France REAL good, Austria sucking wind up hill) to see how quickly these
same instructions are delivered and executed.
However, this process is in itself very slow and ponderous and does detract
from the fun of the game for even me. Besides, I HATE WRITING ORDERS!!!! Yet
I still prefer Design to Model games over Design for Effect games (again
this is my definition of what reality is, not necessarily the correct
definition), so I am willing to put up with the extra detail. And there are
times where the Command Radius system simply will not work even from a DFE
stand point, eg, narrow terrain sets like at Auerstadt.
I know this is going to sound funny, but every time I play a miniatures game
which uses a Command Radius, I can see a conversation like this happening:
"Verzeihen Sie Herr Feldmarschal-Leutnant von Hiller, but we are from the
Imperial Cartographic Korps and we have just determined that your forces
have moved 1256 meters away from the Hauptquartier von Erherzog Karl. Would
you please direct all troops to begin marching at half-step and please
decline intiatiating combat until you are able to decrease your distance
from the Archduke by 56 meters? Vielen dank."
I know this is NOT what the process is supposed to replicate in the game and
yet for the life of me I can't put it out of my mind. And yet for the life
of me the same process doesn't bother me at all with a boardgame. Figure
that one out.
In my own Fire & Fury variant, I tried to strike happy medium but I will be
the first to admit my own efforts don't meet my own litmus test for
accuracy. I had to abstract to keep it simple and there is a major glitch in
the process that I haven't figured out how to get rid of yet.
Bottom line and in defense of both Coggins and Taylor, identifying the
problem is a whole lot easier than fixing it. Game design is a LOT harder
than you think. Folks ought to try it some time.
Anyway, here is the appropriate section from my Nappy F&F set. If nothing
else, it'll make you laugh:).
Warmest regards to all,
Bill Gray
Reserve Movement
1. Introduction. This is perhaps the most complex portion of the NFF
variant. Reserve Movement (RM) is defined as any brigade movement,
partially or in total, which takes place in the Reserve Zone (RZ). The RZ is
that area of the tabletop that is greater than 15 inches away from any enemy
brigade, artillery battery or Grand Battery. The use of RM in this game
replaces order systems to simulate Grand Tactical Command & Control (C2), a
process that the French, with their formal and practiced Staff System,
excelled at while other countries did not. The subsequent advantage the
French gained was the ability to react to enemy intentions by quickly moving
orders up, down, and laterally across the chain of command to disengage
formations or move unengaged units to that area of the battle where they
would be most effective. Napoleon’s Grande Armee swiftly handled
(particularly if Marshal Berthier was present) what was a slow and painful
process for other armies, such as Prussia’s in 1806. It enabled Napoleon to
simply issue general guidance and then immediately react when his opponent
made a mistake. This, in turn, remains a major reason why institutions, such
as the US Army War College, have labeled the Emperor the world’s first and
greatest “intuitive general.” In other eras, such as the American Civil
War, the C2 systems used by the opposing forces were nearly identical and
thus C2 does not have to be modeled in detail as not doing so will not
impart a particular advantage to one side or the other. As noted above,
however, this was not the case in the Napoleonic Wars, making Grand Tactical
C2 a critical consideration.
2. The Reserve Zone (RZ). The RZ is defined as any area of the tabletop
greater than 15 inches away from any enemy brigade, artillery battery or
Grand Battery. Friendly brigades are in the RZ if they are greater than 15
inches away from such enemy formations. Such friendly forces are described
as Unengaged. Conversely, forces are in the Tactical Zone (TZ) of the table
top, and are said to be Engaged if they are 15 inches or less away from any
enemy unit, excluding leaders.
3. Reserve Movement (RM). Any portion of a brigade’s movement that takes
place in the RZ is defined as RM. This includes brigades that move out of
the TZ into the RZ, or vice versa. This represents troops moving primarily
in response to their Commander’s Grand Tactical orders, rather than as a
reaction to nearby enemy forces. RM takes place during the Reserve Movement
Subphase of Phase 1: Maneuver.
a. RM may include movement within the TZ (eg, the brigade begins in the TZ
and moves into the RZ, or vice versa). Such movement is considered solely RM
and completed within the Reserve Movement Subphase of Phase 1: Maneuver.
b. Terrain and interpenetration modifiers apply to RM in the same way as
they apply to movement within the TZ.
c. All units using RM, even in part (such as a unit wishing to disengage
from the TZ), must complete their movement prior to any units using solely
TZ movement.
d. Units using RM may not initiate fire or close action combat in the same
turn. Such formations may always defend themselves, however, to include
issuing defensive fired if charged and countercharging if cavalry.
e. A unit may not leave the TZ, move in the RZ and then reenter the TZ in
the same turn. Likewise, a unit may not use RM to enter the TZ, and then
move out of the TZ in the same turn.
f. Units in the RZ who subsequently have an enemy unit move to within 15
inches of their position are no longer considered to be in the RZ, but in
the TZ, moving and fighting accordingly. Likewise, should all enemy forces
move greater than 12 inches away from a friendly formation, than that unit
is then considered to be in the RZ.
4. Procedure. The player must announce that the unit in question intends to
use RM, then simply rolls a single 10 sided die against the appropriate
column of the Maneuver Table, using the modifiers specified for RM. The RM
modifiers are used in lieu of all other maneuver modifiers (for movement
within the TZ), even if the unit in question begins its RM within the TZ or
ends its RM within the TZ. This procedure constitutes use of RM, even if the
unit subsequently fails to physically move at all. Apply results as
indicated on the Maneuver Table, using the Reserve Movement Column.
5. RM Die Roll Modifications. The following die roll modifications are
unique to RM and are used in lieu of the other modifications found on the
Maneuver Table (modifiers are cumulative).
a. + 4 If unattached Napoleon with Berthier as Chief of Staff commands
the army.
b. + 3 If unattached Napoleon (without Berthier), Davout or Wellington
commands the army.
c. + 3 If one of Napoleon’s ADCs or any Army Commander is “attached”
(eg, moved in base to base contact during the previous turn’s Detached
Leader Movement Subphase) with the commander of the formation using RM.
d. + 2 If unattached Archduke Charles, Suvorov, Lannes, Massena,
Moreau, Suchet or Bluecher (1813 – 15) commands the army.
e. + 1 If any unattached Prussian General (1813 – 15) other than
Bluecher, Moore, Kutusov, Barclay de Tolley, Bagration or any unattached
French General other than those noted above commands the army. Allow French
Marshal Bernadotte this modifier even when an Allied Commander 1813-15.
f. – 1 If unattached Archduke John, Duke of Brunswick, Cuesta, Czar
Alexander or the Prince of Orange commands the army.
g. + 2 If first turn of the game (in a set battle, vice meeting
engagement, representing prepared operations order, eg, such as Austerlitz
in 1805, but not Auerstadt in 1806).
h. +2 If unit successfully used RM last turn.
i. + 1/+2 If RM failure (eg, Reserve Movement Table indicated no movement
allowed) last turn/ two or more previous turns.
j. – 2 If unit is attempting to disengage from the enemy (eg, moving out
of the TZ into the RZ).
k. – 1 If the unit is Disordered.
Note: To clarify, if one of Napoleon’s ADCs is attached to a commander of a
formation, his brigades would receive the +3 modifier for the ADC, as well
as the +4/+3 modifier for Napoleon being in command of the Army.
6. Leaders. Leaders may freely combine movement within the TZ and RZ
without restriction or die roll during the two traditional F&F Leader
Movement Phases (Leader Attachment and Detached Leader Movement) so long as
the Leader’s total movement allowance is not exceeded.
7. Artillery. Movement of artillery batteries follows the same specifics as
brigades when using RM (eg, may move in one phase or the other but not both,
must use RM when withdrawing from the TZ, etc), but require no die roll. The
batteries, however, must be properly commanded as in traditional ACW F&F.
8. Divisions and Corps. For simplicity and accuracy, players are encouraged
to make a single RM die roll for all the brigades in a division or corps
when the modifiers across all affected brigades are identical. The results
obtained apply to all brigades so rolled for.
9. Reserve Movement Rate. Note there is no change in the movement rate for
units maneuvering in the RZ. The given NFF movement rates apply. Rather,
this procedure represents the problems of committing forces that are not
already engaged with the enemy or need to become disengaged. As opposed to
deploying and moving forces based on the actions of enemy forces in
proximity, the problem becomes one of the Army’s Command-Control system
reacting fast enough to execute the Commander’s wishes as he reacts to the
every changing nature of the battlefield. This procedure will be
particularly critical for Commanders who wish to deploy their Reserve
formations.
Bob Rodgers wrote in message <87rlnr$h...@news-central.tiac.net>...
Jay
><<13. National Differences involving 'character', rather than simple quality
>differences in units and leadership(including 'accepted' practice), were REALLY
>important.>>
>Again, very interesting.
>Certainly, it is an anachronistic and facile view on our part to Pooh-pooh
>national differences. The memoirs of all the participants recognize them as
>real and true, and there is no denying that at least national differences were
>a self-fulfilling prophecy at the very least.
>So, if we want to create the proper atmosphere of the late 18th and early 19th
>century on our tabletops, treating national differences as "real" and "true"
>may not be an invalid design technique.
On the other hand, the reason for the percieved "national
characteristics" is more mechanical than a measure of character, in
most cases. The basic materiel of the soldier is the same through most
of Europe, but his performance varies with his level of training, the
quality of his officers and the soundness of the national doctrine.
The soldiers' "spleen" and such may be a colourful way to express
national differences, but the mechanics of a game should avoid it,
IMO.
Jay
"O God assist our side: at least avoid assisting the enemy
and leave the rest to me."
Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau
Dallas Gavan
Interesting that you should mention boardgames. I agree with John Hill
where he says that boardgamers are prepared to accept more complex
mechanics than mini's gamers. How many mini gamers would attempt
something like "Wacht am Rhein", "Highway to the Reich" or "Wellington's
Victory" in mini's at a similar scale, let alone play to conclusion?
As you say, the level of detail is where a game can be made or not. Too
much detail or detail clumsily handled will make the game unplayable.
But often what is seen as unplayable in mini's is seen as perfectly
playable in boardgames (JR1's arty rules being a case in point- lifted
from JH's own very successful "Squad Leader", they were panned by JR
players as "too complicated").
This isn't to say boardgamers are smarter, more tolerant or anything
else. It just illustrates the diffeent appetites I was alluding to.
Dal.
--
http://www.historyserver.org/spanners.toolbox/index.shtml
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Dallas Gavan
You wrote:
> 6.5 Any use of cards in the mechanics of a design automatically makes
it less
> realistic and NOT a simulation. :-)
>
failed, rules) and "Push of Pike" like that. You really didn't have to.
Dal.
PS It WAS them you were obliquely referring to, wasn't it?
Quid Veritas
mjc
Gen...@earthlink.net
subordinates is an art that faded after the event of instant
communications
I tend to agree that forceing higher commanders to give a set of written
orders for there subordinate commanders would add to the fog of war and
the "realisim" of many games.
although the playability factor comes into play,
mur...@my-deja.com
i have spent the last couple of days leisurely thinking about the C2
problem you perceive to be in NB, and which leads you to view NB as a
flawed system with respect to historical simulation- the command radius
problem as you described it, and the consequential improvement in non-
french C2 when the front is compressed (ala freidland as you presented)
does seem "not right"- although I believe we have the world's most
accomplished NB players here in colorado springs and i am skeptical
that they could not crack the freidland nut with 1805-07 french,
regardless of allied C2-
i would suggest a simple fix for this problem in the NB context, and
will do so after i address a "philosophical" issue that this thread is
cresting upon- not that i think you will come back to NB, but just to
point out that the command radius approach to C2 may work to model
inept staff operations- if you include the effectiveness quotient-
but first:
as someone said so eloquently somewhere else in this refocus- "where am
i in the game?"- it is a question i have never asked during gaming
itself, i lose sense of myself and get completely absorbed with the
mental tasks at hand- but it is an excellent consideration in trying to
manage C2 in any historical miniatures game- after all, it is only our
ability to impact upon the flow of events on the table that makes it a
game (otherwise we might as well watch a computer simulation)-
AS C2 is more perfectly modeled in a nappy game, it would seem that we,
as tabletop generals, have fewer decisions to make and will find less
opportunity to affect the battle...on the other hand, a game lacking
consideration of C2 differences during nappy wars is lacking a large,
possibly crucial, dose of historical authenticity ( i am reminded of an
AH version of Gettysburg where the map had beatifully painted terrain
that did not affect movement- i immediately lost all interest in
playing that one)- i presume that somewhere in between is where most
rules systems strive to land, and it then becomes a matter of balancing
simplicity of execution/playability with DTM considerations while still
giving the russian/austrian player at austerlitz the illusion that he
just might pull it off because he DOES have significant impact upon
unit actions-
OK, with that preamble, let me proceed, again with the caveat that i
have limited experience and am speaking within a context exclusively
developed from gaming NB:
"where am I in the game?"- i am the brigade commander obviously, as
that is the lowest level of unit interaction/decision making- and i
want to be there, trying to use terrain and unit formations to the best
effect- should i have 100% control at this level? (i.e. the helicopter
view and radio control)- well, barring a referreed game with hidden
movement, i have seen no simulation in lead or cardboard that leaves me
comfortable in relinquishing control at this level- this is pretty much
the gamer in me coming out, and not the historical simulator- really, i
do not want to have to roll a die to determine if my troops will route
intelligentely into cover (good C2) or instead go running about in the
open, ignoring their colonel (bad C2)- while it may be closer to
historical, the loss of player control verges upon ruining the gaming
element.
but i am also commanding at the army/corps level in the game as well (
i see these as pretty much the same) where i "send" corps or divisions,
with proper arty support, etc, to take certain objectives or hold a
flank or sit in reserve- this too is a rewarding game decision element,
allowing all of us to attempt to be that "intuitive" general that was
napoleon- I AM quite willing to give up TOTAL control at this level for
the sake of historical C2 flavor-
"the question for the game designer and the gamer": how much
obfuscation of C2 function can the gaming element of a system tolerate-
clearly, this is a personal choice that depends upon how the player
gets his joy in our hobby; is he a gamer who loves history, or a
historian who tolerates the compromises of a game? - for sure i am the
former and relish the opportunity of being the intuitive general in
each game- even at levels where i do have near 100% control, my own
human error provides enough obfuscation that it can substitute for DTE
effort at the lowest level-
but where would i draw the line at giving up control at the lowest
level? again, personal choice for us all- but i am very skeptical of
rolling cards for instance, and i know there are many devotees of such
an approach- and your design in F&F nappy (RM when out of TZ if roll is
successful) may, at first glance (although i have not looked at the
table itself), create too much obfuscation at the brigade movement
level for the gamer in me- AND i absolutely refuse to write orders and
roll a die to see if they get followed, nor will i select from a table
of pre-made orders - might as well let the computer play itself while i
just watch the simulation- eeccch!
Anyway, let me make this suggestion as a "fix" for the NB C2 problem-
if i remember rightly (having played NB for over a year, i have NEVER
player a historical scenario- i do hope to participate in waterlooat
NB!), army commanders on both sides have automatic (10) for
effectiveness ratings, so all corps and independent divisions are in C2
when within leader radius-
simple fix- use unadjusted effectiveness rating for army commander
(don't know what john is, but it should be low) or at least coin your
own reasonable rating knowing how it will affect the game as follows:
each turn, army commander must roll on his effectiveness #- he makes
it, no problem, all units in his command radius can transmit effective
orders- he misses the roll, corps commanders (and division commanders
lacking corps designation or not near their corps commander) in his
radius must roll on their number (just as if they were out of his
command radius), they make their number, full movement for all
divisions in command, miss number, and, as per NB rules, all divisions
have 1/2 movement for that turn (ouch!! there goes the reacting cav
option!)-
heck, give napoleon a 9 on a 10 scale (10 if you want), wellington an
8, charles a 7, and so on (don't have the blue book with me at work, so
don't know the real effectiveness ratings)
clearly this is DTE, not DTM, but it will definitely not improve allied
C2 when lines are compressed in NB-
hope to meet you at cold wars-
lamont anderson
COL Bill Gray
gamers are much more legalistic than, say, British gamers. Thus it would
seem that just mandating written orders would not be enough. It would seem
to call for orders a la Legacy/Valmy, drawn from a master list where each
directive was painstakingly defined in detail.
Otherwise you get the old, "Well that may be what you think my orders say,
but what they mean to me is this and this is why my division is doing this."
Notionally, this could be very historical as players get confused over what
they thought they were supposed to do (remember I Corps at Ligny/Quatre
Bras), but I have seen it where the player, with his helicopter view of the
battlefield, almost certainly twisted his written orders in such a way as to
take advantage of that fact.
Anyone else have this problem?
Regards,
Bill Gray
<Gen...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:38A26FA0...@earthlink.net...
COL Bill Gray
and 60+ days of terminal leave:)!
Bill Gray
Quid Veritas <quidv...@netscape.net> wrote in message
news:38A26AF9...@netscape.net...
Brick
We don't necessarily have to go through the whole nine yards involved in
drafting up a formal 5 paragraph field order.
The two most important elements here are that a Commander (wargamer) makes, 1) a
binding (ala Matt) commitment when he decides to act and 2) this act has a
specific intent (purpose). Together these elements form a baseline reference
point when associated with time, turn, bound or what have you. Granted most
wargamers tend to balk at such restrictions. Especially, if it appears that
they have created a disaster in the making. And, I won't argue that guessing
wrong really sucks! I have too many first hand experiences that already prove
that theory. But, these are the makings, the roots and foundations of all
decisive battles and catastrophic defeats.
Who out there is willing to argue against the effect that the Russo-Austrian
Army's plan at Austerlitz, had in helping to create the circumstances that lead
to their own disaster?
I don't see the necessity of creating artificial constraints and illusions that
only serve to mimic the impact of these factors, when this single function lays
at the heart of all things that are totally within a wargamer's power to enable
him to enhance the historical accuracy of the game.
Give this some careful consideration and it may appear to you as does to me that
the real challenge here is to streamline the orders process, reducing its
elements to the bare essentials of critical information and capture the
wargamers intent.
Let's ponder the how and not the why for a change.
Regards,...James
Steve Burt
>I think the biggest problem with all of this is that breaking squares et al
>is only really a concern of the brigade commander. I prefer Napoleonic
>battles where the smallest individual element is at worst a brigade, and
>preferably a division - such petty matters as the deployment of the 13th
>Regiments Voltiguers or whatnot are of no interest whatsoever.
>
>All that matters in higher level games is that steady infantry formations
>will generally be able to repel cavalry assaults, however a cavalry
>division/corps lugs enough horse artillery along so that it has at least a
>chance of defeating an opposing infantry division, just not a very good one
>in the absence of additional infantry and artillery support.
I agree absolutely. Volley & Bayonet does an excellent job of simulating battles at this level.
But most Nappy gamers scream blue murder when you tell them there is no column, line and square in the game :-(
Pete Piva
>orders for there subordinate commanders would add to the fog of war and
>the "realisim" of many games.
To make it even more interesting, put the higher commander in a separate room
and require the subordinates to send updates to the higher commander. And
create a two or three turn delay.
Then when the higher commander issues a damn fool order (either because of
outdated information, a lack of understanding of what is happening or garden
variety stupidity), the subordinate commanders are forced between choosing what
is right or what has been ordered...
Pete Piva
>that
>the real challenge here is to streamline the orders process, reducing its
>elements to the bare essentials of critical information and capture the
>wargamers intent.
Of course this can best be done with computer wargames which can add artificial
intelligence/stupidity on the part of subordinates and the fog of war.
nukday
Hark, hark. Do I hear the Prussian Kriegsspiel arising from the grave!
COL Bill Gray
DTM of an Empire and the DFE of a Nappys Battles. The concept was that once
in the Tactical Zone, the colonels and brigadiers take over and fight the
battle according to what is happening around them using the normal ACW F&F
methodology.
In the Grand Tactical Reserve Zone, the Army Commander and the efficiency of
his staff come into play. Thus you have to roll the die to determine
movement, as in original F&F, but distance doesn't matter and the modifiers
are based on the ability of the commander and his staff to get things done
efficiently and quickly. Fail this turn? There will be a better chance next
turn.
However, once a successful die roll is made, the troops are on their way,
and THERE ARE NO WRITTEN ORDERS (which is where the glitch lies, but I
despise writing orders or drawing them from a menu, just like you, and this
is the closest I could get).
Your proposal would seem to alleviate the problem I refer to but as you (and
I) hate order writing, I loathe C2 based on distance even more. Personal
preference here.
Otherwise, I have absolutely no problem giving up control below the brigade
level and consider this to be one of the great strengths of NB. Many of the
concepts that made the Napoleonic Wars unique can only be reproduced when
entire battles are played and where the corps commanders concentrate on
being exactly that. Tough to do Wagram with Empire.
Anyway, here are the Reserve Movement Die Roll results and Modifiers you
wondered about. Interestingly enough, of the 53 folks playtesting this
variant, Reserve Movement is the one area where I have received little to no
complaints whatsoever. Everyone seems to think it works fine and likes it.
It gives Nappy with Berthier about an 80% shot of getting the troops moving
the first time out, Archduke John 30% and I think this is just about right.
Regards,
Bill
Reserve Movement Modifiers
+4 Napoleon with Berthier Commanding Army
+3 Napoleon, Davout or Wellington Commanding Army.
+2 Archduke Charles, Suvorov, Lannes, etc Commanding.
+1 Kutusov, Barclay, Bagration, etc Commanding.
- 1 Archduke John, Cuesta, the Czar, etc Commanding.
+3 If one of Napoleon’s ADCs or any Army Commander
Attached to Leader.
+2 First Turn of the Game.
+2 Successful Reserve Movement Previous Turn.
+1/+2 Reserve Movement Failure Previous Turn/Two or More
Previous Turns.
-2 Unit Disengaging from Enemy.
-1 Unit Disordered.
Die Roll
0 or Less Failure – No Change in Unit Status.
1 - 2 Failure – No Change in Unit Status.
3 - 4 Failure – No Change in Unit Status.
5 - 6 Partial Failure – No Movement but All Units
Undisordered.
7 - 9 Success – All Units Undisordered, Move Normally.
10 + Success – All Units Undisordered, Move Normally.
mur...@my-deja.com wrote in message <87ukda$co0$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
>Bill-
>
>i have spent the last couple of days leisurely thinking about the C2
>problem you perceive to be in NB, and which leads you to view NB as a
>flawed system with respect to historical simulation- the command radius
>problem as you described it, and the consequential improvement in non-
>french C2 when the front is compressed (ala freidland as you presented)
>does seem "not right"- although I believe we have the world's most
>accomplished NB players here in colorado springs and i am skeptical
>that they could not crack the freidland nut with 1805-07 french,
>regardless of allied C2-**SNIP**
Malcolm McCallum
> Who out there is willing to argue against the effect that the
Russo-Austrian
> Army's plan at Austerlitz, had in helping to create the circumstances that
lead
> to their own disaster?
>
I'll take that one up. Yes, the plan contributed to the disaster but, having
played the Austerlitz scenario numerous times without any sort of binding
written orders, I can tell you that giving the allies the ability to change
plans at the drop of a hat makes little difference. The committed troops
cannot be extricated from the fight, they have no functional reserve, and do
not have any flexibility in their C2 to adapt to a crisis.
All talk about written orders seems really designed just to force someone to
continue a line of reasoning that is no longer the best. Well, I've found
that you can get that from players being stubborn or over-focussed or just
plain dim. Yes, coordination should be a consideration but written binding
orders are,I think, are too often desired for the wrong reason.
Malcolm McCallum
Pan Loaf <pan...@muck.almac.co.uk> wrote in message
news:ksCiOJo2FdzYmr...@4ax.com...
> On Wed, 9 Feb 2000 11:27:00 -0000, "Steve Burt"
> <shubni...@blackgoat.freeserve.co.uk> wrote:
>
> "During their charges ther French Cavalry captured several colours
> Their number is given as six by Thiers (Le Consulat et l'Empire) and
> by General Regnalt."
>
> Possible indication of broken British squares in my book.
>
> We should remember that most histories of the Hundred Days which are
> written in English are incredibly biased drawing mainly from sources
> who would seem likely to neglect to mention broken British squares.
Well, Dutch-Belgian, Nassau, Brunswick, Welsh or Scottish squares don't
really count afterall. ;)
Gen...@earthlink.net
the more accurate discription.
but a good idea. I've thought for a long time that computers would add
the "staff" that is as important as the commander in actual warfare.
Steve Burt
>On Wed, 9 Feb 2000 11:27:00 -0000, "Steve Burt"
><shubni...@blackgoat.freeserve.co.uk> wrote:
>
>
>>while it was forming, but the rear ranks turned round and killed them. The square didn't break. If
>>you know of an instance of a square breaking during the Hundred Days,
>>I'd be very interested to hear about it (the article I referred to
>>seemed to have trawled through the sources pretty exhaustively).
>
>
>On page 176 of the book Waterloo by Commandant Henry Lachouque there
>is a reproduction of a painting by Chaperon entitled "The last
>Trophies". It depicts French Curiassiers presenting six British
>colours to Napoleon. The accompanying text reads.
>
>"During their charges ther French Cavalry captured several colours
>Their number is given as six by Thiers (Le Consulat et l'Empire) and
>by General Regnalt."
>
Were these even infantry colours?
>Possible indication of broken British squares in my book.
>
Certainly an indication of broken British units.
>We should remember that most histories of the Hundred Days which are
>written in English are incredibly biased drawing mainly from sources
>who would seem likely to neglect to mention broken British squares.
>
Hmm. Maybe.
>Commandant Lachouque is incredibly biased the other way (you should
>see his book on the Peninsular War, the French just about win) and
>gives a very different perspective.
>
>Did the article you refer to use French language primary sources?
>
Yes. And German ones, too.
--
Steve Burt
The moral is to the physical as three is to one
Napoleon
>Pan Loaf <pan...@panloaf.fsnet.co.uk>
dunn...@my-deja.com
is a universal requirement in role-playing games. The wise umpire
would judge where a potential conflict occurs and determine the
outcome, hopefully with some guidelines.
Say:
Asking a unit to turn their flank or rear to a known enemy
Something inconsistent with previous orders
Something apparently foolhardy
The unit has just been devastated and is apparently no longer
capable of that order
etc...
The umpire might even play a few turns for both sides to keep him
interested, but impartial. He could interpret written orders from his
superior wih a limited # of words - no talking at that point.
Or rather than an expert umpire, a novice might be employed as
"Napoleon's corporal" to carry out written orders with less than say 10
words each. That would get some new guys involved.
Pax,
P_Dunn
In article <96xo4.8649$pH6.2...@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net>,
> > I tend to agree that forceing higher commanders to give a set of
written
> > orders for there subordinate commanders would add to the fog of
war and
> > the "realisim" of many games.
> >
> > although the playability factor comes into play,
> >
> >
> >
>
>
Matt DLM
written orders.
Binding orders can be handled so many differnt ways that to categorically
reject the mechanic strikes me as, well, close minded.
What was the experience with written orders that turned people off to them? How
can you rule out a game simply if it employs a certain mechanic?
In a grand-tactical game, where you issue 90% of the orders at the beginning,
and only to divisions, order writing produces historical effects that more than
justify the five minutes it takes to write all of them!
Yet, eliminate that five minutes of "effort", and you've really crippled your
ability to produce historically accurate command and control.
Granted, some rules made written orders a nightmare - they were unclear, and
not very binding. But, not all rules have failed to utilize binding orders to
great and fun effect.
Matt DeLaMater
Matt DLM
Would be fun to see how many cases we can document.
I would like to know how you feel about the rules you are using - are squares
unbreakable? frequently overrun?
More interestingly, one of the great combined arms myths perpetrated by wargmes
is that squares were often caught and charged by infantry. Many wargames rules
give great bonuses for infantry charging home against squares.
1) How many documented cases in history do we have of infantry charging static
squares? (in wargames, typically, the squares are first pinned by cavalry until
the infantry can come up)
2) Why would a square ( a veritible phalanx) suffer in a melee with infantry?
Wouldn't infantry shoot at a square rather than charge it?
3) Why do our games systems permit infantry to be caught in square so
frequently if it almost never happened in history? (this is a big clue that the
rules have some sort of problem).
Matt DeLaMater
Melancthon
I was originally turned off written orders by WRG 6th & 7th
edition Ancients and by their Renaissance set. Totally vague,
badly organized, I get a headache just thinking about them.
I agree with you that you cannot have a historical outcome
without them; but many rulesets make them painless by minimizing
the writing and using cards and counters on an offboard sheet,
like Crossbows and Cannons by 3W. A bit simplistic in this case,
but others add more detail. You'll never get gamers to write orders
unless the result and effect is clear.
The Perfect Captain
Matt DLM <mat...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20000211144258...@ng-cp1.aol.com...
Dan Cyr
and date, with possiblely a short description. This would be data, and useful.
How about we break it out for 1756-1790 (SYW and AWI), 1791-1815 (Napoleonic Wars)
and 1816-1865 (ACW and Crimean War?
An additional thread might be of infantry that stayed in line, and fought off a
cavalry charge for the same periods.
Dan
Matt DLM wrote:
> Your interesting discussion about breaking squares can be a thread unto itself.
> Would be fun to see how many cases we can document.
<<large snip>>
nukday
>
> I am intrigued by the sheer number of gamers who won't play a game if it has
> written orders.
>
Which raises a point that we really don't want 'realistic' or 'historical'
games, regardless of the rationalizations.
Besides the prior mentioned FRAGO, how many gamers out there have worked
a real OPLAN or OPORD? Very damn few.
Yet the very posters who deplore the lack of realism or historical 'form'
avoid the constraints in operation that professional soldiers deal with
in deployments, exercises, and the various training centers every day.
We want the play not the burdens and then want to claim the title
"most" accurate when we justify our rule mechanisms and theories.
DAW
Dan Higdon
news:38A48648...@worldnet.att.net...
> Which raises a point that we really don't want 'realistic' or 'historical'
> games, regardless of the rationalizations.
Hear, hear! I agree - people say they want realism, and then when they get
it,
it's not as much "fun" as they thought it would be. That very thing has
happened in
the computer sim (game) market - people for years screamed for "realistic"
sims,
and once they came out, most people found out that they made very poor
fighter
pilots (or tank commanders, or...) when not allowed to "fudge" a little.
What people really want (IMHO) is the elusive "verisimilitude". Something
that
captures enough "realism" to strike their fancy, but abstracts the less
interesting
parts (like waiting for the recovery vehicles when you throw a track in a
tank).
In my games I like to get a glipse of the tactical problems and maybe some
real
history along with my fun. Sure, I want my miniatures to be accurately
painted
(bounded by my limited painting skill), and I wouldn't be likely to play a
game
that stretched my credulity too far. The "DBA" level of abstraction suits
my
needs very well, and while it's terribly undetailed, it seems to get results
that
match what you'd expect reading battle reports, without a lot of unit
rosters
and cross-indexed tables of modifiers.
For someone who deeply cares about the penetration of a HVAP tank round
used against 45 degree sloped rolled steel, and wants their game to match
the
data from their favorite source, I suspect DBA (and similar sets) would
drive
them insane. But I'm getting off topic.
> Besides the prior mentioned FRAGO, how many gamers out there have worked
> a real OPLAN or OPORD? Very damn few.
VERY damn few. Certainly not me.
> Yet the very posters who deplore the lack of realism or historical 'form'
> avoid the constraints in operation that professional soldiers deal with
> in deployments, exercises, and the various training centers every day.
That's because they know more about the mechanics of using the weapons
and battlefield formations than they do about writing orders, and they want
a game that matches their favorite misconceptions (as someone wrote on
this list not too long ago).
As you say:
> We want the play not the burdens and then want to claim the title
> "most" accurate when we justify our rule mechanisms and theories.
I think you can have an accurate combat model and an inaccurate C&C
model. People like to lump all "realism" together, although any single game
has many different abstractions.
hdan
Dallas Gavan
> Besides the prior mentioned FRAGO, how many gamers out there have
worked
> a real OPLAN or OPORD? Very damn few.
Most gamers wouldn't know an ops plan or orders if you stapled it to
their hands. For many people the experience of orders is the one they
get from Hollywood, TV or books (or getting a pizza). When you look at
the abstractions in a game, do you really need them for most periods
anyway? Something set in the WWII-modern period may benefit from the
full gamut of reports and orders ranging from INTSUM to SMEAC but for
most of history there were no formal instructions. Orders were "Go and
do that" for all intents.
We should be equally wary of grafting modern concepts on to periods
where they don't apply as to ignoring them when they do.
Just a thought.
Dal.
--
http://www.historyserver.org/spanners.toolbox/index.shtml
nukday
Maybe, but then why all the fuss about the absence of Berthier at Waterloo?
Someone was cutting orders.
DAW
Niko Mikkanen
> Besides the prior mentioned FRAGO, how many gamers out there have worked
> a real OPLAN or OPORD? Very damn few.
> DAW
Um. Is that anything like a Pioneeritiedusteluraportti or a
Sulutussuunnitelma?
Let's face it, it's always fun to throw in special acronyms, but that
doesn't mean that people who do not know them do not have any military
experience. That was, after all, what you were asking about, right?
Some countries, like Finland, have a mandatory military service, so most
wargamers in Finland have at least a vague notion about warfare. Of
course, we haven't had a war after -45, but it's still easier to
understand what an assault behind a rolling barrage is when you have at
least practiced it. In that respect, I agree with you. Just drop the
fancy words.
GNiko
--
"There is no sweeter sound than the crumbling of your fellow man."
--Groucho Marx
nukday
FRAGO - Fragmentary Order
OPLAN - Operations Plan
OPORD - Operations Order
Does that help.
As to experience. The Americans military are doing a pretty good job in
replicating the friction of combat. The National Training Center [Army],
Twenty Nine Palms [Marines], Red Flag [Air Force], and Navy [Top Gun] give the
fighter about as good as an experience without loss of limb or life as the
real thing. Many troop were quoted after the Gulf War that it was easier
than the NTC. And yes, too many game designers grossly abuse the words
'realistic' and 'historical' in hawking their ware. Damn few of them
have been in leadership or staff positions to understand the total
environment, all the actions, work, and experience [been there, seen it,
done it] which allow or don't allow commanders and staff to make
decisions or to effect outcomes.
DAW
pgray55
For me the reasoning is simple. I am a full bird colonel in the Army and
have written more than my share of ConPlans, OpOrds and so on. Thus,
whenever I play a game I prefer not to have written orders because its too
much like work. However, I do want realism, or at least my definition of it.
And if push comes to shove, I'll go ahead and write the damn orders.
Regards to all,
Bill Gray (or Paula, or whoever the Hell I am:)
nukday <nuk...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:38A48648...@worldnet.att.net...
> Matt DLM wrote:
> >
> > I am intrigued by the sheer number of gamers who won't play a game if it
has
> > written orders.
> >
>
>
> Which raises a point that we really don't want 'realistic' or 'historical'
> games, regardless of the rationalizations.
>
> Besides the prior mentioned FRAGO, how many gamers out there have worked
> a real OPLAN or OPORD? Very damn few.
>
> Yet the very posters who deplore the lack of realism or historical 'form'
> avoid the constraints in operation that professional soldiers deal with
> in deployments, exercises, and the various training centers every day.
>
> We want the play not the burdens and then want to claim the title
> "most" accurate when we justify our rule mechanisms and theories.
>
> DAW
Dallas Gavan
I think the problem wasn't that Soult couldn't write an ops order but
that it took him a lot longer to do so (and he probably missed some
detail). The formal templates for ops orders these days is different
from the less precise orders that were drawn up then. I also think that
Berthier had an incredible memory for detail and was able to do many
things that other nations needed a formal staff organisation to do.
Berthier had his clerks, orderlies, etc but seemed to be the man who
made the decisions and worked out routes, convoy packets (to use a
modern term), resup points and etc by himself. He didn't need the
SO3SUP, SO2EME and other impedimentia [aren't all staff officers
impedimentia anyway? ;-)] we seem to need today. Impedimentia that the
OPORD is based on and needs to work.
I suppose part of the problem is that I see a definite format and chain
of events asociated with the terms rather than just the passing of
orders and instructions. And the modern terms, for me, doesn't fit the
period. Somehow I just can't picture Napoleon standing beside a mud
model, and surrounded by his generals, in the following scenario:
"All right, gents, smokes out and no questions until the end of the
orders.
Situation:
Topography- Gently rolling terrain with strongpoints here, at
Hougoumont, here at LHS and here at Papolette. The buildings in the
area are strongly built and easily defended. Travers, there's dead
ground to the ridge...."
See what I mean? ;-)
However, I understand what you mean, I think. Even in multiplayer games
the orders are usually "Bill, you've got the left opposite Tom. I'll
take the centre and Jim, you take the right." There's no plans for the
battle nor instructions as to limits of exploitation, boundaries, etc
(it's hard to talk about this without using modern terms, isn't it?)
beyond the taking of a terrain feature or two. Many one-on-one games
seem to be pure turn-by-turn reactions rather than planning as well. A
bit of planning does help (though with me it seems to help my opponent
more).
Gen...@earthlink.net
the information you are looking for is in the copy of the stratagy and
Tactics
the issue that covered Quatra Bra (sorry can't give you the issue
number) It covered both successful occasions where lines fought off
cavalry and cases of squares being broken.
in the cases of line successfully repelling cavalry while in line in
each case (3-4 if I recall correctly) the infantry had not fired prior
to this (no smoke, no fouled muskets, and carefully charged weapons) at
Cavalry units that had reached the extent of thier charge or were
already disorganized and blown.
in the cases of broken squares in most cases the infantry had already
been shaken by other causes (artillery or hev skirmish loses).
from what I've read I come to the conclusion that squares when properly
formed, by steady troops were the best possible defence against Cavalry
and allowed the Infantry to stand up in all but the worst of situations.
since it is safe to say that squares were formed hundreds and probobly
thousands of times in the face of cavalry charges during the Nap War,
and that another asstemed colligue has provided the evidence of only a
hand full of broken squares (less then 100 I believe) this supports
the belief that squares were successful at least 90% of the time. The
very fact that 1st hand reports make a major event out of the breaking
of a square further leads one to believe that it was a very rare and
noteworthy event when it did happen and that it was not something the
observer expected to see happen.
Just my two cents on the matter.
Jon-Paul Filkins
(Jon-Paul Filkins) wrote:
> In article <38A136C6...@earthlink.net>, Gen...@earthlink.net ()
> wrote:
>
> >
> > probobly in the same place I was on the only real battle field I
> > experianced
> >
> > honkered down in a bunker saying OH &^%*^$
> >
> > sorry had to have a bit of levity
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
oops, where did that comment go?
what I ment to say is I subscribe to the murphys rules school of thought
when it comes to a real battle. And In my case I would be discovering
religion in a fox hole some-where ;0)
JP
Matt DLM
at Austerlitz in Scott Bowden's latest book.
Matt DeLaMater
Malcolm McCallum
> a real OPLAN or OPORD? Very damn few.
>
I've written up 2-4 page Op Orders for a couple of Napoleonic games and each
time it has been very useful. The players are all informed, coordinated, and
know what is and is not within the sphere of their initiative. They know
what everyone else is doing and you, as the commander, are forced to spell
out exactly what the mission and plan is.
It certainly boosts their confidence in the plan and therefore they are more
likely to follow orders. As well, since no gamer takes notes in O Gps, they
have some paper that they can refer to when you make changes. (ie, phase 4
will commence 30 minutes later than originally scheduled).
No, I certainly won't be writing orders for most games but going through the
steps certainly does help one to crystalize and communicate the plan.
I'll have to try an After Action report some time....
Anthony/Susan Holton
British and two Hanoverian battalions at Minden, all in a supported
line, which steadfastly repelled repeated charges by numerous squadrons
of French cavalry.
Best Wishes,
Anthony Holton
Martin Rapier
<20000211144258...@ng-cp1.aol.com>...
> I am intrigued by the sheer number of gamers who won't play a game if it
has
> written orders.
>
> reject the mechanic strikes me as, well, close minded.
I think it depends on the nature of the order writing - those dreadful rule
sets where the allowed words & syntax are painfully spelled out etc. OTOH
something like 'SpearHead' or 'Shako' is great - just lines on the map,
possibly with some timings, list of attached/detached units, fireplans etc.
Depending on the level of game I'm running, I usually make the players do
some sort of orders, even if they only only verbal instructions, and if
units are out of communication, they can't simply respond telepathically.
With a bit of prompting you find players doing all the sensible stuff like
laying down unit boundaries, phase lines, rally points, pre-agreed flare
signals & stuff like that. In another game (simulating a WW2 Army level
attack) the orders were implicit, in that as units were redeployed from 3rd
to 2nd to 1st echelon status (Red Army), their freedom of action became
more and more constrained, until when they were actually committed, each
regiment had to stick to its assigned line of advance and not deviate at
all. This made allocation of unit sectors and timing of the commitment of
reserves critical (and in fact theRussians committed their deep manouvre
group too late).
Cheers
Martin.
Andy O'Neill
<mat...@aol.com> writes
>What was the experience with written orders that turned people off to them?
For me, there were two experiences.
Way back when I started miniatures...
There was a group of people playing WRG ancients.
This was something like 3rd edition IIRC.
They had exercise books full of written standing orders, and they used
to argue about what they meant in this or that situation.
In order that they could bend the things to the maximum effect, players
appeared to couch these in a way which they could twist easily.
Playing a game next to these people every week....
Well it left an indelible and forceful impression.
Then I played some sort of space game with written orders.
You plotted something like three or four hexes of move at the start of
your turn.
As a result there was little to no player skill as you had no chance of
working out where another ship would be, let alone the twenty or so
buzzing about crashing into one another.
Yep, crashing.
There's a Napoleonics naval game currently played at the club has
similar sort of order writing. I think I got through one game without
managing to crash.
Result.
Writing orders is associated in part of what passes for my mind with
interpretive arguments and daft annoying results.
>How
>can you rule out a game simply if it employs a certain mechanic?
Because they hate the mechanics.
Replace the mechanic or avoid the game.
In order to replace a mechanic you may have to crack the ribs of a game
open and design a new heart to whack in there.
This can be hard work.
Easiest course is to avoid the game.
For me, a short paragraph or preferably an arrow on a map for a maximum
of 4 "units" of stuff is about the most I want.
No way will I play a game where writing your orders means that the
helmsman fails to notice there's a huge great big vessel drawing right
in front of our ship.
Andy O'Neill
www.l-25.demon.co.uk/index.htm
Liverpool Wargames Association
www.l-25.demon.co.uk/LWA.htm
Andy O'Neill
<nuk...@worldnet.att.net> writes
>many game designers grossly abuse the words
>'realistic' and 'historical' in hawking their ware. Damn few of them
>have been in leadership or staff positions
I've worked and with dozens of managers in business.
Maybe approaching a hundred.
Virtually all of these have been on the courses and know what you're
supposed to do. When you talk to them about management theory they have
terminology you never even realised existed.
Some even sound pretty good until you get to see what they do.
In practice I'd say perhaps 2 of these were good at their jobs.
About a dozen or so make small mistakes but learn from them and are
generally OK.
The rest range from bad to truly unbelievably awful.
Like the project manager that took on tasks, agreed deadlines and then
came over to me to ask who we had available to do the work (nobody).
D'Oh!
Better recruit more contractors...
What? No desks left?
D'Oh!
How about setting a team to work on a project, agreeing a deadline prior
to handing them the work and then not even having a list of tasks for
them to do...
( It's usual to produce a project plan with all the tasks in it,
allocate them to people and discuss with them how long the work is going
to take... then add in up to 25% contingency ).
D'Oh!
>to understand the total
>environment, all the actions, work, and experience [been there, seen it,
>done it] which allow or don't allow commanders and staff to make
>decisions or to effect outcomes.
If the military is anything like business...
The mind boggles.
They'd be out there making those decisions, cocking em up, never
learning from their mistakes.
I'm not so sure how this maps into gaming though.
You don't really care that the troops haven't been fed today, what you
worry about is they're poor quality... not why they are.
This squad over here, the boss knows nothing, would know his acronym A
from B. What a dunce.
On the chit it says Leadership 3....
Listen to the company cook and get his impression of what'd be very
important in the war.
Talk to a grunt who's out there in the mud n guts.
Both will have a different gnats eye view of events.
On further consideration you may find that how long potato soup takes to
cook is not much use in a wargame.
Many soldiers got to fight on two hours sleep for a period of weeks and
were consequently obsessed by how to snatch some extra kip... you may
find this equally irrelevant.
I suppose the shockingly bad marksmanship most ww2 soldiers could manage
might be useful, there again few are likely to even mention this.
Andy O'Neill
<pgr...@email.msn.com> writes
>For me the reasoning is simple. I am a full bird colonel in the Army and
>have written more than my share of ConPlans, OpOrds and so on. Thus,
>whenever I play a game I prefer not to have written orders because its too
>much like work. However, I do want realism, or at least my definition of it.
>And if push comes to shove, I'll go ahead and write the damn orders.
This made me laugh out loud...
A fair bit of time at work I spend sat in front of a computer.
I'm not so keen on computer gaming.
Perhaps a more serious sort of implication is that you don't feel that
written orders are really necessary for realism?
John R. "Buck" Surdu
> - Detail. The more detail a game has could on the surface be thought to
> make a game more realistic as it directly portrays a greater proportion of
> the variables present in battle. However, does the wealth of detail itself
> become a distractor from more important historical aspects of the game by
> making it too difficult and time consuming to play?
>
Greater detail only makes a game more detailed. It MAY add more realism
if (and only iff)
the greater detail adds something to the ABSTRACTION that is neccessary
to understanding
some aspect of warfare that the author is trying to emphasize. A little
primer on
simulation terminology from someone who does this for a living:
-- fidelity deals with how well the simulation matches the real system
being modeled
-- resolution deals with the amount of detail presented in the
simulation.
Fidelity and Resolution are independent attributes. Some high-fidelity
simulations have
relatively few details, and some high-resolution simulations are very
inaccurate. The
trick is to find just those details that are neccessary, not all details
that you can.
We have all seen simple games that are good abstractions (the board game
Napoleon (with the
wooden blocks)) is a prime example in my book. We have also seen
complicated games that are
good abstractions. We have all also seen bad abstractions of both the
simple and complicated
variety.
In the final analysis, realism (which most gamers use as a surrogate for
the term fidelity)
is defined by the goals of the author. What aspects of warfare will he
emphasize/simulate.
(Short of lining us up on a field and blazing away at each other we
cannot simulated ALL
aspects.) This is why the introduction/forward to a set of rules is
important. Players should
find a set of rules that simulate those things that the players also
think are important.
The rub here is that many rules authors do not have a coherent idea of
the level of abstraction
they wish to portray in their rules -- or at least they seem to loose
focus sometime during the
development process. For instance, in an operational-level game, does
the location of skirmish
companies really matter? It takes a strong idea of the designer's goals
to curb the temptation
to add more and more crap to a set of rules as play testers and
know-it-alls who once read an
article in some magazine about a period and think they are experts want
special rules.
Once while running a game of Beer and Pretzels Skirmish (note the title
as it indicates my
intention with these rules) I had a know it all ask me how my rules took
into account the
weaker bolts on some access panel on the right side of Char-B's. I had
no response except to
give him an open-mouthed, dead fish look. (I once watched three grown
men argue for an hour about
the size and color of the stars on the side of U.S. tanks, but that is
another story.)
Buck Surdu
--------------------------------------------------------------
John R. "Buck" Surdu
Major, U.S. Army
su...@cs.tamu.edu (http://www.cs.tamu.edu/people/surdu)
JSu...@aol.com (http://members.aol.com/jsurdu)
(409) 845-9216