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Fatal glider/tow plane accident, France
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Sean F2
May 6, 2012, 5:33:10 PM5/6/12
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Sean F2
May 6, 2012, 5:44:58 PM5/6/12
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More info here: http://www.pilotes-prives.fr/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=14272
If you don't read French try copy and paste into google translate
Basically, glider on or just off winch hit by two plane.
Glider had FLARM. Towplane did not... (from the sound of it).
If you don't read French try copy and paste into google translate
Basically, glider on or just off winch hit by two plane.
Glider had FLARM. Towplane did not... (from the sound of it).
fred....@gmail.com
May 6, 2012, 6:49:29 PM5/6/12
to
The way I read it (and there are conflicting reports) the two-place glider, with one instructor and another pilot (both Air France pilots) on board, was in the process of taking an auto launch when it collided with a Pawnee returning from a tow. Altitude is given as 200 meters but one commenter thinks they might have confused feet with meters, which sounds plausible. The Pawnee pilot and both glider pilots were killed. The Pawnee had collision avoidance equipment (FLARM) but the glider did not. Fred
Sean F2
May 6, 2012, 7:32:43 PM5/6/12
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Awful.
Frank Whiteley
May 6, 2012, 11:43:39 PM5/6/12
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On Sunday, May 6, 2012 3:33:10 PM UTC-6, Sean F2 wrote:
> Very sad to report....
>
> http://www.pnc-contact.com/2012/05/06/air-france-2-pilotes-meurent-dans-un-accident-de-planeur-34087
There was a fatal in the UK last week. The images show the wreckage quite near some power lines, but no official word on that to date.
> Very sad to report....
>
> http://www.pnc-contact.com/2012/05/06/air-france-2-pilotes-meurent-dans-un-accident-de-planeur-34087
Someone had a close call in TN today.
Jonathon May
May 7, 2012, 8:43:47 AM5/7/12
to
about it.
Sean F2
May 7, 2012, 9:06:22 AM5/7/12
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What happened in TN?
Jordan Pollock
May 7, 2012, 9:40:07 AM5/7/12
to
On May 7, 8:06 am, Sean F2 <smfid...@gmail.com> wrote:
> What happened in TN?
Everyone is safe. Nothing worth speculating about.
Jordan
ASW20 E
> What happened in TN?
Everyone is safe. Nothing worth speculating about.
Jordan
ASW20 E
szd5...@gmail.com
May 7, 2012, 9:34:27 AM5/7/12
to
The Dunstable Gazette had reported this......
http://www.dunstabletoday.co.uk/community/glider-death-crash-pilot-experienced-1-3797817
http://www.dunstabletoday.co.uk/community/glider-death-crash-pilot-experienced-1-3797817
Frank Whiteley
May 7, 2012, 10:35:23 AM5/7/12
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On Monday, May 7, 2012 7:06:22 AM UTC-6, Sean F2 wrote:
> What happened in TN?
http://www.t-g.com/story/1845882.html
> What happened in TN?
Pilot surname is Miller, erroneously reported as Smith.
Frank Whiteley
May 7, 2012, 10:47:30 AM5/7/12
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Frank Whiteley
May 7, 2012, 10:44:09 AM5/7/12
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Jonathon May
May 7, 2012, 11:23:07 AM5/7/12
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been a lot of publicity ,but I do find the endless fatalities upsetting.
Jon
linwoods...@mac.com
May 7, 2012, 2:21:52 PM5/7/12
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BobW
May 7, 2012, 11:40:59 PM5/7/12
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You're not alone in finding 'the endless fatalities upsetting.' If you're like
me - and probably like a whole lot of other gliderpilots - you probably find
the endless *accident* litany upsetting, too, whether minor or major.
There's nothing any of us can do about past accidents, but I submit there
*ARE* things each of us can (and should) do to help prevent future ones.
Risking upsetting some readers by using the most recent USA accident of which
I'm aware as a discussional point of departure...
http://www.t-g.com/story/1845882.html
...I give the crashed glider's co-owner credit for positing what he thought
might have gone wrong. If we assume the quotes are accurate as reported, and
further assume the observations in them are accurate, this 'immediately'
becomes a pilot-induced (and therefore quite preventable) accident. In any
event, this particular pilot is luckier than most in that he at least gets the
chance of a 'do-over' should he decide to continue with the sport. Most pilots
in the pattern-stall-spin scenario die.
Here's my point about what this pilot could (should?) have done differently
had he ever vaguely suspected beforehand that he might one day set him up for
a low, slow pattern (and thus heighten his chances for a whole host of
possibilities associated with an inadvertent stall-spin to insinuate
themselves into his pattern)...
1) Don't do it!!! (Don't make a low pattern entry.)
2) Don't do it!!! (Don't lower your pattern speeds; if anything increase 'em.)
3) Work extra hard on your coordination!!!
4) Never - EVER - depart controlled flight in the pattern.
All 'Duh!' stuff, right? Except people continue to make these sorts of
depressing (to everyone), easily preventable errors. I submit that if pilots
really and truly thought beforehand (and here I mean while sipping a beer on
the patio, not just as they're sinking inexorably toward a
low-pattern-entry-point) they might just possibly some day crash their
sailplane in a particular way (e.g. departure from controlled flight in the
pattern), then they might work that much harder to NOT do precisely that.
Where pilots 'need to be' when it comes to predictable, 'stupid pilot tricks',
is in the place where the Navy pilot was when he responded to an ignorant
reporter's amazed question/statement after he ejected during a low-energy
catapult shot. The question/statement was to the effect: "Wow! How amazing you
could make that sort of decision so quickly!" The response was: "That was a
decision made long ago."
I submit that many (most?) 'stupid pilot tricks' come about precisely because
Joe Pilot - for whatever reason(s)...ignorance, mis-placed superhero attitude,
whatever - has NOT pre-decided to 'actively work' to avoid them.
Is this a harsh view? If anyone thinks so, then it is. But it's the view I've
long had in my own flying, and (so far) it has worked for me. I can honestly
say I've never had an insurance claim resulting from one of my own 'stupid
pilot tricks.' Knock on wood...
As the co-owner of the TN glider now knows too well, sometimes it's not always
'some other guy' (whom you don't know) who has the accident. Pilots who crash
are from our little, highly interconnected community. If you think it's
upsetting when strangers crash (even from 'chance' or from some previously
undetectable airframe defect), it's an order of magnitude worse when it's
someone you know...or worst yet, yourself.
Flying inherently contains sufficient kinetic energy that to indulge in it
without *actively* respecting the twin facts: a) gravity never quits, and b)
Mother Nature doesn't care *what* Joe Pilot's experience is, is setting
oneself up for higher chances of committing a stupid pilot trick.
Respectfully,
Bob W.
P.S. Earlier this year there was a fatal private charter approach crash in
western CO. Some survived, but not the 70,000+ hour pilot (not a
typo!)/(active-)glider pilot. They hit the ground, apparently under control,
apparently in a localized snow shower, in daylight, at an airport not
constricted by nearby mountains. Why? I don't know, but you'll have to look a
ways to find a more experienced pilot dying at the controls. Mother Nature and
physics are a relentless, powerful combination demanding ceaseless respect
from all pilots. To presume every pilot who pulls a 'stupid pilot trick'
suffered (for example) medical incapacitation would be an example of
ostrichian thinking in my view, maybe even denial. Compared to light twins
(the plane in this particular accident), gliders are simple airplanes, flown
entirely (in the USA) in VFR conditions. The NTSB database (and personal
observation) strongly suggests (to me, anyway) the loosest nut in the whole
glider is likely to be the one holding the top of the stick.
Jordan Pollock
May 8, 2012, 8:07:18 PM5/8/12
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individuals in question...until it's your home field and your own club
members. My only suggestion is we all keep it in our minds who reads
these boards, and how silly we can look playing armchair quarterback,
when we don't even have the playbook.
Jordan
ASW20 E
Ramy
May 8, 2012, 11:37:39 PM5/8/12
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Unfortunately we have to speculate to learn lessons since there is one thing in common across almost all accidents whether they are fatal or not - those who knows the details, including the clubs and pilots involved, almost never share the details. The recent bailout was a welcome change. NTSB reports are usually useless.
Luckily the pilot involved in the stall/spin incident survived so am looking forward to read his timely report. It will be extremely valuable to learn from someone who survived a low altitude stall/spin what went wrong and how.
Ramy
Luckily the pilot involved in the stall/spin incident survived so am looking forward to read his timely report. It will be extremely valuable to learn from someone who survived a low altitude stall/spin what went wrong and how.
Ramy
Frank Whiteley
May 9, 2012, 1:13:12 AM5/9/12
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Frank W
pfb
May 9, 2012, 7:52:21 AM5/9/12
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Evan Ludeman
May 9, 2012, 7:23:53 AM5/9/12
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On May 8, 11:37 pm, Ramy <ryan...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> It will be extremely valuable to learn from someone who survived a low altitude stall/spin what went wrong and how.
>
> Ramy
Perhaps, but I doubt it.
> It will be extremely valuable to learn from someone who survived a low altitude stall/spin what went wrong and how.
>
> Ramy
Trying to fly a full pattern with 1/3 the energy required to do it
safely (which is what I understand happened here) is going to lead to
problems and we've known that as a community for rather longer than
most of us have been alive. Sadly, people do this every season
despite considerable effort invested by instructors and writers of
safety articles, books and other media. I've watched this accident
scenario develop personally, from the ground, three times in last four
years. Two pilots got away with it (barely, visibly shaken
afterward), one stalled turning final and walked away from his broken
glider with a bad back. In all three cases that I observed, there was
3000' + of available, easily reachable runway (going the other
direction) that the pilot *never* considered using.
It appears that, in general, these guys seem to have understood that
their plan was failing, or at best scary marginal. Under stress, it
seems to be difficult for some people to change plans, even when a
really excellent, completely safe, no downside scenario is literally
right in front of them.
Primary rule for planning: "If your plan isn't working, you need a
new plan."
-Evan Ludeman / T8
Papa3
May 9, 2012, 10:22:15 AM5/9/12
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Ramy
May 9, 2012, 12:17:53 PM5/9/12
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Both are classic examples of tunnel vision we all may develope under stress. I'll go as far as claim that tunnel vision is one of the leading cause of accidents. I am sure most of us can identify a time they got tunnel vision due to stress and did not consider a better alternative even if there was no bad outcome. This is precisely why we need to speculate and learn from accidents so we can identify the problems and perhaps find a solution.
Ramy
Ramy
ppc...@charter.net
May 9, 2012, 1:25:37 PM5/9/12
to
On Wednesday, May 9, 2012 11:17:53 AM UTC-5, Ramy wrote:
> Both are classic examples of tunnel vision we all may develope under stress. I'll go as far as claim that tunnel vision is one of the leading cause of accidents. I am sure most of us can identify a time they got tunnel vision due to stress and did not consider a better alternative even if there was no bad outcome. This is precisely why we need to speculate and learn from accidents so we can identify the problems and perhaps find a solution.
>
> Ramy
Tunnel Vision is really an adrenaline dump. The individual suddenly realizes they are in trouble and the body dumps adrenaline into the bloodstream as a natural response. Tunnel vision, an inability to think or solve problems and blood moving to the internal organs are some of the results. I talked to the head of the psychiatric unit of the Houston Police Department about this and he enlightened me: the police know all about it and train their officers accordingly. We pilots refuse to acknowledge that we are susceptible and pay the price. The accepted practice in police departments when in a high speed chase or similar situation is to breath in and out on the slow count of four. This seems to abate or counter the effect of the adrenaline. It is all about the perceived threat. A low time pilot might feel more threatened than a high time pilot in a given situation, but any pilot can have this happen. The pilot will only be able to act on what they have been trained to do in that situation. If all they know is to fly a full pattern, then that is what they will do. The reasoning function can't work, so they can not run through other scenarios and choose the best one. This is why we have the saying, "in an emergency, pilots do not rise to the occasion, they revert to their training".
> Both are classic examples of tunnel vision we all may develope under stress. I'll go as far as claim that tunnel vision is one of the leading cause of accidents. I am sure most of us can identify a time they got tunnel vision due to stress and did not consider a better alternative even if there was no bad outcome. This is precisely why we need to speculate and learn from accidents so we can identify the problems and perhaps find a solution.
>
> Ramy
I have never seen any of this information in any aviation manual. I have asked several prominent SSA members and instructors to research this and publish an article in SOARING. Complete silence. The problem just does not exist according to the powers that be.
Brian Bange
Tony
May 9, 2012, 1:31:07 PM5/9/12
to
> Tunnel Vision is really an adrenaline dump. The individual suddenly realizes they are in trouble and the body dumps adrenaline into the bloodstream as a natural response. Tunnel vision, an inability to think or solve problems and blood moving to the internal organs are some of the results. I talked to the head of the psychiatric unit of the Houston Police Department about this and he enlightened me: the police know all about it and train their officers accordingly. We pilots refuse to acknowledge that we are susceptible and pay the price. The accepted practice in police departments when in a high speed chase or similar situation is to breath in and out on the slow count of four. This seems to abate or counter the effect of the adrenaline. It is all about the perceived threat. A low time pilot might feel more threatened than a high time pilot in a given situation, but any pilot can have this happen. The pilot will only be able to act on what they have been trained to do in that situation. If all they know is to fly a full pattern, then that is what they will do. The reasoning function can't work, so they can not run through other scenarios and choose the best one. This is why we have the saying, "in an emergency, pilots do not rise to the occasion, they revert to their training".
>
> I have never seen any of this information in any aviation manual. I have asked several prominent SSA members and instructors to research this and publish an article in SOARING. Complete silence. The problem just does not exist according to the powers that be.
>
> Brian Bange
It seems that you have researched this at least some, why not write an article? Or, have you suggested this to Dr. Daniel Johnson who writes the Soaring Rx column in Soaring? It sounds like a great subject and I'd be interested to learn more.
>
> I have never seen any of this information in any aviation manual. I have asked several prominent SSA members and instructors to research this and publish an article in SOARING. Complete silence. The problem just does not exist according to the powers that be.
>
> Brian Bange
Bill D
May 9, 2012, 2:32:15 PM5/9/12
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using peripheral vision when danger threatened was a survival skill.
In fact, if "tunnel vision" resulted every time humans felt
threatened, I doubt our species would have survived.
In the age of computers and TV people have actually learned "tunnel
vision" by shutting out anything that isn't directly in front of
them. Peripheral vision is the opposite of "Tunnel vision" - both are
learned skills.
I don't know what "aviation manuals" you've been reading but I have
certainly seen it covered in many of them. In fact, it's pretty basic
stuff. I agree training sometimes overlooks the subject but good
instructors know all about it and work to get their students to form a
habit of using their peripheral vision at all times.
mdfa...@gmail.com
May 9, 2012, 3:37:48 PM5/9/12
to
I am also a police trainer and operating under stress is one of the areas I instruct. One of the main differences between what police train for (and how they train for it)and what pilots train for is the "suddenness" of the incident. Tunnel vision can take place in protracted things such as high speed chases but it is even more evident when the crap hits the fan more or less out of the blue.
Most police shootings are a surprise to the officer. "The first sign you are in a gunfight is that you've already been shot or shot at" is a commonly heard quote. The officer's response is likely to be a reaction, not a reasoned out decision. So we try to train officer to recognize the signs of a potential problem before it becomes one. Sound familiar?. Picking up on things like body language or putting themselves in a good tactical position in the first place (situational awareness). But its not easy. Poor procedures that produce favorable outcomes time and again become ingrained as being "right".
One of the things that happens under life-threatening stress is you lose the ability to speak or even think, in language. It is sometimes called the "jangle effect". This accounts for people, literally, not being able to spit the words out. You've all heard tapes of pilots simply screaming the word "Mayday!" over and over again. Once the "Oh sh*t!" moment has passed and there is time to think, so-called combat breathing can be effective. Simply counting while breathing gets your brain back into the internal speaking mode.
It would seem that many glider accidents are more subtle than sudden. It is the recognition of an impending accident that is the issue. Tunnel vision can be an issue once the pilot realizes that he is in trouble and he fixes on the regular runway to the exclusion of everything else.
The best way to train for stress in to go through it - stress innoculation. We use what could be termed paint balls for this. Officers are put through simulations where they may get shot (it hurts) if they screw up. Pulse rates go up, voices crack, motor skills fall off and tunnel vision/tunnel hearing become major issues. And this is a simulation with no real consequences other than some minor bruising. With repeated exposure, officers get better and better but it is a perishable skill.
Maybe Condor or one of the other sims could be set up so that the flight simply starts with the pilot being low (1000' AGL? or low but already in/near the pattern) but with viable options available. The pilot could even be briefed - "You are in a 40:1 glider x miles from the field at y feet AGL. Winds are 15 from 270. your flight begins in 30 seconds". Maybe include "damage but not death" options. Tree top landings or landing in a less than perfect field vs a stall/spin on that turn to final. Pilots could make the land now/land where vs. stretch-the-glide decision and do it. For that matter, include all kinds of emergencies. Just like the big boys. Spoilers stuck opened or closed, loss of rudder control, sudden obstruction on the runway or anything else you can think of. Setting up scenarios like this is probably easier said than done but since you can't do it for real...
Just saw Bill D's post. Tunnel vision indeed happens when faced with a life threatening event and I believe that its instinctive. It didn't matter to the caveman what was going on in his peripheral vision when the bear was standing right in front of him. We visually lock onto threats. Of course, when in an emergency in an aircraft there usually isn't a single thing that you can see that threatens you (approaching aircraft excepted). Its the whole situation, so what do you stare at? The adrenaline dump and everything that goes with may still go on.
Most police shootings are a surprise to the officer. "The first sign you are in a gunfight is that you've already been shot or shot at" is a commonly heard quote. The officer's response is likely to be a reaction, not a reasoned out decision. So we try to train officer to recognize the signs of a potential problem before it becomes one. Sound familiar?. Picking up on things like body language or putting themselves in a good tactical position in the first place (situational awareness). But its not easy. Poor procedures that produce favorable outcomes time and again become ingrained as being "right".
One of the things that happens under life-threatening stress is you lose the ability to speak or even think, in language. It is sometimes called the "jangle effect". This accounts for people, literally, not being able to spit the words out. You've all heard tapes of pilots simply screaming the word "Mayday!" over and over again. Once the "Oh sh*t!" moment has passed and there is time to think, so-called combat breathing can be effective. Simply counting while breathing gets your brain back into the internal speaking mode.
It would seem that many glider accidents are more subtle than sudden. It is the recognition of an impending accident that is the issue. Tunnel vision can be an issue once the pilot realizes that he is in trouble and he fixes on the regular runway to the exclusion of everything else.
The best way to train for stress in to go through it - stress innoculation. We use what could be termed paint balls for this. Officers are put through simulations where they may get shot (it hurts) if they screw up. Pulse rates go up, voices crack, motor skills fall off and tunnel vision/tunnel hearing become major issues. And this is a simulation with no real consequences other than some minor bruising. With repeated exposure, officers get better and better but it is a perishable skill.
Maybe Condor or one of the other sims could be set up so that the flight simply starts with the pilot being low (1000' AGL? or low but already in/near the pattern) but with viable options available. The pilot could even be briefed - "You are in a 40:1 glider x miles from the field at y feet AGL. Winds are 15 from 270. your flight begins in 30 seconds". Maybe include "damage but not death" options. Tree top landings or landing in a less than perfect field vs a stall/spin on that turn to final. Pilots could make the land now/land where vs. stretch-the-glide decision and do it. For that matter, include all kinds of emergencies. Just like the big boys. Spoilers stuck opened or closed, loss of rudder control, sudden obstruction on the runway or anything else you can think of. Setting up scenarios like this is probably easier said than done but since you can't do it for real...
Just saw Bill D's post. Tunnel vision indeed happens when faced with a life threatening event and I believe that its instinctive. It didn't matter to the caveman what was going on in his peripheral vision when the bear was standing right in front of him. We visually lock onto threats. Of course, when in an emergency in an aircraft there usually isn't a single thing that you can see that threatens you (approaching aircraft excepted). Its the whole situation, so what do you stare at? The adrenaline dump and everything that goes with may still go on.
Bill D
May 9, 2012, 4:15:15 PM5/9/12
to
On May 9, 1:37 pm, mdfad...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> It would seem that many glider accidents are more subtle than sudden. It is the recognition of an impending accident that is the issue. Tunnel vision can be an issue once the pilot realizes that he is in trouble and he fixes on the regular runway to the exclusion of everything else.
>
> The best way to train for stress in to go through it - stress innoculation.
>
>
>
> It would seem that many glider accidents are more subtle than sudden. It is the recognition of an impending accident that is the issue. Tunnel vision can be an issue once the pilot realizes that he is in trouble and he fixes on the regular runway to the exclusion of everything else.
>
> The best way to train for stress in to go through it - stress innoculation.
>
> Maybe Condor or one of the other sims could be set up so that the flight simply starts with the pilot being low (1000' AGL? or low but already in/near the pattern) but with viable options available. The pilot could even be briefed - "You are in a 40:1 glider x miles from the field at y feet AGL. Winds are 15 from 270. your flight begins in 30 seconds". Maybe include "damage but not death" options. Tree top landings or landing in a less than perfect field vs a stall/spin on that turn to final. Pilots could make the land now/land where vs. stretch-the-glide decision and do it. For that matter, include all kinds of emergencies. Just like the big boys. Spoilers stuck opened or closed, loss of rudder control, sudden obstruction on the runway or anything else you can think of. Setting up scenarios like this is probably easier said than done but since you can't do it for real...
>
> Just saw Bill D's post. Tunnel vision indeed happens when faced with a life threatening event and I believe that its instinctive. It didn't matter to the caveman what was going on in his peripheral vision when the bear was standing right in front of him. We visually lock onto threats. Of course, when in an emergency in an aircraft there usually isn't a single thing that you can see that threatens you (approaching aircraft excepted). Its the whole situation, so what do you stare at? The adrenaline dump and everything that goes with may still go on.
I agree glider threats are more subtle than sudden. I don't think the
>
> Just saw Bill D's post. Tunnel vision indeed happens when faced with a life threatening event and I believe that its instinctive. It didn't matter to the caveman what was going on in his peripheral vision when the bear was standing right in front of him. We visually lock onto threats. Of course, when in an emergency in an aircraft there usually isn't a single thing that you can see that threatens you (approaching aircraft excepted). Its the whole situation, so what do you stare at? The adrenaline dump and everything that goes with may still go on.
sort of threats faced by glider pilots have much in common with police
tactics.
It's difficult to say what is instinctive given the fact that we all
grew up immersed in a culture dominated by TV, movies and computers.
All of these present 'threats' directly in front of us. We've learned
to stare at them. However, we can learn to use peripheral vision to
see threats coming at us from all directions.
Gilbert Smith
May 9, 2012, 6:23:38 PM5/9/12
to
the ground has survived, whereas the pilot who stopped the spin did
not. (I am not talking of a marginal difference in outcome here).
Maybe if you are too low to recover from the ensuing dive it is better
to hold the spin.
Chris Nicholas
May 9, 2012, 6:55:55 PM5/9/12
to
I suspect that this is because the spin recovery involves more nose down
than when in the spin, and higher forward speed when the recovery starts to
bite, so a greater vertical component. In addition, hitting the ground
spinning often (if not always) means that the wing that hits first absorbs
some energy.
This is anecdotal and not a representative survey perhaps, but I have known
at least two people in my club who survived low level spins without
recovery and none who were fatally injured thus.
I have known at least one who died having initiated recovery from a spin,
and none who survived when hitting the ground in the recovery.
Better still, of course, is not to spin low down. Fly it all the way to the
crash if short of energy.
Chris N.
At 22:23 09 May 2012, Gilbert Smith wrote:
>pfb wrote:
than when in the spin, and higher forward speed when the recovery starts to
bite, so a greater vertical component. In addition, hitting the ground
spinning often (if not always) means that the wing that hits first absorbs
some energy.
This is anecdotal and not a representative survey perhaps, but I have known
at least two people in my club who survived low level spins without
recovery and none who were fatally injured thus.
I have known at least one who died having initiated recovery from a spin,
and none who survived when hitting the ground in the recovery.
Better still, of course, is not to spin low down. Fly it all the way to the
crash if short of energy.
Chris N.
At 22:23 09 May 2012, Gilbert Smith wrote:
>pfb wrote:
Bill D
May 9, 2012, 7:15:17 PM5/9/12
to
receiving injuries but surviving. It was a true unrecoverable spin
due to an aft CG.
I have a theory that most fatal "spin-in's" only started as incipient
spin departures which then transitioned into spiral dives before
impact due to the glider's natural resistance to sustained spinning.
We instructors may have made things worse by drilling spin recovery
techniques into students without first making sure they can tell the
difference between spins and spiral dives. Applying spin recovery
controls when in an otherwise recoverable low level spiral dive makes
a survivable situation into a fatal one.
ppc...@charter.net
May 9, 2012, 7:26:34 PM5/9/12
to
>
> I agree glider threats are more subtle than sudden. I don't think the
> sort of threats faced by glider pilots have much in common with police
> tactics.
>
> It's difficult to say what is instinctive given the fact that we all
> grew up immersed in a culture dominated by TV, movies and computers.
> All of these present 'threats' directly in front of us. We've learned
> to stare at them. However, we can learn to use peripheral vision to
> see threats coming at us from all directions.
Ramy
May 9, 2012, 7:54:22 PM5/9/12
to
Lots of extremely valuable information here. I hope you will share it with wider audience in the form of articles and maybe it will even make it to instruction books. I can't count how many articles I read about the risk of dehydration, not using enough oxygen, mental and physical state and other medical conditions, but none about tunnel vision. I believe tunnel vision is much more common and more serious than the rest. And just to clarify, we are not talking about an actual tunnel vision of seeing only what is in front of you, but a mental tunnel vision just as explained in those posts.
Ramy
Ramy
CLewis95
May 9, 2012, 8:59:23 PM5/9/12
to
>
> We instructors may have made things worse by drilling spin recovery
> techniques into students without first making sure they can tell the
> difference between spins and spiral dives. Applying spin recovery
> controls when in an otherwise recoverable low level spiral dive makes
> a survivable situation into a fatal one.
Bill D .. I agree with this 100%! .. and will add that we need to let students experience the transition from spin to spiral dive as part of recognizing the difference and responding accordingly.
> We instructors may have made things worse by drilling spin recovery
> techniques into students without first making sure they can tell the
> difference between spins and spiral dives. Applying spin recovery
> controls when in an otherwise recoverable low level spiral dive makes
> a survivable situation into a fatal one.
Curt - 95
Genesis 2
Bill D
May 9, 2012, 9:19:47 PM5/9/12
to
On May 9, 5:26 pm, ppc...@charter.net wrote:
> > I agree glider threats are more subtle than sudden. I don't think the
> > sort of threats faced by glider pilots have much in common with police
> > tactics.
>
> > It's difficult to say what is instinctive given the fact that we all
> > grew up immersed in a culture dominated by TV, movies and computers.
> > All of these present 'threats' directly in front of us. We've learned
> > to stare at them. However, we can learn to use peripheral vision to
> > see threats coming at us from all directions.
>
> Bill, IMHO, you are not only wrong, you are dead wrong. Pun intended ;-) You cannot learn to use peripheral vision while in an adrenaline dump.
I detect a subject shift here. The original subject, as I understood
> > I agree glider threats are more subtle than sudden. I don't think the
> > sort of threats faced by glider pilots have much in common with police
> > tactics.
>
> > It's difficult to say what is instinctive given the fact that we all
> > grew up immersed in a culture dominated by TV, movies and computers.
> > All of these present 'threats' directly in front of us. We've learned
> > to stare at them. However, we can learn to use peripheral vision to
> > see threats coming at us from all directions.
>
> Bill, IMHO, you are not only wrong, you are dead wrong. Pun intended ;-) You cannot learn to use peripheral vision while in an adrenaline dump.
it, was tunnel vision in a crisis. "Adrenaline dump" is quite
another. If a person can't control their emotions to the extent an
"adrenaline dump" makes them unable to function every time something
goes wrong, they probably shouldn't be a pilot on medical grounds.
That IS the subject for an article.
I also detect yet another attempt to shift responsibility for
accidents onto something we can't control thus allowing accident
pilots to claim to be a "victim" of their own physiology instead of
accepting responsibility for their actions. Somewhat like martial
arts practitioners, we as pilots must learn to control our emotional
response to danger so we can act to avoid it.
Given a degree of emotional control, and absent an "adrenaline dump",
people can certainly learn to use peripheral vision in a crisis or
otherwise.
Walt Connelly
May 9, 2012, 5:53:24 PM5/9/12
to
Glad the guy in Tennessee survived and perhaps as previously stated we
can learn something from him when he recovers and responds. I remember
getting off tow in 800 FPM of sink (3000 foot tow) and intuitively knew
not to stray too far from the airport. In about 3 minutes I found
myself at pattern altitude at the IP, downwind, descending as if I had
the spoilers deployed. I maintained good airspeed, turned a close base
and final and didn't deploy the spoilers until I was right over the end
of the runway. Never experienced a gravity storm like that before,
haven't experienced one since. Bottom line is that sometimes things
happen and while they are not completely beyond our control, they can be
difficult to overcome. I was lucky considering my lack of experience at
the time. Experience is the great teacher, one can only hope to live
long enough and fly long enough to gain a level of experience that will
keep us out of trouble. What I have learned thus far is that low and
slow in the pattern is not good.
Walt
--
Walt Connelly
bumper
May 9, 2012, 11:34:36 PM5/9/12
to
There's something else that often happens along with "tunnel vision",
which I assume in this case is continuing with Plan-A even though it
is clearly not working.That "something" I often saw investigating
traffic accidents involving loss of control . . . the driver becomes a
passenger and is essentially just "along for the ride". Sometimes it
would only take getting off the brakes (this was before ABS) and
simply steering to avoid the accident. Seems that when they realize
the situation is deteriorating rapidly, they sort of lock up.
At least in gliders we can't assume the fetal position and crawl under
the panel.
bumper
which I assume in this case is continuing with Plan-A even though it
is clearly not working.That "something" I often saw investigating
traffic accidents involving loss of control . . . the driver becomes a
passenger and is essentially just "along for the ride". Sometimes it
would only take getting off the brakes (this was before ABS) and
simply steering to avoid the accident. Seems that when they realize
the situation is deteriorating rapidly, they sort of lock up.
At least in gliders we can't assume the fetal position and crawl under
the panel.
bumper
Bill D
May 10, 2012, 9:45:42 AM5/10/12
to
On May 9, 3:53 pm, Walt Connelly <Walt.Connelly.
Heavy sink in the pattern is SOP for mountain flying. I try hard to
get pilots to keep the vario in their scan while in the pattern.
Sounds like you did.
Sometimes it works the other way. I rode around a pattern with a
student who didn't notice the vario was pegged up! We entered the
pattern at 800' AGL but when he rolled out on final he was 2000' AGL
where he finally decided the pattern wasn't going to work. I told him
to glide back to the IP and start over. After that, he kept the vario
in his scan.
It seems every year someone (or several someones) wind up landing
short. Often it's an airplane pilot with a glider "add-on" who is
subconsciously treating spoilers like 'set and forget' flaps on a
Cessna - and then flying a Cessna pattern. I've had to take the
controls many times in this situation.
get pilots to keep the vario in their scan while in the pattern.
Sounds like you did.
Sometimes it works the other way. I rode around a pattern with a
student who didn't notice the vario was pegged up! We entered the
pattern at 800' AGL but when he rolled out on final he was 2000' AGL
where he finally decided the pattern wasn't going to work. I told him
to glide back to the IP and start over. After that, he kept the vario
in his scan.
It seems every year someone (or several someones) wind up landing
short. Often it's an airplane pilot with a glider "add-on" who is
subconsciously treating spoilers like 'set and forget' flaps on a
Cessna - and then flying a Cessna pattern. I've had to take the
controls many times in this situation.
Gilbert Smith
May 10, 2012, 10:14:17 AM5/10/12
to
experienced enough to make this call will most likely not get into the
situation in the first place.
My CFI's response was the same as yours - keep the glider flying no
matter what lies ahead.
Gilbert.
Don Johnstone
May 10, 2012, 5:39:34 PM5/10/12
to
At 22:55 09 May 2012, Chris Nicholas wrote:
>I suspect that this is because the spin recovery involves more nose down
>than when in the spin, and higher forward speed when the recovery starts
to
>bite, so a greater vertical component. In addition, hitting the ground
>spinning often (if not always) means that the wing that hits first
absorbs
>some energy.
>
>This is anecdotal and not a representative survey perhaps, but I have
known
>at least two people in my club who survived low level spins without
>recovery and none who were fatally injured thus.
>
>I have known at least one who died having initiated recovery from a spin,
>and none who survived when hitting the ground in the recovery.
>
>Better still, of course, is not to spin low down. Fly it all the way to
the
>crash if short of energy.
>
>Chris N.
>
>
There is absolutely no doubt that the chances of survival are greater if
>I suspect that this is because the spin recovery involves more nose down
>than when in the spin, and higher forward speed when the recovery starts
to
>bite, so a greater vertical component. In addition, hitting the ground
>spinning often (if not always) means that the wing that hits first
absorbs
>some energy.
>
>This is anecdotal and not a representative survey perhaps, but I have
known
>at least two people in my club who survived low level spins without
>recovery and none who were fatally injured thus.
>
>I have known at least one who died having initiated recovery from a spin,
>and none who survived when hitting the ground in the recovery.
>
>Better still, of course, is not to spin low down. Fly it all the way to
the
>crash if short of energy.
>
>Chris N.
>
>
the aircraft hits the ground in a full spin rather than a partially
recovered one. This is is why I have always said that teaching spin
recovery will do nothig to save one from harm in the most common spins,
final turns and launch failures. Teaching people to recognise and recover
BEFORE the spin occurs is much more valuable and will save you.
Ramy
May 10, 2012, 8:20:35 PM5/10/12
to
Ramy
BobW
May 10, 2012, 8:31:05 PM5/10/12
to
especially fundamental aspects of our sport. Using ground contact as an example...
If you're going to hit the ground, hit it as horizontally as possible. Under
control is nice, too, but - if survival is high on Joe Pilot's wish list -
being under control is more of an option than the verticality of ground
contact is.
Bob - Duh :-) - W.
T
May 10, 2012, 8:46:31 PM5/10/12
to
On May 7, 7:44 am, Frank Whiteley <frank.white...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Monday, May 7, 2012 7:06:22 AM UTC-6, Sean F2 wrote:
> > What happened in TN?
>
> http://www.t-g.com/story/1845882.html
I've read the newspaper accounts and saw the pictures.. scary.
> On Monday, May 7, 2012 7:06:22 AM UTC-6, Sean F2 wrote:
> > What happened in TN?
>
> http://www.t-g.com/story/1845882.html
I also tried to research for a club in the area, but nothing shows up
on the SSA Where to Fly pages. The two TN clubs that do show are far
away.
Is there an SSA club there? Looks like a nice place to retire at.
T
Ramy
May 10, 2012, 9:33:36 PM5/10/12
to
Easy said than done though.
Ramy
Ramy
May 16, 2012, 11:13:09 PM5/16/12
to
On Sunday, May 6, 2012 3:49:29 PM UTC-7, fred....@gmail.com wrote:
> The way I read it (and there are conflicting reports) the two-place glider, with one instructor and another pilot (both Air France pilots) on board, was in the process of taking an auto launch when it collided with a Pawnee returning from a tow. Altitude is given as 200 meters but one commenter thinks they might have confused feet with meters, which sounds plausible. The Pawnee pilot and both glider pilots were killed. The Pawnee had collision avoidance equipment (FLARM) but the glider did not. Fred
Any new info on this tragic accident in France which claimed 3 lives? In particular, will be helpful to get a confirmation on the Flarm situation, and if radios were used.
Ramy
> The way I read it (and there are conflicting reports) the two-place glider, with one instructor and another pilot (both Air France pilots) on board, was in the process of taking an auto launch when it collided with a Pawnee returning from a tow. Altitude is given as 200 meters but one commenter thinks they might have confused feet with meters, which sounds plausible. The Pawnee pilot and both glider pilots were killed. The Pawnee had collision avoidance equipment (FLARM) but the glider did not. Fred
Any new info on this tragic accident in France which claimed 3 lives? In particular, will be helpful to get a confirmation on the Flarm situation, and if radios were used.
Ramy
Gilbert Smith
May 17, 2012, 11:36:45 AM5/17/12
to
Ramy
May 17, 2012, 6:56:37 PM5/17/12
to
Ramy
Martin Gregorie
May 18, 2012, 6:02:04 PM5/18/12
to
On Wed, 09 May 2012 07:22:15 -0700, Papa3 wrote:
> He chose to believe that the altimeter was
> right despite what his eyes must have been telling him.
>
That sounds odd to me: here in the UK I was taught that, although you
might use the altimeter before high key and that you *never* use local
landmarks for high key or to indicate where the base leg is. Instead, you
fly the circuit using angles and distances relative to your chosen touch-
down point and how that looks on this flight.
There's a good reason for this: if you're landing out you won't have any
landmarks and the altimeter will be lying because you won't know the
field height or (possibly) the pressure setting. IOW from when I first
started to fly landings I was taught to treat each one as a potential
field landing.
--
martin@ | Martin Gregorie
gregorie. | Essex, UK
org |
> He chose to believe that the altimeter was
> right despite what his eyes must have been telling him.
>
That sounds odd to me: here in the UK I was taught that, although you
might use the altimeter before high key and that you *never* use local
landmarks for high key or to indicate where the base leg is. Instead, you
fly the circuit using angles and distances relative to your chosen touch-
down point and how that looks on this flight.
There's a good reason for this: if you're landing out you won't have any
landmarks and the altimeter will be lying because you won't know the
field height or (possibly) the pressure setting. IOW from when I first
started to fly landings I was taught to treat each one as a potential
field landing.
--
martin@ | Martin Gregorie
gregorie. | Essex, UK
org |
Martin Gregorie
May 18, 2012, 6:19:24 PM5/18/12
to
On Thu, 10 May 2012 17:20:35 -0700, Ramy wrote:
> I never look at the vario (or altimeter) in the pattern. The only
> instrument you need to scan is the ASI. You should easily recognize
> strong sink or lift in the pattern without the vario. In fact, you
> shouldn't think in terms of sink or lift, but in terms of your angle
> relative to your planned touch down. If your angle getting too low
> faster than you expect - close spoilers or abbreviate the pattern, if it
> is increasing than open spoilers, extend the pattern or put it in a
> slip.
>
Spot on.
> I never look at the vario (or altimeter) in the pattern. The only
> instrument you need to scan is the ASI. You should easily recognize
> strong sink or lift in the pattern without the vario. In fact, you
> shouldn't think in terms of sink or lift, but in terms of your angle
> relative to your planned touch down. If your angle getting too low
> faster than you expect - close spoilers or abbreviate the pattern, if it
> is increasing than open spoilers, extend the pattern or put it in a
> slip.
>
The business of treating the airbrakes like flaps also strikes me as dead
wrong / bad instruction. Flaps is flaps, but the airbrakes/spoilers
aren't flaps, don't have the same effect, and shouldn't be used that way.
Rather, they should be used to control the glide slope in exactly the
same way as a power pilot (which I'm not) uses the throttle. I really
question whether an instructor who lets a student use them like flaps
should keep his rating.
Bob Whelan
May 18, 2012, 9:32:45 PM5/18/12
to
On 5/18/2012 4:19 PM, Martin Gregorie wrote:
<Snip...>
From the perspective of someone with far more time in
large-deflection-landing-flap-equipped sailplanes than spoilered ones, I'm
uncertain what you mean by the phrase, "...treating airbrakes like flaps..."
What's below makes perfectly good sense (and is sensible) to me.
Could you elaborate on the 'airbrakes like flaps' phraseology, please? Thanks!
Bob W.
<Snip...>
>
> The business of treating the airbrakes like flaps also strikes me as dead
> wrong / bad instruction.
Martin,
> The business of treating the airbrakes like flaps also strikes me as dead
> wrong / bad instruction.
From the perspective of someone with far more time in
large-deflection-landing-flap-equipped sailplanes than spoilered ones, I'm
uncertain what you mean by the phrase, "...treating airbrakes like flaps..."
What's below makes perfectly good sense (and is sensible) to me.
Could you elaborate on the 'airbrakes like flaps' phraseology, please? Thanks!
Bob W.
Martin Gregorie
May 19, 2012, 9:17:41 AM5/19/12
to
On Fri, 18 May 2012 19:32:45 -0600, Bob Whelan wrote:
> Could you elaborate on the 'airbrakes like flaps' phraseology, please?
> Thanks!
>
I was referring to Bill D's previous comment "Often it's an airplane
> Could you elaborate on the 'airbrakes like flaps' phraseology, please?
> Thanks!
>
pilot with a glider 'add-on' who is subconsciously
treating spoilers like 'set and forget' flaps on a Cessna - and then
flying a Cessna pattern."
I agree that you do exactly this with the flaps on a flapped glider but
treating spoilers like 'set and forget' flaps on a Cessna - and then
flying a Cessna pattern."
should not use the airbrakes that way: they are for glide slope
adjustment.
BobW
May 19, 2012, 2:01:09 PM5/19/12
to
On 5/19/2012 7:17 AM, Martin Gregorie wrote:
> On Fri, 18 May 2012 19:32:45 -0600, Bob Whelan wrote:
>
>> Could you elaborate on the 'airbrakes like flaps' phraseology, please?
>> Thanks!
>>
> I was referring to Bill D's previous comment "Often it's an airplane
> pilot with a glider 'add-on' who is subconsciously
> treating spoilers like 'set and forget' flaps on a Cessna - and then
> flying a Cessna pattern."
>
> I agree that you do exactly this with the flaps on a flapped glider but
> should not use the airbrakes that way: they are for glide slope
> adjustment.
>
>
Ah, so. I didn't pick up on that comment, and not being an instructor have
> On Fri, 18 May 2012 19:32:45 -0600, Bob Whelan wrote:
>
>> Could you elaborate on the 'airbrakes like flaps' phraseology, please?
>> Thanks!
>>
> I was referring to Bill D's previous comment "Often it's an airplane
> pilot with a glider 'add-on' who is subconsciously
> treating spoilers like 'set and forget' flaps on a Cessna - and then
> flying a Cessna pattern."
>
> I agree that you do exactly this with the flaps on a flapped glider but
> should not use the airbrakes that way: they are for glide slope
> adjustment.
>
>
never experienced that sort of behavior. If it happens, it must be possible,
but I'd sure hope any glider instructor ever minted (since ca. 1970, anyway)
would quickly suss out this sort of incorrect ignorance...and instruct away!
If you'll excuse the anality, I'll note the "hidden assumption" required to
make your 2nd para above completely accurate (for readers who may be
incompletely informed on glider flap capabilities and use). Hidden assumption:
Martin's statement applies *only* to camber-changing flaps, and NOT to
large-deflection landing flaps. These latter tend to be most common in the USA.
Many gliders have both camber-changing flaps (which for landing patterns
should be set to their maximum [smallish] deflection to obtain maximum
reduction of stalling speed) AND airbrakes/spoilers (their primary glidepath
control devices, and which should definitely NOT be "set and forget" devices
[maybe unless one is landing in a perfect calm...]).
Gliders which have ONLY large-deflection landing flaps for glidepath control
are another kettle of fish...as most regular RAS readers are aware. Curious
readers can search for threads with "flaps" or "V-tailed" for earlier
discussions of large-deflection landing flap characteristics...
Bob W.
Martin Gregorie
May 19, 2012, 4:11:42 PM5/19/12
to
On Sat, 19 May 2012 12:01:09 -0600, BobW wrote:
> If you'll excuse the anality, I'll note the "hidden assumption" required
> to make your 2nd para above completely accurate (for readers who may be
> incompletely informed on glider flap capabilities and use). Hidden
> assumption: Martin's statement applies *only* to camber-changing flaps,
> and NOT to large-deflection landing flaps. These latter tend to be most
> common in the USA.
>
You're right: I should have spotted that.
> If you'll excuse the anality, I'll note the "hidden assumption" required
> to make your 2nd para above completely accurate (for readers who may be
> incompletely informed on glider flap capabilities and use). Hidden
> assumption: Martin's statement applies *only* to camber-changing flaps,
> and NOT to large-deflection landing flaps. These latter tend to be most
> common in the USA.
>
> Many gliders have both camber-changing flaps (which for landing patterns
> should be set to their maximum [smallish] deflection to obtain maximum
> reduction of stalling speed) AND airbrakes/spoilers (their primary
> glidepath control devices, and which should definitely NOT be "set and
> forget" devices [maybe unless one is landing in a perfect calm...]).
>
a pair of Kestrel 19s, a Mosquito and a Mini-Nimbus. All use moderate
flap deflection on landing combined with a raised flap LE for added drag.
I haven't flown any of these types. The nearest I've come was an early
ASW-20 which, of course, has both large-deflection flaps and airbrakes.
Terence Wilson
May 19, 2012, 5:10:24 PM5/19/12
to
> I have never seen any of this information in any aviation manual. I have asked several prominent SSA members and instructors to research this and publish an article in SOARING. Complete silence. The problem just does not exist according to the powers that be.
>
> Brian Bange
Tunnel Vision referred to as "fixation" in books dealing with CRM (Crew Resource Management):
"Fixation on a single objective or nonperforming strategy: Fixation is common when there are multiple distractions. One method humans use to improve performance is to consciously block out things that are not directly tied to our primary objective."
My recollection is that it is covered in the FAA books (but perhaps not glider), but I couldn't give you a precise citation.
Good discussion.
Terence
On Wednesday, May 9, 2012 10:25:37 AM UTC-7, ppc...@charter.net wrote:
> On Wednesday, May 9, 2012 11:17:53 AM UTC-5, Ramy wrote:
> > Both are classic examples of tunnel vision we all may develope under stress. I'll go as far as claim that tunnel vision is one of the leading cause of accidents. I am sure most of us can identify a time they got tunnel vision due to stress and did not consider a better alternative even if there was no bad outcome. This is precisely why we need to speculate and learn from accidents so we can identify the problems and perhaps find a solution.
> >
> > Ramy
>
> Tunnel Vision is really an adrenaline dump. The individual suddenly realizes they are in trouble and the body dumps adrenaline into the bloodstream as a natural response. Tunnel vision, an inability to think or solve problems and blood moving to the internal organs are some of the results. I talked to the head of the psychiatric unit of the Houston Police Department about this and he enlightened me: the police know all about it and train their officers accordingly. We pilots refuse to acknowledge that we are susceptible and pay the price. The accepted practice in police departments when in a high speed chase or similar situation is to breath in and out on the slow count of four. This seems to abate or counter the effect of the adrenaline. It is all about the perceived threat. A low time pilot might feel more threatened than a high time pilot in a given situation, but any pilot can have this happen. The pilot will only be able to act on what they have been trained to do in that situation. If all they know is to fly a full pattern, then that is what they will do. The reasoning function can't work, so they can not run through other scenarios and choose the best one. This is why we have the saying, "in an emergency, pilots do not rise to the occasion, they revert to their training".
>
> I have never seen any of this information in any aviation manual. I have asked several prominent SSA members and instructors to research this and publish an article in SOARING. Complete silence. The problem just does not exist according to the powers that be.
>
> Brian Bange
On Wednesday, May 9, 2012 10:25:37 AM UTC-7, ppc...@charter.net wrote:
> On Wednesday, May 9, 2012 11:17:53 AM UTC-5, Ramy wrote:
> > Both are classic examples of tunnel vision we all may develope under stress. I'll go as far as claim that tunnel vision is one of the leading cause of accidents. I am sure most of us can identify a time they got tunnel vision due to stress and did not consider a better alternative even if there was no bad outcome. This is precisely why we need to speculate and learn from accidents so we can identify the problems and perhaps find a solution.
> >
> > Ramy
>
> Tunnel Vision is really an adrenaline dump. The individual suddenly realizes they are in trouble and the body dumps adrenaline into the bloodstream as a natural response. Tunnel vision, an inability to think or solve problems and blood moving to the internal organs are some of the results. I talked to the head of the psychiatric unit of the Houston Police Department about this and he enlightened me: the police know all about it and train their officers accordingly. We pilots refuse to acknowledge that we are susceptible and pay the price. The accepted practice in police departments when in a high speed chase or similar situation is to breath in and out on the slow count of four. This seems to abate or counter the effect of the adrenaline. It is all about the perceived threat. A low time pilot might feel more threatened than a high time pilot in a given situation, but any pilot can have this happen. The pilot will only be able to act on what they have been trained to do in that situation. If all they know is to fly a full pattern, then that is what they will do. The reasoning function can't work, so they can not run through other scenarios and choose the best one. This is why we have the saying, "in an emergency, pilots do not rise to the occasion, they revert to their training".
>
> I have never seen any of this information in any aviation manual. I have asked several prominent SSA members and instructors to research this and publish an article in SOARING. Complete silence. The problem just does not exist according to the powers that be.
>
> Brian Bange
>
> Brian Bange
Tunnel Vision referred to as "fixation" in books dealing with CRM (Crew Resource Management):
"Fixation on a single objective or nonperforming strategy: Fixation is common when there are multiple distractions. One method humans use to improve performance is to consciously block out things that are not directly tied to our primary objective."
My recollection is that it is covered in the FAA books (but perhaps not glider), but I couldn't give you a precise citation.
Good discussion.
Terence
On Wednesday, May 9, 2012 10:25:37 AM UTC-7, ppc...@charter.net wrote:
> On Wednesday, May 9, 2012 11:17:53 AM UTC-5, Ramy wrote:
> > Both are classic examples of tunnel vision we all may develope under stress. I'll go as far as claim that tunnel vision is one of the leading cause of accidents. I am sure most of us can identify a time they got tunnel vision due to stress and did not consider a better alternative even if there was no bad outcome. This is precisely why we need to speculate and learn from accidents so we can identify the problems and perhaps find a solution.
> >
> > Ramy
>
> Tunnel Vision is really an adrenaline dump. The individual suddenly realizes they are in trouble and the body dumps adrenaline into the bloodstream as a natural response. Tunnel vision, an inability to think or solve problems and blood moving to the internal organs are some of the results. I talked to the head of the psychiatric unit of the Houston Police Department about this and he enlightened me: the police know all about it and train their officers accordingly. We pilots refuse to acknowledge that we are susceptible and pay the price. The accepted practice in police departments when in a high speed chase or similar situation is to breath in and out on the slow count of four. This seems to abate or counter the effect of the adrenaline. It is all about the perceived threat. A low time pilot might feel more threatened than a high time pilot in a given situation, but any pilot can have this happen. The pilot will only be able to act on what they have been trained to do in that situation. If all they know is to fly a full pattern, then that is what they will do. The reasoning function can't work, so they can not run through other scenarios and choose the best one. This is why we have the saying, "in an emergency, pilots do not rise to the occasion, they revert to their training".
>
> I have never seen any of this information in any aviation manual. I have asked several prominent SSA members and instructors to research this and publish an article in SOARING. Complete silence. The problem just does not exist according to the powers that be.
>
> Brian Bange
On Wednesday, May 9, 2012 10:25:37 AM UTC-7, ppc...@charter.net wrote:
> On Wednesday, May 9, 2012 11:17:53 AM UTC-5, Ramy wrote:
> > Both are classic examples of tunnel vision we all may develope under stress. I'll go as far as claim that tunnel vision is one of the leading cause of accidents. I am sure most of us can identify a time they got tunnel vision due to stress and did not consider a better alternative even if there was no bad outcome. This is precisely why we need to speculate and learn from accidents so we can identify the problems and perhaps find a solution.
> >
> > Ramy
>
> Tunnel Vision is really an adrenaline dump. The individual suddenly realizes they are in trouble and the body dumps adrenaline into the bloodstream as a natural response. Tunnel vision, an inability to think or solve problems and blood moving to the internal organs are some of the results. I talked to the head of the psychiatric unit of the Houston Police Department about this and he enlightened me: the police know all about it and train their officers accordingly. We pilots refuse to acknowledge that we are susceptible and pay the price. The accepted practice in police departments when in a high speed chase or similar situation is to breath in and out on the slow count of four. This seems to abate or counter the effect of the adrenaline. It is all about the perceived threat. A low time pilot might feel more threatened than a high time pilot in a given situation, but any pilot can have this happen. The pilot will only be able to act on what they have been trained to do in that situation. If all they know is to fly a full pattern, then that is what they will do. The reasoning function can't work, so they can not run through other scenarios and choose the best one. This is why we have the saying, "in an emergency, pilots do not rise to the occasion, they revert to their training".
>
> I have never seen any of this information in any aviation manual. I have asked several prominent SSA members and instructors to research this and publish an article in SOARING. Complete silence. The problem just does not exist according to the powers that be.
>
> Brian Bange
Frank Whiteley
May 19, 2012, 8:09:03 PM5/19/12
to
Frank Whiteley
BruceGreeff
May 20, 2012, 5:49:39 AM5/20/12
to
All 19m Kestrels have the same control setup as far as I know. My Series
1 is the same as the 3 & 4 as far as airbrake and drag chute are
concerned. The only difference I am aware of is that there is only one
landing flap setting at 35 degrees.
Throw it all out and the landing point is going to be really close by.
Arguably, because the effect on the Kestrel glide path is so
"noticeable" when you deploy the landing flap, you could argue that the
primary glidepatnh control is the flaps. However, it is unwise to raise
the landing flap unless you have a lot of excess height. So glidepath
control is still finessed by means of the airbrakes, which are
reasonably effective. Ok - my standards may be low given that I the
previous toy was a Std Cirrus.
On 2012/05/20 2:09 AM, Frank Whiteley wrote:
> On Saturday, May 19, 2012 2:11:42 PM UTC-6, Martin Gregorie wrote:
>> On Sat, 19 May 2012 12:01:09 -0600, BobW wrote:
>>
>>> If you'll excuse the anality, I'll note the "hidden assumption" required
>>> to make your 2nd para above completely accurate (for readers who may be
>>> incompletely informed on glider flap capabilities and use). Hidden
>>> assumption: Martin's statement applies *only* to camber-changing flaps,
>>> and NOT to large-deflection landing flaps. These latter tend to be most
>>> common in the USA.
>>>
>> You're right: I should have spotted that.
>>
>>> Many gliders have both camber-changing flaps (which for landing patterns
>>> should be set to their maximum [smallish] deflection to obtain maximum
>>> reduction of stalling speed) AND airbrakes/spoilers (their primary
>>> glidepath control devices, and which should definitely NOT be "set and
>>> forget" devices [maybe unless one is landing in a perfect calm...]).
>>>
>> The only gliders on our field without airbrakes as a distinct control are
>> a pair of Kestrel 19s, a Mosquito and a Mini-Nimbus. All use moderate
>> flap deflection on landing combined with a raised flap LE for added drag.
>>
>> I haven't flown any of these types. The nearest I've come was an early
>> ASW-20 which, of course, has both large-deflection flaps and airbrakes.
>>
>>
>> --
>> martin@ | Martin Gregorie
>> gregorie. | Essex, UK
>> org |
>
> Kestrel 19's (at least series 3& 4) have airbrakes fairly aft on the chord. The inboard 1/2 span sections of the flaperons have a second handle to allow landing and ground launching deflections. One notch will add 200ft+ gain to a 4500ft winch run. This is about 14 degrees and is enough for most landings with a bit of headwind and airbrakes. Full inboard deflection is 35 degrees and adds significant lift and drag when landing.
>
> Frank Whiteley
--
Bruce Greeff
T59D #1771
1 is the same as the 3 & 4 as far as airbrake and drag chute are
concerned. The only difference I am aware of is that there is only one
landing flap setting at 35 degrees.
Throw it all out and the landing point is going to be really close by.
Arguably, because the effect on the Kestrel glide path is so
"noticeable" when you deploy the landing flap, you could argue that the
primary glidepatnh control is the flaps. However, it is unwise to raise
the landing flap unless you have a lot of excess height. So glidepath
control is still finessed by means of the airbrakes, which are
reasonably effective. Ok - my standards may be low given that I the
previous toy was a Std Cirrus.
On 2012/05/20 2:09 AM, Frank Whiteley wrote:
> On Saturday, May 19, 2012 2:11:42 PM UTC-6, Martin Gregorie wrote:
>> On Sat, 19 May 2012 12:01:09 -0600, BobW wrote:
>>
>>> If you'll excuse the anality, I'll note the "hidden assumption" required
>>> to make your 2nd para above completely accurate (for readers who may be
>>> incompletely informed on glider flap capabilities and use). Hidden
>>> assumption: Martin's statement applies *only* to camber-changing flaps,
>>> and NOT to large-deflection landing flaps. These latter tend to be most
>>> common in the USA.
>>>
>> You're right: I should have spotted that.
>>
>>> Many gliders have both camber-changing flaps (which for landing patterns
>>> should be set to their maximum [smallish] deflection to obtain maximum
>>> reduction of stalling speed) AND airbrakes/spoilers (their primary
>>> glidepath control devices, and which should definitely NOT be "set and
>>> forget" devices [maybe unless one is landing in a perfect calm...]).
>>>
>> The only gliders on our field without airbrakes as a distinct control are
>> a pair of Kestrel 19s, a Mosquito and a Mini-Nimbus. All use moderate
>> flap deflection on landing combined with a raised flap LE for added drag.
>>
>> I haven't flown any of these types. The nearest I've come was an early
>> ASW-20 which, of course, has both large-deflection flaps and airbrakes.
>>
>>
>> --
>> martin@ | Martin Gregorie
>> gregorie. | Essex, UK
>> org |
>
>
> Frank Whiteley
--
Bruce Greeff
T59D #1771
Martin Gregorie
May 20, 2012, 6:56:13 AM5/20/12
to
On Sat, 19 May 2012 17:09:03 -0700, Frank Whiteley wrote:
> Kestrel 19's (at least series 3 & 4) have airbrakes fairly aft on the
> chord. The inboard 1/2 span sections of the flaperons have a second
> handle to allow landing and ground launching deflections. One notch
> will add 200ft+ gain to a 4500ft winch run. This is about 14 degrees
> and is enough for most landings with a bit of headwind and airbrakes.
> Full inboard deflection is 35 degrees and adds significant lift and drag
> when landing.
>
Thanks for the correction. I thought the Kestrel wing was the same as the
> Kestrel 19's (at least series 3 & 4) have airbrakes fairly aft on the
> chord. The inboard 1/2 span sections of the flaperons have a second
> handle to allow landing and ground launching deflections. One notch
> will add 200ft+ gain to a 4500ft winch run. This is about 14 degrees
> and is enough for most landings with a bit of headwind and airbrakes.
> Full inboard deflection is 35 degrees and adds significant lift and drag
> when landing.
>
Mosquito/MiniNimbus wing despite the lever collection in the cockpit.
Frank Whiteley
May 20, 2012, 12:48:29 PM5/20/12
to
On Sunday, May 20, 2012 3:49:39 AM UTC-6, BruceGreeff wrote:
> All 19m Kestrels have the same control setup as far as I know. My Series
> 1 is the same as the 3 & 4 as far as airbrake and drag chute are
> concerned. The only difference I am aware of is that there is only one
> landing flap setting at 35 degrees.
>
> Throw it all out and the landing point is going to be really close by.
>
> Arguably, because the effect on the Kestrel glide path is so
> "noticeable" when you deploy the landing flap, you could argue that the
> primary glidepatnh control is the flaps. However, it is unwise to raise
> the landing flap unless you have a lot of excess height. So glidepath
> control is still finessed by means of the airbrakes, which are
> reasonably effective. Ok - my standards may be low given that I the
> previous toy was a Std Cirrus.
>
I didn't want to mention the raising of the 19's landing flaps once deployed because if starts a discussion about whether it can be done safely (in general, not specifically). In my discussions with other Kestrel 19 pilots, it has been suggested that dumping the landing flaps will cost about 150ft in altitude. My impression is that's a fair estimate, so as you say, have plenty of altitude in hand.
> All 19m Kestrels have the same control setup as far as I know. My Series
> 1 is the same as the 3 & 4 as far as airbrake and drag chute are
> concerned. The only difference I am aware of is that there is only one
> landing flap setting at 35 degrees.
>
> Throw it all out and the landing point is going to be really close by.
>
> Arguably, because the effect on the Kestrel glide path is so
> "noticeable" when you deploy the landing flap, you could argue that the
> primary glidepatnh control is the flaps. However, it is unwise to raise
> the landing flap unless you have a lot of excess height. So glidepath
> control is still finessed by means of the airbrakes, which are
> reasonably effective. Ok - my standards may be low given that I the
> previous toy was a Std Cirrus.
>
Ian Kennedy
May 20, 2012, 1:25:07 PM5/20/12
to
"BruceGreeff" wrote in message news:jpaenk$i87$1...@dont-email.me...
I quote from the Kestrel 19 Pilot Notes
" Approach and landing is possible in many configurations, the best being
with the flaps set to landing flap and +2
or landing flap and 0, using the not very effective airbrakes as a final
approach control"
Ian Kennedy
Kestrel 19 575.
And now owner of Kestrel 22 G BDWZ
Andrew
May 20, 2012, 8:25:12 PM5/20/12
to
about the statement "it is unwise to raise the landing flap unless
you have a lot of excess height":
one has to be careful doing this, but its safe to do this so long as
the nose is raised at the same time (to increase the angle of
attack and compensate the loss of lift otherwise produced by the
reduced flap setting). The glide angle flattens out and the
approach speed remains the same. I used to practice exactly this
in my Kestrel 19, at height, in case I ever needed to do it if a bad
undershoot developed on a real approach. I never had to do it for
real, but after practicing it, it was very comfortable. Its not
something normally taught, so it needs to be practiced well above
the ground initially. If the airspeed remains constant, its being
done right.
At 17:25 20 May 2012, Ian Kennedy wrote:
>
>"BruceGreeff" wrote in message news:jpaenk$i87$1@dont-
you have a lot of excess height":
one has to be careful doing this, but its safe to do this so long as
the nose is raised at the same time (to increase the angle of
attack and compensate the loss of lift otherwise produced by the
reduced flap setting). The glide angle flattens out and the
approach speed remains the same. I used to practice exactly this
in my Kestrel 19, at height, in case I ever needed to do it if a bad
undershoot developed on a real approach. I never had to do it for
real, but after practicing it, it was very comfortable. Its not
something normally taught, so it needs to be practiced well above
the ground initially. If the airspeed remains constant, its being
done right.
At 17:25 20 May 2012, Ian Kennedy wrote:
>
>"BruceGreeff" wrote in message news:jpaenk$i87$1@dont-
C-FFKQ (42)
May 22, 2012, 2:11:27 PM5/22/12
to
My Kestrel 19's airbrakes make some noise, but not much else. I get about 1 knot of sink out of the them. I rely on judicious setting of flaps and then finesse the glideslope with the airbrakes. If I'm much too high, the drogue comes out and I ride the express elevator to ground level.
Series 1 & 2 had a TI about cutting a notch in the landing flap lever for about 14 degrees of deflection. I don't know if this was factory-done for Series 3 and 4. This helps in take-off for towing and winching, plus for the initial part of the circuit.
-John
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