Reasoning for Just Verdict
Robert Jasiek
have reasoning. Why? In democracy a verdict is always given together
with reasoning. Thereby the involved parties as well as the public can
see whether or why a verdict is just.
Furthermore, reasoning ought not to pretend application of law but
ought to apply law truthfully. Also a verdict or its reasoning ought
not to bend [pervert, German: beugen] law.
Is all this the most obvious? Until recently I thought so. However,
now there has been a verdict where two instances (including the final)
have not given reasoning at all and an instance has given reasoning
that contradicts the law. Why? The cause is the EGF politics of
using Ing rules, i.e. rules that are so difficult to interpret that
courts are not always confident enough to construct interpretations
based on reasoning so just that it would bear public criticism.
However, this is not justification for omitting reasonings of
verdicts. If a court is not able to interpret law, then its verdict
can be, e.g., neutral and its reasoning can state, e.g., that more
than one interpretation does not allow any verdict favouring only one
party.
On a related topic, one should not exclaim "unsportsmanlike" if one
does not also give reasoning and explain usage and meaning of the
word. Otherwise it does not have more meaning than expressing an
opinion "guilty" while a trial is still active.
--
robert jasiek
Bernd Gramlich
> However, now there has been a verdict where two instances (including
> the final) have not given reasoning at all and an instance has given
> reasoning that contradicts the law.
Instead of merely complaining, could you please describe the case
and/or give a link to the wording the decision?
--
Bernd Gramlich [bE6nd "gRamlIC]
-
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> When a court or a referee decides on a dispute, the verdict
> should have reasoning. Why? In democracy a verdict is always
> given together with reasoning. Thereby the involved parties as
> well as the public can see whether or why a verdict is just.
This type of musing comes up repeatedly. Now recently
I am studying "computer forensics" which can involve computer
privacy law and encryption law. It turns out that Europeans have
a different attitude with regards to police powers, and whether
this is by conscious choice or largely the result of "tradition" is
unclear. A preoccuption on the part of many Americans is how
to preserve liberty while maintaining the civil order. The "civil
order" is not to be obtained by means of Stasi or KGB, but by
means of the applied rules of discourse in the conduct of how
"reasoning" occurs. A "reason" is not simply how one gets
from A-to-B; it entails the procedures of "social logic" which
present all perspectives that "have standing" (meritorious), and
from those perspectives construct a suitable balancing. Origins
for such notions in American law stem from John Locke. Thomas
Hobbes, and John Stuart Mill, in Britain, and from Montesquieu,
Rosseau, other French Enlightenment philosophers, and the Greeks,
With regards to that "A-to-B notion" there are some fascinating
pages at the Donald Kunth website for counting polyominoes
of high order, though Steven Wolfram devotes to them only a
paragraph. This was an extremely intricate and abstruse topic.
The "decision on a dispute" is not always termed a verdict.
A verdict implies something formal, as with the court, but referees
are not necessarily conducting court business, though they may
have been delegated by a court authority, such as with counting
ballots for a contested election. The referee is more akin to the
arbiter, considered as an alternative to the formal courts. Thereby
if the decision maker is a referee, the decision stands provisionally,
though after-the-fact there may be opportunity, even a right, for
appeal. The expectation of appeal usually occurs with the referees.
A sports event reaches a conclusion under time pressure, however,
so there is also an counter-expectation not to delay the validation
seal-of-approval that confirms the decision reached by a referee.
Olympics Skating "Judges" are, perhaps, more like referees, since
their decision was not final in the recent figure-skating competition,
when a Canadian silver-medallist team was also awarded a duplicate
gold medal. This is a kind of problem, since they were awarded both
the silver and gold, which elevates them above the team that won
only the gold.
One might expect to find just verdicts in a democracy, but there
is no necessary correlation between reasoned verdicts and whether
the society is a democracy or not. Indeed, when a democracy is
lacking then perhaps there is even more pressure placed upon the
courts to present reasoned verdicts, because that society might have
more difficulty with problems to maintain "civil order." The presence
of democracy can also work against the need to present reasoned
verdicts, because it could be taken for granted that procedures for
arriving at the verdict were already sourced from the democracy.
So we find much controversy concerning any correlations there.
There is a difference between reasoning and rationalization, though we
could require services of a phD dissertation to disentangle the two.
A rationalization provides an explanation for some "A-to-B" event,
as by its necessity, even an obsession or compulsion. Reasoning,
however, at least by the American language dictionaries, entails a
discussion among participants, as with a forum, so is -NOT- a "crack
the whip" motion in the sense of Nietzsche's treatment for women.
In the course of moderated discussion, perspectives not obtaining
rationality do not attain meritorious standing, so are not generally
allowed into play when weaving the tapestry of social reasoning.
If, however, the overall process should exclude alternative rational
perspectives, in haste for closure upon a set of rational arguments,
then the process has not attained the quality of "reasonability" which
for its proper understanding must be inclusive rather than exclusive.
Much literature preceeds us, concerning what renders a verdict
"just", so we should not expect to be comprehensive or even improve
upon our predecessors. The verdict must satisfy participants to the
court action, otherwise the participants will seek means alternative
to the courts which may involve terrorism, violence, and other
"extra-legal" means. The task of a judge is to restore "civil order"
while not infringing upon the liberties of those who are party to the
action, and those who are not party to the action (general public).
Judges are usually successful in their endeavor, because they are
professionals and there is already much respect for judges, however
there have been notable exceptions serving to remind of fallibility.
One question to ask would be whether a "just verdict" must be immune
to appeal. There is some divergent opinion on this matter, perhaps
owing to another (similar) lack of correlation among the concepts.
When a court decision is released, sometimes there is the "short
version" and the "longer version" and also a "much longer version"
so one should not be too hasty to criticize the "short version" of an
opinion if it did not include references to the panoply of reasonings
and considerations that may, in fact, be available elsewhere, though
sometimes obtaining the documentation might require a finder's fee
or publication cost (becoming a moot point today with the ease of
electronic filing and dissemination). When one meets with a "brick
wall" in the course of conducting investigations, then there may be
many other explanations alternative to the paranoid conspiracy theory.
In privacy cases, for example, stonewalling might protect privacy
concerns. But privacy concerns are not germane to public financing
issues in open governance for Karl Popper's open society notion.
Many people become discouraged by closed societies, and so
they become persuaded to neglect their sovereign citizen rights
in democratic society. The rhetoric of "class warfare" and even the
counter-rhetoric critical of "class warfare" rhetoric, may obfuscate.
There is a public sector and private sector. Where they blend, or
form quasi-public agencies, with deregulations, then one tendency
is for the rules applicable to private sectors to be carried over into
the public sector contribution, and thereby the concomitant loss of
some prior privileges that formerly were available to public sectors.
Where possible, look to the "longer version" and, if necessary, the
"much longer version" for locating insights into the court reasoning.
> Furthermore, reasoning ought not to pretend application of law but
> ought to apply law truthfully. Also a verdict or its reasoning ought
> not to bend [pervert, German: beugen] law.
Pretending is actually at one foundation for law, since testimony
of fiction may be regarded as preceeding testimony of fact. If the
truth is going to be something arrived at, then presuming truth from
the outset might predispose the verdict to something other than what
it might have been, were the inquiry conducted on assumptionless
grounds. The notion of "bend" seems rather abstruse, so I shall leave
it for the experts who may help clarify what use it should be put to.
Law is not merely static, but can be evolving and dynamic. We had no
law, then law came about; law became more complicated; there were
changes in law. Unless a larger picture for what law has been, is,
and may be, can be obtained, then there's not much chance for an
understanding of non-static law, when law is amidst process reality.
Biochemical evolutions, or X-Men mutation, do not appear to have
much precedence in law, even at efforts with xenobiological space law.
> Is all this the most obvious? Until recently I thought so. However,
> now there has been a verdict where two instances (including the final)
> have not given reasoning at all and an instance has given reasoning
> that contradicts the law. Why? The cause is the EGF politics of
> using Ing rules, i.e. rules that are so difficult to interpret that
> courts are not always confident enough to construct interpretations
> based on reasoning so just that it would bear public criticism.
> However, this is not justification for omitting reasonings of
> verdicts. If a court is not able to interpret law, then its verdict
> can be, e.g., neutral and its reasoning can state, e.g., that more
> than one interpretation does not allow any verdict favouring only one
> party.
Quantum mechanics may exhibit multiple outcomes from a "psi"
state-vector, even with parallel universes, so one question at that
point is to ask how many parallel unverses are involved and go about
counting them. Sixteen is not an "unreasonable" number, some say.
Here's an interesting poll: inform contestants there will be a huge
reward to the person who guesses which number between 1-100
will be selected the -LEAST- (by secret ballot), as with a lottery.
> On a related topic, one should not exclaim "unsportsmanlike" if one
> does not also give reasoning and explain usage and meaning of the
> word. Otherwise it does not have more meaning than expressing an
> opinion "guilty" while a trial is still active.
I would be uncomfortable associating these two terms so closely
that a conclusion concerning their proper deployment in the rules for
logic must by necessity bring them into uniform categorical coherence.
Sports, unlike matters of life and death, should be optional pursuits.
- regards
- jb
Robert Jasiek
Bernd Gramlich wrote:
> Instead of merely complaining,
I do not see it as a mere complaint but as a proposal how courts
should issue verdicts in future.
(What follows is about the particular dispute only.)
> could you please describe the case
> and/or give a link to the wording the decision?
Of course, especially since verdicts should be public although so
far EGF third instance trials and verdicts have not been public.
However, only Matti Siivola as a representative of the third
instance court judging on the case "EGC 2002 round 2 Mero-Jasiek"
has informed me as follows:
>>
Subject:
Decision about Robert's protest
Date:
Thu, 12 Sep 2002 09:36:27 +0300
From:
Matti Siivola <Matti....@helsinki.fi>
To:
commission....@european-go.org
Dear Robert,
Your protest has been handled by the rest of the rules and ratings
commission.
Six members out of seven took part in the discussion. We agreed that the
decision of the appeals commssion will be not changed, with slightly
varying reasons.
What measures should the commission take for future cases was not
decided
and is left to be decided later.
on behalf of the rest of the rules and ratings commission
Matti Siivola
<<
Notes: I consider this to be public since it is the decision sent
to me as one of the players involved in the dispute. The "rest of the
rules and ratings commision" is the EGF Rules and Ratings Commission
except those persons involved in the dispute, i.e. except me. Since
the "To:" addresses only one of the players (me), I cannot know
whether or how the other player involved in the dispute has been
informed as well. The "slightly varying reasons" have not been
explained to me. On my request to Matti Siivola he has stated his
personal reasons, which, however, vary more than slightly. However,
I have not received any reasoning from the court as a body, except
the above claim of the existence of "slightly varying reasons".
The referee judging in the first instance, IIRC, did not state
reasons for his verdict that the game shall continue with removals
and counting. The appeals committe judging in the second instance
gave "because the game is in a pause" as the reasoning for its
verdict that the game shall continue with removals and counting.
The dispute was simplified as follows:
The game proceeded until a succession of four pass plays had
occurred with Jasiek passing last. Then Mero was about to remove
stones while Jasiek pointed out that according to the Ing 1991
rules it was not legal to remove stones when the game end had
occurred and only counting was still to be done. Therefore we let
decide the referee, then I appealed and let decide the appeals
committee, then I appealed and let decide the third instance court.
To keep the thread reasonably concise, I shall discuss interpretation
of late game stages under Ing rules separately.
--
robert jasiek
Robert Jasiek
- wrote:
[further interesting parts skipped]
> The verdict must satisfy participants to the
> court action, otherwise the participants will seek means alternative
> to the courts which may involve terrorism, violence, and other
> "extra-legal" means.
I agree. Therefore I asked the appeals committee to explain its
reasoning so that I would be enabled to apply the decision.
Unfortunately, the attempt of explanation did not explain me the
given reasoning and I had to proceed with the game nevertheless.
> Where possible, look to the "longer version" and, if necessary, the
> "much longer version" for locating insights into the court reasoning.
Such I do not expect after the time elapsed since the final judgement,
its lacking promise to provide details later, and considering that I
had provided my view on possible rules interpretations together with
my appeal so that an approach to reasoning has been available in
principle.
> Pretending is actually at one foundation for law, since testimony
> of fiction may be regarded as preceeding testimony of fact. If the
> truth is going to be something arrived at, then presuming truth from
> the outset might predispose the verdict to something other than what
> it might have been, were the inquiry conducted on assumptionless
> grounds.
Right. Here I have referred to truth not to the truth of the
particular case but to something that is supposed to exist so
that one can find and then apply it. IIUYC, that thing to be
found could be remodelled during the process of finding it?
Why not, however, if we presume an existing sense of justice
independently of a case, then a remodelling of truth would be
an extension of a previously existing concept of truth but would
not dismiss that entirely to replace it by a completely fresh
concept of truth.
> The notion of "bend" seems rather abstruse,
Just in general I refer to "bend" as a violation or contradiction
of law. E.g., if the law says "Punishment may not be to kill a
human being.", then a sentence "The accused shall be killed." bends
the law (quite severely indeed).
> I would be uncomfortable associating these two terms so closely
> that a conclusion concerning their proper deployment in the rules for
> logic must by necessity bring them into uniform categorical coherence.
OC, their association need not to be so close. Contrarily, it has
been my observation that usage lets them appear closely related
too often and too prematurely.
--
robert jasiek
Bernd Gramlich
>> could you please describe the case and/or give a link to the wording
>> the decision?
>
> Of course, especially since verdicts should be public although so far
> EGF third instance trials and verdicts have not been public.
Agreed.
> However, I have not received any reasoning from the court as a body,
> except the above claim of the existence of "slightly varying
> reasons".
A short public summary of these reasons would be nice. But in any
case, the decision of the RRC is final. Intuitively, I would have
decided likewise, but justifying my decision might have proven tricky.
> To keep the thread reasonably concise, I shall discuss interpretation
> of late game stages under Ing rules separately.
Have you asked the Ing Foundation for their interpretation?
Robert Jasiek
Bernd Gramlich wrote:
> A short public summary of these reasons would be nice. But in any
> case, the decision of the RRC is final.
I do not doubt that the RRC decision is final. However, since it
contradicts the rules, if I were a referee and had to judge about
a similar case, then all I could do is to tell the players that
a judgement depending on the rules is not possible and why and
that therefore the judgement has to be "default draw".
> Intuitively, I would have decided likewise,
If _we_ were to write something like Ing rules, then we would
describe the game end handling clearly, e.g. like in International
Rules. One of the problems with Ing rules is that they are neither
intuitive nor desirable.
> but justifying my decision might have proven tricky.
Easy if jurisdiction wants to override legislature and executive.
Then, e.g., frequent practice could be declared to have higher
priority than both.
There are some much more difficult justifications that one can
come up with (although I am not convinced in such, see my
interpretation) but I believe in the power of the legislature. So I
apply the rules and do not encourage courts to violate them or to
disrespect legislature and executive.
> Have you asked the Ing Foundation for their interpretation?
More than once. They never reply.
--
robert jasiek
Pawel Slusarz
news:3D915432...@snafu.de...
> When a court or a referee decides on a dispute, the verdict should
> have reasoning. Why? In democracy a verdict is always given together
> with reasoning. Thereby the involved parties as well as the public can
> see whether or why a verdict is just.
This has much less to do with democracy (court is NOT a democratic
institution), but more with the due process. Due process is a rather
long and thorough procedure put in place because breaking the law can
have very serious consequences. In sports you traditionally do not get a
due process, because a speedy resolution is preferable to one which may
be ultimately more just, but halt a tournament for years. Referees may
act on their "gut feelings" and hence they are not required to provide
an explanation for their decision. Primary purpose of a referee decision
is to allow the play (or the tournament) to continue smoothly, and the
decision does not have to be just, but it still gets carried out.
> The game proceeded until a succession of four pass plays had
> occurred with Jasiek passing last. Then Mero was about to remove
> stones while Jasiek pointed out that according to the Ing 1991
> rules it was not legal to remove stones when the game end had
> occurred and only counting was still to be done. Therefore we let
> decide the referee,
It seems to me that, while you were technically correct, the referee
made the right decision by continuing the game. Lack of knowledge of the
exact protocol for ending the game should not prevent the player who
ultimately had the better position from winning.
This is not to say that I think you were in the wrong for starting the
dispute. As a result, the tournament authority should amend the rules in
the future.
Paul
makko
I don't know, but I feel somewhat uncomfortable, since all this
attitude, maybe "etiquette", is to me like corroding the beauty of Go.
Robert Jasiek
Pawel Slusarz wrote:
> This has much less to do with democracy (court is NOT a democratic
> institution),
A court in a democratic structure is part of that. I have meant that
relation and not the court alone for itself. A go court in the
democratic EGF is like a court in a country or a union of states that
is democratic.
> but more with the due process. Due process is a rather
> long and thorough procedure put in place because breaking the law can
> have very serious consequences.
Due process is another important aspect.
> In sports you traditionally do not get a
> due process, because a speedy resolution is preferable to one which may
> be ultimately more just, but halt a tournament for years. Referees may
> act on their "gut feelings" and hence they are not required to provide
> an explanation for their decision. Primary purpose of a referee decision
> is to allow the play (or the tournament) to continue smoothly, and the
> decision does not have to be just, but it still gets carried out.
Sports like athletics is not go. In go referees may also try to
rule reasonably quickly, however, they are not supposed to rule
so quickly that they cannot understand their own rulings. They
must know them if for no other reason than to state it to a
next appeals court, if used, because that will hear also the
referee. Furthermore, in go situations can occur repeatedly. So
it is useful if a decision can be applied the next time instead
of creating new disputes with new judgements whenever a situation
reappears.
> It seems to me that, while you were technically correct, the referee
> made the right decision by continuing the game. Lack of knowledge of the
> exact protocol for ending the game should not prevent the player who
> ultimately had the better position from winning.
One might change the Ing rules and their headline statement that a
contest of competition applies to alternation and to removals of
stones so that some new rules of play would be a contest only about
alternation. The new rules would also have to disallow any
strategic option of intervening successions of less than three
pass plays possibly having strategic relevance.
> This is not to say that I think you were in the wrong for starting the
> dispute. As a result, the tournament authority should amend the rules in
> the future.
I think you give a nice summary of what can be done in future.
--
robert jasiek
Robert Jasiek
makko wrote:
> I don't know, but I feel somewhat uncomfortable, since all this
> attitude, maybe "etiquette", is to me like corroding the beauty of Go.
That's what application of bad rules is about. They are not
beautiful, so their application is not, either. If we want
beauty, then we must change the rules.
--
robert jasiek
-
irde...@gmx.de (makko) wrote:
>
>
> I don't know, but I feel somewhat uncomfortable, since all this
> attitude, maybe "etiquette", is to me like corroding the beauty of Go.
R.Jasiek correctly identified this source of corrosion with the
Ing Rule formulations. I suspect that something was lost in the
Rules translations, or that antipathy persists among the Taiwanese
for explaining the "officious" character of the Ing Rules, and so for
further explanations I would examine the Taiwan-China relationship.
Though some could say "beauty is in the eye of the beholder" it
seems possible to arrive at a common preliminary agreement with
regards to certain descriptors for "beauty" in the general sense.
If it is possible to conduct a computer programming obfuscation
contest, then one could turn that around to pronouce the loser of
such contests a "beautiful" coding example. Computer development
was at inception not necessarily a "beautiful" enterprise, but with
its recent marvels has attained a more respectable status, shifting
from the (unpopular) "geek" or "nerd" characterization to various
and assorted arts and crafts arrangements, which in effect mimic
the classic science-fiction short-story "Flowers for Algernon" made
into its classic film equivalent _Charly_. The race against time is
then viewed also as a race between life and death, infusing one
with a sense of purpose for adding final touches here and there.
I do not yet find any statement from the tournament organizers
that the "EGC 2002 Round 2 Mero-Jasiek" game was conducted
under pre-agreed auspices of the Ing 1991 Rules. This seems to
be a critical missing-link in the problem statement establishing how
a chain-of-causation could extend from that which might conclude
the result in some manner different from alternative counting systems.
Once the stipulation of Ing 1991 Rules can be provided, then further
consideration for the status of this "EGC 2002 Round 2 Mero-Jasiek"
game may resume.
- regards
- jb
Bill Spight
> Referees may
> act on their "gut feelings" and hence they are not required to provide
> an explanation for their decision.
As an ACBL contract bridge director I was trained to make all rulings
from the rule book. That is good and correct procedure, even if you know
the book backwards and forwards. It is a good procedure for go directors
and referees, as well.
As a bridge player I sometimes ask for a ruling from the book if the
director has given a ruling without reading the relevant law. If Robert
had done that, I suspect that he would have gotten the ruling he wanted.
Sometimes the rules are open to interpretation, do not cover the
situation, or give the referee or director discretion. Only in such
cases should referees act on their gut feelings. And in those cases they
should provide an explanation and inform the players that they may
appeal the decision.
Best,
Bill
Robert Jasiek
- wrote:
> I do not yet find any statement from the tournament organizers
> that the "EGC 2002 Round 2 Mero-Jasiek" game was conducted
> under pre-agreed auspices of the Ing 1991 Rules.
Deliberately I have simplified the issue here so that everybody has
a slight chance of following what was going on. In particular I
have ignored the context of EGF tournament rulesets, which include
- EGF Tournament Rules 1997-8
- EGF Fujitsu GP Guidelines 1997-8
- EGF Fujistsu GP Regulations 1997-8
- Rules and Ratings Commissions Tasks 1997-8
- EGF Precedents for Tournament Rules 2001
In one of them there is a reference that the default EGF rules of
play are the Ing rules of play 1991. In practice and given the
context of EGF history this means that the EGC uses Ing rules on
all boards if the Ing Wei-ch'i Educational Foundation (or
something equivalent) is the only main sponsor. That was affirmed
shortly before the EGC02 and so the Ing 1991 rules were in effect
as well.
--
robert jasiek
Simon Goss
>When a court or a referee decides on a dispute, the verdict should
>have reasoning. Why? In democracy a verdict is always given together
>with reasoning. Thereby the involved parties as well as the public can
>see whether or why a verdict is just.
>
>Furthermore, reasoning ought not to pretend application of law but
>ought to apply law truthfully. Also a verdict or its reasoning ought
>not to bend [pervert, German: beugen] law.
>
>Is all this the most obvious? Until recently I thought so.
Rules of a game and laws are different things, with rather different
objectives, and for that reason courts and referees can be subject to
different criteria. So I'm worried by some of your analogies.
Be that as it may, there is law and there is justice. Sometimes courts
are faced with situations where a law has just intentions, but a
particular application of a law would be unjust. That is why we
sometimes see cases where people are let off free, or fined one 0.01
Euro, for actions which were innocent and harmless, although technically
they broke some law. It is also why we sometimes see civil actions in
which "derisory" damages are awarded. I don't think laws and courts are
there to allow people to gain unfair advantages over others by
exploiting technicalities. Rather, part of their job is to prevent that.
Likewise game rules and referees.
In the present case, you have argued that Mr. Mero's removal of the
stones after the four consecutive passes was against the rules, and that
the rules forbid resumption of play. For the sake of discussion, let us
assume that you're right about this. (Actually, I believe you are. Your
analysis in the other thread seems convincing to me). The question,
then, is "so what?"
You described what happened in this way:
>The dispute was simplified as follows:
>
>The game proceeded until a succession of four pass plays had occurred
>with Jasiek passing last. Then Mero was about to remove stones while
>Jasiek pointed out that according to the Ing 1991 rules it was not legal
>to remove stones when the game end had occurred and only counting was
>still to be done. Therefore we let decide the referee, then I appealed
>and let decide the appeals committee, then I appealed and let decide the
>third instance court.
Unless you are claiming that Mr. Mero was deliberately cheating, we
should assume from this that he believed that he was allowed to remove
the stones. On the assumption that your interpretation of the rules is
correct, he was wrong in this belief, but perhaps we should consider it
to be a justifiable misunderstanding on his part, because you yourself
have said things like:
<...>
>Ing rules, i.e. rules that are so difficult to interpret that
>courts are not always confident enough to construct interpretations
>based on reasoning so just that it would bear public criticism.
and you needed an extremely long article with extremely close reasoning
to justify your interpretation.
So, we are assuming that your interpretation of Ing91 is correct, and
that Mr. Mero misunderstood them in a justifiable way. Where does
justice lie?
You seem to be saying that a referee has no options here: if the rules
address the question, then he is obliged to seek the correct
interpretation of them and apply it rigorously. I no more agree with
this than I would agree with a judge being forced to imprison somebody
who failed to comply with the archaic, but (so I'm told) never repealed,
English law that every Englishman must do archery practice on Sunday.
When the exact meaning of the rule is apparently so difficult to be
certain of, the effect of shackling the referee in that way would likely
be that the person who wins is not necessarily the most skilled player,
but the most skilled rules debater. A horrible way to go, IMHO.
Robert, I believe that you and I are probably agreed that the ideal way
to avoid this kind of dispute is ultimately to adopt a set of rules
unambiguous enough to leave no room for it - and easy enough to
understand. But until the ideal can be achieved, we all have to find
ways to manage.
From these perspectives, IMHO the decision for playing on was fair and
wise. It is the only decision that I can see that allows the game result
to be determined by the fuskei+middlegame+yose without requiring the
players to have high expertise in rules interpretation. IMO, such a
requirement would drive people away from Go congresses.
In this instance, there was a way to avoid the dispute, and all lengthy
rules debate, had you wished to. It would have been to point out that
the rules don't allow that, but to accept that it was an innocent
mistake for which the opponent should not be penalised, and to offer to
continue play. The only thing you give up from doing this is the
opportunity to claim on a technicality points that you haven't earned
during the contest of skill.
>The cause is the EGF politics of using Ing
>rules
Agreed. I think it's also true that the benefit we get from using them,
in terms of the support we get for educational and promotional projects,
greatly outweighs the small trouble we have from the difficulties in
interpreting the rules. (Small trouble, not because it's easy, but
because we really don't need to get into it very often). Rules
considerations really must take a back seat to those considerations,
IMO.
Best regards,
--
Simon
-
Simon Goss <si...@gosoft.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> ... You seem to be saying that a referee has no options here: if the
> interpretation of them and apply it rigorously. I no more agree with
> this than I would agree with a judge being forced to imprison somebody
> who failed to comply with the archaic, but (so I'm told) never repealed,
> English law that every Englishman must do archery practice on Sunday.
Perhaps there is some statement in the Tournament RuleSet
which speaks toward the binding authority of referees, even for
situations involving the possibility of complex misinterpretation.
> When the exact meaning of the rule is apparently so difficult to be
> certain of, the effect of shackling the referee in that way would likely
> be that the person who wins is not necessarily the most skilled player,
> but the most skilled rules debater. A horrible way to go, IMHO.
Mr.Goss has outlined two basic alternatives in the form of "the
game of Go" (maybe as it ought to be), and (paraphrased) "legalism
in forms of technical chicanery for purposes of quibbling/bickering."
There is a third alternative, however, which R.Jasiek invokes: this
consists of (paraphrased) "Tournament Rules (for any generic game)
as adopted by various EGF Guidelines, Regulations, Commissions,
and Precedents." It seems reasonable to say that once the EGF
embarks upon its thorny path of legalisms that they intend to follow
through on that thorny path when players such as R.Jasiek put the
legalisms to use. Had the EGF sought to avoid the instance which
R.Jasiek presents, then the EGF should not be adopting its complex
legalisms from the outset. One could speculate on why the EGF had
placed itself into such hot water: there is a -personality- who seeks
to -dominate- group discussions with the specious "authoritarianism"
attendant upon legalistic tangles with extremely complicated rulesets.
Rather than complain here after-the-fact about R.Jasiek's privilege
to -debate- the EGF Ruleset interpretations, the discussion should
rightfully not hinder player perogatives, once Rulesets are Adopted,
but address the EGF Guidelines, Regulations, Commissions, and/or
Precedents that enabled the consequent scenario R.Jasiek identifies.
Presumably, such anticipations were envisioned at EGF Conferences;
now R.Jasiek "rises to the occasion" with envisionings anticipated.
It is -incorrect- to criticize R.Jasiek's invocation of EGF legalisms.
If the EGF legalisms are inappropriate then they could be elided.
If it appears that the EGF has invited "games other than Go" then
R.Jasiek seeks to play those games as well under EGF Tournament Rules.
Rather often it is difficult in a context of promulgating Guidelines,
Regulations, Commissions, and Precedents, to opt for simplicity
in place of complexity, owing to the mistaken assumption that "more"
langauge should denote "more" gaming potential, and also owing to
the mistaken assumption that the dominator personalities with their
airs of authenticity, who tend to be more vocal and vociferous, should
enact in language what could alternatively better be left unsaid. Yet
now here is the EGF, perhaps with referees who had not attended those
prolific EGF Guidelines, Regulations, Comissions, and Precedents,
attempting to -backtrack- on its prior committments by those dominator
personalities with airs of authenticity, while in the procedure laying
blame upon players of a Tournament, who were among paying entrants
to the fee subscription procedure -supportive- of such shenanigans.
> Robert, I believe that you and I are probably agreed that the ideal way
> to avoid this kind of dispute is ultimately to adopt a set of rules
> unambiguous enough to leave no room for it - and easy enough to
> understand. But until the ideal can be achieved, we all have to find
> ways to manage.
Yes, indeed. If players don't like Rulesets then new Rulesets
could be adopted. Once a Tournament is in Progress, however,
then the RuleSets in effect for Round One should not be changed
for Round Two and thereafter. R.Jasiek is correct to apply RuleSets
in effect for Round One when attempting to arbitrate Round Two.
The time to change or enact a RuleSet occurs (preferably) prior to
Tournament Registration, and prior to any collection of playing fees.
Finding "ways to manage" seems to be precisely the complaint lodged:
"bending the law" should -not- be considered as a legitimate tactic.
I am reminded of "hand-eye coordination" with respect to video games,
or even such things as playing a stone on its intended point (without
sliding), not touching stones when there is no justification for it,
or (for internet players), mistaken mouse clicks with refused "undo."
> From these perspectives, IMHO the decision for playing on was fair and
> wise. It is the only decision that I can see that allows the game result
> to be determined by the fuskei+middlegame+yose without requiring the
> players to have high expertise in rules interpretation. IMO, such a
> requirement would drive people away from Go congresses.
Given the RuleSet in effect, players should have been driven away
prior to that European Go Congress, or form their own Go Congress.
If R.Jasiek's opponent should be disgruntled by the application of the
RuleSet then pressure could be brought to bear upon the EGF for an
appropriate RuleSet clarification. Mr.Goss strikes me as a person
well-equipped for presenting such cogent arguments, in conjunction
with R.Jasiek's opponent, so that R.Jasiek should not be awarded any
more "suprise wins" by scurrilous/questionable legalism technicality.
Perhaps some other players who would also -not- object to the usual
"revolutions" for topsy-turvy organizations to inject new names/faces.
"Term limits" could be adopted in the by-laws to promulgate fresh
newspaper in their anonymous birdcages for those pooper-scoopers.
> In this instance, there was a way to avoid the dispute, and all lengthy
> rules debate, had you wished to. It would have been to point out that
> the rules don't allow that, but to accept that it was an innocent
> mistake for which the opponent should not be penalised, and to offer to
> continue play. The only thing you give up from doing this is the
> opportunity to claim on a technicality points that you haven't earned
> during the contest of skill.
That "begged the question" on the types of skill being measured.
R.Jasiek considers that EGF RuleSet legalisms offer extensions upon
the simplified gaming activity, enacted for the express purpose of
presenting his case to the opponent, the referees, and this newsgroup.
If the Ing 1991 RuleSet was in effect, and R.Jasiek has not erred in
his description of the grievance, then R.Jasiek should be awarded his
win. Yes, it does not sound like Go, but then EGF by all appearances
was determined not to play "normative Go" in the first place, and all
European Tournament Entrants had agreed to the EGF constructions
when paying membership and playing fees, and electing representatives.
>> The cause is the EGF politics of using Ing rules
> Agreed. I think it's also true that the benefit we get from using them,
> in terms of the support we get for educational and promotional projects,
> greatly outweighs the small trouble we have from the difficulties in
> interpreting the rules. (Small trouble, not because it's easy, but
> because we really don't need to get into it very often). Rules
> considerations really must take a back seat to those considerations,
> IMO.
This has not been adequately explained: why the EFG adoption of
the Ing 1991 RuleSets was in any way, shape or form correlated with
what Mr.Goss describes as "educational and promotional projects."
- regards
- jb
.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 23:31:23 -0500
From: xganon <rema...@xganon.com>
Subject: Another Secret Door Found In Great Pyramid
Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy
From: kcaj_...@yahoo.com
National Geographic
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/09/0923_020923_egypt.html
---
This post was anonymized at http://www.xganon.com
---
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael G. Dobbins
"Simon Goss" <si...@gosoft.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:2WXzOxAq...@gosoft.demon.co.uk...
> Robert, I believe that you and I are probably agreed that the ideal way
> to avoid this kind of dispute is ultimately to adopt a set of rules
> unambiguous enough to leave no room for it - and easy enough to
> understand. But until the ideal can be achieved, we all have to find
> ways to manage.
I believe that this is the key point of this issue, not the determined
status of this game but to force the powers that be to face the issue of
ambiguous rules. I applaud Robert for all of his efforts to uncover these
issues and push them into the public view. This is like programming
practices, do you go back and rewrite some code to fix the real root cause
of a bug or do you apply a quick fix patch that hides the effects of the
bug. In the long run these quick fixes which only hide the root cause come
back and bite you. Finding a way to manage is only a quick fix. Fixing the
rules to be unambiguous fixes the root cause.
-
>> to avoid this kind of dispute is ultimately to adopt a set of rules
>> unambiguous enough to leave no room for it - and easy enough to
>> understand. But until the ideal can be achieved, we all have to find
>> ways to manage.
"Michael G. Dobbins"
<michael.dob...@No.Spam.unisys.No.Spam.com.No.Spam> wrote:
> I believe that this is the key point of this issue, not the determined
> status of this game but to force the powers that be to face the issue of
> ambiguous rules. I applaud Robert for all of his efforts to uncover these
> issues and push them into the public view. This is like programming
> practices, do you go back and rewrite some code to fix the real root
> cause of a bug or do you apply a quick fix patch that hides the effects
> of the bug. In the long run these quick fixes which only hide the root
> cause come back and bite you. Finding a way to manage is only a quick
> fix. Fixing the rules to be unambiguous fixes the root cause.
Yes, I would tend to think simplicity is a key, but then I had
also previously identified certain differences in the "police power"
notion for Europeans, and there may be other differences in their
notions for (cultural) "reason" in play. To my mind it seems rather
stinky to set up RuleSet legalisms merely as pitfalls for technical
RuleSet wizards like R.Jasiek to discover, and then to apply. Does
that explanation provided by Mr.Goss leave an open-ended question
for those loosey-goosey "interpretations" which, apparently, some can
supply but others cannot? So all did -not- appear to be privileged
equally in the discussion there, not merely an absense of "due
process" but also a failure to obtain "equal protection", which were
two of the most basic principles enshrined by (English) common-law.
More critical to the discussion seems to be a premise that rules being
laid-down for OTHERS are also rules by which one is willing to abide.
Many (unfortunate) case exceptions to the universal premise appear
haphazardly, owing to "moral inequivalence" hangovers in culture wars.
The United Nations, however, whose role seems to be -slightly- more
effectual than the League of Nations, operates at odds to the presumed
"moral inequivalence" doctrine, where such things as equal votes can
supply representation from sovereign nations, having accoutrements of
a Security Council with inner-sanctum chambers of five veto nations.
Mr.Goss had identified "educational and promotional projects" so I
would surmise we are -enacting- that procedure at this very moment.
Then again, it was bewildering to find excess "No.Spam" items in your
stated point-of-contact "email address" which were not simplest. :-)
Bill Spight
> Unless you are claiming that Mr. Mero was deliberately cheating, we
> should assume from this that he believed that he was allowed to remove
> the stones. On the assumption that your interpretation of the rules is
> correct, he was wrong in this belief, but perhaps we should consider it
> to be a justifiable misunderstanding on his part
...
> So, we are assuming that your interpretation of Ing91 is correct, and
> that Mr. Mero misunderstood them in a justifiable way. Where does
> justice lie?
>
> You seem to be saying that a referee has no options here: if the rules
> address the question, then he is obliged to seek the correct
> interpretation of them and apply it rigorously.
Pardon a comment from an outsider, but this whole thing strikes me as
incredible.
As I understand it, not only was this tournament conducted under Ing
rules, the Ing rules are the default, so that many tournaments are
conducted under them. Furthermore, this is not a question of some
strange, rare position that puzzles even experienced players. We are
talking about normal end of game procedure, something that affects
nearly every game.
Looking at the Ing rules, it appears to me that
1) stones may be removed
a) by play, or
b) by agreement during the pause;
2) they may not be removed after the end of the game, until the game is
counted, unless there is a resignation.
Even if I am wrong about that, everybody should know the procedures for
ending the game and for removing stones. If the correct procedure is
unfamiliar to the players, the tournament sponsor should inform them of
the correct procedure, either through written material or through a
brief talk at the start of the tournament.
Best,
Bill
-
> - wrote:
>> Pretending is actually at one foundation for law, since testimony
>> of fiction may be regarded as preceeding testimony of fact. If the
>> truth is going to be something arrived at, then presuming truth from
>> the outset might predispose the verdict to something other than what
>> it might have been, were the inquiry conducted on assumptionless
>> grounds.
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> Right. Here I have referred to truth not to the truth of the
> particular case but to something that is supposed to exist so
> that one can find and then apply it. IIUYC, that thing to be
> found could be remodelled during the process of finding it?
> Why not, however, if we presume an existing sense of justice
> independently of a case, then a remodelling of truth would be
> an extension of a previously existing concept of truth but would
> not dismiss that entirely to replace it by a completely fresh
> concept of truth.
If the truth is going to be something found, then how had
the truth become lost in the first place? Is justice always in
existence independently of a case? What of "case by case"?
If truth can change by remodelling, then what of an infinitely
nested condition of remodelling? How does one distinguish
what is remodelled and what is not?
>> The notion of "bend" seems rather abstruse,
> Just in general I refer to "bend" as a violation or contradiction
> of law. E.g., if the law says "Punishment may not be to kill a
> human being.", then a sentence "The accused shall be killed."
> bends the law (quite severely indeed).
This severe bending was 180-degrees, or an antithesis, which
makes ambiguous the direction into which the bend had occurred.
That notion continues to remain abstruse, or perhapd another idea
other than "bend" was intended.
Robert Jasiek
Bill Spight wrote:
> the tournament sponsor should inform them of
> the correct procedure, either through written material or through a
> brief talk at the start of the tournament.
The sponsor has done this or it has been done virtually on his
request occasionally but not every year. Tournament organizers
are not always eager enough to bother about repeating rules
explanations that are principally available anyway.
--
robert jasiek
Robert Jasiek
Simon Goss wrote:
> Rules of a game and laws are different things, with rather different
> objectives,
Ok.
> and for that reason courts and referees can be subject to
> different criteria. Be that as it may, there is law and there
> is justice.
Ok, but criteria are so different that there would not be a desire
of the players to understand verdicts and their reasoning or a
likewise desire of observers. IOW, everybody is interested in
seeing reasoning together with a verdict.
> Sometimes courts
> are faced with situations where a law has just intentions, but a
> particular application of a law would be unjust.
In the particular case the intentions of the Ing rules are to
have a comptition between the players and to play everything
out or to do something equivalent (like verbally agreeing) to
actually perform competition.
If some law is considered unjust, then this must be spelled out
by reasoning because the law is supposed to be applied, was
announced as having to be applied, and was dealts with as being
applied by the referees in charge. They have said to apply it.
So if they do the opposite, then they have to say so, and since
violating/overriding the rules is a fundamentally severe action
by referees, they have to give reasons for such.
Unjust? The default is that application of the rules is considered
just. In particular it is considered just if the referees say to
apply them. So if suddenly and exceptionally referees want to use
the opposite (not apply the rules), then the needs their explanation
of justice in a boarder context that explains why generally
application of rules is just and why at the same time in a particular
application it is unjust.
I agree that there can be unjust laws in principle, however, since
the law does not tell us itself "I am unjust", the courts have to
make and justify such an announcement and interpretation.
Why? Otherwise just is not what the law says but only what the
courts say. This means that then the legislature's power is
subject to arbitrary overriding by the jurisdiction, i.e. the
jurisdiction weakens the principle power of the legislature
considerably. Instead legislature and jurisdiction are supposed
to have equally mighty power.
> I don't think laws and courts are
> there to allow people to gain unfair advantages over others by
> exploiting technicalities.
Wait. You use the word "technicalities". This is subjective. In
the particular case it ignores the general philosophies of Ing
rules to play everything out (possibly if necessary because there
is no agreement) and to have competition over everything that can
be competed. Removals can be played and they can be a competition.
The rules allow removals to be played out and they include them in
the players' competition. Neither is just dismissed as a
"technicality" but both is of fundamental importance if we
acknowledge the intentions underlying the Ing rules.
What is an "unfair advantage"? Is it unfair to apply the rules and
their intentions or is it unfair to construct a context for the
purpose of not having to apply the rules? By default, the former is
fair and the latter is unfair. So in general I see no point in
making a general assumptions in your direction.
More precisely, what exactly is a technicality in contrast to a
key law? What distinguishes both clearly in general? You would
need to explain that as well. Otherwise each player would play
different rules because one rulesets would be interpreted
fundmentally differently by each player.
> Rather, part of their job is to prevent that.
This is a hypothesis. If you look into the Ing rules and count
just their minimal number of terms, then you see that the Ing
rules do cannot be presupposed to rely on your suggested principle.
Therefore in effect you are saying that the Ing rules contain so
many details that because of that they cannot be applied as rules.
No referee in charge has said such a thing. Instead they would
rather look into the rules to understand details to use terms that
deescribe details.
> Likewise game rules and referees.
No, see before.
> In the present case, you have argued that Mr. Mero's removal of the
> stones after the four consecutive passes was against the rules, and that
> the rules forbid resumption of play.
That they do so at or after the game end.
> Unless you are claiming that Mr. Mero was deliberately cheating, we
I don't. I only think that he deliberately made no attempt whatsoever
to remove final stones before the game stop or before the game end.
In fact, he did not make any such attempt.
> should assume from this that he believed that he was allowed to remove
> the stones.
Yes, we can say that he assumed that.
> On the assumption that your interpretation of the rules is
> correct, he was wrong in this belief, but perhaps we should consider it
> to be a justifiable misunderstanding on his part,
As a justifiable misunderstanding there should not be a punishment
for such (also because there is no tournament rule prescribing any).
Likewise, as a justifiable misunderstanding there should not be a
gift for such. I.e. there also should not be the reward to be
allowed to remove stones after the game end _just because_ of the
justifiable misunderstanding. (A player mistakenly retaking a ko is
also not allowed to retake it just because he has mistakenly thought
to be allowed to retake it.)
> because you yourself
> have said things like:
[about difficulties of interpretation]
(Ignoring particular tournament rules, if any.) If application of a
ko is too difficult and leads to a move that violates the rules,
then a player does not immediately lose the game but is forgiven; he
also does not win the game strategically by being suddenly allowed
to play in a ko against the rules. If application of removals is too
difficult and leads to an action that violates the rules, then a
player does not immediately lose the game but is forgiven; he also
does not win the game strategically by being suddenly allowed to
remove against the rules.
In general, it is the duty of the players to understand the rules.
Not being able to understand them is not an excuse to be rewarded
for not understanding them. At best, it can be reason for not
being punished by harsh extra means (like a sentence to lose
immediately).
> and you needed an extremely long article with extremely close reasoning
> to justify your interpretation.
This says little. We may also ask why the courts do not even apply
the rules what requires at least extremely long study and close
reasoning. Only after careful rules analysis has been done, one may
decide to dismiss rules. Any earlier dismissing is premature and
does not do justice to the rules. It would not be interpretation and
application of the rules but interpretation and application of
some dreamt of rules. It is not the task of referees first to dream
of other rulesets, then to apply only the other rulesets.
> So, we are assuming that your interpretation of Ing91 is correct, and
> that Mr. Mero misunderstood them in a justifiable way. Where does
> justice lie?
It has to be found out. To find it out, besides other measures one
needs to understand in particular the original rules carefully.
Before justice with a scope to respect everything is not found and
otherwise justice becomes partial.
> You seem to be saying that a referee has no options here: if the rules
> address the question, then he is obliged to seek the correct
> interpretation of them and apply it rigorously. I no more agree with
> this than I would agree with a judge being forced to imprison somebody
> who failed to comply with the archaic, but (so I'm told) never repealed,
> English law that every Englishman must do archery practice on Sunday.
A referee must always also analyse and interprete the rule very
carefully. When he then finds that there is unjustice in them
(like shooting arrows on Sundays), then he emphases study and
interpretation of justice more globally and explains what he is doing
and in particular does not pretend to apply the rules entirely.
> When the exact meaning of the rule is apparently so difficult to be
> certain of, the effect of shackling the referee in that way would likely
> be that the person who wins is not necessarily the most skilled player,
> but the most skilled rules debater.
It is very easy for every player to avoid even being faced with
removals problems: Remove stones during alternation. The safest
way is to remove them before the first succession of passes. When
using Ing rules I do remove stones in alternation to avoid any
difficulties of rules interpretation possibly associated with my
removals as often as possible.
So even though the rules about removals may be difficult, every
player can avoid referee judgements even though he is not a rules
expert. In particular, if a player sees his opponent removing
stones in alternation, then he is reminded at every move that he
can remove stones in alternation, too.
> A horrible way to go, IMHO.
Not more "horrible" that to use "horrible" rules at all.
> Robert, I believe that you and I are probably agreed that the ideal way
> to avoid this kind of dispute is ultimately to adopt a set of rules
> unambiguous enough to leave no room for it - and easy enough to
> understand.
Yes.
> But until the ideal can be achieved, we all have to find
> ways to manage.
The players can play defensively, as above. The referees can give
reasonings for suggesting unexpected rulings, especially if they
are asked for reasonings by the players.
> From these perspectives, IMHO the decision for playing on was fair and
> wise.
It might have been fair and wise if the referees had explained
their view of fairness and wisdom. Instead their wisdom was to
to explain nothing or to justify a decision by a rules violation
per se.
> It is the only decision that I can see that allows the game result
> to be determined by the fuskei+middlegame+yose without requiring the
> players to have high expertise in rules interpretation.
See above; the referees could have pointed out that strategic
mistakes should be avoided even during the late yose and that
therefore it would have been strategically wise to remove stones
alternatingly or at least to offer agreements verbally or by
mannerism. It does not require any high rules expertise to remove
stones alternatingly, to remove stones by verbal agreement before
the game end (which other [not arcane] purpose should two instead
of just one successions of passes have in a game, especially if
one player is demonstrating that usage the most clearly?), or to
remove stones by mannerism before the game end.
It is the right of a player to make a strategic mistake. A player
suffers from a strategic mistake. A strategic mistake is not
something that a player should not suffer from.
> IMO, such a
> requirement would drive people away from Go congresses.
It is bad rules that drives some people away from tournaments.
> In this instance, there was a way to avoid the dispute, and all lengthy
> rules debate, had you wished to.
I did all to avoid it while at the same time not helping my opponent
in any way that would violate the spirit of competition. My opponent
had the same spirit of competition but did everything legal not to
avoid reaching the dispute.
> It would have been to point out that
> the rules don't allow that, but to accept that it was an innocent
> mistake for which the opponent should not be penalised, and to offer to
> continue play.
I do not violate rules intentionally or even ask my opponent to
do likewise!
> The only thing you give up from doing this is the
> opportunity to claim on a technicality
See above.
> points that you haven't earned
> during the contest of skill.
Under Ing rules removals are part of the contest of skill. So I
have earned points during the contest of skill.
> Agreed. I think it's also true that the benefit we get from using them,
> in terms of the support we get for educational and promotional projects,
> greatly outweighs the small trouble we have from the difficulties in
> interpreting the rules.
I believe contrarily. With simple rules we would get many more
new players. If we did not use Ing clocks and Ing stones, then
everybody would appreciate the beauty of the game much more and
this would considerably improve motivation of teachers and so
also lead to more new players.
Ask yourself? Do you teach Ing rules to beginners or do you teach
something like simple rules or international rules? The only place
where I have seen beginners being "taught" Ing rules is in Ing
sponsored youth tournaments.
--
robert jasiek
Robert Jasiek
- wrote:
> If the truth is going to be something found, then how had
> the truth become lost in the first place?
It has not been lost. One has to remind its existence and features.
One also has to consider whether it deserves slight changes due to
broader insight gained. Perception of truth underlies a historical
development like every time-dependent aspect of mankind.
> Is justice always in
> existence independently of a case?
There is an independently existing part of justice and particular
part of justice that is given due to the particular context of a
particular case.
> What of "case by case"?
The particular part of justice needs to be studied also in a case
by case perspective.
> If truth can change by remodelling, then what of an infinitely
> nested condition of remodelling?
What is your problem here?
> How does one distinguish
> what is remodelled and what is not?
Good question. At least one should try rather than not try to
understand such a distinction.
--
robert jasiek
-
> - wrote:
>> If the truth is going to be something found, then how had
>> the truth become lost in the first place?
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> It has not been lost. One has to remind its existence and features.
If, for its existence, then one "has to..." perform an action,
then what would be the status of truth -without- that reminding?
> One also has to consider whether it deserves slight changes due to
> broader insight gained. Perception of truth underlies a historical
> development like every time-dependent aspect of mankind.
Could it also be likely that "slight changes" might occur due to
attrition of insight, i.e. former insight that now becomes lost? In
that event would "reminding" occur, or does that add by subtracting?
[ ... ]
>> If truth can change by remodelling, then what of an infinitely
>> nested condition of remodelling?
> What is your problem here?
This question leads into consideration of the subsequent
query which you had termed a "good question." The problem
is not mine, but merely the problem of logic consideration. If
one has an assertion "p" then the singular instance of "p" could
be described as subjective. Should "p" occur in multiple instances,
(and be reported by many observers), then "p" transcends the
subjective. Being "out there" is generally one characteristic for
association with a real world, or objectivity. Naive realism asserts
that multiple instances of "p" are a strong indicator of independence.
The question, concerning "remodelling" is a counting question, and
infinite sets are useful constructs to guarantee unlimited counting,
for purposes of logical analysis of propositions in multiple instance.
Next, the arrangements of sets, given multiple instance, could occur
as series, parallel, nesting, actually of the second-order as proved
by Gregory Chaitin of IBM a number of years ago. Nesting is a
severe instantiation which usually illustrates series and parallel.
>> How does one distinguish
>> what is remodelled and what is not?
> Good question. At least one should try rather than not try to
> understand such a distinction.
Time flow is said to proceed accordingly, but then there are such
phenomena as inhalation and exhalation which might suggest otherwise.
Questions attempt to disclose motivation for rules formation & change.
Robert Jasiek
- wrote:
> If, for its existence, then one "has to..." perform an action,
> then what would be the status of truth -without- that reminding?
It would possibly be not applied truth.
> Could it also be likely that "slight changes" might occur due to
>
> attrition of insight, i.e. former insight that now becomes lost? In
> that event would "reminding" occur, or does that add by subtracting?
Modelling truth can mean to confirm it, to add, or to substract
from it.
--
robert jasiek
Henric Bergsåker
Jasiek:
> I agree. Therefore I asked the appeals committee to explain its
> reasoning so that I would be enabled to apply the decision.
> Unfortunately, the attempt of explanation did not explain me the
> given reasoning and I had to proceed with the game nevertheless.
I may be wrong, but as I recall an explanation was offered to you at
the time, in essence that your lonely black stones in the middle of white
territory were obviously dead and should be removed.
Your points now seem to be that the Ing rules and other rules are bad
(since their strict application would have absurd consequences in this
case?) and that the decisions by the referee, the appeals commission
and the rules- and rating commission have been poorly motivated, right?
May I ask:
1) What general requirements would you like to impose on explanations?
Do you for instance think that an explanation must necessarily be accepted
and approved by all concerned parties?
2) In the case of your game it is clear that the decision as such could not
have been different; it would have been absurd and unthinkable to give you
the game based on the confusion over the passing and removal of dead
stones. You do agree with that, don't you? If so, would you accept that as
a valid explanation of the decision?
3) Suppose as an hypothesis that it is impossible to make rules and laws
which unambiguosly cover every possible situation and problem. Suppose that
it is also impossible to write laws and rules which have reasonable,
acceptable
and desirable consequences in all cases. If so, how would you propose to
deal
with the abnormal cases? How about applying common sense and generally
accepted fairness criteria in these cases for instance? Or simply let one or
more
trustworty people decide and leave it at that? This is in fact what happens
now,
but do you think that there is anything fundamentally wrong with that model?
Even if you believe that perfect rules are possible it is obvious that
existing
rules aren't, so you must agree that there has to be a way of dealing with
imperfect
rules today.
4) Usually rules and laws are written with some purposes in mind. In the
rare
cases where the rules are found to have consequences which are obviously
in conflict with their purposes, how do you feel about the following
solution:
a referee/commission recognises that the generally accepted purposes have
a higher authority than the rules, decides in favour of the purpose of the
rules
and works for an amendment of the rule?
5) If you find a problem with a rule, do you really think it is appropriate
to
argue that at the expense of your opponent in a tournament? I may be wrong,
but I think that the argument was probably an unpleasant experience for your
opponent in the EGC, as well as for the referees, how do you feel about
that?
6) I would agree with you that the referees and commissions are well advised
to state the reasons for their decisions publicly as far as possible. It may
be
useful both for future decisions, for future rules improvements and for
judging
how well the referees and commissions are doing their job.
best regards,
Henric
Robert Jasiek
"Henric Bergsåker" wrote:
> I may be wrong, but as I recall an explanation was offered to you at
> the time, in essence that your lonely black stones in the middle of white
> territory were obviously dead and should be removed.
I asked the appeals committee to explain their given reason
"the game is in a pause". The appeals committee used a lot of words
trying to explain that to me. I do not remember all and it is quite
possible that they said something like you remember. However, all
their speech did not explain why the appeals committee could say
correctly that the game was in a pause. Since the appeals committee
hurried a little and asked us to continue the game under my protest,
the talk between the appeals committee and me about an explanation
of their given reason for the decision had no chance to consider
the precise meaning of "dead" as may have been used by it (if you
remember correctly), i.e. whether it would mean rules-dead,
strategically dead, or something else, altough quite likely they
meant strategically dead.
> Your points now
For years.
> seem to be that the Ing rules and other rules are bad
> (since their strict application would have absurd consequences in this
> case?)
I would not necessarily call it absurd but maybe counter-intuitive.
> and that the decisions by the referee, the appeals commission
> and the rules- and rating commission have been poorly motivated, right?
I have not even a chance to be roughly sure about their motivation
because I do not even understand or know their reasoning for their
decisions. What I point out is the missing or poor reasoning.
> 1) What general requirements would you like to impose on explanations?
They should enable third persons that were not present to understand
a verdict. (Implicitly, the players are enabled to understand it as
well.)
> Do you for instance think that an explanation must necessarily be accepted
> and approved by all concerned parties?
No. The power to state reasons is associated with the judging bodies.
The concerned parties should be given an explanation that is at least
good enough to allow them to perform any actions requested by a
verdict without having to guess how performance is expected.
Otherwise an involved party might violate application of a verdict
simply because he has not been enabled to apply it.
> 2) In the case of your game it is clear that the decision as such could not
> have been different; it would have been absurd and unthinkable to give you
> the game based on the confusion over the passing and removal of dead
> stones.
This is your opinion.
> You do agree with that, don't you?
I disagree entirely.
(You know, I also think that the rules should have been set before
the tournament so that they would have been easy.)
> [...] would you accept that as a valid explanation of the decision?
Possibly it is sufficient for continuing the game (possibly under
protest). Otherwise it does not address interpretation of the
rules and would question the power of the legislature. How should
ever an explanation fail to address the rules sufficiently or -
much more serious - disrespect legislature without even explaining
either? Do you suggest that jurisdiction shall ignore legislature
intentionally?
> 3) Suppose as an hypothesis that it is impossible to make rules and laws
> which unambiguosly cover every possible situation and problem.
As an implication we speak of tournament rules here, not of core
rules of go game play.
> Suppose that
> it is also impossible to write laws and rules which have reasonable,
> acceptable
> and desirable consequences in all cases. If so, how would you propose to
> deal
> with the abnormal cases?
Why do you mention abnormal cases? Couldn't we just solve the normal
cases (like ending every game) first?
> How about applying common sense and generally
> accepted fairness criteria in these cases for instance?
Here you mention one of the most fundamental aspects of rules and
their application.
Simply speaking, there are two basic ways of approaching rules
application:
1) "primacy of rules":
Rules are applied. When rules express something, then they are
applied (unless they violate, e.g., the international law).
Application of the rules is considered fair. Otherwise "fairness"
is (partially) applied only if the rules when referred to factual
circumstances do not have (sufficient) meaning.
2) "primacy of fairness":
Fairness is applied. It is supposed that application of fairness
is clear and predictable. Rules are not applied as rules but they
serve merely as a guideline of how to adapt fairness for the
particular special topic "playing go".
In principal, either primacy is possible, and hybrids could be
imagined.
Concerning the EGF, the last decade's history of rules application
in the EGF has used the primacy of rules. It particular, it has
been asserted that the concept "sportsmanlike behaviour" applies
only if rules cannot be applied because they do not address a
problem and do not provide sufficient meaning for it.
So concerning the particular dispute, it falls under the primacy
of rules. (You can see that, e.g., by the appeals committee having
immediately asked one of they players whether he could hand out an
Ing rules booklet. Or, concerning theory, see the various EGF
tournament rulesets.)
> Or simply let one or
> more
> trustworty people decide and leave it at that?
There are many possible structures or primacies for jurisdictions.
However, once an associations or federation uses one kind of
jurisdiction, it cannot be altered without prior notice.
> This is in fact what happens
> now,
Here on RGG? We simple discuss; RGG is not a jurisdiction.
> but do you think that there is anything fundamentally wrong with that model?
With a model "primacy of fairness"?
Neither primacy model is so fundamentally wrong that it could not
be installed and then used. To decide which model to install, one
needs additional desires or aims.
E.g., I like the aim of predictable decisions. This is possible
for playing go as such if the primacy of rules is used together
with clear rules. It is also possible for playing go as such if
the primacy of fairness is used together with clear rules. However,
it is not possible together with unclear rules. So IMO, it much
more important to have clear rules than to choose one or the other
model of primacy.
> Even if you believe that perfect rules are possible it is obvious that
> existing
> rules aren't, so you must agree that there has to be a way of dealing with
> imperfect
> rules today.
No doubt. The way of dealing is that one given by historical context
with the federation in question: usage of the primacy of rules.
> 4) Usually rules and laws are written with some purposes in mind.
Yes.
> In the rare
> cases where the rules are found to have consequences which are obviously
> in conflict with their purposes,
Ah, do you think of Ing rules and the particular dispute? Some
of the purposes of Ing rules are given: like the possibility
to play everything out (Ing rules' contrast to Japanese rules
and one of the key motivations for Ing to invent the Ing rules).
Some of the purposes of Ing rules are not given: like simplicity.
> how do you feel about the following
> solution:
> a referee/commission recognises that the generally accepted purposes have
> a higher authority than the rules, decides in favour of the purpose of the
> rules
Possible. Anyway, intentions of rules should be a guideline for
every interpretation of them. It becomes more difficult if there
are several rulesets and one has to identify their relative
priorities. For EGF rulesets this has been done.
> and works for an amendment of the rule?
Amendments are not desirable.
> 5) If you find a problem with a rule, do you really think it is appropriate
> to
> argue that at the expense of your opponent in a tournament?
Concerning the particular case, I have not found a problem with a
rule (but at worst quite some difficulties). I.e. the rule CAN be
applied. It is not so flawed that it could not be applied.
Why do ask that without asking at the same time why an opponent
would do everything that does not avoid a possible argument?
In the particular case, if my opponent had done something to
avoid a possible dispute, then I could even not have had any
useful possibility to point out an application of rules.
> I may be wrong,
> but I think that the argument was probably an unpleasant experience for your
> opponent in the EGC, as well as for the referees, how do you feel about
> that?
Why should I guess? Do you imply that a referee should not be called
by us because this involves feeling?
--
robert jasiek
Bill Spight
So the assumption is that the players are familiar with the game ending
procedure? Thus, games typically end with 2 passes, a pause during which
dead stones are removed, and 2 more passes, making 4 consecutive passes.
The players are used to doing that?
Thanks,
Bill
Simon Goss
I'm sorry.
From JB:
I didn't understand all of that, but perhaps I should clarify some
points:
(A) I have no standing in the EGF except as the contact point for one of
its member organisations (the BGA); I'm not a member of the executive,
or any of the commissions, or anything like that.
(B) I wasn't present at Zagreb and didn't see the events Robert
described.
(C) So my comments were personal opinions, not an explanation. I don't
know the reasons the referee and the Rules and Ratings Commission
decided as they did. At any rate, we shouldn't infer that they were the
same as my comments.
(D) The EGF has nothing equivalent to the UN Security Council. There is
no inner sanctum and nobody has a veto.
From Robert (heavily snipped because of length):
>It might have been fair and wise if the referees had explained their
>view of fairness and wisdom. Instead their wisdom was to to explain
>nothing or to justify a decision by a rules violation per se.
I agree that the referees should give reasons for their decision. Sorry
if I didn't make that clear before. OC I don't know whether or not they
did so adequately in this case.
>It is the right of a player to make a strategic mistake. A player
>suffers from a strategic mistake. A strategic mistake is not something
>that a player should not suffer from.
Of course. But failure to remove the stones at the correct time seems to
be a procedural mistake rather than a strategic one.
From Bill Spight:
>Pardon a comment from an outsider, but this whole thing strikes me as
>incredible.
>
>As I understand it, not only was this tournament conducted under Ing
>rules, the Ing rules are the default, so that many tournaments are
>conducted under them. Furthermore, this is not a question of some
>strange, rare position that puzzles even experienced players. We are
>talking about normal end of game procedure, something that affects
>nearly every game.
The rules under which European congresses are played depends on who is
sponsoring them. Ing rules have been used for many years now, except in
the top group, which has often (but not this year, apparently) used
Japanese rules.
But the European congress happens but once a year. What rules we use in
our own countries is up to the countries themselves. AFAIK Japanese
rules are used in most. Csaba Mero is Hungarian; I don't know what rules
they normally use there.
>Looking at the Ing rules, it appears to me that
>
>1) stones may be removed
> a) by play, or
> b) by agreement during the pause;
>2) they may not be removed after the end of the game, until the game is
>counted, unless there is a resignation.
So I believe ;)
>Even if I am wrong about that, everybody should know the procedures for
>ending the game and for removing stones. If the correct procedure is
>unfamiliar to the players, the tournament sponsor should inform them of
>the correct procedure, either through written material or through a
>brief talk at the start of the tournament.
Know the procedures, yes. But procedural mistakes happen, and I think
the question is what one should do about them. If (as I believe) these
rules aren't in common use in Europe, perhaps that's relevant.
--
Simon
Robert Jasiek
Simon Goss wrote:
> failure to remove the stones at the correct time seems to
> be a procedural mistake rather than a strategic one.
A procedural mistake can also be a strategic mistake.
E.g., Nihon Kiin 1989 rules: If a loss-of-both position is
detected after a game stop, then it has been one player's
strategic mistake to take part in stopping the game.
--
robert jasiek
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> 2) In the case of your game it is clear that the decision as such could not
> have been different; it would have been absurd and unthinkable to give you
> the game based on the confusion over the passing and removal of dead
> stones. You do agree with that, don't you? If so, would you accept that as
> a valid explanation of the decision?
Suppose a player makes a very-end-of-endgame move; playing an open
point which makes an atari and forces his opponent to fill a single
socket at the edge of his territory. Something like black playing "a"
in the following diagram, assuming everything is alive:
---------------------------------------
| . . . . O O O O O O O O O O O a X . . |
| O O O O X X X X X X X X X X X X X . . |
Now suppose white passes instead of filling. Under the Japanese
rules, the white groupon the edge is now *dead* (if I read them
correctly), because it can be captured with black going first, and
white has no way after the capture to place a live stone on one of the
captured points.
Did white make a totally amazingly stupid mistake by passing? Yes.
Did he nontheless lose the game? Yes.
Or is the rule now that a player, in tournament play, can take back
any mistake, provided it's stupid enough?
Thomas
-
> - wrote:
>> If, for its existence, then one "has to..." perform an action,
>> then what would be the status of truth -without- that reminding?
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> It would possibly be not applied truth.
> - wrote:
>> Could it also be likely that "slight changes" might occur due to
>> attrition of insight, i.e. former insight that now becomes lost? In
>> that event would "reminding" occur, or does that add by subtracting?
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> Modelling truth can mean to confirm it, to add, or to substract
> from it.
Your first reply locates for truth a social context, and your
second reply could locate for truth the personal (subjective)
context. In either case, whether lack of reminding or subtractive
procedures, one would accepts non-objective foundation as truth.
That would not conform, however, to expectations for RuleSets.
An objective context should entail only constancy or be additive.
Neither an individual, nor any society, can prescribe objectivism.
- regards
- jb
-
> "Henric Bergsåker" wrote:
>>
>> [...] would you accept that as a valid explanation of the decision?
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> Possibly it is sufficient for continuing the game (possibly under
> protest). Otherwise it does not address interpretation of the
> rules and would question the power of the legislature. How should
> ever an explanation fail to address the rules sufficiently or -
> much more serious - disrespect legislature without even explaining
> either? Do you suggest that jurisdiction shall ignore legislature
> intentionally?
Here is another possible divergence between European and American
legal systems: the United States system was designed with independent
judiciary. The legislative power can be overruled by judiciary; then
a legislature would require 2/3rd vote to overrule the judiciary with
concurrence of 3/4th of the States for a Constitutional Amendment.
[ ... ]
>> How about applying common sense and generally
>> accepted fairness criteria in these cases for instance?
> ...
> Simply speaking, there are two basic ways of approaching rules
> application:
>
> 1) "primacy of rules":
> Rules are applied. When rules express something, then they are
> applied (unless they violate, e.g., the international law).
> Application of the rules is considered fair. Otherwise "fairness"
> is (partially) applied only if the rules when referred to factual
> circumstances do not have (sufficient) meaning.
>
> 2) "primacy of fairness":
> Fairness is applied. It is supposed that application of fairness
> is clear and predictable. Rules are not applied as rules but they
> serve merely as a guideline of how to adapt fairness for the
> particular special topic "playing go".
>
> In principal, either primacy is possible, and hybrids could be
> imagined.
Yet the intent of either is also to assure the success of the
other. This appears to impose "a false dilemma" by asserting
conflict between rules-based and fairness-based derivations.
Its object is harmonization: to conceal rather than to advertise.
> Concerning the EGF, the last decade's history of rules application
> in the EGF has used the primacy of rules. It particular, it has
> been asserted that the concept "sportsmanlike behaviour" applies
> only if rules cannot be applied because they do not address a
> problem and do not provide sufficient meaning for it.
>
> So concerning the particular dispute, it falls under the primacy
> of rules. (You can see that, e.g., by the appeals committee having
> immediately asked one of they players whether he could hand out an
> Ing rules booklet. Or, concerning theory, see the various EGF
> tournament rulesets.)
The EGF's difficulties appear motivated essentially by an
incompleteness to their proceedings, well understandable when
various languages and cultures must by necessity mix together.
One would think such difficulties -easily- resolved by placing all
participants into a negotiations room on a diet of bread and water,
or perhaps only water, until each and every issue were resolved.
Negotiations are a brain-dead activity, actually, when facing with
prospects of their interminable starvation. So the lack of agreement
could instead be traced to -narcissistic- melodramatic infatuations.
There was a style of presentation which takes for a survival instinct
its "advertising" of complaint and whining, serving only to disedify.
Issue resolving is also quite simple when ruling on the panoply of
difficult case-by-case circumstances, as codified by large databases.
Should two cases be discovered that contradict each other, then
a subsequent clarificatory warning could be issued to all future
arbitration boards never again to muddy the waters of RuleSets.
[ ... ]
>> This is in fact what happens now, but do you think that there
>> is anything fundamentally wrong with that model?
> With a model "primacy of fairness"?
>
> Neither primacy model is so fundamentally wrong that it could not
> be installed and then used. To decide which model to install, one
> needs additional desires or aims.
>
> E.g., I like the aim of predictable decisions. This is possible
> for playing go as such if the primacy of rules is used together
> with clear rules. It is also possible for playing go as such if
> the primacy of fairness is used together with clear rules. However,
> it is not possible together with unclear rules. So IMO, it much
> more important to have clear rules than to choose one or the other
> model of primacy.
Life is not predictable, so some effort to acknowledge what is in
fact "the requirement of flexibility" (sic!), could be included with
statements so as "to preclude the aim of predictable decisions."
I spoke of -delegating- authoritative duties to referees, which in
turn would focus attention on the -careful- selection of referees so
as to minimize the likelihood of unqualified referees. For example,
any referee against whom four complaints were lodged could not be
a referee again for at least two or three cycles plus five meanwhiles.
[ ... ]
>> I may be wrong, but I think that the argument was probably an
>> unpleasant experience for your opponent in the EGC, as well as
>> for the referees, how do you feel about that?
> Why should I guess? Do you imply that a referee should not be
> called by us because this involves feeling?
I agree with Mr.Jasiek here: referees are not idle spectators
but must perform double-duty when called into action by players.
Tournament Directors similarly maintain an obligation to provide
extra pairs of tennis shoes, when the referees wear out their own.
"Unpleasant experience avoidance" is not a goal for engagement.
- regards
- jb
Simon Goss
Really? How?
>E.g., Nihon Kiin 1989 rules: If a loss-of-both position is detected
>after a game stop, then it has been one player's strategic mistake to
>take part in stopping the game.
Do you mean the case: both players pass successively, and then they
notice that there's something that could have been done that would
affect the result?
In this case, the strategic(*) mistake is clear (and AFAICS, both
players have made one, not just one player). What was the procedural
mistake?
(*) Probably tactical, really. I assume we're not concerned with
strategy/tactics distinction here?
--
Simon
-
Simon Goss <si...@gosoft.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> Perhaps my comments were less helpful than I meant them to be.
> If so, I'm sorry.
Not at all: they're quite helpful, especially toward the our ends of
facilitating discussion and, of course, "educational and promotional
projects" which you cite as the purpose of adopting Ing 1991 Rules.
I found your analysis, by means of asking Mr.Jasiek of his views
concerning the attitude toward opponent "cheating", quite fascinating.
In other words, when settling a Rules Dispute, the BGA President might
poll the sentiments of players concerned. I am repeatedly amazed by
a refreshing personalism of Britishers, as if people really do matter.
Our Time Magazine editor finds the British analysis of "Iraqi missile
delivery systems" as an extraordinarily clever means for presentation.
> I didn't understand all of that, but perhaps I should clarify some points:
My remarks (now elided) were in reply to Michael Dobbins.
> (A) I have no standing in the EGF except as the contact point for one of
> its member organisations (the BGA); I'm not a member of the executive,
> or any of the commissions, or anything like that.
This is confusing. The BGA is a "member organization" and yet
the BGA President has "no standing in the EGF." Yes, not being "a
member of the executive or any of the commissions" could for some
connote a lack of -THAT- sort of standing, however many other types
of "standing" persist nevertheless.
> (B) I wasn't present at Zagreb and didn't see the events Robert
> described.
This, however, is typical of Rules Disputes, so we shall continue.
> (C) So my comments were personal opinions, not an explanation. I don't
> know the reasons the referee and the Rules and Ratings Commission
> decided as they did. At any rate, we shouldn't infer that they were the
> same as my comments.
Mr.Jasiek has spoken toward the lack of documentation from the
EGF Rules and Ratings Commission, which seems rather strange, if
Mr.Jasiek is current on his EGF membership dues and playing fees.
> (D) The EGF has nothing equivalent to the UN Security Council.
> There is no inner sanctum and nobody has a veto.
This may be the case, however a lack of documentation from the EGF
might for some indicate some -comparison- to the UN Security Council.
Robert Jasiek
- wrote:
> That would not conform, however, to expectations for RuleSets.
> An objective context
A written ruleset should be expected to have some objective meaning.
However, since one cannot write down all tournament rules, parts
of verbal contexts for tournament rules can be less stable than an
absolute objective truth. Especially such verbal contexts deserve
reconsideration repeatedly.
--
robert jasiek
Simon Goss
>"Henric Bergsåker" <henrik....@telia.com> writes:
>
>> 2) In the case of your game it is clear that the decision as such could not
>> have been different; it would have been absurd and unthinkable to give you
>> the game based on the confusion over the passing and removal of dead
>> stones. You do agree with that, don't you? If so, would you accept that as
>> a valid explanation of the decision?
>
>Suppose a player makes a very-end-of-endgame move; playing an open
>point which makes an atari and forces his opponent to fill a single
>socket at the edge of his territory. Something like black playing "a"
>in the following diagram, assuming everything is alive:
>
> ---------------------------------------
>| . . . . O O O O O O O O O O O a X . . |
>| O O O O X X X X X X X X X X X X X . . |
>
>Now suppose white passes instead of filling. Under the Japanese
>rules, the white groupon the edge is now *dead* (if I read them
>correctly), because it can be captured with black going first, and
>white has no way after the capture to place a live stone on one of the
>captured points.
After White passed, Black should capture the stones. He definitely
should not pass.
If Black passes after White's pass, the white stones are dead, yes, but
Black cannot remove them, because they aren't inside Black territory.
>Did white make a totally amazingly stupid mistake by passing? Yes.
Yes. So did Black, if he passed without making the capture.
>Did he nontheless lose the game? Yes.
Not yet, but he probably will, and so probably will Black. Once it's
pointed out to Black that he can't remove the stones, he may want to
call for resumption, but that would give White the next board play. If
Black needs the first board play in order to win, he can get nothing
better than the both-players-lose provision of article 13.1 - unless
White blunders again by asking for resumption himself, of course.
>Or is the rule now that a player, in tournament play, can take back
>any mistake, provided it's stupid enough?
No. The moral of this story is don't pass in hot positions. A bit
different from the case under debate, which is about observance of (and,
perhaps, familiarity with) the game-ending procedure in a cold position.
--
Simon
Robert Jasiek
Simon Goss wrote:
> Do you mean the case: both players pass successively, and then they
> notice that there's something that could have been done that would
> affect the result?
Yes.
> In this case, the strategic(*) mistake is clear (and AFAICS, both
> players have made one, not just one player).
It may be clear but presumably to the players it has only become
clear after the game stop.
> What was the procedural mistake?
To cross the game stop as the border that separates the alternation
phase from the confirmation phase with the differing rulings for
either and thus the differing strategic consequences.
> (*) Probably tactical, really. I assume we're not concerned with
> strategy/tactics distinction here?
We are not; it is all the same:)
--
robert jasiek
Robert Jasiek
Simon Goss wrote:
> which is about observance of (and,
> perhaps, familiarity with) the game-ending procedure in a cold position.
It will depend on your definition of "cold", I guess.
--
robert jasiek
-
> - wrote:
>> ... would not conform, however, to expectations for RuleSets.
>> An objective context should entail only constancy or be additive.
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> A written ruleset should be expected to have some objective meaning.
> However, since one cannot write down all tournament rules, parts
> of verbal contexts for tournament rules can be less stable than an
> absolute objective truth. Especially such verbal contexts deserve
> reconsideration repeatedly.
The examples might be provided by computer databases of the
game records, plus all commentaries, and such things as newsgroup
transcripts from archives. If something were omitted it may thereby
be added, and later searched if need be. The idea that truth could
be "acceptibly subtractive" presumes that human beings have not at
their disposal these modern conveniences for electronic computer
recordings, distributed databases, thousands of research personnel,
and rapid search capability on a number of archive retrieval systems.
Once something is discovered as missing, it is included into records,
a further argument -against- notions of "acceptable subtractiveness."
On principle, the mechanism of "selective perception" is -not- highly
regarded as any means or method by which one attains truthfulness.
There is, at present, confrontation between (previous) lifestyles and
new directions charted by technology in the 21st-Century, and later.
Formerly, one could expect continual review of past decision-making
procedures, as a normative course for civic activism in one's village.
With technology, and hyper-technology, mechanisms for continual
review may give way to inceptions of the arriving optimum, e.g. the
software Chess programs that today defeat even instructors of Chess
who might have formerly been termed "authorities" for public schools.
The notions for "moral equivalance" do not imply "value irrelevance."
- regards
- jb
-------------------------------------------------------------
Otto Rank , Psychologist and Philosopher
http://www.ottorank.com/
-------------------------------------------------------------
.
Thomas Bushnell, BSG
> >Or is the rule now that a player, in tournament play, can take back
> >any mistake, provided it's stupid enough?
>
> No. The moral of this story is don't pass in hot positions. A bit
> different from the case under debate, which is about observance of (and,
> perhaps, familiarity with) the game-ending procedure in a cold position.
I think you missed my point.
If the moral is "don't pass in hot positions", then note that this is
exactly what Robert's opponent did. The difference between passing
(and thus letting Robert have those "extra" points) and taking the
stones off, was considerable. It *was* a hot position under the Ing
rules.
Thomas
Henric Bergsåker
"Robert Jasiek"
> I have not even a chance to be roughly sure about their motivation
> because I do not even understand or know their reasoning for their
> decisions. What I point out is the missing or poor reasoning.
>
You are certainly right that the authorities should give clear reasons
for their decisions. In particular, since the rules an ratings commission
has discussed a matter and made a decision, it seems odd if they
haven't given any reasons, one would think that that's their job.
> > 4) Usually rules and laws are written with some purposes in mind.
>
> Yes.
>
> > In the rare
> > cases where the rules are found to have consequences which are obviously
> > in conflict with their purposes,
>
> Ah, do you think of Ing rules and the particular dispute? Some
> of the purposes of Ing rules are given: like the possibility
> to play everything out (Ing rules' contrast to Japanese rules
> and one of the key motivations for Ing to invent the Ing rules).
> Some of the purposes of Ing rules are not given: like simplicity.
I think the purpose of the passing rules you are referring to in the
particular case must be to handle the situation in cases when the
players disagree on whether some stones are dead or alive.
But in the particular case there wasn't any such doubt. You, your
opponent, the referee and all the onlookers could all see that your
stones were clearly dead. In that situation you shouldn't have
brought the matter of the passing rules up and the referees could
not rule differently from what they did, in my opinion. The situation
would have been different if there had been even the
slightest doubt in anybody's mind that your stones might be able
to live. Does it really not make any difference to you if your stones
were in fact dead or not??
best regards,
Henric
-
> "Robert Jasiek"
>> I have not even a chance to be roughly sure about their motivation
>> because I do not even understand or know their reasoning for their
>> decisions. What I point out is the missing or poor reasoning.
"Henric Bergsåker" <henrik....@telia.com> wrote:
> You are certainly right that the authorities should give clear reasons
> for their decisions. In particular, since the rules an ratings commission
> has discussed a matter and made a decision, it seems odd if they
> haven't given any reasons, one would think that that's their job.
Yes, if it is their "job" then the EGF should -publish- their names
and how -much- they were being paid to do that "job." In fact, a
thorough -accounting- of -all- EGF funds should be made public, ASAP.
> I think the purpose of the passing rules you are referring to in the
> particular case must be to handle the situation in cases when the
> players disagree on whether some stones are dead or alive.
> But in the particular case there wasn't any such doubt. You, your
> opponent, the referee and all the onlookers could all see that your
> stones were clearly dead. In that situation you shouldn't have
> brought the matter of the passing rules up and the referees could
> not rule differently from what they did, in my opinion. The situation
> would have been different if there had been even the
> slightest doubt in anybody's mind that your stones might be able
> to live. Does it really not make any difference to you if your stones
> were in fact dead or not??
Mr.Jasiek regarded his stones as alive once they were not removed
after the second pass. This was his -interpretation- of Ing 1991, and
so there persisted a tacit disagreement, sufficing for a disagreement
condition. Mr.Jasiek had studied RuleSets extensively for precisely
this situation, where he could -illustrate- his knowledge of RuleSets.
The purpose of highly formalized behavior is to remove all doubt
from the minds of participants, concerning their stated intentions.
Mr.Jasiek's opponent did not follow the protocol of highly formalized
behavior as -prescribed- by Ing 1991, and adopted by the EGF. The
aberration (departure from norm) presented confusion to Mr.Jasiek.
The opportunity to demonstrate stone removal by hypothetical play
had expired, after fourth pass. This was the official Jasiek ruling.
- regards
- jb
Robert Jasiek
"Henric Bergsåker" wrote:
> I think the purpose of the passing rules you are referring to in the
> particular case must be to handle the situation in cases when the
> players disagree on whether some stones are dead or alive.
[...]
We must distinguish the following:
A1) What do the rules express?
A2) How would rules be if they expressed what we might want them
to express in future?
B1) Exactly when is the informal "dead or alive" used with the
meaning "strategically dead or alive just before the first
succession of pass plays"?
B2) Exactly when is the informal "dead or alive" used with the
meaning "rules-dead [=breathless] or -alive"?
Above you do not even consider either distinction. Thereby you do not
discuss Ing91 rules but possibly your personal desire of possibly
better rules in future.
> But in the particular case there wasn't any such doubt. You, your
> opponent, the referee and all the onlookers could all see that your
> stones were clearly dead.
Some of my stones had clearly been "strategically dead before the
first succession of pass plays".
> In that situation you shouldn't have
> brought the matter of the passing rules up
I have not brought that up BEFORE the succession of four pass plays
because until it the stones that had been "strategically dead before
the first succession of pass plays" still were "strategically dead".
However, AFTER the succession of four pass plays the stones that had
been "strategically dead just before the first succession of pass
plays" became "strategically alive" since they still were not
"rules-dead" and then could not be made "rules-dead" any longer.
> and the referees could
> not rule differently from what they did, in my opinion.
They should have ruled differently because of the aforementioned
relation to the succession of four pass plays.
> The situation would have been different
It might have been different if before the start of the
tournament the EGF had had declared, e.g., a change from the
primacy of rules to the primacy of fairness. Then application
of the not sufficiently clear rules would have been even less
predictable but it would have been possible to use that
unpredictability by making a decision of the kind "all the late
game stage handling rules are not a particularly useful guideline
for fairness, so they are overridden by what is believed to be a
fair handling".
> if there had been even the
> slightest doubt in anybody's mind that your stones might be able
> to live. Does it really not make any difference to you if your stones
> were in fact dead or not??
They were in fact rules-alive [not breathless] after the succession
of four pass plays (and therefore also strategically alive then).
That is what does make the difference.
--
robert jasiek
Robert Jasiek
- wrote:
> Mr.Jasiek had studied RuleSets extensively for precisely
> this situation, where he could -illustrate- his knowledge of RuleSets.
I did not involve myself in the dispute for the purpose of
illustrating rules knowledge. However, once having become involved
in the dispute, having available rules knowledge was useful because
I could apply it.
> This was the official Jasiek ruling.
How could I have issued any (official) ruling during the handling
of the dispute since I was not any referee?
--
robert jasiek
-
> - wrote:
>> Mr.Jasiek had studied RuleSets extensively for precisely this
>> situation, where he could -illustrate- his knowledge of RuleSets.
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> I did not involve myself in the dispute for the purpose of
> illustrating rules knowledge. However, once having become
> involved in the dispute, having available rules knowledge was
> useful because I could apply it.
I think it will be exceedingly difficult to -segregate- your
involvement in a Rules Dispute from illustration of knowledge
concerning RuleSets. You are arguing _pro_se_, after all ...
>> This was the official Jasiek ruling.
> How could I have issued any (official) ruling during the
> handling of the dispute since I was not any referee?
There were two qualifiers, i.e. "official" -and- "Jasiek".
I would not expect others qualified to issue a "Jasiek ruling."
If you accept the decision of referees, then there's no contest.
If EGF fails to clarify this point prior to the next tournament then
there's been a failure to communicate, perhaps even intentional.
Players should not need to roll over and play dead to high-level
EGF mucky-mucks. The game is supposed to -settle- disputes.
- regards
- jb
Robert Jasiek
- wrote:
> I think it will be exceedingly difficult to -segregate- your
> involvement in a Rules Dispute from illustration of knowledge
> concerning RuleSets.
For whom?
> You are arguing _pro_se_, after all ...
"pro se": is this Latin?
> The game is supposed to -settle- disputes.
One should suppose the game not to create any disputes:)
--
robert jasiek
-
> - wrote:
>> I think it will be exceedingly difficult to -segregate- your
>> involvement in a Rules Dispute from illustration of knowledge
>> concerning RuleSets.
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> For whom?
Recall that the topic is "Reasoning for Just Verdict" so
we are not much concerned with the subjective opinions.
A judicial body is not necessarily non-subjective, but by
means of the multiplicity of perspectives, they have a better
opportunity of converging upon an objective than would any
individual. This was also an assumption of "naive realism."
The objective is not necessarily an "Earth Philosophy" but
might be merely the parade of a litany of facts.
>> You are arguing _pro_se_, after all ...
> "pro se": is this Latin?
Yes, it means "on behalf of oneself." Also, "He who argues his
own case in Federal Court has a fool for a client."
>> The game is supposed to -settle- disputes.
> One should suppose the game not to create any disputes:)
Yes, the game does not create disputes. Disputes are the result of
human players. Subjective perspectives are rendered more objective.
- regards
- jb
Robert Jasiek
- wrote:
> > One should suppose the game not to create any disputes:)
> Yes, the game does not create disputes. Disputes are the result of
> human players.
I have meant that the game's rules should be so that disputes cannot
arise. OC, this only concerns core rules of play. How often
tournament rules lead to disputes depends on the quality of
tournament organization. By experience moderately doubtful
tournament organization leads to three times as many disputes as
equivocal core rules of play. So reasonable tournament organization
together with clear rules avoids almost all disputes. (Hence I would
rather say that disputes are the result of bad organization; players
play only a minor role when suffering from consequences.)
--
robert jasiek
-
>>> One should suppose the game not to create any disputes:)
> - wrote:
>> Yes, the game does not create disputes.
>> Disputes are the result of human players.
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> I have meant that the game's rules should be so that disputes
> cannot arise. OC, this only concerns core rules of play. How often
> tournament rules lead to disputes depends on the quality of
> tournament organization. By experience moderately doubtful
> tournament organization leads to three times as many disputes as
> equivocal core rules of play. So reasonable tournament organization
> together with clear rules avoids almost all disputes. (Hence I would
> rather say that disputes are the result of bad organization; players
> play only a minor role when suffering from consequences.)
I would be uncomfortable with the notion of banning disputes,
since the referees need exercise wearing out their tennis shoes.
Also, since we agree that disputes are brought forward by players,
others might easily -misinterpret- some mandate to ban disputes to
mean banning all players who exercise a right to present disputes.
Be careful about criticizing tournament organization, because they
might ask you to volunteer your organizing services next time, instead
of participating as a playing contestant for tournament prize money.
It seems reasonable that -serious- players would use a video camera.
Also, it is possible that you meant to say "unequivocal core
rules" since these definitions provided for "equivocal" are:
========
equivocal, a. and n. -( Oxford English Dictionary )-
A. adj.
1. Equal or the same in name (with something else) but not in reality;
having a name, without the qualities it implies; nominal. Obs.
2. Of words, phrases, etc.: Having different significations
equally appropriate or plausible; capable of double
interpretation; ambiguous.
b. Of evidence, manifestations, etc.: Of uncertain bearing or
significance.
c. nonce-use. Of a person: Expressing himself in equivocal
terms.
3. Of uncertain nature; not admitting of being classified,
`nondescript'. equivocal generation: the (supposed) production
of plants or animals without parents; spontaneous generation.
b. Of sentiments, etc.: Undecided, not determined to either
side. Chiefly in negative sentences.
c. Music. equivocal chord: one which may be resolved into
different keys without changing any of its tones.
4. Of advantages, merits, etc.: Dubiously genuine, questionable.
5. Of persons, callings, tendencies, etc.: Doubtful in character
or reputation; liable to unfavourable comment or description;
questionable; suspicious.
B. n. An equivocal word or term; a homonym.
========
- regards
- jb
-------------------------------------------------------------
Books ( Cults and Psychiatry )
"At the heart of science is an essential balance between
two seemingly contradictory attitudes -- an openness to
new ideas, no matter how bizarre or counterintuitive, and
the most ruthlessly skeptical scrutiny of all ideas, old
and new. This is how deep truths are winnowed from deep
nonsense." -- Carl Sagan
http://www.rickross.com/reference/books/reading_list.html
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Jasiek
- wrote:
> I would be uncomfortable with the notion of banning disputes,
> since the referees need exercise wearing out their tennis shoes.
Tournaments should not create disputes that can be avoided. They
may have disputes that even good organization cannot avoid. IOW,
there should be only about 10% as many disputes as there are
currently.
> Also, it is possible that you meant to say "unequivocal core
> rules"
With unequivocal core rules the number of disputes related to core
rules is virtually zero. (I have compared frequency of disputes
caused by equivocal core rules with frequency of disputes caused
by tournament organization.)
--
robert jasiek
-
> - wrote:
>> I would be uncomfortable with the notion of banning disputes,
>> since the referees need exercise wearing out their tennis shoes.
> Tournaments should not create disputes that can be avoided. They
> may have disputes that even good organization cannot avoid. IOW,
> there should be only about 10% as many disputes as there are
> currently.
The advice breaks down when considering that "can be avoided"
occurs rather often by 20-20 hindsight, where as "create disputes"
occurs -prior- to the post-mortem _tewari_ or game replay analysis.
There are steps one can take for accident prevention, but having
exhausted all means for accident prevention, accidents will happen.
Freud can believe there are no things as accidents, because he works
in office-space which for the most part is a -controlled- environment.
Have Freud work as a paratrooper, and his impressions would change.
>> Also, it is possible that you meant to say "unequivocal core rules"
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> With unequivocal core rules the number of disputes related to core
> rules is virtually zero. (I have compared frequency of disputes
> caused by equivocal core rules with frequency of disputes caused
> by tournament organization.)
This is a critical juncture, which conceivably could -affect- the
EGF final -revised- ruling: if you are bringing a Rules Dispute for
the purpose of -challenging- EGF hegemony, then your cause of
action will quite likely fail. Adherence to an -ideal- for tournament
organization is a matter -separate- from descriptive statements for
that tournament organization. Those descriptive statements are not
unlike the RuleSets themselves. If, for example, EGF had sustained
any obligation to FAX their reasons to you in triplicate, according to
the EGF charter, then their failure to do so would comprise violation
of that EGF Tournament Organization RuleSet. Had the EGF adopted
any obligation to provide citations for dispute resolution precedents?
If the core rules were "equivocal" as you say, then there would
appear to be no obligation by the EGF to explain their referee ruling.
With "equivocal core rules" you would lose your Rules Dispute, IMHO.
You would need to establish that Ing 1991 Rules were "unequivocal."
- regards
- jb
Robert Jasiek
- wrote:
> If the core rules were "equivocal" [...], then there would
> appear to be no obligation by [referees'] ruling.
Do you say that either player can be declared the winner of a game
whenever equivocal core rules are used and the reasoning remains
equivocal by not being given? :) This is what I call arbitrary
arbitration. Such may be "fine" if before a tournament it is
announced. It has the side effect that starting a dispute turns a
lost game into an almost 50% win.
--
robert jasiek
-
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> claimed that:
> "-" wrote --
>> If the core rules were "equivocal" [...], then there would
>> appear to be no obligation by [referees'] ruling.
When, in point of fact, the actual sentence had been:
> From: jum...@earthlink.net:
>> If the core rules were "equivocal" as you say, then there would
>> appear to be no obligation by the EGF to explain their referee ruling.
Some parties and issues, to be identified here, concern:
(a) The Tournament Directors, who host a tournament
under auspices of the EGF, and thereby made official,
(b) The referees at the tournament, given a seal-of-approval
by the Tournament Directors, for an official EGF event,
(c) The chain-of-authority for refereed events, which extends
from referees to Tournament Directors, to EGF council,
(d) The players at the Tournament, who are sponsors of the
event made official by the EGF imprimatur and sanction,
(e) The RuleSet, and the default conditions upon which a
playing dispute is brought, as official Rules Disputes,
(f) Obligations of the EGF to provide reasoned accountability
for their oversight authority upon tournament decisions,
(g) Election and representation procedures for the EGF, to
assure player concerns are being addressed generally.
(h) Whether Ing 1991 comprises "equivocal core rules" ...
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> Do you say that either player can be declared the winner of a game
> whenever equivocal core rules are used and the reasoning remains
> equivocal by not being given? :) This is what I call arbitrary
> arbitration. Such may be "fine" if before a tournament it is
> announced. It has the side effect that starting a dispute turns a
> lost game into an almost 50% win.
If the answer to (h) is "yes", and if under (e) Ing 1991 applies,
then referees have been granted implicit latitude to arbitrate over
equivocal conditions, pre-anticipated by the answers to (h) and (e).
At the same time, referees are accountable to Tournament Directors,
who in turn are made accountable to the EGF if they have advertised
and promoted their tournament as an official EGF event. If referees
do not suffice for reasoned explanation, and Tournament Directors
do not suffice for supplying reasoned explanation, then the EGF ought
to supply the reasoned explanation, or cease granting those Tournament
Directors an EGF seal-of-approval in future Tournament Events. Else,
explanations provided by Tournament Directors could be rubber-stamped
by the EGF council and fowarded to the player, so that the EGF council
doesn't need to play guesswork. Further issues would transpire under
(g), if many disgruntled players perceive Rule Displutes over RuleSet
issues to be resolved unsatisfactorilly. I'm uncertain whether one
correctly characterizes "reasoning not given" as equivocal. The term
"equivocation" expresses positive attribute, of empirical observation,
not a possibility of something existing even for events of non-being.
If a RuleSet is not known to be "equivocal" or not -- if the status of
(h) is, by agreement, unknown or undetermined -- then it is not yet
correct to assert "equivocal" status as the default. To summarize,
it seems that you have described possible reasons given by referees
and/or Tournament Directors as unsatisfactory, and are seeking some
further reasoning behind the EGF's decision, which may have merely
remanded their ruling -back- to your Tournament Directors.
Now when you entered the tournament, you did so with prior
knowledge of the (default) Ing 1991 RuleSet, under previous EGF
announcements, and you maintain that the status of (h) is "yes."
Once a RuleSet is considered to be "equivocal" then human arbiters
are invoked for settling player Rules Disputes. Under the chain of
authority, via (b)(c), referees have been enabled to provide counsel
to Tournament Directors, for settling Rules Disputes. Somewhere one
may find a precedent which establishes how the EGF has delegated
Rules Disputes settlement authority to Tournament Directors. However
the EGF has -not- delegated that delegation any further, to referees.
The referees operate under a (subchapter) delegation, according to the
Tournament Directors, and so are acting as agents for the Tournament
Directors, and cannot correctly issue those final arbitration rulings.
Those final arbitration rulings proceed from the Tournament Directors,
under EGF auspices, by the chain of authority created under (a)(b)(c).
Referees are not EGF representatives, unlike Tournament Directors.
You state that there are two possiblities, under a Rules Dispute,
that outcomes can retain the "lost game", or convert to "a 50% win."
Under formulations of quantum mechanics we would thereby average
the two outcomes, using the sum of squared probabilities convention.
Thereby the player facing a "lost game" absent the Rules Contest, sees
(25%*25% + 50%*50%)/2 = 3125%, in the event that Rules Contest occurs.
The player facing a "won game" absent the Rules Contest, would face
(75%*75% + 50%*50% )/2 = 8125%, for the event of a Rules Contest.
Your opponent still retains a 72.22...% "win" and you have 27.77...%
The extra 0.00...1% goes to referees, Tournament Directors, and EGF.
And, for these purposes, we are assuming that an "equivocation" status
for (h) renders Rules Disputes at a 50% figure, which is not exactly a
meaning for "equivocation" but appears to conform for your purposes.
When "equivocating" backwards to the original propensity, we then
take -half- of that backwards "equivocating" as well, to 0% or 100%.
The numbers were adding up to 5/16 + 13/16 = 18/16 = 9/8, or slightly
in excess of expectation (owing to the Rules Contesting procedures).
Observe also that this -figure- is R(4,4)/(4*4), from Ramsey Theory.
And 13/5 > 5/2, so your opponent still retains a slight edge for the
event of a Rules Dispute. One reason for that slight edge is owing to
a factor of dissuading players from bringing specious Rules Disputes.
The numbers 9 & 8 also yield what may be the only non-trivial solution
for the equation x^y - y^x = 1, as speculated by Diophantine experts.
So, as I said previously, if you are to win in a Rules Dispute,
then your Tournament RuleSet, under (e) or under (e)(h), needs to
be "unequivocal" which -disallows- further "equivocation" upon that
manner of interpretation as a Rules Dispute percolates up to the EGF.
Henric Bergsåker
"Robert Jasiek":
> We must distinguish the following:
(...)
> B1) Exactly when is the informal "dead or alive" used with the
> meaning "strategically dead or alive just before the first
> succession of pass plays"?
> B2) Exactly when is the informal "dead or alive" used with the
> meaning "rules-dead [=breathless] or -alive"?
>
> Above you do not even consider either distinction.
If you like. Let me rephrase then:
The purpose of the particular rule under discussion here is to
handle situations where there is disagreement on whether
some stones are strategically dead or alive before the first
passes. Hence, if there is no such disagreement the rule
is irrelevant. Maybe you could call this the primacy of common
sense?
(...)
> > to live. Does it really not make any difference to you if your stones
> > were in fact dead or not??
>
> They were in fact rules-alive [not breathless] after the succession
> of four pass plays (and therefore also strategically alive then).
> That is what does make the difference.
Ok, I rephrase:
Does it really not make any difference to you if your stones were
strategically dead or not before the first succession of passes?
best regards,
Henric
Robert Jasiek
- wrote:
> I'm uncertain whether one
> correctly characterizes "reasoning not given" as equivocal. The term
> "equivocation" expresses positive attribute, of empirical observation,
> not a possibility of something existing even for events of non-being.
German mehrdeutig [having more than one meaning], which my dictionary
translates as "ambiguous, equivocal". It stands in contrast to
eindeutig [having one and only one meaning], which is given as
"unambiguous", which itself is also used to define "unequivocal".
> knowledge of the (default) Ing 1991 RuleSet, under previous EGF
> announcements, and you maintain that the status of (h) is "yes."
If a ruleset is equivocal, then it does not automatically follow
that all of its subaspects are.
> Referees are not EGF representatives, unlike Tournament Directors.
It may depend on definition.
> You state that there are two possiblities, under a Rules Dispute,
> that outcomes can retain the "lost game", or convert to "a 50% win."
Two _likely_ possibilities because referees do not tend to make
neutral decisions.
--
robert jasiek
Robert Jasiek
"Henric Bergsåker" wrote:
> The purpose of the particular rule
Which particular rule? (Or do you mean ruleset?) Why do you refer
to only one rule and only one purpose?
> under discussion here is to
> handle situations where there is disagreement on whether
> some stones are strategically dead or alive before the first
> passes.
You sound sure about exactly that being the purpose. How do you
derive this?
Exactly when do you mean that situations are handled? Do I
understand you correctly that you mean handling before the
first [succession of] passes? What is the relevance for us then;
what do you think that handling before the first succession of
passes means for the handling after the first succession of
passes?
You speak of disagreement as if it occurred before the first
succession of passes. Do you mean "were" instead of "are"?
IMO, you are not precise enough.
> Hence, if there is no such disagreement the rule
> is irrelevant.
Which rule? (See above.) Disagreement when? (See above.)
> Maybe you could call this the primacy of common
> sense?
So far I do not understand you. Nevertheless, do you want to
construct a difference between primacy of fairness and primacy
of common sense?
> Does it really not make any difference to you if your stones were
> strategically dead or not before the first succession of passes?
Whether it did not make any difference to me after the succession
of four passes (given the rules context set before the tournament)?
Yes. - This is like during the phase before the first succession of
passes where it does not matter for future strategy whether life
and death status was different earlier during the game.
--
robert jasiek
Henric Bergsåker
"Robert Jasiek" :
>
> "Henric Bergsåker" wrote:
> > The purpose of the particular rule
>
> Which particular rule? (Or do you mean ruleset?) Why do you refer
> to only one rule and only one purpose?
I mean the rule that stipulates a second round of passes after
the dead stones have been removed. Sorry if that wasn't clear.
> > under discussion here is to
> > handle situations where there is disagreement on whether
> > some stones are strategically dead or alive before the first
> > passes.
>
> You sound sure about exactly that being the purpose. How do you
> derive this?
I am not sure in any mathematical sense and I don't have in mind
a strict logical derivation, however my thinking is roughly that
if there weren't any possible disagreement on the status (dead or alive,
"strategically" with your term), then there wouldn't be any need
for a second round of passes, the players could proceed with
the counting. Do you follow? If you can state any good reason
other than making sure that both players agree on which stones
are ("strategically") dead for the second round of passes, I might
even change my mind about the purpose.
> Exactly when do you mean that situations are handled? Do I
Exactly what do you mean by handled?
> understand you correctly that you mean handling before the
> first [succession of] passes? What is the relevance for us then;
> what do you think that handling before the first succession of
> passes means for the handling after the first succession of
> passes?
In my opinion it means that if you are aware that your stones are dead
and that your opponent and everybody else around are aware
that they are dead, you shouldn't pass again until they have been
removed. If you do pass anyway and manage to make your
opponent so confused that he says pass as well, then you
shouldn't claim that the obviously dead stones have come to
life. Why did you pass before the dead stones had been
removed? Why didn't you remove them yourself for instance?
You could have removed their breaths yourself if you felt the
need to: "breathless stones are taken off the board by the player
who eliminated their last breath, whether the stones belong to
that player or his opponent".
> You speak of disagreement as if it occurred before the first
> succession of passes. Do you mean "were" instead of "are"?
Funny you should say that, I did feel after I had written it that
"were" would be the more precise word, but I didn't bother to
change it, as I thought it would be obvious from context what
I meant: the stones were clearly dead when you passed the
first time, you know it, your opponent knows it and everybody
else knows it and that remains a true statement for ever, in fact
it still is.
> IMO, you are not precise enough.
That's why I try to spell it out more precisely now.
> > Hence, if there is no such disagreement the rule
> > is irrelevant.
>
> Which rule? (See above.) Disagreement when? (See above.)
See above. Disagreement (at any time) over whether the stones
were dead or not (when you passed the first time).
> > Maybe you could call this the primacy of common
> > sense?
>
> So far I do not understand you. Nevertheless, do you want to
> construct a difference between primacy of fairness and primacy
> of common sense?
If you like. I don't think that fairness is a very precise term.
Don't you think it is fair if rules are adhered to to the letter?
I thought you did.
>
> > Does it really not make any difference to you if your stones were
> > strategically dead or not before the first succession of passes?
>
> Whether it did not make any difference to me after the succession
> of four passes (given the rules context set before the tournament)?
> Yes. - This is like during the phase before the first succession of
> passes where it does not matter for future strategy whether life
> and death status was different earlier during the game.
I think you are implicitly using 'dead' in several different meanings
here. What I intended was that there was no hope of making the
the stones live by continuing to play (i.e. with alternate stones played on
the board and your opponent not helping you to make them live).
I believe this is the ordinary usage.
As I understand your answer, it still doesn't matter to you if your
stones were dead or not (in the ordinary sense of the word, as above),
and if both you and your opponent were aware that they were dead,
and were aware that the other person knew that they were dead
(at the moment of your first passes), you think that you should have
won the game anyway?
regards,
Henric
Robert Jasiek
"Henric Bergsåker" wrote:
> I mean the rule that stipulates a second round of passes after
> the dead stones have been removed.
Ignoring undefined "dead" and "have", you should not interpret a
ruleset as if interpretation sentence by sentence would be the same
as interpretation for the whole ruleset in its context. Such is the
same only for an unequivocal ruleset. So for Ing91 is it not the
same. Therefore interpretation cannot be done by only analysing each
sentence separately and independently. Please see my commentary for
some interpretation that considers also the ruleset as a whole and
its context.
> I am not sure in any mathematical sense and I don't have in mind
> a strict logical derivation, however my thinking is roughly that
It does not matter whether your interpret strictly mathematical or
not but it matters whether you do everything to do the ruleset
justice. IMO, you do not but you dream of some desired ruleset as
mentioned below. There is nothing wrong with dreaming of other
rulesets, however, one should always be aware that one may not
apply a desired ruleset instead of the actually used ruleset.
> if there weren't any possible disagreement on the status (dead or alive,
> "strategically" with your term), then there wouldn't be any need
> for a second round of passes, the players could proceed with
> the counting. [...] If you can state any good reason
> other than making sure that both players agree on which stones
> are ("strategically") dead for the second round of passes, I might
> even change my mind about the purpose.
Reasons for using passes or successions of passes vary greatly
from ruleset to ruleset. So if a ruleset uses passes for some
reasons, then they must be used and for those reasons.
I could list a lot of pass-and-reasons-for-passes types but that
would be immaterial for the particular ruleset and is particular
application. In particular, Tromp-Taylor shows us that two passes
in succession are enough for a game. We may dream of TT but that
is immaterial currently.
So now I consider Ing91 and its particular application EGC02. For
EGC02 there have not been special tournament rules overriding the
Ing91 usage of and principle reasons for a second succession of
passes. Therefore it is comparatively straightforward that
interpretation of Ing91 provides us with a description of usage
and reasons for it.
It is clear that usage of the second succession of passes consists
of at least two passes. It is not clear whether it should consist
of two, rarely three, or four passes. If between the first and the
second succession of passes nothing happens, then it seems to be
clear that both successions of passes consist of four passes
altogether. However, if something happens in between both successions
of passes, then one might argue that the second succession of passes
consists of two passes because two of altogether four passes occurred
earlier or consists of four passes because after some intervening
incidents it might be necessary to have another game pause, which is
then preceded by the first two and followed by the last two of the
four passes of the second block of passes.
It is also unclear whether a game may have more than one game pause,
may have one or two game pauses, or may have arbitrarily many game
pauses (if only "invariation" is not violated). Possibly numbers of
allowed game pauses might depend on circumstances (like a requirement
that a pass as a ko threat would be useful). So if we have spoken of
"second" succession above, we might need to say "last" succession
instead.
Anyway, for Ing91 it is clear what the main meaning of the game's
last two passes is: To finally end all possibilities of agreements
or removals and to allow counting to start. That this is obvious
does not mean that it can be ignored; these reasons exist and
therefore they are to be applied as such.
Ing91 know of another reason for blocks of two passes: Each block
of two passes lifts a (basic) ko ban; ko recapture becomes available
again. This is a meaning for every non-final block of two passes.
The final block of two passes has the additional to disallow even
any further recapture in a ko. (See example A3-A8.)
Whether you call any reason for passes "good" is also immaterial. If
the rules suggest reasons, then they are there and that's it. Calling
successions of passes "good" is nothing but personal preference. (E.g.
my currently immaterial personal preference is that rules should have
only one succession of only two passes.)
> > Exactly when do you mean that situations are handled? Do I
> Exactly what do you mean by handled?
Everything that happens to the situation and the manner of it
happening. Whether "everything" or its manner should be restricted
for the sake of semantics depends on what you meant when you used
"handled".
> In my opinion it means that if you are aware that your stones are dead
[strategically dead]
> and that your opponent and everybody else around are aware
> that they are dead,
[strategically dead]
> you shouldn't pass again until they have been
> removed.
What you describe possibly is your desired ruleset that you dream
of:
Presumably it is close to what I wrote down as verbal EGF-Ing rules
at <http://home.snafu.de/jasiek/egfrul.html> but with the following
changes:
"
- The phase alternation ends with a succession of passes that
consists of two passes.
- During the phase removals the players agree on stones to be
removed. They are required to agree to remove all those stones
already on the board as have not but could have been removed
during wise continued alternation during the phase alternation.
"
(The players' agreement is superfluous. The rules could more
simply require the players to remove those stones in question.
I have included agreement in the text only because I try to
model what I think your desired rules would be like.)
I would not want to introduce a mighty concept primacy of common
sense. It is sufficient to construct a hybrid of both the primacy
of rules and the primacy of fairness to allow for a reasonable
application of the above kind of rules.
One thing with "your" rules is clear: They are not Ing rules; they
are something else. E.g., it is suddenly unclear what might happen
to passes used as ko threats; furthermore the ko restriction must
consider already occurred removals, see egfrul.html.
> If you do pass anyway and manage to make your
> opponent so confused that he says pass as well, then you
> shouldn't claim that the obviously dead stones have come to
> life.
You refer to an abstract case, do you? (It does not make sense
to refer it to the EGC02 case.)
> Why did you pass before the dead stones had been
> removed?
Presuming an abstract case:
- It matters whether you say rules-dead or strategically dead here.
- The Ing91 game is a competition of skill.
- It is not a player's task or duty to help him strategically
during the game. Instead it would even violate the game's spirit of
being a competition of skill. (Also see my Ing91 game end commentary.)
- Removing opposing stones is a strategic advantage, removing own
stones is a strategic disadvantage. The aim of the game is to win.
- Does it make a difference whether the opponent or the player of
strategically dead stones passes, more particularly passes first?
> Why didn't you remove them yourself for instance?
Presuming an abstract case:
- That would help the opponent strategically, etc., see before.
> You could have removed their breaths yourself
Adventurous thought:)
> the stones were clearly dead when you passed the
> first time, you know it, your opponent knows it and everybody
> else knows it and that remains a true statement for ever, in fact
> it still is.
dead = strategically dead until the final two passes
> > Nevertheless, do you want to
> > construct a difference between primacy of fairness and primacy
> > of common sense?
> If you like. I don't think that fairness is a very precise term.
Like "sportsmanlike" or "common sense". Therefore a defined
"primacy of fairness".
> Don't you think it is fair if rules are adhered to to the letter?
Rules used under the primacy of rules must be understood as well
as anyhow possible using any means contributing to an interpretation
as good and precise as anyhow possible. See above, this does not
mean to read and understand letter by letter but by using every
scale for approach from letter to international context.
> > Whether it did not make any difference to me after the succession
> > of four passes (given the rules context set before the tournament)?
> > Yes. - This is like during the phase before the first succession of
> > passes where it does not matter for future strategy whether life
> > and death status was different earlier during the game.
>
> I think you are implicitly using 'dead' in several different meanings
> here.
Strictly, in this paragraph it is always "strategically dead".
> What I intended was that there was no hope of making the
> the stones live by continuing to play (i.e. with alternate stones played on
> the board and your opponent not helping you to make them live).
> I believe this is the ordinary usage.
E.g., Nihon Kiin 1989 rules: They are do not use "dead" as an
ordinary word but they attempt to define it formally.
> As I understand your answer, it still doesn't matter to you if your
> stones were dead or not (in the ordinary sense of the word, as above),
> and if both you and your opponent were aware that they were dead,
> and were aware that the other person knew that they were dead
> (at the moment of your first passes),
Indeed.
> you think that you should have won the game anyway?
After the game end: Indeed.
--
robert jasiek
Bill Spight
Henric:
> > The purpose of the particular rule under discussion here is to
> > handle situations where there is disagreement on whether
> > some stones are strategically dead or alive before the first
> > passes.
>
Robert:
> You sound sure about exactly that being the purpose. How do you
> derive this?
>
I have a related question. Robert, what do you think is the purpose of
the pause after the first two consecutive passes?
Thanks,
Bill
-
> - wrote:
>> I'm uncertain whether one
>> correctly characterizes "reasoning not given" as equivocal. The term
>> "equivocation" expresses positive attribute, of empirical observation,
>> not a possibility of something existing even for events of non-being.
Robert Jasiek <jas...@snafu.de> wrote:
> German mehrdeutig [having more than one meaning], which my
> dictionary translates as "ambiguous, equivocal". It stands in contrast
> to eindeutig [having one and only one meaning], which is given as
> "unambiguous", which itself is also used to define "unequivocal".
Yes, our dictionaries appear to correlate, however this question
stems from logic, involving a third possibility other than merely the
two "standing in contrast" to each other. One -analogy- would be
positive and negative numbers not quite completing the number set.
Neutral territory, for example in Go, between living stone groups
or serving as liberties in _seki_, is counted as _dame_ and thereby
is "neither equivocal nor unequivocal", but (neutrally) neither case.
>> ... knowledge of the (default) Ing 1991 RuleSet, under previous EGF
>> announcements, and you maintain that the status of (h) is "yes."
> If a ruleset is equivocal, then it does not automatically follow
> that all of its subaspects are.
Agreed, however the particular subaspects deemed equivocal might
not all be correlated among different observors once admitting to the
possibility that (unstated) portions of a RuleSet could be equivocal.
>> Referees are not EGF representatives, unlike Tournament Directors.
> It may depend on definition.
Yes, I spoke generally. Conceivably, the EGF could make a
deliberate appointment of one or more referees for a tournament if
they were micromanaging the event, and of course the Tournament
Directors can also act in capacity of referees. I sought to describe
some categorical guidelines, barring those unforseen exceptions.
The idea stems from the notion that delegated authority cannot be
redelegated. The EGF has delegated authority to the Tournament
Directors when consenting to the official label for that event, and so
the authority delegated by the EGF to the Tournament Directors cannot
be redelegated to other referees at that tournament without obtaining
another special EGF dispensation or approval for that redelegation.
>> You state that there are two possiblities, under a Rules Dispute,
>> that outcomes can retain the "lost game", or convert to "a 50% win."
> Two _likely_ possibilities because referees do not tend to make
> neutral decisions.
Yes, "equivocal" does not necessarily mean a 50-50 split, so I
was addressing an hypothetical situation where it might, when saying:
> From: jum...@earthlink.net --
>> ... for these purposes, we are assuming that an "equivocation" status
>> for (h) renders Rules Disputes at a 50% figure, which is not exactly a
>> meaning for "equivocation" but appears to conform for your purposes.
Additionally, I used "halfway notions" to obtain 25% and 75% figures.
Robert Jasiek
> I have a related question. Robert, what do you think is the purpose of
> the pause after the first two consecutive passes?
Under Ing91 without tournament rules context? (Pause: period of time.)
- It allows the players to remove stones that have not been removed
before and that may not be removed thereafter and that both players
allow to be removed by appropriate means, although it is unclear
which these can be exactly. Since appropriate means are unclear, it
is also rather unclear why an otherwise almost superfluous removals
handling is part of the rules at all, except for the following or
otherwise for standard guesses about optionally available verbal
agreements.
- It allows a (basic) ko recapture when an intervening pass is used
as a ko threat (and unless other restriction rules, like the
disturbing ko rules [in my interpretation: esp. the prohibition rule],
provide restrictions).
Best,
--
robert jasiek