(USA) NTSB issues recommendations to the FAA and the SSA regarding transponder use in gliders
VARR
August 28, 2006, midair collision involving a Hawker 800XP airplane
and a ASW27-18 glider near Smith, NV.
Letter 1: NTSB letter to the SSA (A-08-14 and A-08-15)
Letter 2: NTSB letter to the FAA (A-08-10 through A-08-13)
The FAA is obliged to provide an initial response to the NTSB in 90
days and that response will be open to the public in addition to any
potential NPRM which might result from these recommendations.
Any SSA members interested in providing comment should probably get in
touch with the SSA Government Liaison Committee or engage their
regional representatives as appropriate.
Any discussion should remain courteous and keep in mind that the FAA
has not yet made any decisions or changed any regulations in response
to the NTSB's recommendations and that the FAA currently has many
priorities and a slightly broader perspective (ADS-B, etc.) and is not
obligated to follow the precise recommendations made by the NTSB.
Please excuse any OCR translation errors in the following...
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Letter 1: NTSB letter to the SSA (A-08-14 and A-08-15)
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594
Safety Recommendation
A-08-14 and -15
Date: Mar 31 2008
Soaring Society of America, Inc.
Attn: Government Liaison Committee
Post Office Box 2 100
Hobbs, New Mexico 82241-2100
The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal
agency charged by Congress with investigating transportation
accidents, determining their probable cause, and making
recommendations to prevent similar accidents from occurring. We are
providing the following information to urge your organization to take
action on the safety recommendations in this letter. The Safety Board
is vitally interested in these recommendations because they are
designed to prevent accidents and save lives.
These recommendations address expanding the safety efforts by the
Soaring Society of America, Inc., (SSA) for glider operations. These
recommendations are derived from the Safety Board's investigation of
the August 28, 2006, midair collision involving a Raytheon Aircraft
Company Hawker 800XP airplane and a Schleicher ASW27-18 glider and are
consistent with the evidence we found and the analysis we performed.
Information supporting these recommendations is discussed below. The
Board would appreciate a response from you within 90 days addressing
the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement our
recommendations.
Background
On August 28, 2006, about 1506 Pacific daylight time, [1] a Raytheon
Aircraft Company Hawker 800XP airplane, N879QS, and a Schleicher AS
W27-18 glider, N7729, collided in flight near Smith, Nevada, about 42
nautical miles (nm) south-southeast of the Reno/Tahoe International
Airport (RNO), Reno, Nevada, at an altitude of about 16,000 feet above
mean sea level (msl). The airline transport-certificated captain and
first of5cer in the Hawker received minor injuries, and the three
passengers were not injured. The private pilot in the glider received
minor injuries, and both aircraft sustained substantial damage. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the collision. The
Hawker, which was fractionally owned by multiple corporations and
managed by NetJets Aviation, Inc., was operating under the provisions
of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, Subpart K, as an
executivelcorporate flight. It departed from Carlsbad, California,
about 1400 and was en route to RNO with an instrument flight rules
(IFR) flight plan filed. The glider was registered to a private owner
and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91
as a personal flight. It departed from Minden, Nevada, about 1300 for
a local flight with no flight plan filed. [2]
The collision occurred in an area that is frequently traversed by air
carrier and other turbojet airplanes inbound to RNO and that is also
popular for glider operations because of the excellent thermal and
mountain wave gliding opportunities there. [3] The Hawker flight was
in radar and radio contact with an air traffic control (ATC) facility.
The glider pilot, who intended a 5-hour flight in the local area to
familiarize himself with the glider, was not communicating with ATC
and was not required to do so. [4] Before the collision, the Hawker
had been descending toward RNO on a stable northwest heading for
several miles, and the glider was in a 30°, left-banked, spiraling
climb. According to statements from the Hawker's captain and the
glider pilot, they each saw the other aircraft only about 1 second or
less before the collision and were unable to maneuver to avoid the
collision in time. Damage sustained by the Hawker disabled one engine
and other systems; however, the flight crew landed the airplane. The
damaged glider was uncontrollable, and the glider pilot bailed out and
parachuted to the ground.
Because of the lack of radar data for the glider's flight, it was not
possible to determine at which points in each flight each aircraft may
have been in the other's available field of view. Although Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs) require all pilots to maintain vigilance
to see and avoid other aircraft (this includes pilots of flights
operated under IFR, when visibility permits), a number of factors that
can diminish the effectiveness of the see-and-avoid principle were
evident in this accident. For example, the high closure rate of the
Hawker as it approached the glider would have given the glider pilot
only limited time to see and avoid the jet. Likewise, the closure rate
would have limited the time that the Hawker crew had to detect the
glider, and the slim design of the glider would have made it difficult
for the Hawker crew to see it. Although the demands of cockpit tasks,
such as preparing for an approach, have been shown to adversely affect
scan vigilance, both the Hawker captain, who was the flying pilot, and
the first officer reported they were looking out the window before the
collision. However, the captain saw the glider only a moment before it
filled the windshield, and the first officer never saw it at all.
Although the Hawker was equipped with a traffic alert and collision
avoidance system (TCAS)-II capable of generating vertical resolution
(collision avoidance) advisories (RA), the glider's Mode C transponder
was turned off (and, therefore, not detectable by the Hawker's
equipment) because the glider pilot wanted to reserve battery power
for radio use. Although transponder installation is not required on
gliders, FARs require that any person operating a transponder-equipped
aircraft must use the transponder. [5] Had the glider pilot turned on
his transponder, the Hawker's TCAS-II likely would have depicted the
glider on the flight crew's monitor and would have generated an RA to
alert the crewmembers and prompt them to deviate their course in time
to prevent the accident.
According to Reno Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) personnel,
it is not uncommon for arriving and departing air traffic to receive
TCAS RAs because of transponder-equipped gliders operating in the
area. For example, in a 30-day interval before the accident, the
facility recorded four such TCAS RA events reported by pilots. [6]
Each event involved a conflict between a transport-category airplane
operated under 14 CFR Part 121 and a glider. In addition, the glider's
transponder, if turned on, would have provided position and altitude
information to ATC personnel who could have used that information to
provide separation services and traffic advisories to the Hawker crew.
The Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident
was the failure of the glider pilot to utilize his transponder and the
high closure rate of the two aircraft, which limited each pilot's
opportunity to see and avoid the other aircraft.
The investigative findings from this accident revealed safety issues
related to limitations of the see-and-avoid concept in preventing
midair collisions, especially when one or more high-speed aircraft are
involved; the regulatory exemption that allows gliders to operate
without transponders; and glider design and electrical power
limitations that present unique challenges for the installation and
operation of transponders. The Safety Board has issued four safety
recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regarding
these issues.
Distribution of Transponder Safety Information
The Safety Board recognizes that the SSA, through the efforts of its
Soaring Safety Foundation and its supporting groups, such as glider
clubs, chapters, and glider fixed-base operators (FBOs) in all SSA
regions, periodically distributes safety information to the glider
community regarding transponders. For example, the Pacific Soaring
Council, Inc., (PASCO) [7] publishes and disseminates a seasonal
newsletter to glider pilots throughout its local area, which includes
the areas surrounding RNO. [8] Since January 1998, all of the
newsletters have included the safety message encouraging the use of
transponders within 50 nm of RN. [9] The SSA also published a two-part
safety article in the February and March 2002 issues of Soaring
magazine that discussed the safety benefits of transponder use in
gliders and considerations regarding transponder size and weight,
installation, maintenance, and battery power. The article was updated
in December 2004 and was also published on the SSA's Soaring Safety
Foundation Web site. [10]
The Safety Board commends the SSA's efforts to distribute safety
information. However, the Board notes that, on November 5, 2003, the
SSA submitted a petition to the FAA requesting that pilots of
transponder-equipped gliders be allowed to turn the transponders off
when flying more than 40 nm from the primary airport in Class B
airspace and more than 20 nm from the primary airport in Class C
airspace. [11] The intent of the petition was to encourage voluntary
transponder installations by exempting those installations from the
"always on" requirement of 14 CFR 91.215(c). According to the SSA,
this would allow glider pilots to conserve the limited battery power
of gliders during exceptionally long flights outside of congested
airspace to ensure that power would be available for the pilots to use
the transponders in the vicinity of airports with significant air
traffic. The FAA responded on January 22, 2008, and denied the SSA's
request but stated that the FAA has an ongoing rulemaking project that
proposes revisions to 14 CFR 91.215(c) that will cover the relief that
the SSA's petition sought. Although the Board recognizes that gliders
have electrical power limitations, the Board is opposed to any
rulemaking action that would enable such exemptions because aircraft
would remain at risk for a midair collision, as demonstrated by this
accident, which occurred more than 40 nm from RNO, a Class C airport.
As a result of this accident and numerous documented near midair
collisions (NMACs) involving nontransponder-equipped gliders, the
Safety Board has issued a safety recommendation to the FAA regarding
transponder requirements for gliders. [12] However, rulemaking action
can be a lengthy process. The Safety Board concludes that the
circumstances of this accident can serve to educate glider operators
about collision hazards associated with the failure to use a
transponder as required by 14 CFR 91.215(c), which are similar to the
hazards associated with operating a nontransponder-equipped glider.
The Safety Board further concludes that an immediate safety benefit
could be achieved by voluntary transponder installations because such
installations would be subject to mandatory use. Therefore, the Safety
Board believes that the SSA should, using the circumstances of the
August 28, 2006, midair collision near Smith, Nevada, inform your
members, glider clubs, chapters, and glider FBOs of the circumstances
of this accident and, through your publications, Web site, and
conferences, as appropriate, use the information to encourage
voluntary transponder installations and emphasize the importance of
their use, as required by 14 CFR 91.2 15(c).
Air Traffic Control and Glider Pilot Working Groups
Following this accident, a Safety Board investigator, members of the
local glider groups (many of whom are SSA members), and personnel from
the Reno TRACON facility met to discuss collision concerns in the RNO
area. The talks resulted in the establishment of four working groups
composed of Reno TRACON personnel and local glider pilots that
developed a glider pilot briefing document for their area of operation
and distributed it to local glider groups. The briefing document
outlines detailed guidance and information related to routes and radio
communications that the controllers and pilots (of both powered and
nonpowered aircraft) developed to help ensure safety for all aircraft
operating around RNO and to improve communications between glider
pilots and ATC. For example, the briefing document contains an
illustration depicting RNO arrival and departure routes; detailed
textual descriptions of the depicted routes, variations of the routes,
and the typical altitudes and flightpaths at which air carrier traffic
can be expected; guidance for suggested ATC radio communications,
position reporting, phraseology, and etiquette; frequently asked
questions; and other guidance for using transponders, becoming
familiar with the area, obtaining RNO traffic information, and
understanding RNO ATC radar coverage limitations.
In addition to the briefing document, the glider community developed a
cockpit card for glider pilots that delineates the arriving and
departing jet traffic routes, ATC-identified intersections and their
minimum altitudes, and radio communication procedures. This card
contains an abbreviated, ready-reference version of some of the
information from the briefing document, including the illustration
depicting RNO arrival and departure routes and guidance for
communicating with RNO ATC.
All of these tools are designed to educate RNO-area glider pilots on
the midair collision potential and provide them with information to
help them mitigate the risk; however, the risk persists, and more
improvements are needed. For example, in an August 2007 Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) report, a captain of a Boeing 737-300
reported that, while the captain's flight was at 14,000 feet msl 25 nm
southwest of RNO, a controller advised that traffic with a transponder
was showing at or near the flight's altitude. [13] The captain did not
see the traffic but noted that the TCAS unit provided an RA to
descend, and the captain did so; however, the TCAS then "quickly
commanded ['climb, climb now']," and the captain initiated a maximum-
power climb with a course deviation to the west. The captain reported
then seeing a glider pass off the right side of the airplane, about
200 feet away and coming head-on. The captain reported that, because
the glider was climbing and descending, the TCAS reversed its initial
RA and that the captain had to respond with "aggressive" maneuvers.
Although this ASRS report did not provide any information about
whether the controller knew or advised that the traffic was a glider
or provided any advisories on its altitude or flightpath variations,
the report further illustrates that both flight crews and ATC
personnel could benefit from the ability to readily identify glider
transponder returns and understand the limitations and variable
flightpaths that may be associated with them.
In addition, RNO is not the only area where a collision threat
persists. A review of the ASRS database revealed that, from 1988 to
August 2007, 60 NMACs involving air carrier/corporate jet traffic and
gliders were reported, and areas such as RNO; Chicago, Illinois;
Washington, D.C.; and Colorado Springs, Colorado, had multiple events.
[14] The Safety Board concludes that, because of the SSA's widespread
membership and its ability to disseminate information to the glider
community, the SSA can serve as a valuable resource for improving its
RNO-area working group and developing similar working groups in other
areas to develop guidance and distribute information that can improve
safety in local airspace areas nationwide. Therefore, the Safety Board
believes that the SSA should encourage your members, glider clubs,
chapters, and glider FBOs to develop working groups with local ATC
facilities to develop and distribute detailed guidance and information
related to air traffic routes, ATC radio communications, transponder
use, and other pertinent information to improve the safety of glider
and aircraft operations in their area.
Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that
the Soaring Society of America:
Using the circumstances of the August 28, 2006, midair collision
near Smith, Nevada, inform your members, glider clubs, chapters, and
glider fixed-base operators of the circumstances of this accident and,
through your publications, Web site, and conferences, as appropriate,
use the information to encourage voluntary transponder installations
and emphasize the importance of their use, as required by 14 Code of
Federal Regulations 91.215(c). (A-08-14)
Encourage your members, glider clubs, chapters, and glider fixed-
base operators to develop working groups with local air traffic
control (ATC) facilities to develop and distribute detailed guidance
and information related to air traffic routes, ATC radio
communications, transponder use, and other pertinent information to
improve the safety of glider and aircraft operations in their area.
(A-08-15)
The Safety Board also issued safety recommendations to the FAA. In
your response to this letter, please refer to Safety Recommendations
A-08-14 and -15. If you need additional information, you may call
(202) [redacted].
Chairman ROSENKER, Vice Chairman SUMWALT, and Members HERSMAN,
HIGGINS, and CHEALANDER concurred with these recommendations.
By: Mark Rosenker
Chairman
Footnotes:
[1] All times are in Pacific daylight time unless otherwise noted.
[2] The report for this accident, LAX06FA277A/B, can be found on the
Safety Board's Web site at <http://ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?
ev_id=20060906XO1297&ntsbno=LAX06FA277A&akey=1>.
[3] The area surrounding RNO is known for its world-class gliding and
hosts a number of gliderports and glider clubs. Three airports
surrounding RNO service glider operations: Minden-Tahoe Airport (35 nm
south of RNO), Reno-Stead Airport (14 nm north-northwest of RNO), and
Truckee-Tahoe Airport (23 nm southwest of RNO).
[4] The collision occurred in Class E airspace that has no
requirements for two-way radio communication.
[5] According to 14 CFR 91.215(c), "each person operating an aircraft
equipped with an operable ATC transponder. . . shall operate the
transponder, including Mode C equipment, if installed."
[6] The facility retains TCAS RA reports for only 30-day intervals.
Safety Board investigators reviewed reports for the most recent
available 30-day interval before the accident.
[7] PASCO is a nonprofit group that supports the SSA's Region 11.
[8] PASCO not only distributes the newsletters to its members but also
makes them available to the public on its Web site at <http://
www.pacificsoaring.org>.
[9] The safety message states, "The potential conflict between gliders
and commercial air traffic near Reno has increased with the growth of
commercial jet traffic into . . . [RNO] during the past few years.
PASCO emphasizes that glider pilots operating in the Reno area must be
alert for all air traffic arriving and departing RNO. Transponder
signals are received by . . . [TCAS] on board commercial aircraft as
well as by . . . [ATC] radar. By ATC Letter of Agreement, gliders in
the Reno area can transmit the 0440 transponder code in the blind,
without establishing radio contact with Reno Approach Control. PASCO
recommends that gliders operating cross country, within 50 nm of Reno-
Tahoe Airport, install and use a Mode C altitude encoding
transponder."
[10] This article discussed the problems associated with a flight
crew's ability to see and avoid a glider in flight and informed glider
pilots that transponders make their aircraft visible to both ATC radar
screens and TCASs.
[11] The petition was open for public comments in FAA docket No.
FAA-2003-16475.
[12] Safety Recommendation A-08-10 was adopted on March 18, 2008, and
recommends that the FAA "remove the glider exemptions from the [FARs]
that pertain to transponder requirements and use."
[13] The report did not provide any information as to whether the
traffic was using a unique transponder code, was in radio
communication with ATC, or was known to ATC personnel to be a glider.
[14] Because ASRS reports are voluntary, it is possible that other
NMAC events occurred but were unreported. During that timeframe, the
RNO area had nine reported NMAC events; Chicago Midway International
Airport area in Chicago, Illinois, had four reports; the City of
Colorado Springs Municipal Airport area in Colorado Springs, Colorado,
had three reports; and the Washington, D.C., area, which includes more
than one airport and the surrounding areas, had four NMAC reports
filed. Some reports did not specify the area where the event occurred,
and those reports were excluded when determining area totals.
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Letter 2: NTSB letter to the FAA (A-08-10 through A-08-13)
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594
Safety Recommendation
A-08-10 through -13
Date: Mar 31 2008
The Honorable Robert A. Sturgell
Acting Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, D.C. 20591
On August 28, 2006, about 1506 Pacific daylight time, [1] a Raytheon
Aircraft Company Hawker 800XP airplane, N879QS, and a Schleicher
ASW27-18 glider, N7729, collided in flight about 42 nautical miles
(nm) south-southeast of the Reno/Tahoe International Airport (RNO),
Reno, Nevada, at an altitude of about 16,000 feet above mean sea level
(msl). The airline transport-certificated captain and first officer in
the Hawker received minor injuries, and the three passengers were not
injured. The private pilot in the glider received minor injuries, and
both aircraft sustained substantial damage. Visual meteorological
conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the collision. The Hawker,
which was fractionally owned by multiple corporations and managed by
NetJets Aviation, Inc., was operating under the provisions of 14 Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, Subpart K, as an executive/
corporate flight. It departed from Carlsbad, California, about 1400
and was en route to RNO with an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight
plan filed. The glider was registered to a private owner and was
operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 as a
personal flight. It departed from Minden, Nevada, about 1300 for a
local flight with no flight plan filed. [2]
Background
The collision occurred in an area that is frequently traversed by air
carrier and other turbojet airplanes inbound to RNO and that is also
popular for glider operations because of the thermal and mountain wave
gliding opportunities there. [3] The glider pilot, who intended a 5-
hour flight in the local area to familiarize himself with the glider,
was not communicating with air traffic control (ATC) and was not
required to do so. [4] The Hawker flight was in radar and radio
contact with an ATC facility. Before the collision, the Hawker had
been descending toward RNO on a stable northwest heading for several
miles, and the glider was in a 30°, left-banked, spiraling climb.
According to statements from the Hawker's captain and the glider
pilot, they each saw the other aircraft only about 1 second or less
before the collision and were unable to maneuver to avoid the
collision in time. Damage sustained by the Hawker disabled one engine
and other systems; however, the flight crew landed the airplane. The
damaged glider was uncontrollable, and the glider pilot bailed out and
parachuted to the ground.
Because of the lack of radar data for the glider's flight, it was not
possible to determine at which points in each flight each aircraft may
have been in the other's available field of view. Although Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs) require all pilots to maintain vigilance
to see and avoid other aircraft (this includes pilots of flights
operated under IFR, when visibility permits), a number of factors that
can diminish the effectiveness of the see-and-avoid principle were
evident in this accident. For example, the high-speed closure rate of
the Hawker as it approached the glider would have given the glider
pilot only limited time to see and avoid the jet. Likewise, the
closure rate would have limited the time that the Hawker crew had to
detect the glider, and the slim design of the glider would have made
it difficult for the Hawker crew to see it. Although the demands of
cockpit tasks, such as preparing for an approach, have been shown to
adversely affect scan vigilance, both the Hawker captain, who was the
flying pilot, and the first officer reported that they were looking
out the window before the collision. However, the captain saw the
glider only a moment before it filled the windshield, and the first
officer never saw it at all.
The Hawker was equipped with a traffic alert and collision avoidance
system (TCAS)-II capable of generating vertical resolution (collision
avoidance) advisories (RA). However, the glider's Mode C transponder
was turned off and, therefore, was not detectable by the Hawker's
equipment. [5] Although transponder installation is not required on
gliders, FARs require that any person operating a transponder-equipped
aircraft must use the transponder. [6] Had the glider pilot turned on
his transponder, the Hawker's TCAS-II likely would have depicted the
glider on the flight crew's monitor and, at a minimum, would have
generated an RA to alert the crewmembers and prompt them to deviate
their course in time to prevent the accident. In addition, had the
glider's transponder been turned on, it would have provided position
and altitude information to ATC personnel who could have used that
information to provide separation services and traffic advisories to
the Hawker crew.
According to Reno Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) personnel,
it is not uncommon for arriving and departing air traffic to receive
TCAS RAs because of transponder-equipped gliders operating in the
area. For example, in a 30-day interval before the accident, the
facility recorded four such TCAS RA events reported by pilots. [7]
Each event involved a conflict between a transport-category airplane
operated under 14 CFR Part 121 and a glider.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable
cause of this accident was the failure of the glider pilot to utilize
his transponder and the high closure rate of the two aircraft, which
limited each pilot's opportunity to see and avoid the other aircraft.
The investigative findings from this accident revealed safety issues
related to limitations of the see-and-avoid concept in preventing
midair collisions, especially when one or more high-speed aircraft are
involved, and the regulatory exemption that allows gliders to operate
without transponders. The Safety Board also noted that glider design
and electrical power limitations present unique challenges for the
installation and operation of transponders. Following this accident,
members of the local glider groups and the Reno TRACON facility met
and formed working groups to establish interim policies and
procedures, improve communications between glider pilots and ATC, and
educate glider pilots on the midair collision potential and what they
can do to mitigate the risk. [8]
Benefits of Transponders in Collision Avoidance
The limitations of the see-and-avoid concept for collision avoidance
have long been recognized and acknowledged by the Safety Board and
other aviation safety advocates. Following four midair collisions in
1986 and 1987, all of which occurred in daylight VMC, the Board issued
a July 27, 1987, safety recommendation letter to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). This letter emphasized the Board's longstanding
belief that midair collision avoidance is significantly improved when
pilots are alerted to the presence and location of potentially
conflicting traffic by ATC personnel or a TCAS. [9]
In the letter, the Safety Board expressed specific concerns about
airspace in the vicinity of airports that is used not only by arriving
and departing air carrier traffic but also by transiting aircraft
operating under visual flight rules (VFR). The Safety Board concluded
that, because both airborne TCAS and controller-initiated conflict
alerts rely upon operating transponders, such transponders should be
required for all aircraft that share airspace with TCAS-equipped air
carriers. The Board issued a safety recommendation to the FAA on this
issue. [10] Although the FAA responded and issued a final rule on June
17, 1988, requiring transponders for aircraft operating near primary
airports and in airspace at or above 10,000 feet msl, gliders and
other aircraft without an engine-driven electrical system remain
exempt from many requirements. [11]
As evidenced by this accident, aircraft that are not using or not
equipped with transponders and are operating in areas transited by air
carrier trafic represent a collision hazard. This hazard has persisted
more than 20 years since the Safety Board initially expressed concern.
According to glider operators in the RNO area, the area of the
collision is very popular with gliders for the thermal lift provided
by the Pine Nut Ridge, and gliders can reach altitudes up to 18,000
feet msl or higher. [12]
Review of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database
revealed that, from 1988 to August 2007, 60 near midair collisions
(NMACs) involving air carrierlcorporate jet trafic and gliders were
reported. [13] Of these events, nine occurred in the vicinity of RNO,
which represents more reports than any other airport area during that
timeframe. [14] Although the most recent reported RNO-area NMAC event,
which occurred in August 2007, involved a glider that
was equipped with a transponder that both ATC and the other aircraft's
TCAS detected, [15] most of the ASRS reports involved gliders that
were neither detected by the jet flight crews' TCAS equipment nor
visible on the ATC facilities' radar screens, indicating that the
gliders were not equipped with, or not using, a transponder. Some of
the reports indicated that, after the flight crews reported to ATC
that they saw the glider, the controllers noticed primary radar
returns in the vicinity of the jet traffic. In some instances, the
controllers had notified the jet crews of the primary radar returns
but informed the pilots that they did not know what the traffic was or
at which altitude it was flying. During postaccident interviews, Reno
TRACON personnel reported that, although they can sometimes see
primary radar returns for what they suspect are nontransponder-
equipped gliders, they did not see any primary returns from the
accident glider before this collision. Further, even when ATC
personnel detect primary returns, they cannot ascertain the type or
altitude of the aircraft.
More than 10 years before this accident, Reno Flight Standards
District Office (FSDO) personnel concluded that, on the basis of many
NMAC reports, inspectors' observations of traffic conflicts, and other
information, the increasing glider operations in the departure and
arrival areas around RNO represented a collision hazard. On April 11,
1997, the Reno FSDO manager submitted a memorandum to the FAA's Office
of Accident Investigation, Recommendation and Analysis Division
(AAI-200) [16] detailing these concerns. The memo indicated that:
Gliders are invisible to radar because they do not have a
transponder, and they will not show up as a primary target on radar
due to their design. Air carrier pilots are very busy with the
approach or departure procedure and tend to rely on their TCAS for
identifying traffic. Gliders do not show up on TCAS unless they use an
appropriate transponder. In addition, due to the design of the
gliders, they are very difficult to see unless the air carrier is very
close to them, which may be too late to avoid the glider.
The memo detailed some of the FSDO's efforts to correct the problem,
stating that it developed an ongoing program to try to educate the
glider community and air carriers. The memo stated that:
However, the gliders continue to operate in the arrival and
departure areas around RNO. This ofice has suggested that gliders
carry transponders and/or communicate with the RNO tower. The glider
community does not want to adopt the FAA's suggestion. The glider
community wants ATC to reroute the air carriers around their area of
operation. RNO is located in a valley and if ATC were to try and
reroute the air carriers then they would not be able to make a safe
descent for landing.
The memo suggested a number of solutions, including a proposal to
require gliders to carry transponders with appropriate modes for ATC
and TCAS. In response to the FSDO's concerns, the FAA published a
notice to airmen (NOTAM) cautioning pilots about glider soaring
operations 30 to 50 miles south of RNO and ensured that the San
Francisco Sectional Aeronautical Chart and five of the RNO-published
instrument procedures were updated with caution boxes to warn pilots
of extensive glider activity. [17] However, the FAA elected not to
implement the transponder recommendation.
The Safety Board acknowledges that the FAA's actions to publish the
NOTAM and the chart updates are steps in the right direction. However,
because the collision threats observed by Reno FSDO personnel 10 years
ago persist today, the Safety Board concludes that the safety measures
implemented by the FAA to notify air carriers and other RNO-area
traffic of glider activity are insufficient to prevent collisions. The
Board notes that, because of the limitations of the see-and-avoid
concept, transponder-initiated collision alerts (either from ATC or
TCAS) provide both VFR and IFR aircraft with a higher degree of safety
in an environment where high-speed closure rates are possible.
Therefore, the Safety Board further concludes that transponders are
critical to alerting pilots and controllers to the presence of nearby
traffic, so that collisions can be avoided, and that gliders should
not be exempt from the transponder requirements. This is especially
important at higher altitudes, where flight crews may rely more on
their TCAS, expecting that other aircraft, including light aircraft,
are in contact with ATC and/or are transponder-equipped. Therefore,
the Safety Board believes that the FAA should remove the glider
exemptions from the FARs that pertain to transponder requirements and
use.
Considerations for Transponder Installation Retrofits in Gliders
Since 1998, the Soaring Society of America, Inc. (SSA) has encouraged
glider operators to voluntarily install and use transponders because
of their safety benefits. However, as mentioned previously, the Reno
FSDO's suggestion of voluntary transponder installation and use was
met with resistance from members of the local glider community. When
transponders were mandated in general aviation aircraft, gliders were
excluded from the requirement because they lack an engine-driven
electrical system to power the equipment.
Although some newer transponders require less battery power than older
models or models originally designed for powered aircraft, power
limitations remain a concern for glider operators. According to a
transponder article available from the SSA's Soaring Safety Foundation
(SSF), in order to power a transponder, a glider owner would likely
need to install an additional battery, which would allow anywhere from
5 to 12 hours of transponder operation, depending on the type of
transponder, the temperature conditions during the flight, and the age
of the battery. [18] However, gliders typically have limited space to
accommodate transponder equipment and the additional batteries needed
to power it.
The Safety Board recognizes that glider design issues present unique
challenges for transponder retrofit installations and that some glider
operators have voiced concerns about a lack of transponder
installation guidance. The SSF article noted that some gliders do not
have room to carry additional batteries and that glider fuselage
designs and trailering, rigging, towing, and landing considerations
have limited the locations where owners can feasibly mount transponder
antennas. The Board notes that, in the past, the FAA has published
guidance to help aircraft owners understand their options for approved
installations of retrofit equipment to ensure that such retrofits meet
airworthiness regulations. The Safety Board concludes that a policy
statement for transponder installation in gliders would help
facilitate timely and effective transponder retrofits. Therefore, the
Safety Board believes that the FAA should develop guidance material
for glider owners/operators that describes feasible installation
options to aid in the prompt installation and approval of transponders
in gliders.
National Transponder Code to Identify Gliders and Minimize Battery
Draw
As mentioned previously, glider transponders require battery power.
Many glider operators have reported having sufficient battery power to
operate their transponders and other instruments/avionics [19] during
a 5- to 6-hour flight. However, during cross-country flights, which
can last twice that time, transponders and other equipment can drain
the installed batteries before the end of the flight. In fact, the
glider pilot involved in the collision had turned off his transponder
because he wanted to conserve battery power for radio use.
Battery power issues are of such concern for gliders that, on November
5, 2003, the SSA submitted a petition [20] to the FAA requesting that
pilots of transponder-equipped gliders be allowed to turn the
transponders off when flying more than 40 nm from the primary airport
in Class B airspace and more than 20 nm from the primary airport in
Class C airspace. [21] On January 22, 2008, the FAA responded and
denied the SSA's request but stated that an ongoing rulemaking project
proposes revisions to 14 CFR 91.215(c) that will cover the relief that
the SSA's petition sought. Although the Safety Board recognizes that
gliders have electrical power limitations, the Board is opposed to any
rulemaking action that would enable such exemptions because aircraft
would remain at risk for a midair collision. The Board notes that this
midair collision took place more than 40 nm from RNO, a Class C
airport, and rulemaking exemptions could allow the circumstances of
this accident to be repeated.
Currently, all transponder-equipped aircraft, including gliders,
operating under VFR use the transponder code 1200 unless otherwise
instructed by ATC. According to transponder manufacturers, the battery
draw from a transponder varies, depending on the number of
interrogations it receives (either from a ground-based unit or from a
TCAS) and on the code tuned on the unit. The lower the transponder
code, the lower the battery draw per interrogation. Some glider
communities, including those in the vicinity of RNO, have worked to
secure a letter of authorization with their local ATC facilities that
establishes a local glider transponder code to notify controllers of
glider activity in their area. For example, glider operations in the
vicinity of RNO can use the transponder code 0440.
In 2001, the SSA requested that the FAA provide a single, national
transponder code for gliders so that ATC personnel could readily
differentiate gliders from other aircraft appearing on their displays.
This would enable ATC personnel to consider the limited flight options
of these nonpowered aircraft when providing separation and advisory
information to other pilots. For example, in an August 2007 ASRS
report, a captain of a Boeing 737-300 reported that, while the
captain's flight was at 14,000 feet msl 25 nm southwest of RNO, a
controller advised that traffic with a transponder was showing at or
near the flight's altitude. [22] The captain did not see the traffic
but noted that the TCAS unit provided an RA to descend, and the
captain did so; however, the TCAS then "quickly commanded ['climb,
climb now']," and the captain initiated a maximum-power climb with a
course deviation to the west. The captain reported then seeing a
glider pass off the right side of the airplane, about 200 feet away
and coming head-on. The captain reported that, because the glider was
climbing and descending, the TCAS reversed its initial RA and that the
captain had to respond with "aggressive" maneuvers.
Although this ASRS report did not provide any information about
whether the controller knew or advised that the traffic was a glider
or provided any advisories on its altitude or flightpath variations,
the report further illustrates that both flight crews and ATC
personnel could benefit from the ability to readily identify glider
transponder returns and understand the limitations and variable
flightpaths that may be associated with them. Therefore, the Safety
Board supports the SSA's request for the establishment of a unique
national transponder code for gliders. Further, because of the battery
power limitations of gliders, the Safety Board concludes that a glider-
specific transponder code that is low in the transponder code range
could reduce battery draw, which would increase the feasibility of
using transponders in gliders. Therefore, the Safety Board believes
that the FAA should establish a national transponder code for glider
operations, as low in the transponder code range as feasible, that
would notify air traffic controllers of glider operatiodposition.
Also, to ensure the maximum possible safety benefit of this unique
code, the Safety Board concludes that ATC personnel must be adequately
informed of the code, what it represents, and under what limitations
the users are typically operating. Therefore, the Safety Board
believes that, upon establishment of a national transponder code for
glider operations, the FAA should ensure that ATC personnel are
informed of the code, what it represents, and under what limitations
the users are typically operating.
Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that
the Federal Aviation Administration:
Remove the glider exemptions from the Federal Aviation Regulations
that pertain to transponder requirements and use. (A-08-10)
Develop guidance material for glider owners/operators that describes
feasible installation options to aid in the prompt installation and
approval of transponders in gliders. (A-08-11)
Establish a national transponder code for glider operations, as low
in the transponder code range as feasible, that would notify air
traffic controllers of glider operatiodposition. (A-08-12)
Upon establishment of a national transponder code for glider
operations, as per Safety Recommendation A-08-12, ensure that air
traffic control personnel are informed of the code, what it
represents, and under what limitations the users are typically
operating. (A-08-13)
The Safety Board also issued safety recommendations to the SSA. In
your response to this letter, please refer to Safety Recommendations
A-08-10 through -13. If you need additional information, you may call
(202) [redacted].
Chairman ROSENKER, Vice Chairman SUMWALT, and Members HERSMAN,
HIGGINS, and CHEALANDER concurred with these recommendations.
By: Mark Rosenker
Chairman
Footnotes:
[1] All times are in Pacific daylight time unless otherwise noted.
[2] The report for this accident, LAX06FA277A/B, can be found on the
Safety Board's Web site at <http://ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?
ev_id=20060906XO1297&ntsbno=LAX06FA277A&akey=1>.
[3] The area surrounding RNO is known for its world-class gliding and
hosts a number of gliderports and glider clubs. Three airports
surrounding RNO service glider operations: Minden-Tahoe Airport (35 nm
south of RNO), Reno-Stead Airport (14 nm north-northwest of RNO), and
Truckee-Tahoe Airport (23 nm southwest of RNO).
[4] The collision occurred in Class E airspace that has no
requirements for two-way radio communication.
[5] The glider pilot turned off the transponder because he wanted to
reserve battery power for radio use.
[6] According to 14 CFR 91.215(c), "each person operating an aircraft
equipped with an operable ATC transponder. . . shall operate the
transponder, including Mode C equipment, if installed."
[7] The facility retains TCAS RA reports for only 30-day intervals.
Safety Board investigators reviewed reports for the most recent
available 30-day interval before the accident.
[8] Also, as a result of this accident, the Safety Board issued Safety
Recommendations A-08-14 and -15 to the Soaring Society of America,
Inc., regarding expanding similar safety efforts in other areas and
informing the glider community about this accident and the importance
of transponders.
[9] The letter also reiterated two safety recommendations to the FAA
that were originally issued in 1985. Safety Recommendation A-85-64
asked that the FAA "expedite the development, operational evaluation,
and final certification of . . . [TCAS] for installation and use in
certificated air carrier aircraft," and Safety Recommendation A-85-65
asked that the FAA "amend 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135 to require the
installation and use of. . . [TCAS] equipment in certificated air
carrier aircraft when it becomes available for operational use." Both
of these recommendations were classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" on
May 23, 1989, because the FAA implemented the TCAS requirements and
issued guidance materials for TCAS airworthiness and operational
approval.
[10] Safety Recommendation A-87-97 asked that the FAA "require
transponder equipment with Mode C altitude-reporting for operations
around all Terminal Control Areas and within Airport Radar Service
Areas after a specified date compatible with implementation of. . .
[TCAS] requirements for air carrier aircraft." This recommendation was
classified "Closed-Acceptable Action" on May 3, 1989, because the FAA
implemented transponder requirements for aircraft operating near
certain primary airports and in other airspace at and above 10,000
feet msl.
[11] According to 14 CFR 91.215(b), all aircraft, unless otherwise
authorized or directed by ATC, must be equipped with an operable
transponder and altitude-reporting equipment for operations in Class
A, Class B, and Class C airspace and within 30 nm of listed Class B
airports, fiom the surface upward to 10,000 feet msl. However, 14 CFR
91.2 15(b)(3) states that, "any aircraft which was not originally
certificated with an engine-driven electrical system or which has not
subsequently been certified with such a system installed, balloon or
glider may conduct operations in the airspace within [30 nm of listed
Class B airports, provided such operations are conducted] . . . (i)
Outside any Class A, Class B, or Class C airspace area; and (ii) Below
the altitude of the ceiling of a Class B or Class C airspace area
designated for an airport or 10,000 feet msl, whichever is lower." In
addition, 14 CFR 91.2 15(b)(5) states that "all aircraft except any
aircraft which was not originally certificated with an engine-driven
electrical system or which has not subsequently been certified with
such a system installed, balloon or glider" are required, unless
otherwise authorized or directed by ATC, to be equipped with an
operable transponder and altitude-reporting equipment for operations
in the following airspace: "(i) In all airspace of the 48 contiguous
states and the District of Columbia at and above 10,000 feet msl,
excluding the airspace at and below 2,500 feet above the surface; and
(ii) In the airspace from the surface to 10,000 feet rnsl within
a. . . [10-nm radius of a Class B airport] excluding the airspace
below 1,200 feet outside of the lateral boundaries of the surface area
of the airspace designed for that airport."
[12] The floor of Class A airspace begins at 18,000 feet msl, and 14
CFR 91.135 requires that all aircraft operating in Class A airspace
must do so under IFR and must operate an appropriate transponder with
altitude-reporting capabilities, in accordance with 14 CFR 9 1.2 15.
Therefore, glider pilots who wish to fly at 18,000 feet rnsl or higher
must operate a transponder and activate the local glider operations
box, which provides clearance from arriving traffic. According to the
local glider pilots, the box is usually activated during mountain wave
flying conditions. During thermal flying conditions, the gliders
usually remain below 18,000 feet msl.
[13] Because ASRS reports are voluntary, it is possible that other
NMAC events occurred but were unreported.
[14] Some of the reports did not specify where the event occurred, and
those reports were excluded from determining area totals. After the
RNO area, the next airport with the most NMAC reports was the Chicago
Midway International Airport area in Chicago, Illinois, with four
reports; followed by the City of Colorado Springs Municipal Airport
area in Colorado Springs, Colorado, with three reports. The
Washington, D.C., area (which includes more than one airport and the
surrounding areas) had four NMAC reports filed.
[15] The reported circumstances of this event are discussed in more
detail later in this letter.
[16] The original memo was addressed to the "Office of Accident
Investigation, Recommendation and Quality Assurance Division,
AAI-200," which slightly misidentified the division's title. However,
the memo reached its intended recipient, and the manager of AAI-200
responded to it.
[17] Before this accident, the government's National Oceanic Service
(NOS) standard instrument departure (SID) and standard terminal
arrival route (STAR) charts for RNO contained a relatively large box
cautioning pilots of "intensive glider activity." The instrument
approach procedures for RNO published by Jeppesen Sanderson, which
were used by the Hawker flight crew, contained a glider caution in the
approach briefing section, but the SIDs and STARs did not have a
glider caution. Following the accident, the Hawker's operator
contacted Jeppesen and requested that a similar caution advisory, as
found on the NOS SIDs and STARs, be placed on the Jeppesen charts.
Jeppesen has since added the caution advisory to its RNO SIDs and
STARs.
[18] The article, "Choosing, Installing, and Using a Transponder," was
originally published in two issues of Soaring magazine in February and
March 2002 and was updated December 2004 and made available on the SSF
Web site at <http://www.soaringsafety.org/prevention/
transponders.pdf>.
[19] Many gliders are equipped with a radio, variometer, and global
positioning system, which all require battery power.
[20] The letter was open for public comments in FAA docket No.
FAA-2003-16475.
[21] Class B and Class C airspace consists of specified airspace
containing at least one primary airport around which the airspace is
designated. All aircraft operations within Class B and C airspace are
subject to certain operating rules and equipment requirements,
including ATC transponder equipment requirements.
[22] The report did not provide any information as to whether the
traffic was using a unique transponder code, was in radio
communication with ATC, or was known to ATC personnel to be a glider.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Greg Arnold
transponders always on.
Sarah Anderson
> I see they want to require transponders in all gliders, with the
> transponders always on.
>
Nice summary. And, in compensation we'd get the low, low transponder code of 0440
I've never heard that low codes would save power, maybe they just wouldn't ping it as
often as 1200
Sarah
BT
above 10K MSL without ADS-B regardless of the aircraft, glider, balloon,
lawn chair... makes no matter.
So Transponders now, and ADS-B later.
BT
"Greg Arnold" <Soa...@cox.netREMOVE> wrote in message
news:MPeIj.8071$CO2....@newsfe12.phx...
Darryl Ramm
Ah, that is not possible. The simple answer is all transponders seeing
an interrogation signal will reply. The SSR can interrogate the
transponder to send it's code (Mode A) or altitude (Mode C). There is
no concept of the SSR being able to "address" a transponder.
Darryl
Marc Ramsey
I assume what the NTSB is referring to is the duty cycle of the reply
transmission, I'm too tired right now to figure out the actual encoding,
but if 0440 has a lower duty cycle than 1200, it will save some amount
of power. How much, I don't know...
Marc
rroz...@aol.com
Assuming transponders become mandatory in gliders, what concerns me
most is that we may find that folks may not be willing to install
transponders in their ships. This might be especially true in older
gliders that may have a value of anywhere from $5K to perhaps $ 15 or
20K. I can see folks selling their gliders (perhaps to overseas
buyers) and giving up on the sport. We are having enough trouble
growing the sport and I'm afraid this could really hurt soaring in the
US.
Some clubs, operating on the edge, might fold as they may have to
install transponders in every 1-26 and 2-33. They may be unwilling to
comply, and as a result, disband. I am a realist and I do understand
the concerns of the NTSB, but this potential new requirement, though
not unexpected, could really have an adverse effect on soaring
operations in the US.........
Darryl Ramm
Oh doh, thank you Mr. Governor. OK there is a basis to the claim, but
definitely not because of differences "pinging". 0440 is just two
pulses (binary 4 twice). And 1200 (binary 1 and 2) also has two
pulses, and there are always two framing pulses, and maybe an ident
pulse. So 1200 and 0440 should be no different in terms of radiated
power. And usually every second interrogation/response is going to be
an altitude code. So I guess they could pick a worse code and have
several more pulses (would have to look at the map of available codes
to see how bad it could be, luckily 7xxx is taken :-)) I'd be curious
to see actual differences in power consumption measurements.
Darryl
Tuno
have the expense of buying and installing transponders, but batteries,
electrical harnesses, and chargers as well.
Not one of the gliders I ever trained in had batteries, or a place to
put one!
2NO
Marc Ramsey
> Oh doh, thank you Mr. Governor. OK there is a basis to the claim, but
> definitely not because of differences "pinging". 0440 is just two
> pulses (binary 4 twice). And 1200 (binary 1 and 2) also has two
> pulses, and there are always two framing pulses, and maybe an ident
> pulse. So 1200 and 0440 should be no different in terms of radiated
> power. And usually every second interrogation/response is going to be
> an altitude code. So I guess they could pick a worse code and have
> several more pulses (would have to look at the map of available codes
> to see how bad it could be, luckily 7xxx is taken :-)) I'd be curious
> to see actual differences in power consumption measurements.
Uh, no Mr. Boffin, tis not quite that simple. It's been a while since I
looked at this stuff, but I believe the actual transponder code is
encoded using a modified Gray code (as is the altitude code), so the
actual duty cycle is not quite that obvious. Second, the fashion in
which the transponder code and the altitude code are transmitted differ
significantly, as the transponder code portion of the transmission dates
back to WW II IFF, and the Mode C stuff came much later. I doubt the
NTSB would have brought it up, unless there was something to it.
Personally, I'm not interested enough to try to figure it out...
Marc
Marc Ramsey
> Uh, no Mr. Boffin, tis not quite that simple. It's been a while since I
> looked at this stuff, but I believe the actual transponder code is
> encoded using a modified Gray code (as is the altitude code), so the
> actual duty cycle is not quite that obvious. Second, the fashion in
> which the transponder code and the altitude code are transmitted differ
> significantly, as the transponder code portion of the transmission dates
> back to WW II IFF, and the Mode C stuff came much later. I doubt the
> NTSB would have brought it up, unless there was something to it.
> Personally, I'm not interested enough to try to figure it out...
I'll take it back, Mode A and Mode C are transmitted the same way, and
while altitude is Gray encoded, the squawk code is straight binary. So,
I have no idea what the NTSB was talking about.
Marc
Sarah Anderson
If it is a joke, it's not fair dating it 3/31 instead of 4/1
Sarah
sta...@gmail.com
thing. Remember, it just makes them required above 10,000' or in the
Class B 30 mile veil, not everywhere - just like everybody else! I
would guess that most (not all, unfortunately) training flights would
be outside the airspace where xponders would be needed.
The cost issue? We pay almost 2K$ for parachutes, glider computers
are over 2K$, etc. It just follows the trend of the sport - it isn't
cheap flying anymore (unless you stay below 10k ft). If you want to
run with the big dogs, etc..
Batteries? I would think the new technology (Nimh, etc) would allow
an Xponder to be powered all day. A non-issue, IMHO.
I just got my PCAS, so I can see the other VFR traffic (that isn't
talking to ATC but has to have a transponder), and a transponder is
next (when I figure out where to stick it in my panel).
Or, as MasterCard would put it:
Transponder and installation: $3000
Fancy battery to power said transponder: $100
Watching the Southwest 737 jinking out of your way as you core a 12
knot thermal just outside Phoenix's Class B airspace: Priceless!
Kirk
66
Mike Schumann
an airliner and 150 people are killed.
Mike Schumann
<rroz...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:7fac878a-5d3b-494a...@e23g2000prf.googlegroups.com...
--
Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com
Frank Whiteley
wrote:
> If you want to hurt the sport of soaring, wait till we have a mid-air with
> an airliner and 150 people are killed.
>
> Mike Schumann
>
If the FAA wants to mandate transponders and/or ADS-B for gliders, I'd
like VFR for gliders to FL245, like before, at least west of the
Kansas line as part of 'free flight'.
Frank Whiteley
Darryl Ramm
I also don't see the problem with this. We knew it was coming, like
what else could the NTSB possibly do? They politically just can't not
take action, leave things how they are and hope that airliner
collision does not happen. I thought the letters were well written and
appropriate and I support the FAA removing the transponder exemption.
So a local N. Califonia/Nevada rant: I've seen/heard transponders work
at Reno with traffic being diverted and I've had a close call with a
GA aircraft that also convinced me that for where I fly the
combination of a transponder first and a PCAS second are useful tools.
And in our area it is not just Reno, I also fly south of the San
Francisco Bay Area and we have heavy traffic going overhead into San
Jose who are oblivious to gliders being in the area, an issue on wave
days when we get up to their altitudes. Many of the popular XC routes
also cross several VORs and there is lots of GA traffic in the area at
all altitudes flying radials into those VORs (the ones with student
pilots in them with a IFR visor on worry me most). PCAS and Tansponder
helps with these.
The Sacramento Delta area near Travis AFB is another problem area,
where gliders fly close to or occasionally cross the Sacramento delta.
Travis AFB is the busiest military airlift operation in the USA, it
does operate on weekends at times (unlike the sectional implies) and
heavy/fast military aircraft operate outside of the marked danger zone
and there are lots of transiting GA traffic *and* Travis approach who
provide ATC services for civilian traffic in the area (a much larger
area than the Travis alert area on the sectional) are completely blind
to all non-transponder equipped aircraft to their south east because
of radar reflections from electric power windmills on the ground. I
have found Travis approach to be very easy to work with and happy to
have gliders with transponders on flight following, and they seem to
get we are gliders (they will also take position reports from non-
transponder equipped gliders). The requirement above 10,000 feet or
the 30nm veil won't require gliders in this area to have transponders
but hopefully most folk in the area are already aware of the issues.
Flying last weekend many of the gliders had transponders and Zaon MRX
(seems Santa has been kind to some pilots) and it is great to hear the
enhanced awareness on the radio as people check off who else is close
to them. Yes they all are just tools and your mileage may vary, and
again the biggest thing is not destroying the sport overnight by
taking out an airliner.
Darryl
kirk.stant
> If the FAA wants to mandate transponders and/or ADS-B for gliders, I'd
> like VFR for gliders to FL245, like before, at least west of the
> Kansas line as part of 'free flight'.
>
Yeah, that would be cool! VFR thermal climbs to 22k ft cloudbases
over the Grand Canyon...BTDT!
Break - how about a way to show IFR & jet arrival and departure routes
on our nifty moving maps? We show all kinds of airspace that we know
to avoid - if we had the arrival and departure routes depicted
(showing direction and approximate altitude), along with VORs (already
possible, of course), we would have another tool to know where to look
for traffic.
Time for a quick email to the SeeYou forum, i think...
Kirk
66
Tim Mara
been flying where you shouldn't be .... I never went skin diving where they
were chumming for sharks.... it's the same thing
tim
Please visit the Wings & Wheels website at www.wingsandwheels.com
"Mike Schumann" <mike-...@traditions-nospam.com> wrote in message
news:47f24fb3$0$29811$8826...@free.teranews.com...
Bob
You are saying that the Hawker shouldn't have been there right?
Bob
On Apr 1, 2:57 pm, "Tim Mara" <t...@wingsandwheels.com> wrote:
> the problem isn't gliders without transponders....the problem has always
> been flying where you shouldn't be .... I never went skin diving where they
> were chumming for sharks.... it's the same thing
>
> tim
> Please visit the Wings & Wheels website atwww.wingsandwheels.com
>
> "Mike Schumann" <mike-nos...@traditions-nospam.com> wrote in message
>
> news:47f24fb3$0$29811$8826...@free.teranews.com...> If you want to hurt the sport of soaring, wait till we have a mid-air with
> > an airliner and 150 people are killed.
>
> > Mike Schumann
>
> > <rrozz...@aol.com> wrote in message
Darryl Ramm
> the problem isn't gliders without transponders....the problem has always
> been flying where you shouldn't be .... I never went skin diving where they
> were chumming for sharks.... it's the same thing
>
> tim
> Please visit the Wings & Wheels website atwww.wingsandwheels.com
>
>
> news:47f24fb3$0$29811$8826...@free.teranews.com...
>
> > If you want to hurt the sport of soaring, wait till we have a mid-air with
> > an airliner and 150 people are killed.
>
> > Mike Schumann
>
No the problem is when you really look at it there is much more
traffic up there than we appreciate, and that is not just Reno but
many other places. See and avoid does not work, see and estimate the
traffic density does not really work either. People can underestimate
the density and overestimate their safety and continue to believe they
are doing a good job seeing and avoiding - pilots should try out a
PCAS and it may surprise them how how much stuff they missed before.
There are many places where you just can't go XC without significant
exposure to GA, commercial and military traffic but many glider pilots
are underestimating that traffic, live in a pilotage/VFR world, don't
have a feel for traffic flow with approach/departure procedures, and
without a transponder just do not fit into a radar managed traffic
control system.
Darryl
Darryl Ramm
While heading off topic, I just checked the latest San Francisco
sectional chart and the warning about radar visibility only for
transponder equipped aircraft south east of Travis AFB is now on the
sectional. Travis AFB has been working with the FAA for a while to get
this warning on the sectional, good on them for doing so.
Darryl
Tim Mara
glider pilots...
allowing (or forcing the FAA's hand)into making transponders mandatory in
gliders is going to be a real bump in the road for many (most) glider owners
and clubs...many who don't need to fly down the approach corridor of
international airports to get their kicks..
The other problem with transponders in gliders is the false sense of
security it implies....to many it is "assumed" that this is like a shield
keeping everyone else aware of their presents as they go happily flying
along with their heads down looking at the wiz-bang flight computer...this
leads to more near misses and occasional hits than electronics can
avoid....I know of no Cherokee 140's or Cezna 172's flying with TCAS on
board....and I also know of a lot more glider pilots who will insist they
only turn on the transponder when they are flying down the glideslope of
major airports..
Transponders are not the fix all for the problem, but mandatory transponders
in k6's, 2-33's and 126's will certainly have an impact on the sport as we
"knew" it.
tim
"Darryl Ramm" <darry...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:67ee0ba4-6092-42cf...@e6g2000prf.googlegroups.com...
> On Apr 1, 11:57 am, "Tim Mara" <t...@wingsandwheels.com> wrote:
>> the problem isn't gliders without transponders....the problem has always
>> been flying where you shouldn't be .... I never went skin diving where
>> they
>> were chumming for sharks.... it's the same thing
Andy
"Although the Hawker was equipped with a traffic alert and collision
avoidance system (TCAS)-II capable of generating vertical resolution
(collision avoidance) advisories (RA), the glider's Mode C
transponder
was turned off (and, therefore, not detectable by the Hawker's
equipment) because the glider pilot wanted to reserve battery power
for radio use. "
Early reports on this accident indicated that the pilot had not turned
the transponder on because the installation had not been approved.
Anyone know which is true?
Andy
Jim Meade
(3) and (5) that they will have to address the issue of aircraft that
were built without an engine driven electrical system, which also have
an exemption? I'd think the FAA will have to gore more oxen than just
gliders (like all the J-3 cubs) or they would have to reword so those
aircraft were exempted but gliders included in. Any comments?
Knowing the IFR approach corridors helps in bad weather, but in good
weather, many charter operators file direct and fly it when possible,
especially when visual approaches are being issued. Do all direct
approaches fit in al lthe corridors? I don't know. I do know that in
good weather one can cancel IFR and come in VFR from about any
quadrant and altitude (below 18,000) one wants.
NTSB recommendations are not always promptly saluted and acted on by
FAA, as we all know.
It would be good to have a good, broad ranging debate that included
technologically and financially feasible operations.
Regretably, some struggling clubs may have to physically move to
operate outside the listed areas and that may not be easy in some
cases.
Darryl Ramm
> I agree completely.....PCAS would be a good and very affordable option for
> glider pilots...
> allowing (or forcing the FAA's hand)into making transponders mandatory in
> gliders is going to be a real bump in the road for many (most) glider owners
> and clubs...many who don't need to fly down the approach corridor of
> international airports to get their kicks..
> The other problem with transponders in gliders is the false sense of
> security it implies....to many it is "assumed" that this is like a shield
> keeping everyone else aware of their presents as they go happily flying
> along with their heads down looking at the wiz-bang flight computer...this
> leads to more near misses and occasional hits than electronics can
> avoid....I know of no Cherokee 140's or Cezna 172's flying with TCAS on
> board....and I also know of a lot more glider pilots who will insist they
> only turn on the transponder when they are flying down the glideslope of
> major airports..
> Transponders are not the fix all for the problem, but mandatory transponders
> in k6's, 2-33's and 126's will certainly have an impact on the sport as we
> "knew" it.
> tim
>
>
> news:67ee0ba4-6092-42cf...@e6g2000prf.googlegroups.com...
>
> > On Apr 1, 11:57 am, "Tim Mara" <t...@wingsandwheels.com> wrote:
> >> the problem isn't gliders without transponders....the problem has always
> >> been flying where you shouldn't be .... I never went skin diving where
> >> they
> >> were chumming for sharks.... it's the same thing
> > No the problem is when you really look at it there is much more
> > traffic up there than we appreciate, and that is not just Reno but
> > many other places. See and avoid does not work, see and estimate the
> > traffic density does not really work either. People can underestimate
> > the density and overestimate their safety and continue to believe they
> > are doing a good job seeing and avoiding - pilots should try out a
> > PCAS and it may surprise them how how much stuff they missed before.
> > There are many places where you just can't go XC without significant
> > exposure to GA, commercial and military traffic but many glider pilots
> > are underestimating that traffic, live in a pilotage/VFR world, don't
> > have a feel for traffic flow with approach/departure procedures, and
> > without a transponder just do not fit into a radar managed traffic
> > control system.
>
> > Darryl
Tim
I do fly in high traffic density areas (with transponder and PCAS and
talking to ATC when appropriate) and know many other pilots that also
at least have a transponder in their ship and none that I know have
this naive view of transponders and safety bubbles. If anything the
fact that they have a transponder in their glider, tends to be
correlated with an awareness of traffic, ATC, etc. and I suspect if
anything these folks are more likely to have their heads outside the
cockpit. And since many of those same pilots also fly with PCAS I can
guarantee they understand the need to be looking outside.
I know of many light aircraft flying with PCAS (Zaon) and a few (new
expensive ones) with the Avidyne/Ryan system that is between PCAS and
TCAS.
Darryl
BT
BT
<sta...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:ff52003f-ad63-482e...@a23g2000hsc.googlegroups.com...
VARR
>> been flying where you shouldn't be .... I never went skin diving where they
>> were chumming for sharks.... it's the same thing
Well, it certainly is not quite the same thing, but I can appreciate
Tim's point, from a certain perspective, if what he fully intends to
convey is that those who *do* chose to fly "there" (i.e., wherever a
transponder really would be a "good idea") should indeed be allowed to
do so, but then they really "should" chose to equip themselves
appropriately for their own benefit as well as the benefit of others.
Extending his analogy, those who do chose to stay in the water when
others are chumming for sharks nearby should be allowed to do so, but
then they really "should" take the opportunity, whenever feasible, to
chose to equip themselves appropriately (e.g., place themselves inside
a shark cage, etc.) when participating in such activity in order to
mitigate the risk to themselves as well as the risk to others (where
"others" is obviously more of a concern in the case of transponders in
gliders).
Perhaps the FAA will choose to only issue "stronger guidelines"
recommending transponder use under certain operating conditions and in
certain environments. Or, if they chose to make regulatory changes,
perhaps they might issue less of a blanket regulation, as recommended
by the NTSB, and something more conditional and specific to certain
operating environments. It seems reasonable that such conditions
could be defined which would mitigate the majority of the risk without
negatively impacting the majority of glider operations. Even better,
if the SSA were to perform well at issuing such guidelines and making
such recommendations to the community, then perhaps the powers that be
will consider the risk appropriately managed and not take burdensome
and inappropriate action (at least for now, at least not until, if
ever, low-cost and effective risk mitigating solutions are actually
available).
Taking into account (a) the recent widespread adoption of PCAS, and
(b) local operating agreements that do exist and continue to be
created nationwide between local soaring operations and local ATC,
there seems to be hope for a non-regulatory solution -- perhaps these
efforts just need to be more cohesive, better standardized, and better
"marketed?"
Here is hoping that rationality prevails at the FAA and that the sport/
industry/etc. (the SSA?) takes strong leadership action on the issue
and demonstrates to the FAA and others that the sport/industry/etc.
can indeed appropriately self-regulate.
J a c k
> On Apr 1, 3:23 pm, "Tim Mara" <t...@wingsandwheels.com> wrote:
>> I agree completely.....PCAS would be a good and very affordable option for
>> glider pilots...
>> allowing (or forcing the FAA's hand) into making transponders mandatory in
>> gliders is going to be a real bump in the road for many (most) glider owners
>> and clubs...many who don't need to fly down the approach corridor of
>> international airports to get their kicks..
>> The other problem with transponders in gliders is the false sense of
>> security it implies....to many it is "assumed" that this is like a shield
>> keeping everyone else aware of their presents as they go happily flying
>> along with their heads down looking at the wiz-bang flight computer...this
>> leads to more near misses and occasional hits than electronics can
>> avoid....I know of no Cherokee 140's or Cezna 172's flying with TCAS on
>> board....and I also know of a lot more glider pilots who will insist they
>> only turn on the transponder when they are flying down the glideslope of
>> major airports..
>> Transponders are not the fix all for the problem, but mandatory transponders
>> in k6's, 2-33's and 126's will certainly have an impact on the sport as we
>> "knew" it.
[....]
> I do fly in high traffic density areas (with transponder and PCAS and
> talking to ATC when appropriate) and know many other pilots that also
> at least have a transponder in their ship and none that I know have
> this naive view of transponders and safety bubbles. If anything the
> fact that they have a transponder in their glider, tends to be
> correlated with an awareness of traffic, ATC, etc. and I suspect if
> anything these folks are more likely to have their heads outside the
> cockpit. And since many of those same pilots also fly with PCAS I can
> guarantee they understand the need to be looking outside.
>
> I know of many light aircraft flying with PCAS (Zaon) and a few (new
> expensive ones) with the Avidyne/Ryan system that is between PCAS and
> TCAS.
I think you and Tim are dealing with different ends of the same stick.
The people who NOW have xpndrs and/or PCAS are a different breed than
many who will have xpndrs only when they are forced to have them. Some
of these will take the same blindered approach to traffic avoidance then
that they take now, just with more equipment in the cockpit.
Jack
Eric Greenwell
> The other problem with transponders in gliders is the false sense of
> security it implies....to many it is "assumed" that this is like a shield
> keeping everyone else aware of their presents as they go happily flying
> along with their heads down looking at the wiz-bang flight computer...this
> leads to more near misses and occasional hits than electronics can
> avoid....I know of no Cherokee 140's or Cezna 172's flying with TCAS on
> board
How many transponder equipped gliders, transponder on, have been hit by
a non-TCAS equipped general aviation aircraft? Is this really a problem?
Can it be addressed by training?
>....and I also know of a lot more glider pilots who will insist they
> only turn on the transponder when they are flying down the glideslope of
> major airports..
Sounds like a good start, doesn't it? I mean, we wouldn't be having this
discussion if the Reno glider had turned the transponder in that
situation. Again, perhaps a training issue.
> Transponders are not the fix all for the problem,
In a sense, it would fix "all" the problem, if we think colliding with
airliners is our problem.
> but mandatory transponders
> in k6's, 2-33's and 126's will certainly have an impact on the sport as we
> "knew" it.
Yes, so I'm hoping any requirement for transponders recognizes that most
gliders aren't a hazard to airliners and other "controlled" traffic.
--
Eric Greenwell - Washington State, USA
* Change "netto" to "net" to email me directly
* Updated! "Transponders in Sailplanes" http://tinyurl.com/y739x4
* New Jan '08 - sections on Mode S, TPAS, ADS-B, Flarm, more
* "A Guide to Self-launching Sailplane Operation" at www.motorglider.org
dnc...@gmail.com
Ironic that you talk about 22k cloudbases over Grand Canyon! That
is about the altitude of the midair on June 30, 1956, that got
Positive Control Airspace(now Class A) lowered from 24,000 to 18,000
feet! I put a transponder in my DG303 years ago. Most of the glass
ships at Warner Springs have transponders. There is no excuse for not
having a transponder if you do cross-country. The same excuses I hear
(not from you) are the ones I heard when I started power flying in
1973. Too expensive, blah blah blah.
It was extremely lucky no one was killed in that Minden midair. The
few times I have soared there(in rental ships) I have had close calls
with 121 carriers on the localizer for Reno or corporate jets going
into Minden. Flying wave the other day at Warner I was on LA Center
the whole flight. It was amazing the amount of carriers that vectored
around me or got TCAS alerts.
There is lots of traffic out there folks. Transponders are a great
safety device. The 0440 vs. 1200 has nothing to do with power output.
Per LOA with Reno the 0440 identifies you as a glider rather than an
airplane. It should be an FAR to have a discrete code for gliders and
hopefully will happen soon.
Happy Soaring, Dean "GO"
herron...@gmail.com
> Early reports on this accident indicated that the pilot had not turned
> the transponder on because the installation had not been approved.
> Anyone know which is true?
>
> Andy
I was at the Minden airport at the time of the accident, and it is my
understanding that the transponder had not been certified. The glider
(an ASG 29, not an ASK 27) had recently been imported from Sweden
where it was used in the Worlds, and this was its maiden flight, at
least maiden for one of its two owners. Given the circumstances, it
makes sense that the transponder might not have been certified, but I
can't say for sure.
Matt
Mike Schumann
defense against a collision. If glider / jet traffic is regularly resulting
in TCAS alerts, then ATC isn't providing enough separation between
transponder equipped gliders and IFR traffic. This is a big issue that
needs to be brought up with the FAA.
Mike Schumann
<dnc...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:36ae8508-07d9-442c...@s8g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
--
Mike Schumann
get it and create situations that give the rest of us a black eye or worse.
I don't think that it is unreasonable to require that all aircraft (gliders,
balloons, etc.) who fly above 10K or near major airports are transponder
equipped. I would hope that rather than forcing everyone to install Mode C
(an antiquated technology), that we could get the FAA to accelerate the
deployment of ADS-B ground stations in strategic areas, and let gliders and
balloons meet the transponder requirements with low cost ADS-B transceivers,
which will hopefully be available within the next year or so. A side
benefit of this, is that the power draw for ADS-B UAT transceivers should be
a lot lower than Mode C.
Mike Schumann
"VARR" <var...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:42200894-699c-4bde...@2g2000hsn.googlegroups.com...
--
kirk.stant
Dean,
I would set a slightly different priority: A PCAS - type device is
the absolute minimum required for XC (or local in busy areas). Out
west, where XC is flown at much higher altitudes, then the transponder
becomes important.
I currently fly east of St Louis, not far from the Class B but never
get high enough to conflict with airliners. Our main threat (aside
from the occasional bizjet or KC-135 out of Scott AFB) is VFR light
planes. Here, a transponder will not help much (if at all) for most
of the traffic, while a PCAS will help a lot. But a transponder
wouldn't hurt!
But I have a hard enough problem convincing members of my club for the
need for radios, much less transponders in gliders! Lots of
resistance to change in older club cultures, not surprisingly...
And let's not get started on altimeter settings! I've run into many
pilots who are more concerned with using the altimeter (set to QFE!)
to figure out their pattern altitude than with using a properly set
altimeter, along with a radio, to decrease the chance of a midair in
busy airspace. Scary, really...
Cheers,
Kirk 66
Mike Schumann
What is the basis for that claim? There's IFR traffic everywhere. The
stuff you see isn't the threat, it's the targets you don't. Anyone who
thinks that they are immune from mid-airs because of where they fly is just
rolling the dice. Yes, the odds are different in different places, but the
risk is > 0 everywhere.
Mike Schumann
"Eric Greenwell" <flyg...@verizon.netto> wrote in message
news:PjEIj.3585$lV1.2099@trndny06...
--
Tom Nau
wrote:
>
> - Show quoted text -
Mike,
ATC is tasked only with separating IFR traffic from other IFR
traffic. Even when VMC, IFR traffic is supposed to "see and avoid".
Tom
Andy
> The glider(an ASG 29, not an ASK 27)
The ASG 29 is certificated as an ASW27-18. All glider pilots know it
as the 29 but any FAA or NTSB report will reference it as ASW27-18.
Not sure if anyone else reported it but MSNBC ran the story (with
their own bias).
LOV2AV8
Soaring Club has bought transponders for all or our two place ships.
We talk with approach control before beginning operations and many of
us monitor if not talk to to approach while flying. We are also on
the ATIS for Tucson. Most club members think they are safe with the
transponders and are not as vigilant to "see and avoid". My closest
call has been with a Bonanza, overtaking me on a high speed descent
into Ryan field. All that I heard was the engine noise as he buzzed
by me at 1&1/2 wingspans at 9000'. He was not talking to approach
contol, had not listened to Tucson ATIS, did not have a TCAS and was
most likely not looking outside the cockpit for traffic. I would
rather exercise diligence myself with a Zaon MRX and have the
additional heads up to allow for me to "see and avoid". I already
will not do long straight runs without turning to clear myself of
traffic inbound or outbound from Tucson.
Randy "AV8"
Tim Mara
"Eric Greenwell" <flyg...@verizon.netto> wrote in message
news:PjEIj.3585$lV1.2099@trndny06...
>
>> The other problem with transponders in gliders is the false sense of
>> security it implies....to many it is "assumed" that this is like a shield
>> keeping everyone else aware of their presents as they go happily flying
>> along with their heads down looking at the wiz-bang flight
>> computer...this leads to more near misses and occasional hits than
>> electronics can avoid....I know of no Cherokee 140's or Cezna 172's
>> flying with TCAS on board
>
> How many transponder equipped gliders, transponder on, have been hit by a
> non-TCAS equipped general aviation aircraft? Is this really a problem? Can
> it be addressed by training?
this sounds like an FAA response......sorry...but how many glider pilots
ahve ever even picked up a book after passing their parctical exam... I
"was" an FAA designated examiner....amazing how little most really know
about even the very basics in regulations or for that matter in the
gliders/airplanes they are flying...so don't simply think that "mandating"
some additional training is going to fit the bill....sorry...as a group we
are not all that smart!....seriously.... I'll ask you and everyone else to
take a "private" pilot written exam and see how many that are already flying
with that littel piece of paper that says "pilot certificate" that can pass
this today... I know I'd struggle!
>
>>....and I also know of a lot more glider pilots who will insist they only
>>turn on the transponder when they are flying down the glideslope of major
>>airports..
>
> Sounds like a good start, doesn't it? I mean, we wouldn't be having this
> discussion if the Reno glider had turned the transponder in that
> situation. Again, perhaps a training issue.
>
>> Transponders are not the fix all for the problem,
>
> In a sense, it would fix "all" the problem, if we think colliding with
> airliners is our problem.
>
>> but mandatory transponders in k6's, 2-33's and 126's will certainly have
>> an impact on the sport as we "knew" it.
>
> Yes, so I'm hoping any requirement for transponders recognizes that most
> gliders aren't a hazard to airliners and other "controlled" traffic.
"hoping" the FAA will look at any requirement to benefit "recreational"
aviation is pretty optomistic... The FAA and every other government agency
is more in tune with voters and what is on CNN, 60 minutes and
20/20....you'll have to remember just what a very small voice glider pilots
have in the larger scheme of things...we are a very (ultra) small voice ....
The very best secenario we could hope for would ultimately be more
restricted airspace....ya I know you don't want to hear this if it affects
where you fly....but, it may boil down to making certain high traffic aeas
completely off limits or TCAS equipped 126's!...
just the simple truth....
tim
Tim Mara
> Tim
>
> I do fly in high traffic density areas (with transponder and PCAS and
> talking to ATC when appropriate) and know many other pilots that also
> at least have a transponder in their ship and none that I know have
> this naive view of transponders and safety bubbles. If anything the
> fact that they have a transponder in their glider, tends to be
> correlated with an awareness of traffic, ATC, etc. and I suspect if
> anything these folks are more likely to have their heads outside the
> cockpit. And since many of those same pilots also fly with PCAS I can
> guarantee they understand the need to be looking outside.
I am glad you can "Guarantee" this.....that makes it a lot easier
tim
Darryl Ramm
>
> > - Show quoted text -
>
> Mike,
>
> ATC is tasked only with separating IFR traffic from other IFR
> traffic. Even when VMC, IFR traffic is supposed to "see and avoid".
> Tom
Ah do you fly much in high traffic areas, talk much to ATC? ATC
regularly issues traffic advisories to help separate all types of
traffic. If you fly a glider with transponder near places like Reno,
or Travis AFB, or ... traffic gets routed around you by ATC issuing
traffic advisories to other aircraft, wether IFR or VFR. The operating
procedures in place near Reno including for non-transponder equipped
gliders are intended to help ATC issue those advisories to IFR and VFR
traffic. That's why they are in place. Luckily people involved in the
Reno area seem to get that while important, see and avoid does not
work perfectly, and when you much high density fast traffic with those
invisible white gliders it works a lot less perfectly. And I'll repeat
again this applies to many more places than the Reno area.
Darryl
Darryl Ramm
Tim you are welcome. :-) But if I do ever meet anybody flying with
PCAS who does not admit after a while there was lot more traffic out
there than they thought I'll be sure to let you know.
Darryl
Tim Mara
> non-TCAS equipped general aviation aircraft? Is this really a problem? Can
> it be addressed by training?
does that mean that having a transponder on board will eliminate this risk?
Does that then allow us to feel secure that it can't happen or won't? The
only way even with a transponder installed and operating to know what
traffic is around you is to be in contact with ATC....simply sending a
signal doesn't tell everyone around you that you are there.
tim
Ron Gleason
wrote:
> Voluntary compliance is great. However, there are always people who don't
> get it and create situations that give the rest of us a black eye or worse.
>
> I don't think that it is unreasonable to require that all aircraft (gliders,
> balloons, etc.) who fly above 10K or near major airports are transponder
> equipped. I would hope that rather than forcing everyone to install Mode C
> (an antiquated technology), that we could get the FAA to accelerate the
> deployment of ADS-B ground stations in strategic areas, and let gliders and
> balloons meet the transponder requirements with low cost ADS-B transceivers,
> which will hopefully be available within the next year or so. A side
> benefit of this, is that the power draw for ADS-B UAT transceivers should be
> a lot lower than Mode C.
>
> Mike Schumann
I think this idea is bad and wrong. Not all aircraft that flies above
10K can feasibly fly with a transponder. Where can store the
transponder when flying my hang glider or paraglider? The technology
is not there to cover all aircraft.
Ron Gleason
DG303 N303MR
Tim Mara
transponders....
the PCAS more or less tell you to "look out"...the transponder by nature of
it's apparent shield of protection can leave you feeling pretty secure that
someone else is "looking out" for you..
tim
"Darryl Ramm" <darry...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:b4a6d259-ebe4-42a5...@s37g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
Tom Nau
> precisely why I do recommend PCAS and do not always recommend
> transponders....
> the PCAS more or less tell you to "look out"...the transponder by nature of
> it's apparent shield of protection can leave you feeling pretty secure that
> someone else is "looking out" for you..
> tim
>
>
> news:b4a6d259-ebe4-42a5...@s37g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
>
>
>
> > On Apr 2, 8:09 am, "Tim Mara" <t...@wingsandwheels.com> wrote:
> >> > Tim
>
> >> > I do fly in high traffic density areas (with transponder and PCAS and
> >> > talking to ATC when appropriate) and know many other pilots that also
> >> > at least have a transponder in their ship and none that I know have
> >> > this naive view of transponders and safety bubbles. If anything the
> >> > fact that they have a transponder in their glider, tends to be
> >> > correlated with an awareness of traffic, ATC, etc. and I suspect if
> >> > anything these folks are more likely to have their heads outside the
> >> > cockpit. And since many of those same pilots also fly with PCAS I can
> >> > guarantee they understand the need to be looking outside.
>
> >> I am glad you can "Guarantee" this.....that makes it a lot easier
> >> tim
>
> >> > I know of many light aircraft flying with PCAS (Zaon) and a few (new
> >> > expensive ones) with the Avidyne/Ryan system that is between PCAS and
> >> > TCAS.
>
> >> > Darryl
>
> > Tim you are welcome. :-) But if I do ever meet anybody flying with
> > PCAS who does not admit after a while there was lot more traffic out
> > there than they thought I'll be sure to let you know.
>
>
> - Show quoted text -
I humbly submit that two PCAS-equipped aircraft have no protection
unless at least one has a transponder!
Tom
kirk.stant
>
> - Show quoted text -
What we need is a combination PCAS/FLARM/Transponder...
Kirk 66
Marc Ramsey
> What we need is a combination PCAS/FLARM/Transponder...
It's called "ADS-B". Seriously, at the SSA convention, a representative
from MITRE showed a proof of concept cigarette pack size ADS-B UAT
transmitter that is powered by 2 AA batteries. It is currently
undergoing flight testing on the east coast. Constructed primarily
using about $150 worth of cellphone RF components, the estimated retail
cost if produced would be $750 to $1000, and MITRE is willing to license
the design for a nominal cost. A transceiver is currently on the
drawing board. The major problem with this device is that it uses a
consumer GPS receiver module, and the FAA has apparently not given much
thought to the idea of VFR-only ADS-B devices, instead assuming that
everyone will be using certified GPS units at $3000 or so a pop.
Efforts are being made to counter this assumption, hopefully there will
be news on this front in a few months...
Marc
Tony Verhulst
>> ATC is tasked only with separating IFR traffic from other IFR
>> traffic. Even when VMC, IFR traffic is supposed to "see and avoid".
>> Tom
>
> Ah do you fly much in high traffic areas, talk much to ATC? ATC
> regularly issues traffic advisories to help separate all types of
> traffic.
Tom is right. ATC does often issue traffic advisories to VFR traffic but
they don't *have* to. See section 4.1.16 (3)(e) of the Airman
Information Manual at
http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim/Chap4/aim0401.html.
They can, and have, denied me radar service when they're hip deep in IFR
traffic - not that I think that it's a good idea.
Tony V.
Tony Verhulst
> ..We are also on
> the ATIS for Tucson.
Why? ATIS is a recorded message. Perhaps you mean CTAF?
Tony V.
Tony Verhulst
> .... ATC does often issue traffic advisories to VFR traffic but
> Information Manual at
> http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim/Chap4/aim0401.html.
> They can, and have, denied me radar service when they're hip deep in IFR
> traffic - not that I think that it's a good idea.
>
> Tony V.
And be sure not to miss section 4-1-1.
T
dlh...@charter.net
whatever the technology should be) around certain high risk areas?
Maybe a new "veil" designation for gliders above 10k?
BT
Out here the airport elevations are 3-6K MSL, a 10K ceiling doe not give
much breathing room with land out areas few and far between.
Wait until ADS-B, you will be limited to 10K (according to the NPRM) if you
are not ADS-B capable.
B
<dlh...@charter.net> wrote in message
news:a541a644-852b-44ec...@e67g2000hsa.googlegroups.com...
Mike Schumann
pack of cigarettes, runs for 14 hours and 4 internal AA batteries, and has a
parts cost of ~$150. With this kind of technology, there is no reason that
any aircraft, balloon, hang glider, or parachutist should be flying around
without one. Hopefully we'll see this commercialized within the next year
or so.
Mike Schumann
"Ron Gleason" <xcfl...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:33a22e8a-7c5c-4316...@k13g2000hse.googlegroups.com...
--
Bruce
One is that we are talking to tha converted - pretty much everyone in this forum
understands that transponders do not offer a panacea, and would have major
negative results if mandated for all aviation.
Two is that the propaganda value is against us.
Consider human nature - The transponder issue - is in my opinion another example
of intellectual laziness. Generally speaking people are inherently given to
doing the smallest amount of thinking they can. Our problem here is that is is a
very easy thing to "understand" that if everything in the sky carries a
transponder then we (the general public, sitting in the nth row)will be safe.
Unfortunately this also extends to the bureaucrats occupying the nth desk at
FAA, because it is an easy decision. The FAA types probably do understand the
issues, but from their perspective less random aviation means less risk. In fact
it is easy to conclude that it is actually better for the people who are
resisting this idea, because even if this prevents large parts of a sport from
operating - they are better off not flying, than flying without this technology.
Because we have already accepted that this technology already somehow magically
ensures there will be no mid-airs.
We know that a transponder without human attention is an expensive waste of
panel space. We know that the speed differentials make ACAS etc a nice idea but
unlikely to help in a real emergency. We know there are a few places where a
transponder will substantially improve safety, and by all accounts most glider
pilots operating in those areas have voluntarily started fitting them.
From an intellectual effort perspective all of our arguments are much harder
work. If we want to win this argument we have to present a simpler case.
Maybe one way is to look at the behavioural consequences of a blanket policy of
fitting transponders . The airliners can now "safely" assume that they can fly
point to point at, over any point in the country, and at any time, because
everything in the sky is now visible to ATC. Apart from the assumption about ATC
capacity to monitor and manage, I wonder how many of the general public are
thinking of the intrusion this could mean for them. In this world the airlines
start having the contest finish problem, of aircraft are approaching from all
directions, and need to be sent via a couple of control points to straighten out
the kinks.
Look at it from the positive side, at least the lives of the ALTPs will get a
whole lot more interesting.
When the predictable incident/accident ensues, it is unlikely that the NTSB will
conclude that probable cause included inappropriate behavioural change as a
result of complacency resulting from the mandatory fitting of transponders. Too
many thoughts in one sentence - pilot error is something everyone understands.
The long report that started this looks like someone was actually trying to
understand and explain, and ended up getting edited somewhat.
Mike Schumann
aviation? The only argument against transponders is the cost.
Having a transponder is not a panacea, in that it will not protect you from
a 172 or other VFR traffic that doesn't happen to see you, either due to a
lack of attention, or due to the inherent difficulty of seeing other
traffic. However, it should protect you from IFR traffic that is under ATC
control.
Mike Schumann
"Bruce" <bg...@wesgray.co.za> wrote in message
news:ft1slq$1tis$1...@newsreader02.ops.uunet.co.za...
LOV2AV8
Not CTAF. That wouldn't do much in a Class C area with multiple
airports. On the recorded ATIS along with winds, runway in use,
contact approach control on XXX.XX it says "Caution, glider operations
in the vicinity of the Tucson VOR 297 radial at 28 miles up to
12,000'. This doesn't do much good as the commercial jets fly right
thru the area and even have a checkpoint near our field. I don't
think that these guys are doing too much "see and avoid" but are
counting on ATC and TCAS. I'm also not as concerned about two PCAS
gliders finding each other as a 200mph heavy metal airliner finding
me.
Randy "AV8"
Bob Whelan
> Kirk,
>
> Ironic that you talk about 22k cloudbases over Grand Canyon! That
> is about the altitude of the midair on June 30, 1956, that got
> Positive Control Airspace(now Class A) lowered from 24,000 to 18,000
> feet!
This thread and (plus recent others, topically related) is a great
example of people at risk being more informed than regulators (e.g. FAA,
prodded over the years and at various times by the NTSB) and news types
(AP, MSNBC, ad nauseum, etc.). Being informed is a good thing, IMHO.
Its also well illustrates the very real absence of a technical 'panacea
fix' for traffic separation, despite everyone's fondest wishes. (Back
to this in a moment...)
Less good is inaccurate information and defeatism, both seen in this and
other recent threads.
The above-referenced mid-air brought Americans (so called) 'positive
control' for all commercial flights, NOT a reduction from 24.5K to 18K
for flights into the upper-air positive control airspace. That came
about in the late 1960's or early 1970's, as I recall. There was no
single act the FAA used to justify the lowering; it was a pure-n-simple
airspace grab 'in the interest of safety.'
As for 'defeatism' if you're in the "It's inevitable, so might as well
roll over and 'surrender' now before something REALLY bad happens camp,"
IMHO you're arguably contributing to the problem of under-informed,
politically-inspired, regulation. Personally, I'd rather go down in
(figurative!) flames fighting that depressing colossus, simply because I
believe doing right trumps doing the politically-expeditious thing.
Don't misunderstand. I'd love a (genuine) panacea fix as much as any
faceless, white-collar-welfare, bureaucrat. Where our approaches differ
is me being prepared to NOT do certain things IF those things arguably
make 'the regulateds' situations worse, without corresponding societal
(as distinct from political) benefit. 'Rolling over and surrendering to
the inevitable' certainly panders to a political approach more than it
reflects interactively working with the regulators to regulate sensibly.
I define 'sensibly' as blending risk amelioration (for the traveling
public), practicality, cost, technical reality, etc.
Who regulates air safety in the U.S.? Congress, via the FAA.
Who does NOT regulate air safety in the U.S.? The NTSB and the news
media...and anyone else not in Congress of the FAA.
Tangentially, diligent, chronological reading NTSB crash investigations
in "Aviation Week & Space Technology" will make it abundantly clear that
whenever the NTSB pressures the FAA to 'do something' in the wake of a
crash (i.e. after nearly every crash of a U.S. carrier), this is
'merely' a turf war between a wannabe regulating agency and a regulating
one. Not that I'm defending either one...merely pointing out facts.
My recommendation?
Since our particular interest group has not YET been threatened with an
imminent bureaucratic bludgeon, is to begin educating and interacting
NOW, rather then after the crisis has occurred. Thanks to computers,
the creation - and circulation - of accurate, necessarily-detailed,
educational letter(s) is trivially easy. Rationalizing your
congress-critters won't take the time to read such letters is
practically begging for them to join the panacea bandwagon when it rolls
into town. Ditto, the 'whomevers' in the FAA.
Just because your target isn't the 'panacea target' doesn't mean your
information doesn't have potential to bear fruit.
Unless you control a media typewriter, ignore the media...at best
they're a noisy agitator, with little likelihood to prove an ally in any
way. Their job is 'news,' the more 'scare-ific' the better. (If it
bleeds, it leads.) Nuance isn't their strong suit.
Time to start educating the regulatory world, folks...the choir already
knows!
Respectfully,
Bob W.
Michael Ash
> How would transponders have "negative" results if mandated for everyone in
> aviation? The only argument against transponders is the cost.
The cost is certainly one negative result. A lot of people own machines
for which the cost of instaling a transpoder would make up a significant
fraction of the total value of the aircraft. A lot of owners couldn't
easily absorb such a cost. I don't know if there are other downsides, but
the cost shouldn't simply be dismissed.
> Having a transponder is not a panacea, in that it will not protect you from
> a 172 or other VFR traffic that doesn't happen to see you, either due to a
> lack of attention, or due to the inherent difficulty of seeing other
> traffic. However, it should protect you from IFR traffic that is under ATC
> control.
It will *help* protect you, but ATC isn't perfect. Mid-air collisions have
occurred between aircraft equipped with transponders and under ATC
control. All things being equal I'd certainly rather have one than not,
but it won't always save you.
--
Michael Ash
Rogue Amoeba Software
J a c k
> Having a transponder is not a panacea, in that it will not protect you from
> a 172 or other VFR traffic that doesn't happen to see you, either due to a
> lack of attention, or due to the inherent difficulty of seeing other
> traffic. However, it should protect you from IFR traffic that is under ATC
> control.
"Should"?
ATC _may_ give traffic information involving VFR traffic if they have
time. In other circumstances "protection" would come from the fact that
the IFR traffic _may_ have TCAS.
Mandating transponders is only a partial solution. Until every aircraft
also has a collision avoidance system of some type TCAS, PCAS, etc., the
regulatory push for more, and more expensive, equipment will never stop.
And in fact it will not stop until we have positive control of all
aircraft at all times in all places. We do not want to go there.
If the traffic that worries you is likely to have a transponder, then
spend a few hundred bucks and get a PCAS unit so you know where that
traffic is. And whether you add such equipment or not, learn how to scan
visually. It isn't something that comes naturally, even though you think
you are doing a great job. When you operate with a PCAS for a short
time, you will find out how much traffic you've been missing. As always,
we don't know what we don't know.
Jack
Eric Greenwell
> "Most gliders aren't a hazard to airliners or other controlled traffic"?????
> What is the basis for that claim? There's IFR traffic everywhere. The
> stuff you see isn't the threat, it's the targets you don't. Anyone who
> thinks that they are immune from mid-airs because of where they fly is just
> rolling the dice.
"Most" was too strong, so let me replace that with "At least half the
gliders aren't a hazard...". It is a guess, but a reasonable one, I
think. By "hazard", I mean that an IFR pilot might actually pause for a
seconds before deciding to make the flight anyway, once he is informed
about where the glider is. In other words, the risk to IFR traffic is so
low, no one is worried about it.
That situation describes a lot of training operations, ride operations,
and even cross-country flights. The risk can be low for several reasons:
*there aren't any airliners going through the area when the gliders are
operating, and very few other IFR flights.
*Or, operations are conducted in a manner where installing a transponder
wouldn't change the risk significantly. For example, where procedures
such as contact with the tower at the nearby field ensure separation.
> Yes, the odds are different in different places, but the
> risk is > 0 everywhere.
There are many places without airliners or IFR traffic. Lots and lots of
small airfields, even municipal airports, simply don't attract that kind
of traffic. I think it's important to recognize that not every airfield
is not just outside a Class B airspace.
Mike Schumann
getting up to 8-10K MSL, I don't care where you are in the country, there is
a >0 chance that you may end up in the vicinity of an airliner or someone
else flying IFR who thinks that ATC is protecting them from everyone else.
Without a transponder, you have no protection.
Outside of the $ involved, why would you not want everyone to have a
transponder on board?
Mike Schumann
"Eric Greenwell" <flyg...@verizon.netto> wrote in message
news:JugJj.1492$at6.1201@trndny01...
--
Mike Schumann
virtually 100% of pilots flying IFR, and certainly 100% of the passengers on
commercial jets, expect ATC to vector IFR traffic around, and provide
separation from, every aircraft that has an identifiable location and
altitude (i.e. Mode C transponder equipped), regardless if that aircraft is
also flying IFR or VFR.
If this is not what the current rules say, or what is current procedure is,
then that needs to be changed as a 1st step. As a second step, we should
try to get all aircraft equipped with transponders. The argument should not
be on whether that is worthwhile doing, etc., but rather how we can make it
affordable so that it is not unduly burdensome to do so.
Once we get the price down under $1K, which I firmly believe is possible in
the not too distant future with ADS-B, the price argument will no longer
fly. Can you imagine the uproar if there was an airliner collision with a
non-transponder equipped glider with thousands of dollars worth of flight
recorders and other goodies, and the justification for not having a
transponder was the lack of willingness to spend another $1K? That would
put a quick end to our sport.
A more productive track than trying to stop a transponder mandate, is to
negotiate an agreement to require transponders in all gliders in exchange
for increased ATC separation of IFR traffic from glider targets and VFR
access to higher altitudes. This is an argument we can win, that doesn't
make us all look like a bunch of whiners.
Mike Schumann
"J a c k" <baro...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:jugJj.59$%41...@nlpi064.nbdc.sbc.com...
--
J a c k
> ...we should try to get all aircraft equipped with transponders.
This is not sufficient, even if practical.
> ...negotiate an agreement to require transponders in all gliders in exchange
> for increased ATC separation of IFR traffic from glider targets and VFR
> access to higher altitudes. This is an argument we can win, that doesn't
> make us all look like a bunch of whiners.
How much separation do you want?
How likely are you to get _any_ more separation in a system which is
already overburdened and has every expectation of becoming more so in
terms of personnel, equipment, and airspace? The response of the US.gov
to requests for more separation for gliders will be to restrict gliders
and no one else. We already have wave windows. A raising of the national
floor of Class A airspace is not in the cards.
Jack
rroz...@aol.com
this important subject. Does anyone know if the SSA is working this
issue with the FAA? If so, do we have information on what "position"
and/or approach that they will be taking on this subject?
I would also hope that the SSA is coordinating their efforts with
AOPA, EAA and other interested organizations....
Thanks - Renny
On Apr 3, 9:12 pm, "Mike Schumann" <mike-nos...@traditions-nospam.com>
wrote:
> I don't know what the rules or current procedures are. I suspect that
> virtually 100% of pilots flying IFR, and certainly 100% of the passengers on
> commercial jets, expect ATC to vector IFR traffic around, and provide
> separation from, every aircraft that has an identifiable location and
> altitude (i.e. Mode C transponder equipped), regardless if that aircraft is
> also flying IFR or VFR.
>
> If this is not what the current rules say, or what is current procedure is,
> then that needs to be changed as a 1st step. As a second step, we should
> try to get all aircraft equipped with transponders. The argument should not
> be on whether that is worthwhile doing, etc., but rather how we can make it
> affordable so that it is not unduly burdensome to do so.
>
> Once we get the price down under $1K, which I firmly believe is possible in
> the not too distant future with ADS-B, the price argument will no longer
> fly. Can you imagine the uproar if there was an airliner collision with a
> non-transponder equipped glider with thousands of dollars worth of flight
> recorders and other goodies, and the justification for not having a
> transponder was the lack of willingness to spend another $1K? That would
> put a quick end to our sport.
>
> A more productive track than trying to stop a transponder mandate, is to
> negotiate an agreement to require transponders in all gliders in exchange
> for increased ATC separation of IFR traffic from glider targets and VFR
> access to higher altitudes. This is an argument we can win, that doesn't
> make us all look like a bunch of whiners.
>
> Mike Schumann
>
> "J a c k" <baron...@yahoo.com> wrote in messagenews:jugJj.59$%41...@nlpi064.nbdc.sbc.com...
Eric Greenwell
> Once we get the price down under $1K, which I firmly believe is possible in
> the not too distant future with ADS-B, the price argument will no longer
> fly.
If transponders were only $1000 instead of $3000+, we would not be
having this conversation. Almost every glider pilot would have one.
If you really believe that a $1000 ADS-B will happen "soon", then you
can relax and wait for it to show up in Aircraft Spruces catalog. I
guarantee they will fly off the shelves so fast you'll hear sonic booms
as tens of thousands aircraft owners rudely push their way to the front
of the line to buy one.
In fact, you don't have to wait for it to hit $1000. If it was available
at the same price as a transponder, a lot of glider pilots that are
thinking about transponders would do it right now. At $2000, there would
be flood of orders. There wouldn't be any left to sell for $1000.
I listened to the MITRE presentation for the low cost ADS-B, but I think
it's years before it can get past the regulatory hurdles that produced
the current Garmin unit that is the size of a shoebox, weighs six
pounds, takes over 1.5 amps, and sells for $7000.
But I sure hope you are right. I'd gladly toss out my transponder and
put an ADS-B in it's place, even at $2000.
Eric Greenwell
> Once we get the price down under $1K, which I firmly believe is possible in
> the not too distant future with ADS-B, the price argument will no longer
> fly.
There is another way to mitigate the cost of transponders that can be
done right now, without waiting for what may be the "too distant
future": the FAA sells them to glider pilots and other currently exempt
aircraft for, say, $1000. That's what New Zealand did 10-15 years ago,
and it was apparently a very successful plan.
Perhaps someone familiar with that plan can explain it in detail.
Mike Schumann
transceiver is not technical, it's all the regulatory stuff. My personal
belief is that if instead of fighting mandatory transponders, we partner
with the NTSB to cut through the current certification / regulatory BS, we
could actually be successful, and everyone would be happy and a LOT safer.
The current approach that the SSA and AOPA, etc. seem to be taking to try to
hold off mandatory deployment makes us all look bad, particularly when we
have a major fatal accident, which is guaranteed to happen eventually in the
current airspace environment.
Mike Schumann
"Eric Greenwell" <flyg...@verizon.netto> wrote in message
news:aTiJj.4376$fq2.3352@trndny03...
--
Philip Plane
> There is another way to mitigate the cost of transponders that can be
> done right now, without waiting for what may be the "too distant
> future": the FAA sells them to glider pilots and other currently exempt
> aircraft for, say, $1000. That's what New Zealand did 10-15 years ago,
> and it was apparently a very successful plan.
>
> Perhaps someone familiar with that plan can explain it in detail.
back into gliding so I wasn't heavily involved, but it went something
like this:
CAA organised a good price for suitable transponders. I guess there
would have been over 100 going into gliders. They provided drip feed
payment too, I think.
CAA made a bunch of promises/claims about how it would benefit gliders.
Some of these things happenned, some didn't.
It was very successful from the point of view of the Airways Corp who
run the ATC. They have lots of transponder mandatory airspace.
Mixed blessing for gliders. If you're in controlled airspace ATC talk to
you less because they know where you are. Reduced your workload considerably.
But there's a lot more controlled airspace now.
After the initial batch, we're on our own. We just had a transponder
installed in a new club glider. It cost NZ $5000. It requires extra
battery power. It takes up valuable panel space.
Some places you can't fly without a transponder. Some places you can
easily get along without one.
It hasn't made any difference to the rate of collisions between gliders
and airliners in NZ. We've never had one.
--
Philip Plane _____ phi...@xinqu.net
|
---------------( )---------------
Glider pilots have no visible means of support
Martin Gregorie
> It hasn't made any difference to the rate of collisions between gliders
> and airliners in NZ. We've never had one.
>
I heard that the NZ transponder requirement had nothing to do
with a collision or near miss, but everything to do with the desire
of some Aussy GA pilots to fly into airports with full CTA rules. This
somehow became applicable to all GA aircraft, forcing them to fit
transponders. Because of ANO harmonisation this also applied to NZ's GA
fleet. Somehow gliding got caught up in it too, hence the transponders in
NZ gliders.
Is this a fair summary?
The irony is that within a month of of the rule coming into effect there
was a near miss inside the Sydney CTA between a transponder-equipped GA
plane and an airliner. I believe this was the first such incident on
Australia.
--
martin@ | Martin Gregorie
gregorie. |
org | Zappa fan & glider pilot
user
cheap or not, it has to be approved. Are the chances real???
"Mike Schumann" <mike-...@traditions-nospam.com> wrote in message
news:47f4442c$0$26099$8826...@free.teranews.com...
Shawn
Anyone seen what the price of jet fuel is? Airlines are going TU all
over, and the US is now officially (by everyone's account except W's) in
a recession. Hi perf. piston aircraft won't have fuel in six months.
Why not just do some foot dragging until the entire civil aviation
system collapses, and we'll be arguing winch sites and airspace
separation with the hang and paragliders?
Cynically Yours,
Shawn
Mike Schumann
biggest challenge is to get the FAA to accept the notion that there should
be a VFR only version of ADS-B that is designed to be cost effective, and
does not provide the accuracy and reliability levels needed for parallel
instrument approaches in Class B airspace.
My gut instinct (I don't have any experience dealing with the FAA) is that
we can get the FAA to provide a mechanism so that this type of device can be
sold commercially at a ~$1K price point. Politically, it would help a lot
of the SSA, AOPA, and the EAA took the position that universal deployment
would be acceptable, if equipment was available to the GA community at this
price point.
Mike Schumann
"user" <a...@b.com> wrote in message
news:VpKdnRluHJzMC2ra...@comcast.com...
Marc Ramsey
> There are obviously some challenges in getting this commercialized. The
> biggest challenge is to get the FAA to accept the notion that there should
> be a VFR only version of ADS-B that is designed to be cost effective, and
> does not provide the accuracy and reliability levels needed for parallel
> instrument approaches in Class B airspace.
>
> My gut instinct (I don't have any experience dealing with the FAA) is that
> we can get the FAA to provide a mechanism so that this type of device can be
> sold commercially at a ~$1K price point. Politically, it would help a lot
> of the SSA, AOPA, and the EAA took the position that universal deployment
> would be acceptable, if equipment was available to the GA community at this
> price point.
I sent the following comment out to various parties back in February, as
a response to a proposal by a manufacturer to build 25 of the MITRE
designed UAT transmitters for research and development purposes:
===
What if there was a highly publicized proposal by the SSA, USHPA, EAA,
AOPA, etc., to test these transmitters in a high traffic density area
with UAT ground station coverage (say Maryland or Virginia) in a range
of sport aircraft including hang gliders, ultralights, LSAs, sailplanes,
Cubs/Champs, etc.? It might encourage the FAA to address the VFR-only
issue in the near term...
===
The intent is to get the ball rolling. If you think this might be
useful, contact me, I'd like to get enough of a working group together
to insure that the proposal actually happens...
Marc
Eric Greenwell
> There are obviously some challenges in getting this commercialized.
> The biggest challenge is to get the FAA to accept the notion that
> there should be a VFR only version of ADS-B that is designed to be
> cost effective, and does not provide the accuracy and reliability
> levels needed for parallel instrument approaches in Class B airspace.
>
> My gut instinct (I don't have any experience dealing with the FAA) is
> that we can get the FAA to provide a mechanism so that this type of
> device can be sold commercially at a ~$1K price point. Politically,
> it would help a lot of the SSA, AOPA, and the EAA took the position
> that universal deployment would be acceptable, if equipment was
> available to the GA community at this price point.
Certainly, AOPA is already doing that. See this for their position on
ADS-B implementation:
http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/air_traffic/ads-b.html
Some highligts from that page:
> 4. The cost of the ADS-B datalink system must be at or below today's
> price of a Mode C transponder.
> 5. Once the ADS-B mandate becomes effective, aircraft should not be
> required to be equipped with a Mode C transponder.
> The AOPA-preferred UAT datalink is capable of providing pilots with
> three separate but related services:
> 3. FIS-B (Flight Information Services). FIS-B data includes graphic
> Nexrad weather radar and textual METAR/TAF data. In the future, FIS-B
> services may include graphic TFR data.
I believe all glider pilots should also be members of AOPA. I've been
one for more than 25 years. They do a lot heavy lifting that the SSA can
not, related to airplanes (think towplanes), airspace, required
equipment (ADS-B is the focus now), and pilot rights. The magazine is
ocasionally interesting, and the dues are reasonable.
Mike Schumann
deployment in aircraft without electrical systems, gliders, and balloons.
They have been primarily focused on eliminating the current FAA strategy to
require both Mode C and ADS-B on aircraft in Class B airspace and above 10K
MSL.
Mike Schumann
"Eric Greenwell" <flyg...@verizon.netto> wrote in message
news:2XVJj.99$PJ3.18@trndny02...
--
Mike Schumann
player to get on board with getting something like this organized.
Mike Schumann
"Marc Ramsey" <ma...@ranlogREMOVE.com> wrote in message
news:W8VJj.257$%V7....@newssvr14.news.prodigy.net...
--
peck...@gmail.com
> On Mar 31, 3:13 pm, VARR <var...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> "Although the Hawker was equipped with a traffic alert and collision
> avoidance system (TCAS)-II capable of generating vertical resolution
> (collision avoidance) advisories (RA), the glider's Mode Ctransponder
> was turned off (and, therefore, not detectable by the Hawker's
> equipment) because the glider pilot wanted to reserve battery power
> for radio use. "
>
> Early reports on this accident indicated that the pilot had not turned
> thetransponderon because the installation had not been approved.
> Anyone know which is true?
>
> Andy
I spoke with the operator who briefed the Japanese pilot in the mid-
air collision to "turn off the transponder to ensure the data recorder
would record the five hours for silver badge."
Lie number 1: Not enough battery power to run transponder.
Truth: I seldom need to switch to second battery on a long cross
country even over four hours.
Lie number 2: I will turn on the transponder when I am in high
density traffic area.
Truth: The pilot seldom knows where high speed and high density
traffic is routed.
Lie number 3: I am circling and can clear my path for traffic.
Truth: Any pilot even when traffic is pointed out by ATC can not spot
1 in 4 or 5 aircraft that are headed towards him within 1000 feet
vertical and 3 miles horizontal.
Lie number 4: There have been very few near misses with gliders.
Truth: There have been 60 reported near misses between jet traffic
and gliders reported to the National Transportation Safety Board's
ASRS (aviation safety reporting system.) Not counting the actual
collisions.
Lie number 5: Let SSA regional rep or director handle the problems
concerning requirement of transponders.
Truth: SSA has no policy concerning use of transponders despite the
strong need to address this safety problem.
I have used an on board transponder starting with my 1970 Standard
Cirrus. The transponder allows me to navigate through class B
airspace for final glides, following lines of clouds, and showing
other glider pilots in formation how to communicate with the
controllers.
Truth: With a policy from the SSA it is possible to work on access to
otherwise unavailable airspace. In the meantime it behooves us all
who want to continue access above 10,000 feet and within 30 miles of a
primary airport, and who want to thermal under clouds to carry our own
transponder and work the best deal we can with ATC.
Group action can be a powerful tool to ensure growth and freedom in
our soaring aviation pursuit.
Mike Schumann
heading directly towards a mode C equipped VFR target, they issue a traffic
advisory to the IFR traffic, but do NOT make an adjustment to the IFR
traffic's flight path. They rely on the IFR pilot to visually see and avoid
the VFR traffic.
In my opinion, this is crazy. We all know how difficult it is to see and
avoid traffic visually. The FAA's rules need to change. They should be
providing separation between all IFR traffic and any other known target.
Mike Schumann
"Darryl Ramm" <darry...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:511ce46b-3a25-413f...@s13g2000prd.googlegroups.com...
> On Apr 2, 6:57 am, Tom Nau <tw...@stic.net> wrote:
>> On Apr 2, 8:20 am, "Mike Schumann" <mike-nos...@traditions-nospam.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> > Why is anyone getting TCAS alerts? TCAS is suppose to be the last line
>> > of
>> > defense against a collision. If glider / jet traffic is regularly
>> > resulting
>> > in TCAS alerts, then ATC isn't providing enough separation between
>> > transponder equipped gliders and IFR traffic. This is a big issue that
>> > needs to be brought up with the FAA.
>>
>> > Mike Schumann
>>
>> > <dnc...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>>
>> >news:36ae8508-07d9-442c...@s8g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
>>
>> > > Kirk,
>>
>> > > Ironic that you talk about 22k cloudbases over Grand Canyon! That
>> > > is about the altitude of the midair on June 30, 1956, that got
>> > > Positive Control Airspace(now Class A) lowered from 24,000 to 18,000
>> > > feet! I put a transponder in my DG303 years ago. Most of the glass
>> > > ships at Warner Springs have transponders. There is no excuse for not
>> > > having a transponder if you do cross-country. The same excuses I hear
>> > > (not from you) are the ones I heard when I started power flying in
>> > > 1973. Too expensive, blah blah blah.
>>
>> > > It was extremely lucky no one was killed in that Minden midair. The
>> > > few times I have soared there(in rental ships) I have had close calls
>> > > with 121 carriers on the localizer for Reno or corporate jets going
>> > > into Minden. Flying wave the other day at Warner I was on LA Center
>> > > the whole flight. It was amazing the amount of carriers that vectored
>> > > around me or got TCAS alerts.
>>
>> > > There is lots of traffic out there folks. Transponders are a great
>> > > safety device. The 0440 vs. 1200 has nothing to do with power output.
>> > > Per LOA with Reno the 0440 identifies you as a glider rather than an
>> > > airplane. It should be an FAR to have a discrete code for gliders and
>> > > hopefully will happen soon.
>>
>> > > Happy Soaring, Dean "GO"
>>
>> > --
>> > Posted via a free Usenet account fromhttp://www.teranews.com-Hide
>> > quoted text -
>>
>> > - Show quoted text -
>>
>> Mike,
>>
>> ATC is tasked only with separating IFR traffic from other IFR
>> traffic. Even when VMC, IFR traffic is supposed to "see and avoid".
>> Tom
>
> Ah do you fly much in high traffic areas, talk much to ATC? ATC
> regularly issues traffic advisories to help separate all types of
> traffic. If you fly a glider with transponder near places like Reno,
> or Travis AFB, or ... traffic gets routed around you by ATC issuing
> traffic advisories to other aircraft, wether IFR or VFR. The operating
> procedures in place near Reno including for non-transponder equipped
> gliders are intended to help ATC issue those advisories to IFR and VFR
> traffic. That's why they are in place. Luckily people involved in the
> Reno area seem to get that while important, see and avoid does not
> work perfectly, and when you much high density fast traffic with those
> invisible white gliders it works a lot less perfectly. And I'll repeat
> again this applies to many more places than the Reno area.
>
> Darryl
>
** Posted from http://www.teranews.com **
Eric Greenwell
> According to the guys at our local TRACON, when they have IFR traffic
> heading directly towards a mode C equipped VFR target, they issue a traffic
> advisory to the IFR traffic, but do NOT make an adjustment to the IFR
> traffic's flight path. They rely on the IFR pilot to visually see and avoid
> the VFR traffic.
>
> In my opinion, this is crazy. We all know how difficult it is to see and
> avoid traffic visually. The FAA's rules need to change. They should be
> providing separation between all IFR traffic and any other known target.
Did they explain why they used this procedure? One possibility is that
encoders used for VFR are not required to meet the same calibration
standards as encoders used for IFR, and if they are not in contact with
the VFR traffic, they can't confirm the altitude matches the encoder
output. Without knowing the altitude accurately, perhaps they are unable
to vector the IFR traffic safely around it, and must rely on "looking
out the window".
Jack
> According to the guys at our local TRACON, when they have IFR traffic
> heading directly towards a mode C equipped VFR target, they issue a traffic
> advisory to the IFR traffic, but do NOT make an adjustment to the IFR
> traffic's flight path. They rely on the IFR pilot to visually see and avoid
> the VFR traffic.
>
> In my opinion, this is crazy. We all know how difficult it is to see and
> avoid traffic visually. The FAA's rules need to change. They should be
> providing separation between all IFR traffic and any other known target.
"They rely on the IFR pilot to visually see and avoid the VFR traffic."
--and vice versa.
There are provisions for IFR traffic to request vectors to avoid known
traffic. If the IFR pilot wants it, he can get it.
On the other hand, give some thought to exactly how separation could be
guaranteed from all other traffic when only one of the aircraft is under
the control of ATC. Your answer to the problem will be that there should
be no aircraft which is not under positive ATC control. Good luck with
that, and good bye to gliding--and a great many other uses of aircraft,
both pleasure- and business-oriented. If the solutions were simple,
simple people like us would have solved the problem long ago.
Jack
Mike Schumann
the way the system has been run since day one. The rules haven't been
changed to account for increases in aircraft speed and traffic density. VFR
altitude encoders, while not meeting the standards of IFR systems designed
for reduced separation environments, still have to meet FAA standards. Any
lack of accuracy should be reflected in the separation provide to the IFR
traffic.
Mike Schumann
"Eric Greenwell" <flyg...@verizon.netto> wrote in message
news:hF8bk.213$9W.210@trndny04...
Mike Schumann
separation as when they are talking to both. However, it is not impossible.
If the VFR target is moving in a straight line, all you need to do is make
sure that the IFR traffic is at a different altitude, or vector them, so
they pass behind the VFR traffic. If the VFR traffic is a glider (which ATC
would know if the NTSB recommendation for a uniform nationwide glider squawk
code was implemented), the appropriate response would be to give the VFR
traffic a wide birth, both latterly and vertically.
Mike Schumann
"Jack" <jack_h...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:r7mdnTVEgdSDUuPV...@comcast.com...
Jack
> ...since day one. The rules haven't been changed to account for increases in aircraft speed and traffic density.
An absurd claim. You will have to qualify your statements a great deal
more carefully if you expect whatever value your suggestions may have to
be recognized.
Jack
Eric Greenwell
> The failure to provide separation services between VFR and IFR traffic is
> the way the system has been run since day one. The rules haven't been
> changed to account for increases in aircraft speed and traffic density. VFR
> altitude encoders, while not meeting the standards of IFR systems designed
> for reduced separation environments, still have to meet FAA standards. Any
> lack of accuracy should be reflected in the separation provide to the IFR
> traffic.
My understanding is it's not the lack of basic accuracy of the encoders,
but the lack of confirmation that the encoder is working properly. An
IFR aircraft is in contact with ATC, and ATC knows it's altimeter and
encoder show the same pressure altitude. ATC is not in contact with the
VFR aircraft, and can not do this cross-check of the altimeter and
encoder readings.
Mike Schumann
working, you go ahead and let an IFR aircraft head right towards the
target??? That certainly doesn't make sense. If there is a legitimate
concern that the VFR encoder is not accurate, the logical conclusion would
be to make sure you have extra separation vertically between the IFR
aircraft than you otherwise might.
Mike Schumann
"Eric Greenwell" <flyg...@verizon.netto> wrote in message
news:_SUgk.205$oU.75@trnddc07...
Andy
nospam.com> wrote:
> If there is a legitimate
> concern that the VFR encoder is not accurate, the logical conclusion would
> be to make sure you have extra separation vertically between the IFR
> aircraft than you otherwise might.
In a system where the transponder and encoder are separate units, the
encoder to transponder altitude interface is typically implemented by
multiple ground/open discretes. Something as simple as a dirty
contact may result in a discrete being assumed open instead of ground
state. A single bit error may result in an encoder reporting an
altitude several thousands of feet in error. The Gilham Grey code
used for altitude encoders has no parity check and, with few
exceptions, no other means of error checking except correlation with
the pilot's altitude report. One exception is transponders that
display the reported altitude and allow the pilot to check it.
Nevertheless the controller has no way to know the reported altitude
is accurate unless verified against a pilot altitude report.
In this context accurate does not mean plus/minus 200 feet (the
resolution is only 100ft) but perhaps plus/minus 5000ft or more.
Of course the same non error checked, low integrity, transponder/
encoder systems are the basis for TCAS conflict resolution.
ref http://www.airsport-corp.com/dot_faa_ct-97_7.pdf
"The results of this study indicate that most of the transponders
carried
by GA aircraft fail to meet all of the performance criteria specified
in national
standards documents, and that a number of these failures may be
serious enough
to significantly affect their performance with secondary surveillance
radar
systems and TCAS collision avoidance equipment. In addition, the data
showed
that performance failures on key transponder parameters were unrelated
to the
time that had elapsed since a transponder had received its last
biennial
inspection."
Anyone ready for ADS-B yet.
Andy
Mike Schumann
which is that the FAA is ignoring the data that they already have. Even if
they get have VFR ADS-B target that they know is accurate, their current
procedure is to give the IFR traffic an advisory, but generally not any
deviation to avoid the known traffic.
Mike Schumann
"Andy" <a.du...@netzero.net> wrote in message
news:c28ef5e3-3016-40e6...@8g2000hse.googlegroups.com...
ref http://www.airsport-corp.com/dot_faa_ct-97_7.pdf
Andy
Eric Greenwell
> ADS-B is definitely the way to go. But this ignores the most basic problem,
> which is that the FAA is ignoring the data that they already have.
The FAA isn't ignoring any data, they just aren't using it the way you
think they should. They do give the information to the IFR pilot, who
can request a new vector if the pilot thinks the present one is unsafe.
You aren't getting the detailed reasoning or procedures from RAS that
you seem to be looking for, so I suggest you discuss the situation with
a controller as the next step. That should get you the procedures, but
not necessarily the reasoning, for which you will likely have to dig
further.
Practically speaking, the current procedures seem to work well. If you,
as a transponder equipped VFR pilot, want to improve upon them, you can
contact ATC so they can confirm your altitude. You can also request
flight following. Contacting ATC will usually help even if you are not
transponder equipped.
> Even if
> they get have VFR ADS-B target that they know is accurate, their current
> procedure is to give the IFR traffic an advisory, but generally not any
> deviation to avoid the known traffic.
We are at the beginning of the transition to ADS-B. The procedures will
change as it's use expands, and I don't think even the FAA knows what
the detailed procedures will be 10 or 20 years from now, but no one
suggests they will the same.
jb92563
> We are at the beginning of the transition to ADS-B. The procedures will
> change as it's use expands, and I don't think even the FAA knows what
> the detailed procedures will be 10 or 20 years from now, but no one
> suggests they will the same.
>
> --
> Eric Greenwell - Washington State, USA
When is ADS-B going to be implimented?
Do you think it will be any better for gliders from the power/size/
cost standpoint?
Perhaps the FAA /SSA can help fund/steer development of ADS-B for use
in gliders
to meet our specific limitations and concede on some points for
Gliders not using them below some agreed upon
altitude to conserve power. It could simply be desinged to turn on
automatically at the preset altitude.
Im sure we could get these things made to mil spec by some Chineese
company at a greatly reduced price.
Ray
5Z
> Perhaps the FAA /SSA can help fund/steer development of ADS-B for use
> in gliders
Your questions are answered in this month's and last (or a bit older)
month's issues of Soaring.
-Tom
Mike Schumann
few TCAS advisories being generated between IFR traffic and transponder
equipped VFR aircraft, both powered and gliders. This indicates that the
system is NOT working well. A TCAS advisory should be considered just as
serious as a runway incursion. The reason that we are getting all of these
TCAS advisories is because we are relying on see and be seen for IFR traffic
to avoid VFR aircraft, instead of having ATC automatically vector IFR
traffic around known targets.
Mike Schumann
mi...@traditions.com
651-208-3791
"Eric Greenwell" <flyg...@verizon.netto> wrote in message
news:Kgnhk.323$oU.266@trnddc07...
Jack
> The reason that we are getting all of these TCAS advisories
> is because we are relying on see and be seen for IFR traffic
> to avoid VFR aircraft, instead of having ATC automatically
> vector IFR traffic around known targets.
Mike,
Are you just venting, or are you willing and able to offer a suggestion
about how that could be done?
Jack