Ogonyok Article, Part 2
Ted Schuerzinger
relationship. This section deals with the Moscow 1984-85 match and its
aftermath. I've kept the Russian style of referring to people by their
first name and patronymic where this was used in the article as it was
easier to translate that way. Also, the last section from Litvinov seemed
to be missing a few quotation marks; this made it slightly unclear as to
who was speaking about whom. Finally, I hope I haven't misspelt any
foreign names that I had to retransliterate back out of Russian.
The next part should be posted to the net sometime Friday.
--Ted Schuerzinger
z...@Dartmouth.EDU
Post no .sigs.
THE FIRST MATCH
Klara Shagenovna Kasparova: In the summer of 1984, Garry and the
Soviet team set off for the so-called "match of the century" in London. We,
that is I and Aleksandr Sergeevich Nikitin, his trainer since childhood,
left to go to the Petrosian's dacha. Tigran Vartanovich was already
seriously ill and had only a few months to live. The ex-champion was sorry
that he couldn't help Garry. With regret he mentioned that the team for the
match, in his opinion, was weaker than a team under Karpov, where there
would be many strong grandmasters with many ideas. But a current player
from the top ten is necessaary for analysis of adjourned games. So Rona
Yakovleva, Petrosian's wife, offered to get us in touch with Dorfman, who
until that time worked with Tigran Vartanovich. I called to Lvov. Dorfman
asked for time to think, but on the next day he agreed.
KGB Document "On the relationship of Feldman with Grandmaster Dorfman
"In August 1984, Dorfman offered his friend Pyotr Marusenko, a
doctoral candidate in the philology department of the University of Kiev,
the chance to organize an "equalizer" for the match, in addition using all
the current information during the match. Marusenko, not being well-versed
in such matters, turned to Vadim Bairamov, President of the Soviet Checkers
Federation and a close friend of Karpov.
"Taking this into account, Karpov instructed Feldman (who plays an
important part later in the article -- M.-K.) to get acquainted with
Dorfman during the match and receive from him information about Kasparov's
opening analysis, sealed moves from the adjourned games, and results of
home analysis. For the first two games, Feldman studied Dorfman from afar,
and then got to know him. Next, Feldman asked him to take part by giving
him the information he had; Dorfman readily agreed to this and even
formulated the terms of the deal and the information to be transferred:
- opening information,
- sealed moves,
- home analysis of adjourned games, and
- information on timeouts.
For each game, Dorfman would receive 150-200 rubles.
"From the fourth game through the eleventh game, Dorfman and Feldman
met daily at noon on the corner by the hotel Rossiya, where Dorfman
transferred the necessary information to Feldman and received money. In
all, Dorfman received 1600 rubles.
"Feldman took the information he received to Archangelskoye (where
Karpov was staying at the dacha of the Minister of Defense -- M.-K.) and
personally handed it to Karpov. Nobody in Karpov's camp knew about
Feldman's mission, with the exception of Oleg Aleksandrovich Ladychenko, a
close friend of Karpov.
"After the 11th game, when Karpov played the move Kf3, Dorfman
understood that his information was making it to the Karpov camp and
demanded that Feldman sharply increase the amount of money he was paying,
adding: "It's all the same to me who becomes champion. I just want to earn
my money." However, Karpov didn't agree with the idea of increased
payments, and the contacts between Feldman and Dorfman stopped, and Dorfman
left for Tashkent.
"After returning to Moscow from Tashkent, Dorfman, on his own
initiative, met with Feldman before the adjournment session of the 41st
game. However, Dorfman received no money for this service, as by that time
it was already impossible to talk with Karpov in view of the condition of
his state of mind...."
Let's break from that useful document. I read it with a very serious
feeling. It returned me to those insane September days when Kasparov
inexplicably collapsed completely in those first games.
The author of the KGB document -- retired KGB lieutenant colonel
Viktor Petrovich Litvinov.
LITVINOV: I was working in the Azerbaijani KGB as the head of the
division of ideology and sport. All those who travelled abroad came under
our watch. We were supposed to protect Soviet sportsmen from Western
ideological influences. Once, we received information that Garry's mother
had brought to work a book that was not allowed to be brought into the
USSR, (Klara Shagenovna explained, that it was a book by Nabokov; this was
1981. -- M.-K.) and given it to her friends to read. Her son had brought it
from Switzerland. This information caused our leadership to pay great
attention.
Garry Kasparov, a young man of 18 who constantly travelled abroad,
was, in the eyes of the specialists, a player with a bright future, which,
as is well-known, raises interest in certain circles in the West
(especially the USA); interests which were prepared to offer him
citizenship for the long struggle ahead with Karpov.
[Litvinov specifically uses the Russian word 'grazhdanstvo', meaning
'citizenship', but I'm completely unaware that any Western countries were
openly willing to offer Kasparov citizenship, as he didn't seem to be
saying anything about defecting. Does anybody have any information about
this? -- JTS.]
When we discussed this question at length, we discovered that
chessplayers are a serious, envious people; Kasparov was frankly ignored in
his journeys. The only one who would have him in an adjoining hotel room
was Spassky, who by that time already had a well-developed Weltanschauung.
Spassky had a rather strong influence on Kasparov. We were required to
protect Kasparov from this "education".
The first person to work with Kasparov was my colleague involved with
problems in sport; for some reason, after a few months -- even to this day
I don't know what the reasons for this were -- my boss called me and said,
"You're going to work personally with Kasparov."
Of course, both Garry and Klara were suspicious of me. In general, our
meeting didn't give them a great deal of happiness. But then, a decision to
have daily meetings and my sincere desire to help made us friends.
Klara Shagenovna KASPAROVA: There was no other way out for us; the
main thing was that accepted this guardianship as a defense of our
interests against those of Moscow.
M.-K.: I should add, of course, that for Garry this 'romantic aureole'
also played a role as a person on a counter-reconnaissance mission; as if
he were serving Kasparov's interests. But without a doubt, the main thing
is that this was a straight line to the highest leader in the republic --
Geidar Alievich Aliev.
LITVINOV: Everybody in the chess world feared Karpov, feared his
persecution, his revenge by the hands of the nomenclatura, all those who
supported him; as the words of Brezhnev at the Kremlin after the World
Champion's title was awarded to Karpov: state "He won the crown; let nobody
give it back" became a command for life.
This negative image of Garry was deliberately fashioned. From
Dzerzhinsky square [site of KGB headquarters -- JTS], rather distorted
information about Kasparov's personality, his plans, and his moods went to
Red Square. But here, the internal organs of the KGB, which had started to
give their own information, began to interfere; this information went
against the standing opions about the hopelessness of Kasparov as a Soviet
citizen.
Having arrived in Moscow on official business, I read the materials on
Kasparov, made up of information from certain people who had reported their
own opinions, which were at times completely made up. Everything was saved,
everything correctly filed. The famous chess journalist Roshal [sp?] was by
far not the first in this roll.
I can remember some strange examples. During the first match, Garry
was being helped by his doctor Pyotr. As his personal doctor, Garry
completely trusted this man and was completely open with him. But every
evening, the doctor would call and report everything that Garry had told
him. Now there's professional ethics and the Hippocratic oath for you!
At a meeting with General Abramov (head of the 5th Division of the
national KGB; the ideological division. -- M.-K.), I said: "How do you take
this? Here are six written documents, on the basis of which you prepared a
report for the Central Committee of the CPSU. All six of these people are
from Anatoly Karpov's camp. Does it really work like this?"
M.-K.: Do you think that these documents are currently in the KGB
archives?
LITVINOV: No. Most likely they've been destroyed. As far as I know, in
1991, when it was suggested, that the people might burst into Lubyanka [the
current name of Dzerzhinsky Square -- JTS], many documents were destroyed.
In addition the Department [Although Litvinov does not make clear whether
this was Abramov's department, that should probably be assumed -- JTS] was
already disbanded before the August coup, the documents in the archives
were destroyed, there was nobody to transfer them, there were no
successors.
M.-K. Here I must say a few words about Lieutenant-General Abramov.
Litvinov said, that his 25-minute reports at times stretched out for an
hour, as the general was often diverted by editors and leaders of creative
unions who were looking for valuable advice.
One of the first declarations on ideology Litvinov heard from his boss
at Dzerzhinsky Square: "The World Champion is a political figure. We
believe that Kasparov is not yet mature enough for this title." To this,
Litvinov, showing certain powers, answered, "Geidar Alievich doesn't think
so."
But let's return to the order in which these events occured. And thus,
the curtain fell, the stage was cleared, the match, at the behest of the
Party, whose spokesman, was Candidate Member of the Politburo Pyotr
Nilovich Demichev, who shook hands with our honest friend Florencio
Campomanes. The scandal surrounding the conclusion of the match was
enormous. It was February 1985; glasnost still had to wait another two
months. At a stormy conference at the hotel "Sport", two representatives of
the Central Committee of the Soviet Komsomol, who were also members of the
Party, first cleared up the relations with the Western media. The dying
General Secretary was still alive, and our leading grandmasters, for that
reason, bided their time. Such sorting out was only legitimized by the era
of perestroika.
LITVINOV: After the match Kasparov was invited to West Germany, where
the German magazine 'Der Spiegel' wanted an interview with him. The
Azerbaijani KGB was opposed to this trip, which took place in April 1985.
We felt that after such a conclusion to a match, Garry would unavoidably
find himself in a compex situation, even if it was simply psychological,
and in the heat of the situation might do something stupid. Let him cool
off first. Let everything settle. But with what urgency they shoved him off
to Germany for this interview! Not just the Central Committee, but the
State Committe of Sport and the Soviet Chess Federation as well.
M.K.: It seems as if there was in this move an old plan, which they
had played in the Korchnoi era. Use your oppenent's hot temper, then
angrily prosecute him for anti-Soviet speech, and as a result disqualify
him. As far as I know, an appropriate article for "Soviet Sport", written
by a well-known chess journalist, had already been written for this
purpose.
LITVINOV: Garry and I agreed, that in the interview with "Der
Spiegel", he would only talk about chess. Not about the government, not
about politics. But Garry permitted himself to criticize sharply the Soviet
Chess Federation for the way the match was ended.
When we returned to Moscow and I went to Dzerzhinsky Square, everybody
avoided me as if I were a leper: "What the hell did you tell 'Der
Spiegel'?" In other words, criticism in the direction of the Soviet Chess
Federation was immediately taken as anti-Soviet speech.
I went to one office -- the occupant was busy. I went to another --z
exactly the same situation. This was a bad state. I called Garry, but he
was on his way to see the Central Committee. After dinner, Garry informed
me: "Everything's okay, Yakovlev listened to me. He said, 'Garry's
excellent; he always has to tell the truth.'" I put down the phone went one
of my bosses' offices, and said: "Garry's trip received high marks from the
Central Committee, specifically with Yakovlev, and he passed it on upstairs
(that is, to Gorbachev)." Somehow, everybody knew about this within five
minutes; they even smiled: "Come now, Viktor, something must not be clear
to you...."
M.K.: There's a continuation to this story. At an anniversary party
for Ogonyok, I reminded Aleksandr Nikolaevich Yakovlev of this, and he
said, that they should have kept a report on Kasparov's behavior in the
Central Committee archives that were prepared for the General Secretary.
Back then, Mikhail Sergeevich [Gorbachev -- JTS] was disturbed by Garry's
actions. "He was actually in a rather bad mood about it," said Aleksandr
Nikolaevich, "but I told him, 'they say it's not our place to appoint
champions in sport,' and Mikhail Sergeevich agreed with me."
That's how the second match, and with it Kasparov's career, were
saved.
The middle of 1985 came, Gorbachev was in his third month as General
Secretary, and Yakovlev was just appointed as the head of the Ideology
Department of the Central Committee.
--end of section
COMING UP: THE SECOND MATCH
o Death threats on GM Dorfman
o A request for 100,000 rubles
o more!