I have. There are many time when he says things like, "It's clear 36. f4
was stronger," (Tal-Gligoric, Zagreb 59), or see his note to 5. ... Qc7
in Tal-Olaffson, Bled 1961 (a move he describes as "bad" - but that he
clearly made intentionally) or, say, 10. a3 in Tal-Bagirov,
Dnepropetrosk, 1970, which he describes as "in no way stronger than the
approved Re1."

(I found these notes by basically opening "The Life and Games of Mikhail
Tal" at random. Stuff like this is all over that book. You should try
reading it sometime, before you talk about what Tal was, or wasn't,
thinking. His book on his match with Botvinnik goes into even more depth
on his thinking, again, and does a good job explaining the emphasis Tal
put of psychology over soundness. And what is psychology, in chess,
other than playing an inferior move which you think your opponent will
respond badly too. In particular, I'd point you to his discussion of his
12th move of game 17.)

It's clear from his notes that he doesn't care if his sacrifices were
"correct" or not. He made a move - which he knew could well be unsound -
with the expectation that in the resulting position his opponents would
play incorrectly.

That's pretty much the definition of "making an error to induce your
opponent into making a bigger one."

-"Ron"